



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0137 – Evacuation for Life-Safety Reasons – Pentagon Station – August 3, 2021

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on December 7, 2021

Safety event summary:

During the response to the stabbing of a law enforcement officer by a member of the public, and an associated report of an active shooter after law enforcement responded to the threat, Metrorail evacuated Pentagon Station for life-safety reasons. This safety investigation relates to that evacuation and related aspects of Metrorail's emergency preparedness and response. This safety investigation does not include the criminal investigation into the initial event.

Metrorail did not properly establish on-scene command and failed to properly notify and effectively communicate with personnel in a timely manner. This resulted in confusion and a delay in aspects of the safety response.

At 10:49 a.m., a Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Assistant Superintendent received notification from a Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) Information Specialist that Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) reported an active shooter event at Pentagon Station. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) instructed all Train Operators in approach to Pentagon Station on tracks 1 and 2 to hold on the platform as the ROIC Information Specialist, after being prompted by the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Assistant Superintendent, called to confirm with MTPD whether the station should be closed.

The Information Specialist confirmed the request to close Pentagon Station with MTPD and notified the ROCC Assistant Superintendent. The ROCC Assistant Superintendent separately received a call from an upper-level member of Metrorail's executive management team (which was made outside of the incident command system process), instructing the Superintendent to bypass Pentagon Station in both directions until further notice.

The ROCC Assistant Superintendent instructed the Radio RTC to have train operators bypass Pentagon Station in both directions. At 10:52 a.m. the Radio RTC instructed Train 302 Train Operator, holding at Pentagon City Station, not to service Pentagon Station. Power Desk personnel initiated emergency radio communication, advising some personnel to stay away from Pentagon Station and instructing personnel already in the station to call the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) for further instructions.

At 10:54 a.m., the Radio RTC contacted Train 302 Train Operator to have the train operator key on any remaining customers at Pentagon Station for evacuation. However, the train had already bypassed the station as previously instructed. At 10:56 a.m., ROCC Radio RTC then instructed non-revenue Train 715 Train Operator to key on the customers at Pentagon Station and offload the train at Pentagon City Station. Keying on customers requires the operator to leave the operator cab and manually open a car door using a key to allow customers to board or exit. The Radio RTC dispatched Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisors to Pentagon Station at 10:56 a.m., and 10:57 a.m. Train 715 Train Operator keyed customers aboard the train's lead car at approximately 10:58 a.m. The Pentagon Station Manager was notified at 11:02 a.m., 13 minutes after the ROCC received notification of the reported active shooter.

Train 303 Train Operator verified and confirmed that Pentagon Station was clear of customers. MTPD and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency requested that train movement be suspended at Pentagon Station. The Radio RTC notified all Ops 3 (Blue and Yellow Line) Train Operators and advised them to make announcements to riders that trains would



be bypassing Pentagon Station due to police activity. Power was de-energized at 11:25 a.m. on tracks 1 and 2 at Pentagon Station.

At 11:32 a.m., after some confusion with the Power Desk and the Radio RTC regarding the location of personnel, the MOC Desk reported having personnel sheltering in place at Pentagon Station, locked in an ancillary room. An RTRA Supervisor notified the Radio RTC that the Pentagon Force Protection Agency wanted to investigate a sighting of someone in the tunnel to determine if they were an employee or suspect. The Pentagon Force Protection Agency determined they would wait for the Arlington County Fire Department to arrive before accessing the roadway.

At 12:23 p.m., the search was determined to be unnecessary. No personnel entered the roadway.

The ROCC later restored third rail power, however this did not include documentation from Metrorail's Incident Management Official (IMO) and came after several separate communications related to power restoration.

Metrorail personnel rode trains to check the roadway between Archives and Pentagon stations and Arlington Cemetery and Pentagon City stations.

Service then resumed with trains bypassing Pentagon Station, which remained closed due to the ongoing criminal investigation.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this evacuation was the report of an active shooter near the Pentagon Station entrance.

Corrective Actions:

There are no additional corrective actions for this event, but CAPs as noted in report W-0084, relating to MTPD and Roadway Worker Protection are still in progress.

WMSC staff observations:

Metrorail should ensure timely information is provided to all personnel through clear communication among departments and by closely adhering to SOP 1A and emergency checklist to limit confusion and prevent delays in actions necessary for public and personnel safety during emergency events.

Metrorail instituted the IMO without documented training, procedures or responsibilities. The WMSC is assessing this and other aspects of Metrorail's emergency preparedness and fire & life safety programs through a current audit (draft report being finalized).

During the course of this investigation, MTPD improperly withheld video from Metrorail safety investigators, hindering the opportunity for Metrorail to identify safety improvements.

Staff recommendation: Adopt final report.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety and Environmental
Management (SAFE)
FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E21340

Date of Event:	08/03/2021
Type of Event:	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	10:44 hours.
Location:	Pentagon Station
Time and How received by SAFE:	10:59 hours. SAFE/IMO On-call Phone
WMSC Notification Time:	11:38 hours.
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA SAFE: No WMSC: No Other: N/A
Rail Vehicle:	N/A
Injuries:	Several Casualties
Damage:	No
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20210812#94990

Pentagon Station
Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
August 3, 2021
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CM	Chain Marker
CMC	Crisis Management Center
COMM	Office of Systems Maintenance Communication Section
DVEU	Metro Transit Police Department Digital Video Evidence Unit
ECC	Emergency Communications Center - Arlington County
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESR	Event Scene Release
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
IC	Incident Commander
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IMO	Incident Management Official
MOC	Maintenance Operation Center
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OSC	On-Scene Commander
PA	Public Address
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
ROIC	Rail Operations Information Center
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
SAFE	Department of Safety and Environmental Management
SMS I/A	Safety Measurement System Incidents/Accidents
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

On Tuesday, August 3, 2021, at approximately 10:50 hours, Audio Recording System (ARS) playback revealed that a Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) Information Specialist notified a Rail Operation Control Center (ROCC) Assistant Superintendent and reported that the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) requested to close Pentagon Station due to an active shooter event.

Based on ARS playback at approximately 10:52 hours, the ROCC Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) alerted all Ops 3 Train Operators instructing them to bypass Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 due to police activity. As a result, bus and train service was suspended. All buses were detoured to the Pentagon City Station while trains bypassed Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2. Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) playback revealed at approximately 10:54 hours, revenue Train ID 302 Train Operator was the first train to bypass Pentagon Station. Based on ARS playback, the ROCC Radio RTC instructed non-revenue Train ID 715 Train Operator to berth at Pentagon Station and key the customers on the train and offload the train at Pentagon City Station. Based on the AIMS display at approximately 10:56 hours, non-revenue Train ID 715 Train Operator serviced Pentagon Station, Track 2.

MTPD's report revealed that at approximately 10:44 hours, the MTPD received a call for a shooting at Pentagon Station. At approximately 10:50 hours, an MTPD officer arrived at Pentagon Station as the call was dispatched. MTPD reported that at approximately 10:54 hours, the Incident Command Post (ICP) was established. MTPD assumed On-Scene Commander (OSC) for WMATA and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency assumed Incident Command (IC) of the scene under Unified Command in the Incident Command System (ICS). Based on the AIMS display at approximately 11:25 hours, third-rail power was de-energized at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2. ARS playback revealed that trains started to perform turn-back moves due to the ROCC notifying all Ops 3 Train Operators that trains are not allowed at Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2. Based on ARS playback, at approximately 12:56 hours, the RTRA Supervisor notified the ROCC and reported that all personnel and equipment had cleared the roadway, and the ROCC had permission to have third rail power restored at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2.

MTPD reported that the initial ICP was established at the Pentagon Station 8W Bus Bay and eventually moved to the northern end of the Pentagon Station Bus Bay. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responded to the scene, assumed investigative command, and interviewed the witnesses. MTPD reported they received conflicting reports of the number of persons involved, and different law enforcement agencies began searching the area for a possible person of interest. While an Arlington County Police Officer searched the Pentagon Station, they observed a person who failed to obey commands to stop and believed the person put on a reflective vest and entered the portal toward L'Enfant Plaza Station at approximately 11:17 hours. As a result, this prompted a request to de-energize third rail power at Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 at approximately 11:42 hours to search for a suspicious person. MTPD reported units were dispatched to L'Enfant Plaza Station, Pentagon City Station, and Arlington Cemetery Station to stop anyone exiting a tunnel.

Additionally, Pentagon Force Protective Agency Officers were sent to the area of the only vent shaft between Pentagon Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station. MTPD reported that at approximately

11:33 hours, two WMATA employees were located in the station and interviewed. MTPD reported that at approximately 11:41 hours, the ROCC confirmed that the third rail at Pentagon Station, Track 1 and Track 2, was de-energized. At approximately 11:50 hours, MTPD, Arlington County Police Department, and Arlington County Fire Department responded to the Pentagon Station platform to search for a suspicious person. MTPD reported that third rail power was hot stuck and confirmed de-energized at approximately 12:15 hours. Before units needed to enter the roadway, MTPD Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) confirmed all were accounted for. The units therefore did not enter the roadway and left the roadway area.

MTPD reported that at approximately 12:23 hours, the search for a suspicious person was terminated, and the Maintenance Operation Center (MOC) advised of an active fire alarm at the Pentagon Station, which was cleared without incident. MTPD reported that at approximately 12:25 hours, all units and equipment were confirmed clear from the roadway and at approximately 12:26 hours permission was granted to restore third rail power and resume bypassing Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2. At approximately 12:42 hours, another request to restore the third rail was sent to the ROCC from the Incident Management Official (IMO). MTPD reported that at approximately 13:00 hours, the IMO confirmed that third rail power was restored. A track inspection was initiated at approximately 13:13 hours from Pentagon City Station to L'Enfant Plaza Station and from L'Enfant Plaza Station to Pentagon City Station, Track 1 and Track 2. **NOTE:** AIMS display showed that third rail power was restored at approximately 13:16 hours. The track inspection performed was completed at approximately 13:35 hours, and rail service was resumed with trains bypassing Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2. MTPD reported that the FBI advised that the Pentagon Station and Bus Bay will be closed for the remainder of the day. See Appendix A.

AIMS display showed that at approximately 13:16 hours, third rail power was restored at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2. Non-revenue trains went through the affected area to perform a good track inspection at Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 and were not occupied with customers at the inspection time. The area was deemed safe for train movement. Based on ARS playback, at approximately 13:36 hours, the ROCC Radio RTC alerted all Train Operators and reported that they are back to normal operations at this time.


As a result of this event, rail and bus service remained temporarily suspended at the Pentagon Station through closing due to the ongoing law enforcement investigation. After reviewing the ARS, there did not appear to be any communication deficiencies over the radio. No WMATA personnel were injured due to this incident. SAFE's Incident Management Official (IMO) notified the Washington Metropolitan Safety Commission (WMSC) on Tuesday, August 3, 2021, at approximately 11:20 hours. On Tuesday, August 3, 2021, SAFE's IMO issued an Event Scene Release (ESR) at approximately 13:34 hours.

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event that resulted in several casualties was a reported active shooter event. Based on public information about this event, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) described the initiating event as the attacker stabbing a Law Enforcement Officer, resulting in other officers responding rapidly and shooting the attacker.

Incident Site

Outside the Pentagon Station in the Bus Bay area.

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Procedures Manual
 - Office of Systems Maintenance Communication Section (COMM)
 - Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) hot wash report

- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback [Radio and Phone Communications]
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) playback

Investigation

On Tuesday, August 3, 2021, at approximately 10:50 hours, ARS playback revealed that the ROIC Information Specialist notified the ROCC Assistant Superintendent and reported that the MTPD requested to close Pentagon Station due to an active shooter event.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone, ambient, and radio communications, revealed the following:

Time	Description
10:49:17 hours.	<p><u>ROIC Information Specialist</u>: Notified ROCC Assistant Superintendent and stated that MTPD reported there is a potential active shooter at Pentagon Station.</p> <p><u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u>: Responded “does MTPD want us to evacuate the station?”</p> <p><u>ROIC Specialist</u>: Responded “let me call back and double check.” [Phone]</p> <p>Note: Using the ARS playback, SAFE could not confirm communications between the communication between MTPD and ROIC Specialist. It appears that some of the console phones may not have the NICE Inform applications attached to them that allow phone conversations to be recorded.</p>
10:49:57 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Alerted all Ops 3 Train Operators in approach to Pentagon Station and instructed them to hold on the platform.</p> <p><u>Train ID 302 Train Operator</u>: Responded “I can hold at Pentagon City Station.”</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Responded “that’s a good copy, and be advised C08-02 signal will be red.”</p> <p><u>Train ID 302 Train Operator</u>: Acknowledged. [Ops 3] Note: Using the ARS playback on Ops 3 at approximately 10:49:41 hours, ATC personnel stated that they have control of the panel. As the ROCC Radio RTC pressed the push-to-talk button to transmit their message back to ATC, you can hear ROCC personnel in the background saying there’s an active shooter at Pentagon Station. The ROCC Radio RTC immediately alerted all Ops 3 Train Operators approaching Pentagon Station to hold on the platform.</p>
10:50:23 hours.	<p><u>ROIC Information Specialist</u>: Notified ROCC Assistant Superintendent and stated MTPD requested to close Pentagon Station due to an active shooter. [Phone] Note: Using the ARS playback, SAFE could not confirm communications between the communication between MTPD and ROIC Specialist. It appears that some of the console phones may not have the NICE Inform applications attached to them that allow phone conversations to be recorded.</p>
10:50:27 hours.	<p><u>Pentagon Station Manager</u>: Notified ROIC Information Specialist and reported they received a request from Pentagon Force Protection Agency to bypass Pentagon Station.</p> <p><u>ROIC Information Specialist</u>: Acknowledged. [Phone]</p>

10:51:00 hours.	<u>Executive Management</u> : Notified the ROCC Assistant Superintendent and stated they just got off the phone with the MTPD Chief and instructed the Assistant Superintendent to bypass Pentagon Station in all directions until they understand what's going on. <u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u> : Acknowledged. [Phone]
10:51:40 hours.	<u>Train ID 302 Train Operator</u> : Notified Radio RTC and reported "I need to permission to properly berth at Pentagon City Station." <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Responded "that's a good copy you have permission to berth 8-car marker serving the station and standby at C08-02 signal." [Ops 3]
10:52:08 hours.	<u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u> : Notified the ROCC RTC and instructed them to have all trains bypass Pentagon Station in all directions. [Phone]
10:52:14 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified Train ID 302 Train Operator and instructed them not to service Pentagon Station, Track 1, and make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and stations. <u>Train ID 302 Train Operator</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
10:52:51 hours.	<u>Power Desk</u> : Announced "Emergency, Emergency, Emergency all personnel need to stay away from Pentagon Station. If you are at Pentagon Station, I need you to leave or call MOC for further instructions." [Fire Liaison Ambient]
10:54:01 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Alerted all Ops 3 Train Operators and reported all Blue Line and Yellow Line trains are bypassing Pentagon Station, Tracks 1, and Track 2 and make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations. [Ops 3]
10:54:31 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified Train ID 302 Train Operator and asked them to contact the ROCC. <u>Train ID 302 Train Operator</u> : Reported that they are not on the platform at Pentagon Station, Track 1. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Responded "can you properly berth on the platform?" <u>Train ID 302 Train Operator</u> : Responded "that's a negative. I am halfway in the tunnel." <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Responded "that's a good copy; you have permission to continue." [Ops 3]
10:56:24 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified Train ID 715 Train Operator and instructed them to berth at Pentagon Station, Track 2 properly. <u>Train ID 715 Train Operator</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
10:56:29 hours.	<u>Power Assistant Superintendent Desk's Ambient Mic</u> : The ambient mic captured an unknown person's transmission that announced "the Pentagon to the ROCC, Pentagon to the ROCC; the scene is safe by the Pentagon Force Protection Agency. All we know is we have two individuals down, and one police officer is down medical en route. The Pentagon will maintain lockdown until further notice." [Ambient]
10:56:45 hours.	<u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u> : Notified the ROCC RTC on Ops 3 and asked, is Train ID 715 picking up the customers and dropping them off at Pentagon City Station. Note : Based on SPOTS, it appeared Train ID 715 was at Pentagon Station around this time, and the Assistant Superintendent was instructing Ops 3 ROCC RTC to tell the Operator to key the customers on the train and drop them off at Pentagon City Station. [Phone]

10:56:54 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Notified Train ID 715 Train Operator and asked “what’s the status of your train?”</p> <p><u>Train ID 715 Train Operator</u>: Responded “coming from Shady Grove Yard to Alexandria Yard. The consist is not suitable for service. I am dropping off four cars and returning with four cars.”</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Instructed Train ID 715 Train Operator to key the customers on at Pentagon Station platform and offload them at Pentagon City Station.</p> <p><u>Train ID 715 Train Operator</u>: Responded “whatever you guys want me to do, that’s fine. I am just relaying the message from the Tower.”</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Notified RTRA Supervisor One and instructed them to landline the ROCC.</p> <p><u>RTRA Supervisor One</u>: Acknowledged. [Ops 3]</p>
10:57:57 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Notified RTRA Supervisor Two and instructed them to respond to Pentagon Station and landline the ROCC.</p> <p><u>RTRA Supervisor Two</u>: Acknowledged. [Ops 3]</p>
10:58:17 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Notified Train ID 715 Train Operator and instructed them to key the customers aboard the train at Pentagon Station.</p> <p><u>Train ID 715 Train Operator</u>: Responded “confirm copy loud and clear.”</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Responded “after keying the customers aboard the train, offload them at Pentagon City Station.”</p> <p><u>Train ID 715 Train Operator</u>: Acknowledged. [Ops 3]</p>
10:58:22 hours.	<p><u>Executive Management</u>: Notified the ROCC Assistant Superintendent and asked “are we shut down?”</p> <p><u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u>: Responded “Yes. We had a non-revenue train go through the area keying the customers on and taking them to Pentagon City Station Also, RTRA Supervisors are en route and trains are bypassing the station.”</p> <p><u>Executive Management</u>: Responded “so are we requesting shuttle buses? An alert just went out stating that they are requesting shuttle busses.”</p> <p><u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u>: Responded “no that’s for Pentagon City Station.”</p> <p><u>Executive Management</u>: Acknowledged. [Phone]</p>
10:59:17 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Notified Train ID 411 Train Operator and stated that once they arrive at Pentagon Station, if they see customers, do not service the station, key them aboard the train and make good announcements to the customers.</p> <p><u>Train ID 411 Train Operator</u>: Acknowledged. [Ops 3]</p>
10:59:46 hours.	<p><u>RTRA Supervisor One</u>: Notified ROCC Assistant Superintendent and reported they are at Pentagon Station.</p> <p><u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u>: Instructed them to go to the 8W bus bay command post. [Phone]</p>
11:00:22 hours.	<p><u>Executive Management</u>: Notified the ROCC Assistant Superintendent indicated that an Everbridge Alert will be sent out warning everyone to stay clear of the station due to an active investigation and asked is anyone is still in the station.</p> <p><u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u>: Responded “yes a Supervisor is supposed to go to 8W bus bay and they are the POC for RTRA.”</p> <p><u>Executive Management</u>: Acknowledged “I just want to make sure personnel in the station are safe.” [Phone]</p>

11:01:56 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified Train ID 403 Train Operator and instructed them to bypass Pentagon Station. <u>Train ID 403 Train Operator</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
11:02:32 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified Pentagon Station Manager and instructed them to remain on the platform at Pentagon Station and landline the ROCC. <u>Pentagon Station Manager</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
11:02:38 hours.	<u>Train ID 715 Train Operator</u> : Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported that Pentagon Station was clear of customers. They had keyed all customers on the lead car and asked “do you want me to drop them off at Pentagon City Station?” <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Responded “you can offload the customers at Pentagon City Station.” [Ops 3]
11:03:47 hours.	<u>RTRA Supervisor One</u> : Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported they are onboard Train ID 303, and they will verify that the platform was clear at Pentagon Station and key on any customers. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
11:04:15 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Alerted all Ops 3 Train Operators and reported “we are currently bypassing Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 due to police activity. Would you please make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations?” [Ops 3]
11:04:17 hours	<u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u> : Received a call from the RTRA Supervisor One and notified them that someone from MTPD will meet them at the kiosk and informed them not to go outside to 8W bus bay. <u>RTRA Supervisor One</u> : Acknowledged. [Phone]
11:04:40 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified Pentagon Station Manager and instructed them to meet MTPD at the Pentagon Station kiosk. [Ops 3]
11:08:00 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified Train ID 303 Train Operator and instructed them to verify that the station is clear of all customers once they arrive at Pentagon Station. <u>Train ID 303 Train Operator</u> : Responded “I don’t see any customers on the platform at this time. I am going to continue.” [Ops 3]
11:08:45 hours.	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported Pentagon Force Protection Agency wants everyone to clear from the kiosk at Pentagon Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
11:19:42 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Alerted all Ops 3 Blue and Yellow Line Train Operators and reported “we are currently bypassing Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 due to police activity. Would you please make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations?” [Ops 3]
11:21:05 hours.	<u>RTRA Supervisor One</u> : Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported that the police department requested no trains allowed in Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
11:23:28 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified RTRA Supervisor and asked “who is giving you this information not to allow trains to bypass Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2?” <u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Responded “MTPD, and Pentagon Force Protection Agency.” <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]

11:23:59 hours.	<u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u> : Notified the ROCC RTC and instructed them to de-energize third rail power at Pentagon Station, Track 1 and Track 2. [Phone]
11:24:35 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Alerted all Ops 3 Train Operators and reported "at this time trains are allowed at Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 due to police activity. Please make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and in the stations." [Ops 3]
11:29:28 hours.	<u>Power Personnel</u> : Notified the ROCC Radio RTC and reported they are at Pentagon Station and believe there are active shooters. Pentagon Force Protection Agency wants to know if anyone passed by Arlington Cemetery Station Traction Power to Pentagon Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Responded "we stopped all train movement in that location when the police department requested it." <u>Power Personnel</u> : Responded "the Pentagon Force Protection Agency also wants to know if anyone accessed any tunnels or shafts from Arlington Cemetery Station to Crystal City Station." <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Responded "there's no one in those locations." [Ops 3]
11:32:11 hours.	<u>Power Personnel</u> : Notified the MOC Desk and reported Pentagon Force Protection Agency would like to verify if anyone accessed any tunnels or shaft from Rosslyn Station to Crystal City Station. <u>MOC Desk</u> : Responded "that is affirmative. We do have personnel at Pentagon Station locked inside room #43074 AC 2." <u>Power Personnel</u> : Responded "stand down; they do not want them to exit the room until they receive an all-clear to leave the room." <u>MOC Desk</u> : Acknowledged. [Fire Liaison Ambient]
11:41:52 hours.	<u>RTRA Supervisor One</u> : Notified ROCC Radio RTC and requested an update with third rail power at Pentagon Station and the portal area. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Responded, standby. [Ops 3]
11:53:45 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Notified RTRA Supervisor and stated that C08-02, C08-06, and F03-08 signals are red, prohibit exits, block calls, cancellation of automatic signals, blue block, and human form status are in place at Pentagon Station Track 1 and 2. At this time, you have permission to enter the roadway under Foul Time (FT) protection to hot stick and confirm that third rail power is de-energized. Please provide the ROCC a Chain Marker. <u>RTRA Supervisor One</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
11:56:48 hours.	<u>RTRA Supervisor One</u> : Notified the ROCC Radio RTC and reported disregard FT. The police department will wait for the fire department to arrive to make sure power is de-energized. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
12:17:27 hours.	<u>Executive Management</u> : Notified the ROCC Assistant Superintendent and asked "do you have any updates?" <u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent</u> : Responded "personnel are waiting on the fire department to enter the roadway at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2. Train service remains suspended in all directions entering Pentagon Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station is closed on upper and lower level. No trains are entering Pentagon Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station." <u>Executive Management</u> : Acknowledged and asked "are we bypassing the lower level at L'Enfant Plaza Station Plaza Station?"

	<p><u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent:</u> Responded “trains are bypassing L’Enfant Plaza Station lower and upper level. MTPD and Pentagon Force Protection Agency does not want any customers traveling through the stations.”</p> <p><u>Executive Management:</u> Responded “right now they need to enter the roadway to perform their inspection.”</p> <p><u>ROCC Assistant Superintendent:</u> Responded “yes.”</p> <p><u>Executive Management:</u> Responded “apparently what we are hearing is that there was a Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) member from Virginia that responded and saw someone go down a vent shaft and don’t know if it’s related. It could be another suspect or an employee who happened to be at the Pentagon Station at the time. Reportedly, that’s what they are going to be inspecting for.” [Phone]</p>
12:56:34 hours.	<p><u>RTRA Supervisor One:</u> Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported all personnel and equipment had cleared the roadway and the ROCC has permission to restore third rail power. Also, MTPD and Pentagon Force Protection Agency would like to have test trains at Pentagon Station Track 1 and 2.</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Acknowledged and asked “can you confirm that the scene has been turned back over to RTRA?” [Ops 3]</p>
12:58:31 hours.	<p><u>RTRA Supervisor One:</u> Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported that the scene has been turned back over to RTRA.</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Acknowledged.</p> <p><u>RTRA Supervisor One:</u> Responded that trains are only allowed to bypass Pentagon Station after the track inspections are completed.</p> <p><u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Responded “standby.” [Ops 3]</p>
13:00:19 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Alerted all Ops 3 Train Operators and reported that third rail power is about to be restored at Track 1 and Track 2 between L’Enfant Plaza Station and Pentagon Station. [Ops 3]</p>
13:00:47 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Notified Train ID 304 Train Operator and indicated “once you arrive at Mt. Vernon Station, Track 2 offload the train and hold, and you will be the test train.”</p> <p><u>Train ID 304 Train Operator:</u> Acknowledged. [Ops 3]</p>
13:01:35 hours.	<p><u>ROCC RTC:</u> Notified the ROCC Assistant Superintendent and reported Train ID 304 will be the test train Track 2. [Phone]</p>
13:08:30 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Notified Train ID 304 Train Operator and instructed them not to load their train. The ROCC Radio RTC indicated “I need you to perform a track inspection between Archives Stations and Pentagon Station, Track 2.”</p> <p><u>Train ID 304 Train Operator:</u> Acknowledged. [Ops 3]</p>
13:11:51 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Notified Train ID 402 Train Operator and instructed them to offload their train at Pentagon City Station, Track 1. The ROCC Radio RTC stated “you would be the test train and perform inspection from Pentagon City Station, Track 1 to Arlington Cemetery Station Track 1 and go back in service at Arlington Cemetery.”</p> <p><u>Train ID 402 Train Operator:</u> Acknowledged. [Ops 3]</p>
13:12:29 hours.	<p><u>RTRA Supervisor One:</u> Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported to the ROCC that Pentagon Station will remain closed for the remainder of the day. [Ops 3]</p>
13:13:24 hours.	<p><u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Notified Train ID 304 Train Operator and instructed them to change their Train ID to 704, pick up MTPD Officers at L’Enfant Plaza Station, and be governed by their instruction.</p>

	<u>Train ID 704 Train Operator:</u> Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
13:14:30 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Notified Train ID 301 Train Operator and instructed them when they arrive at Pentagon City Station to offload their train and change their Train ID to 701. The ROCC Radio RTC then instructed them to perform a track inspection from Pentagon City Station to L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 1. <u>Train ID 701 Train Operator:</u> Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
13:24:00 hours.	<u>Train ID 704 Train Operator:</u> Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported a good track inspection performed between Archives Stations and Pentagon Station, Track 2 and MTPD officers got off the train at Pentagon Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Acknowledged and reported "you are back in service from Pentagon City Station to Huntington Station as Train ID 304." [Ops 3]
13:30:23 hours.	<u>RTRA Supervisor One:</u> Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported to the ROCC that Pentagon Station will remain closed until the following day. [Ops 3]
13:31:39 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Notified RTRA Supervisor, requested an update and reported a good track inspection completed at L'Enfant Plaza Station and Pentagon Station. <u>RTRA Supervisor One:</u> Responded "track inspections have been completed on Track 1 and Track 2 and reported MTPD permitted all trains to continue revenue service in all directions bypassing Pentagon Station Tracks 1 and 2 due to an ongoing police investigation." [Ops 3]
13:35:35 hours.	<u>Train ID 701 Train Operator:</u> Notified ROCC Radio RTC and reported a good track inspection from Pentagon City Station to L'Enfant Plaza Station Track 1. <u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Acknowledged. [Ops 3]
13:36:45 hours.	<u>ROCC Radio RTC:</u> Alerted all Train Operators and reported "we are back to normal operations at this time. However, Yellow and Blue Line trains will be bypassing Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 due to police activity." [Ops 3]

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Diagram 1 - Based on the AIMS display at 10:54 hours, revenue Train ID 302 Train Operator did not service Pentagon Station, Track 1. Based on ARS playback, it appeared that this is when the ROCC Radio RTC instructed Train ID 302 Train Operator not to service Pentagon Station and make prescribed public address announcements to passengers on the trains and stations.




Diagram 2 - Based on the AIMS display at 10:56 hours, non-revenue Train ID 715 Train Operator serviced Pentagon Station, Track 2. Based on ARS playback, it appeared that this is when the ROCC Radio RTC instructed Train ID 715 Train Operator to key the customers on the train and offload the train at Pentagon City Station.




Diagram 3 - Based on the AIMS display at 11:05 hours, Train ID 403 on Track 2 and Train ID 411 on Track 1 bypassed Pentagon Station.




Diagram 4 - Based on the AIMS display at 11:08 hours, Train ID 303 bypassed Pentagon Station, Track 1. Based on ARS playback, it appeared that this was when Train ID 303 Train Operator reported to the ROCC that they did not see any customers on the platform at Pentagon Station.




Diagram 5 - Based on the AIMS display at 11:25 hours, it showed C07-02, C07-04, C07-06, and C07-08 signals were red, blue block status was in place, and third-rail power was de-energized at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2. Based on ARS playback, it appeared that this was when trains started to perform turn-back moves due to the ROCC instructing all Ops 3 Train Operators that no trains were allowed at Pentagon Station, Track 1 and Track 2.




Diagram 6 - Based on the AIMS display at 11:51 hours, human form status was in place at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2. Based on ARS playback, it appeared that this was when the ROCC granted the RTRA Supervisor FT protection to hot stick and confirm that third rail power was de-energized. However, the RTRA Supervisor then notified the ROCC, relinquished their FT protection, and stated disregard the request the police department would wait for the fire department to arrive to make sure power was de-energized.




Diagram 7 - Based on the AIMS display at 12:56 hours, third-rail power was still de-energized at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2. Based on ARS playback, it appeared that this was when the RTRA Supervisor notified the ROCC and reported that all personnel and equipment had cleared the roadway, and the ROCC had permission to have third rail power restored at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2.



Diagram 8 - Based on the AIMS display at 13:16 hours, third rail power was restored at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2.




Diagram 9 - Based on the AIMS display at 13:22 hours, non-revenue Train ID 402 went through the affected area to perform an inspection at Pentagon Station, Track 1, and was not occupied at the time of the inspection.




Diagram 10 - Based on the AIMS display at 13:24 hours, non-revenue Train ID 704 went through the affected area to perform an inspection at Pentagon Station, Track 2, and was not occupied at the time of the inspection.




Diagram 11 - Based on the AIMS display at 13:27 hours, non-revenue Train ID 701 went through the affected area to perform an inspection at Pentagon Station, Track 1, and was not occupied at the time of the inspection.




Diagram 12 - Based on the AIMS display at 13:40 hours, revenue Train ID 404 was the first train bypassing Pentagon Station Tracks 1 after normal service resumed.




Diagram 13 - Based on the AIMS display at 13:44 hours, revenue Train ID 403 was the first train bypassing Pentagon Station Track 2 after normal service resumed.

Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)

The Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) report revealed that at approximately 10:44 hours, the MTPD received a call for a shooting at Pentagon Station. At approximately 10:50 hours, an MTPD officer arrived at the station at the same time the call was dispatched. MTPD reported that at 10:49 hours, a request to close Pentagon Station was received, and the ROCC began bypassing Pentagon Station at approximately 10:51 hours. At approximately 10:54 hours, the Incident Command Post (ICP) was established. MTPD assumed On-Scene Commander (OSC)

for WMATA and Pentagon Force Protection Agency assumed command of the scene under a unified command. At approximately 11:02 hours, the bus service was rerouted to the Pentagon City Station. MTPD reported that the initial ICP was established at the Pentagon Station 8W Bus Bay and eventually moved to the northern end of the Pentagon Station Bus Bay. MTPD reported they identified several witnesses. The FBI assumed investigative command and interviewed the witnesses. The crime scene protection was expanded to ensure all potential evidence items were included in the scene. Pentagon Force Protective Agency requested and received assistance from MTPD Crime Scene Technicians to photograph the scene before the fire department departure and retrieved video from a WMATA Bus. There were conflicting reports of the number of suspects, and different law enforcement agencies began searching the area for a possible person of interest. An Arlington County Police Officer searched the Pentagon Station and observed a male who failed to obey commands to stop and believed the person put on a reflective vest and entered the portal toward L'Enfant Plaza Station at approximately 11:17 hours. This prompted the request to de-energize third rail power at Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 at 11:42 hours to search for a suspicious person. MTPD reported units were dispatched to L'Enfant Plaza Station, Pentagon City Station, and Arlington Cemetery Station to stop anyone exiting a tunnel. Pentagon Force Protection Agency Officers were sent to the area of the only vent shaft between Pentagon Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station, which was on sensitive classified documents of the Pentagon. At 11:33 hours, two WMATA employees were located in the station and interviewed. At approximately 11:41 hours, the ROCC confirmed that the third rail at Pentagon Station, Track 1 and Track 2, was de-energized. MTPD reported third rail power was also de-energized up to but not including Arlington Cemetery Station to allow trains to turn around. At approximately 11:50 hours, MTPD, Arlington County Police Department, and Arlington County Fire Department responded to the platform to initiate a search for a suspicious person. MTPD reported that third rail power was hot stuck and confirmed de-energized at approximately 12:15 hours. Before entering the roadway, MTPD Digital Video Evidence Unit confirmed that all individuals who entered the roadway were accounted for.

At approximately 12:23 hours, the search for a suspicious person was terminated, and the MOC advised of an active fire alarm at the Pentagon Station, which cleared without incident. At approximately 12:25 hours, all units were confirmed clear from the roadway, and at approximately 12:26 hours, permission was granted to restore third rail power and resume bypassing Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2. At approximately 12:42 hours, another request to restore the third rail was sent to the ROCC from the IMO. At approximately 13:00 hours, the IMO confirmed that third rail power was restored. A track inspection was initiated at approximately 13:13 hours from Pentagon City Station to L'Enfant Plaza Station and from L'Enfant Plaza Station to Pentagon City Station, Track 1 and Track 2. The track inspection performed was completed at approximately 13:35 hours, and rail service was resumed with trains bypassing Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2. MTPD reported that the Pentagon Station and Bus Bay would remain closed through the end of service that day. See Appendix A. **Note:** Based on available data, it could not be confirmed if SAFE/IMO signed the form/authorized the restoration at 13:00 hours. Using the ARS playback, at approximately 13:13:24 hours, ROCC Radio RTC notified Train ID 304 Train Operator and instructed them to change their Train ID to 704, pick up MTPD Officers at L'Enfant Plaza Station, and be governed by their instruction. At approximately 13:14:30 hours, the ROCC Radio RTC notified Train ID 301 Train Operator and instructed them when they arrived at Pentagon City Station to offload their train and change their Train ID to 701. The ROCC Radio RTC then instructed them to perform a track inspection from Pentagon City Station to L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 1.

Office of System Maintenance Communication Section (COMM)

COMM personnel performed a comprehensive radio operational test at Pentagon Station, Tracks 1 and 2. The test was successful, and the signal was at an optimal level.

Note: After reviewing the Audio Recording System playback, there did not appear to be any communication deficiencies over the radio. See Appendix B.

Weather

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature at 68° F, mostly cloudy and 67% humidity. Weather was not considered to be a contributing factor to the response. (Weather source: National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration – Location: Washington, DC.

Findings

- ROCC incident report indicated that at approximately 11:21 hours, RTRA Supervisor One was on the scene at Pentagon Station, appointed as OSC, and SOP 1A was in effect. See Appendix C. Using the ARS playback, it could not be confirmed when the RTRA Supervisor was appointed as OSC and if the ROCC initiated SOP 1A utilizing the National Incident Management System/ICS). However, the roles were fulfilled as prescribed based on the associated Hot Wash reports.
- Based on ARS playback, it could not be confirmed if the ROCC complied with all aspects of SOP 1A, Command, Control, and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System to notify the Fire Department, however the Fire Liaison is heard at several points during the event communicating with ROCC personnel.
- Based on the AIMS display, at approximately 11:25 hours, the ROCC de-energized third rail power at Pentagon Station Track 1 and Track 2. However, it could not be confirmed via ARS playback if third rail power was confirmed de-energized. Note: a search of the tunnel was reportedly cancelled before personnel entered the roadway.
- Based on the AIMS display, non-revenue test trains went through the affected area to inspect Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 and were not occupied by customers at the time of the inspection.
- Prior to the station closure request, in an attempt to assist customers in evacuating the Pentagon Station premises, the ROCC instructed non-revenue Train ID 715 Train Operator to report to Pentagon Station, key the customers aboard the train, and offload them at Pentagon City Station. Additionally, the ROCC asked other Train Operators if they saw any customers as they bypassed Pentagon Station, to safely key them onboard their train.
- MTPD DVEU reported that CCTV footage was unavailable due to the ongoing criminal investigation.
- On August 3, 2021, WMATA rail and bus service remained temporarily suspended at the Pentagon until opening on August 5, 2021 due to the ongoing law enforcement investigation. As a result of the closure, Blue and Yellow line trains bypassed Pentagon Station.
- WMATA bus service that normally operates to the Pentagon Bus Bay was detoured to Pentagon City Station.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Due to the ongoing law enforcement investigation, all rail and bus services remained suspended at the Pentagon Station until opening August 5, 2021. As a result of the closure, Blue and Yellow line trains bypassed the Pentagon Station.

- WMATA bus service that normally operates to the Pentagon Bus Bay was detoured to Pentagon City Station.
- The ROCC de-energized third rail power at Pentagon Station, Track 1, and Track 2 so that the emergency responders could enter the roadway to conduct their incident investigation. This request was later cancelled.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event that resulted in several casualties was a reported active shooter event. Based on public information about this event, the FBI described the initiating event as the attacker stabbing a Law Enforcement Officer, resulting in other officers responding rapidly and shooting the attacker. However, this is a criminal investigation, and Law Enforcement entities will determine this event's final investigation and disposition.

SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

There are no recommendations for this event as it was precipitated by a criminal action. At the time of this report, no new corrective actions were identified to the evacuation procedure and response coordination with emergency responders. However, corrective actions related to MTPD and Roadway Worker Protection are in progress, as noted in Event Report 20488 (Customer Evacuation at Fort Totten Station). Those Corrective Actions are copied below for reference:

Corrective Action Code	Description (E20488)	Due Date
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_001	OEM shall undertake a review of the Fire Liaison turnover process to identify opportunities for improvement under COVID 19 pandemic cleaning restrictions.	1/31/22
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_002	Shall develop an incident response / IC quick [tick] checklist to identify responsibilities, respective equipment, processes upon arrival	2/28/22
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_003	MTPD shall retrain MTPD Management on post-incident drug and alcohol testing requirements for their staff.	1/31/22
90755_SAFECAPS_SAFE_004	MTPD RWP training materials shall be reviewed at least annually by OPMS, to ensure process changes and rule updates are reflected in the material.	12/31/21
90755_SAFECAPS_SAFE_005	OEM instructors shall be evaluated and approved by OPMS training leadership. The approval process would mirror that followed by SAFE's contractor RWP instructors. Approval would ensure RWP material is presented in a consistent manner regardless of instructor group.	12/31/21
90755_SAFECAPS_SAFE_006	The newly-created Incident Management Official's role shall be clearly defined when emergency response procedures are enacted. This includes supporting the Incident Commander when SOP 1A is followed.	12/31/21

90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_007	Annual MIRs shall include reviews of the ROCC emergency SOPs, which are covered during new recruit training.	12/31/21
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_008	MTPD Hot Washes shall include an evaluation of RWP practices.	1/31/22
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_009	ROCC and MTPD shall conduct after action reviews after each emergency response incident; this is in addition to MTPD's field Hot Wash reviews. Lessons learned will be documented, as well as mitigations that would address issues experienced.	1/31/22
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_010	Until all IMO personnel have been trained in MTPD procedures, an MTPD officer should be deployed to the ROCC to ensure proper communications are maintained in the event of an emergency.	10/31/21
90755_SAFECAPS_MTPD_011	The Incident Commander shall communicate to ROCC the full section of track that is part of their oversight when SOP 1A is enacted.	12/31/21

Appendix A – COMM Work Order Details



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page: 1 of 1
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 16501751
Type: INSP



Status: COMP
08/09/2021 13:49

Work Description: C07 Request by Safe dept for tracks 1 & 2 after Evacuation
Job Plan Description:

Work Information									
Asset: COMMC07 COMM, C07, COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM				Owning Office: COMM-TSSM			Parent:		
Asset Tag:				Maintenance Office: COMM-TSSM-CFLD			Create Date: 08/09/2021 08:16		
Asset S/N: COMM C07				Labor Group: COMMR3RADO			Actual Start: 08/09/2021 13:49		
Location: 6012 C07, PENTAGON, STATION, PLATFORM 2, ROOM 117, COMMUNICATIONS ROOM				Crew:			Actual Comp: 08/09/2021 13:49		
Work Location:				Lead: [REDACTED]			Item: R60000001		
Failure Class: SAMS011 COMM EQUIPMENT				GL Account: WMATA-02-33540-50499280-042-*****-OPR**					
Problem Code: 2500 NO PROBLEM FOUND				Supervisor:			Target Start:		
Requested By: [REDACTED]				Requestor Phone: [REDACTED]			Target Comp:		
							Scheduled Start:		
Create-Mileage: 0.0				Complete-Mileage: 0.0					
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10 SEE LONG DESCRIPTION									
CONDUCTED RADIO CHECKS FROM C06 TO C08 LOUD AND CLEAR WITH NO ISSUES INBOUND AND OUT BOUND									
Component:		Work Accompl:		Reason:		Status: COMP		Position: Warranty?: N	
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	08/09/2021	08/09/2021	10:00	12:00	Y	02:00	00:00	\$74.72
10	[REDACTED]	08/09/2021	08/09/2021	10:00	12:00	Y	02:00	00:00	\$83.93
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							04:00	00:00	\$158.65
Failure Reporting									
Cause	Remedy		Supervisor				Remark Date		
2450 NO DEFECT	3191 TESTED - NO TROUBLE FOUND								
Remarks:									

WT_plust_woprnt.rptdesign

08/10/2021 08:13

Attachment 2 – Page 1 of 1.

Date: 08/03/2021 Time: 10:37 hours.
Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons.
E21340

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 08/12/2021
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 08/16/2021
Approved By: SAFE 70 – 11/26/2021

Page 22

Appendix B – ROCC Incident Report

View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT ID: 2021215YELLOW1

DATE 2021-08-03	TIME 1054	LINE Yellow	ITEM 1
LOCATION (STATION/YARD) Pentagon (C07)	LOCATION/CHAIN MARKER (If Applicable)		REPORTED BY ROIC Information Controller [REDACTED] (CTF-ROCC)
TRAIN ID 302	DIRECTION O/B	TRACK NUMBER 2	DEPTS NOTIFIED Everbridge Alert/Messaging
CAR NUMBERS (XXXX-XXXX) Lead Car			
-			
Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>
TRBL CODE MTPD-METRO TRANSIT POLICE DEPT	RESP CODE POL		

TYPE INCIDENT
Report Of Active Shooter

ACTION PLAN
De-energize Third Rail, Suspend Service, Turn Back Trains And Implement SOP-1A.

DELAYS IN MINUTES					
LINE	INCIDENT	TRAIN	TOTAL DURATION		
0	36	0	0		

TRIPS MODIFIED					
PARTIAL	GAP TRAIN	LATE DISPATCHES	REROUTED	NOT DISPATCHED	OFFLOADS
0	0	0	0	0	0

FIVE PRIMARY CONSOLE INDICATIONS				
BCP	BRAKES ON ILLUMINATED	ALL DOORS CLOSED ILLUMINATED	AUTO\MANUAL BPP ILLUMINATED	
			AUTO	

Attachment 3 – Page 1 of 3.

View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY	
TIME	DESCRIPTION
1054	ROIC Information Controller [REDACTED] notified ROCC of an active shooter at Pentagon. Train 302, departing L'Enfant Plaza track two was instructed to stop train, make announcements to customers, key down, reverse ends and was given an absolute block back to L'Enfant Plaza track two and offload. ROCC Assistant Superintendent, ROIC, MTPD, SAFE and all concerned departments were notified.
1121	Unit [REDACTED], RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] on the scene at Pentagon and appointed On Scene Commander. Station Supervisor [REDACTED] on the scene. SOP-1A in effect.
1124	Third rail power de-energized tracks one and two between Pentagon and Arlington Cemetery as well as L'Enfant Plaza to Pentagon.
1130	Orange, Blue and Silver line trains bypassing L'Enfant Plaza. Shuttle Bus services requested.
1137	Train 302 offloaded track two at L'Enfant Plaza for service towards Fort Totten. Rail service adjustment implemented.
1140	Train 406 instructed to offload track two at Arlington Cemetery, verify clear of customers and reverse ends for service towards Largo Town Center.
1148	Train 603 operator instructed to key customers on train at L'Enfant Plaza track one and continue in service towards Largo Town Center.
1156	Train 902 operator instructed to key customers on train at L'Enfant Plaza track two and continue in service towards Vienna.
1200	Shuttle bus service established at Pentagon City
1259	Unit [REDACTED] reported all personnel are clear from the roadway at Pentagon, third rail power may be restored and requested an inspection train. Third rail power restoration announcements made.
1300	Third rail power restoration announcements made between Pentagon and Arlington Cemetery and L'Enfant Plaza to Pentagon tracks one and two.
1307	Third rail power restored.
1312	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported to ROCC that Pentagon will remain closed for the remainder of the day.
1322	Train 304 was offloaded at Mt. Vernon Square and performed an inspection between L'Enfant Plaza and Pentagon Track Two. Train 701 completed a track inspection from Pentagon City to L'Enfant Plaza on Track one. Train 707 completed a track inspection from Navy Yard to L'Enfant Plaza on track one. All inspections were reported as good inspections.
1330	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported to ROCC MTPD Officer [REDACTED] gave permission to continue revenue service bypassing Pentagon Tracks 1 and 2 for Police Investigation. Train 303 holding at L'Enfant Plaza Track 2 first Yellow line train to continue revenue service in the direction of Huntington. Train 507 first train to service L'Enfant Plaza on track one in the direction of Fort Totten.
1333	Train 507 was the first train to service L'Enfant on track one in the direction of Fort Totten. Train 304 was the first train to service Pentagon City on track two in the direction of Huntington.
1337	Trains continue to pass Pentagon tracks one and two pending MTPD investigation. Normal Revenue service continued at other stations.
0000	Pentagon station remained closed until the end of revenue service. MTPD and Pentagon police remain on scene for further investigation.
MAXIMO TICKET# 8551846	
REPORT PREPARED BY	NAME
CLICK TO SIGN	

Attachment 3 – Page 2 of 3.

View Approved Incident Report

RADIO CONTROLLER 1	[REDACTED]	✓
BUTTON CONTROLLER 1	[REDACTED]	✓
RADIO CONTROLLER 2	[REDACTED]	✓
BUTTON CONTROLLER 2	[REDACTED]	✓

SUPERINTENDENTS OR ASSISTANTS SECTION

ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP CORRECTIVE
ACTIONS OR REMARKS

FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM
SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS

NOTIFICATIONS/PAGE GROUPS #1/CEO ☐ #2/DGM & BELOW ☒

ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS MADE BY
PHONE

APPROVED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
REPORT APPROVED BY SUPT. OR ASST SUPT.	[REDACTED]	✓

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Appendix C – SOP 1A Checklist

SOP #1A – COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF EMERGENCIES ON THE RAIL SYSTEM CHECKLIST



Important: This Checklist in no way replaces the SOP. Tasks listed below are required to be performed. Please use this list to check off the tasks.

- ☐ **NOTIFY:**
 - ROCC ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT
 - FIRE DEPARTMENT
 - MTPD
 - ROIC
 - SAFE
 - OEM
 - MREL
 - APPROPRIATE COMMON CORRIDOR SHARER (IF NECESSARY)
 - BOCC – INITIALIZE BUS SHUTTLE
- ☐ DISPATCH TWO (2) RTRA MANAGERS/SUPERVISORS, FIRST MANAGER/SUPERVISOR TO ARRIVE DESIGNATED ON SCENE COMMANDER (OSC) (IF NO MTPD) OR RTRA FORWARD LIASON
- ☐ WHEN THE SECOND MANAGER/SUPERVISOR ARRIVES, DIRECT THE RTRA MANAGER TO COMMAND POST AND ASSUME THE RTRA INCIDENT COMMANDER (IC) LIAISON ROLE
- ☐ PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO BE AN RTRA INCIDENT COMMANDER (IC) LIAISONS:
 - ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT
 - SUPERINTENDENTS
 - RTRA DIRECTOR
 - MANAGING DIRECTORS
 - DGM-RAIL
- ☐ OBTAIN THE LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND POST
 - OBTAIN NAME AND CONTACT INFORMATION
- ☐ MAINTAIN LOG OF INDIVIDUALS ASSIGNED TO IC, OSC, LIAISON POSITIONS AND THE LOCATION OF COMMAND POST
- ☐ COORDINATE SAFE MOVEMENT OF ALL TRAINS WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE IC AND OSC
- ☐ INITIATE VENTILATION SYSTEM ACTIVATION PROCEDURES, AS REQUIRED BY THE IC OR OSC
- ☐ REQUEST MTPD ASSISTANCE IN CRITICAL STATIONS FOR CROWD CONTROL INSTRUCT TRAIN OPERATORS TO MAKE APPROPRIATE ANNOUNCEMENTS TO THEIR CUSTOMERS
- ☐ PROVIDE AND OBTAIN, FROM MOC, FREQUENT UPDATES ON EVENTS AS THEY OCCUR, IF SYSTEM RELATED EMERGENCY

**On Scene Command Checklist for the First Rail Employee on the Scene of an
Emergency: SOP 1A – APPENDEX B:**

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SOP #1A Checklist Ver. 1.2

05/05/2017


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SOP #1A – COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF EMERGENCIES ON THE RAIL SYSTEM CHECKLIST

- ☐ VERIFY TYPE OF INCIDENT AND MAKE NOTIFICATIONS TO ROCC AND MTPD
- ☐ TAKE STEPS NECESSARY TO MITIGATE LIFE SAFETY ISSUES SUCH AS CUSTOMER EVACUATION
- ☐ ADMINISTER FIRST AID AND REQUEST MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AS NEEDED
- ☐ PROTECT THE SCENE BY ESTABLISHING A SAFE PERIMETER AND CONTROLLING ACCESS
- ☐ REQUEST ADDITIONAL RESOURCES AS NEEDED
- ☐ PROVIDE INCIDENT UPDATES TO ROCC
- ☐ TRANSFER COMMAND TO APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL UPON THEIR ARRIVAL AT THE SCENE AND PROVIDE SITUATION UPDATE

Attachment 3 – Page 2 of 2.

Appendix D - Root Cause Analysis



Attachment 4 – Page 1 of 1.