



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0123 – Improper Roadway Worker Protection – Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Station – June 21, 2021

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on October 26, 2021

Safety event summary:

A Metrorail employee walked on the roadway without permission in an area near Reagan National Airport Station that was being traversed by Prime Mover 26, (PM26) a Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM). This led to a near collision with that employee. The Equipment Operator of PM26 reported this event to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) as PM26 crossed from Track 2 to Track 1 via the pocket track at the station.

The Automatic Train Control (ATC) Technician told the ROCC that they had gotten permission from the Roadway Worker In-Charge (RWIC) to work on Track 1 at the station. The RWIC stated that they had not given the ATC Technician permission to access the roadway at that time.

The area was part of a multi-day single-tracking work zone that included a Roadway Job Safety Briefing location at a construction trailer near the future Potomac Yard-VT Station. These briefings are conducted by an individual at that location, not the RWIC for the work area. After that briefing, there was no additional briefing documented related to this crew's specific work. Following the general briefing at the trailer, the RWIC stated that the ATC Technician, acting as a crew leader, contacted the RWIC via cell phone. The RWIC stated that they told the ATC Technician to wait for a red tag (power outage involving racking out breakers to prevent inadvertent power restoration) before entering the roadway. The investigation identified that the RWIC and ATC Technician may not have fully understood each other during the conversation. The ATC technician has worked for WMATA for 13 years, and the RWIC, a Track Repair "B" Mechanic, has worked for WMATA for 3.5 years.

The ATC Technician stated that they were assigned to check on Switch 5, and that they got permission from the RWIC. While intending to walk to Switch 5, the ATC Technician stated that they instead walked to Switch 9, at which time they saw PM26 coming toward them. The ATC Technician did not have permission to be on the roadway to begin work on either switch.

Although this event was reported to a ROCC Assistant Superintendent, Metrorail allowed the ATC Technician and the RWIC to continue working, which is contrary to WMATA policies that require removal from service for post-event drug and alcohol testing.

Metrorail notified the WMSC of this event 2 hours 20 minutes after it occurred, which is not within the required two-hour notification window.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was inadequate communication, inadequate supervisory oversight, and inadequate standardization of communication to ensure effective, accurate and fully understood communication among all personnel.



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Corrective Actions:

Metrorail revised weekend work zone briefing scripts to reflect required communication between each crew leader and the RWIC.

WMSC staff observations:

This near miss is an example of the risks of inadequate communication.

The WMSC is examining physical characteristics training through other oversight activities, including the ongoing Rail Operations Audit.

Staff recommendation: Adopt final report.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety and Environmental
Management (SAFE)
FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E21252

| | |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Date of Event: | 06/21/2021 |
| Type of Event: | Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) |
| Incident Time: | 00:38 hours |
| Location: | National Airport Station, Track 1 |
| Time and How received by SAFE: | 00:50 hours – SAFE On-Call Phone |
| WMSC Notification Time: | 02:58 hours |
| Responding Safety Officers: | WMATA: No WMSC: No Other: No |
| Rail Vehicle: | N/A |
| Injuries: | None |
| Damage: | None |
| SMS I/A Incident Number: | 20210702#94243 |

National Airport Station – Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Violation

June 21, 2021

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|--------------|---|
| AIMS | Advanced Information Management System |
| ARS | Audio Recording System |
| ASST | Assistant |
| ATC | Automatic Train Control |
| CAP | Corrective Action Plan |
| CF | Contributing Factor |
| CM | Chain Marker |
| GOTRS | General Orders & Track Rights System |
| I/A | Incidents/Accidents |
| MSRPH | Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook |
| NOAA | National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |
| PLNT | Office of Plant Maintenance |
| PM | Prime Mover |
| RC | Root Cause |
| ROCC | Rail Operations Control Center |
| RWIC | Roadway Worker In Charge |
| RWP | Roadway Worker Protection |
| SAFE | Department of Safety and Environmental Management |
| SMS | Safety Measurement System |
| SRC | Safety Risk Coordinator |
| SUPT | Superintendent |
| TRST | Office of Track and Structures |
| WMATA | Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority |
| WMSC | Washington Metrorail Safety Commission |

Executive Summary

On Monday, June 21, 2021, at approximately 00:38 hours, an Automatic Train Control (ATC) Technician was reported being on the roadway without permission to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) by the vehicle operator of Prime Mover (PM) 26 at National Airport Station, Track 1, near Signal C10-38. ROCC notified SAFE of the Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) violation at approximately 00:50 hours. ROCC contacted the Track and Structures (TRST) Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) and was informed the ATC Technician did not receive permission to enter the roadway. Additionally, when ROCC contacted the ATC Technician, the ATC Technician stated they were given permission to enter roadway by the RWIC. Both employees were permitted to continue work and were not removed from service. There were no reported injuries as a result of this incident.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) playback [radio and landline] indicated that the vehicle operator of PM26 contacted ROCC to report an employee walking on the roadway as they were traveling through Nation Airport Station, Track 1 in the direction of Crystal City Station. ROCC instructed PM26 operator to contact ROCC via landline. PM26 vehicle operator contacted ROCC via landline and disclosed they saw an employee run across the tracks as they were approaching Signal C10-38, Track 1. ROCC contacted the ATC Technician to ascertain if they were on the roadway and who gave them permission. The ATC Technician responded that the TRST RWIC gave them permission to enter the roadway. Next, ROCC contacted the RWIC via landline and asked if they gave the ATC Technician permission to enter the roadway. The RWIC denied giving the ATC Technician access to the roadway. The RWIC and ATC Technician were not removed from service.

The primary probable cause of the incident was inadequate communication between the RWIC and the ATC Technician. The ATC Technician assumed they received confirmation to access the roadway to perform their work assignment. However, the RWIC stated they did not give the ATC Technician permission to access the roadway. Due to the use of cellular communications between the ATC Technician and RWIC, the root cause of the communication deficiencies could not be determined.

Incident Site

National Airport Station, Track 1



- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - ARS (Audio Recording System) playback [Radio and Landline Communications]
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) Playback

Investigation

Based on findings, at approximately 00:38 hours, a New Carrollton Division, ATC Technician was seen on the roadway without permission by the vehicle operator of PM26 near National Airport Station, Track 1, Signal C10-38. PM26 was traveling through the work area at National Airport Station and while crossing over from Track 2 to Track 1 (via pocket track), they noticed personnel walking in the roadway. PM26 contacted ROCC and reported to incident. ROCC contacted the ATC Technician to ascertain about their work assignment and location on the roadway. The ATC Technician stated they were working on Track 1 at National Airport Station and was given permission to enter the roadway from the RWIC. Subsequently, ROCC contacted the RWIC to ascertain if the ATC Technician was given permission to enter the roadway. The RWIC reported the ATC Technician was not given permission to access the roadway at that time.

The RWIC stated the Roadway Job Safety Briefing was given by an authorized person at a construction trailer, near the future Potomac Yard Station, as work crews entered the work area during various times throughout the weekend. The RWIC stated after ATC personnel received their safety briefing, the crew leader contacted the RWIC via cell phone to receive the work assignment. The RWIC stated the ATC Technician called to receive work instructions but was told to wait for the completion of the red tag before entering the roadway. The RWIC was later contacted by ROCC and informed of the incident.

The ATC Technician stated they were communicating with the RWIC and needed to go check on Switch 5. The ATC Technician stated the RWIC gave them permission to check the switch. While walking to the switch, the ATC Technician stated they went to Switch 9 mistakenly and noticed PM26 coming towards their way. The ATC Technician then reported they moved to a place a safety to allow PM26 to pass through safely. The ATC Technician was later contacted by ROCC and asked about the incident.

Both the RWIC and ATC Technician were permitted to continue to work and were not removed from service by their management as both TRST and ATC reported that their personnel were not at fault based on their preliminary assessments at the time of the incident. No injuries occurred as a result of this incident.

*Note: Both employees should have been removed from service to determine if a safety violation had been committed. ROCC personnel did not remove the employees as they reported that they could not determine if an RWP violation had been committed in the immediate.

Chronological Event Timeline

ARS playback revealed the operator of PM26 contacted ROCC to report personnel walking on the roadway. ROCC contacted both the ATC Technician and the RWIC via landline to ascertain who granted permission for the ATC Technician to enter the roadway. The ATC Technician stated the RWIC gave them permission to access the roadway. However, the RWIC reported to ROCC they did not give the ATC Technician permission to enter the roadway.

| Time | Description |
|----------------|---|
| 00:38:13 hours | <u>ROCC</u> : ROCC asks PM26 if they are clear of Signal C10-34, in the pocket track at National. PM26 operator states they are clear of Signal C10-34 and will be clear of Signal C10-38 in 10 seconds. [Radio] |
| 00:39:23 hours | <u>PM26</u> : Reported clear of National Airport Station, Signal C10-38. Vehicle operator stated when they get to Crystal City Station they need to stop and give ROCC a landline. [Radio] |
| 00:39:41 hours | <u>Unit 1111</u> : Calls RWIC (Unit 6097) and requests permission to enter work area on Track 1, C1 408+00 to cross over to Track 2 for hot sticking and then cross back over to Track 1 to clear the work area. [Radio] |
| 00:40:10 hours | <u>RWIC</u> : Acknowledges Unit 1111's request and grants them permission to enter the work area to hot stick on Track 2 and cross back over to Track 1 to exit the work area. [Radio] |
| 00:40:59 hours | <u>ROCC</u> : Receives a landline from PM26 vehicle operator stating they witnessed an employee wearing a WMATA vest who crossed over in front of their vehicle as they were passing Signal C10-38. ROCC informs Assistant (ASST) Superintendent (SUPT) of the incident. [Landline] |
| 00:43:35 hours | <u>ROCC ASST SUPT</u> : Receives a landline from PM26 vehicle operator stating as they were traveling through National Airport Station from Track 2 to Track 3 to Track 1, a person with a WMATA safety vest crossed in front of their vehicle. [Landline] |
| 00:43:35 hours | <u>ROCC ASST SUPT</u> : Receives a landline from the ATC Technician stating they received permission from the RWIC to enter the roadway at National Airport Station on Track 1. [Landline] |
| 02:18:55 hours | <u>ROCC ASST SUPT</u> : Receives a landline from the RWIC stating they did not give the ATC Technician permission the roadway while the restoration tag was in progress. [Landline] |
| 02:38:26 hours | <u>ROCC ASST SUPT</u> : Informs the RWIC to contact SAFE in the morning once the work area is restored. [Landline] |

***Note: Times listed above may differ from other system times due to differences in settings*

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) Playback




Photo #1 – PM 26 crossing over from Track 2 to Track 3. PM 26 Vehicle Operator noticed and reported personnel on the roadway to ROCC at approximately 00:38:15 hours.




Photo #2 – PM 26 crossing over from Track 3 to Track 1 at Signal C10-38. PM 26 clears personnel on the roadway at approximately 00:38:50 hours.

Interview Findings

Based on the investigation launched into the improper RWP violation at National Airport Station, SAFE conducted formal interviews via Microsoft Teams, which included the investigation team, relevant Metro personnel and representatives from the WMSC. The interviews conducted identified the following key findings associated with this event:

The Vehicle Operator of PM 26 reported personnel on the roadway near Signal C10-38. The RWIC reported they did not give the ATC Technician instructions to enter the roadway as they were waiting for the restoration tag process to be completed. The ATC Technician reported the

RWIC gave them permission to enter the roadway. The communication between the RWIC and ATC Technician occurred via cell phone and could not be verified.

Findings

- The RWIC's protected work area included Chain Marker (CM) C1 338+44 to C1 519+35.
- The RWIC did not document the meeting of personnel before entering the roadway on the department-issued safety briefing form. This action was not in compliance with MSRPH SOP #28 – 28.5.4.5 – *“Prior to starting work, the RWIC shall brief the personnel of the work crew on applicable WMATA safety rules/procedures, tracks(s) involved, work area limits, the means of protection, safe areas in which to clear, red tag number and any restrictions on the work, and document meeting on department issued safety briefing form.”*
- The ATC Technician did not receive permission from the RWIC prior to entering the roadway. This action was not in compliance with MSRPH Section 5 – 5.15 Piggybacking – *“The Crew Leaders shall request permission from the RWIC to enter the working limits. If the work crew must access the Roadway outside of the established working limits, the Crew Leader shall request permission from ROCC to enter the Roadway.”*
- The ATC Technician contacted the RWIC via cell phone to receive work instructions.
- ATC and PICO management did not remove the involved personnel from service to determine if an RWP violation had been committed.
- Post incident testing was not conducted on either employee for this RWP violation.

Weather

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature at 77° F, winds South to North at 8 mph, passing clouds with visibility of 10 miles. Humidity was at 82%. Based on findings, SAFE has concluded that weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Arlington, VA.)

Human Factors

Fatigue

RWIC

Evidence of Fatigue:

The incident data was evaluated for evidence of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. No video of the involved person was available to ascertain whether evidence of fatigue was present. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident and did not experience any symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk:

The incident data was evaluated for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The employee reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked evening shifts (17:00 – 01:00) in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 10.6 hours at the time of the incident and reported a total of 6 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period preceding the incident was 40 hours long, which

provides an opportunity for adequate sleep. The employee reported that this was comparable to the amount of sleep on a normal workday. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

ATC Technician

Evidence of Fatigue:

The incident data was evaluated for evidence of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident and did not experience any symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk:

The incident data was evaluated for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The employee reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked night shifts (22:00 – 06:00) in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 8.6 hours at the time of the incident and reported a total of 7 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period preceding the incident was 16 hours long, which provides an opportunity for adequate sleep. This employee reported that this was comparable to the amount of sleep on a routine workday. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

At the time of this incident, the RWIC and ATC Technician were not removed from service for post-incident toxicology testing. Based on SAFE's investigative findings and Metro's Drug and Alcohol Policy, the involved personnel should have been removed from service for post-incident testing given the known facts at the time of the incident. Under WMATA's current Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy Instruction 7.7.3/6, post-incident testing may be performed on employees and contractors whose performance cannot be "completely discounted" as a contributor to an event.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- This incident was reported to SAFE.

Probable Cause Statement

The primary probable cause of the incident was inadequate communication between the RWIC and the ATC Technician. The ATC Technician assumed they received confirmation to access the roadway to perform their work assignment. However, the RWIC stated they did not give the ATC Technician permission to access the roadway. Due to the use of cellular communications between the ATC Technician and RWIC, the root cause of the communication deficiencies could not be determined.


SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

The following are the recommendations and corrective actions identified as a result of this investigation. These recommendations and corrective actions are tracked using WMATA's Safety Measurement System Incidents/Accidents (SMS I/A) Module and are verified by SAFE upon completion. The responsible department is identified in the corrective action code, and the respective departmental Safety Risk Coordinator (SRC) will manage the mitigation. Refer to the SMS I/A Module for additional information.

| Corrective Action Code | Description | Responsible Party | Due Date |
|-------------------------------|---|--------------------------|-----------------|
| 94243_SAFE CAPS_WWP L_001 | (RC-1, CF-1) Office of Way Work Planning (WWPL) – WWPL will revise weekend scripts to reflect a proper communication channel between the RWIC and piggyback crews. | WWPL SRC | 9/1/2021 |
| 94243_SAFE CAPS_ATC_001 | (RC-1, CF-1) ATC management will ensure supervisors are aware of procedures for removal of personnel from service following a safety violation and Policy Instruction 7.7.3/6 Drug & Alcohol Policy And Testing Program concerning Post-Incident Testing. | ATC SRC | 11/1/2021 |
| 94243_SAFE CAPS_TRST_001 | (RC-1, CF-1) TRST management will ensure supervisors are aware of procedures to removal personnel from service following a safety violation and Policy Instruction 7.7.3/6 Drug & Alcohol Policy And Testing Program concerning Post-Incident Testing. | TRST SRC | 11/1/2021 |


Appendices

Appendix A - Root Cause Analyses



Root Cause Analysis





Root Cause Analysis



Appendix B – Interview Summaries

The below narratives are summaries of the interviews with SAFE and represent the statements made by the involved individuals. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

RWIC

This employee is a WMATA Track Repair “B” Mechanic with a total of three and a half years of experience: one and a half years as a “B” Mechanic, one year as a “C” Mechanic and one year as a “D” Mechanic. The RWIC’s last RWP certification was in November 2020, as a Level 4. This employee has no history of sleep issues to report.

The RWIC reported their work assignment was to assist contractors with cleaning up the work area and removing all of their equipment from the roadway, send units to and from the work area to Alexandria Yard, and upon receipt of the restoration tag, permit ATC personnel to enter the roadway to perform work. The RWIC stationed themselves at Potomac Yard to oversee the night operations. The RWIC stated they had a designated safety briefer for the shutdown to brief all personnel entering the roadway for the shutdown. The RWIC stated at approximately 11:30 hours, they contacted ATC crew leaders to ascertain if they had all personnel and equipment ready to reconnect bonds. RWIC stated there were three ATC Crews at National Airport (C10), Potomac Yard (C11) and Braddock Road (C12) on standby. RWIC reported he explained specific instructions needed at C10 with the ATC Technician; in addition to explaining they were waiting for a restoration tag before the RWIC could hot stick the work area on Track 2 and permit all ATC Crews to enter the roadway. The RWIC stated the work routine had remained unchanged for the last month with the work crews conducting these operations. The RWIC stated he only spoke with the ATC Technician once to inform them they did not have access to the roadwork yet. Once contacted by ROCC, RWIC reported they were surprised about the incident.

Automatic Train Control (ATC) Technician

This employee is a WMATA ATC Technician with a total of 13 years of service; 11 years of service as an ATC Technician and 2 years of service as an ATC Supervisor. The ATC Technician is currently certified as RWP-4 as of May 2021. They have no history of sleep issues to report.

Based on the SAFE interview, the ATC Technician reported they were performing ATC duties at National Airport and was granted permission by the RWIC to inspect Switch 5. The ATC Technician stated they incorrectly went to Switch 9 on Track 1 and while traveling to Switch 5, moved to a place of safety as a prime mover was coming in their direction from Track 3. The ATC Technician stated they did not see any shunts or lights/lanterns and could not tell the exact chain markers of their location. After the vehicle passed, the ATC Technician reported they surveyed Switch 5 and finished the rest of the work assignments for the night. After completion, they stated ROCC informed them via landline someone had reported them as a RWP safety violator. The ATC Technician stated they contacted the RWIC via cell and was instructed that the night’s work assignment was to pick up all of ATC’s equipment as the project was finishing up. The ATC Technician stated they have been working on this project for 6 years and the routine has remained unchanged for contacting the RWIC before entering a work area.

Appendix C – PICO - General Orders & Track Rights System (GOTRS) Request

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM
Track Rights Request

Request Summary

| | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Request Number: | 202115202600 | Track Access: | True |
| Dates Requested: | 06/18/2021 23:01 to: 06/21/2021 03:00 | Clear In Ten: | False |
| Request Status: | Approved | Equipment on Track: | 0 |
| Requestor: | [REDACTED] | Allow Piggybacks: | True |
| Requestor Organization: | DECO/MCAP | In Piggyback: | Yes, Senior |
| Switch Order: | Approved (2021170510) | Power Outage: | Red Tag Request is for RSA21-533 |
| Lock Out / Tag Out: | Yes | Additional AC: | |
| Request Title: | RSA21-533 Request | | |

Location, Work Type and Description

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Location: | Mainline |
| Non-Wayside Location Type: | |
| Request Type: | Expedited |
| Charge Job Number: | |
| Contract Number: | |
| Maximo Work Order: | |
| Request Group: | No |
| Location Description: | Single Track RSA21-533 |
| Request Description: | Install Trough and Conduit for Fiber Cable |
| Work Type: | Other |
| Meeting Location: | C11 Project Trailer |
| PB Meeting Location: | |
| Tools and Equipment: | PPE, Contractors Hi_rails 3 Trucks, 2 Mini Excavators, Spot Tamper |
| Equipment on Track: | |

Track 1

| | | |
|----------------------|---------|---------|
| Actual Work Area: | C362+65 | C514+35 |
| Protected Work Area: | C338+44 | C519+35 |

Hot Stick Info. Third Rail Gaps:

| From | To | Track ID |
|---------|---------|----------|
| C338+44 | C371+14 | 1 |
| C371+70 | C407+48 | 1 |
| C408+04 | C455+15 | 1 |
| C455+71 | C493+86 | 1 |
| C494+42 | C519+35 | 1 |

Date & Time

As of 06/18/2021 08:31
1 of 5

*Let Ate know
Restriction on track 2
from C10 - C12
C2 371-514*

Document #1 – TRST GOTRS Request depicting their protected work area.

Appendix D – Safety Briefing Script for C-Line (C10 – C12) Weekend TK1 Single Track

6-21-2021

Safety Briefing Script for C-Line (C10-C12) Weekend TK1 Single Track
06-18-2021 to 06-21-2021

ALL safety briefers are to read the briefing out loud for all personnel to hear during the safety briefing.

Hello, My Name is _____

This Weekend TK1 Single Track is from: 23:01 on June 18, 2021 until 04:00 on June 21, 2021.

The RWIC on duty is – **PICO/RECP (See Contact Sheet)**.

Today's Date is _____, 2021

Safety Rule of the day is: _____

The current weather conditions are _____

Make sure to stay hydrated at all times.

This briefing is for the Weekend TK1 Single Track area between C10-C12.

This is a **RED TAG/LOTO** Power Outage. The RWIC is the RED Tag holder.

You must contact the RWIC before entering the work area.

The RWIC will be on OPS-3 and can be reached by phone at (OPS-3) 202-962-1502 or Contact Sheet

The single tracking using Inaccessible Track (IT) protection with wooden ties as the barriers.

The shunts, lights, wooden cross ties and work mats are at Chain Markers: **C1 362+65 and C2 519+00.**

No stations will be closed within the working limits.

PICO/RECP will be working from C1 465+80 to C1 519+00 for troughs, portal retaining wall, FRE conduits, and cable clips. TRST SW will be working from C1 371+70 to C1 373+00 for grout repair and debris removal.

The safety briefing location will be at **(C11) Potomac Yard (Future Station) Construction Trailer.**

Parking: Please note that this is a construction site. Be mindful of uneven surfaces and debris.

Safety Concerns

- There are RMM's in the work area, be diligent of movement at all times. During any work being performed, a watchman/lookout must be used.
- There are multiple work groups working within the area at all times.
- You must contact the work group leader to enter their area within the single track.
- Watch for poor footing, poor lighting at night, debris, loose cables, sound hazards, drilling, and obstacles.
- Proper footwear and face coverings/masks are required anytime entering the work area.
- Watch for items that could potentially fall on your feet and cause damage.
- Be mindful of social distancing and make sure that you are wearing a face mask/cover, as well as any other safety precautions.
- Be diligent to not damage any equipment that is located in the work area especially when working, walking or stepping around switch machines.
- Closest Hospitals: Inova Mt. Vernon Hospital (703) 664-7000 and Inova Alexandria Hospital (703) 504-3000.

Are there any questions concerning something I may or may not have covered?

Please have your PPE and ID cards ready for inspection.

Also, please ensure proper social distancing!

Please discard this script after 05:00hrs on 06-21-21

Document #2 – Safety Briefing Script used for the C-Line weekend project from 6-18-2021 – 06-21-2021