



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0171 – Improper Roadway Worker Protection – Rosslyn Station – February 15, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on June 28, 2022

Safety event summary:

An Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor, who had been granted Foul Time protection by Rail Controllers to retrieve an apparent piece of a gun that had been knocked onto the roadway as Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) personnel took a rider into custody, improperly accessed the roadway by jumping down from the middle of the platform, being on the roadway while wearing a backpack, and being on the roadway without wearing a safety vest. The Rail Supervisor also improperly exited the roadway by stepping onto the running rail and being assisted to the platform by MTPD personnel lifting the Rail Supervisor back to the platform. The Rail Supervisor picked up the item that had apparently been kicked onto the roadway by MTPD as they took the rider into custody and provided it to MTPD.

Metrorail rules require personnel to access the roadway using the stairs at the end of the platform, to wear required personal protective equipment including a safety vest, to not wear items such as a backpack on the roadway that pose a snag hazard, and to not step on the top of the running rail.

MTPD personnel on-scene and the Rail Supervisor did not identify these safety issues, however other personnel saw this safety issue on CCTV. Rail Operations Control Center personnel contacted the Rail Supervisor and the Rail Supervisor's management and had them removed from service.

The supervisor had had at least six minutes to put on the proper protective equipment and prepare to properly enter the roadway before their foul time protection request was granted. Foul time is a form of protection where train traffic is stopped to provide an additional layer of protection against collision.

The Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) asked for and used the Rail Supervisor's personal cell phone to contact them and inform them of the safety event. The Rail Supervisor was removed from service for post-event toxicology testing, which determined they were not in violation of Metrorail's drug and alcohol policy.

The Rail Supervisor had been running behind in reporting for their shift, and therefore reported directly to Rosslyn Station in their personal vehicle. This was the first activity of their shift after speaking with the Rosslyn Station Manager, returning to their car, then returning to the station kiosk.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was Metrorail's culture that accepts noncompliance with written operational rules, procedures and manuals. Contributing to this event was the perceived pressure and stress on the Rail Supervisor due to their running late and responding to assist with a police investigation.

Corrective Actions:

Metrorail reminded Rail Supervisors of the importance of safety vests.

Metrorail will develop policies and procedures for Rail Supervisors detailing instructions for reporting for duty.



750 First St. NE • Ste. 900 • Washington, D.C. 20002

Office: 202-384-1520 • Website: www.wmsc.gov

Metrorail will develop policies and procedures for Rail Supervisors authorized to use their personal vehicles to direct report and clock in for duty at various locations.

Metrorail will update its rules and procedures regarding the use of personal cell phones to conduct WMATA business.

Metrorail will develop additional MTPD Roll Call Meeting notes specific to roadway access violations and reporting.

WMSA staff observations:

Based on the investigative interview, Metrorail should consider whether utility (fill-in) supervisors need additional tools, such as ensuring that utility supervisors have access to Metrorail cell phones when needed for official use so that they do not use personal cell phones to conduct Metrorail business or in violation of electronic device policies. This Rail Supervisor stated that they had used a personal cell phone while acting as a utility supervisor, prior to becoming a full-time supervisor.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Investigations (OSI)
FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22104

Date of Event:	February 15, 2022
Type of Event:	Improper RWP
Incident Time:	17:31 Hours
Location:	Rosslyn Station, track 1
Time and How received by SAFE:	17:32 Hours – SAFE/MAC
WMSC Notification Time:	18:23 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: N/A WMSC: N/A Other: N/A
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20220218#98512

Rosslyn Station – Improper RWP

February 15, 2022

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms-----	3
Executive Summary -----	4
Incident Site -----	5
Field Sketch/Schematics-----	5
Purpose and Scope -----	5
Investigative Methods-----	5
Investigation -----	6
Chronological Event Timeline-----	8
Office of Radio Communications (COMR)-----	9
Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) -----	9
Interview Findings-----	10
Weather -----	10
Human Factors -----	10
Fatigue-----	10
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing -----	10
Findings -----	11
Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence -----	11
Probable Cause Statement-----	11
SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions-----	12
Appendices -----	13
Appendix A – Interview Summary -----	13
Appendix B – After Action - RTRA Supervisor Notification-----	14
Appendix C - Root Cause Analysis-----	15

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
COMR	Office of Radio Communications
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
RWP	Roadway Worker Protection
SAFE	Department of Safety and Environmental Management
SMS	Safety Measurement System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

On Tuesday, February 15, 2022, at approximately 17:31 hours, an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisor entered the roadway at Rosslyn Station, track 1, to retrieve an item that fell onto the roadway without the required Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) equipment. Preceding the event, at approximately 17:15 hours, the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) was investigating a report of a customer aboard a train with a firearm. During the customer's apprehension, an item fell onto the roadway. The Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) instructed the Rail Supervisor to enter the roadway and granted foul time to retrieve the item. The Rail Supervisor entered the roadway without wearing a safety vest. There were no injuries or damage as a result of this event.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) playback [radio and landline] indicated that at approximately 17:15 hours, MTPD contacted ROCC and requested to hold Train ID 901 at Rosslyn Station, track 1, for a report of a customer aboard the train with a firearm. At approximately 17:20, MTPD notified ROCC that Train ID 901 at Rosslyn, track 1, was released. At approximately 17:22 hours, MTPD contacted ROCC and requested a Rail Supervisor to retrieve an item from the roadway. At approximately 17:22 hours, ROCC contacted the Rail Supervisor at Rosslyn Station and instructed them to respond and perform a track inspection.

At approximately 17:24 hours, the Rail Supervisor contacted ROCC and requested foul time to enter the roadway to retrieve an item at Rosslyn Station, track 1. The Rail Supervisor was advised that three trains were approaching Rosslyn Station and to stand by. At approximately 17:31 hours, the RTC granted foul time to the Rail Supervisor to enter the roadway to retrieve the item. At approximately 17:32 hours, the Rail Supervisor relinquished their foul time. At approximately 17:52 hours, the RTC instructed the Rail Supervisor to contact ROCC.

After reviewing the Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) the Rail Supervisor is observed arriving at Rosslyn Station, track 1, alongside an MTPD Officer at approximately 17:24 hours. The Rail Supervisor's safety vest was attached to their backpack. The Rail Supervisor entered the roadway at the middle of the platform with their safety vest strapped to their backpack. This action was not in accordance with Metro Rail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) Sec. 5 RWP – 5.11 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Standard for On-Track Safety. They retrieved the item and passed it to an MTPD Officer. Afterward, they were assisted back to the platform after stepping on the ball of the running rail while being hoisted up onto the platform by other WMATA personnel. This action was not in accordance with MSRPH Sec. 4 Safety Rules – 4.171 “Employees shall not walk, stand, step, or sit on running rails, frogs, switches, switch points, third rail cover boards, PVC conduit, guard rails, rail braces, interlocking apparatus, or other wayside equipment;” and Section 4 – Safety Rule, 4.183 “When it is necessary for employees to walk beyond the platform end gate where the walkway is not protected by a handrail, or to walk or work on tracks around moving trains or track equipment, they shall:

b. Contact ROCC, prior to entering the track area, for mainline access and/or the appropriate tower for yard access, indicating the work area to include the beginning and ending station and track number or entry point and track number and the purpose of the work. Permission to enter the roadway is required from the control point (see rule 4.168).”


The Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) removed the Rail Supervisor from service for post-incident toxicology testing.

The probable cause of the Improper RWP event on February 15, 2022, was the Rail Supervisor did not consider the full scope of their response to support an MTPD investigation from ROCC. A potential contributing factor to the incident was the pressure sustained by the Rail Supervisor when they arrived in the middle of an active MTPD apprehension on the platform at Rosslyn Station. Additionally, the stress experienced by the Rail Supervisor may have contributed, as they were behind schedule reporting for duty and then reported to an active MTPD investigation shortly after starting their shift.

Incident Site

Rosslyn Station, Track 1

Field Sketch/Schematics



**Locations are approximate. Not to scale.*

Purpose and Scope

This accident investigation and candid self-evaluation aims to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Improper RWP event at Rosslyn Station, track 1, on February 15, 2022, SAFE dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct a

subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through video and document review
- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed one individual as part of this investigation. Interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the Rail Supervisor.
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Note: Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
 - MTPD Officer
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
 - Rail Supervisor Training Procedures & Records
 - Rail Supervisor 30-Day work history review
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
 - Maximo Data
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback [Radio and Landline Communications]
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Tuesday, February 15, 2022, at approximately 17:31 hours, an RTRA Rail Supervisor entered the roadway at Rosslyn Station, track 1, to retrieve an item that fell onto the roadway without the proper Roadway Worker Protection equipment. Preceding the event, at approximately 17:15 hours, MTPD was investigating a customer aboard a train with a firearm. During the customer's apprehension, an item fell onto the roadway. The ROCC RTC instructed the Rail Supervisor to enter the roadway to retrieve the item. The Rail Supervisor was observed entering the roadway by jumping down to the roadway from the middle of the platform without wearing a safety vest. There were no injuries or damage as a result of this event.

At approximately 17:15 hours, the MTPD contacted ROCC via landline telephone and requested to hold train ID 901 at Rosslyn Station, track 1. At approximately 17:20 hours, while responding, an MTPD Officer kicked an item onto the roadway; ROCC was notified that train ID 901 was released to leave Rosslyn Station. At approximately 17:22 hours, the MTPD requested a Rail Supervisor to retrieve the item from the roadway.

At approximately 17:22 hours, the RTC contacted a Rail Supervisor via radio and instructed them to report to Rosslyn Station, track 1, to perform a track inspection. At approximately 17:23 hours, the Rail Supervisor contacted ROCC via cellular telephone and was instructed to perform a track inspection; something had fallen onto the roadway during a scuffle. The ROCC RTC did not advise the Rail Supervisor that a heightened MTPD investigation and apprehension was ongoing. At approximately 17:24 hours, the Rail Supervisor arrived at Rosslyn Station, track 1, and requested foul time to retrieve an item from the roadway.



Image 1 – RTRA Rail Supervisor arriving at Rosslyn Station platform with MTPD.

The RTC informed the Rail Supervisor that three trains were approaching Rosslyn Station, track 1, and to stand by for foul time.

At approximately 17:31 hours, after the third train passed, the RTC granted foul time, permitting the Rail Supervisor to enter the roadway and retrieve the item. The Rail Supervisor entered the roadway in the middle of the platform with their safety vest attached to their backpack. At approximately 17:32 hours, the Rail Supervisor relinquished their foul time.




Image 2 - RTRA Rail Supervisor entering the roadway under foul time, and the Rail Supervisor returning to the platform.

The Rail Supervisor had sufficient time (approximately 6 minutes) to prepare to enter the roadway with the required personal protective equipment; as they arrived at the platform at 17:24 hours, and the third train passed their location at approximately 17:30 hours before ROCC granted foul time.

At approximately 17:52 hours, the Rail Supervisor was instructed to contact ROCC, the RTC requested the personal cellular telephone number for the Rail Supervisor. The Rail Supervisor provided the RTC with their personal cellular telephone number. The Rail Supervisor confirmed that the ROCC RTC contacted the Rail Supervisor via personal cellular telephone and advised the Rail Supervisor that they were being removed from service due to the Improper RWP event.

Chronological Event Timeline

Time	Description
17:15:19 hours	MTPD contacted ROCC and requested to hold Train ID 901 at Rosslyn Station, track 1. [Phone]
17:20:35 hours	MTPD released Train ID 901 at Rosslyn, track 1. [Phone]
17:22:17 hours	MTPD requested a Supervisor to retrieve an item from the roadway. [Phone]
17:22:31 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Unit 33, come in to Central. <u>Unit 33</u> : Acknowledges. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : What's your location. <u>Unit 33</u> : Rosslyn. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : 33, head to Rosslyn for a track inspection. [Radio]
17:23:15 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Head to Rosslyn for a track inspection, something fell to the roadway during a scuffle. <u>Unit 33</u> : I'm upstairs, I'm going downstairs now. [Phone]
17:24:48 hours	<u>Unit 33</u> : I need foul time to retrieve an item from the roadway. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Track 1 or track 2 at Rosslyn? <u>Unit 33</u> : Track 1, Rosslyn. [Radio]
17:25:06 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : I have three trains in approach, then I'll give you foul time. <u>Unit 33</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. Standing by. [Radio]
17:30:44 hours	<u>Unit 33</u> : The third train has passed. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Do you need 3rd rail power deenergized to remove the item? <u>Unit 33</u> : No, third rail does not need to be deenergized at this time. [Radio]
17:31:04 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : C05-12 signal and C05-04 signal, red; for your protection blue block, human form and prohibits are in place. You have foul time, track 1 only; third rail power is energized. Advise when you are relinquishing. <u>Unit 33</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
17:32:01 hours	<u>Unit 33</u> : Foul time relinquished. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio]
17:44:14 hours	OM contacted AOM and requested that they review something relating to the Rosslyn foul time. [Phone]

Time	Description
17:52:25 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Unit 33, come in to Central. [Radio]
17:52:42 hours	<u>Unit 33</u> : This is Unit 33. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : What's your direct line? <u>Unit 33</u> : [PHONE#1]. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Is this the Metro phone? <u>Unit 33</u> : Yeah. Do you need my private? <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Yeah, give me the other one. <u>Unit 33</u> : [PHONE#2] <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : I'll call you in 2-minutes. [Phone]
18:10:00 hours	The OM contacted the Superintendent of West Falls Church Division and reported the incident of the Rail Supervisor entering the roadway without the required personal protective equipment. [Phone]
18:13:23 hours	The OM contacted the Assistant Superintendent of West Falls Church Division and reported the incident of the Rail Supervisor entering the roadway without the required personal protective equipment. [Phone]
18:27:00 hours	The Assistant Superintendent of West Falls Church Division contacted the OM and advised that the Rail Supervisor would be taken out of service. [Phone]
18:28:54 hours	The OM contacted the Assistant Superintendent of West Falls Church Division to confirm which Rail Supervisor would respond to escort the Rail Supervisor involved in the incident.

****Note:** Times above may vary from other system's timelines based on clock settings and reporting source.

Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

After reviewing the Audio Recording System (ARS) playback there did not appear to be any communication deficiencies over the radio.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 1 - AIMS display of foul time protection in place at 17:31 hours and foul time protection relinquished at 17:32 hours.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the Rosslyn Station Improper RWP event, SAFE conducted one interview via Microsoft Teams, including the Investigations Team and the WMSC. The interview was conducted 16 days after the event and identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from interviews and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

Rail Supervisor

The Rail Supervisor stated that they reported to Rosslyn Station platform, track 1, and observed what was going on. The customer was in custody when they arrived, and MTPD notified them that the end of the rifle was on the roadway. The Rail Supervisor stated that they reported to ROCC that they needed foul time to retrieve an item from the roadway. ROCC advised that three trains would pass by, and then they would be able to grant foul time. The Rail Supervisor stated that after the three trains, they contacted ROCC and requested foul time. After foul time was granted, they went to the roadway without thinking about their safety vest, which is not something that they would usually do. The Rail Supervisor stated that they jumped down onto the roadway, grabbed the item, handed it to MTPD, and MTPD helped them back onto the platform, then relinquished the foul time.

Weather

On February 15, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 36° F, with passing clouds. The event occurred within a tunneled section of the rail system. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Rosslyn, VA)

Human Factors

Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

We evaluated conditions at the time of the incident to distinguish whether evidence of fatigue was present. Video of the incident was reviewed for behaviors suggesting fatigue. No indications of fatigue were evident from the video. The Rail Supervisor reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The Rail Supervisor reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

The incident data was evaluated for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were not present. Since fatigue evidence and risk factors were not present, the biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Rail Supervisor was not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Findings

- MTPD Officer kicked an item onto the roadway during their response to a call for service.
- Rail Supervisor entered the roadway at the middle point of the platform.
- Rail Supervisor was not wearing their safety vest and was wearing a backpack (snag hazard) when they entered the roadway.
- Rail Supervisor stepped on the ball of the running rail to return to the platform.
- The Rail Supervisor had sufficient time (6 minutes) to prepare to enter the roadway with the required personal protective equipment (PPE) and at the prescribed location.
- The RTRA Supervisor reported on duty with their personal vehicle at Rosslyn Station due to being behind schedule.
- Before and after the event, the RTRA Supervisor and ROCC RTC communicated using personal cellular phones.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- The Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) removed the Rail Supervisor from service for post-incident toxicology testing.
- RTRA distributed a Supervisor Notification relating to the Importance of Safety Vest.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Improper RWP event on February 15, 2022, was the Rail Supervisor did not consider the full scope of their response to support an MTPD investigation from ROCC. A potential contributing factor to the incident was the pressure sustained by the Rail Supervisor when they arrived in the middle of an active MTPD apprehension on the platform at Rosslyn Station.

Additionally, the stress experienced by the Rail Supervisor also contributed when they were behind schedule reporting for duty, then reported to an active MTPD investigation shortly after starting their shift.

SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Due Date
98512_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_001	RTRA to distribute a Supervisor Notification relating to the Importance of Safety Vest.	RTRA	Completed
98512_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_002	Develop a policy/procedures specific to Rail Supervisors that detail instructions for Rail Supervisors reporting for daily duty.	RTRA	09/30/2022
98512_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_003	Develop a policy/procedures specific to Rail Supervisors authorized to use their personal vehicles to direct report and clock in for duty at various locations.	RTRA	09/30/2022
98512_SAFE CAPS_RSSC_001	Update to MSRPH regarding use of personal cellular phones to conduct WMATA matters.	RSSC	09/30/2022
98512_SAFE CAPS_MTPD_001	Develop additional Roll Call Meeting notes specific to roadway access violations and reporting.	MTPD	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

Rail Supervisor

The Rail Supervisor stated that they were running late and drove their personal vehicle to Rosslyn Station to clock on duty, spoke with Station Manager at Rosslyn Station, then returned to their vehicle and called on duty approximately 10-15 minutes later. The Rail Supervisor stated that they heard over the radio that a customer was on the train with a rifle at Courthouse Station. ROCC contacted them and asked their location when the train was in approach to Rosslyn Station. They noticed MTPD going to the platform, and they stayed in the kiosk. ROCC instructed them to go to retrieve an item on the roadway for transit. The Rail Supervisor stated that they reported to Rosslyn Station platform, track 1 for observation. The customer was in custody at the time of their arrival and MTPD notified them that the end of the rifle was on the roadway. They looked on the roadway, observed the item, and contacted ROCC. The Rail Supervisor stated that they reported to ROCC that they needed foul time to retrieve an item from the roadway. ROCC advised that three trains would pass and then they would be able to grant foul time. The Rail Supervisor stated that after the three trains, they contacted ROCC and requested foul time. After foul time was granted, they went to the roadway without thinking about their safety vest which is not something that they would usually do. The Rail Supervisor stated that with the type of situation and the adrenaline flowing, they did not think about putting on the safety vest, they just simply forgot. The Rail Supervisor stated that they jumped down onto the roadway, grabbed the item, handed it to MTPD, and MTPD helped them back onto the platform, then relinquished the foul time. The Rail Supervisor stated that they are aware of the proper entry and exits to the roadway and should have used the end gate. The Rail Supervisor indicated that they were issued a WMATA cellular phone to perform duties as a Rail Supervisor and there is no reason to use their personal cellular phone to perform WMATA business. They were a Utility Supervisor for four years and would use their personal cellular phone to perform WMATA business. The Rail Supervisor advised that they are accustomed to performing WMATA duties with their personal cell phone because they were using it as a Utility Supervisor. Most information is saved on their personal cell phone than their WMATA-issued cell phone. The Rail Supervisor stated that they provided their personnel cellular phone contact information to the ROCC RTC after the ROCC RTC requested the information. The Rail Supervisor stated that the ROCC RTC called their personal cell phone to inform them that they would taken out of service.

MTPD Officer

The MTPD Event Report described a response for a person with a firearm on board train 901. The person of interest was identified and arrested by responding officers. The report did not describe the Rail Supervisor entering the roadway to retrieve any item.

Appendix B – After Action - RTRA Supervisor Notification

From: RTRA Supervisor Notification <noreply@everbridge.net>
Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2022 5:34 AM
Subject: Importance of Safety Vests
Importance: High



Importance of Safety Vests

RTRA Supervisors:

Earlier this week, an RWP violation occurred. Upon receiving foul time, an RTRA Supervisor entered the roadway without a safety vest to retrieve an item. Please be reminded, even when areas are protected under foul time, personnel are still expected to ensure their own personal safety. When worn properly, safety vests help to protect personnel entering the roadway by making them more visible. Further, safety vests are required when entering the roadway.

Your safety and security are paramount.

If you are in need of a safety vest, or any other form of personal protective equipment (PPE) contact an RTRA Division Manager as soon as possible.

Thank you and please be safe.

Appendix C - Root Cause Analysis

