



WMSM Commissioner Brief: W-0159 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Huntington Station – December 6, 2021

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on April 12, 2022

Safety event summary:

An Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor reported that someone lit a bottle on fire, or possibly had a bomb and boarded Train ID 302. Subsequently, a Metrorail employee reported there was a threat to blow up the train. Metrorail evacuated riders from the train and, later, the station.

At approximately 8:24 a.m., an RTRA Supervisor notified the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) of a male on the platform at Huntington Station lighting a bottle on fire. The Supervisor then reported the event to a Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Radio Traffic Controller. At 8:27 a.m., MTPD instructed the ROCC to hold Train 302 on the platform. At approximately 8:30 a.m., the Incident Management Officer (IMO) reported to MTPD that the person threatened to blow up the train.

MTPD arrived on the scene at 8:31 a.m., however the person left the station prior to their arrival. At 8:36 a.m., train service was suspended between Huntington and Eisenhower Avenue stations. At 8:42 a.m., MTPD began offloading Train ID 302, which was still on the platform at Huntington Station, and it was clear of customers at 8:46 a.m.

At 8:47 a.m., MTPD established Incident Command. The station was all clear of customers and closed at 8:51 a.m. MTPD's Explosive Ordnance Detection (EOD) units conducted a sweep of the station and train. There were no explosives or hazardous materials found. The station was reopened at 9:17 a.m.

After further investigation, MTPD concluded that the subject in question was smoking from a pipe while engaged in an argument on the platform and the bomb threat was unsubstantiated.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this evacuation for life safety reasons was a possible bomb threat.

Staff recommendation: Adopt final report.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety and Environmental
Management (SAFE)
FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E21636

Date of Event:	12/06/2021
Type of Event:	A-4: Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	08:24 hours
Location:	Huntington Station, Track 1
Time and How received by SAFE:	08:28 hours Incident Management Official (IMO)
WMSC Notification Time:	10:15 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA SAFE: No WMSC: No Other: N/A
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 302 (3166/67x3099/98x3250/51)
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA), Fairfax County Fire & Rescue, Fairfax County Police Department

Huntington Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

December 6, 2021

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
EOD	Explosive Ordinance Detection
IMO	Incident Management Official
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety and Environmental Management
SMS	Safety Measurement System
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

On Monday, December 6, 2021 at approximately 08:22 hours, the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) was notified by an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor that there was a male subject on the platform of Huntington Station lighting a bottle on fire. The subject eventually boarded Train ID 302, which was berthed on the platform. According to the Audio Recording System (ARS), at approximately 08:25 hours, the RTRA Supervisor contacted a Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) to inform them of the situation at Huntington Station. Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) #14, Bomb Threat/Suspicious Package/Unattended Package, was put into effect. At approximately 08:26 hours, the RTC contacted MTPD dispatch to ask if the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) should hold Train ID 302 at Huntington Station. MTPD affirmed to hold Train ID 302 at Huntington Station. The IMO was assisting as the Radio Controller during this event. The first MTPD officer arrived on scene at 08:31 hours. The male subject exited Huntington Station before MTPD officers arrived. MTPD officers canvassed the area but were unsuccessful in apprehending the male subject.

At approximately 08:42 hours, MTPD started offloading Train ID 302 and clearing the station. At approximately 08:46 hours, Train ID 302 was cleared of customers. The Incident Command Post was established at approximately 08:47 hours. The RTC informed the RTRA Supervisor that SOP 1A was in effect and they would be the RTRA Forward Liaison. At approximately 08:51 hours, the RTRA Supervisor informed the RTC that Huntington Station was cleared of customers and the station was closed. A bus bridge was requested after the station was closed. MTPD's Explosive Ordinance Detection (EOD) units conducted a complete sweep of Train ID 302 and Huntington Station and did not detect any explosive devices. During the on-scene investigation, witness interviews were unable to produce evidence of anyone hearing a specific threat to the station or train.

At approximately 09:17 hours, MTPD turned the scene back over to the RTRA Supervisor. Huntington Station was reopened shortly after. There were no reported injuries as a result of this incident.


The probable cause for the Huntington Station evacuation on December 6, 2021, was an intentional action by an unidentified subject attempting to light a bottle and boarding Train ID 302, where the male subject reportedly stated they would blow up the train. A RTRA Supervisor made the initial call to the MTPD. This notification prompted an MTPD response and subsequent evacuation of the station for life safety reasons.

MTPD concluded their investigation and did not find any explosives or hazardous substances. MTPD declared the scene safe for revenue service. There were no actual hazards to the train, Metro station, or passengers identified.

Incident Site

Huntington Station, Track 1

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Formal Interview – No interviews were conducted related to this event.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - MTPD Hot Wash Summary
 - MTPD CAD Report
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback include OPS 3 Radio, Phone – 12062, 12061, Emergency/IT/MTPD-Phone – 12065, SOCC Console – Phone-12045, MTPD-2x Radio

Investigation

On Monday, December 6, 2021 at approximately 08:22 hours, MTPD was notified by a RTRA Supervisor that there was a male subject on the platform of Huntington Station lighting a bottle and eventually boarding Train ID 302. According to ARS, at approximately 08:25 hours, the RTRA Supervisor contacted a RTC to inform them of the situation at Huntington Station. SOP #14, Bomb Threat/Suspicious Package/Unattended Package, was put into effect. At approximately 08:26 hours, the RTC contacted MTPD dispatch to ask if the ROCC should hold Train ID 302 at Huntington Station. MTPD affirmed to hold Train ID 302 at Huntington Station. The IMO was assisting as the Radio Controller during this event. The first MTPD officer arrived on scene at 08:31 hours. The male subject exited Huntington Station before MTPD officers arrived. MTPD officers canvassed the area but were unsuccessful in apprehending the male subject. Further investigation by MTPD revealed, a verbal altercation took place on the platform between two parties, one of who was smoking from a marijuana style pipe. WMATA staff overheard the confrontation and reported it. Individuals that were still on scene were interviewed by MTPD and nobody advised they heard a bomb threat.

At approximately 08:42 hours, MTPD started offloading Train ID 302's customers and clearing the station. At approximately 08:46 hours, Train ID 302 was cleared of customers. The entire train was checked and there were no explosive devices or suspicious materials discovered. The Incident Command Post was established at approximately 08:47 hours and located at the Kiosk on the North Side of Huntington Avenue. The RTC informed the RTRA Supervisor that SOP 1A was now in effect and they would be the RTRA Forward Liaison. At approximately 08:51 hours, the RTRA Supervisor informed the RTC that Huntington Station was clear of customers, and the station was closed. A bus bridge was requested after the station was closed. MTPD's EOD units conducted a complete sweep of Train ID 302 and Huntington Station and did not detect any explosive devices.

At approximately 09:17 hours, MTPD turned the scene back over to the RTRA Supervisor. Huntington Station was reopened shortly after. There were no reported injuries as a result of this incident.

Chronological Event Timeline

Time	Description
8:22:56 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor: Contacted MTPD to report that there was a male subject on the platform at Huntington Station with a bottle trying to light it like a pipe bomb or something. Provided a description of the subject, their location on the fourth car on 3096. [Phone- 12045]</u>
8:25:22 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor: Contacted an RTC to give them the description of a male that was on Train ID 302 on the third or fourth car, who was believed to be in possession of a pipe bomb. They informed the RTC that they notified MTPD already and they didn't tell them what to do with the train. [Phone-12062]</u>
8:26:31 hours	<u>RTC: Contacted MTPD to ask if they should hold the train at Huntington Station. MTPD confirmed to hold the train. [Phone-12062]</u>
8:27:00 hours	<u>RTC: Informed the RTRA Supervisor that MTPD wants the train held at Huntington Station. [Phone-12062]</u>

Time	Description
8:28:32 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Contacted a ROCC Operations Manager (OM) to advise them that Train ID 302 was being held at Huntington Station by MTPD due to a customer on board threatening to blow up the train with a pipe bomb. The ROCC OM asked if Transit was on scene and/or if they were using Bomb Threat procedures? The ROCC OM instructed the RTC to take out the Bomb Threat SOP and follow it. [Phone- 12065]
8:29:55 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Contacted by RTRA Supervisor #2 (Unit 50) via landline. Informed the RTRA Supervisor of the situation at Huntington Station. Instructed the RTRA Supervisor to head towards Eisenhower Station because they may have to turn trains around at that station. [Phone- 12061]
8:31:51 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Informed the RTC that MTPD arrived on scene. [Ops. 3]
8:36:16 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Contacted Train ID 303 and instructed them to make announcements to the customers, offload their customers, and reverse ends at Eisenhower Avenue Station. [Ops. 3]
8:36:25 hours	<u>Operator of Train ID 303</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
8:36:34 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Advised MTPD that they were going to turn Train ID 303 around at Eisenhower Station and not send it to Huntington. [Phone-12061]
8:36:36 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Made blanket announcement to all Yellow Line Operators that train service was being suspended from Huntington to Eisenhower Station due to a police situation. [Ops. 3]
8:41:46 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Informed the RTC that the male exited Train ID 302 and exited the station before MTPD arrived. The RTRA Supervisor also noted they would provide an update after speaking with MTPD. [Ops. 3]
8:41:59 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
8:42:44 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Informed the RTC that MTPD was offloading Train ID 302, Track 1 and clearing the station. [Ops. 3]
8:42:54 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Asked the RTRA Supervisor if MTPD was offloading Train ID 302 and clearing the station at this time. [Ops. 3]
8:43:01 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Gave a good copy. [Ops.3]
8:44:54 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Informed the RTC that they believed the Operator told them the suspect left through the South Entrance of the station. [Phone-12061]
8:46:25 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Updated the RTC that Train ID 302 was walked through and cleared of customers. [Ops. 3]
8:46:34 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
8:47:00 hours	Incident Command Post was established at 8:47 hours at the North Side Kiosk. [MTPD Hot Wash]
8:47:01 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Instructed the RTRA Supervisor to head to the Command Post, South Side Entrance, after they were done clearing the station. [Ops. 3]
8:47:57 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Informed the RTC that the North Side of Huntington Station was clear of customers and closed. [Ops. 3]
8:48:07 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back and instructed them to head to the Command Post at the South Side Entrance after clearing the station. [Ops. 3]
8:48:19 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
8:48:35 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Instructed the RTRA Supervisor to ask the Station Manager to verify the station cleared of customers. [Ops. 3]

Time	Description
8:48:40 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Confirmed a good copy and noted they were walking to the South Side end and would give an update when the South side was clear. [Ops. 3]
8:48:47 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Informed the RTRA Supervisor that SOP 1A is in effect, and they would be the RTRA Forward Liaison [Ops. 3]
8:49:10 hours	<u>IMO</u> : Asked the OSC if the Command Post was on the South side. The OSC informed the IMO the Command Post was on the North Side. [MTPD-2x]
8:49:09 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Gave a repeat back that they were the RTRA Forward Liaison. [Ops. 3]
8:51:26 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Informed the RTC that Huntington Station was clear of all customers. [Ops. 3]
8:51:33 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back and clarified that the Command Post was on the North Side [Ops. 3]
8:51:48 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
8:59:46 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Informed the RTC that they were headed back to the South Side of Huntington Station because the Command Post was moving to that side.
9:00:08 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
9:13:00 hours	Huntington Station and Train ID 302 were swept by EOD units. [MTPD Hot Wash]
9:17:06 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Informed the RTC that Huntington Station was about to be reopened. They stated MTPD did a complete sweep of Train ID 302 on Track 1 and both the North and South Side of the station. [Ops. 3]
9:17:31 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Asked if they can resume normal revenue service. [Ops. 3]
9:17:45 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Confirmed that revenue service could be resumed. [Ops. 3]
9:17:50 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Made blanket announcement that revenue service has resumed to Huntington Station. [Ops. 3]

***Note: Times above may vary from other system's timelines based on clock settings.*

Findings

- A RTRA Supervisor contacted MTPD about a customer lighting a bottle on the platform and the customer later threatened to blow up the train.
- The customer left Huntington Station before MTPD arrived.
- The RTC implemented SOP 1A and assigned the RTRA Supervisor as the RTRA Forward Liaison.
- MTPD personnel was the on-scene commander.
- The RTRA Supervisor and MTPD Officers cleared Train ID 302 and Huntington Station.
- MTPD was unable to apprehend the customer that made the bomb threat.
- MTPD EOD units swept Train 302 and Huntington Station and concluded there were no explosives or hazardous substances.
- MTPD declared Train ID 302 and Huntington Station cleared for revenue service.
- SAFE did not identify any non-compliance to the rules and procedures.

Weather

On December 6, 2021, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 71° F, with clear skies throughout the morning. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Huntington, VA.)

Human Factors

No human factors were evaluated related to the incident response of this event.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Huntington Station was evacuated and closed for Life Safety Reasons.
- MTPD and a RTRA Supervisor offloaded Train ID 302.
- MTPD Officers and EOD units swept Train ID 302 and Huntington Station.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause for the Huntington Station evacuation on December 6, 2021, was an intentional action by an unidentified subject attempting to light a bottle and boarding Train ID 302, where they reportedly stated they would blow up the train. This notification prompted an MTPD response and subsequent evacuation of the station for life safety reasons.

MTPD concluded their investigation and did not find any explosives or hazardous substances. MTPD declared the scene safe for revenue service. There were no actual hazards to the train, Metro station, or passengers identified.

Recommendations/ Corrective Actions

There are no recommendations or corrective actions for this evacuation for life safety reasons event. There were no deficiencies identified for the incident response or lapse in safety procedures.

Appendices

Appendix A – Hot Wash Summary



Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary



ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. **Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.**

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:		THREAT OF PIPE BOMB AT HUNT	
*Incident Commander (IC):		SGT. [REDACTED] CR #51	
MTPD CCN:	2021-05892	Local CCN:	
*Date ICS Initiated:	12-06-2021	*Time ICS Initiated:	0847HRS
*Date ICS Terminated:	12-06-2021	*Time ICS Terminated:	0918HRS
*Duration of Incident:	54MINS	*Service Disrupted (Type and Time):	TRAIN SVC. 0843-0918HRS
Incident Location:	HUNT PLATFORM	Command Post Location:	KIOSK NORTH SIDE HUNT AVE.
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	SGT. [REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	SGT. [REDACTED]
Forward Liaison:	OFC. [REDACTED]	Unified Command:	NO
OCC Liaison:	ON DUTY IMO	Alternate Channel:	MTPD CH.2
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	NO TRAINS TURNED AROUND @EISN	Bus Bridge Established (From /To):	HUNT-EISN
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	NO	Power De-energized:	NO
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name: [REDACTED] Dept: RTRA		Medical Attention Required/Requested:	NO
Entry/Exit Log:	YES	CID Response:	NO

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
	MTPD	FIRST ON SCENE/CANVAS
	MTPD	ENTRY/EXIT HUNT AVE.
	MTPD	OSC #1,
	MTPD	OSC ASSIT.
	MTPD	ON SCENE CANVAS
	MTPD	ENTRY/EXIT N. KINGS HWY
	MTPD	EOD K-9 STATION CANVAS
	MTPD	EOD K-9 STATION CANVAS
	MTPD	K-9 BUS BAY CANVAS
	MTPD	OSC #2
	MTP EMERGENCY MGMT	STAGGED
	RTRA	RAIL SUPERVISOR
	RTRA	TRAIN OPERATOR

EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Agency/Department	Title/Role
	FXPD	STAGGED/ASSIST
	FXFD	STAGGED
	FX CO. FIRE & RESCUE	STAGGED

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	NO
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	YES
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	DVEU

OBSERVATIONS
<p>-0824hrs COMM advised patron liting a bottle on platform HUNT -0827hrs ROCC held train at HUNT -0830hrs IMO advise subject threatened to blow up train - 0831hrs MTPD Units acknowledged and en route -0832hrs MTPD [REDACTED] acknowledged -0832hrs MTPD [REDACTED] on scene, canvased with negative results -0838 additional MTPD units on scene -0843hrs ROCC advised trains will turn around at EISN -0847hrs [REDACTED] established On Scene Command Huntington Ave. Side (North Side Kiosk) -0847hrs Switched radio to MTPD [REDACTED] -0848hr MTPD EOD [REDACTED] on scene -0852hrs DVEU sent still image snippet -0900hrs Request for bus bridge to be established on N. Kings Hwy side -0901hrs Request for [REDACTED] to sweep Huntington Ave. side bus bay -0912hrs Cr. [REDACTED] on scene and established command -0913hrs Station and trains were swept by EOD K-9 units. Bus bridge to be terminated -0913hrs FFX CO Engine [REDACTED] on scene -0918hrs scene turned back over to RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] -0918hrs All MTPD units back to MTPD [REDACTED]</p>

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

NOTES

On 12-06-2021 at approximately 0824hrs an initial call went out for a subject lighting a bottle on fire while on the platform at HUNT, MTPD units then acknowledged the call and advised they were enroute. While units were responding to the station, IMO updated units that the subject in question was now threatening to blow the station up, DVEU then distributed a snippet. [REDACTED] was first to arrive on scene and conducted a canvas with negative results. Additional MTPD units arrived on scene to assist while CR- [REDACTED] marked out, established command and closed the station down while setting up entry/exit. EOD units swept the station as well as both bus bays with nothing found. The station was closed from 0840-0918hrs as trains conducted a turnaround at EISN. A bus bridge was established on the N. Kings HWY side.

Further investigation revealed that a verbal altercation took place on the platform between two parties, one of whom was smoking from a marijuana style pipe. Revenue techs overheard the confrontation and reported to dispatch. Remaining parties that were still on scene were interviewed and nobody advised they heard a bomb threat was made. The station was deemed cleared and turned back over to RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] at 0918hrs. ID [REDACTED] will be holding a Police Information-Station Closure report for the incident (21-05892). All units have returned back in service. TSOC notification was made at 0935hrs to [REDACTED].

The Hot wash was conducted By Lt. [REDACTED] and he advised before we close a station, members must locate a confirmed devise or have credible information of a devise. Also members were advised to ensure they secure the reporting party before implementing ISC, closing the station and requesting a bus bridge.

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

Patrol Operations Bureau Commander's Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

Office of Emergency Management Director's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

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