

Cap ID	Current CAP Completion Date	Finding/Required Action	Source
FTA-17-1-10	6/31/22	<p>Finding 4: Traction power cables are often loose on the ground, subjecting them to contamination, vibration, and damage from movement.</p> <p>Finding 9: There is insufficient dielectric insulation for cable terminations used in the traction power system.</p> <p>Finding 17: The cable replacement and upgrade program for 8-car train roll out has been deferred.</p> <p>Finding 18: WMATA's negative return system (at traction power substations) has not been upgraded to address plans for 50 percent and 100 percent operation of 8-car trains.</p> <p>Finding 19: WMATA has suspended its contact rail expansion joint elimination program until further analysis is completed.</p>	<a href="#">Special Directive 17-1 Issued December 6, 2016</a>
FTA-TSR-18-003	06/01/22	WMATA does not consistently implement its Hazard Management Procedure.	<a href="#">Special Directive 18-2 Issued January 19, 2018</a>
WMSC-19-C0008-B	09/30/22	Metrorail must develop and implement an effective hours of service policy as part of an overall fatigue management program.	NTSB
WMSC-19-C0026	03/18/22	WMATA does not conduct annual culvert inspections as specified in Section 105.1 of the TRST-1000.	Track Audit (2/13/2020)
WMSC-20-C0037	12/24/21	Third rail power restoration is routinely rushed by ROCC management with a focus on restoring train service rather than a focus on following safety procedures.	WMSC Directive (5/12/2020)
WMSC-20-C0049	12/01/23	ROCC management contributes to a chaotic environment. Use of profanities, threats and racial, sexual or other forms of harassment are regular features of the control centers environment, which makes it difficult for controllers to do their jobs and drives low morals and significant turnover.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0051	07/29/22	Metrorail does not record all critical ROCC communications, limiting the lessons that can be learned from safety events.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0052	02/24/23	There is no consistent, clear, concise, immediate and reliable Metrorail communication process for safety-critical information between Metrorail personnel and fire liaison.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0053	01/06/23	Some Metrorail procedures lack the required urgency to address life-safety issues.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0054	02/25/22	Repeated failures to address safety issues have contributed to a culture where frontline workers no longer see any	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0055	12/16/22	WMATA does not always follow or clearly define its fatigue risk management procedures for the Rail Operations Control Center, including those limiting the length of controller shifts.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0056	08/30/24	Metrorail ROCC recruitment and retention approach is failing. Some controller trainees have left the ROCC immediately after or shortly after the training course, which is scheduled to last nine months.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0057	01/06/23	A high rate of staff turnover in the Rail Operations Control Center contributes to staffing challenges and a lack of positive institutional knowledge that can contribute to safety challenges.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0058	12/02/22	Controllers still have too many responsibilities and are frequently rushed to complete tasks by management.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0059	04/26/24	WMATA has failed to regularly update the Rail Operations Control Center Procedures Manual.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0060	01/06/23	WMATA has not reviewed SOPs or OAPs on a regular basis.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0061	07/29/22	Ride alongs are not effectively utilized to increase controller knowledge, contributing to a lack of controller understanding of what is actually happening on the roadway.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)

WMSC-20-C0064	04/30/22	Required on the job training (OJT) is not carried out in a structured or standardized fashion.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0065	02/17/23	Not all controllers experience emergency drills. If each ROCC controller does not get this experience, it diminishes the value of the drills	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0066	07/01/22	The certification process for ROCC instructors, assistantsuperintendents, superintendents and controllers isinconsistent, not properly documented, and lacks propercontrols to ensure the integrity and meaning of certification.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0068	01/26/24	WMATA does not have a standardized training program for personnel working at desks such as the MOC or ROIC. Metrorail could not provide any documentation of MOC training materials, a curriculum or a training description. Metrorail provided only a study guide for the ROIC.	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0070	10/27/23	Metrorail puts the integrity of safety event investigation at risk by not following procedures requiring proper chain of custody and control of evidence as outlined in SOP 800-01 and Policy/Instruction 10.4/1, not following procedures requiring direct access for investigators to all information, recordings and other evidence that is potentially relevant to the investigation, and not fully training all personnel on the steps they are required to take when a safety event occurs.	WMSC Directive (10/20/2020)
WMSC-21-C0072	04/14/23	WMATA does not have load ratings for its bridges and aerial structures.	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0074	05/13/22	A new Structural Inspection Manual was made effective without any associated training for the employees responsible for implementing it.	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0075	05/13/22	Standard Operating Procedure 208-07 (dated March 2020) contains outdated and conflicting references.	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0076	05/13/22	Metrorail does not have important structural steel inspection tools available that are listed in its Structural Inspection Manual.	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0077	04/14/23	Metrorail does not have consistent requirements for refresher or additional training for structures inspection and maintenance teams.	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0078	07/16/22	Structures inspection supervisors are not able to spend adequate time in the field, creating concerns about work quality and workload.	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0080	07/29/22	Metrorail inspection, repair and design data are spread across disparate systems in a way that makes certain work challenging, creating the risk that safety issues could be misidentified or slip through the cracks.	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0081	08/12/22	Metrorail does not review contractor credentials, qualifications or trainings before a contractor conducts an elevated structure inspection.	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0083	11/10/23	Ten Metrorail structures have steel rocker bearings, which created a seismic risk in the event of an earthquake other seismic events.	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0084	07/19/24	Metrorail is not following and does not have effective safety certification and acceptance procedures for new RMMs. There is no Metrorail-wide safety certification procedure to implement the SSCP.	Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMM) (3/9/2021)
WMSC-21-C0085	07/08/22	Metrorail does not always follow safety certification or safety approval process requirements for modifications to existing RMMs.	Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMM) (3/9/2021)
WMSC-21-C0087	08/12/22	Metrorail is not utilizing reliability data for its RMMs, including the specific nature of any failure, which prevents WMATA from realizing the safety benefits of a complete, ongoing analysis program.	Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMM) (3/9/2021)
WMSC-21-C0088	11/18/22	Equipment operators are not fully trained on each type of vehicle they may be directed to operate. Some training has not included sufficient hands-on experience.	Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMM) (3/9/2021)

WMSC-21-C0090	11/18/22	Supervisors or others have no way of confirming while in the field whether an operator is properly trained to operate a specific RMM.	Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMM) (3/9/2021)
WMSC-21-C0091	02/22/23	Metrorail risks key safety and maintenance work coming to a halt due to insufficient succession planning and training.	Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMM) (3/9/2021)
WMSC-21-C0095	08/12/22	CTEM mechanics get only limited training on specific vehicles that would assist them in moving and maintaining RMMs, and do not get adequate refresher training.	Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMM) (3/9/2021)
WMSC-21-C0098	06/06/25	Several Metrorail preventive maintenance instructions do not include acceptable tolerances for required measurements.	Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMM) (3/9/2021)
WMSC-21-C0099	04/07/28	Intrusion Detection Warning (IDW) systems are not present in all areas where such systems are required	WMSC Directive (3/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0100	10/30/26	Metrorail is not maintaining a fully functioning radio communications system in all rail yards and shops.	WMSC Directive (4/30/2021)
WMSC-21-C0101	11/16/22	Metrorail does not have, provide training on, or otherwise follow specific rules related to rail vehicle and switch movement in non-signalized territory. Further, Metrorail provides no controls on or oversight of movement in dark territory.	WMSC Directive (4/30/2021)
WMSC-21-C0102	09/23/22	Metrorail has not adequately trained ATCM employees on safety procedures to ensure that all employees fully understand their roles with respect to safety.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0103	02/25/22	Metrorail has continued efforts to return to Automatic Train Operation without following its safety certification procedures.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0104	11/18/22	WMATA is not conducting all inspections and maintenance required by its ATC manuals and ATC manuals have incorrect or incomplete information and outdated references.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0105	08/12/22	Metrorail allows employees to use tools that have not gone through any safety review or approval process.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0106	08/12/22	Metrorail does not have a standardized determination of which preventive maintenance work must be prioritized as safety critical.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0107	01/13/23	There is no formal process for ATCM, the department that performs the work in the field, to initiate or request an engineering modification or manual change from ATCE.	ATC Audit 2021
WMSC-21-C0108	11/18/22	Departments responsible for ATC do not have clear, documented, effective working relationships which contributes to communication and coordination challenges that limit safety improvements.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0109	07/29/22	WMATA does not have a standardized process to prioritize and advance ATC capital projects.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0110	03/17/23	Training and parts needed for maintenance appear to be an afterthought in WMATA procurements.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0111	08/25/23	Metrorail does not have adequate replacement parts or materials and has not planned for the obsolescence of critical equipment.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0112	12/16/22	Metrorail has no specific minimum training course requirements, documented OJT requirements or equipment certifications for ATCM employees, or requirements that individuals be trained on a system element prior to conducting maintenance work on it.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0114	05/27/22	Some test forms, work orders, or data sheets are not completed or are not completed with the required level of	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)

WMSC-21-C0115	08/04/23	Metrorail's written procedures do not reflect changes that employees are being directed to implement	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0117	05/20/22	Metrorail does not have documented ATC software standards.	ATC Audit (5/12/2021)
WMSC-21-C0118	07/07/23	Metrorail does not consistently follow its safety certification process, which leads to project activation and use without proper hazard identification and mitigation, putting Metrorail customers, personnel and first responders at risk.	WMSC Directive (8/13/2021)
WMSC-21-C0119	01/27/23	Safety sensitive physicals are not conducted as required by Metrorail policy, and Metrorail does not document or track when these physicals are due for all existing employees.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0120	07/18/25	Metrorail ignores the minimum daily release period (rest period) requirements in its Fatigue Risk Management Policy.	Triennial Safety Audit of Fitness for Duty Programs
WMSC-21-C0121	10/25/24	There is not adequate access to, documentation of, or compilation of data for WMATA to assess compliance with its hours of service requirements.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0122	09/16/22	WMATA does not conduct safety sensitive physicals at the time of or soon after hire as required by its policies.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0123	12/30/22	Not all safety sensitive employee position have fully documented and up-to-date physical and medical requirements	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0124	10/21/22	Many follow up and random drug and alcohol tests required by Metrorail policies and federal regulations were not completed with no documented reason why the tests were missed.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0125	06/24/22	WMATA does not have written criteria for post-incident testing and does not consistently implement post-event testing.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0126	11/18/22	Supervisors are not receiving reasonable suspicion training, as required by Metrorail policy and federal regulation.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0127	08/12/22	WMATA does not provide adequate, clear, understandable information to employees regarding what over-the-counter medications must be disclosed.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0128	12/30/22	WMATA does not have procedures to confirm that employees are consistently removed from service for positive drug and alcohol test results in a timely manner as required by federal regulations.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0129	06/21/24	WMATA does not have a documented procedure for and training to carry out fitness for duty checks prior to or during shifts on a regular basis for all covered employees as specified in the APTA fitness for Duty Standard.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0130	08/23/24	Metrorail does not collect fitness for duty data in a manner that allows for identification, tracking and trending of issues.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0131	12/19/25	Metrorail is not providing medical oversight of contractors and does not include any requirement in contracts that contractors meet WMATA medical, fatigue or hours of service standards.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0132	12/15/23	WMATA does not have a policy in place to test employees or contractors involved in a safety event who are hospitalized but conscious and providing consent.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0133	02/17/23	Metrorail does not confirm the accuracy of new hires' self-reported list of prior DOT-covered employers.	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0134	12/02/22	Metrorail's 6000-Series rehabilitation program, including coupler overhaul work, was implemented by CMOR, CENV and CMNT without safety certification and approvals required by WMATA's SSCPP.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0135	08/26/22	SAFE approved SMP documentation that was incomplete and that did not match approved forms, and Metrorail did not comply with safety certification requirements defined in the SSCPP.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0136	12/02/22	6000 Series cars that underwent rehabilitation were put into service without SAFE approval.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)

WMSC-21-C0137	12/02/22	Metrorail removed the coupler overhaul from the 6000 Series SMP process without documenting that change or completing a review of that change by the SCRC.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0138	12/02/22	Metrorail does not require or receive all necessary OEM documentation, parts or tools.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0139	05/24/24	The 7000 Series rehabilitation and subsystems overhaul program is being developed without full SAFE coordination, involvement or approval.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0141	08/26/22	Metrorail does not have adequate document control practices for car maintenance job plans.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0142	01/06/23	Metrorail does not have a systematic process to ensure that mechanics and engineers are trained for the specific tasks they are assigned to perform.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0143	07/26/24	Metrorail does not consistently follow a standard process to address wheels out-of-round, to prevent cars with wheels out-of-round from operating, and to identify and address the root causes of wheels out-of-round.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0144	03/24/23	Metrorail does not clearly define the proper use of engineering modification instructions (EMIs), service bulletins (SBs), and other railcar engineering change documents.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0145	03/24/23	Metrorail utilizes multiple versions of the same inspection form that do not all include the same pass/fail criteria.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0146	02/05/27	Metrorail railcars do not include inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders in all operating compartments.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0147	02/17/23	Part numbers are not being consistently entered in Maximo Work Orders for 7000 Series railcars.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0148	01/04/23	Some WMATA job descriptions have not been reviewed in more than 20 years.	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0149	08/12/22	WMATA has not fully implemented sufficient protections against the unauthorized movement of trains with zero speed commands.	Formerly (CAP) FTA-RED16-003-B
WMSC-21-C0150	11/18/22	Metrorail is not complying with its safety certification and approval requirements that are specified in its SSCPP before installing and placing traction power systems into service	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)
WMSC-21-C0151	07/12/24	Metrorail is not documenting, tracking and conducting all preventive maintenance inspections that are required by WMATA policy, manuals and instruction.	High Voltage Traction Power (TRPM) (10/27/2021)
WMSC-21-C0155	09/30/22	Metrorail is not effectively identifying, tracking and mitigating hazards related to high voltage and traction power.	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)

WMSC-21-C0156	04/24/26	Metrorail is behind schedule on its floating slab testing to monitor for deterioration due to stray current.	High Voltage Traction Power (TRPM) (10/27/2021)
WMSC-21-C0156	04/26/26	Metrorail is behind schedule on its floating slab testing to monitor for deterioration due to stray current.	High Voltage Traction Power (TRPM) (10/27/2021)
WMSC-21-C0158	11/18/22	Metrorail does not have a policy, process or procedure to ensure effective prioritization of corrective maintenance work orders	High Voltage Traction Power (TRPM) (10/27/2021)