



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0165 – Collision at Potomac Avenue Station – January 9, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on May 24, 2022

Safety event summary:

A Metrorail rider stumbled and fell from the platform onto the tracks at Potomac Avenue Station at 7:51 p.m. on January 9, 2022. They were later struck by a train.

After the fall, the person appeared disoriented, and got up to sit on the third rail coverboard. Approximately one minute later, an Orange Line train toward Vienna Station entered Potomac Avenue Station and struck the person.

The train entered the station at 25 mph, which is under the maximum allowed speed for station entry. The train had slowed to 18 mph when the Train Operator activated the emergency brake push button (mushroom) approximately 386 feet into the platform. The train travelled another 71 feet, stopping 142 feet from the end of the platform. Data review demonstrated that the train's data acquisition module did not record required information consistently during the train's trip, suggesting a failure of the real-time serial communications controller. This was demonstrated by the signals not being properly recorded at the time of the event for various train conditions including the master controller position and emergency relay. Metrorail vehicle engineers calculated speed and braking based on other systems.

The Train Operator was distraught by the event as they reported to the ROCC that a person had been struck. This slightly delayed the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) rail controllers' understanding of what had occurred. The ROCC then de-energized third rail power on Track 2, where the person had been struck. Train 905, moving in the other direction, was permitted to service the station on Track 1 approximately 5 minutes after the person was struck and approximately 3 minutes after power was de-energized on Track 2. Train 405 was also permitted to service the station a few minutes after Train 905. Metrorail's Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for a person struck by a train states that the station must be closed to passengers with the assistance of the Station Manager and Metro Transit Police (MTPD). Instead, train service continued until D.C. Fire and EMS (DC FEMS) directed that power be de-energized on Track 1.

Both the ROCC Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) and a Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) Information Controller called D.C. 911 from the ROCC facility regarding the person struck by a train. Both provided similar information, however the calls were not coordinated.

A Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor dispatched to the scene was designated on-scene commander (OSC) by the ROCC. Riders were offloaded from the train. The RTRA Supervisor verified that power was de-energized, then performed a ground walk-around of the train and spoke with the person under the train.

A DC FEMS Battalion Chief assumed command upon arrival at the station and established a command post. The Battalion Chief directed Metrorail to de-energize third rail power on Track 1 as a safety precaution at approximately 8:07 p.m. The ROCC de-energized power on Track 1 at 8:08 p.m. After significant care and effort due to the way the person was pinned under the train, DCFEMS personnel took the person who was struck to a hospital with non-life-threatening injuries.



The investigation identified incident command system deficiencies and related communication process deficiencies. MTPD established on-scene command despite DC FEMS having established incident command. Metrorail, including ROCC, Traction Power and MTPD, also experienced confusion about which WMATA department was controlling the scene, the authorization for red tag power outage changes and other safety requirements. Based on the timing of these concerns, this confusion appears to have included communication from the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC), a position Metrorail has described as existing in part to prevent such confusion.

MTPD had not recorded any transfer of incident command to Rail Transportation (RTRA) or clearance for additional activities on scene. However, at 11:43 p.m., MTPD determined that a red tag request had been authorized. The ROCC Operations Manager stated that they believed MTPD had transferred the scene to RTRA more than an hour earlier. MTPD and the MAC had no records of such a transfer. Still, the ROCC Operations Manager had initiated a red tag at approximately 10:44 p.m. that was later executed at 11:57 p.m. Power Desk personnel, who report to Traction Power, had a staffing change during this time. The absence of Power Desk personnel contributed to a delay in the execution of the red tag. Delays in the overall post-event process were also caused by problems with the transfer of the ROCC operations from the Jackson Graham Building (JGB) in D.C. back to the Carmen Turner Facility (CTF) in Maryland.

Metrorail inspected the train after the event and replaced the train-to-wayside communication (TWC) antenna.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was a rider falling onto the roadway.

WMSC staff observations:

The WMSC assessed Metrorail's incident command process as part of the Audit of Emergency Management and Fire and Life Safety issued in February 2022 and found that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structures and had procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. The audit also found that, during emergencies, Metrorail's calls to public safety answering points (911 call centers) are inconsistent, incomplete and contribute to delayed or ineffective emergency response. Metrorail is required to address these and other findings through open corrective action plans (CAPs).

Following the event, during the power restoration process, a third rail power restoration announcement was made for Track 2 at Potomac Avenue Station, however power was not actually restored until approximately 22 minutes after the announcement. These announcements are made to inform and give personnel ample time to inform the ROCC if power should not be restored. Metrorail should consider a process to make this announcement a second time if needed to provide appropriate warning to personnel on the roadway.

Metrorail plans to discuss with the Train Operator the process for clear communications in the event of an emergency (including the use of "Emergency; Emergency; Emergency!" to initiate communication) when the Train Operator returns to service. The WMSC understands the stress such a situation places on an operator.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority

Department of Safety and Environmental
Management (SAFE)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22019

Date of Event:	01/09/2022
Type of Event:	Person Struck by Train
Incident Time:	19:51 hours
Location:	Potomac Avenue Station, Track 2
Time and how received by SAFE:	19:57 hours, SAFE MAC
WMSC Notification Time:	19:57 hours
Event Scene Release	21:52 hours, WMSC
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA SAFE: No WMSC: No Other: N/A
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 903 L3213-3212 x 2003-2002 x 3245-3244T
Injuries:	One transport for medical attention. Non-life-threatening injury. Right Leg Lacerations
Damage:	Train-to-Wayside Communication Antenna
Emergency Responders:	Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA), Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Services (DCFEMS), Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT), Emergency Response Team (ERT), and Office of Plant Maintenance (PLNT).
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20220109#97784MX

Potomac Avenue Station
January 9, 2022
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ATC	Automatic Train Control
ARS	Audio Recording Service
CAD	Computer-Aided Dispatch
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CENV	Vehicle Program Services
CSS	Crime Scene Search
DAM	Data Acquisition Module
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
ER	Event Recorder
ESR	Event Scene Release
FT	Foul Time
IC	Incident Command
ICP	Incident Command Post
MAC	Mission Assurance Coordinator
MC	Master Controller
MOC	Maintenance Operations Center
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
OSC	On-scene Commander
PLNT	Office of Plant Maintenance
ROC	Rail Operations Control
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
ROIC	Rail Operations Information Center
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
RSCC	Real-Time Serial Communications Controller
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
VCU	Vehicle Control Unit
VMS	Vehicle Monitoring System
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

At approximately 19:51 hours on January 9, 2022, a customer appeared to stumble and fall onto the roadway on Track 2 at Potomac Avenue Station. After the fall, the person recovered, but appeared disoriented, and sat on the third rail coverboard. Less than a minute later, an Orange Line train [Train ID 903] on Track 2, traveling inbound towards Vienna Station entered the Potomac Avenue platform limits and struck the person. The Train Operator of Train ID 903 notified the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) of the event. The Radio RTC acknowledged the transmission. The Button RTC notified the Rail Operation Information Center (ROIC) Specialist and ROCC Operations Manager. The Radio RTC proceeded to dispatch an RTRA Supervisor to Potomac Avenue Station. At approximately 19:53 hours, the ROCC commanded breakers to open remotely and de-energized third rail power on Track 2. At approximately 19:54 hours, the ROIC Specialist notified DCFEMS of a person struck by train. The Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) also notified DCFEMS at approximately 19:54 hours. Both the ROIC and ROCC AOM provided similar information to DCFEMS.

The RTRA Supervisor arrived on scene and was designated as the on-scene commander (OSC). The OSC conducted a ground walk-around and verified signs of life under car 3213 at approximately 20:01 hours. Persons aboard Train ID 903 were off-loaded onto the Potomac Avenue platform assisted by RTRA personnel. Potomac Avenue Station was closed to revenue service during the response. There were no reported injuries to persons aboard the train or to WMATA personnel. The person was extricated from beneath car 3213 by DCFEMS personnel and transported to Medstar hospital with unknown injuries at approximately 20:46 hours. After arriving at the hospital, medical staff identified that the person suffered lacerations to their right leg. RTRA removed the Train Operator from service for post-incident toxicology testing and subsequent interview with MTPD. The MAC contacted the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) and received an Event Scene Release (ESR) at approximately 21:52 hours.

Office of Plant Maintenance (PLNT) personnel responded and stood by on the platform until emergency response operations were completed. They were permitted to enter the roadway under Red Tag# #2022010524 outage to clean and disinfect the roadway in preparation for mainline restoration. PLNT personnel began cleaning mitigation efforts at approximately 00:01 hours. At approximately 00:42 hours, ROCC commanded third rail power breakers closed and re-energized at Potomac Avenue Station, Track 2. ROCC resumed normal service, and Train ID 904 was the first train to continue revenue service from Potomac Avenue towards Virginia.

An analysis of data collected from the record systems, staff incident report review, and CCTV review determined no safety deficiencies related to any WMATA station facility or rail vehicle failures contributed to the person being struck by the train. An examination of VMS data revealed that the Train Operator of Train ID 903 applied the emergency push button before striking the unidentified person.


The probable cause of the Potomac Avenue Station person struck by train event was an unintentionally fall to the roadway as a train was in approach to the station. The Train Operator activated the Emergency Pushbutton and MC handle as they observed a person sitting on the third rail cover board. Despite these braking efforts, the Train Operator was unable to prevent contact with the person.

Incident Site

Potomac Avenue Station, Track 2
Direct Fixation Track
Length of Curve - 119-feet
The radius of Curve - 755.00.'
Elevation of 9.48
Point of Vertical Intersect D2-175+50
Point of Vertical Tangent Track D2-176+50
Point of Tangent Track D2-173+50
230-foot Vertical Curve at D2-180+30.73

The Vertical Curve ends 36.83 feet before the Station platform entrance. WMATA's Quick Access Guide shows a restricted view curve on approach to the Potomac Avenue station end at the platform limits near D2-174+00, meaning that the Train Operator had a limited view of Potomac Avenue Station on approach.

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigation Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

Written Statements – SAFE received and reviewed statements with the following involved personnel as part of this investigation:

- Train Operator – [Written Statement]**
- RTRA Supervisor - [Incident Report]

***Note: SAFE was unable to interview the Train Operator due to a leave of absence resulting from this event as of the date of this report submission.*

Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation in Metro systems of record. These records include:

- Employee Training Procedures & Records
- Certifications
- The 30-Day work history
- Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Procedures Manual
- Office of Radio Communications (COMR)
- Vehicle Program Services (CENV)
- Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) post-incident inspection data
- Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Incident report
- Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) report
- After-Action Report (AAR)

System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems and Open MHz This data includes:

- Audio Recording System (ARS) playback [Radio and Phone Communications]
- Open MHz (DCFEMS)
- Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) playback
- Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) Playback

Investigation

At approximately 19:51 hours on January 9, 2022, a customer appeared to stumble and fall onto the roadway on Track 2 at Potomac Avenue Station. After the fall, the person recovered but appeared disoriented and sat on the third rail coverboard. Less than a minute later, an Orange Line train [Train ID 903] traveling inbound on Track 2 in the direction of Vienna entered Potomac Avenue platform limits at a speed of 25 mph. Based on the train data, the train slowed to 18 mph when emergency braking was initiated, approximately 386 feet into the platform. After the Train Operator initiated emergency braking, the train traveled an additional 71.4 feet, stopping approximately 142 feet from the 8-car marker after striking the person on the roadway. The deceleration rate was calculated to be 3.33 mph per second in emergency braking. The Train Operator of Train ID 903 notified the ROCC Radio RTC of the event. Based on AIMS Playback, at approximately 19:53 hours, the ROCC commanded breakers to open remotely and de-energized third rail power on Track 2. At approximately 19:54 hours, the ROIC Specialist notified the DCFEMS of a person struck by train. The AOM also notified DCFEMS at approximately 19:54 hours. Both the ROIC and ROCC AOM provided similar information to DCFEMS.




Figure 1- AIMS Playback showed third rail power de-energized

The Radio RTC proceeded to dispatch an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor to Potomac Avenue Station. At approximately 19:56 hours, an Orange Line train [Train ID 905] serviced Potomac Avenue Station on Track 1.




Figure 2 - Train ID 905 serviced Potomac Avenue Station at approximately 19:56 hours.

Immediately following Train ID 905, Blue Line Train [Train ID 405] serviced Potomac Avenue station Track 1.¹

¹ Person struck by Train SOP states, "26.5.3.5 Initiate action to close the affected station to passengers, and unauthorized personnel, with assistance from the Station Manager and MTPD."




Figure 3 - Train ID 405 Serviced Track #1 Potomac Avenue Station.

An RTRA Supervisor arrived on the scene and the Radio RTC designated them as the OSC. The OSC confirmed that a handbrake was applied on the lead car and conducted a ground walk-around. They verified signs of life under car 3213 at approximately 20:03 hours. The persons aboard Train ID 903 were off-loaded onto the Potomac Avenue platform assisted by RTRA personnel. Potomac Avenue Station was closed to revenue service. There were no reported injuries to persons aboard the train or to WMATA personnel.

DCFEMS Battalion Chief notified DCFEMS communications that they assumed command and established the incident command post at Potomac Avenue station at the 700th block of 17th Street SE at approximately 20:07 hours. The Battalion Chief confirmed they had one person under a train on Track 2 with power de-energized. DCFEMS Battalion Chief IC requested WMATA remove the third rail power of Track 1 for safety precautions. WMATA deenergized third rail power on Track 1 at approximately 20:08 hours.




Figure 4 - Third rail power de-energized on Track #1 at 20:08:40 hours.

DCFEMS removed the person from beneath car 3213 and transported them to Medstar Hospital with unknown injuries at approximately 20:46 hours. DCFEMS Battalion Chief terminated incident command at approximately 21:15 hours. RTRA removed the Train Operator from service for post-incident toxicology testing and subsequent MTPD interview. The WMSC authorized the ESR at 21:52 hours.

PLNT personnel stood by on the platform during the response phase of the event. They were permitted to enter the roadway under Red Tag #2022010524 to disinfect the roadway in preparation for mainline restoration. PLNT personnel began cleaning mitigation efforts at approximately 00:01 hours.

An analysis of data collected from the record systems, staff incident report review, and CCTV review determined that no safety deficiencies related to any WMATA station facility or rail vehicle failures contributed to the person being struck by the train. A review of the Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS) recordings revealed that the Train Operator of Train ID 903 applied the Console Emergency Pushbutton before striking the unidentified person.




Figure 5 - Red Tag established with shunts placed at approximately 23:58 hours.

At approximately 00:42 hours, ROCC commanded third rail power breakers closed and re-energized at Potomac Avenue Station, Track 2. ROCC resumed normal service, and Train ID 904 was the first train to continue revenue service from Potomac Avenue inbound Track 1 single-tracking towards Virginia.




Figure 6 - Power Re-energized on Track #2 at approximately 00:42 hours.

A review of the incident response did not reveal significant deviations with Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)'s, (i.e., SOP 2 Emergency Removal and Restoration of Third Rail Power; SOP 1A Command, Control, and Coordination of Emergencies on the Roadway). However, train service continued at Potomac Avenue on Track 1 for approximately seven minutes after the event. Data reviewed did not identify the decision-making process to maintain single-tracking operations during the initial response. The Train Operator also did not make their initial report beginning with

“Emergency, Emergency, Emergency.” The Radio RTC asked the Train Operator to repeat their message after the initial report, which caused a slight delay in gathering information.

Audio Recording System (ARS) Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications and the MTPD Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) report, revealed the following:

Time	Description
19:51:00 hours	CCTV video showed a person stumble and fall onto the roadway from the platform on Track 2. After the fall, they seemed to be disoriented and sat on the third rail cover board; thereafter, Train ID 903 made contact with the person. [CCTV]
19:51:55 hours	<u>Train ID 903 Train Operator</u> : Reported that they made contact with a person on the roadway that was sitting on the third rail. [Ops 2 Radio] **Note: Approximately one minute was used to confirm the initial report from the Train Operator.
19:53:00 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power de-energized on Track 2.
19:54:13 hours	<u>ROIC Specialist</u> : Notified DCFEMS of a person struck by a train at Potomac Avenue Station.
19:56:00 hours	AIMS playback showed Orange Line Train ID 905 Serviced Potomac Avenue Station.
19:56:00 hours	<u>DCFEMS Dispatch</u> : Dispatched DCFEMS personnel for a person struck by train at Potomac Avenue Metro Station. [Open MHz Channel 1 DCFEMS]
19:58:00 hours	AIMS playback showed Blue Line Train ID 405 Serviced Potomac Avenue Station.
19:59:20 hours	AIMS playback showed Blue Block and Human Forms established on Track 2.
20:00:46 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Notified Radio RTC handbrakes were applied on the incident consist. [Ops 2 Radio]
20:01:21 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted RTRA Supervisor permission to enter the roadway under FT protection to hot stick and confirm third rail power was de-energized. <u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Confirmed Third rail power was de-energized on Track 2
20:03:35 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Conducted a ground walk-around, notified the Radio RTC they verified signs of life, and the customer was positioned underneath car 3213.
20:07:00 hours	<u>DCFEMS</u> : Battalion Chief notified DCFEMS communications that they assumed command and established the incident command post at Potomac Avenue station. The Battalion Chief confirmed they had one person under a train on Track 2 with power de-energized. [Open MHz Channel 1 DCFEMS]
20:08:00 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Reported DCFEMS requested third rail power de-energized on Track 1 for safety precaution. [ROCC report]
20:08:40 hours	AIMS playback showed Third Rail power de-energized on Track 1.

Time	Description
20:46:00 hours	<u>DCFEMS</u> : Battalion Chief IC reported to DCFEMS communications that the passenger was extricated from under the rail car, and DCFEMS were evaluating the passenger. [Open MHz Channel 1 DCFEMS]
20:50:40 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power re-energized on Track 1.
20:53:00 hours	<u>DCFEMS</u> : Battalion Chief notified DCFEMS communications that the patient was being transported to Medstar. [Open MHz Channel 1 DCFEMS]
20:57:00 hours	AIMS playback showed the first Train [Train ID 450] single tracking began on Track 1.
21:03:02 hours	<u>DCFEMS</u> : Battalion Chief IC rescue squad one notified DCFEMS communications that all personnel were clear of the incident scene. [Open MHz Channel 1 DCFEMS]
21:15:00 hours	<u>DCFEMS</u> : Battalion Chief IC terminated incident command at Potomac Avenue Station. [Open MHz Channel 1 DCFEMS]
21:20:00 hours	AIMS playback showed Blue Line Train ID 402 first train to service Potomac Avenue Platform on Track 1, operating outbound.
21:52:00 hours	WMSC authorized ESR to the MAC.
22:23:00 hours	MTPD authorized Third rail power restoration at Potomac Avenue Track 2 so that the train [Train ID 703] could move under an absolute block back to New Carrollton Yard. [ROCC Report]
22:37:00 hours	AIMS playback showed Train ID 703 operate outbound from Potomac Avenue Station, Track 2.
23:25:00 hours	AIMS playback showed Blue Block and Human Forms established on Track 2 and power de-energized again for cleaning efforts.
23:58:00 hours	AIMS playback showed shunts placed on Track 2 for red tag #2022010524 power outage.
00:01:00 hours	PLNT personnel began cleaning Potomac Avenue Station Track 2.
00:11:12 hours	MTPD turned the scene over to RTRA personnel. [CAD Report]
00:19:00 hours	ERT relinquished Red Tag #2022010524 to Maintenance Operation Control (MOC). All personnel and equipment cleared the roadway at Potomac Avenue, Track 2. Third rail power restoration announcements were made. [ROCC Report]
00:42:00 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power re-energized and normal service restored to Track 2.

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Metro Transit Police Department

MTPD Event Report

Adopted relevant sections

"On January 9th, 2022, at approximately 19:54 hours, [Redacted] responded to the Potomac Avenue Metro Station (1400 Potomac Ave, SE 20003) for the report of a person struck by a train."

DCFEMS Units responded in approximately three minutes to help with the search for the person struck. The person struck was located under the first rail car 3213 on track #2 by DCFEMS. The scene was determined to be a rescue at 20:05 hours. The responding MTPD units taped off the area to preserve the crime scene and assisted with escorting patrons out of the station. DCFEMS requested that third rail be de-energized on both tracks at 20:07 hours. MTPD began an entry-exit log to notate all emergency personnel and assets on the scene. MTPD Sergeant established on-scene command of the incident, and an MTPD Officer was the forward liaison. DCFEMS made a successful recovery at 20:40 hours.

The injured party suffered from a deep laceration to his right leg with non-life-threatening injuries and was transported to MedStar Washington Hospital Center via EMS unit #8 without further incident. CSS Officers were on the scene to process the incident. Single Tracking began on track #1, and the station was granted access to open at 21:17 hours. Criminal Investigation [Division] responded to the scene and interviewed the train operator. The train was taken to the New [Carrollton] Railyard for CSS processing. I secured the train, commuted back aboard, and met with CSS at the New Carrollton Railyard to process the train car. The scene was turned over to RTRA Supervisor at 00:11 hours.”

After-Action Report (AAR)

DCFEMS and MTPD Hot Wash

According to DCFEMS and MTPD Hot wash, the DCFEMS expressed there were challenges in the rescue process due to the position of the person. DCFEMS reported, “the person was pinned under the train for a significant time as planning and strategies were discussed to safely rescue the person without further injury. The DCFEMS felt they had the necessary resources on scene to complete the rescue mission and felt that the DCFEMS and MTPD worked very well together to successfully complete the goal.”

MTPD Hot Wash

Challenges identified during the AAR Hot Wash:

- At 23:43 Hours, MTPD contacted the Operations Manager (OM) at ROCC, inquiring who authorized the red tag request. The OM advised the Line Controller notified Rail #1, the further advised that command was released to rail from MTPD just before 22:00 hours.
- At 23:51 hours, MTPD Officer contacted MTPD communications to verify via the CAD to see if there were any entries for MTPD relinquishing command to RAIL and MTPD communications advised this was negative per CAD notes.
- MTPD Sgt contacted MAC at 00:22 hours to verify if the command was relinquished at any time, according to the notes, the findings were negative as well.
- Red tag was set in motion by the OM at approximately 22:44 hours through 23:57 when it was executed.
- Power Assistant Supervisor advised Power staffing changed over during the incident. Power personnel absence contributed to a delay in executing the red tag.
- The transfer from the ROCC from JGB to CTF was not smooth, which also contributed to the delays in recovery phase.

Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)

CMNT technicians inspected the incident consist for damage and found no major damage on Lead Car 3213. CMNT personnel replaced the front-end TWC antenna. CMNT technicians performed Master Controller (MC) operational checks on the incident consist and did not find any indications of an abnormal condition with the MC. CMNT personnel performed brake rate testing and determined the readings were within acceptable ranges.

Vehicle Program Services (CENV)

CENV analyzed data retrieved from Car 3213. CENV reported that the Data Acquisition Module (DAM) information was intermittently recorded throughout the train's run on January 9, 2022, suggesting that the Real-Time Serial Communications Controller (RSCC) board in the Vehicle Control Unit (VCU) was not functioning properly. Various signals, including the Master Controller position (Notch), Station ID, Emergency Relay, TL82, and 72 statuses, were not recorded correctly during the time of this event, however speed and braking could be calculated by other systems.

At approximately 19:48:01 hours, Train ID 903 entered Potomac Avenue Suitland Station, Track 2 traveling at a speed of 25 mph. At approximately 19:48:10 hours, the train slowed to 18 mph when emergency was initiated, approximately 386 feet into the platform. At first F4 marker, the lead was 215 ft into the platform. After emergency braking was initiated, the train traveled an additional 71.4 ft having the train stop approximately 142 feet from the 8-car marker, never receiving the second F4. The deceleration rate is 3.33 mph per second in Emergency braking. An F4 is a marker coil with a fixed frequency that governs station stop accuracy when operating in Automatic Train Operation (ATO). The F4 marker is consistently positioned 160 feet from the center platform of a station.

Event Recorder (ER) Data Graph/Sequence of Events

Based on CENV's analysis of the downloaded VMS and ER, details from the data analysis are as follows:

Time	Description
19:48:01 hours	Train ID 903 entered Potomac Avenue Station, traveling at 25 mph.
19:48:10 hours	Train ID 903 speed reduced to 18 Mph when Emergency braking is activated and applied.
19:48:15 hours	The train recorded zero speed.

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Based on the VMS and ER data, all the subsystems' safety components such as Automatic Train Control (ATC), brakes, and propulsion acted as designed. There were no faults with the train that contributed to this event.




Diagram 1 - Event Recorder Graphical Analysis

Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

COMR conducted a comprehensive radio check on Track 1 and Track 2 at Potomac Avenue Station and did not identify any issues with the communication system. The communication system operated as designed.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the Potomac Avenue person struck by train event, SAFE reviewed MTPD and Train Operator incident reports via Safety Measurement System Incident/Accident module. These incident reports identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

Train Operator

"I was coming in Potomac Avenue, Track #2. The person was sitting on the third rail. I stopped the train hit the emergency stop button. The train didn't stop before making contact with the person. I notified ROCC."

RTRA Supervisor

"I arrived on the scene at 19:53 hours and was appointed the OSC. I was instructed to first check on the Train Operator and apply hand brakes to the lead, and trailing cars of the six cars consist."

After applying hand brakes, I made announcements to the customers, off-loaded the train, and verified the consist was clear of customers after performing a walk-through of the train.

MTPD arrived on the scene at 20:00 hours; I was appointed the RTRA forward Liaison. At 20:21 hours, I was granted Foul Time to enter the roadway at Potomac Avenue Track #2 to hot stick and confirm third rail power was de-energized.

After confirming third rail power was de-energized, I performed a ground walk-around to check for signs of life from the unknown customer. As I conducted my ground walk around, I noticed the customer under-car number 3213 showing signs of life. I stayed with the customer until DCFEMS arrived at 20:10 hours. The customer was removed from the track bed at 20:25 hours and transported to Medstar hospital at 20:40 hours.”

Weather

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature at 35°F with clear skies. The incident occurred within a tunnel section of the rail system. Weather was not a contributing factor. (Weather source: National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration – Location: Washington, DC)

Human Factors

Evidence of fatigue: Train Operator

As of the date of this report, SAFE was unable to interview the Train Operator due to being out on leave for an undetermined amount of time.

Fatigue Risk: Train Operator

As of the date of this report, SAFE was unable to interview the Train Operator due to being out on leave for an undetermined amount of time.

Since fatigue evidence was not present, the biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Train Operator was not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Mitigations Completed to Prevent Recurrence

- RTRA removed the Train Operator from service for post-incident toxicology testing.
- RTRA removed Train ID 903 from service for post-incident inspection.

Findings

- No slip or trip hazards contributed to this event.
- Station lighting appeared sufficient within the Potomac Avenue station.
- Train ID 903 entered Potomac Avenue Station, traveling at a speed of 25 mph.
- Train ID 903 speed reduced to 18 Mph when Emergency braking is activated and applied.
- Third-rail power was deenergized within two minutes of the event.

- Train service was not immediately suspended, and the station did not close during the initial response. Two trains serviced the station on the opposite track during the initial response to the event.
- Responding personnel established Incident Command, however there appeared to be challenges with the transfer of command between MTPD and Rail during execution of a Red Tag for post-incident cleaning. Potential contributing factors included a shift change at the Power Desk and transfer of operations from the backup ROCC to the primary location. No immediate hazards were identified as a result, however a return to normal operations may have been delayed.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Potomac Avenue Station person struck by train event was an unintentionally fall to the roadway as a train was in approach to the station. The Train Operator activated the Emergency Pushbutton and MC handle as they observed a person sitting on the third rail cover board. Despite these braking efforts, the Train Operator was unable to prevent contact with the person.

Recommendations/Corrective Actions

There are no recommendations for this person who was struck by train because they unintentionally placed themselves onto the roadway fouling the train's dynamic envelope. The Train Operator, vehicles, and infrastructure did not contribute to the event.

The following are the recommendations and corrective actions identified as a result of the incident response. These recommendations and corrective actions are tracked using WMATA's Safety Measurement System Incidents/Accidents (SMS I/A) Module and are verified by SAFE upon completion. The responsible department is identified in the corrective action code, and the respective departmental Safety Risk Coordinator (SRC) will manage the mitigation. Refer to the SMS I/A module for additional information.

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Due Date
97784_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_001	RTRA shall reinstruct Train Operator on General Rules 1.74 upon return.	RTRA SRC	June 2022
97784_SAFE CAPS_MTPD_001	Update procedures to ensure that the Incident Commander communicates the full section of track that is part of their oversight to ROCC when SOP 1A is enacted.	MTPD	August 2022

Appendices

Appendix A – Incident Statement / Interviews

Train Operator

The below narrative summarizes the written statement by the involved personnel. As such, times and details may conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

The Train Operator is a WMATA employee with nine years of experience as a Train Operator and 16 years of service in various roles such as Bus Operator. The Train Operator record does reflect two safety violations for Station Overruns in December of 2020 and July of 2018 within the last three years. The Train Operator was last certified on December 16, 2020 (QL-1)

“I was coming in Potomac Avenue, Track #2. The person was sitting on the third rail. I stopped the train hit the emergency stop button. The train didn’t stop before making contact with the person. I notified ROCC.”

RTRA Supervisor

The below narrative summarizes the written statement by the personnel involved. As such, times and details may conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

“At 19:51 hours, ROCC contacted instructed I responded to Potomac Avenue Station for a person struck by train Track two. At 19:51 hours, I arrived on the scene. At 19:53 hours, I was appointed the OSC. I was instructed to first check on the Train Operator and apply hand brakes to the lead and trailing cars of the six-car consist.

After applying hand brakes, I made announcements to the customers, off-loaded the train, and verified the consist was clear of customers after performing a walk-through of the train. MTPD arrived on the scene at 20:00 hours; I was appointed the RTRA forward Liaison. At 20:21 hours, I was granted Foul Time to enter the roadway at Potomac Avenue Track #2 to hot stick and confirm third rail power was de-energized.

After confirming third rail power was de-energized, I performed a ground walk-around to check for signs of life from the unknown customer. As I conducted my ground walk around, I noticed the customer under-car number 3213 showing signs of life. I stayed with the customer until DCFEMS arrived at 20:10 hours. The customer was removed from the track bed at 20:25 hours and transported to Medstar hospital at 20:40 hours.”

Appendix B – Associated Rules and Procedures

SOP #26 Person Struck by train

“26.5.3.2.1 Provide them with as specific information as possible (i.e., nature of the emergency, location, nearest points of entry, conditions as known at that time).”

“26.5.3.2.2 As additional information is received from the scene, the Fire Department is to be updated.”

“26.5.3.5 Initiate action to close the affected station to passengers, and unauthorized personnel, with assistance from the Station Manager and MTPD.”

Section 1. General Rules:

1.74 “Emergency messages shall be transmitted over the most expedient means of communication consistent with clear understanding. 1.74.1. When an employee is involved in or is witnessing an emergency and needs to communicate immediately with ROCC via radio, the employee shall immediately make the following transmission: “Emergency; Emergency; Emergency!”

1.74.2 “Emergency; Emergency; Emergency!” shall be stated prior to providing identifying information (i.e., train/unit/employee number, name, title, and location)

Appendix C – ROCC Report

View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT ID: 2022009ORANGE1

DATE 2022-01-09	TIME 1953	LINE Orange	ITEM 1
LOCATION (STATION/YARD) Potomac Ave (D07)		LOCATION/CHAIN MARKER (If Applicable)	REPORTED BY Train Operator [REDACTED]
TRAIN ID 903	DIRECTION I/B	TRACK NUMBER 2	DEPTS NOTIFIED Everbridge Alert/Messaging
CAR NUMBERS (XXXX-XXXX)			
Lead Car			
3213-3212	2003-2002	3245-3244	-
Caused Issue <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>
TRBL CODE JUMP-JUMPER: PERSON HIT BY TRAIN		RESP CODE PUB	

TYPE INCIDENT
Person Struck by Train.

ACTION PLAN
Dispatch RTRA Supervisor/CMNT, Implement SOP 1A, De-energize Third Rail Power, Turn Trains, Single Track

DELAYS IN MINUTES											
LINE		INCIDENT		TRAIN		TOTAL DURATION					
78		78		156		0					
TRIPS MODIFIED											
PARTIAL		GAP TRAIN		LATE DISPATCHES		REROUTED		NOT DISPATCHED		OFFLOADS	
2		0		0		0		0		2	
FIVE PRIMARY CONSOLE INDICATIONS											
BCP		BRAKES ON ILLUMINATED		ALL DOORS CLOSED ILLUMINATED		AUTO\MANUAL ILLUMINATED		BPP			
						AUTO					
INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY											
TIME		DESCRIPTION									
1953		Train 903 Operator [REDACTED] reported the train made contact with a customer on the roadway at Potomac Avenue track two. Unit [REDACTED] RTRA Supervisors [REDACTED] and RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported on the scene. CMNT Scott was dispatched from Eastern Market to assist. ROCC Assistant Operations Manager, ROIC, MTPD, MOC IMO and all concerned personnel were notified.									

Attachment 1 – ROC Report page 1 of 3

View Approved Incident Report

1954	Operator [REDACTED] reported the train was properly berthed on the platform and instructed to offload the train/verified clear of all passengers. Third rail breakers were remotely commanded open and third rail power was de-energized at Potomac Ave track two.
1956	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported on scene at Potomac Ave and was designated as the On Scene Commander. Train 403 Operator was instructed to offload and verify clear of all passengers at Stadium Armory track two.
1959	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported Train 903 was clear of all passengers. Unit [REDACTED] RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported on scene and was designated as RTRA Incident Command Liaison. RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] was inform third rail power was de-energized beneath the train and to apply a handbrake on the lead car.
2000	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported the car brake was applied on lead car, car #3213.
2001	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] was granted foul time protection to hot-stick and confirm third rail power was de-energized at Potomac Avenue track two.
2002	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] verified third rail power was de-energized within platform limits at Potomac Avenue track two.
2003	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] conducted ground walk around inspection and verified signs of life, customer was underneath lead car #3213.
2004	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported MTPD and EMS were on scene. MTPD On Scene Commander was Officer [REDACTED] Badge #846. Supervisor [REDACTED] was delegated as RTRA Forward Liaison.
2008	IMO reported Washington D.C. Fire department requested third rail power de-energized at Potomac Avenue track one as a safety precaution. Third rail breakers were remotely commanded open and third rail power was de-energized at Potomac Ave track one.
2010	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported the incident command post was established outside the station at the 700th block of 17th Street S.E.
2017	Train service was suspended from Federal Center SW to Minnesota Ave and Benning Road, shuttle bus service was requested. Train 906 was first train to offload at Federal Center SW and turn around in the direction of Vienna.
2020	Train 403 reversed ends at Stadium Armory, track two and went in service on track one from Benning Road to Largo Town Center.
2038	Medics removed customer from underneath train and transported to MedStar Hospital.
2042	CMNT [REDACTED] and ERT [REDACTED] reported on scene to investigate.
2045	IMO verified third rail power could be restored at Potomac Avenue track one. Third rail power announcement was made.
2050	Third rail breakers were remotely commanded open and third rail power was restored at Potomac Ave track one. Train 450 was first train to single track from D&G junction to Eastern Market in the direction of Franconia-Springfield.
2111	Train 904 serviced the incident train's customers at Potomac Avenue track one and continued in revenue service to Vienna ending the longest customer delay.
2134	ERT [REDACTED] and CMNT [REDACTED] was granted foul time protection to investigate train and any possible damage to the third rail.
2142	CMNT [REDACTED] reported no damage to the train and relinquished his foul time protection.
2223	Third rail power restored Potomac Avenue track two so that the train can move under an absolute block back to New Carrollton.
2234	Rolling/Rolling Brake Test performed to verify train was rolling freely. Train 703 moving under an absolute block to New Carrollton Yard for storage.
2238	ERT [REDACTED] requested a red tag power outage at Potomac Avenue track two.

Attachment 1 – ROC Report page 2 of 3

View Approved Incident Report

2251	Red tag #2022010524 authorized.
2352	ERT [REDACTED] was in possession of red tag #2022010524. Foul time was granted foul to enter the roadway to hot-stick and confirm third rail power de-energized at Potomac Avenue track two.
2357	Third rail power confirmed de-energized at chain marker D2-167+00.
0001	Central copied two shunts, remainder of safety equipment installed. Cleaning began at Potomac Avenue track two.
0019	Red Tag 2022010524 relinquished to MOC. All personnel and equipment cleared the road way at Potomac Avenue track two. Third rail power restoration announcements were made.
0058	Third rail power restored at Potomac Avenue track two. Normal service resumed.

MAXIMO TICKET#
8581737

REPORT PREPARED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
RADIO CONTROLLER 1	[REDACTED]	✓
BUTTON CONTROLLER 1	[REDACTED]	✓
RADIO CONTROLLER 2		
BUTTON CONTROLLER 2		

SUPERINTENDENTS OR ASSISTANTS SECTION

**ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP CORRECTIVE
ACTIONS OR REMARKS**

**FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM
SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS**

NOTIFICATIONS/PAGE GROUPS

#1/CEO ☐ #2/DGM & BELOW ☒

**ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS MADE BY
PHONE**

Rail 1 notified

APPROVED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
REPORT APPROVED BY SUPT. OR ASST SUPT.	[REDACTED]	✓

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Attachment 1 – ROC Report page 3 of 3

Appendix D – After-Action Report (AAR)



Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary



ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:		Injured Person to the Hospital (Person Struck by Train)	
*Incident Commander (IC):		Sergeant [REDACTED]	
MTPD CCN:	2022-00102	Local CCN:	NA
*Date ICS Initiated:	1/9/22	*Time ICS Initiated:	20:03 hours
*Date ICS Terminated:	1/10/22	*Time ICS Terminated:	00:11 hours
*Duration of Incident:	4 hrs 8mins	*Service Disrupted (Type and Time):	20:03 hours to 21:17 hours (Single Tracking)
Incident Location:	Potomac Ave Metro Station	Command Post Location:	Bus Bay
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	Sgt [REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	Sgt [REDACTED]
Forward Liaison:	Officer [REDACTED]	Unified Command:	NA
OCC Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Alternate Channel:	MTPD 3X
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	20:03 Track #1	Bus Bridge Established (From /To):	Requested but was never established.
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	Officer [REDACTED]	Power De-energized:	20:09-22:25 23:57-00:11
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name: Dept:	00:11 hours command was released to rail personnel.	Medical Attention Required/Requested:	Yes; V-001 and train operator both received medical attention.
Entry/Exit Log:	Officer [REDACTED]	CID Response:	[REDACTED]

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Attachment 1 – MTPD AAR page 1 of 4

Incident Date: 01/09/2022 Time: 19:51 hours.
Final Report – Collision
E22019

Drafted By: SAFE 704 – 05/12/2022
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 05/12/2022
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 05/12/2022

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
Sgt [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Sergeant
Sgt [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Sergeant
Officer [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Officer
Officer [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Officer
Officer [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Officer
Officer [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Officer
Officer [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Officer
Officer [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Officer
Officer [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Officer
Officer [REDACTED]	MTPD/POB	Officer
[REDACTED]	IMO	WMATA
[REDACTED]	IMO	WMATA
Supervisor [REDACTED]	ROCC	WMATA

EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Agency/Department	Title/Role
[REDACTED]	DC Fire	Incident Command
	DC Fire	Fire Personnel
	DC Fire	Fire Personnel
	DC Fire	Fire Personnel
	DC Fire	MEDIC
	DC Fire	MEDIC
	MPD	Outside Resouce

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

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MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

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Effective: 12/30/20

Attachment 1 – MTPD AAR page 2 of 4

Incident Date: 01/09/2022 Time: 19:51 hours.
Final Report – Collision
E22019

Drafted By: SAFE 704 – 05/12/2022
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 05/12/2022
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 05/12/2022

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	Yes
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	SOCC
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	Yes
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	SOCC

OBSERVATIONS
<p>1954 Hour- TRACK 2 SUBJ STRUCK BY TRAIN 1957 Hour- DVEU OBSERVED SUBJ WALKED I OFF THE PLATFORM TO ROADWAY 1959 Hour- B32 ON SCENE (OFC [REDACTED]) 2001 Hour- B32 SECURED THE TRAIN OPERATOR 2002 Hour- OFC [REDACTED] ON SCENE/ENGINE 3 ON SCENE 2003 Hour- CR75 ON SCENE & ESTABLISHED COMMAND 2005 Hour- SUBJECT WAS LOCATED AND WAS SPEAKING AND COMPREHENDING 2006 Hour- INCIDENT SWITCHED TO MTP [REDACTED] FORWARD LIASION 2007 Hour- 3RD RAIL DEENERGIZED TRACK 2 2008 Hour- TRACK 1 DEENERGIED 2010 Hour- BATTALION CHIEF AUTH ON SCENE 2012 Hour- COMMAND POST MOVED TO BUSBAY 2014 Hour- RAIL SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] ON SCENE 2025 Hour- F/R STILL ATTEMPTING TO REMOVE SUBJ FROM UNDER THE TRAIN 2040 Hour- SUBJ REMOVED FROM UNDER THE TRAIN 2042 Hour- CR906 IN SCENE 2045 Hour- SINGLE TRACKING TRACK 1 REQUESTED 2046 Hour- POWER RESTORED TRACK 1 2105 Hour- B/C TURNED INCIDENT BACK TO MTPD 2106 Hour- HOT WASH CONDUCTED 2116 Hour- HOT WASH COMPLETED 2120 Hour- TRAINS SEVICING THE PLATFORM ON TRACK 1 SIDE 2123 Hour- COMMAND POST MOVED BACK TO THE PLATFORM 2132 Hour- SUPV [REDACTED] HOT STICK TRACK 2 2141 Hour- WSAD/HOT STICK CONDUCTED 2145 Hour- B34 TRANSPORTED RAIL SUPV [REDACTED] AND OPER TO JGB 2149 Hour- CAR MAINTANCE CLEARED TRACK 2 2158 Hour- SUPV [REDACTED] AND OPER AT JGB 2204 Hour- CR75 ADVISED SWITCHING BACK TO [REDACTED] 2225 Hour- POWER HAS BEEN RESTORED TO TRACK 2 2237 Hour- B32 ONBOARD THE TRAIN TO NEWC RAILYARD 2238 Hour- CR75 REQUESTED POWER TRACK 2 TO BE DEENERGIZED FOR CSS 2244 Hour- IMO ADVISED ERT REQUESTED EMERGENCY RED TAG 2357 Hour- CR75 ADVISED ERT ARE EXECUTING THE RED TAG 0002 Hour- CR75 ADVISED RED TAGS IN PLACE AND CSS TO RESUME PROCESSING 0011 Hour- CR75 ADVISED CSS COMPLETED PROCESSING AND ALL UNITS CLEARED THE ROADWAY 0011 Hour- CR75 TRANSFERRED THE SCENE TO RAIL SUPV [REDACTED] 0025 Hour- B2 ON SCENE NEWC RAILYARD FOR CSS</p>

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

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Effective: 12/30/20

Attachment 1 – MTPD AAR page 3 of 4

Incident Date: 01/09/2022 Time: 19:51 hours.
Final Report – Collision
E22019

Drafted By: SAFE 704 – 05/12/2022
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 05/12/2022
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 05/12/2022

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

NOTES

FIRE DEPT/MTPD HOT WASH

-FIRE DEPT ADVISED HAVING CHALLENGES IN THE RESCUE PROCESS DUE TO THE POSITIONING OF TO SUBJ TO THE TRAIN. SUBJ WAS PINNED UNDER THE TRAIN FOR SIGNIFICANT TIME PERIOD AS PLANNING AND STRATEGIES WERE DISCUSSED TO SAFELY RESCUE WITHOUT CAUSING FURTHER INJURIES.

- FIRE DEPT FELT THE HAD THE NECESSARY RESOURCES ON SCENE TO COMPLETE THE RESCUE MISSION.

-FIRE DEPT FELT THAT DC FIRE/EMS AND MTPD WORKED VERY WELL TOGETHER TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THE GOAL.

MTPD HOT WASH

(POSITIVE)

-ESTABLISHED COMMAND ONCE PERSONNEL WERE IN PLACE

-SECURED THE TRAIN OPERATOR AND REMOVED FROM THE INCIDENT AREA

-ORIGINAL OFFICERS CREATED AN INCIDENT PERIMETER WITH CSS TAPE

-ENTRY/EXIT WAS SET UP IN A SWIFT MANNER

-FORWARD LIAISON & ENTRY/EXIT PERSONNEL DOCUMENTED GREAT NOTES AND ASSISTED FIRE AND RESCUE ON SCENE.

(NEGATIVE)

SEE PDF ATTACHMENT.

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date

Sgt

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

Captain

[REDACTED]

Commander, District 1

[REDACTED]

Patrol Operations Bureau Commander's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

Office of Emergency Management Director's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1/11/2022

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Effective: 12/30/20

Attachment 1 – MTPD AAR page 4 of 4