



**WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0062 – Improper Roadway Worker Protection
Anacostia Interlocking – September 9, 2020**

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on March 2, 2021

Safety event summary:

Rail Operations Control Center personnel provided conflicting instructions to an ATC work crew and did not share information within the ROCC, which led to an ATC work crew that had been granted Exclusive Track Occupancy (ETO) protection and local signal control being directed to clear the roadway as they were completing a scheduled interlocking inspection.

The ROCC lost radio contact with the Automatic Train Control Maintenance crew that had been granted permission to perform an interlocking inspection at the Anacostia Station Interlocking just after 10 a.m. on September 9, 2020.

Radio communications attempts to this crew were made at approximately 10:25 a.m., several minutes after the AIM system indicated that switches were out of correspondence with a revenue train holding at a red signal at the station platform. The ROCC controllers were aware of these communications issues in real time, which were related to attempted ROCC radio transmissions not being heard by personnel in the field.

The ROCC Button Controller stated in an interview that they attempted to set signals and adjust switches that were indicating out of correspondence despite local control of the panel as part of ETO protection for the ATCM crew.

A third ROCC controller decided to come over to the OPS 3 console, and then to answer a phone call from the RWIC without coordinating with the Button Controller. In an interview, the third controller stated they did provide information to the radio controller.

Following the ROCC's inability to communicate on the OPS 3 radio, the two ROCC controllers conducted separate phone communications with 1) the Roadway Worker In Charge (RWIC) and 2) the work crew member operating the Local Control Panel in the train control room as part of the crew's exclusive track occupancy (ETO) form of roadway worker protection (RWP).

The Local Control Panel operator spoke to the Button Controller and maintained local control of the panel. The RWIC spoke on the phone to a separate, third controller who requested that the crew clamp the interlocking in the normal position. The RWIC stated that the interlocking was clamped in the normal position already, and that personnel were clear of train movement.

The additional controller stated to the RWIC that there was a clearing time of 10:30 a.m., however did not attempt to have the work crew relinquish local control of the panel. The Button Controller spoke to the Local Control Panel Operator at 10:32 a.m. who said that the RWIC and other personnel were at the interlocking clear of train movement.

Radio recordings indicate that communications were restored at 10:46 a.m.

At 11:01 a.m., the additional controller that had joined radio and button controller on the Ops 3 desk contacted the Local Control Panel operator to request adjustments to the signals. The panel operator relayed that the work crew had not yet completed their inspection and were putting covers back on the switches. The additional controller stated that the work crew was supposed to be clear, due to that controller's prior statement of a clearing time, and directed the



work crew to exit the roadway. The additional controller and Button Controller had not exchanged information about their conflicting calls and conflicting instructions provided to the ATCM crew.

WMATA removed the ATC crew from service for post event testing but did not remove the ROCC staff involved in this event.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was the lack of management oversight in the ROCC and the lack of clear communication and communications processes within the Rail Operations Control Center, including the lack of procedures and processes to govern communications, operations and protections.

Corrective Actions:

The Rail Operations Control Center developed a "Lessons Learned" document related to communication within the ROCC and with personnel in the field, and actions to take when there are radio communications challenges.

ATCM also provided RWP refresher training to the RWIC.

WMSC staff observations:

This event occurred just after the WMSC issued its ROCC Audit report, which includes a number of required corrective actions that can help partly address the lead up to this event, and the follow up where ROCC management did not remove personnel from service.

Staff recommendation: Adopt final report.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety and Environmental
Management (SAFE)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I 20341

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Date of Event: | 9/9/2020 |
| Type of Event: | Improper Roadway Worker Protection |
| Incident Time: | 11:22 hrs. |
| Location: | Anacostia Interlocking |
| Time and How received by SAFE: | 13:01 hrs. SAFE On-call Phone |
| WMSC Notification Time: | 13:23 hrs. |
| Responding Safety Officers: | WMATA SAFE: No WMSC: No Other: N/A |
| Rail Vehicle: | None |
| Injuries: | None |
| Damage: | None |
| Emergency Responders: | N/A |

Anacostia Station – Improper RWP

September 9, 2020

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|--------------|---|
| AIMS | Advanced Information Management System |
| ARS | Audio Recording Service |
| ATC | Automatic Train Control |
| ATCM | Automatic Train Control Maintenance |
| ETO | Exclusive Track Occupancy |
| MSRPH | Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook |
| NOAA | National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration |
| ROCC | Rail Operations Control Center |
| RTC | Rail Traffic Controller |
| RTRA | Office of Rail Transportation |
| RWIC | Roadway Worker In Charge |
| RWP | Roadway Worker Protection |
| SAFE | Department of Safety & Environmental Management |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedures |
| TCR | Train Control Room |
| WMATA | Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority |

Executive Summary

On Wednesday, September 9, 2020, Automatic Train Control Maintenance (ATCM) conducted an interlocking inspection at Anacostia Station, utilizing Exclusive Track Occupancy (ETO) protection at approximately 10:00 hrs. The Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) granted ATCM permission to perform their interlocking inspection at 10:01 hrs. At 10:20 hrs., Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) displayed that F06 1A/B switches were out of correspondence in the normal position with a revenue train holding outside of F06-08 signal red. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) began to experience radio communication issues from personnel in the field. At 10:26 hrs., the Button RTC attempted to contact the Train Control Room (TCR) trying to have ATCM on the panel to go direct to the Roadway Worker In Charge (RWIC) due to the inability to communicate via Radio.

At 10:30 hrs., an additional RTC working on the console spoke with the RWIC at Anacostia Station via landline and reported the radio communication issues to the RWIC and requested Anacostia Station interlocking be clamped normal for train movement. The RWIC stated that the interlocking was currently clamped; the RTC ascertained if personnel were clear of the roadway, the RWIC reported that they were clear, and the RTC gave them a clearing time of 10:30 hrs. At approximately 10:32 hrs. the Button RTC contacted the TCR to ascertain if Anacostia Station interlocking was clamped as well as if the RWIC and all personnel were clear of the roadway. ATCM Employee in the TCR reported that the RWIC was still in the interlocking, and all personnel were standing by standing clear for train movement.

At 10:46 hrs., ROCC regained radio communications and were able to transmit and receive to personnel in the field. At 11:01 hrs., the additional RTC on the console assisting the Button RTC and the Radio RTC contacted the TCR and requested a fletted signal on Track 1 and Track 2 at Anacostia interlocking. The ATCM on the panel reported that the RWIC and personnel remained at the interlocking and placed clamps on the interlocking switches. The Radio RTC notified the RWIC clearing time was 10:30 hrs. and instructed ATCM personnel to clear the roadway immediately. ROCC notified SAFE to report the incident, and subsequently, all personnel were removed from service and transported for post-incident analysis.

The probable cause of the Improper Roadway Worker Protection incident was a breakdown in communication between the Button RTC, the additional RTC on the console for assistance, and the Local Control Panel Operator in the TCR. The Button RTC failed

to report to the additional RTC that a conversation with the Local Control Panel Operator had taken place and they stated that the RWIC and personnel were on the roadway clear of train movement and still in the immediate area of the interlocking. Additionally, ATCM acknowledged the instruction for personnel to clear the roadway with a clearing time of 10:30 hrs.; however, ATCM was under the impression to stand by and stand clear of the train movement. The Button RTC did not relay to the additional RTC or the Radio RTC that ATCM remained in the interlocking.

SAFE determined after ATCM personnel accessed the roadway without permission from ROCC to continue their interlocking inspection. The RWIC was not in compliance with the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) Roadway Worker Protection, section 19.4.6, which states, *"Personnel requiring access rights are responsible for advising ROCC of their work areas, and after approval by ROCC, monitoring the appropriate radio frequencies during access."*

As a result of this investigation, SAFE makes the following recommendations:

To ROCC, provide Lessons Learned detailing the Improper Roadway Worker Protection events that provide effective communication with personnel in the field and within ROCC.


To ROCC, provide a train pickup during radio communication issues to ensure personnel UfY removed from the roadway.

To ATCM, provide re-training for RWIC in Level-4 procedures before assuming duties as an RWIC.

Incident Site

Anacostia Station Interlocking, Tracks 1 and 2.

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigation Process and Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Improper Roadway Worker Protection incident at Anacostia Station on September 9, 2020, SAFE launched a cross-functional investigation into this event. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed four individuals as part of this investigation. Interviews will include persons present during and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process. SAFE interviewed the following individuals:
 - RWIC
 - Local Control Panel Operator
 - Button RTC
 - RTC
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information

- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Employee Training Procedures & Records
 - Certifications
 - The 30-Day work history review
 - MSRPH
 - National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data review

- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback (Radio and Phone Communications)
 - AIMS (Advanced Information Management System)

Investigation

On Wednesday, September 9, 2020, at approximately 10:00 hrs., ATCM Roadway Worker In Charge (RWIC) contacted the ROCC and requested permission to perform an interlocking inspection at Anacostia Station utilizing ETO. The RWIC further noted that two additional personnel reported to Anacostia interlocking with one crew member on the Local Control Panel in the Train Control Room (TCR). The Radio RTC granted the RWIC permission to assume local control of Anacostia interlocking and perform their interlocking inspection at 10:01 hrs.

At 10:20 hrs., AIMS indicated that F06 1A/B switches were out of correspondence in the normal position with revenue train ID 507 holding at F06-08 signal red. At approximately 10:26 hrs., the Radio RTC attempted to contact the RWIC on Ops 3 with three transmissions to no avail. The Radio RTC appeared to have the ability to transmit over the Radio; however, personnel in the field were unable to receive any transmissions. At 10:27 hrs., the Button RTC contacted the Train Control Room (TCR) to ascertain if the Local Control Panel Operator can transmit directly to the RWIC at the interlocking due to the revenue train holding at a red signal outside the interlocking. At 10:30 hrs., the Radio RTC continued to experience issues of the Radio failing to communicate with personnel in the field.

The Button RTC contacted the Local Control Panel Operator in the TCR, who reported no radio communications with the RWIC located at the Anacostia interlocking and would continue to attempt to make radio contact with the RWIC. At 10:30 hours, the RWIC contacted ROCC via ETS box and spoke with an additional RTC that helped the Button RTC and the Radio RTC on the console. The additional RTC reported to the RWIC that due to ROCC

having no radio communication, they requested that the RWIC clamp Anacostia interlocking normal due to switch 1A showing out correspondence. The RWIC stated that Anacostia interlocking was clamped, the RTC ascertained if the RWIC and personnel were clear of the roadway, and the RWIC confirmed that personnel were clear and given a clearing time of 10:30 hrs.

At 10:32 hrs., the Button RTC contacted the TCR to ascertain if the RWIC and personnel were clear from the roadway. The Local Control Panel Operator reported that the RWIC and personnel clamped Anacostia interlocking normal and were still in the interlocking standing clear of train movement. At 10:46 hrs., radio communications were restored in the ROCC, and the Radio RTC regained the ability to transmit and receive. At Approximately 11:01 hrs., the additional RTC assisting the Button RTC and the Radio RTC contacted the TCR and requested a fledged signal on Tracks 1 and 2. The Local Control Panel Operator stated that the RWIC was still in the interlocking and that they were placing covers back on the switches in the interlocking. The RTC stated that the RWIC was given a clearing time of 10:30 hrs. and instructed the Local Control Panel Operator to have the RWIC and personnel in the interlocking to clear the roadway immediately. Subsequently, ATC personnel were removed from the roadway and transported for post-incident analysis. There were no injuries or equipment damage reported as a result of this incident.

SAFE determined that the Button RTC failed to report to the additional RTC that the conversation with the Local Control Panel Operator stated that the RWIC and personnel were clear of train movement and that they were still in the interlocking. Additionally, ATCM acknowledged the instruction for personnel to clear the roadway with a clearing time of 10:30 hrs.; however, ATCM was under the impression to stand by and stand clear of the train movement. The Button RTC did not relay to the additional RTC or the Radio RTC that ATCM remained in the interlocking.

Based on SAFE's findings, the cause of the Improper Roadway Protection incident was a miscommunication between the RWIC, the Button RTC, and the additional RTC aiding on the console.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

| | |
|----------------|--|
| 10:00:00 hrs. | ATCM personnel requested to perform an interlocking inspection utilizing ETO protection. [Radio] |
| 10:01:07 hrs. | ROCC granted permission to the RWIC to perform their interlocking inspection utilizing ETO protection. [Radio] |
| 10:20:32 hrs. | AIMS displayed F06 1A/B switches out of correspondence in the normal position with a revenue train holding outside of F06-08 signal red. [AIM] |
| 10:26:05 hrs. | Radio RTC makes three attempts to contact the RWIC at Anacostia Station to no avail. [Ambient] |
| 10:27:10 hrs. | Button RTC land lined the MOC desk to ascertain if the MOC specialist can contact the RWIC and notify them that a revenue train is holding at a red signal outside of Anacostia interlocking. [Phone Recording] |
| 10:28: 03 hrs. | Button controller contacted ATCM on the control panel in the TCR and states that a revenue train is holding outside of the F06-08 signal. ATCM stated that personnel in the field were experiencing radio communications issues and could not make adjustments to the interlocking due to the ineffective Radio and would continue attempting to contact the RWIC. [Phone Recording] |
| 10:30:00 hrs. | The RWIC contacted ROCC via ETS Box and spoke with an additional RTC assisting the Button RTC and the Radio RTC. The RTC ascertained if the Anacostia interlocking was clamped, and the RWIC advised the RTC that the interlocking was clamped normal. The RTC asked if the RWIC and personnel were clear of the roadway, and the RWIC responded that they were; the RTC copied and gave the RWIC a clearing time of 10:30hrs. [Phone Recording] |
| 10:32:14 hrs. | The Button RTC contacted the TCR to confirm if the RWIC and personnel were clear of the roadway. The ATCM stated that the RWIC remained at the interlocking at Anacostia and stood by and stood clear for train movement. [Phone Recording] |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| 10:46:24 hrs. | Radio communications were restored between the ROCC and personnel in the field. [Radio] |
| 11:01:30 hrs. | The additional RTC assisting the Radio Controller and the Button Controller contacted the TCR and requested a fledted signal at Anacostia on Tracks 1 and 2. The ATCM stated that the RWIC was still in the interlocking, placing covers over the switches in the interlocking. The RTC instructed all personnel to clear the roadway immediately. [Phone Recording] |

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Photo 1: AIMS indication shows F06 1A/B switches of correspondence with F06-08 signal red.

Interview Findings

Based on the investigation into the Anacostia Improper Roadway Worker Protection event, SAFE conducted four (4) investigative interviews and identified the following key findings associated with this event, as follows:

At the time of the incident, ROCC had an additional RTC that was on the console assisting the Button RTC and the Radio RTC. The additional RTC received a call via landline from the RWIC that stated the Anacostia interlocking was clamped normal. The RTC notified the RWIC that ROCC was experiencing radio communication issues; the RTC ascertained that the RWIC was clear of the roadway with a clearing time of 10:30hrs. The RWIC was under the impression that they were requested to standby and stand clear for the train movement. The Button RTC contacted the TCR and was notified that the RWIC remained in the interlocking and was standing by and standing clear for train movement. At no point did Button RTC have ATCM relinquish the panel back to ROCC to close the loop verifying all personnel were clear of the roadway when utilizing ETO protection.

ROCC personnel did not attempt to have any revenue trains traversing through the interlocking pick up the RWIC in the interlocking to confirm no personnel was on the roadway.

Findings

- The Button RTC did not relay information to the additional RTC or the Radio RTC that ATCM on panel reported that the RWIC and personnel were still in the interlocking after telling all personnel was clear.

Weather

At the time of the incident, National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recorded the at 88° F, with no visibility restrictions. SAFE has concluded that weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC.)

Human Factors

Fatigue

Based on SAFE interview question related to Fatigue Factors and review of all employees' 30-day work history, SAFE determined, employees' hours of service were in accordance with WMATA's *Fatigue Risk Management Policy 10.6* and *Hours of Service Limitations for Prevention of Fatigue Policy 10.7* and discounted Fatigue as a contributing factor for this event.

Post-Incident Toxicological Testing

After reviewing all ATCM employee post-incident testing results, SAFE determined that the employees involved were not violating the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7. 3/5, therefore, being under the influence of a controlled substance has been excluded as a contributing factor.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Improper Roadway Worker Protection incident on September 9, 2020, was a breakdown in communication between the Button RTC, the additional RTC on the console for assistance, and ATCM personnel in the TCR on the panel. The Button RTC failed to report to the additional RTC that a conversation with the Local Control Panel Operator had taken place and that the Local Control Panel Operator stated that the RWIC and personnel were on the roadway, clear of train movement and still in the immediate area of the interlocking. Additionally, ATCM acknowledged the instruction for personnel to clear the roadway with a clearing time of 10:30 hrs.; however, ATCM was under the impression to stand by and stand clear of the train movement. The Button RTC did not relay to the additional RTC or the Radio RTC that ATCM remained in the interlocking.

SAFE Recommendations

As a result of this investigation, SAFE makes the following recommendations:

To ROCC, provide a Lessons Learned detailing the events of the Improper Roadway Worker Protection that provides effective communication with personnel in the field and within ROCC.

To ROCC, provide a train pickup during radio communication issues to ensure personnel are removed from the roadway.

To ATCM, provide re-training for in Level-4 procedures before assuming duties as an RWIC.

Appendix A Interview Summaries

Interviews

Automatic Train Control Maintenance

RWIC

The ATCM acting as an RWIC is a WMATA employee with nineteen (19) years of experience as an ATC "C" Mechanic.

Based on the SAFE interview, the RWIC stated that they were conducting preventative switch maintenance at Anacostia interlocking with a crew member stationed in the TCR to set routes for train movement. The RWIC reported that while personnel were working on the switches in the interlocking, after troubleshooting efforts, personnel clamped the interlocking normal due to trains holding outside of the interlocking. Upon the interlocking being clamped normal, the RWIC relayed information to ATCM on the panel that personnel was standing by and standing clear for train movement. The RWIC stated that they contacted ROCC via landline and reported that the interlocking was clamped normal and that ATCM personnel was standing by and standing clear for train movement. The RWIC said that trains traversed the interlocking passing red signals. After trains passed the interlocking, the RWIC reported that personnel went back out to the interlocking to troubleshoot the switches. The RWIC said that while personnel was in the interlocking, they received a call from the TCR to clear the roadway; the RWIC and all personnel kept the interlocking clamped before exiting the roadway. The RWIC reported that they maintained radio communications with ATCM personnel on the TCR panel utilized a talk around channel with no communication issues. The RWIC stated that they did not hear the ROCC attempting to contact them on the Radio. The RWIC reported that they did not recall anyone from ROCC notifying them that the ROCC was having radio communication issues with personnel in the field. The RWIC stated that they contacted ROCC via Electronic Telephone System (ETS) and informed ROCC the Anacostia interlocking was clamped normal. However, they did not recall the ROCC notifying them of any radio communications issues; they reported that they notified the ROCC personnel were standing by standing clear. After all of the trains cleared the interlocking, all personnel entered the roadway to continue the interlocking inspection.

ATC "B" Mechanic/Local Control Panel Operator

The ATC B Mechanic is a WMATA employee with nine (9) years of experience as an ATC "B" mechanic.

Based on the SAFE interview, the ATC mechanic reported that the RWIC requested to enter the roadway to perform switch obstruction preventative maintenance at Anacostia interlocking under ETO protection. The ATC mechanic was operating the duties setting routes for train movement in the interlocking. The ATC mechanic reported that while the RWIC was performing maintenance in the interlocking, switches went out of correspondence. The ATC mechanic noticed a revenue train in approach to Anacostia interlocking when the switches went out of correspondence and notified the RWIC of switch indication from the panel screen. The ATC mechanic reported that they could not establish routes due to the interlocking showing out of correspondence, and the RWIC and personnel on the roadway proceeded to clamp the interlocking in a normal position. The ATC mechanic reported that they received an initial phone call from ROCC requesting they contact the RWIC due to the revenue train holding on the platform. The ATC mechanic stated that ROCC had lost all communication on Ops 3. The RWIC then called ROCC via landline to notify them that ATCM personnel clamped the Anacostia interlocking in a normal position. The ATC mechanic additionally stated that ROCC had revenue trains contact ROCC via ETS phone to receive permission to pass red signals at Anacostia interlocking. Prior to revenue trains passing red signals at Anacostia, the ATC mechanic reported that they received a phone call from an RTC that attempted to ascertain if the RWIC and personnel were clear of the roadway; the RWIC notified ROCC that they did not believe they were clear of the roadway and contacted the RWIC for verification. The ATC mechanic stated that the ATCM personnel he spoke with reported that the interlocking was clamped and that personnel were clear of train movement. The ATC said after four trains traversed the interlocking, the RWIC re-entered the roadway to continue maintenance on the interlocking. The ATC mechanic stated that a different RTC contacted them and requested fletted signals in the interlocking. The RTC was informed that the RWIC was still in the interlocking troubleshooting. The RTC instructed the ATC mechanic to contact the RWIC and was adamant about having personnel clear the roadway. The ATC mechanic reported that at no time did anyone in the ROCC request that they relinquish the control panel at Anacostia, and they held control of the panel the entire time of the incident. The ATC mechanic stated that at no point did they lose radio communication with the RWIC and ATC personnel used a "Talk Around" channel.

Rail Operations Control Center

Button RTC

The Buttons RTC is a WMATA employee for 18 years with five (5) years of experience as an RTC and thirteen (13) years in various positions including Bus Operator, Train Operator, and Interlocking Operator.

Based on the SAFE interview, the Button RTC reported that ATCM personnel requested to enter the roadway to perform an interlocking inspection. The Button RTC stated that while ATCM personnel were in the roadway, they believed the work that was being conducted in the interlocking caused the interlocking to go out of correspondence. A revenue train began to hold outside the interlocking. The Button RTC reported that they began to experience radio communication issues where personnel in the field could not hear ROCC communications. The Button RTC stated that after several attempts to restore the interlocking, they contacted the Local Control Panel Operator to contact the RWIC and request personnel in the field to clamp the interlocking normal to allow trains to traverse the interlocking. The Button RTC reported that when the interlocking was clamped, trains passed F06-08 signal red. The Button RTC contacted the TCR again and asked the Local Control Panel Operator if ATCM personnel were clear of the roadway. The Local Control Panel Operator stated that ATCM personnel were standing by standing clear at the interlocking. The Button RTC noted that an additional RTC on the console spoke with ATCM personnel on the phone, but they were unaware that ATCM personnel were given a clearing time. The Button RTC reported that when they spoke with the Local Control Panel Operator in the TCR. The Buttons RTC said ATCM personnel stated they were standing by, standing clear of the interlocking. The Button RTC was under the impression that the instructions to the RWIC were to standby and stand clear of the interlocking and assumed they were following the instructions given to them from the additional RTC on the console.

Additional RTC

This RTC is a WMATA employee for 16 years with seven (7) years of experience as an RTC and nine (9) years in various positions including car cleaner and Track Inspector.

The RTC reported that they were in the performance of an As Directed RTC due to testing procedures that were being conducted on the Silver Line console. The RTC said that they observed that OPS 3 was having an issue on the console. The RTC stated that ATCM personnel were in the interlocking performing switch preventative maintenance, and the interlocking went out of correspondence. The RTC reported that the RWIC stated that Anacostia interlocking was clamped normal; the RTC

ascertained if all personnel and equipment were clear, and the RWIC confirmed that they were clear. The RTC instructed the RWIC not to re-enter the roadway due to radio communication issues and issued the RWIC a clearing time. The RTC stated that they relayed information to the Radio RTC that personnel in the interlocking were clear and that the Radio RTC can allow trains to pass F06-08 signal red. The RTC stated that they did not know if the RWIC relayed the clearing time to the Local Control Panel Operator. The RTC noted that the AIMS screen indicated that Anacostia interlocking switches were displayed in correspondence. The RTC contacted the Local Control Panel Operator to request a lunar at the F06-08 signal at that time. The Local Control Panel Operator stated that they wanted to make sure personnel in the field were clear of the interlocking. The RTC instructed all personnel to clear the interlocking and reported the incident to the ROCC Assistant Superintendent.