



## **WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0050 – Improper RWP – Rosslyn-Foggy Bottom-GWU stations – July 11, 2020**

*Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on October 20, 2020*

### **Safety event summary:**

A track inspection crew moving from Rosslyn Station to Foggy Bottom-GWU Station traversed an area that required a higher level of roadway worker protection (RWP) without asking for and being granted that higher level of protection.

Due to the layout of the tracks in this underground part of the system, there is the risk of a turbulent air vortex in the area between chain markers 109+00 and 94+00 when trains pass through. Therefore, Metrorail has identified that area in the RWP Manual's Track Access Guide as a hot spot that requires Foul Time protection due to the risk from the force of the air and inability to hear communications.

Foul Time protection involves the use of red signals and radio announcements by the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) to stop trains. This is a higher level of protection than the Advance Mobile Flagger (AMF) protection that is currently the minimum level of protection Metrorail allows. Under AMF protection, an AMF verbally warns each train operator at the station platform just before the train will encounter the work crew that the train operator must proceed at a lower speed and must be prepared to slow or stop when approaching the work crew.

In this case, the work crew indicated that this hot spot was identified in the job safety briefing, however no one on the work crew recognized when they entered the hot spot, and the crew continued its inspection without proper protection. Consequently, AMF protection was used to traverse an area that required Foul Time protection. A job safety briefing form was not provided.

When the crew reached Foggy Bottom-GWU Station and communicated their location to the ROCC, a ROCC controller recognized that there should have been Foul Time requested and that an RWP violation must have occurred.

The Roadway Worker In Charge (RWIC) said the crew may have been too focused on inspection work and lost situational awareness regarding their location on the tracks.

### **Probable Cause:**

The loss of both situational awareness and a focus on safety led to a work crew on the right of way without proper protection. Potentially contributing to this event was a lack of comprehensive training that effectively communicates the risks posed to personnel traversing hot spots that do not have restricted views so that everyone on the right of way understands the risks of "hot spots" such as those that are marked due to the risk of a turbulent air vortex.

### **Corrective Actions:**

The RWIC was retrained on RWP Level IV.

WMATA's Safety Department recommended internally that other departments install signage on the roadway to indicate where Foul Time protection is required, and recommended that an individual be specifically tasked with identifying hot spots during Track and Structures work. The WMSC is focused on ensuring that proper RWP procedures are carried out, and these are two options to assist in achieving that that WMATA should consider.

### **WMSC staff observations:**



The WMSC is concerned that despite a stated job safety briefing covering hot spots, no one in the work crew raised a concern about traversing a hot spot without Foul Time protection. This location is less obvious than others that require Foul Time because it has a clear view and the risk is an invisible vortex, which suggests that crews may frequently be relying on their eyes to identify Foul Time areas rather than the specific chain marker locations identified in job safety briefings.

Generally, the segment involved in this incident is not walked during revenue hours of service, and the RWIC may have been aware that had Foul Time been requested, the ROCC would have likely denied it. This may have influenced the RWIC to conduct the work without proper protection; however, there is no direct evidence of this.

Ensuring that Foul Time is requested and approved before traversing identified hot spots is critical to safety. This requires a clear understanding from workers of why hot spots are dangerous and why Foul Time is required as well as the associated attention to detail to get the required protection in place. Such understanding could be conveyed through a safety stand down or other training on the importance of getting Foul Time even in hot spots that have clear views.

**Staff recommendation:** Adopt final report.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety and Environmental  
Management (SAFE)

**FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E20249**

<b>Date of Event:</b>	7/11/2020
<b>Type of Event:</b>	Improper RWP
<b>Incident Time:</b>	09:49 hrs.
<b>Location:</b>	Rosslyn Station
<b>Time and How received by SAFE:</b>	09:53 hrs. SAFE On-Call Phone
<b>WMSC Notification Time:</b>	10:20 hrs.
<b>Responding Safety Officers:</b>	WMATA SAFE: No WMSC: No Other: N/A
<b>Rail Vehicle:</b>	None
<b>Injuries:</b>	None
<b>Damage:</b>	None
<b>Emergency Responders:</b>	N/A

# Rosslyn – Roadway Worker Protection Violation July 11, 2020

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AIMS</b>	Advanced Information Management System
<b>AMF</b>	Advanced Mobile Flagger
<b>ARS</b>	Audio Recording Service
<b>CM</b>	Chain Marker
<b>FT</b>	Foul Time
<b>MSRPH</b>	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures
<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
<b>ROCC</b>	Rail Operations Control Center
<b>RWIC</b>	Roadway Worker in Charge
<b>RWP</b>	Roadway Worker Protection
<b>RTC</b>	Rail Traffic Controller
<b>RTRA</b>	Office of Rail Transportation
<b>TRST</b>	Track and Structures

### **Executive Summary**

On Saturday, July 11, 2020, at approximately 09:15 hrs., a Track and Structure (TRST) employee standing by Rosslyn track 2 contacted the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) to request permission to enter the roadway in an attempt to perform a track inspection between Rosslyn and Smithsonian platform track 2 under Advanced Mobile Flagger (AMF) protection. Upon the initial request, the Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) notified ROCC that a safety briefing was performed and that all "hotspots" were identified. The RWIC stated their AMF was standing by Foggy Bottom track 2 to notify all incoming train traffic of personnel on the roadway between Rosslyn and Foggy Bottom.

After notifying all train operators of personnel on the roadway, ROCC gave permission to the RWIC to enter the roadway with an on-track time of 09:18; the RWIC was instructed to notify ROCC when safely on the platform at Foggy Bottom track 2. At approximately 09:46 hrs., the RWIC notified ROCC that all personnel and equipment were safely on the platform at Foggy Bottom Station, and requested to continue their track inspection to Farragut West, track 2. Upon notification that all personnel were clear of the roadway, ROCC requested the RWIC to contact them via landline.

The RWIC contacted ROCC on the telephone and spoke with the Button Rail Traffic Controller (RTC). The Button RTC then asked "if they were aware of the turbulent vortex between Rosslyn and Foggy Bottom Stations." The RWIC stated, "they were aware of the turbulent vortex and acknowledged that it is a Foul Time (FT) requirement between CM C2-109+00 to C2-094+00." The RWIC stated, "personnel had a clear view ahead and overlooked the FT request due to their attention being solely on the inspection." The RTC instructed the RWIC to remain at Foggy Bottom station and momentarily discontinue their inspection; the RTC notified the Assistant Superintendent of the roadway violation.

The RWIC and all personnel involved in the incident were given an incident time of 09:49 hrs., and subsequently removed from service for post-incident toxicology testing

The probable cause for the July 11, 2020, Rosslyn RWP violation was a lack of both situational awareness and safety focus by Metrorail employees, and a potential lack of comprehensive training to ensure that personnel on the right of way understand the risks of "hot spots" that are not due to restricted views.

Upon review of the identified hotspot covered in the safety briefing associated with the inspection area, the RWIC reported a clear view of trains in approach while on the roadway and forgot to request the proper protection from the turbulent air vortex in their work location.

Upon completion of data collected from systems of record and the results of interviews with staff, human factor failures occurred as a result of this incident. After the request to enter the roadway, the RWIC did not initiate FT protection between Chain Marker (CM) C2-109+00 and CM C2 94+00 in accordance with the RWP Quick Access.

As a result of its investigation, SAFE makes the following safety recommendation:

SAFE recommends signage on the roadway to indicate the CM where personnel walking on the mainline are to request FT protection and the CM where personnel should relinquish FT back to ROCC.

### **Incident Site**

Rosslyn Station, Track 2

FT Vortex Location: CM C2-109+00 and CM C2 94+00

### **Field Sketch/Schematics**



### **Purpose and Scope**

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

## **Investigation Process and Methods**

Upon receiving notification of the Roadway Worker Protection incident at Rosslyn Station on July 11, 2020, SAFE conducted a subsequent investigation.

### **Investigative Methods**

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Review of the Audio Recording System
- Formal Interviews – Two (2) individuals were interviewed as part of this investigation. Interviews included personnel that were directly involved in the incident. The following individuals were responsible for the process and law enforcement personnel. The following individuals were interviewed:
  - Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC)
  - Advanced Mobile Flagger (AMF)
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the course of the investigation to provide background and supporting information
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
  - Employee Training Procedures & Records
  - Certifications
  - MSRPH
  - Roadway Worker Protection Quick Access Guide 2018
  - 30-day work history review
  - Track and Structure maintenance records review
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
  - ARS Review [Radio, ambient, and Phone]

### **Investigation**

On Saturday, July 11, 2020, the TRST Unit contacted the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) at approximately 09:16 hrs., to request permission to perform a track inspection between Rosslyn and Smithsonian Stations, track 2. The Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) made the request from Rosslyn Station's platform utilizing Advanced Mobile Flagger (AMF) protection, with the AMF standing by Foggy Bottom Station, track 2 at the 8-car marker. The RWIC reported to ROCC that a safety briefing




was held, and all “Hot Spots” were identified. Announcements were made to notify all train operators prior to personnel entering the roadway. At approximately 09:46 hrs., the RWIC notified ROCC that all personnel and equipment were clear between Rosslyn and Foggy Bottom Stations, and requested to continue their track inspection to Farragut West, track 2. Upon notification that all personnel were clear of the roadway, ROCC requested the RWIC to contact them via landline. While conversing with the RWIC, ROCC Button Controller asked if they were aware of the turbulent vortex hot spot located between Rosslyn and Foggy Bottom Stations. The RWIC stated that they were aware of the foul time requirement between CM C2-109+00 to C2-094+00; the RWIC stated that personnel had a clear view of oncoming traffic ahead and contributed to their oversight; additionally, the RWIC stated that their attention was solely on the inspection which was also a contributing factor for not requesting FT. All personnel were instructed to contact their office and subsequently removed from service at 09:49 hrs.

**Chronological Timeline of Events**

Based on a review of Closed-Circuit Television, Audio Recording Services (ARS), SAFE determined the following sequence of events:

Time	
09:16 hrs.	RWIC requested permission to enter the roadway under AMF protection to perform a track inspection between Rosslyn and Smithsonian track 2. <i>"Requesting to do a track inspection between Rosslyn and Smithsonian, track 2. Using AMF as my protection. My AMF is set up at Foggy Bottom, track 2. Safety briefing complete and all hot spots indentified, over"</i>
09:18 hrs.	ROCC granted permission to RWIC to perform their track inspection and notify ROCC when personnel were safely on the platform at Foggy Bottom Station.
09:46 hrs.	RWIC reported that all personnel were safely on the platform at Foggy Bottom. ROCC requested that TRST contact them via landline.
09:48 hrs.	RWIC contacted ROCC and reported that he realized they did not request foul time due to the turbulent vortex stating that the foul time location “slipped their mind.”
09:49 hrs.	ROCC notified RWIC of their incident time, terminated the duration of their inspection and instructed them to landline their office.

## Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)



**Photo 1:** AIM shows no indication for FT protection. **Note:** The RWIC did not request FT protection and subsequently did not allow ROCC personnel to adequately provide the proper protection for personnel on the roadway.

### Interview Findings

Based on the investigation into the Rosslyn RWP violation event, SAFE conducted two (2) investigative interviews and identified the following key findings associated with this event, as follows:

TRST personnel had the RWP Manual on their person with access to confirm the “Hot Spot.” Upon completion of the Roadway Safety Job Briefing, personnel entered the roadway, the RWIC did not verify the “Hot Spot” to make the appropriate request to upgrade their form of protection to FT.

### Findings

- The roadway between Rosslyn and Foggy Bottom Stations has a FT requirement between CM-109+00 and CM-094+00 for Clear View: Turbulent Air Vortex.
- The roadway between Rosslyn and Foggy Bottom Stations has an area that does not require FT between CM-094+00 and CM-089+00 for restricted View: Curve.
- Additional personnel on the roadway acting as the advanced watchman lookout did not notice that personnel were in the Foul Time area due to looking for train traffic.

## **Weather**

At the time of the incident, the temperature was recorded at 92° F and clear. SAFE has concluded that weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC.)

## **Human Factors**

Fatigue

Based on SAFE interview question related to Fatigue Factors and review of all employees' 30-day work history, it was determined, employees' hours of service were in accordance with WMATA's Fatigue Risk Management Policy 10.6 and Hours of Service Limitations for Prevention of Fatigue Policy 10.7 and discounted Fatigue as a contributing factor for this event.

## **Post-Incident Testing**

RWIC and TRST personnel were removed from service and transported for post-incident analysis.

After reviewing all employee post-incident testing results, it was determined that the employees involved were not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7. 3/5, therefore, being under the influence of a controlled substance has been excluded as a contributing factor.

## **Probable Cause Statement**

The probable cause for the July 11, 2020, Rosslyn RWP violation was a lack of both situational awareness and safety focus by Metrorail employees, and a potential lack of comprehensive training to ensure that personnel on the right of way understand the risks of "hot spots" that are not due to restricted views.

Upon review of the identified hotspot during the daily safety briefing of the area where personnel would be walking, the RWIC reported a clear view of trains in approach while on the roadway and forgot to request the proper protection from the turbulent air vortex in their work location.

## **SAFE Recommendations**

As a result of this investigation, SAFE makes the following recommendations:

To Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), install signage on the roadway to indicate the CM where personnel walking on the mainline are to request Foul Time protection and the CM where personnel should relinquish Foul Time back to ROCC.

To TRST, designate personnel whose sole purpose is to identify “hot spots” on the roadway and to ensure that the RWIC makes the appropriate request for FT Protection.

## **Corrective Action**

- The Employee was required to retake RWP Level 4 class to begin 7-14-2020.

## Appendix A - Interview Summaries

### TRST

#### RWIC

A WMATA employee with seven (7) years of service as a Track Walker "D."

Based on SAFE interview, the RWIC reported that personnel were to perform a daily track inspection under AMF protection between Rosslyn and Smithsonian, with an AMF standing Foggy Bottom Station, track 2, to notify operators of personnel on the roadway. Prior to the track inspection, a Roadway Job Safety Briefing (JSB) was held with all personnel in a WMATA non-revenue vehicle before requesting permission to enter the roadway at Rosslyn Station's platform. The RWIC stated, "that during the RJSB, all "Hot Spots" were identified." The RWIC reported that after their request was made with ROCC, they received permission to begin their track inspection from Rosslyn to Foggy Bottom Stations, Track 2, under AMF protection.

Upon completion of the track inspection, the RWIC notified ROCC that they were safely on the platform at Foggy Bottom Station's platform. The RWIC then stated, "that they were informed of the Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) violation due to their failure to request foul time when traversing through an area that has a restricted view." The RWIC stated, "they had an oversight in the area due to their concentration on inspecting the track." The RWIC reported that they had a clear view allowing them to observe trains up to 1,000 feet away. The RWIC stated, "they were aware of the restricted view and that moving forward, they will make a personnel reminder of all hot spots in the area regardless of the view they may have on the roadway."

#### Advance Mobile Flagger

A WMATA employee with seven (7) months of service as a Track Walker "D."


Based on the interview, the AMF reported that the RWIC held a Safety Briefing in the WMATA non-revenue vehicle prior to arriving at the platform at Rosslyn Station. The AMF stated that the RWIC made all personnel aware of the "hot spot" before departing for the station. The AMF boarded a train and exited at Foggy Bottom Station, track 2, and set up at the 8-car marker. The AMF stated that they heard the RWIC request permission to enter the roadway. The AMF reported that it took the RWIC 30 minutes to clear the roadway from the inspection. While the AMF awaited a train to move to the next station, they were notified by the RWIC that they were being removed from service for an RWP violation, which was the failure to request FT while they were on the roadway in an area that had a restricted view.

## Appendix B – Track Access Guide

Attachment 1 – Initial Instructions on Utilizing the Track Access Guide Located Within the RWP Manual.

### Track Access Guide

In order to use this guide correctly, start by finding the train line you will work on. Next, find the chain markers for your work zone.

 A **RED** block signifies a Hot Spot on the system. Additional protection, Foul Time (FT) at a minimum, is required in these areas (see Example 1).

The last column on the train line chart is the Notes field. If special instructions or important information needs to be communicated, a Note number will populate this field. Refer to the Notes chart at the end of the train line chart for the information (see Example 2).

#### Example 1:

A Line Track 1					
A Line Track 1	Station	Station	Chain Marker	Chain Marker	Notes
Clear View	A-01	A-02	000+00	003+00	
<b>Metro Center Station</b>	<b>A-01</b>	<b>A-01</b>	<b>A 003+00</b>	<b>B 003+00</b>	
Clear View	A-01	A-02	003+00	012+00	

Attachment 2 – Track Access Guide displaying the Turbulent Air Vortex and associated Chain Markers that require Foul Time Protection.

<b>C Line Track 2</b>					
<b>Rosslyn Station</b>	<b>C-05</b>	<b>C-05</b>	<b>145+00</b>	<b>139+00</b>	
Restricted View: Curve	C-05	C-04	139+00	121+00	
Clear View	C-05	C-04	121+00	109+00	
Clear View: Turbulent Air Vortex	C-05	C-04	109+00	094+00	
Restricted View: Curve	C-05	C-04	094+00	089+00	
Clear View	C-05	C-04	089+00	074+00	
<b>Foggy Bottom Station</b>	<b>C-04</b>	<b>C-04</b>	<b>074+00</b>	<b>068+00</b>	
Clear View: Interlocking	C-04	C-03	068+00	064+00	
Restricted View: Curve	C-04	C-03	064+00	047+00	

## Appendix C – Rail Job Safety Brief Form

Attachment 1 – Rail Job Safety Briefing Form page 1 of 2

WMATA ROADWAY JOB SAFETY BRIEFING FORM			
DATE: _____		TRACK TIME ON/OFF: ____ / ____	
RWIC NAME: _____		CALL#: _____	EMPLOYEE #: _____
RWIC's CELL PHONE NUMBER: _____		RADIO OPS CHANNEL: _____	
<b>SAFETY RULE OF THE DAY</b> _____			
WORK ASSIGNMENT _____		DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC: INBOUND <input type="checkbox"/> OUTBOUND <input type="checkbox"/>	
RAIL LINE: <b>A B C D E F G J K L N</b>		TRACK 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 ___	WORK LIMITS CHAIN MARKER(S): _____
PLACE OF SAFETY: _____			
TYPE OF PROTECTION(S): IT _____ ETO AUTHORITY _____ ETO LOCAL SIGNAL _____ TAW/AMF _____ FT _____			
REQUEST FROM ROCC: BLOCK CALLS <input type="checkbox"/>		CANCEL AUTOMATIC SIGNALS <input type="checkbox"/>	PROHIBIT EXITS <input type="checkbox"/>
RED HOT SPOT(S) TYPE/LOCATION(S): <input type="checkbox"/>		RED HOT SPOT HAZARDS <input type="checkbox"/>	ETS/RADIO OUTAGE <input type="checkbox"/>
<b><u>FOUL TIME PROTECTION CAN BE REQUESTED IN ALL WORK ZONE CONFIGURATIONS</u></b>			
POWER OUTAGE: LOCK OUT TAG OUT _____ RED TAG _____ SUPERVISORY _____ NO POWER OUTAGE _____			
RED TAG NUMBER: _____		RED TAG HOLDER: _____	
WATCHMAN/LOOKOUT ASSIGNED: Yes ___ No ___ WATCHMAN/LOOKOUT NAMES(S): _____			
WATCHMAN/LOOKOUT EQUIPPED WITH "W" WARNING DISC, AIR HORN AND WHISTLE (required for fixed work zones): <input type="checkbox"/>			
<b><u>WATCHMAN/LOOKOUT MUST BE PROPERLY SPACED AND HAVE SUFFICIENT SIGHTING DISTANCE TO PROVIDE AMPLE WARNING</u></b>			
ADVANCE MOBILE FLAGGER ASSIGNED: Yes ___ No ___ ADVANCE MOBILE FLAGGER CALL #(S): _____			
ADVANCE MOBILE FLAGGER EQUIPPED WITH AMBER LANTERNS/E-FLARES, ORANGE FLAG, AIR HORN, WHISTLE AND RADIO: <input type="checkbox"/>			
PIGGY BACK GANG LEADER CALL # (S): _____		PIGGY BACK WORK ZONE CM(S): _____	
PIGGY BACK WORK ASSIGNMENT: _____			
NUMBER OF RMM(S): _____		RMM OPERATIONS IN WORK ZONE: _____	
<b>ALL ROADWAY WORKERS MUST EXERCISE GOOD JUDGEMENT AND CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND PROCEDURES BEFORE ENTERING THE ROADWAY:</b>			
WEATHER CONDITIONS <input type="checkbox"/>	TRIPPING HAZARDS / UNEVEN WALKING SURFACES <input type="checkbox"/>		
TRACK GRADE AND VISIBILITY <input type="checkbox"/>	POOR LIGHTING / TUNNEL AND VENT SHAFT(S) <input type="checkbox"/>		
HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH RAIL VEHICLE MOVEMENT <input type="checkbox"/>	TRAIN / CURVE SPEED(S) <input type="checkbox"/>		
WORK SITE CONDITIONS AND ACTIVITIES <input type="checkbox"/>	ETS BOX (S) LOCATIONS <input type="checkbox"/>		
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES <input type="checkbox"/>	EQUIPMENT AND TOOL SAFETY <input type="checkbox"/>		
ADJACENT TRACK PROTECTION <input type="checkbox"/>	ROTATION AND RELIEF PROCEDURES <input type="checkbox"/>		
Rv. 1 WMATA Roadway Job Safety Briefing Form, Date: May 2018			

Attachment 1 – Rail Job Safety Briefing Form page 2 of 2



WMATA ROADWAY JOB SAFETY BRIEFING FORM

**ROADWAY WORKERS HAVE THE RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO INITIATE A GOOD FAITH CHALLENGE WHEN NECESSARY.**

Inspect PPE  Inspect RWP Card(s)  Inspect Radio(s) Certification Due Date  Perform Radio Check(s)

ROADWAY WORKER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I understand and agree with all aspects of the Roadway Job Safety Briefing I just received. I feel I am adequately protected from any train movement or roadway hazards. I understand I have a responsibility to conduct myself in a safe manner at all times.

Roadway Worker Signature	Employee/Contractor ID#	Crew Leader(s) Signature/ID#	Radio Call #

RWIC COMMENTS:

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

RWIC SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE/TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

RELIEVING RWIC: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE/TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

GOOD FAITH CHALLENGE INFORMATION		
EMPLOYEE(s) NAME: _____	EMPLOYEE(s) # _____	DATE/TIME: _____
RWP ISSUE(s): _____		ISSUE(s) RESOLVED: Yes ___ No ___

Rv. 1 WMATA Roadway Job Safety Briefing Form, Date: May 2018