

**WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0098 – Improper Roadway Worker Protection – L’Enfant Plaza Station – January 25, 2021**

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on August 3, 2021

Safety event summary:

Metrorail directed contractors with no roadway worker protection (RWP) training and without proper personal protective equipment to enter the roadway, contrary to Metrorail's RWP procedures, to clean up debris from a restroom demolition project on the mezzanine level of the L’Enfant Plaza Station. This restroom sits above the tracks, so demolition work would cause debris to fall onto the roadway. This risk of fouling the roadway meant that protections were required on the tracks to ensure no rail vehicle movement occurred.

The Plant Maintenance General Equipment Mechanic AA acting as a Roadway Worker In-Charge (RWIC) who was directed by a Plant Maintenance Supervisor to allow the three contractors onto the roadway did not have the details of the scheduled work from the General Orders and Track Rights System (GOTRS), and was only provided with a text message from a supervisor with the work location. The GOTRS system is used by field personnel and reviewed by the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) to schedule and complete track work and includes work requests, approvals and approved forms of protection. In an interview, the RWIC said they had been provided only this limited GOTRS information via text on a regular basis, and that despite serving as a RWIC for approximately six years, they did not have access to the GOTRS system.

Plant Maintenance personnel specified in the GOTRS request were not at the station to conduct the scheduled work. Instead, the RWIC brought three contractors onto the roadway to conduct the work. The RWIC stated in an interview that they had been assigned to the job as an escort for any cleanup efforts necessary following restroom demolition work. Metrorail employees do not require escorts.

The RWIC did not properly set up the work zone. The RWIC only installed shunts (which electrically connect the running rails to indicate that the track is occupied) and lights that were not placed sufficiently outside of the working area. The RWIC did not place “end work area” mats or Warning Strobe and Alarm Devices (WSADs) that provide warning if third rail power is inadvertently re-energized. The RWIC did not wear a hard hat as required on the roadway.

The Plant Maintenance Supervisor on site overseeing the demolition work, who directed the RWIC to have these contractors conduct this cleanup on the roadway, did not identify or raise any issues with the improperly equipped RWIC or contractors, or with the untrained contractors being on the roadway without approval. The contractors were wearing yellow vests without a required reflective “X” pattern on the back. Metrorail requires that contractors wear orange vests and that all personnel on the roadway have a reflective “X” pattern on the back of their vest. A fourth contractor who was not wearing required personal protective equipment carried bags of debris away from the work area via the station platform.

A Plant Maintenance Superintendent asked the Supervisor to provide information about the work that had been conducted. During that discussion in another part of the station, the Supervisor disclosed to the Superintendent that the contractors were on the roadway cleaning up debris. The Superintendent told the supervisor that the contractors were not allowed on the roadway. At that time, the RWIC and contractors had completed their work.



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Metrorail removed the RWIC for post-event drug and alcohol testing at that point. Following a review of the test results, the RWIC was kept out of service due to non-compliance with WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Policy.

Metrorail did not remove the Supervisor from service for post-event drug and alcohol testing as required by WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Policy.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was Metrorail's lack of safety assurance and supervisory oversight to ensure that safety-critical procedures are followed, Metrorail's failure to provide employees with access to databases and information required for their work, a lack of clear communication of RWP requirements and restrictions for contractors, and Metrorail not sending trained and qualified personnel to complete this cleanup work. Inadequate communication, inconsistent work practices, and a lack of planning and coordination to ensure demolition work only occurred if trained and qualified cleanup crews were available contributed to this event.

Corrective Actions:

Plant Maintenance conducted a safety stand-down related to RWP rules.

Metrorail committed to conducting site visits and safety observations to identify hazards and develop strategies to reduce risks.

Plant Maintenance will provide RWICs and Supervisors with a copy of their GOTRS rights and written instructions for roadway work assignments.

Plant Maintenance will provide RWICs and Supervisors with GOTRS training to provide access, including mobile access, to reduce the risk of miscommunication in relation to roadway work assignments.

The RWIC and Supervisor received refresher training on rules and procedures directly related to this event.

WMSA staff observations:

WMATA is in the process of a roadway worker protection rules overhaul, including changes to forms of protection and processes.

This event also demonstrates the importance of fully utilizing all available data as required by the safety management system (SMS) approach embodied in WMATA's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP). Ongoing access to and review of CCTV video and other information can provide for improved supervisory oversight and monitoring, and can provide another layer of protection to identify safety issues like this one before the hazards result in consequences such as collision or injury.

Staff recommendation: Adopt final report.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety and Environmental
Management (SAFE)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E21029

Date of Event:	1/25/2021
Type of Event:	Improper Roadway Worker Protection
Incident Time:	02:35 hours
Location:	L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2
Time and How received by SAFE:	03:36 hours SAFE On-call Phone
WMSC Notification Time:	04:28 hours
Rail Vehicle:	None
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20210125#91529

L'Enfant Plaza Station
Improper Roadway Worker Protection
January 25, 2021

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms	3
Executive Summary	4
Incident Site	5
Field Sketch/Schematics	5
Purpose and Scope	6
Investigation Methods	6
Investigation	6
Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)	7
Audio Recording System (ARS) Chronological Event Timeline	14
Office of Systems Maintenance Communication Section (COMM)	15
Interview Findings	15
Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence	16
Investigative Findings	16
Weather	17
Human Factors	17
Fatigue	17
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing	18
Probable Cause	18
Recommendations/Corrective Actions	18
Appendices	19
Appendix A – PLNT Escort Employee Safety Stand-Down	19
Appendix B – Roadway Job Safety Briefing (RJSB)	21
Appendix C – General Orders and Track Rights System (GOTRS)	23
Appendix D – Interview and Written Summary	26

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CM	Chain Marker
CMSR	Construction Maintenance and Station Rehabilitation
COMM	Office of Systems Maintenance Communication Section
EAP	Employee Assistance Program
ETO	Exclusive Track Occupancy
GOTRS	General Orders and Track Rights System
ID	Identification Card
MOC	Maintenance Operations Control
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OJT	On-the-Job Training
PLNT	Office of Plant Maintenance
RJSB	Roadway Job Safety Briefing
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
RWIC	Roadway Worker in Charge
RWP	Roadway Worker Protection
SAFE	Department of Safety and Environmental Management
SMS I/A	Safety Measurement System Incidents/Accidents
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WSADS	Warning Strobe Alarm Devices

Executive Summary

On Monday, January 25, 2021, at 03:23 hours, Maintenance Operations Control (MOC) was notified by the Office of Plant Maintenance (PLNT) Superintendent of an improper roadway worker protection (RWP) event at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. Based on the Audio Radio System (ARS) playback, the PLNT Superintendent reported that they removed a PLNT Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) from service for failing to conduct a proper Roadway Job Safety Briefing (RJSB). The RWIC did not inspect the contractors' Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) issued identification card (ID) for a roadway training endorsement and failed to identify the contractors wearing an unauthorized yellow vest without an X-stripe pattern on the back. Three contractors entered the roadway to engage in work activities without being RWP trained and qualified. Upon further investigation, the RWIC had a Supervisory Power Outage scheduled in General Orders and Track Rights System (GOTRS) at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2 under Exclusive Track Occupancy (ETO) RWP. The purpose of the GOTRS request was for PLNT personnel to perform cleanup efforts for any debris that fell on the roadway from the restroom demolition project being conducted by the contractors. Per GOTRS, the debris cleanup was assigned to PLNT employees, not the contractors. However, the assigned PLNT employees never arrived (see Appendix C). The RWIC indicated during the virtual interview with SAFE that they never received a GOTRS report for their assigned task. They only received a text message from their supervisors with Chain Markers of the work location. The RWIC does not have access to GOTRS, a mainframe computer program used by WMATA employees. Based on the GOTRS review, the contractors hired by WMATA to do the restroom demolition at the L'Enfant Plaza Station mezzanine level were not assigned or authorized to go in the roadway.

Based on ARS playback, at 01:27 hours, the RWIC contacted the Rail Operation Control Center (ROCC) Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) and reported they hot stuck and confirmed third rail power de-energized at Chain Marker D2-066+00 and Chain Marker D2-067+00. The Radio RTC acknowledged and instructed the RWIC to contact the ROCC when the shunts were installed correctly to verify track occupancy. At 01:35 hours, the RWIC reported to the Radio RTC that they had two good shunts at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. The Radio RTC acknowledged and granted the RWIC permission to properly install all necessary safety equipment for the work's nature and begin work. The RWIC acknowledged and reported that they were relinquishing their Foul Time protection. The Radio RTC confirmed over the radio to the RWIC that Foul Time had been relinquished at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. The RWIC only installed shunts and e-flares, which is not in compliance with the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) RWP, as detailed in section 5.13.7. An ETO RWP setup requires shunts located at 500 feet outside of each end of the working zone, red lanterns or e-flares, "END WORK AREA" mats, and Warning Strobe and Alarm Devices (WSADS).

Based on Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) footage, at 02:35 hours, the RWIC and the three contractors entered the roadway to engage in work activities without being RWP trained and qualified. The PLNT Craft Supervisor arrived on the worksite and walked beyond the station's end-gate while the three contractors retrieved debris from the roadway. The RWIC stated, the RWIC stated that during the RJSB, they failed to check if the contractors had an orange vest and a valid WMATA issued contactor ID with a roadway training endorsement before allowing them to enter the roadway. Also, the RWIC acknowledged to not wearing their approved WMATA hardhat while on the roadway. CCTV review confirmed the RWIC on the roadway without wearing their hardhat.

The Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) playback reflected ROCC initiated prohibit exits, block calls, cancellation of automatic signals, blue block, and human form status before and after the work crew was on the roadway at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. Based on ARS playback, at 03:05 hours, the RWIC contacted the Radio RTC and reported all personnel and equipment had cleared the roadway at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. The PLNT Superintendent found out about the Improper RWP once they arrived at the worksite at 02:55 hours. Once the PLNT Superintendent became aware of the event, they immediately removed the RWIC from service and subsequently transported them for post-incident toxicology testing. There were no injuries or damage reported as a result of this incident.


The Improper RWP event's probable cause on January 25, 2021, was human error and lack of procedural adherence from the RWIC and PLNT Craft Supervisor. The RWIC and PLNT Craft Supervisor failed to inspect the contractors' WMATA issued identification card (ID) for a roadway training endorsement and failed to identify the contractors wearing an unauthorized yellow vest without an X-stripe pattern on the back.

Additionally, the RWIC and PLNT Craft Supervisor did not review their GORTS rights to ensure the work was being performed with the appropriate maintenance group and failed to establish the work crew's proper ETO RWP. SAFE identified several communication breakdowns, employee non-adherence to written procedures and processes within the MSRPH as contributing factors in this event.

Incident Site

L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2
Actual – CM D2-059+00 to D2-066+00
Protected – CM D2-054+00 to D2-071+00

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigation Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Formal Written Statement – SAFE received one written statement from an individual as part of this investigation. The written statement included:
 - Contractor Supervisor
- Formal Interview – SAFE conducted two interviews as part of this investigation. The interviews included:
 - RWIC
 - PLNT Craft Supervisor
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Employee Training Procedures & Records
 - Certification
 - The 30-Day work history review
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Procedures Manual Review
 - Office of Systems Maintenance Communication Section (COMM)
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback [Radio and Phone Communications]
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) playback
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - General Orders and Track Rights System (GOTRS)

Investigation

On Monday, January 25, 2021, at 03:23 hours, the PLNT Superintendent notified the MOC and reported an improper roadway worker protection event at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. Upon further investigation, the RWIC had a Supervisory Power Outage scheduled in GOTRS at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2, under ETO, RWP. The purpose of the GOTRS request was for PLNT personnel to perform cleanup efforts for any debris that fell on the roadway from the restroom demolition project being conducted by the contractors. Per GOTRS, the debris cleanup was assigned to PLNT employees, not the contractors. However, the assigned PLNT employees never showed up. See Appendix C. Based on fact findings, the RWIC allowed three contractors to enter the roadway to engage in work activities without being RWP trained and qualified and without a WMATA SAFE approved Class 2 orange vest with the X-stripe pattern on the back. **Note:** The

reason why additional PLNT personnel did not show up to clean up the debris that fell on the roadway from the demolition task could not be determined. However, during the virtual interview, the RWIC stated that the scope of work was to provide RWP support and escort personnel to L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2, to clean up any debris that fell on the roadway. In addition, the RWIC indicated that the PLNT Craft Supervisor overseeing the demolition project advised that when the contractors were done with restroom demolition, the RWIC can utilize the contractors to clean up the debris on the roadway. Therefore, based on the incident data that was evaluated, it appears PLNT expected that the contractors would perform clean-up efforts on the roadway.

During the virtual interview, the PLNT Craft Supervisor was unsure what time the contractors started the restroom demolition but believed it was approximately 02:00 hours. The debris that fell on the roadway began after the restroom demolition was complete. Based on the CCTV, at 02:35 hours, the RWIC and three contractors entered the roadway to engage in work activities without being RWP trained and qualified. Additionally, the PLNT Craft Supervisor arrived on the scene and walked beyond the station's end-gate while the three contractors retrieved debris from the roadway. Based on ARS playback, at 22:54 hours, the RWIC contacted the Radio RTC to request and confirm Supervisory Power Outage at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2, Chain Marker D2-054+00 to Chain Marker 071+00. The Radio RTC acknowledged and instructed the RWIC to standby. At 01:07 hours, the Radio RTC contacted the RWIC and stated that the D04-08 signal is red, prohibit exits, block calls, cancellation of automatic signals, and blue block and human form status in place at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. At this time, breakers have been commanded open you have permission to enter the roadway to hot stick and confirm that third rail power is de-energized and provide the ROCC a Chain Marker.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Diagram 1 - At 01:07 hours, the AIMS playback reflected third rail power was de-energized, blue block, and human form status were in place before the RWIC entered the roadway to hot stick and confirm third rail power was de-energized at L'Enfant Plaza, Tracks 2.

Based on ARS playback, at 01:27 hours, the RWIC contacted the Radio RTC and reported they hot stuck and confirmed that third rail power was de-energized at Chain Marker D2-066+00 and Chain Marker D2-067+00. The Radio RTC acknowledged and instructed the RWIC to contact the ROCC when shunts were installed correctly to verify track occupancy. At 01:35 hours, the RWIC reported to the Radio RTC that they have two good shunts on L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. The

Radio RTC acknowledged and granted the RWIC permission to properly install all necessary safety equipment for the work's nature and to begin work. The RWIC acknowledged and reported that they are relinquishing their Foul Time protection. The Radio RTC confirmed over the radio to the RWIC that Foul Time had been relinquished at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2.

The RWIC only installed shunts and e-flares, which is not in compliance with the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) RWP, as detailed in section 5.13.7. An ETO RWP setup requires shunts to be located at 500 feet outside of each end of the working zone, red lanterns or e-flares, "END Work AREA" mats, and WSADS.




Diagram 2 – Correct ETO protection diagram.




Figure 1 - Based on the CCTV, at 01:22 hours, the RWIC jumped from the station platform without using an appropriate means of descent.



Figure 2 - Based on the CCTV, at 01:33 hours, the RWIC was not wearing a hardhat while installing safety equipment on WMATA's roadway.



Figure 3 - Based on the CCTV, at 02:34 hours, the RWIC is sitting on the bench while the three contractors are walking over to be escorted by the RWIC to enter the roadway wearing yellow vests without an X-stripe pattern on the back.




Diagram 3 - At 02:34 hours, the AIMS playback shows prohibit exits, block calls, cancellation of automatic signals, blue block, and human form status are in place while the before the RWIC and contractors entered the roadway to clean up the debris.



Figure 4 - Based on the CCTV, at 02:35 hours, the RWIC and three contractors entered the roadway to engage in work activities without being RWP trained and qualified. Additionally, the PLNT Craft Supervisor arrived on the scene and walked beyond the station's end-gate while the three contractors were retrieving debris from the roadway.



Figure 5 - Based on the CCTV, at 02:40 hours, the RWIC and three contractors were still retrieving the roadway's debris working close to the third rail.



Figure 6 - Based on the CCTV, at 02:41 hours, the fourth contractor never entered the roadway but removed the bags filled with the debris handed to them by the other contractors. CCTV shows that the fourth contractor was not adequately outfitted for work.




Figure 7 - Based on the CCTV, at 02:45 hours, the PLNT Craft Supervisor observed RWIC and three contractors cleaning up the roadway's debris.



Figure 8 - Based on the CCTV, at 02:47 hours, the PLNT Craft Supervisor departed the work area.



Figure 9 - Based on the CCTV, at 02:54 hours, the RWIC and the three contractors cleared the roadway.




Diagram 3 - At 02:55 hours, the AIMS shows prohibit exits, block calls, cancellation of automatic signals, blue block, and human form status still in place after the RWIC and contractors cleared the roadway.

Based on ARS playback, at 03:05 hours, the RWIC contacted the Radio RTC and reported all personnel and equipment had cleared the roadway at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. The RWIC indicated all tracks were revenue ready; all work has been completed and advised that the ROCC was free to restore third rail power at their discretion. At 03:23 hours, the PLNT Superintendent contacted Maintenance Operation Control (MOC) Assistant Superintendent about an improper RWP on the D Line at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. The PLNT Superintendent indicated that the RWIC was taken out of service due to unauthorized contractors being on the roadway. There were no injuries reported.

Audio Recording System (ARS) Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone, ambient, and radio communications, revealed the following:

22:54:51 hrs.	<p><u>RWIC</u>: Notified the ROCC Radio RTC and reported that they were standing by at L'Enfant Plaza Station and requested a supervisory power outage at Track 2, Chain Marker D2-054+00 to Chain Marker 071+00.</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged the request and requested the RWIC to standby and stand clear. [Ops 2]</p>
01:07:36 hrs.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Notified the RWIC and reported the D04-08 signal was red, prohibit exits, block calls, cancellation of automatic signals, Blue Block, and Human Form Status were in place at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. At this time, breakers had been commanded open you have permission to enter the roadway to hot stick and confirm that third rail power is de-energized. Please provide the ROCC as a Chain Marker.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Acknowledged. [Ops 2]</p>
01:27:39 hrs.	<p><u>RWIC</u>: Notified the ROCC Radio RTC and reported that third rail power is confirmed to be de-energized at this time. Chain Marker D2-066+00 and D2-067+00.</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and advised that you have permission to install your shunts per SOP to verify proper placement with the ROCC.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Acknowledged. [Ops 2]</p>
01:35:54 hrs.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Notified the RWIC and asked did you place both of your shunts at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Responded, that's affirmative we have two good shunts on L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2.</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and indicated the RWIC had permission to place equipment in the work area, and you have permission to start work.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Acknowledged and advised they were relinquishing their Foul Time. [Ops 2]</p>
03:05:03 hrs.	<p><u>RWIC</u>: Notified the ROCC Radio RTC and reported that at this time, all personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. All work has been completed; you are free to restore third rail power at your discretion. All tracks are revenue-ready. [Ops 2]</p>
03:23:53 hrs.	<p><u>PLNT Superintendent</u>: Notified the MOC Assistant Superintendent and reported that an improper RWP at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2, occurred. The PLNT Superintendent indicated the RWIC was taken out of service at 03:00 hours due to contractors being on the roadway unauthorized due to not being RWP certified. There were no injuries reported. [Phone]</p>

03:31:25 hrs.	<u>MOC Superintendent</u> : Notified SAFE and asked if they know of an improper RWP at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. <u>SAFE</u> : Responded; they were aware and had just spoken with the PLNT Superintendent. [Phone]
03:32:35 hrs.	<u>MOC Superintendent</u> : Notified PLNT Superintendent and asked what company the contractors represent. <u>PLNT Superintendent</u> : Responded; it was the contractor cleaning crew and advised they didn't have the contractors' name at this time. [Phone]
03:35:42 hrs.	<u>PLNT Superintendent</u> : Notified the ROCC Assistant Superintendent and reported that that the RWIC had work limits established and completed RJSB. However, RWIC never checked the crew's ID to verify they were roadway certified, and they entered the roadway. PLNT Superintendent indicated they reported the incident to SAFE and MOC already. [Phone]
04:23:04 hrs.	<u>PLNT Superintendent</u> : Notified the MOC Assistant Superintendent and provided them the RWIC employee ID number. [Phone]

Office of Systems Maintenance Communication Section (COMM)

COMM performed a comprehensive radio operational test at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 1 and Track 2. The test was successful, and the signal was at an optimal level.

Note: After reviewing the ARS playback, there did not appear to be any communication deficiencies over the radio.

Interview Findings

Based on the investigation into the L'Enfant Plaza Station Improper RWP event, SAFE conducted two virtual interviews via Microsoft teams, which included the investigation team and relevant Metro management. These interviews were conducted over a one-week span after the event and identified the following key findings associated with this event, as follows:

During the virtual interview, the RWIC stated that their scope of work was to provide RWP support and escort personnel to L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2, to clean up any debris that fell on the roadway from the demolition task within their work limits. The RWIC performed an RJSB approximately an hour before any work commenced on January 25, 2021. By the RWIC's own admission, the RWIC stated that during the RJSB, they inadvertently failed to check if the contractors had an orange safety vest and a valid WMATA contactor ID with a roadway training endorsement before allowing them to enter the roadway. The RWIC indicated that upon arriving at L'Enfant Plaza Station, the PLNT Craft Supervisor overseeing the demolition project advised that when the contractors were done with restroom demolition, the RWIC can utilize the contractors to clean up the debris on the roadway. The PLNT Craft Supervisor was with the RWIC when the contractors entered the roadway.

The RWIC was not aware that the contractors were not supposed to enter the roadway and that only qualified PLNT/Construction Maintenance and Station Rehabilitation (CMSR) employees were supposed to conduct cleanup efforts after the demolition was completed per the GOTRS. The RWIC never received a GOTRS report with details regarding their assigned task. They only received a text message from their supervisor with Chain Markers of the work location. The PLNT Craft Supervisor was assigned to oversee the hired contractors' operations during the restroom demolition at the L'Enfant Plaza Station mezzanine level. The PLNT Craft Supervisor specified

that the contractors attended the RWIC's RJSB before work commenced. The PLNT Craft Supervisor indicated that the RWIC never inspected their WMATA ID for a valid RWP sticker or did the RWIC inspect their personal protective equipment. The PLNT Craft Supervisor indicated they went down to the platform and saw the contractors on the roadway, and which is when the PLNT Superintendent contacted them. The PLNT Craft Supervisor reported to the PLNT Superintendent that the contractors were on the roadway cleaning up the debris. Reportedly, the PLNT Superintendent advised that the contractors were not authorized to be on the roadway. The PLNT Superintendent and PLNT Craft Supervisor went to the platform to remove the RWIC and contractors from the roadway, but they had already cleared the roadway.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- PLNT conducted a Safety Stand-Down as an internal corrective action plan. The discussion topic was on the Improper Roadway Worker Protection incident and associated hazards to prevent a similar incident from happening in the future. Additionally, RWP rules were a discussion topic. See Appendix A.

Investigative Findings

- At the time of the incident, it was not known that the PLNT Craft Supervisor had made an error and was not removed from service for post-incident toxicology testing by PLNT.
- Laboratory results revealed that the RWIC was not in compliance with WMATA's Drug and Alcohol policy.
- The RWIC was identified on CCTV as not wearing a hardhat while installing safety equipment on WMATA's roadway. This action was not in compliance with MSRPH 5.11.
- Based on CCTV footage, the RWIC jumped from the station platforms without using an appropriate means of descent. This action was not in compliance with MSRPH, 4.186.
- The RWIC stated that during the RJSB, they failed to physically ensure that the contractors had an orange safety vest and a valid WMATA contractor ID that was not expired and was stamped with the roadway trained endorsement before allowing personnel onto the roadway. This action was not in compliance with MSRPH 28.5.3.6.
- The RWIC did not properly fill out their RJSB form. There's no employee/contractor ID listed for the entire work crew on the RJSB signed the form. Additionally, the RWIC checked the RWP sticker section on the form on the RJSB form, which indicates that the contractors on the roadway cleaning the debris were RWP trained and qualified.
- The RWIC allowed three contractors to enter the roadway to engage in work activities without being RWP trained and qualified. This action was not in compliance with MSRPH 5.2.1 RWP Cardinal Rules, *"All personnel, regardless of rank or title, shall be RWP trained and qualified before entering the Authority's roadway."*
- The RWIC also was not in compliance with MSRPH 5.18 Escorting Requirements for Roadway Worker Protection, Non-WMATA personnel "ID must have a current RWP training endorsement sticker." Additionally, "All contractors shall be RWP Level 1 Qualified before entering the Roadway.
- The RWIC does not have access to GOTRS, a mainframe computer program used by WMATA employees. GOTRS allows an employee to enter track right request, cancel requests, view request type, work type, work description, indicate which department

assigned a specific task or tasks, confirm switch order, work preparation, emergency contact.

- The RWIC indicated during the virtual interview with SAFE that they never received a GOTRS report with the details regarding their assigned task. They only received a text message from their supervisor with Chain Markers of the work location.
- Based on the GOTRS review, the contractors were not assigned to go in the roadway. GOTRS listed PLNT and CMSR personnel as personnel assigned to clean up any debris that fell on the roadway from the demolition task.
- During the virtual interview, the RWIC indicated they were under ETO RWP setup. However, the RWIC only installed required shunts located at 500 feet outside of each end of the working zone and e-flares but did not include "END Work AREA" mats and WASDS.
- The AIMS playback reflected prohibit exits, block calls, cancellation of automatic signals, blue block, and human form status were in place while the work crew was on the roadway at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2.
- The contractors were not wearing a WMATA SAFE approved contractor's vest (Orange without an X on the back).
- Per GOTRS, the debris cleanup was assigned to PLNT employees, not the contractors. However, the assigned PLNT employees never showed up. See Appendix C.
- During the virtual interview, the PLNT Craft Supervisor was unsure what time the contractors started the restroom demolition but believed it was approximately 02:00 hours. The debris that fell on the roadway began after the restroom demolition was complete. Based on the CCTV, at 02:35 hours, the RWIC and three contractors entered the roadway to engage in work activities without being RWP trained and qualified. Additionally, the PLNT Craft Supervisor arrived on the scene and walked beyond the station's end-gate while the three contractors retrieved debris from the roadway.
- The PLNT Superintendent requested the GOTRS for the restroom demolition by the contractors. The PLNT Manager of Special Projects entered the GOTRS requests. There was a lack of planning and coordination for the demolition work by PLNT. The demolition work shouldn't have started if the PLNT personnel required to clean it up weren't coming. The contractors weren't allowed on the roadway.
- During the virtual interview, the PLNT Craft Supervisor indicated that the RWIC never inspected the contractor's WMATA ID for a valid RWP sticker or did the RWIC inspect their personal protective equipment. However, the PLNT Craft Supervisor did not do anything about this discrepancy.

Weather

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 36°F with overcast and 54% humidity. SAFE has concluded that weather was not a contributing factor in this incident. Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC.)

Human Factors

Fatigue

Based on SAFE's review of the RWIC and the PLNT Craft Supervisor's 30-day work history, the employees' 30-day work schedule leading up to the incident was compliant with WMATA's Policy/Instruction 10.6/1 Hours of Service Limitations for Prevention of Fatigue and did not present a significant risk of impairment due to fatigue. Based on employee interviews, no personal factors would have increased the likelihood of fatigue-related impairment. The employees had no history of sleep issues to report.

Note: The RWIC and PLNT Craft Supervisor were in the 4th hour of their 8-hour shift.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

RWIC

After reviewing the RWIC employee post-incident toxicology testing results, it was determined that the RWIC was in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6; therefore, being under the influence of a controlled substance may have contributed to the Improper RWP event.

Probable Cause

The probable cause on January 25, 2021, was human error and lack of procedural adherence from the RWIC and PLNT Craft Supervisor. The RWIC was identified on CCTV as not wearing a hardhat while installing safety equipment on WMATA's roadway. The RWIC and PLNT Craft Supervisor failed to inspect the contractors' WMATA issued ID for a roadway training endorsement and failed to identify the contractors wearing an unauthorized orange vest without an X-stripe pattern on the back. The RWIC and PLNT Craft Supervisor did not have access to GOTRS or review their GOTRS rights to ensure the work was performed with the appropriate maintenance group and failed to establish the proper ETO RWP for the work crew. There was a lack of planning and coordination for the demolition work by PLNT. The demolition work shouldn't have started if the PLNT personnel required to clean it up weren't coming. The contractors weren't allowed on the roadway. SAFE identified communication breakdowns and employee non-adherence to written procedures and processes within the MSRPH as contributing factors in this Improper RWP event.

Recommendations/Corrective Actions

The following are the recommendations and corrective actions identified as a result of this investigation. These recommendations and corrective actions are tracked using WMATA's Safety Measurement System Incidents/Accidents (SMS I/A) Module and are verified by SAFE upon completion. The responsible department is identified in the corrective action code. Refer to the SMS I/A module for additional information.

Corrective Action Code	Description
91529_SAFECAPS_PLNT_001	Shall conduct site visits and perform safety observations to identify any safety hazards of employees not safely completing the job's requirements and develop strategies to reduce their risk.
91529_SAFECAPS_PLNT_002	Shall provide RWICs and Supervisors with a copy of their GOTRS Rights and written work instructions for all roadway work assignments.
91529_SAFECAPS_PLNT_003	Shall require RWICs and Supervisors to undergo GOTRS training to know how to obtain access to GOTRS. WMATA has a mobile version of the GOTRS site that allows personnel to view & cancel requests, perform work prep, and confirm switch orders. All RWICs and Supervisors should utilize the WMATA mobile version of the GOTRS to prevent any miscommunication for all roadway work assignments.
91529_SAFECAPS_PLNT_004	Shall require the RWIC and PLNT Craft Supervisor to undergo refresher training on specific MSRPH rules and procedures that were violated in this incident. This will help the employees understand their duties and responsibilities when an incident of this nature transpires.

Appendices

Appendix A – PLNT Escort Employee Safety Stand-Down



STAND-DOWN

PLNT-Escort Employee Stand-down January 2021

RWP Violation

SUMMARY: Escort handling supervisory outage at D03 L'Enfant Plaza allowed contractors on the roadway without checking their ID's to see if they were qualified or certified.

RWP Rules Discussed:

5.10.2 – RWP Level 4 Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC)

A qualification that allows WMATA personnel to work in any capacity (Escort and Crew Leader) on the Roadway and provide TWP safety protections to all personnel on the Roadway. An RWP level 4 qualified RWIC is responsible for resolving all Roadway Worker safety concerns, rule compliance, and oversight of all aspects of RWP to support the work being performed within their working limits. The RWIC is responsible for establishing, maintaining and canceling working limits. The RWIC shall never act as the AMF or primary Watchman/Lookout except in a mobile work crew; TWP Level 4 RWIC may act as a Watchman/Lookout when working with two (2) Roadway Workers and an AMF.

5.10.5- Roadway Worker

Any Personnel whose duties would potentially cause them to foul the Roadway. All roadway workers are subordinate to the RWIC while on the Roadway.

5.10.8 – Contractor

Personnel who work for another company, but their duties require access to WAMATA's Roadway. Contractors SHALL ONLY enter the Roadway when accompanied by a RWP Level 4 qualified Roadway Worker. All contractors requiring access to the Roadway must be RWP Level 1 qualified and must have a valid contactor ID.

RWP Cardinal Rule:

All personnel, regardless of rank or title, shall be RWP trained and qualified before entering the Authority's Roadway...

- No job is to start without an onsite Safety Briefing first, Check all ID's regardless if they are Metro Employee or Contractor.

Safety Stand-Down Signature Sheet

Safety is success by purpose - Not Accident

Plant Crew Support Personnel Group

01-27-2021

RWP Violation: 5.10.2, 5.10.5, 5.10.8 - Safety Stand-down conducted as a result of a RWP Violation.

* Contractor was allowed on the roadway without checking back for certification*

PLOYEE ID. #	NAME	DATE	SIGNATURE	SIGN IN	SIGN OUT
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1-27-21	[REDACTED]	2200	2300
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1-27-21	[REDACTED]	2200	2300
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1/27/21	[REDACTED]	2200	2300
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1/27/21	[REDACTED]	2200	2300
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1/27/21	[REDACTED]	2200	2300

Additional Discussion: All employees were reminded to follow the WMATA SOPs, and to adhere at all times to WMATA's policies, rules and procedures.

Supervisor Signature: [REDACTED]

Date: 01-27-2021 Night Shift: 2200 to 0600

Appendix B – Roadway Job Safety Briefing (RJSB)

2255

WMATA ROADWAY JOB SAFETY BRIEFING FORM

DATE: 1/24/2021 TRACK TIME ON/OFF: 1

RWIC NAME: [REDACTED] CALL#: [REDACTED] EMPLOYEE #: [REDACTED]

RWIC'S CELL PHONE NUMBER: _____ RADIO OPS CHANNEL: 2

SAFETY RULE OF THE DAY: TRST 3rd RAIL AS NO. AT ALL TIMES

WORK ASSIGNMENT: MASON WORK DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC: INBOUND ☐ OUTBOUND ☒

RAIL LINE: A B C D E F G J K L N TRACK 1 2 3 WORK LIMITS CHAIN MARKER(S): 054+00 → 071+00

PLACE OF SAFETY: PLATFORM @ D03

TYPE OF PROTECTION(S): IT _____ ETO AUTHORITY ☒ ETO LOCAL SIGNAL _____ AMF _____ FT _____

REQUEST FROM ROCC: BLOCK CALLS ☐ CANCEL AUTOMATIC SIGNALS ☐ PROHIBIT EXITS ☐

RED TAG SPOT(S) TYPE/LOCATION(S): ☐ _____ ETS/RADIO OUTAGE ☐

FOUL TIME PROTECTION CAN BE REQUESTED IN ALL WORK ZONE CONFIGURATIONS

POWER OUTAGE: LOCK OUT TAG OUT _____ RED TAG _____ SUPERVISORY ☒ NO POWER OUTAGE _____

RED TAG NUMBER: _____ RED TAG HOLDER: _____

WATCHMAN/LOOKOUT ASSIGNED: Yes _____ No _____ WATCHMAN/LOOKOUT NAME(S): _____

WATCHMAN/LOOKOUT EQUIPPED WITH AIR HORN AND WHISTLE ("W" Warning Disc required for fixed work zones): ☐

WATCHMAN/LOOKOUT MUST BE PROPERLY SPACED AND HAVE SUFFICIENT SIGHTING DISTANCE TO PROVIDE AMPLE WARNING

ADVANCE MOBILE FLAGGER ASSIGNED: Yes _____ No _____ ADVANCE MOBILE FLAGGER CALL # (s): _____

ADVANCE MOBILE FLAGGER EQUIPPED WITH AMBER LANTERNS/E-FLARES, ORANGE FLAG, AIR HORN, WHISTLE AND RADIO: ☐

PIGGY BACK CREW LEADER CALL # (s): _____ PIGGY BACK WORKZONE CM (s): _____

PIGGY BACK WORK ASSIGNMENT: _____

NUMBER OF RMM (s): _____ RMM OPERATIONS IN WORK ZONE: _____

ALL ROADWAY WORKERS MUST EXERCISE GOOD JUDGEMENT AND CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND PROCEDURES BEFORE ENTERING THE ROADWAY:

WEATHER CONDITIONS	<input type="checkbox"/>	TRIPPING HAZARDS / UNEVEN WALKING SURFACES	<input type="checkbox"/>
TRACK GRADE AND VISIBILITY	<input type="checkbox"/>	POOR LIGHTING / TUNNEL AND VENT SHAFT(S)	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH RAIL VEHICLE MOVEMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	TRAIN / CURVE SPEED(S)	<input type="checkbox"/>
WORK SITE CONDITIONS AND ACTIVITIES	<input type="checkbox"/>	ETS BOX(S) LOCATIONS	<input type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	<input type="checkbox"/>	EQUIPMENT AND TOOL SAFETY	<input type="checkbox"/>
ADJACENT TRACK PROTECTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROTATION AND RELIEF PROCEDURES	<input type="checkbox"/>

Rev 3 WMATA Roadway Job Safety Briefing Form, Date: November 2016

Attachment 2 – Page 1 of 2.

ROADWAY WORKERS HAVE THE RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO INITIATE A GOOD FAITH CHALLENGE WHEN NECESSARY

I understand and agree with all aspects of the Roadway Job Safety Briefing I just received. I feel I am adequately protected from any train movement or roadway hazards. I understand I have a responsibility to conduct myself in a safe manner at all times.

RWICOMMENTS:

DATE/TIME: _____

EMPLOYEE(s) NAME: _____ EMPLOYEE(s) # _____ DATE/TIME _____
RWP ISSUE(s) _____ ISSUED RESOLVED: Yes ___ No ___

Page 22

Appendix C – General Orders and Track Rights System (GOTRS)

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM

Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	[REDACTED]	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	01/25/2021 00:30 to: 01/25/2021 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PLNT/BMSS	In Piggyback:	No
Switch Order:		Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	D03, Restroom rehab-demolition by contractor		

Location, Work Type and Description

Location:	Mainline
Non-Wayside Location Type:	
Request Type:	Expedited
Charge Job Number:	
Contract Number:	
Maximo Work Order:	
Request Group:	No
Location Description:	
Request Description:	Station restroom rehab
Work Type:	Other
Meeting Location:	
PB Meeting Location:	
Tools and Equipment:	hand and safety
Equipment on Track:	

Track 2

Actual Work Area:	D059+00	D066+00
Protected Work Area:	D054+00	D071+00

Date & Time

Start:	01/25/2021 00:30	End:	01/25/2021 04:30
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Contacts

Entered by

[REDACTED]

Work: [REDACTED]

Requestor

[REDACTED]

Work: [REDACTED]

As of 01/28/2021 11:47
1 of 3

Attachment 3 – Page 1 of 3.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM

Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	[REDACTED]	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	01/25/2021 00:30 to: 01/25/2021 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PLNT/BMSS	In Piggyback:	No
Switch Order:		Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	D03, Restroom rehab-demolition by contractor		

Cell:	[REDACTED]	Home:	[REDACTED]	Cell:	[REDACTED]	Home:	[REDACTED]
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WMATA Manager

[REDACTED]

Work: [REDACTED]

Cell: [REDACTED]

Home: [REDACTED]

Emergency Contact

[REDACTED]

Work: [REDACTED]

Cell: [REDACTED]

Home: [REDACTED]

Support

SUPPORT GROUP	Crew Size
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PLNT	5
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Request Change History

Date	Event
01/13/2021 13:23	Request was created.
01/15/2021 18:29	Request status was changed to Approved
01/25/2021 03:43	Work Prep was completed.
01/25/2021 03:55	Request status was changed to Opened
01/25/2021 09:24	Request status was changed to Closed

Request Group

Request Number	Description
----------------	-------------

Piggyback

No active piggybacks found

As of 01/28/2021 11:47
2 of 3

Attachment 3 – Page 2 of 3.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM

Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	[REDACTED]	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	01/25/2021 00:30 to: 01/25/2021 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PLNT/BMSS	In Piggyback:	No
Switch Order:		Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	D03, Restroom rehab-demolition by contractor		

Location, Work Type and Description

Location:	Mainline
Non-Wayside Location Type:	
Request Type:	Expedited
Charge Job Number:	
Contract Number:	
Maximo Work Order:	
Request Group:	No
Location Description:	
Request Description:	Station restroom rehab
Work Type:	Other
Meeting Location:	
PB Meeting Location:	
Tools and Equipment:	hand and safety
Equipment on Track:	

Track 2

Actual Work Area:	D059+00	D066+00
Protected Work Area:	D054+00	D071+00

Date & Time

Start:	01/25/2021 00:30	End:	01/25/2021 04:30
--------	------------------	------	------------------

Contacts

Entered by	Requestor
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Work: [REDACTED]	Work: [REDACTED]

As of 01/28/2021 11:47
1 of 3

Attachment 3 – Page 3 of 3.

Appendix D – Interview and Written Summary

PLNT General Equipment Mechanic AA

The General Equipment Mechanic AA is a WMATA employee with 15 years of service. The General Equipment Mechanic AA held various positions such as Mechanic A, Mechanic B, Mechanic C, and Mechanic D.

During the virtual interview, the General Equipment Mechanic AA was assigned as the RWIC when the improper roadway worker protection event happened on January 25, 2021, at approximately 03:00 hours. The scope of work was to provide RWP support and escort personnel to L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2, to clean up any debris that fell on the roadway from the demolition task. The RWIC had a Supervisory Power Outage scheduled in GOTRS at Chain Marker D2-054+00 to D2-071+00 under ETO, RWP. The RWIC indicated they performed an RJSB approximately an hour before work commenced on January 25, 2021. The RWIC performed the RJSB on the L'Enfant Plaza Station mezzanine, and there was a total of five personnel in the work crew, which included four contractors and one WMATA PLNT Supervisor. The RWIC stated that during the RJSB, they inadvertently failed to physically check if the contractors had an approved orange vest and a valid WMATA contactor ID with a roadway training endorsement before allowing them to enter the roadway. The RWIC indicated that upon arriving at L'Enfant Plaza Station, the PLNT Craft Supervisor overseeing the demolition project advised that when the contractors were done with restroom demolition, the RWIC can utilize the contractors to clean up the debris on the roadway.

The RWIC was aware of the required personal protective equipment for personnel to enter the roadway. Three contractors entered the roadway for approximately 15 minutes and were all wearing proper Personal Protective Equipment. The RWIC received permission from the ROCC to enter the roadway, setup up equipment, and start work. Before allowing the work crew onto the roadway, they had all the necessary safety equipment installed. The RWIC said that they were not aware the contractors were not supposed to enter the roadway and that only qualified PLNT employees were supposed to conduct cleanup efforts after the demolition was completed per the GOTRS. The RWIC never received a GOTRS report with details regarding their assigned task. They only received a text message from their supervisor with Chain Markers of the work location. The RWIC stated the PLNT Craft Supervisor was right beside them when the contractors entered the roadway and advised the RWIC they would be right back and went to retrieve a broom to assist with cleanup efforts. The PLNT Craft Supervisor never returned. The RWIC assumed the contractors were qualified since the contractors that entered the roadway were already at the worksite conducting the demolition project and thought that the PLNT Craft Supervisor already checked everyone's ID. The RWIC has been performing RWIC duties for approximately six years and does not have access to GOTRS. The RWIC normally is provided the GOTRS information via text. There were no communication issues on Ops 2 channel.

PLNT Craft Crew Supervisor

The PLNT Craft Supervisor is a WMATA employee with ten years of service. The PLNT Craft Supervisor started as a mason and has been a PLNT Craft Supervisor for two years.

During the virtual interview, the PLNT Craft Supervisor stated they received a call on January 24, 2021, at 22:04 hours from their PLNT Superintendent, providing them with their assigned task for the night. The PLNT Craft Supervisor was assigned to oversee the hired contractors' operations to perform restroom demolition at the L'Enfant Plaza Station mezzanine level. The PLNT Craft Supervisor indicated that they made it to L'Enfant Plaza Station at approximately 23:00 hours and

waited for the RWIC to arrive to conduct their RJSB. The PLNT Craft Supervisor specified that the contractors attended the RWIC's RJSB before work commenced. The PLNT Craft Supervisor indicated that the RWIC never inspected the contractor's WMATA ID for a valid RWP sticker or did the RWIC inspect their personal protective equipment. The PLNT Craft Supervisor was unsure what time the contractors started the restroom demolition but believed it was approximately 02:00 hours on January 25, 2021. Once the contractors completed the restroom demolition project, the PLNT Craft Supervisor took pictures to send to their Superintendent while the RWIC and the contractors went to enter the roadway to clean up any debris on the roadway from the demolition task. After the PLNT Craft Supervisor took the pictures, the PLNT Craft Supervisor went down to the platform and saw the contractors on the roadway, and that's when their Superintendent contacted them. The Superintendent asked the PLNT Craft Supervisor to meet them by the elevator to see the pictures of what the contractors did on the restroom demolition project. The PLNT Superintendent asked the PLNT Craft Supervisor where the contractors were, and the PLNT Craft Supervisor stated that the contractors were on the roadway cleaning up the debris. Reportedly, the PLNT Superintendent advised that the contractors were not authorized to be on the roadway. The PLNT Superintendent and PLNT Craft Supervisor went to the platform to remove the RWIC and contractors from the roadway, but they had already cleared the roadway. The PLNT Craft Supervisor indicated that the PLNT Superintendent advised that they will take it from there, and the PLNT Craft Supervisor departed the station.

Written Statement

Contractor Supervisor

The Contractor Supervisor stated in a written statement on January 25, 2021; they supervised a team of contractors who demolished three wall sections of a bathroom on the west end of L'Enfant Plaza Station. The work crew reported to L'Enfant Plaza Station at 23:30 hours. The PLNT Craft Supervisor went over the work plan with the contractors. A safety meeting took place, and once the safety meeting ended, we began to unload tools and materials. After setting up the work area, the PLNT Craft Supervisor informed the contractors we need to wait for the RWIC since the bathroom is directly above the roadway. Once the RWIC arrived, another safety meeting took place. It was explained to the contractors after the demolition of the bathroom was complete, the contractors would then clean up the falling debris from the roadway. After the contractors cleaned up the debris from the roadway, they ended their shift and signed out.