



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0173 – Serious Injury – L’Enfant Plaza Station – February 21, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on June 28, 2022

Safety event summary:

Silver Line Train 605 struck a person on the roadway while entering L’Enfant Plaza Station at approximately 11:19 a.m. on February 21, 2022.

The Train Operator activated emergency braking 6 feet before entering the station on Track 2 when they noticed a person near the platform end gate, by moving the Master Controller into the Emergency position, slowing the train to 25 mph and 1.5 seconds later depressing the Emergency Mushroom, which slowed the train to 15 mph. The train stopped 102 feet into the platform. The person was struck as the train approached the platform limits. The Train Operator of the Wiehle-Reston East-bound train properly reported the event to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) at approximately 11:19 a.m., starting their transmission with “Emergency, emergency, emergency.” The ROCC designated the Train Operator as on-scene commander at 11:20 a.m. and de-energized power on Track 2 at approximately 11:21 a.m.

The train was offloaded and an Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) Mechanic who had been dispatched to the scene conducted a ground walk around. At 11:27 a.m., the CMNT Mechanic located the person under the train’s lead car and reported to the ROCC that there appeared to be no signs of life.

Single tracking operations were established on Track 1 between Federal Center SW and Smithsonian stations, with trains bypassing L’Enfant Plaza Station. MTPD Personnel arrived at 11:33 a.m. and established the Incident Command Post (ICP) at the 7th and D Street entrance of L’Enfant Plaza Station at approximately 11:33 a.m. DCFEMS personnel arrived at the 9th and D Street entrance at approximately 11:36 a.m., however the DCFEMS Battalion Chief did not arrive to the ICP until approximately 11:51 a.m. because of confusion regarding its location. DCFEMS requested to have the handbrake set at 11:39 a.m. and it was applied at 11:43 a.m. Signs of life were confirmed as DCFEMS extricated the person at approximately 12:00 p.m. The person was transported to George Washington University Hospital with serious injuries. DCFEMS transferred incident command to MTPD at approximately 12:05 p.m.

At approximately 1:16 p.m., the ROCC re-energized third rail power on Track 2 so the incident train could be moved to New Carrollton Yard by an RTRA Supervisor for post-event inspection. At 1:30 p.m., third rail power was again de-energized, an RTRA Supervisor confirmed de-energization using a hot stick and MTPD entered the roadway to continue their investigation. Following an investigation, track inspection and clean up, third rail power was re-energized on Track 2 at L’Enfant Plaza Station and normal service resumed at 2:10 p.m.

The Train Operator was interviewed by Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) personnel and removed from service by an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor for post-incident toxicology testing which determined the Operator was not in violation of WMATA’s Drug and Alcohol Policy.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this serious injury event was an individual intentionally placing themselves into the path of a train.



Corrective Actions:

Metrorail took no specific corrective action related to this event.

WMSC staff observations:

Metrorail should ensure details regarding the ICP location and other pertinent information are shared with first responders as soon as the information is available to reduce confusion and response time, this includes updating the responding jurisdiction via the Fire Liaison Officer (FLO) and when possible, having personnel meet first responders outside the station to guide them to the scene of the incident and/or ICP.



Washington Metro Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety and Environmental
Management (SAFE)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22114

Date of Event:	02/21/2022
Type of Event:	Serious Injury
Incident Time:	11:19 hours
Location:	L'Enfant Plaza, Track 2
Time and How received by SAFE:	11:20 hours via MAC Notification
WMSC Notification Time:	12:25 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: No WMSC: No Other: No
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 605 L3203-3202.3204-3205.3199-3198T
Injuries:	One
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA), Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Services (DCFEMS), Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT), and Emergency Response Team (ERT).
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20220223#98601

L'Enfant Plaza Station – Serious Injury

February 21, 2022

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CMNT	Office of Car Maintenance
CMOR	Office of Chief Mechanical Officer
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Services
EMER	Emergency Position (Master Controller)
ERT	Emergency Response Team
I/A	Incidents/Accidents
ICP	Incident Command Post
MAC	Mission Assurance Coordinator
MC	Master Controller
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OSC	On Scene Commander
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
ROIC	Rail Operations Information Center
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
SAFE	Department of Safety and Environmental Management
SMS	Safety Measurement System
VMS	Vehicle Monitoring System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

On Monday, February 21, 2022, at approximately 11:19 hours, a Silver Line Train, ID 605 [L3203-3202.3204-3205.3199-3198T] on Track 2 traveling inbound towards Wiehle-Reston East, entered the L'Enfant Plaza Station platform limits and came in contact with a person on the roadway. The Train Operator of Train ID 605 notified the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) of the event. The Radio RTC acknowledged the transmission. The Button RTC made the respective calls to Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) and ROCC Rail 2. The Radio RTC proceeded to dispatch an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor to L'Enfant Plaza Station to assist.

The RTC instructed the Train Operator to make announcements to customers, secure the cab, perform a radio check and conduct a ground walk around inspection. An Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) Mechanic arrived on scene to assist the Train Operator. The CMNT Mechanic reported all customers were clear of train and performed the ground walk around inspection. The CMNT Mechanic reported they found the person under lead car 3203 and appeared to have no signs of life. There were no reported injuries to persons aboard the train or to WMATA personnel. RTRA removed the Train Operator from service for post-incident toxicology testing and subsequent Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) interview.

At approximately 11:21 hours, the Button RTC de-energized third rail power on Track 2. The ROIC Controller notified the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) and the Buttons RTC notified MTPD.

MTPD personnel arrived on scene at approximately 11:33 hours and established the Incident Command Post (ICP) at the kiosk on the 7th and D Street entrance of L'Enfant Plaza Station. At approximately 11:36 hours, DCFEMS arrived on the scene at the 9th and D Street entrance. The DCFEMS Battalion Chief arrived at the ICP at approximately 11:51 hours and acted in unified command with MTPD. At approximately 12:00 hours, an RTRA Supervisor reported signs of life as the incident customer was extricated from the roadway and transported to George Washington University Hospital for treatment. The person sustained serious injuries. At approximately 12:05 hours DCFEMS transferred incident command to MTPD and cleared the scene.

At approximately 13:16 hours, third rail power was re-energized on Track 2 to move the affected train to the New Carrollton Yard for further inspection and investigation. The incident train was re-blocked to non-revenue Train ID 705.

At approximately 13:30 hours, third rail power was de-energized on Track 2. The RTRA Supervisor was granted permission to enter the roadway and perform hot-stick testing to confirm third rail power was de-energized for MTPD to conduct further investigation.

At approximately 13:45 hours, the RTRA Supervisor informed ROCC that all personnel were clear of the roadway. The Emergency Response Team (ERT) arrived on scene to assist with track inspection and area clean up. ERT personnel began cleaning mitigation efforts at approximately 14:01 hours after they were granted foul time by ROCC. At approximately 14:08 hours, ROCC commanded third rail power breakers closed and re-energized at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. ROCC resumed normal service, and Train ID 605 was the first train to continue in revenue service from L'Enfant Plaza to Wiehle-Reston East on Track 2.


The probable cause of the L'Enfant Plaza Station serious injury incident was a customer intentionally entering into the train's dynamic envelope while Train ID 605 was on approach to the platform.

An analysis of data collected determined no deficiencies related to any human factors, facility or vehicles contributed to the event. A review of Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS) recordings revealed that the Train Operator of Train ID 605 began emergency braking prior to entering the platform area and applied the Console Emergency Pushbutton (mushroom) before coming in contact with the person.

Incident Site

L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Formal Interview – SAFE interviewed one individual as part of this investigation. Representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) were present during the interview. SAFE interviewed the following individual:
 - Train Operator
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation in Metro systems of record. These records included:
 - Train Operator Training Records
 - Train Operator Certifications

- Train Operator 30-Day work history review
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
 - Maximo Data
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - ARS (Audio Recording System) playback [Radio and Landline Communications]
 - The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) Incident Investigation Team (IIT) Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS)
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) Playback

Investigation

On Monday, February 21, 2022, at approximately 11:19 hours, a Silver Line Train, Train ID 605 [L3203-3202.3204-3205.3199-3198T] on Track 2 traveling inbound in the direction of Wiehle-Reston East, entered the L’Enfant Plaza Station platform limits at approximately 25 miles per hour. Approximately six feet before the platform, the train operator moved the MC to a B5 braking position. The train operator then activated the emergency mushroom, stopping the train approximately 102 feet into the station platform area, after coming in contact with a person who entered the roadway. The Train Operator of Train ID 605 notified the ROCC RTC of the event beginning with “emergency, emergency, emergency.” The Radio RTC acknowledged the transmission. The Button RTC made the respective calls to the ROIC and the ROCC Assistant Superintendent. The Radio RTC dispatched an RTRA Supervisor to L’Enfant Plaza Station to assist.

The CMNT Mechanic assisted and conducted a ground walk-around inspection. They located the injured person and reported there were no signs of life. Customers aboard Train ID 605 were escorted through the lead cars and exited onto the L’Enfant Plaza Station platform assisted by RTRA personnel. There were no reported injuries to persons aboard the train or to WMATA personnel. RTRA removed the Train Operator from service for post-incident toxicology testing and subsequent MTPD interview.

Responding emergency personnel established a unified command structure with WMATA and DCFEMS units. Upon further investigation, the injured person was found with signs of life, extricated from the roadway and transported to an area hospital for emergency treatment. A review of roadway access during the initial response and recovery did not reveal any significant deficiencies.

A review of the event indicated that the individual involved intentionally entered the roadway as the train was entering the station and was classified as a suicide attempt by MTPD.

Some fatigue risk factors were identified for the Train Operator, however their performance, as supported by vehicle data, indicated that they were alert and took emergency actions in an expedient manner.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) Playback



Figure 1 – Train ID 605 in approach to L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2 at approximately at 11:18:15 hours.




Figure 2 – ROCC de-energized third rail power on Track 2 from Federal Center SW to L'Enfant Plaza Stations at approximately 11:21:15 hours.




Figure 3 – ROCC directed Train ID 403 to start single tracking operations around Federal Center SW Station on Track 1 at approximately 11:30:15 hours




Figure 4 – Train ID 403 first train to service Federal Center SW Station on Track 1 at approximately 11:30:45 hours.




Figure 5 – Train ID 403 first train to enter the single track area and serviced L'Enfant Plaza Station on Track 1 at approximately 11:32:45 hours.




Figure 6 – ROCC re-blocked Train ID 605 to Train ID 705 at approximately 11:40:30 hours.




Figure 7 – ROCC re-energized third rail power on Track 2 in order to permit the incident train consist (Train ID 705) to be moved to the New Carrollton Yard for further inspection and investigation at approximately 13:16:15 hours.




Figure 8 – Train ID 705 proceeds to the New Carrollton Yard via Track 2 at approximately 13:26:30 hours.




Figure 9 – ROCC de-energized third rail power on Track 2 at approximately 13:29:45 hours.




Figure 10 – At approximately 13:33:45 hours, ROCC authorizes RTRA Supervisor foul time to confirm third rail power has been de-energized on Track 2. After confirmation, MTPD continued their investigation.




Figure 11 – ROCC re-energized third rail power on Track 2 after all personnel reported clear of the roadway at approximately 14:08:30 hours.




Figure 12 – Train ID 605 was the first train to service Federal Center SW Station, Track 2 at approximately 14:10 hours.




Figure 13 – Train ID 605 was the first train to service L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2 at approximately 14:11 hours.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following:

Time	Description
11:19 hours	<u>Train ID 605 Train Operator</u> : “Emergency, emergency, emergency.” Train Operator reported while entering L'Enfant Plaza Station on Track 2, they made contact with a customer on the platform. ROCC dispatched an RTRA Supervisor to assist. ROIC, MTPD, DCFEMS, MAC and all concerned personnel were notified. [Ops 2]
11:20 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : ROCC de-energized third rail power at L'Enfant Plaza, Track 2 and instructed the Train Operator to make good announcements to customers, secure the cab and conduct a ground walk around inspections to check for signs of life. RTC appoints Train Operator as On Scene Commander (OSC). SOP #1A implemented. CMNT Mechanic reported on scene to assist with the inspection. [ROCC Report]
11:23 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : MTPD initiates Incident Command System (ICS). [MTPD Summary]
11:27 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : CMNT Mechanic reported the train was clear of all customers and stated they located the person under lead car 3203 and there appeared to be no signs of life. MTPD instructed all trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. ROCC established single tracking operations from Federal Center SW Station to Smithsonian Station utilizing Track 1. [ROCC Report]
11:30 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : Train ID 403 was the first train to enter the single track area and serviced Federal Center SW Station on Track 1. [ROCC Report]
11:33 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : MTPD personnel arrived on scene and established the ICP at the 7 th and D Street Kiosk. RTRA Supervisor arrived on scene to assist as the RTRA Forward Liaison. [MTPD Summary]
11:35 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : RTRA Supervisor arrived on scene and deemed as OSC. [ROCC Report]

Time	Description
11:36 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : DCFEMS arrived on scene at the 9 th and D Street entrance to L'Enfant Plaza Station. [MTPD Summary]
11:39 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : DCFEMS requested to set hand brakes. CMNT Mechanic reported the handbrake was applied on Car #3203. [Ops 2] <u>ROCC</u> : MTPD Officer deemed as OSC and RTRA Supervisor assumed role as RTRA Forward Liaison. [ROCC Report]
11:40 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : ROCC re-blocked Train ID 605 to Train ID 705. [AIMS] <u>ROCC</u> : 2 nd RTRA Supervisor arrives on scene and deemed as RTRA Incident Command Liaison. ROCC instructs them to report to the ICP. [ROCC Report]
11:51 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : DCFEMS Fire Chief arrives at the 7 th and D Street ICP and requested to set hand brakes. MTPD reported WSAD was placed. [Ops 2]
11:54 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : MTPD reported victim has been removed from under the train and lifesaving procedures were being conducted. RTRA Supervisor informs ROCC the person is showing signs of life. [Ops 2]
12:05 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : RTRA Supervisor reports DCFEMS have cleared the scene and transferred incident command to MTPD. Injured person was being transported to George Washington University Hospital. [Ops 2]
13:00 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : MTPD reported all personnel and equipment are clear of the roadway. Power restoration announcements were made by ROCC. [Ops 2]
13:16 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : ROCC re-energized third rail power at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. The handbrake on Car #3203 was normalized. [Ops 2]
13:26 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : Train ID 705 Train Operator departs L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2 in the of the New Carrollton Yard for further inspection. [Ops 2]
13:29 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : ROCC de-energized third rail power at L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. [Ops 2]
13:32 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : RTRA Supervisor granted permission to enter roadway to hot stick and confirm third rail power was down. MTPD personnel conducted further investigation tasks. [Ops 2]
13:45 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : RTRA Supervisor reported MTPD personnel were clear of the roadway. ERT personnel on scene to perform track inspection and cleanup tasks. [Ops 2]
14:01 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : ROCC granted ERT personnel foul time to confirm third rail power was de-energized. ERT reported third rail power was de-energized at chain marker D2 066+00 and was granted permission to place shunt and all other safety equipment to begin track inspection. [ROCC Report]
14:05 hours	<u>ERT</u> : ERT relinquished their foul time and reported all personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway, both tracks are ready for revenue service and no test train was needed. [Ops 2]
14:08 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : ROCC re-energized third rail power at L'Enfant Plaza, Track 2. [Ops 2]
14:10 hours	<u>ROCC</u> : Train ID 605 was the first train to service L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2 in revenue service to Wiehle-Reston East Station. [Ops 2]

***Note: Times above may vary from other system's timelines based on clock settings.*

The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) / Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS) Analysis

IIT CMOR analysis of the VMS data found that at approximately 11:16 hours, Car 3203 was headed inbound on the D line Track 2 in approach to L'Enfant Plaza Station. At approximately 6 feet prior to the station, the VMS data is consistent with the Master Controller (MC) being moved into the Emergency (EMER) Position, with a speed of 25 mph. This initiated the brake pipe to dump and full emergency brake cylinder pressure was applied. Approximately 1.5 seconds later, the Emergency Mushroom 1 (on Operator's console) was depressed at 15 mph and at 78 feet into the platform. The train travelled an additional 24 ft before coming to a stop 102 feet into the platform. This corresponds to a deceleration rate of 3.026 Mphps in Emergency. The train performed within design specifications. There is no activation of the road horn.




Figure 1 – IIT CMOR VMS analysis showing Train Operator's actions.

“Based on the VMS data, there was no faults observed with the train that contributed to the cause of this incident.”

Adopted from CMOR IIT Report:

Time	Description
11:16:56 hours	Train ID 605 approached L'Enfant Plaza at a speed of 25 mph.
11:16:57 hours	MC on 3203 moved to EMER, and Brake Pipe dumped.
11:17:00 hours	EMR Mushroom on console was depressed.
11:17:03 hours	Train came to a complete stop 102 ft into the platform.

Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)

At approximately 11:21 hours, MTPD Communications received a call for service from the ROCC stating that a possible person was struck by a train at the L'Enfant Plaza Station on the lower level, Track 2. Once on scene, MTPD made contact with the Train Operator and immediately escorted them to the 7th and D Street kiosk for interview. MTPD Criminal Investigation Division units and DCFEMS responded to the scene. The injured person was reported as showing signs of life and was transported to George Washington University Hospital in stable but critical condition.

On March 4, 2022, MTPD provided supplemental information and updated the classification of the incident to a suicide attempt.

Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)

CMNT technicians inspected the incident consist for damage and found no structural damage. Subsequently, CMNT Technicians encountered other findings during the inspection which included small blood stains on the underneath of the #2 gearbox, small blood spot under the battery box, small blood spot under the rear HVAC Unit, and blood on the axle #3 traction motor cables. No other defects were noted. See Appendix B.

Office of Systems Maintenance, Radio Communications (COMR)

After reviewing the Audio Recording System playback, there did not appear to be any communication deficiencies over the radio.

Interview Findings

Based on the investigation launched into the serious injury at L'Enfant Plaza Station, SAFE conducted one formal interview with the Train Operator via Microsoft Teams, which included the investigation team and a representative from the WMSC. The interview conducted identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from interviews and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report:

The Train Operator reported there were no mechanical issues with train and there were no communication issues with the radio. The Train Operator stated they were traveling at the appropriate speed leaving Federal Center SW Station in the direction of L'Enfant Plaza Station when they noticed someone. The Train Operator reported they slowed down while entering the station to approximately 32 mph. They stated the customer jumped in front of their train as they approached the platform limits and the Train Operator activated the emergency stop button. The Train Operator stated they reported the incident to ROCC and followed all instructions until MTPD personnel arrived and escorted them for an interview.

Weather

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature at 54° F, with scattered clouds, 45% humidity, south to north winds at 7 mph, and visibility of 10 miles. The event occurred within a tunneled section of the WMATA rail system. Weather was not a contributing factor in this event (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC).

Human Factors

Fatigue

Evidence of fatigue:

Conditions at the time of the incident were evaluated to distinguish whether evidence of fatigue was present. Video of the involved person was reviewed for behaviors suggesting fatigue. No indications of fatigue were evident from the video. The Train Operator reported feeling Fully Alert at the time of the incident. The Employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk:

Incident data was evaluated for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were identified. The incident time of day (11:19 hours) does not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The employee worked day shifts, including a 13-hour long shift (4:09 – 17:19), in the days leading up to the incident. Based on the employee's reported bed and wake times, the employee slept a total of 5.8 hours in the sleep period preceding the incident and was awake for 8.7 hours at the time of the incident. The off-duty period preceding the incident was 11.5 hours long, which provided the opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. The employee reported usual workday sleep durations of 7 hours and no issues with sleep.

A biomathematical fatigue modelling application (SAFTE-FAST WebSFC) was used to further evaluate fatigue risk factors that may have been present in the Train Operator's schedule. The analysis was based on the Train Operator's work schedule, reported sleep from the day before the incident, and reported habitual sleep durations. Estimated performance effectiveness at the time of the incident was 85.9%. Specifically, the analysis identified short sleep duration in the last 24 hours as a factor contributing to an increased risk of fatigue at the time of the incident.



Modeling analysis output shows estimated performance effectiveness during the incident work shift and for the week leading up to the work shift, based on the employee work and reported sleep schedule. Estimates were based on the Train Operator's work schedule, reported sleep from the day preceding the incident, and reported habitual sleep durations (7 hours a day). Bold portions of the modeled curve show work (in black) and sleep times (in blue). Effectiveness is shown on the vertical axis, with colored fields.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined the Train Operator was not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Train Operator of Train ID 605 was removed from service for post-incident testing.
- Consist was removed from service for post-incident inspection.
- ROCC de-energized third rail power and implemented single track operations to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station during the response and investigation.

Findings

- DCFEMS initially arrived on scene at the 9th and D Street Kiosk while the incident command post was established at the 7th and D Street Kiosk.
- The customer was retrieved from under lead Car #3203 with signs of life. The customer was transported to George Washington University Hospital.
- Some fatigue risk factors were identified for the Train Operator, however their performance, as supported by vehicle data, indicated that they were alert and took emergency actions in an expedient manner.
- IIT VMS analysis revealed Car #3203 train performed within the design specifications and there was no activation of the road horn.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the L'Enfant Plaza Station serious injury incident was a customer intentionally entering into the train's dynamic envelope while Train ID 605 was on approach to the platform.

An analysis of data collected determined no deficiencies related to any human factors, facility or vehicles contributed to event. A review of Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS) recordings revealed that the Train Operator of Train ID 605 began emergency braking prior to entering the platform area and applied the Console Emergency Pushbutton (mushroom) before coming in contact with the person.

SAFE Recommendations

There are no recommendations for this Serious Injury event, as the primary contributor was the person's intentional action. The Train Operator's performance, vehicles and infrastructure were found to be non-contributors to the incident.

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The below narratives are summaries of the interviews with SAFE and represent the statements made by the involved individuals. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

Train Operator

This employee is a WMATA Train Operator with a total of 11 years and six months of service: three years as a Bus Operator, and eight years and six months as a Train Operator. The Train Operator's last certification was on October 13, 2020. This employee reported no history of sleep issues.

Based on the SAFE interview, the Train Operator reported they were traveling in the direction of Wiehle-Reston East Station on Track 2. As the train came in approach to L'Enfant Plaza Station, the Train Operator stated they saw a customer looking in the tunnel near the end gate. The Train Operator stated this action was normal as they have seen customers in the past conduct the similar activities while awaiting the train to come into the station. The Train Operator reported they began to slow their speed down to approximately 32 mph as they were reaching the platform limits. The Train Operator stated the customer jumped in front of their train as they entered the platform limits of L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 2. The Train Operator reported they immediately activated the emergency brake and reported the emergency via the radio to ROCC. ROCC gave the Train Operator instructions and asked how many cars were on the platform. The Train Operator stated there was only one car on the platform. After making announcements to customers and assisting with offloading, MTPD personnel arrived and escorted the Train Operator for an interview. The Train Operator reported there were no mechanical issues with the consist and they had no radio communication issues. The Train Operator reported they were well rested and fully alert at the time of incident.

Appendix B – Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) Work Order #16893669



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 2
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 16893669
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
02/24/2022 20:28

Work Description: Customer jumped in front of the train track two.

Job Plan Description:

Work Information			
Asset: R3203	3203, RAIL CAR, BREDA, 3000 AC, B CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:
Asset Tag: R3203		Maintenance Office: CMNT-NEWC-INSP	Create Date: 02/21/2022 16:12
Asset S/N: 3203		Labor Group: CMNT	Actual Start: 02/21/2022 16:15
Location: 1230	D99, NEW CARROLLTON YARD	Crew:	Actual Comp: 02/22/2022 04:38
Work Location: 1230	D99, NEW CARROLLTON YARD	Lead:	Item: L18060002
Failure Class: CMNT003	CAR BODY	GL Account: WMATA-02-33393-50499160-041-*****-OPR**	Target Start:
Problem Code: 2423	N/A CODE (BODY SYSTEM)	Supervisor:	Target Comp:
Requested By:		Requestor Phone: [REDACTED]	Scheduled Start:
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:	
Create-Mileage: 2541963.0		Complete-Mileage: 2542232.0	

Task IDs						
Task ID						
10	CENV downloaded the FRA, DAM and EXT files from Train					
	Initial preview found only the front Friction brake unit on the B car is reporting. Please verify VMS communications are restored on all systems. Meanwhile, CENV does not have a hold on these cars. A report will be provided shortly					
	000-300-V02 VEHICLE MONITORING SYSTEM; VMS;					
Component:	2K/3K/6K	Work Accomp:	DOWNLOADED	Reason:	INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	Status: CLOSE Position: Warranty?: N
20	See details					
	Inspected the whole undercar and exterior of both cars for any possible structural damage. Inspected wheels for any defects resulting from the incident. My finding are as follows. Small blood stain on underneath of #2 gearbox. Small blood spot under battery box. Small blood spot under Rear HVAC Unit. Blood on axle 3 traction motor cables. No other defects noted.					
	000-300-B01 CAR BODY; UNDER CAR STRUCTURE					
Component:	GROUP; 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accomp:	INSPECTED	Reason:	DIRTY	Status: CLOSE Position: 232 Warranty?: N
30	UNDERCAR INSPECTION ON BOTH CARS GOOD. NO DAMAGE ON BOTH CARS FOUND.					
	PER CENV - VERIFIED FRICTION BRAKES ON THREE (3) TRUCKS ON BOTH CARS WERE NOT COMMUNICATING WITH VMS. I RECYCLED THE F / B CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON BOTH A & B CARS. I CHECKED LONWORK STATUS ON LWC3 FOR BRAKE COMMUNICATION STATUS. ALL BRAKES ON BOTH CARS COMMUNICATING GOOD WITH THE VMS.					
	000-300-E00 SUBSYSTEM; FRICTION BRAKE; 2K/3K/					
Component:	6K/7K	Work Accomp:	PERFORMED	Reason:	INOPERATIVE	Status: CLOSE Position: Warranty?: N
40	CLEAN UNDER CAR WHERE SIGNS OF BLOOD WERE FOUND					
	000-300-B01 CAR BODY; UNDER CAR STRUCTURE					
Component:	GROUP; 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accomp:	CLEANED	Reason:	INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	Status: CLOSE Position: Warranty?: N

WT_plust_woprint.rptdesign

03/13/2022 20:12

Document 1 - Page 1 of 2 – CMNT Maximo Work Order #16893669 detailing inspections conducted.

Incident Date: 02/21/2022 Time: 11:19 hours
Final Report Rev.1 – Serious Injury
E22114

Rev.1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 06/12/2022
Rev.1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/21/2022
Rev.1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/21/2022

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Work Order #: 16893669
 Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
 02/24/2022 20:28

Work Description: Customer jumped in front of the train track two.

Job Plan Description:

Actual Labor										
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost	
10		02/21/2022	02/21/2022	18:30	22:30	Y	04:00	00:00	\$253.03	
20		02/21/2022	02/22/2022	23:00	00:00	Y	01:00	00:00	\$42.17	
30		02/21/2022	02/22/2022	22:30	01:00	Y	02:30	00:00	\$110.63	
40		02/22/2022	02/22/2022	00:00	01:00	Y	01:00	00:00	\$41.76	
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							08:30	00:00	\$447.59	

Related Incidents				
Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship
8587630	Person struck by train. Train offloaded, medics dispatched and trains single track around.	SR	CLOSED	ORIGINATOR

Failure Reporting				
Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark	Date
1024	ACCIDENT PEDESTRIAN INVOLVEMENT	1342	CLEANED	
Remarks: INSPECTED & CLEANED; NO DAMAGE FOUND UNDERCAR; CLEANED; PERFORMED CENV RECOMMENDATIONS; GOOD DI				

Document 2 - Page 2 of 2 – CMNT Maximo Work Order #16893669 stating no damage found undercar.

Appendix C – Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) After Action Report



Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary



ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or “hot wash” in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:	PERSON STRUCK BY TRAIN		
*Incident Commander (IC):	[REDACTED]		
MTPD CCN:	2022-00768	Local CCN:	
*Date ICS Initiated:	02-21-2022	*Time ICS Initiated:	1123HRS
*Date ICS Terminated:	02-21-2022	*Time ICS Terminated:	1345HRS2
*Duration of Incident:	2.5hrs	*Service Disrupted (Type and Time):	2.5hrs/ Service Restricted
Incident Location:	LFPL Trk#2 Org/Blu line	Command Post Location:	7th/D Kiosk LFPL
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	[REDACTED] CR#54	Command Aid for OSC:	[REDACTED] CR#65
Forward Liaison:	[REDACTED] CR#53	Unified Command:	Yes
OCC Liaison:	ON DUTY MAC	Alternate Channel:	MTPD CH.2
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	1230HRS ON TRK#1	Bus Bridge Established (From /To):	NO
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	INNER(WHOLE LOWER PLATFORM)	Power De-energized:	1150-1240HRS 1336-1408HRS
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name Dept: RAIL	[REDACTED] RTRA Supervisor	Medical Attention Required/Requested:	Treated on scene and transported by Medic #7
Entry/Exit Log:	YES	CID Response:	YES

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Document 3 - Page 1 of 4 – MTPD Hot Wash Summary.

Incident Date: 02/21/2022 Time: 11:19 hours
Final Report Rev.1 – Serious Injury
E22114

Rev.1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 06/12/2022
Rev.1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/21/2022
Rev.1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/21/2022

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
	MTPD	ON SCENE COMMAND
	MTPD	ON SCENE SCRIBE
	MTPD	FORWARD LIAISON
	MTPD	RESPONDED
	MTPD	RESPONDED
	WMATA	STATION MGR. 7/D
	DCFD	OPS. BATTALION CHIEF
	DCFD	RESCUE BATTALION
	MTPD	CSS
	DCFD	ENGINE #1

EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Agency/Department	Title/Role
	MTPD	CID
	WMATA	EMERGENCY
	WMATA	EMERGENCY MGMT.
	WMATA	RTRA SPVR.
	WMATA	RTRA SPVR.
	WMATA	ERT
	WMATA	ERT
	DCFD	BATTALION CHIEF
	WMATA	CAR MAINTENANCE
	WMATA	CID
	WMATA	ON SCENE AND HOSPITAL
	WMATA	WATCH COMMANDER
	WMATA	ENTRY/EXIT log 7th/D

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	NO
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	VIDEO [REDACTED] YES
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	DVEU

OBSERVATIONS
<p>-1123 Person struck by train #605 on track #2 lower level orange and blue platform (H/M 22yrs)</p> <p>-1124 ID#495 [REDACTED] located and secured the train operator [REDACTED] in the 7/D kiosk</p> <p>-1125 Rail single tracking on track #1 and bypassing station</p> <p>-1130 Victim located towards front of train consist by car #3203 wedged between car and running rail showing signs of life</p> <p>-1132 Medics en route</p> <p>-1133 CR#54 on scene and established command at 7/D kiosk. CR#53 Forward Liaison</p> <p>-1135 Normal service on upper green and yellow lines</p> <p>-1136 DCFD on scene 9/D</p> <p>-1138 Switched to MTPD 2X</p> <p>-1139 FD request to set hand brakes</p> <p>-1145 CID on scene. D#952 secured operator in vehicle for interview</p> <p>-1151 DCFD Battalion Chief [REDACTED] on scene 7th/D</p> <p>-1152 WASAD placed and power down</p> <p>-1153 Third rail power on track #2 from FEDC to FEDT taken down</p> <p>-1154 Victim removed from under train and life saving procedures conducted aboard train</p> <p>-1159 ERT and OED on scene</p> <p>-1207 Battalion Chief [REDACTED] cleared and turned incident back to WMATA</p> <p>-1210 Victim transported to GW Hospital by DC Medic#7. Followed by MTPD EOD-4 and CID</p> <p>-1230 Single tracking started on track #1 side lower level Org/Blu</p> <p>-1236 Car Maintenance conducts walk around and gives good to go</p> <p>-1238 RTRA SPVR. [REDACTED] to move affected train to NEWC yard</p> <p>-1300 All personnel and gear cleared from track #2 (Incident side)</p> <p>-1317 Third rail power re-energized on track #2 to move affected train</p> <p>-1338 Third rail de-energized to allow CSS to process</p> <p>-1346 Scene turned back over to SPVR. [REDACTED]</p> <p>-1346 Hot wash conducted top side 7th/D. All units clear and back in service.</p> <p>-1407 ROCC restored power and resumed normal service</p> <p>*TSOC Notification made at 1450hrs to [REDACTED] (TSA-02-05612-22)</p>

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

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MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

Page 3 of 4

Effective: 12/30/20

Document 5 - Page 3 of 4 – MTPD Hot Wash Summary.

Incident Date: 02/21/2022 Time: 11:19 hours
Final Report Rev.1 – Serious Injury
E22114

Rev.1 Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 06/12/2022
Rev.1 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/21/2022
Rev.1 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/21/2022

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

NOTES
<p>DCFD Battalion Chief advised MTPD did a great job. Suggested to work on clarification of where the exact command post will be located when dealing with large scale stations like LFPL. DCFD initially responded to 9th/MD when command was at 7th/D side.</p> <p>MTPD radios continued to work poorly. Units that were trying to communicate with each other from inside LFPL had radio difficulty. Units in the field advised that it was hard to make out LFPL radio traffic as well.</p> <p>Communication with RTRA personnel on scene needs to be better. Took too long to have power restored to the affected track side in order to move the affected train. Approximate time took close to 1hr after victim had been removed from the track.</p> <p>Some RTRA personnel were unfamiliar with the duties of the MAC (Mission Assurance Coordinator), the RTRA supervisors seemed to think that they operate separate from the Mission of the MAC which caused confusion and hindered the operation for approximately 30-40 minutes. Mr. [REDACTED] and RTRA supervisor [REDACTED] had different understandings of how the lines of communication should work.</p> <p>Need to ensure more than one Entry/Exit officer is in place when dealing with large scale stations.</p>

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 60%; background-color: #e0e0ff;"></div> <div style="width: 35%; background-color: black;"></div> </div>

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 60%; background-color: #e0e0ff;"></div> <div style="width: 35%; background-color: black;"></div> </div>

Patrol Operations Bureau Commander's, Printed Name and Signature/Date
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 60%; background-color: #e0e0ff;"></div> <div style="width: 35%; background-color: black;"></div> </div>

Office of Emergency Management Director's, Printed Name and Signature/Date
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 60%; background-color: #e0e0ff;"></div> <div style="width: 35%; background-color: #e0e0ff;"></div> </div>

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Appendix D - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report

View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT ID: 2022052SILVER3

DATE 2022-02-21	TIME 1119	LINE Silver	ITEM 3
LOCATION (STATION/YARD) L'Enfant Plaza (D03)		LOCATION/CHAIN MARKER (If Applicable)	REPORTED BY Train Operator [REDACTED]
TRAIN ID 605	DIRECTION I/B	TRACK NUMBER 2	DEPTS NOTIFIED Everbridge Alert/Messaging
CAR NUMBERS (XXXX-XXXX)			
Lead Car			
3203-3202	3204-3205	3199-3198	-
Caused Issue <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>
TRBL CODE JUMP-JUMPER: PERSON HIT BY TRAIN	RESP CODE PUB		

TYPE INCIDENT
Person Stuck By Train

ACTION PLAN
Dispatched RTRA Supervisors/ERT/CMNT, De-energize Third Rail Power, Implement Single Track Operations, Bypass Station

DELAYS IN MINUTES			
LINE	INCIDENT	TRAIN	TOTAL DURATION
20	20	125	0

TRIPS MODIFIED					
PARTIAL	GAP TRAIN	LATE DISPATCHES	REROUTED	NOT DISPATCHED	OFFLOADS
2	1	0	0	0	1

FIVE PRIMARY CONSOLE INDICATIONS				
BCP	BRAKES ON ILLUMINATED	ALL DOORS CLOSED ILLUMINATED	AUTO\MANUAL BPP ILLUMINATED	BPP
Yes	Yes	Yes	MANUAL	Yes

Document 7 - Page 1 of 3 – ROCC Incident Report.

View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY	
TIME	DESCRIPTION
1119	Train 605 Train Operator [REDACTED] reported while entering L'Enfant Plaza track two his train came into contact with a person and one car was on the platform. Unit 41, Supervisor [REDACTED] and Unit 32, Supervisor [REDACTED] dispatched to the scene to assist. Assistant Operations Manager, ROIC, MTPD, MAC and all concerned personnel were notified.
1120	Third rail breakers were remotely commanded open and third rail power was de-energized at L'Enfant Plaza track two. Train Operator [REDACTED] was instructed to make announcements to customers, secure his cab, perform a radio check and conduct a ground walk around inspection to check for signs of life. Operator [REDACTED] was deemed as the On Scene Commander. CMNT [REDACTED] reported on the scene to assist and was instructed to assist with offloading the train from the lead car.
1127	CMNT [REDACTED] reported the train was verified clear of all customers. Single track operations was established from Federal Center to Smithsonian utilizing track one. MTPD instructed all trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza. CMNT [REDACTED] reported he found the body with which appeared to have no signs of life under the lead car 3203.
1130	Train 403 was the first train to enter the single track area and serviced Federal Center SW track one. Shuttle bus service was requested to accommodate the incident train's customers at L'Enfant Plaza.
1135	Unit 43, RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] arrived on scene and deemed as the On Scene Commander.
1139	MTPD Officer [REDACTED] deemed as the On Scene Commander and RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] assumed the role as the RTRA Forward Liaison. Bus #2831 and 2835 arrived at L'Enfant Plaza to service the incident train's customers.
1140	Unit 36, RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] arrived on scene, deemed as the RTRA Incident Command Liaison and instructed to report to the Incident Command Post located at the 7th and D Street kiosk. CMNT [REDACTED] confirmed the handbrake was applied on car 3203.
1150	Gap Train 650 was placed in service at Clarendon track two to minimize customers delays in the direction of Wiehle-Reston East. ERT 6236 arrived on scene and instructed to respond to the Incident Command Post.
1200	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported signs of life and the incident customer was clear of the roadway and was transported to George Washington Hospital.
1205	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported Washington D.C. Fire Department cleared the scene and transferred the incident scene to MTPD.
1231	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] advised per MTPD, train were able to service L'Enfant Plaza track one. Train 903 was the first train to service L'Enfant Plaza track one and continued in revenue service in the direction of Vienna.
1314	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] advised all personnel/equipment were clear the roadway and third rail power could be restored at L'Enfant Plaza track two. Power restoration announcements were made.
1316	Third rail breakers were remotely commanded closed and third rail power was restored at L'Enfant Plaza track two. Handbrake on car 3203 was normalized, incident train was re-block to non-revenue train id 705 and continued to New Carrollton Yard for storage.
1330	Third rail breakers were remotely commanded open and third rail power was de-energized at L'Enfant Plaza track two.
1332	RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] was granted permission to enter the roadway to hot-stick and confirm third rail power de-energized for MTPD to further investigation.

View Approved Incident Report

- 1345 RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] advised all MTPD were clear of the roadway and RTRA was clear to resume clean up of the incident area. ERT [REDACTED] arrived on the scene to assist and requested foul time protection to perform a track inspection at L'Enfant Plaza track two within the platform limits.
- 1401 ERT [REDACTED] was granted foul time protection to confirm third rail power was de-energized at L'Enfant Plaza track two and give ROCC a chain marker.
- 1402 ERT [REDACTED] reported third rail power confirmed de-energized at chain marker D2-066+00. ERT [REDACTED] was granted permission to place shunts, including the remainder of all other safety equipment and begin track inspection.
- 1405 ERT [REDACTED] reported foul time protection was relinquished, all personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway, both tracks were revenue ready, no test train needed and central may restore third rail power at their discretion.
- 1407 Power announcements and notifications were made.
- 1408 Third rail breakers were remotely commanded closed and third rail power was restored at L'Enfant Plaza track two.
- 1410 Train 605 was the first train to service L'Enfant Plaza track two and continued in revenue service to Wiehle-Reston East. Normal service was resumed.

MAXIMO TICKET#
8587630

REPORT PREPARED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
RADIO CONTROLLER 1	[REDACTED]	✓
BUTTON CONTROLLER 1	[REDACTED]	✓
RADIO CONTROLLER 2	[REDACTED]	✓
BUTTON CONTROLLER 2	[REDACTED]	✓

SUPERINTENDENTS OR ASSISTANTS SECTION

ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP CORRECTIVE ACTIONS OR REMARKS

FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS

NOTIFICATIONS/PAGE GROUPS #1/CEO #2/DGM & BELOW

ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS MADE BY PHONE MAC [REDACTED]

APPROVED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
REPORT APPROVED BY SUPT. OR ASST SUPT.	[REDACTED]	✓

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