



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0114 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Greensboro Station – April 15, 2021

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on September 21, 2021

Safety event summary:

A Metrorail customer conveyed a bomb threat against Spring Hill Station, and later boarded a train toward Largo Town Center Station.

The Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) stated that the initial call for service related to the bomb threat came at 5:23 p.m. At 5:31 p.m., MTPD asked the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) to hold a different train moving toward Largo Town Center Station at Greensboro Station.

At 5:36 p.m., in response to a question from the ROCC, the MTPD dispatcher stated that the train was being held due to a bomb threat that had been made at Spring Hill Station. At 5:39 p.m., the dispatcher responded that the train would be offloaded to conduct a K-9 search. The MTPD dispatcher also stated that there was no officer at Greensboro Station at that time, even though a Train Operator and Rail Supervisor reported to the ROCC that MTPD was on scene.

MTPD did not properly communicate the establishment of incident command or establish a forward liaison, including not communicating this information over the radio as required by Metrorail procedures. This contributed to other Metrorail departments not immediately initiating related emergency response protocols such as SOP 1A.

MTPD did not evacuate any other parts of the Greensboro Station, and trains serviced the station by single-tracking. Nothing was found in the search of the train. A separate search was conducted of the Spring Hill Station.

MTPD review of closed-circuit television (CCTV) identified by 5:45 p.m. that the individual believed to have made the bomb threat had actually boarded a separate train, which was already at Largo Town Center Station. MTPD continued searching the train at Greensboro Station.

At approximately 6:28 p.m., the ROCC Assistant Superintendent conveyed a message from MTPD that a different train needed to be searched.

That train was eventually searched at Largo Town Center Station.

During this event, the ROCC Assistant Superintendent was making personal phone calls. Although this did not impact the response, it is contrary to rules and procedures.

The MTPD Sergeant experienced radio communication problems in their vehicle.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was a Metrorail customer making a bomb threat. Contributing to the challenges in the timeliness of the response was Metrorail's lack of clear and consistent communication and urgency, including from MTPD dispatch, and MTPD's failure to fully implement required incident command practices.

Corrective Actions:

Metrorail did not develop any corrective action plans related directly to this investigation.



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In connection with the previous investigation into a customer evacuation near Fort Totten and Georgia Ave-Petworth stations in December 2021 (W-0084):

MTPD committed to developing an incident response checklist to identify responsibilities, equipment and processes upon arrival.

MTPD's roadway worker protection (RWP) training materials are to be reviewed by operational training departments

Metrorail is taking initial steps to define the role of the Incident Management Official (IMO). Which Metrorail implemented in spring 2021.

MTPD in-service training will include ROCC emergency SOPs.

MTPD will include RWP practices in its post-event hot washes.

ROCC and MTPD will conduct additional after-action reviews.

MTPD is to comply with procedures requiring an officer in the ROCC during emergencies.

MTPD incident commanders are to communicate the full section of track that is part of the incident.

WMSC staff observations:

Metrorail as an organization is responsible for continuous safety improvement, and the investigation shows areas where corrective actions would be beneficial to reduce risks in the future. These include:

- MTPD operational communication and situational awareness during emergency response
- MTPD-ROCC communication and collaboration
- SOP 1A/incident command process and communication; MTPD not properly establishing command or liaison; apparent single-tracking decisions outside incident command process
- Addressing the MTPD Sergeant's radio communication problems, and determining whether other vehicles have similar issues
- Training on proper identification/reporting of accidents/incidents

The WMSC is reviewing these areas and others as part of the Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Audit (draft report expected in October). Metrorail is in the process of revising SOP 1A.

Metrorail could also consider increased oversight of and compliance with rules related to personal phone calls and distractions. This may include regular spot checks of phone, ambient and CCTV recordings.

Staff recommendation: Adopt final report.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety and Environmental
Management (SAFE)
FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E21149

Date of Event:	4/15/2021
Type of Event:	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	17:31 hours.
Location:	Greensboro Station, Track 1.
Time and How received by SAFE:	18:15 hours. SAFE On-call Phone
WMSC Notification Time:	20:05 hours.
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA SAFE: No WMSC: No Other: N/A
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 607, [7020-7021.7115-7114.7000-7001. 7235-7234]
Injuries:	No
Damage:	No
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20210419#92860

Greensboro Station
Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
April 15, 2021

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CM	Chain Marker
CMC	Crisis Management Center
COMM	Office of Systems Maintenance Communication Section
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
IC	Incident Commander
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OSC	On-Scene Commander
PA	Public Address
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
ROIC	Rail Operations Information Center
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
SAFE	Department of Safety and Environmental Management
SAFTE-FAST	Sleep, Activity, Fatigue and Task Effectiveness - Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool
SMS I/A	Safety Measurement System Incidents/Accidents
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

On April 15, 2021, at 17:31 hours, the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) was notified by the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Communication Division of a Bomb Threat onboard Train ID 607 and requested the ROCC to instruct the Train Operator to hold at Greensboro Station. Based on Audio Recording System (ARS) playback, at 17:32 hours, the ROCC Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) instructed Silver Line, Train ID 607 Train Operator [consist 7020-7021.7115-7114.7000-7001.7235-7234], to service Greensboro Station, hold, and be governed by MTPD. The ROCC then initiated emergency notifications to the respective internal departments.

Based on ARS playback, at 17:41 hours, the ROCC Radio RTC assigned the RTRA Supervisor as the On-Scene Commander (OSC). At 17:56 hours, ROCC Radio RTC then appointed the RTRA Supervisor as the RTRA Forward Liaison after MTPD assumed the OSC responsibilities. MTPD had not arrived on the scene yet when the ROCC Radio RTC instructed Train ID 607 Train Operator to service Greensboro Station, Track 1, hold and be governed by MTPD. Based on data obtained from the ARS playback, at approximately 17:34 hours, ROCC contacted Train ID 607 Train Operator and asked whether MTPD had arrived. Train ID 607 Train Operator responded in the negative. The RTRA Supervisor, who was already on the scene, then contacted the ROCC Radio RTC and reported MTPD just arrived in their vehicles in the parking lot and were not on scene yet. ARS playback revealed that MTPD was confirmed on the scene at approximately 17:38 hours when Train ID 607 Train Operator reported to the ROCC Radio RTC that MTPD was checking the train. **Note:** Per MSRPH, SOP 14.5.1.4, which states "MTPD will be responsible for overall coordination of a Bomb Threat or related incidents. If local police and/or Fire Department personnel are required to respond to the threat location, MTPD will be the WMATA OSC per SOP 1A." The local police and /or Fire Department personnel were not required to respond.

Based on the Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) playback, Train ID 607 berthed at Greensboro Station, Track 1, at 17:32 hours. At 17:38 hours, Train ID 607 Train Operator notified the ROCC Radio RTC and reported that MTPD was inspecting the train and then reported that MTPD requested the train to be offloaded due to a Bomb Threat. The responding Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor arrived on the scene and assisted with offloading the affected train safely by performing a walk-through interior inspection of the out-of-service train.

Based on Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) 14.5.1.2, MTPD is responsible for determining if facilities are to be evacuated or closed. Based on ARS playback, MTPD instructed RTRA personnel to only have the customers evacuate the train and not the entire Greensboro Station to search the train. At 17:43 hours, the ROCC initiated single-tracking between Spring Hill Station and Tysons Corner Station, Track 2, to ease train congestion and reduce delays.

The MTPD report revealed that at approximately 17:23 hours, they received a call for service for a person who claimed that they were going to bomb the Spring Hill Station and had possibly boarded a Silver Line train in the direction of Largo Town Center Station. The person who made the claim did not remain on the scene for MTPD. At 17:39 hours, Train ID 607 was stopped at Greensboro Station, Track 1, by MTPD. MTPD searched the train for the person and any suspicious items inside the train, but nothing was found. MTPD Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), K-9 Unit was deployed to Greensboro Station, searched the train for any suspicious devices, and found no evidence of a bomb. Additionally, another MTPD EOD, K-9 Unit, searched

and cleared Spring Hill Station. At approximately 17:45 hours, MTPD reviewed Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) footage that revealed the person who made the Bomb Threat boarded Train ID 606, which was at Largo Town Center Station. MTPD EOD, K-9 Unit searched and cleared Train ID 606 and Largo Town Center Station.

Based on ARS playback, at 18:38 hours, RTRA Supervisor reported to the ROCC that Train ID 607 had been released by MTPD. There were no injuries or equipment damage reported as a result of this incident. The ROCC resumed regular rail service at 18:40 hours.


After reviewing the ARS, there did not appear to be any communication deficiencies over the radio. The Crisis Management Center (CMC) was notified by SAFE on April 16, 2021, at 15:45 hours, via email when this event was reclassified from an O-25 to an A-4.

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event on Train ID 607 at Greensboro Station on April 15, 2021, was due to an unknown person threatening to bomb the Spring Hill Station. This was an MTPD related event, and MTPD was responsible for the overall coordination of investigating the Bomb Threat event. The MTPD investigation of all the related WMATA assets involved in this event yielded no sign of explosive devices.

Incident Site

Greensboro Station, Track 1.

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information.

- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Procedures Manual
 - Office of Systems Maintenance Communication Section (COMM)
 - Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) hot wash report
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback [Radio and Phone Communications]
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) playback
 - Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Thursday, April 15, 2021, ARS playback revealed that, at 17:32 hours, the ROCC Radio RTC instructed Silver Line, Train ID 607 Train Operator, consist 7020-7021.7115-7114.7000-7001.7235-7234, to service Greensboro Station, hold, and be governed by MTPD. Per ARS playback, at 17:38 hours, Train ID 607 Train Operator contacted the ROCC Radio RTC and reported that MTPD was inspecting the train and then reported that MTPD requested the train to be offloaded due to a Bomb Threat. The responding RTRA Supervisor arrived on the scene and assisted with offloading the affected train safely by performing a walk-through interior inspection of the out-of-service train. Based on ARS playback, MTPD instructed RTRA personnel only to have the customers evacuate the train and not the entire Greensboro Station to search the train. At 17:43 hours, the ROCC initiated single-tracking between Spring Hill Station and Tysons Corner Station, Track 2. MTPD searched the train for the person and any suspicious items inside the train, but nothing was found. There were no injuries or equipment damage reported as a result of this incident. The ROCC resumed regular rail service at 18:40 hours.

Chronological Event Timeline

Time	Description
17:31:42 hrs.	<u>MTPD Communication:</u> Notified ROCC RTC and requested them to instruct Train ID 607 Train Operator to hold at Greensboro Station. <u>ROCC RTC:</u> Acknowledged. [Phone]
17:32:22 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Notified Train ID 607 Train Operator and instructed them to service Greensboro Station, Track 1, hold and be governed by MTPD. <u>Train ID 607 Train Operator:</u> Acknowledged. [Ops 2]
17:32:42 hrs.	<u>ROCC RTC:</u> Notified ROCC Assistant Superintendent and reported Greensboro Station, Track 1 was being held by MTPD.
17:34:17 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Notified Train ID 607 Train Operator and asked has MTPD arrived? <u>Train ID 607 Train Operator:</u> Responded; that's a negative. <u>RTRA Supervisor:</u> Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported MTPD just pulled up. [Ops 2]

Time	Description
17:34:24 hrs.	<p><u>ROCC RTC</u>: Notified MTPD Communication and asked why Train ID 607 was held at Greensboro Station, Track 1.</p> <p><u>MTPD Communication</u>: Responded, somebody made a Bomb Threat at Spring Hill Station.</p> <p><u>ROCC RTC</u>: Responded, do we need to offload Train ID 607?</p> <p><u>MTPD Communication</u>: Responded, standby. Note: MSRPH, SOP 14.5.1.4 states "MTPD will be responsible for overall coordination of a Bomb Threat or related incidents. A review of the MTPD report revealed that MTPD EOD, K-9 Unit, was deployed to Spring Hill Station, searched, and cleared the station. [Phone]</p>
17:37:01 hrs.	<p><u>ROCC RTC</u>: Notified ROCC Assistant Superintendent and reported MTPD stated somebody made a Bomb Threat at Spring Hill Station, and that's why Train ID 607 Greensboro Station, Track 1, was being held. The ROCC indicated they asked if the train should be offloaded, and MTPD put the ROCC on hold. [Phone]</p>
17:38:43 hrs.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Notified Train ID 607 Train Operator and asked, do you have a status update?</p> <p><u>Train ID 607 Train Operator</u>: Responded, MTPD is checking the train. [Ops 2]</p>
17:39:12 hrs.	<p><u>ROCC RTC</u>: Notified MTPD and asked do we have an update.</p> <p><u>MTPD Communication</u>: Responded, MTPD will probably offload the train because they have to walk the K-9 dog through the train due to a Bomb Threat at Spring Hill Station, and the person boarded the train. MTPD Communication Division reported no MTPD officer at Greensboro Station, yet so Train ID 607 has to hold based on the nature of the call. [Phone]</p>
17:40:30 hrs.	<p><u>Train ID 607 Train Operator</u>: Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported MTPD requested to offload the train due to a Bomb Threat. [Ops 2]</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and requested Train ID 607 Train Operator to offload the train and give the ROCC a radio check with their handheld. [Ops 2]</p>
17:41:01 hrs.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Announced on Ops 2, do we have an RTRA Supervisor at Greensboro Station?</p> <p><u>RTRA Supervisor</u>: Responded; that's affirmative. I am at Greensboro Station and about to verify that the train is clear of customers.</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and indicated you will be the On-Scene Commander (OSC); Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 1A is in effect. [Ops 2]</p>
17:41:23 hrs.	<p><u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u>: Notified the ROCC RTC and reported MTPD was walking through the train to ensure the person did not leave anything on the train. Note: Train ID 607 Train Operator did not specify whether MTPD was on scene at this time. However, based on the CCTV, at approximately 17:36 hours, MTPD was on the scene. [Phone]</p>
17:41:28 hrs.	<p><u>Rail Operations Information (ROIC) Specialist</u>: Notified Greensboro Station Manager and instructed them to go to the platform and indicated Train ID 607 might have to be offloaded. [Ops 2]</p>
17:42:20 hrs.	<p><u>RTRA Supervisor</u>: Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported MTPD would walk through the consist to ensure it was clear of customers. [Ops 2]</p>
17:42:46 hrs.	<p><u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u>: Indicated to the ROCC RTC that they could single-track around incident Train ID 607. [Phone]</p>

Time	Description
17:43:16 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified Train ID 608 Train Operator and indicated they would be single-tracking on Track 2, servicing Spring Hill Station and Greensboro Station, and cross back over to Track 1 at Tysons Corner Station and verify their lunar signal at N04-02. [Ops 2]
17:43:56 hrs.	<u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u> : Indicated to the ROCC RTC that they can service Greensboro Station. [Phone]
17:44:02 hrs.	<u>ROCC RTC</u> : Notified the ROIC Specialist and indicated we are single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station; Track 2 and Train ID 608 was the first train to go through the affected area. [Phone]
17:45:58 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Alerted all Ops 2 Train Operators and reported, we are currently single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station, Track 2, due to police activity at Greensboro Station. Please make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations. [Ops 2]
17:46:07 hrs.	<u>Student ROIC Specialist</u> : Notified MTPD and reported Silver Line trains were single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station, Track 2 due to police investigation at Greensboro Station. <u>MTPD</u> : Acknowledged. [Phone]
17:48:24 hrs.	<u>Unknown Personnel</u> : Contacted ROCC Radio RTC and asked, just a question for future reference, if it's a possible bomb on the train, is it safe to pass through on the other side? [Ops 2] <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Responded, RTRA Supervisor landline the ROCC. [Ops 2]
17:49:01 hrs.	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Notified the ROCC. <u>ROCC RTC</u> : Instructed the RTRA Supervisor to tell Train ID 607 Train Operator to stop repeating bomb over the radio. [Phone]
17:52:10 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Alerted all Ops 2 Train Operators and reported we are currently single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station, Track 2, due to police activity at Greensboro Station. Please make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations. [Ops 2]
17:56:15 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified RTRA Supervisor and asked for the badge number of the MTPD Officer on scene. <u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Responded with the MTPD Officer Badge number. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and indicated that the RTRA Supervisor had been appointed as the RTRA Forward Liaison. [Ops 2]
17:57:26 hrs.	<u>Train ID 609 Train Operator</u> : Notified ROCC Radio RTC and asked if it's safe to service Greensboro Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Responded, confirm Train ID 609 Train Operator it is safe to service Greensboro Station, then you will cross back over to Track 1 at Tysons Corner interlocking. [Ops 2]
18:00:02 hrs.	<u>ROCC RTC</u> : Notified MTPD Communication and asked, were personnel still waiting to clear the train? <u>MTPD Communication</u> : Responded, yes, they are still waiting. [Phone]
18:04:04 hrs.	<u>Student ROIC Specialist</u> : Notified SAFE Rail and Facility Safety Officer and reported Silver Line trains are single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station, Track 2 due to police activity at Greensboro Station with an active delay.

Time	Description
	<u>SAFE Rail and Facility Safety Officer:</u> Responded; once the delay is more than 30 minutes, give me a callback. [Phone]
18:08:44 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Alerted all Ops 2 Train Operators and reported, we are currently single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station, Track 2, due to police activity at Greensboro Station. Please make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations. [Ops 2]
18:15:04 hrs.	<u>Student ROIC Specialist:</u> Notified SAFE Rail and Facility Safety Officer and reported the Silver Line delays had been approximately 30 minutes, and they were single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station, Track 2, due to police activity at Greensboro Station. [Phone]
18:15:38 hrs.	<u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent:</u> Notified SAFE Rail and Facility Safety Officer and reported the Bomb Threat at Greensboro Station. The ROCC Assistant Superintendent reported no injuries, and the customer delay is twelve minutes, and MTPD was currently investigating. [Phone]
18:20:47 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Alerted all Ops 2 Train Operators and reported, we are currently single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station, Track 2, due to police activity at Greensboro Station. Please make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations. [Ops 2]
18:27:08 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Notified RTRA Supervisor and asked for an update. <u>RTRA Supervisor:</u> Responded; MTPD deployed bomb-sniffing dogs and was still sweeping the train. [Ops 2]
18:28:24 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Alerted all Ops 2 Train Operators and reported, we are currently single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station, Track 2, due to police activity at Greensboro Station. Please make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations. [Ops 2]
18:28:57 hrs.	<u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent:</u> Notified Largo Terminal Supervisor and instructed them to offload Train ID 606; MTPD wants to sweep that train. [Phone]
18:29:33 hrs.	<u>Largo Terminal Supervisor:</u> Notified Train ID 606 Train Operator and instructed them to offload their train at Largo Town Center Station. [Largo Yard Ops]
18:34:36 hrs.	<u>Largo Yard Operator:</u> Notified the Largo Terminal Supervisor and reported Train ID 606 consist at Largo Town Center Station was clear of all customers. [Largo Yard Ops]
18:36:24 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Alerted all Ops 2 Train Operators and reported we are currently single-tracking between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station, Track 2, due to police activity at Greensboro Station. Please make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations. [Ops 2]
18:37:43 hrs.	<u>RTRA Supervisor:</u> Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported Train ID 607 had been released by MTPD. <u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Acknowledged. [Ops 2] Note:
18:38:13 hrs.	<u>RTRA Supervisor Two:</u> Notified ROCC and reported Train ID 607 had been released by MTPD. <u>ROCC RTC:</u> Responded, are you able to get on the train and ride with them. <u>RTRA Supervisor:</u> Responded, yes. [Phone]

Time	Description
18:39:10 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified Train ID 607 Train Operator and instructed them to re-block to non-revenue Train ID 707 and continue inbound down the line. [Ops 2]
18:40:45 hrs.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Alerted all Ops 2 Train Operators and reported normal service resumed between Tysons Corner Station and Spring Hill Station. [Ops 2]
18:42:15 hrs.	<u>Student ROIC Specialist</u> : Notified MTPD Communications and reported, we are no longer single-tracking on the Silver Line. [Phone]
18:44:45 hrs.	<u>Student ROIC Specialist</u> : Notified SAFE Rail and Facility Safety Officer and reported, we are no longer single-tracking on the Silver Line. [Phone]
19:40:45 hrs.	<u>ROCC RTC</u> : Notified Largo Terminal Supervisor and asked for an update with Train ID 606. <u>Largo Terminal Supervisor</u> : Responded, MTPD EOD, K-9 Unit searched, and Train ID 606 at Largo Town Center Station, did not say anything to me and departed the station. <u>ROCC RTC</u> : Responded, so MTPD EOD, K-9 Unit departed. Do you see any officers on the Largo Town Center Station platform? <u>Largo Terminal Supervisor</u> : Responded, no. [Phone]
19:41:20 hrs.	<u>ROCC RTC</u> : Notified MTPD Communication and asked were there any updates with Train ID 606 at Largo Town Center Station being held. <u>MTPD Communication</u> : Responded, Train ID 606 can be released MTPD EOD, K-9 Unit already searched and cleared that train. [Phone]
19:42:15 hrs.	<u>ROCC RTC</u> : Notified Largo Terminal Supervisor and reported that Train ID 606 had been released by MTPD and can be utilized for revenue service. <u>Largo Terminal Supervisor</u> : Acknowledged. [Phone]
19:42:47 hrs.	<u>ROCC RTC</u> : Notified ROCC Assistant Superintendent and reported that Train ID 606 had been released. [Phone]

Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)

The MTPD report revealed that at approximately 17:23 hours, the MTPD received a call for service for a person who claimed that they were going to bomb the Spring Hill Station and had possibly boarded a Silver Line train in the direction of Largo Town Center Station. The person who made the complaint did not remain on the scene for MTPD. At 17:39 hours, Train ID 607 was stopped at Greensboro Station, Track 1, by MTPD. MTPD searched the train for the person and any suspicious items inside the train, but nothing was found. MTPD Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), K-9 Unit was deployed to Greensboro Station, searched the train for any suspicious devices, and found no evidence of a bomb. Additionally, another MTPD EOD, K-9 Unit, searched and cleared Spring Hill Station. At approximately 17:45 hours, MTPD reviewed Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) footage that revealed the person who made the Bomb Threat boarded Train ID 606, which was at Largo Town Center Station. MTPD EOD, K-9 Unit searched and cleared Train ID 606 and Largo Town Center Station. See Appendix A.

Office of System Maintenance Communication Section (COMM)

COMM personnel performed a comprehensive radio operational test at Greensboro Station, Tracks 1 and 2. The test was successful, and the signal was at an optimal level. See Appendix B.

Note: After reviewing the Audio Recording System playback, there did not appear to be any communication deficiencies over the radio.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)



Diagram 1 - Based on the AIMS playback, Train ID 607 berthed at Greensboro Station, Track 1, at 17:32:24 hours.




Diagram 2 – Based on the AIMS playback, at 17:47:24 hours, Train ID 608 was the first train to enter the single-track area servicing Greensboro Station and ending the customer delay.




Diagram 2 – Based on the AIMS playback, at 18:40:24 hours, Train ID 607 was re-blocked to non-revenue Train ID 707 and continued inbound down the line.

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)



Figure 1 - Based on the CCTV, at approximately 17:32 hours, Train ID 607 was approaching Greensboro Station, Track 1, 8-car marker.



Figure 2 - Based on the CCTV, at approximately 17:36 hours, MTPD inspected Train ID 607.



Figure 3 - Based on the CCTV, at approximately 17:40 hours, Train ID 607 was offloaded at Greensboro Station, Track 1.




Figure 4 - Based on the CCTV, at approximately 18:38 hours, MTPD searched the train for the person and any suspicious items inside the train, but nothing was found.

Weather

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature at 64° F with broken clouds and 39% humidity. (Weather source: National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration – Location: McLean, VA.)

Human Factors

Fatigue

Based on SAFE's review of the Train Operator 7-day work history, the employee's 7-day work schedule leading up to the incident was compliant with WMATA'S Policy/Instruction 10.6/1 Hours of Service Limitations for Prevention of Fatigue. It did not present a risk of impairment due to fatigue.

Evidence of Fatigue

The incident data was evaluated, and no signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data.

Fatigue Risk

The incident data was evaluated for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were not present. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The off-duty period was 14.06 hours which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep.

Since fatigue evidence and risk factors were not present, the biomathematical fatigue modeling application Sleep, Activity, Fatigue and Task Effectiveness - Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (SAFTE-FAST) was not applied.

Findings

- Based on the ARS review at approximately 17:22 hours, ROCC Assistant Superintendent used the ROCC phone for personal use to contact the Doubletree Hotel during the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event. The ROCC Assistant Superintendent remained on the phone with the hotel from approximately 17:22 hours to approximately 17:36 hours and then again from approximately 18:19 hours to approximately 18:34 hours. **Note:** This did not appear to have an impact on the ROCC response. The RTC and ROIC Specialist quickly routed radio and phone communication to Train ID 607 Train Operator and respective internal departments. Additionally, MTPD was responsible for the overall coordination of investigating the Bomb Threat event.
- The AIMS display showed that Train ID 607 was held at Greensboro Station, Track 2.
- An RTRA supervisor performed OSC duties even when MTPD was on scene. Per MSRPH, SOP 14.5.1.4, states "MTPD will be responsible for overall coordination of a Bomb Threat or related incidents. If local police and/or Fire Department personnel are required to respond to the threat location, MTPD will be the WMATA OSC per SOP 1A." **Note:** The local police and /or Fire Department personnel were not required to respond.
- Based on the ARS review at approximately 17:32 hours, the ROCC Radio Rail RTC instructed Train ID 607 Train Operator to service Greensboro Station, hold, and be governed by MTPD. The ROCC SPOTS revealed that Train ID 606 was at East Falls Church Station operating towards Largo Town Center Station.
- Based on CCTV playback, MTPD reported the person who made the Bomb Threat boarded Train ID 606, which was at Largo Town Center Station. MTPD EOD, K-9 Unit searched and cleared Train ID 606 and Largo Town Center Station.
- Based on CCTV playback, Train ID 607 was offloaded, and MTPD searched the train for the person who made the threat and any suspicious items inside the train, but nothing was found.
- The Train Operator did not have any causal factors contributing to this incident.
- Based on ARS playback, there was a lack of communication within MTPD. At 17:38 hours, Train ID 607 Train Operator reported that MTPD was checking the train to the ROCC. However, at approximately 17:39 hours, MTPD Communication stated to the ROCC that no MTPD officers are at Greensboro Station yet.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- The ROCC Radio RTC instructed Train ID 607 Train Operator to service Greensboro Station, hold, and be governed by MTPD so that MTPD can conduct their incident investigation.
- MTPD requested the offload of the consist to conduct their investigation.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event on Train ID 607 at Greensboro Station on April 15, 2021, was due to an unknown person threatening to bomb the Spring Hill Station. This was an MTPD related event, and MTPD was responsible for the overall coordination of investigating the Bomb Threat event. The MTPD investigation of all the related WMATA assets involved in this event yielded no sign of explosive devices.

SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

At the time of this report, no new corrective actions were identified related to the bomb threat procedure and response coordination with the jurisdictional emergency responders. Corrective actions related to MTPD and Roadway Worker Protection are in progress, as noted in Event Report 20488 (Customer Evacuation at Fort Totten Station). Relevant Corrective Actions from that report are copied below for reference:

Corrective Action Code (E20488)	Description (E20488)
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_002	Shall develop an incident response / IC quick [tick] checklist to identify responsibilities, respective equipment, processes upon arrival
90755_SAFECAPS_SAFE_006	The newly-created Incident Management Official's role shall be clearly defined when emergency response procedures are enacted. This includes supporting the Incident Commander when SOP 1A is followed.
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_007	Annual MIRs shall include reviews of the ROCC emergency SOPs, which are covered during new recruit training.
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_008	MTPD Hot Washes shall include an evaluation of RWP practices.
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_009	ROCC and MTPD shall conduct after action reviews after each emergency response incident; this is in addition to MTPD's field Hot Wash reviews. Lessons learned will be documented, as well as mitigations that would address issues experienced.
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_011	The Incident Commander shall communicate to ROCC the full section of track that is part of their oversight when SOP 1A is enacted.

Appendix A – MTPD Hot Wash Report



Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary



ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. **Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.**

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:		Bomb Threat	
*Incident Commander (IC):		[REDACTED]abb	
MTPD CCN:	[REDACTED]	Local CCN:	None
*Date ICS Initiated:	4/15/21	*Time ICS Initiated:	1745 hrs
*Date ICS Terminated:	4/15/21	*Time ICS Terminated:	1836 hrs
*Duration of Incident:	49 minutes	*Service Disrupted (Type and Time):	Single Tracking 1747-1836
Incident Location:	Greensboro Metro Station	Command Post Location:	Mezzanine over looking the platform
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	[REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	None
Forward Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Unified Command:	None
OCC Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Alternate Channel:	MTPD 3X
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	1747-1836	Bus Bridge Established (From /To):	None
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	Inner perimeter	Power De-energized:	None
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name <u>N/A</u> Dept: <u>N/A</u>	None	Medical Attention Required/Requested:	None
Entry/Exit Log:	[REDACTED]	CID Response:	[REDACTED]

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Attachment 1 – Page 1 of 4.

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
[REDACTED]	MTPD	Greensboro On Scene Command
[REDACTED]	MTPD	Spring Hill Area Command
[REDACTED]	MTPD	Greensboro Forward Liasion
[REDACTED]	MTPD	Entry Exit Log
[REDACTED]	MTPD/EOD	EOD K-9 Unit
[REDACTED]	MTPD/EOD	Spring Hill Forward Liasion
[REDACTED]	MTPD	Patrol Sergeant
[REDACTED]	Rail	Rail Supervisor
[REDACTED]	Rail	Train Operator
[REDACTED]	OEM	Emergency Management
[REDACTED]	Rail	Station Manager

EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Agency/Department	Title/Role

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

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Attachment 1 – Page 2 of 4.

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	Yes
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	CCU
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	Yes
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	DVEU

OBSERVATIONS
<p>At 1723 hours MTPD units received a call for service an individual who said he was going to blow up Spring Hill Metro Station and possibly boarded a silver line train in the direction of Largo Town Center. The complainant did not remain on scene.</p> <p>The train was stopped at Greensboro and checked by Officer [REDACTED] at 1739 hours. Officer [REDACTED] canvassed the train for the suspect and any suspicious items, with negative results. Patrons on train were escorted off to another train. The station was NOT evacuated.</p> <p>Officer [REDACTED] set up On Scene Command at 1745 hours on the platform and switched to MTPD Radio Channel 3X.</p> <p>At 1747 hours single tracking was established from Spring Hill to Tyson Corner.</p> <p>[REDACTED] arrived on scene at Spring Hill at 1750 hours and assumed Spring Hill Area Command. [REDACTED] arrived at Greensboro and assumed On Scene Command. [REDACTED] met with Rail Supervisor [REDACTED] and relocated the command post to the mezzanine area overlooking the platform.</p> <p>EOD Officer [REDACTED] arrived at Greensboro and swept the train for suspicious devices. During this time EOD Officer [REDACTED] swept and cleared Spring Hill Station.</p> <p>At approximately 1745 hours Sergeant [REDACTED] reviewed video footage and was able to locate the suspect. The suspect boarded train 606 which was at LTCS, this information was passed onto units in the field.</p> <p>Service resumed at 1836 hours.</p> <p>Train 606 was swept by [REDACTED] at LTCS with negative results.</p> <p>A hot wash was conducted with MTP units on scene to include Rail Supervisor [REDACTED] and Emergency Management [REDACTED]</p>

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Attachment 1 – Page 3 of 4.

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

NOTES

Officer [REDACTED] established command quickly but it never came over the air. Officer [REDACTED] should have established himself as the forward liaison when he arrived on scene with Officer [REDACTED]. Officer [REDACTED] established then entry/exit log.

EOD and Patrol units worked well together to quickly evacuate the train and ensure there were no immediate life safety issues.

While responding to Greensboro from 495, Sgt. [REDACTED] lost radio communication and could not hear radio transmissions from his vehicle.

A good perimeter was established at Greensboro.

The rail supervisor and the train operator were unaware of the nature of the call for service.

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 4/16/21

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 4/16/21

Patrol Operations Bureau Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4/16/21

Office of Emergency Management Director's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4/16/2021

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Attachment 1 – Page 4 of 4.

Appendix B – COMM Work Order Details



Work Order #: 16279364
Type: GS

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details



Page 1 of 1
MX76PROD

Status: COMP
04/16/2021 22:44

Work Description: N03, SAFTEY REPORT OF INCIDENT AND IN NEED OF CRCS COVARGE TEST.
Job Plan Description:


Work Information									
Asset: 60339 RADIO, CRCS, REMOTE SITE, T53		Owning Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO		Parent:					
Asset Tag:		Maintenance Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO		Create Date: 04/16/2021 22:08					
Asset S/N: CRCSRST53		Labor Group: COMM3RADO		Actual Start: 04/16/2021 22:44					
Location: 7025 T53, CRCS RADIO ANTENNA SITE, RESTON INTERNATIONAL CENTER		Crew:		Actual Comp: 04/16/2021 22:44					
Work Location:		Lead: [REDACTED]		Item: N60040086					
Failure Class: COMR003 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS		GL Account: [REDACTED]		Target Start:					
Problem Code: 3669 COMMS FAILURE		Supervisor:		Target Comp:					
Requested By: [REDACTED]		Requestor Phone:		Scheduled Start:					
Create-Mileage: 0.0		Complete-Mileage: 0.0							
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10 SEE LONG DESCRIPTION.									
ALL RADIO CHECKS BY UNIT 305 & 3075 FROM N03 PLATFORM, MEZZANINE AREAS AND UNDER CANOPY AS WELL AS ELEVATOR AREAS WERE LOUD AND CLEAR.									
Component:	Work Accomp:	Reason:	Status: COMP	Position:	Warranty?: N				
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	04/16/2021	04/16/2021	20:00	22:00	Y	02:00	00:00	\$78.59
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	04/16/2021	04/16/2021	20:00	22:00	Y	02:00	00:00	\$78.99
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	04/16/2021	04/16/2021	20:00	22:00	Y	02:00	00:00	\$81.34
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							06:00	00:00	\$238.92
Failure Reporting									
Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark	Date					
1397 COMM OPS RADIO SYSTEM PROBLEM	1061 ALIGNED								
Remarks:									

WT_plust_woprint.rptdesign

04/17/2021 10:13

Attachment 2 – Page 1 of 1.

Appendix C - Root Cause Analysis



Attachment 3 – Page 1 of 1.