

WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0155 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Pentagon Station – September 7, 2021

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on March 8, 2022

Safety event summary:

Metrorail evacuated Pentagon Station due to a suspicious package. During the period the station was evacuated for life safety reasons, two trains improperly serviced the station, allowing riders to enter an area that was evacuated for their safety.

As the location where the Blue and Yellow Lines meet in Virginia, Pentagon Station is the first station where Blue Line trains toward Franconia-Springfield Station are operating on the Ops 3 radio channel. Blue Line trains operate on the Ops 2 radio channel between Largo Town Center and Arlington Cemetery stations. Each radio channel and the associated territory is controlled by a separate pair of Rail Traffic Controllers in the Rail Operations Control Center.

During this event, the Ops 3 controllers contacted the first trains approaching Pentagon Station to inform them to bypass the station, and the controllers made general announcements that the station was closed. However, when the first announcement was made at approximately 8:21 p.m., Train 413 was in Ops 2 territory. Therefore, the Train Operator did not hear the announcement. Train 413 (Blue Line toward Franconia-Springfield Station) serviced Pentagon Station at 8:36 p.m. while it was evacuated for life safety reasons.

The Ops 3 controllers continued to make periodic announcements regarding the station evacuation, however there were no similar periodic announcements on Ops 2. The Ops 2 controller made one general announcement at 8:39 p.m., just after Train 413 serviced Pentagon Station, regarding the need to bypass the station until further notice.

At approximately 9:31 p.m., Train 404 (Blue Line toward Franconia-Springfield Station) serviced Pentagon Station while it was evacuated for life safety reasons.

The operator of Train 412 (Blue Line toward Largo Town Center Station), who knew the station was closed for life safety reasons, observed two riders on the inbound platform of Pentagon Station 9:35 p.m. and got permission from the ROCC to allow those riders to board the train to leave the station.

During this event, ROCC personnel were experiencing a high workload including an emergency at Fort Totten Station, Green and Yellow Line trains turning back southbound at Fort Totten Station, trains losing speed commands, and numerous phone calls to the Ops 3 desk.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was an empty battery display case left outside the fare gates. The probable cause of trains servicing a station that was evacuated for life-safety reasons is Metrorail's lack of procedure to ensure that safety information is provided to and understood by all personnel in a timely fashion, including personnel moving from the territory covered by one operations channel to the territory covered by another channel.

Corrective Actions:



Metrorail directed Rail Controllers to broadcast station bypass announcements on all associated Ops channels on a scheduled basis for the duration of an incident response.

Metrorail is addressing blanket announcements to personnel and trains operating on other radio channels in a procedural revision that will cover unknown substances, suspicious packages and bomb threats.

WMSC staff observations:

Metrorail could consider whether additional forms of communication should be implemented, either face-to-face or over radio or digital systems, to ensure that train operators are aware of conditions such as stations that are closed for life-safety reasons.

Staff recommendation: Adopt final report.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority Department of Safety and Environmental Management (SAFE)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E21420

Date of Event:	09/07/2021
Type of Event:	Evacuation for Life Safety
Incident Time:	20:14 hours
Location:	Pentagon Station, Track 2
Time and How received by SAFE:	20:23 hours SAFE/IMO On-call Phone
WMSC Notification Time:	21:59 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: No
	WMSC: No
	Other: No
Rail Vehicle:	N/A
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20210920#95668

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420

Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022 Rev. 1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022 Rev. 1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022

Pentagon Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

September 7, 2021

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms	3
Executive Summary	4
Incident Site	5
Field Sketch/Schematics	5
Purpose and Scope	5
Investigative Methods	5
Investigation	6
Chronological Event Timeline	6
Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)	7
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)	10
Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)	12
Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA)	12
Weather	12
Findings	12
Immediate Mitigation	12
Probable Cause Statement	13
SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions	13
Appendices	14
Appendix A - Root Cause Analysis	14
Appendix B – ROCC Incident Report	15
Appendix C – Rail Operations Control System (ROCS) SPOTS Report	17
Appendix D – MTPD Hot Wash Summary	19

Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022 Rev. 1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022 Rev. 1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Incident Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
ссти	Closed-Circuit Television
DVEU	Digital Video Evidence Unit
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
I/A	Incidents/Accidents
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OSC	On-Scene Commander
PFPA	Pentagon Force Protection Agency
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
ROCS	Rail Operations Control System
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
SAFE	Department of Safety and Environmental Management
SMS	Safety Measurement System
SRC	Safety Risk Coordinator
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Executive Summary

On Tuesday, September 7, 2021, at approximately 20:14 hours, the Station Manager at Pentagon Station, Mezzanine #43, notified the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) of a suspicious package near the fare machines on the mezzanine level. ROCC subsequently notified Metropolitan Transit Police Department (MTPD) of the suspicious package and dispatched an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor to assist with the scene. At approximately 20:20 hours, ROCC implemented Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 1A and instructed trains to bypass Pentagon Station. The MTPD Hot Wash Summary revealed that the Incident Command System (ICS) was activated at approximately 20:17 hours and ended at approximately 21:42 hours. MTPD personnel reported discovering a box that was approximately four feet tall, wrapped in white plastic bags with the words "Duracell" written on all sides. MTPD personnel also reported there was a handwritten note which stated, "not trash." The report further states that the On-Scene Commander (OSC) determined that due to the location of the item and proximity to the anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the station should be shut down and the package analyzed by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The Incident Command Post (ICP) was setup in the bus bay on the street level. After the station was evacuated, MTPD personnel performed a sweep of the area while EOD analyzed the suspicious package. While the station was evacuated, ROCC had to be notified several times that MTPD had instituted SOP 1A and trains needed to bypass the station. MTPD contacted the Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) for assistance with scene security. After the package was analyzed, EOD determined the package was an empty Duracell battery display case. MTPD documented and prepared the package for disposal (see Appendix D). No injuries or damages occurred as a result of the incident.

Based on the Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) playback, Train ID 302 was the first train to bypass Pentagon Station, Track 2, at approximately 20:21 hours during the station evacuation. ROCC Radio Traffic Controller (RTC) made initial announcements on the Ops 3 channel to bypass the station and contacted trains in approach to area at approximately 20:21 hours. At approximately 20:22 hours, Train ID 406 was the first train to bypass Pentagon Station, Track 1. When the initial announcement was made, Train ID 413 was operating within the Ops 2 service area and serviced Pentagon Station Track 2 at approximately 20:36 hours after entering the Ops 3 service area. While Ops 3 continued to make periodic announcements to bypass Pentagon Station, Ops 2 did not continue to make announcements. Train ID 404 serviced Pentagon Station, Track 2, at approximately 21:31 hours. At approximately 21:35 hours, Train ID 412 stopped at Pentagon Station on Track 1 after observing two customers who had entered the station on the platform and receiving permission from ROCC to board them manually. The RTRA Supervisor responded and reported no other customers were on the platform.


The probable cause of the evacuation for life safety reasons at Pentagon Station was a suspicious object near the fare machines on the mezzanine level, left by an unknown person for an unknown reason.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420 Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022 Rev. 1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022 Rev. 1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022

Incident Site

Pentagon Station, Mezzanine Level

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment via Records Review
 - Informal Interviews Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information.
- Documentation Review A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Hot Wash Summary
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedural Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Data
 - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
 - Rail Operations Control System (ROCS) SPOTS Report
- System Data Recording Review A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) Playback

 Rev. 1 Drafted By:
 SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022
 Page 5

 Rev. 1 Reviewed By:
 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022
 Page 5

 Rev. 1 Approved By:
 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022
 Page 5

- Audio Recording System (ARS) Playback
- Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Tuesday, September 7, 2021, at approximately 20:14 hours, MTPD personnel responded to a report of a suspicious package located at Pentagon Station, Mezzanine #43, near the fare machines according to the MTPD Hot Wash Summary. The Station Manager notified ROCC and MTPD determined the station should be evacuated due to the suspicious nature of the package, the location of it being at the Pentagon and because it was four days away from the anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks. In addition, the summary also stated that the suspicious package was approximately four feet tall, wrapped in white plastic bags with the words "Duracell" written of all sides. MTPD and ROCC implemented SOP 1A, and ROCC instructed trains to bypass the station. After the station was evacuated, MTPD contacted Pentagon PD to assist with scene security and conducted a sweep of the station. ROCC dispatched an RTRA Supervisor to assist MTPD with the station closure and EOD conducted an analysis of the suspicious package. After the package was analyzed, EOD determined the package was an empty Duracell battery display case. MTPD documented and prepared the package for disposal. While the station was closed, Train IDs 413 and 404 serviced Pentagon Station on Track 2. No injuries or damages occurred as a result of the incident. The Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) identified through their investigation via CCTV the suspicious package was left near the fare machines at approximately 19:40 hours.

Chronological Event Timeline

Time	Description
19:40 hours	DVEU identified the suspicious package was left at 19:40 hours during their investigation. [MTPD Event Report].
20:14 hours	Station Manager contacted ROCC to notify MTPD of a package left near the fare machines at Mezzanine #43.
20:17 hours	MTPD activated SOP 1A and initiated ICS.
20:20 hours	ROCC dispatched an RTRA Supervisor to assist with the incident scene. ROCC and initiated SOP 1A procedures.
20:21 hours	Ops 3 RTC instructed all trains to bypass Pentagon Station due to suspicious package and contacted Train ID 406, Track 1 at Pentagon City Station and Train ID 412, Track 2 at Arlington Cemetery Station to bypass Pentagon Station due to a suspicious package. Train Operators repeated back the instruction.
20:21 hours	Train ID 302 was the first train to bypass Pentagon Station, Track 2 in revenue service to Huntington Station.
20:22 hours	Train ID 406 was the first train to bypass Pentagon Station, Track 1 in revenue service to Largo Town Center Station.
20:29 hours	Ops 3 RTC made general announcement for all trains to bypass Pentagon station due to suspicious package until further notice.
20:30 hours	RTRA Supervisor arrived on scene to assist MTPD.
20:36 hours	Train ID 413 serviced Pentagon Station Track 2 while the station was closed due to the evacuation.
Incident Date: 09/	07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022 Page 6

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, CCTV, MTPD Hot Wash Summary and ROCC Incident Report revealed the following timeline:

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420

Time	Description
20:38 hours	Ops 3 RTC made general announcement for all trains to bypass Pentagon station due to suspicious package until further notice.
20:39 hours	Ops 2 RTC made general announcement for all trains to bypass Pentagon station due to suspicious package until further notice.
20:40 hours to 21:31 hours	Ops 3 RTC makes periodic general announcements for all trains to continue bypassing Pentagon station due to suspicious package until further notice.
21:31 hours	Train ID 404 serviced Pentagon Station Track 2 while the station was closed due to the evacuation. Nine passengers exited the train and proceeded to exit the station.
21:35 hours	Train ID 412 reported observing two customers on the platform on Track 1 and requested permission to manually board the passengers ("Key them aboard"). ROCC RTC gave permission to board the passengers.
21:42 hours	RTRA Supervisor reported no customers on the platform at Pentagon Station.
21:53 hours	RTRA Supervisor reported the station was cleared by the OSC and the station was reopened for revenue service.
21:54 hours	Train ID 406 was the first train to service Pentagon Station, Track 2, in revenue service to Franconia-Springfield Station after the station reopened.
21:58 hours	Train ID 306 was the first train to service Pentagon Station, Track 1, in revenue service to Fort Totten Station after the station reopened.

**Note: Times above may vary from other system's timelines based on clock settings.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 1 - Train ID 413 serviced Pentagon Station, Track 2 at approximately 20:36:20 hours during the station evacuation.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420

Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022 Rev. 1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022 Rev. 1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022



Figure 2 - Train ID 413 departed Pentagon Station, Track 2 at approximately 20:36:40 hours during the station evacuation.




Figure 3 - Train ID 404 serviced Pentagon Station, Track 2 at approximately 21:31:20 hours during the station evacuation.

Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022 Rev. 1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022 Rev. 1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022




Figure 4 - Train ID 404 departed Pentagon Station, Track 2 at approximately 21:31:40 hours during the station evacuation.



Figure 5 - Train ID 412 serviced Pentagon Station with permission from ROCC, Track 1 at approximately 21:35:20 hours during the station evacuation.



Figure 6 - Train ID 412 departed Pentagon Station, Track 1 at approximately 21:36:20 hours during the station evacuation.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420 Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022 Rev. 1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022 Rev. 1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)



Figure 7 - CCTV footage showing the RTRA Supervisor on scene assisting with the station closure at approximately 20:20:30 hours.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420
 Rev. 1 Drafted By:
 SAFE 702 - 02/18/2022
 Page 10

 Rev. 1 Reviewed By:
 SAFE 71 - 02/25/2022
 Page 10

 Rev. 1 Approved By:
 SAFE 71 - 02/25/2022
 Page 10



Figure 8 - MTPD personnel evacuating customers from the station near the fare gates at approximately 20:20:41 hours.




Figure 9 - MTPD personnel evacuating customers from the platform at approximately 20:20:56 hours.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420 Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022 Rev. 1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022 Rev. 1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022

Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)

The MTPD Hot Wash Summary revealed that at approximately 20:14 hours, the Station manager at Pentagon Station reported a suspicious package that was left in the area of the fare gates. MTPD personnel arrived on scene and discovered a box that was approximately four feet tall, wrapped in white plastic bags and appeared to have the words "Duracell" written on all sides. There was also a handwritten note that stated, "not trash." The summary further stated the ICP was set up in the bus bay while the station evacuation was occurring. MTPD implemented SOP 1A and contacted the PFPA to assist with scene security. MTPD personnel conducted a sweep of the area while EOD conducted an analysis of the suspicious package. The EOD analysis determined the suspicious package to be an empty "Duracell" battery display box. The station and upper bus bay were closed for approximately 1 hour and 25 minutes during this incident. No injuries were reported.

Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA)

Statements from the Station Manager at Mezzanine #43, Pentagon Station revealed they were informed by another WMATA employee of the suspicious package located near the Northside elevators, adjacent to the fare machines on the mezzanine level. After an initial investigation by the Station Manager, they notified ROCC of the situation and were directed by MTPD to evacuate the station. An RTRA Supervisor was dispatched to the scene to assist MTPD with the station closure. The Station Manager reported MTPD Officers were posted by both entrances to prevent customers from entering the station.

<u>Weather</u>

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature at 66° F with no wind, clear with visibility of 10 miles. Humidity was at 90%. Based on findings, SAFE has concluded that weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Arlington, VA.) 23rd Anniversary.

<u>Findings</u>

- On-Scene MTPD and RTRA personnel complied with SOP #1A and SOP #14 procedures when responding to this event.
- Two trains serviced Pentagon Station on Track 2 while the station was closed for evacuation.
- Train ID 412 was given permission to board customers on the platform prior to the station reopening.
- Based on the MSRPH 14.5.1.5, MTPD determines if facilities are to be evacuated or closed. The station was evacuated, and a bus bridge was implemented.

Immediate Mitigation

- MTPD evacuated Pentagon Station.
- ROCC directed revenue trains to bypass Pentagon Station on Tracks 1 and 2.
- ROCC dispatched an RTRA Supervisor to assist with the scene.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the evacuation for life safety reasons at Pentagon Station was a report of a suspicious object near the fare machines on the mezzanine level, left by an unknown person for an unknown reason.


SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

The following are the recommendations and corrective actions identified as a result of this investigation. These recommendations and corrective actions are tracked and verified by SAFE upon completion. The responsible department is identified in the corrective action code, and the respective departmental Safety Risk Coordinator (SRC) will manage the mitigation.

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Due Date
95668_SAFE CAPS_ROC C_001	(RC-1, CF-1) Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) – ROCC Management will ensure ROCC Controllers are reinstructed to broadcast station bypass announcements and other instructions relevant to SOP 1A to all associated Ops Channels on a scheduled basis for the duration of an incident response.	ROCC SRC	10/31/2021
95668_SAFE CAPS_SAFE _001	As part of the MSRPH revision project, include language to 130-ROCC-ALL-01-00, <i>Unknown</i> <i>Substance, Suspicious/Unattended Package,</i> <i>Bomb Threat,</i> to address blanket announcements to personnel and trains operating on other radio channels.	ROCC SRC, RSSC	3/31/2022

Appendices

Appendix A - Root Cause Analysis



Root Cause Analysis

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420
 Rev. 1 Drafted By:
 SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022
 Page 14

 Rev. 1 Reviewed By:
 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022
 Rev. 1 Approved By:
 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022

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Appendix B – ROCC Incident Report

		INCIDENT ID: 202	1250YELLOW6	ALL STREET, ST
DATE 2021-09-07	TIM 202		LINE Yellow	ITEM 6
LOCATION (Pentagon (CO	STATION/YARD) 7)	LOCATION/CH Applicable)	AIN MARKER (If	REPORTED BY Transit Dispatcher
TRAIN ID 302	DIRECTION O/B	TRACK NUME		OTIFIED e Alert/Messaging
CAR NUMBE Lead Car	RS (XXXX-XXXX)			
-	-		-	-
Caused Issue		aused Issue 🗆	Caused Issue I	Caused Issu
TRBL CODE THSP- THREATS AND SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES TYPE INCIDI Suspicious Pac	P	ESP CODE DL		
ACTION PLA		rvisor.		
ACTION PLA	N n, Dispatch RTRA Supe	ervisor. DELAYS IN M	INUTES	
ACTION PLA Bypass Statior	n, Dispatch RTRA Supe		IINUTES TRAIN	TOTAL DURATION
ACTION PLA Bypass Statior	n, Dispatch RTRA Supe	DELAYS IN M		TOTAL DURATION
ACTION PLA Bypass Statior	n, Dispatch RTRA Supe	DELAYS IN M	TRAIN 0	
ACTION PLA	n, Dispatch RTRA Supe	DELAYS IN M INCIDENT 12	TRAIN 0 DIFIED REROUTED NOT	0
ACTION PLA Bypass Station	n, Dispatch RTRA Supe I	DELAYS IN M INCIDENT 12 TRIPS MOD	TRAIN 0 DIFIED REROUTED NOT	0 OFFLOADS
ACTION PLA Bypass Station	n, Dispatch RTRA Supe 0 GAP TRAIN 0	DELAYS IN M INCIDENT 12 TRIPS MOD LATE DISPATCHES	TRAIN 0 DIFIED REROUTED NOT DIST 0	0 OFFLOADS
ACTION PLA Bypass Station	n, Dispatch RTRA Supe 0 GAP TRAIN 0	DELAYS IN M INCIDENT 12 TRIPS MOD LATE DISPATCHES 0 IVE PRIMARY CONSC ALL DOORS C	TRAIN 0 DIFIED REROUTED NOT DISU 0 DIE INDICATIONS CLOSED AUTO\M	0 PATCHED 0 0 ANUAL BPP

Attachment 1 – Page 1 of 2.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420

Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022 Rev. 1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022 Rev. 1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022

View Approved Incident Report

State of the		IDENT CHRONOL	JOGT	A STATE OF THE OWNER
TIME	DION			
2020	ROCC received a report of a sum RTRA Supervi- was established. Bus route 7A, and Arlington Cemetery. ROCC personnel were notified.	sor wa 16A, and 22A were	is dispatched to the scene to e used to mitigate delays be	o assist. SOP 1A tween Pentagon
2021	Train 302 was the first train to services to Huntington.	bypass Pentagon t	rack number two and contin	ued in revenue
2022	Train 406 was the first train to services to Largo Town Center		n track number one and cor	ntinued in revenue
2030	Unit Commander was identified as		ne RTRA Forward Liaison. O	n Scene
2153	RTRA Supervisor Commander and the station co		was cleared for service by t or revenue service.	the On Scene
2154	Train 406 was the first train to service to Franconia Springfield		n track two and continued i	n revenue
2158	Train 306 was the first train to service to Fort Totten.	service Pentagon o	n track one and continued i	n revenue
MAXIMO 1 8557733	FICKET#			
REPORT P	REPARED BY NAME		CLICK T	O SIGN
RADIO CO	NTROLLER 1		×	
	CONTROLLER 1		1	
RADIO CO	NTROLLER 2			
BUTTON C	CONTROLLER 2			
Tant.	SUPERINTEND	ENTS OR ASSIST	ANTS SECTION	THE DUP OF THE OWNER
	IAL FOLLOW-UP CORRECTIVE OR REMARKS			
	JP INFORMATION OBTAINED F	ROM		
NOTIFICA	TIONS/PAGE GROUPS	#1/CEO 🗖 #	2/DGM &BELOW	
ADDITION	IAL NOTIFICATIONS MADE BY	IMO		
APPROVE	DBY	NAME		CLICK TO SIGN
REPORT A	PPROVED BY SUPT. OR ASST			1
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Attachment 1 – Page 2 of 2.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420

Appendix C – Rail Operations Control System (ROCS) SPOTS Report

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Sun Sep 19 09:02:10 2021

Selec	Select Platform: C07-1 and/or Select ID:				ect ID:	Leave blank to remove criteria						
Selec	t Date: Se	p ~ 7	~ 20	021 ~	Selec	t Times	(0-24HRS): From 2	0:00	и то 22	:00 ~	
Ge	nerate Re	eport										
ID	Platform	length	dcode	door	Right door close	dwell	Left door open	Left door close	dwell	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	Headway (door open to door open) door open to door open
<u>404</u>	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72				20:01:25	20:01:49	24	20:00:39	20:02:14]
<u>306</u>	<u>C07-1</u>	8	29				20:07:38	20:08:03	25	20:06:59	20:08:29	6:13
405	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72				20:09:31	20:09:49	18	20:08:57	20:10:13	1:53
307	<u>C07-1</u>	8	29				20:17:48	20:18:05	17	20:17:11	20:18:32	8:17
<u>406</u>	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72							20:23:28	20:24:00	-
<u>308</u>	<u>C07-1</u>	8	29							20:28:51	20:29:34	-
<u>408</u>	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72							20:33:02	20:33:34	-
<u>309</u>	<u>C07-1</u>	8	24							20:41:20	20:42:00	-
<u>409</u>	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72							20:48:25	20:50:00	-
310	<u>C07-1</u>	8	29							20:52:20	20:52:58	-
410	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72							20:58:57	20:59:33	-
301	<u>C07-1</u>	0	29							21:11:03	21:11:42	-
422	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72							21:12:14	21:14:21	-
302	<u>C07-1</u>	8	29							21:19:53	21:20:32	-
	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72							21:23:16	21:23:48	-
	<u>C07-1</u>	8	29							21:29:50	21:30:26	-
	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72				21:35:03	21:36:23	80	21:34:02	21:37:00	77:15
	<u>C07-1</u>	8	94							21:37:31	21:38:03	-
304	<u>C07-1</u>	8	29							21:42:13	21:42:52	-
	<u>C07-1</u>	8	72							21:46:41	21:47:13	-
306	<u>C07-1</u>	8	29				21:59:32	21:59:45	13	21:58:51	22:00:11	24:29

Total number of trains that opened doors: 6

Figure 10 - SPOTS Report showing Train ID 412 stopping at Pentagon Station, Track 1 during the station evacuation at 21:35 hours with permission from ROCC to manually board to customers on the platform.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420
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 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022
 Pa

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Sun Sep 19 09:07:07 2021

Selec	t Platform:	C07-2	an	d/or Sel	ect ID:		Leave bl	ank to remo	ve criteria			
Selec	t Date: Se	p ∨ 7	~ 2	021 ~	Selec	t Times	(0-24HRS)): From 2	20:00 \	и то 22	:00 ~	
Ge	nerate Re	eport										
ID	Platform	length	dcode		Right door close	dwell	Left door open	Left door close	dwell	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	Headway (door open to door open) door open to door open
<u>310</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	31				20:08:39	20:09:28	49	20:08:07	20:09:51	-
<u>422</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16				20:10:53	20:1 <mark>1:</mark> 12	<mark>1</mark> 9	20:10:19	20:11:36	2:14
<u>301</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	6	31				20:16:02	20:16:20	18	20:15:25	20:16:44	5:09
<u>411</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16				20:18:01	20:18:15	14	20:17:22	20:18:42	1:59
<u>302</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	31							20:22:12	20:22:51	-
<u>412</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16							20:23:27	20:23:58	-
<u>303</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	31							20:34:27	20:35:07	-
<u>413</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16				20:36:17	20:36:39	22	20:35:44	20:37:04	18:16
820	<u>C07-2</u>	8	99							20:37:28	20:37:58	-
<u>401</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16							20:43:34	20:44:08	•
<u>304</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	31							20:49:45	20:50:19	-
<u>402</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16							20:57:05	20:57:45	-
<u>306</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	31							20:59:52	21:00:33	-
307	<u>C07-2</u>	8	31							21:08:34	21:09:10	-
<u>403</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16							21:09:48	21:10:1 <mark>2</mark>	-
<u>421</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16							21:19:44	21:20:10	-
308	<u>C07-2</u>	8	31							21:25:05	21:25:39	-
<u>404</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16				21:31:24	21:31:44	20	21:30:55	21:32:32	55:07
310	<u>C07-2</u>	8	31							21:39:08	21:39:39	-
<u>405</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16							21:43:20	21:44:02	-
<u>406</u>	<u>C07-2</u>	8	16				21:55:04	21:55:20	<mark>1</mark> 6	21:54:32	21:55:43	23:40

Total number of trains that opened doors: 7

Figure 11 - SPOTS Report showing Train ID 413 serviced Pentagon Station, Track 2, during the station evacuation at 20:36 hours and Train ID 404 serviced Pentagon Station, Track 2, at 21:31 hours.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420
 Rev. 1 Drafted By:
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Appendix D – MTPD Hot Wash Summary



Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary



ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.

	II	CIDENT	SUMMARY					
Incident Requiring ICS	Activation:	Suspicious	us Package -Pentagon					
*Incident Commander	(IC):	Capt.	Capt.					
MTPD CCN:	2021-04300		Local CCN:	N/A				
*Date ICS Initiated:	9/7/2021		*Time ICS Initiated:	2017 hours				
*Date ICS Terminated:	9/7/2021		*Time ICS Terminated:	2142 hours				
*Duration of Incident:	1 hour 25 minutes		*Service Disrupted (Type and Time):	1 hour 25 minutes				
Incident Location:	Pentagon Metro station		Command Post Location:	Top bus bay				
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	Capt.		Command Aid for OSC:	Sgt.				
Forward Liaison:	Ofc.		Unified Command:	N/A				
OCC Liaison:	(OEM)/	(SAFE)	Alternate Channel:	Ch. 2				
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	Station Bypa		Bus Bridge Established (From /To):	Bus shuttle from PENT to PNTC				
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	Outter- Ofc. Inner- Ofc.		Power De-energized:	N/A				
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name Dept: ROCC	2141 hours		Medical Attention Required/Requested:	N/A				
Entry/Exit Log:	Ofc.		CID Response:	N/A				

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Attachment 1 - Page 1 of 4.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420

Rev. 1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 - 02/18/2022 Rev. 1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 - 02/25/2022 Rev. 1 Approved By: SAFE 71 - 02/25/2022

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA ON-SCENE PERSONNEL					
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role			
	MTPD	CSS/ 1st on scene			
	MTPD	Forward/Operations			
and the	MTPD	Inner Perimeter			
	MTPD	Outer Perimeter / Entry/Exi			
100 0	MTPD	K-9			
	MTPD	EOD			
	MTPD	K-9			
	MTPD	Sgt / Command Aid			
	MTPD	Sgt/ Operations Asst.			
	MTPD	Watch Commander / I.C.			
	ROCC	Rail Supervisor			
1.00	ROCC	Station Manager			
	MTPD	CSS			

Name	Agency/Department	Title/Role
	Pentagon PD	Sgt./ Scene Security
	Pentagon PD	Scene Security
	Pentagon PD	Scene Security
Use separate sheet if	additional space is required.	
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Attachment 1 – Page 2 of 4.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420
 Rev. 1 Drafted By:
 SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022
 Page 20

 Rev. 1 Reviewed By:
 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022
 Page 20

 Rev. 1 Approved By:
 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022
 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

	REQUESTS
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	No
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	Tost beeving COTM reports much high being preven
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	Yes
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	DVEU

On 9/7/2021 at 2014 hours station manager called ROCC to notify MTPD of a package that was left in the area of the fare gates. MTPD Ofc. Ofc. and ofc. arrived on scene to investigate. Officer mediately noticed that the box was approximately 4 ft tall, wrapped in while plastic bags appeared to have the words "Duracell" written on all sides of it, and there was a hand written note that stated "not trash." At that time, Officer mediately noticed that due to the suspicious nature of the package, It location of it being at the Pentagon, and it being 4 days way from the anniversary of the Sep 11 terrorist attacks that the station should be shut down and the package properly analyzed EOD. Officer setup command in the bus bay while officers several times that MTPD had instituted SOP 1A and trains were to bypass the station. Bus service was also diverted away from the upper area at this time. Rail supervisor service was also diverted away from the upper area at this time. Rail supervisor method be an empty "Duracell" battery display case. Officer method and the package for CSS purposes and we be disposing of the item. The station and upper bus bay were closed for 1 hour and 25 minutes before reopening at 2142 hours. No injuries reported. Officer method should be event report #21-04300 Use separate sheet if additional space is required. Ever Official Use Only		OBSERVAT	ONS
Officer mediately noticed that the box was approximately 4 ft tall, wrapped in whi plastic bags appeared to have the words "Duracell" written on all sides of it, and there was a hand written note that stated "not trash." At that time, Officer mediated the station should be shut down and the package properly analyzed EOD. Officer mediated the station should be shut down and the package properly analyzed EOD. Officer mediated the station and order rail to bypass the station. Rail had to be notified several times that MTPD had instituted SOP 1A and trains were to bypass the station. Bus service was also diverted away from the upper area at this time. Rail supervisor arrived on scene to assist with the station closure. K-9 Ofc. Mediated away from the upper area at this time. Rail supervisor "prepared to X-ray the package. The package was determined to be an empty "Duracell" battery display case. Officer mediated and mediated properly documented the package for CSS purposes and w be disposing of the item. The station and upper bus bay were closed for 1 hour and 25 minutes before recpening at 2142 hours. No injuries reported. Officer mediated and the holding the event report #21-04300 Use separate sheet if additional space is required.		5	called ROCC to notify MTPD of a
 location of it being at the Pentagon, and it being 4 days way from the anniversary of the Sep 11 terrorist attacks that the station should be shut down and the package properly analyzed EOD. Officer setup command in the bus bay while officers were able to evacuate the station and order rail to bypass the station. Rail had to be notified several times that MTPD had instituted SOP 1A and trains were to bypass the station. Bus service was also diverted away from the upper area at this time. Rail supervisor service of a sist with the station closure. K-9 Ofc. Setup command in the bus bay while officers were to assist with the station closure. K-9 Ofc. Setup command on scene and performed cursory sweeps of the area while Ofc. Setup repared to X-ray the package. The package was determined to be an empty "Duracell" battery display case. Officer and the item. The station and upper bus bay were closed for 1 hour and 25 minutes before reopening at 2142 hours. No injuries reported. Officer and will be holding the event report #21-04300 Use separate sheet if additional space is required. 	Officer mmediately mmediately plastic bags appeared to ha	noticed that the box wave the words "Duracell"	is approximately 4 ft tall, wrapped in whit
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be disposing of the item. The station and upper bus bay were closed for 1 hour and 25 minutes before reopening at 2142 hours. No injuries reported. Officer Contract of the state of the s	prepared to X-ray t	he package. The package	
2142 hours. No injuries reported. Officer will be holding the event report #21-04300 Use separate sheet if additional space is required.		properly document	ed the package for CSS purposes and w
	2142 hours. No inju <u>ries reported</u> .		
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Attachment 1 – Page 3 of 4.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420
 Rev. 1 Drafted By:
 SAFE 702 – 02/18/2022
 Page 21

 Rev. 1 Reviewed By:
 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022
 Page 21

 Rev. 1 Approved By:
 SAFE 71 – 02/25/2022
 Page 21

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

	NOTES
It was noted that even though command location, trains wer	ith all personnel that were on scene. MTPD advised ROCC that we had command and identified re still servicing the station after being ordered not to. This ginning of the event and towards the end. ROCC had to be o service the station.
Decisions were made prompt commander which created a	ly and decisively by the on scene commander/ incident streamlined operation.
Officers were able to quickly	setup command, operations and entry exit log.
	ly reached out to Pentagon PD for assistance with this event and ing the upper bus bay to buses and pedestrian traffic.
The teamwork between all inv allowed a prompt resolution o	volved was smooth and created seamless transitions which of the incident.
Use separate sheet if additional	l space is required.
09/09/21	e, Printed Name, and Signature/Date
	rinted Name and Signature/Date
Watch Commander's Title, P 09/09/21	rinted Name and Signature/Date
09/09/21	printed Name and Signature/Date
09/09/21 Patrol Operations Bureau Co	ommander's, Printed Name and Signature/Date
09/09/21 Patrol Operations Bureau Co	ommander's, Printed Name and Signature/Date
09/09/21 Patrol Operations Bureau Co	ement Director's. Printed Name and Signature/Date
09/09/21 Patrol Operations Bureau Co	ommander's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

Attachment 1 – Page 4 of 4.

Incident Date: 09/07/2021 Time: 20:14 hours Final Report Rev. 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety E21420