

Cap ID	Expected Completion	Source	Finding/Recommendation/Action
NTSB R-8-004-A	12/31/22	<a href="#">Safety Directive 16-2 (12/15/2015)</a>	WMATA to implement appropriate technology that will automatically alert wayside workers of approaching trains and that will automatically alert train operators when approaching areas with workers on or near the tracks.
WMSC-19-C0008-B	09/30/22	<a href="#">NTSB origin (re-issued by WMSC 9/10/2019)</a>	Metrorail must implement an effective hours of service policy as part of an overall fatigue management program.
WMSC-19-C0026	04/14/23	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training Audit (2/13/2020)</a>	WMATA does not conduct annual culvert inspections as specified in Section 105.1 of the TRST-1000. WMATA must add culverts as an asset in Maximo and begin scheduling annual inspections as specified in Section 105.1 of the TRST-1000.
WMSC-20-C0042	07/14/23	<a href="#">RWP Audit (6/18/2020)</a>	WMATA employees are not consistently following Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Rule 5.12 for equipment calibration. WMATA must develop a procedure or checklist to ensure work equipment is checked and inspected prior to use and ensure that there is enough certified safety equipment available to meet all RWP requirements for each work crew. WMATA also must develop a procedure to track certification dates of all safety-related equipment to ensure that devices like WSADs are consistently re-calibrated and certified on schedule.
WMSC-20-C0049	12/01/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	ROCC management contributes to a chaotic environment. Use of profanities, threats and racial, sexual or other forms of harassment are regular features of the control centers environment, which makes it difficult for controllers to do their jobs and drives low morale and significant turnover. Metrorail must professionalize operations in the Control Center as part of a plan to improve rule compliance and reach full staffing levels. The comprehensive fixes included in previously required Corrective Action Plans must include a correction of the deep-seated toxic workplace culture in the control center.

WMSC-20-C0051	11/17/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	Metrorail does not record all critical ROCC communications, limiting the lessons that can be learned from safety events. Metrorail must fully record and adequately retain all communications that are tied to operations and emergency response.
WMSC-20-C0052	05/26/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	There is no consistent, clear, concise, immediate and reliable Metrorail communication process for safety-critical information between Metrorail personnel and fire liaison. Metrorail must make the fire liaison's role and responsibilities clear to all ROCC employees. Metrorail must establish redundancies and direct communication paths to ensure information from the fire liaison is properly communicated to the relevant controllers, first responders and others, particularly information regarding initial reports of emergencies and the location of personnel prior to power restoration. This must include an information tracking method that makes real-time information available to all employees in the ROCC. The log must be accessible by upper management so that employees managing the emergency can focus on their duties rather than being regularly called away to provide updates to upper management.
WMSC-20-C0053	01/06/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	Some Metrorail procedures lack the required urgency to address life-safety issues. Metrorail must rewrite smoke, fire and related alarm policies including specific responsibilities for calling and dispatching the fire department and immediate communication with the Fire Liaison. The new policies must be developed in consultation with WMATA's Fire Marshall, SAFE, MTPD, the COG Fire chief's passenger rail safety Subcommittee and other relevant experts. All employees involved must be trained on these procedures, and the procedures must be included in refresher and new class training.
WMSC-20-C0055	12/16/22	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	WMATA does not always follow or clearly define its fatigue risk management procedures for the Rail Operations Control Center, including those limiting the length of controller shifts. Metrorail must ensure that hours of service, required rest periods, and related policies are followed and that those requirements are clearly communicated to all staff and management.

WMSC-20-C0056	08/30/24	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	<p>Metrorail's ROCC recruitment and retention approach is failing. Some controller trainees have left the ROCC immediately after or shortly after the months-long training course. Metrorail must provide transparency during recruitment on the taxing requirements of the job of a controller, use those requirements to target recruitment efforts, and use a team evaluation approach for each candidate with standardized rating metrics during the application and interview process to assure an accepted applicant will likely be a good fit for the controller environment (stress, shifts, etc.). Metrorail must provide upfront transparency about required time commitments, required bonus agreements and any other conditions of employment. Accepted applicants must also be allowed to experience the ROCC environment directly beginning early in the training process in order to have a complete understanding of the job they are expected to do.</p>
WMSC-20-C0057	01/06/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	<p>A high rate of staff turnover in the Rail Operations Control Center contributes to staffing challenges and a lack of positive institutional knowledge that can contribute to safety challenges. Metrorail must take action such as conducting detailed exit interview with departing trainees, controllers and assistant superintendents to identify ways to retain qualified and quality staff. These actions must be documented, and the records must be maintained for future review these interviews and other actions to identify potential improvements.</p>
WMSC-20-C0058	12/02/22	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	<p>Controllers still have too many responsibilities and are frequently rushed to complete tasks by management. Metrorail must conduct an assessment of all current responsibilities for ROCC controllers, assess if each responsibility is practical, determine what responsibilities must be shifted to other or additional positions, and determine whether to resume the use of administrative staff to assist with documentation requirements such as Daily Activity Logs. This assessment must include the use of a new cognitive task analysis to inform training, minimum qualifications and distribution of responsibilities. The assessment and cognitive task analysis must be provided to the WMSC.</p>

WMSC-20-C0059	04/26/24	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	WMATA has failed to regularly update the Rail Operations Control Center Procedures Manual. Metrorail must update ROCC procedures and related documents to reflect current realities. This update must include improvements identified through cognitive task analysis and other parts of the required assessment of current responsibilities for ROCC controllers. The update must also include any changes based on cognitive task analyses of the responsibilities of other control center staff and management. Controllers and other ROCC staff must be fully familiarized with and trained on the policies in the updated manual in initial, refresher and updated training.
WMSC-20-C0060	01/06/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	WMATA has not reviewed SOPs or OAPs on a regular basis. WMATA must identify all in-effect ROCC-related SOPs and OAPs, establish an ongoing schedule of when each is due for review, and conduct those reviews as scheduled in order to maintain updated procedures and training. As required by a Safety Management System approach, these reviews must include full consultation with groups including the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), engineering departments, the Rules Committee, and frontline workers to ensure the documents are practical and improve safety.
WMSC-20-C0061	07/29/22	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	Ride alongs are not effectively utilized to increase controller knowledge, contributing to a lack of controller understanding of what is actually happening on the roadway. Metrorail must ensure that each controller has the PPE required to take advantage of the ride alongs, including work boots, and must direct work crews to allow controllers to fully observe and, as appropriate, ask questions regarding work activity. Ride alongs (road days) must include actual experience in all parts of the system to provide territory familiarization in addition to the understanding of how work crews function on the roadway.
WMSC-20-C0065	02/17/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	Not all controllers experience emergency drills. If each ROCC controller does not get this experience, it diminishes the value of the drills. Metrorail must ensure that each controller and assistant superintendent is involved in emergency drills (quarterly or otherwise) on a regular basis. This training must be documented for each individual.

WMSC-20-C0068	01/26/24	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	<p>WMATA does not have a standardized training program for personnel working at desks such as the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) or Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC). Metrorail could not provide any documentation of MOC training materials, a curriculum, or a training description. Metrorail provided only a study guide for the ROIC. Metrorail must establish minimum training and certification standards for each position in the ROCC to ensure competence to perform the job, including associated training courses, qualification requirements and requalification requirements.</p>
WMSC-20-C0070	10/27/23	<a href="#">WMSC Directive (10/20/2020)</a>	<p>Metrorail puts the integrity of safety event investigations at risk by not following procedures requiring proper chain of custody and control of evidence as outlined in SOP 800-01 and Policy/Instruction 10.4/1, not following procedures requiring direct access for investigators to all information, recordings and other evidence that is potentially relevant to the investigation, and not fully training all personnel on the steps they are required to take when a safety event occurs.</p>
WMSC-21-C0072	04/14/23	<a href="#">Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)</a>	<p>WMATA does not have load ratings for its bridges and aerial structures. Metrorail must conduct a load rating assessment for all bridges and elevated structures or otherwise raised platforms or tracks (prioritizing the structures with most severe deficiencies), compare those load ratings to the actual maximum loads that could be placed on those structures, and make any operational changes required for safety. Following that assessment, Metrorail must establish a process, including clear procedures and load rating guidelines, to keep the load ratings up to date. Metrorail must also establish a process to evaluate rail vehicle (both single car or single maintenance machine and entire consist) weight relative to the weight ratings of structures across the system to ensure that no structure is overloaded during scheduled activities or unplanned events.</p>
WMSC-21-C0077	04/14/23	<a href="#">Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)</a>	<p>Metrorail does not have consistent requirements for refresher or additional training for structures inspection and maintenance teams. Metrorail must formalize a timeline for sufficient NHI refresher training courses and fracture-critical member training (including element inspection training). Metrorail must establish sufficient requirements for employee refresher training on the safe use of equipment such as scissor lifts or bucket trucks and proper use of inspection checklists for those vehicles or equipment.</p>

WMSC-21-C0083	01/12/24	<a href="#">Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)</a>	Ten Metrorail structures have steel rocker bearings, which creates a seismic risk in the event of an earthquake other seismic events. Metrorail should develop and implement a plan to incorporate the replacement of these bearings into capital projects on these bridges.
WMSC-21-C0084	07/19/24	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Inspection (3/9/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not following and does not have effective safety certification and acceptance procedures for new RMMs. There is no Metrorail-wide safety certification procedure to implement the SSCP. Metrorail must establish and demonstrate that it is following effective safety certification and acceptance procedures and specific processes for all RMMs from the specification or design phase through acceptance and use. For those RMMs that did not go through the safety certification process required at the time of purchase or delivery, including those identified in the 2016 TOC Audit, Metrorail must complete an Operational Hazard Analysis (OHA) on each vehicle to identify hazards, and then, following a safety review process, must implement any identified mitigations for these hazards.
WMSC-21-C0088	11/18/22	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Inspection (3/9/2021)</a>	Equipment operators are not fully trained on each type of vehicle they may be directed to operate. Some training has not included sufficient hands-on experience. Metrorail must institute sufficient, specific, specialized certification training and standards to operate each type of RMM and must provide that training and certification to each equipment operator for the type(s) of RMM that operator uses. All aspects of this training, including the required classroom, seat-time, OJT and vehicle-type specific certification status of each equipment operator, must be documented.
WMSC-21-C0090	11/18/22	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Inspection (3/9/2021)</a>	Supervisors or others have no way of confirming while in the field whether an operator is properly trained to operate a specific RMM. Metrorail must establish a process requiring regular supervisory checks of certifications, which may include checks during the pick process and automatic notifications of expiring certifications. Vehicle-type specific certification status of each individual who may operate, at a minimum, the most complex equipment such as the TGV, continuous welded rail train, heavy-duty (currently METRO 4x4) tamper, ballast regulator and vacuum train must be available in some way in the field to supervisors, so that they may provide appropriate oversight and control of personnel.

WMSC-21-C0091	02/22/23	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Inspection (3/9/2021)</a>	<p>Metrorail risks key safety and maintenance work coming to a halt due to insufficient succession planning and training. Metrorail must conduct an analysis to determine the necessary number of fully trained and certified operators on each type of RMM for safe operations and continued safety-related maintenance or construction work. The analysis must also determine, for at least the most complex equipment (Track Geometry Vehicle, Continuous Welded Rail Train, heavy-duty tamper, ballast regulator, vacuum train), the seat time each must have on an ongoing basis to remain competent on each piece of equipment. Based on that analysis, Metrorail must train, certify, and maintain at least the required number of operators for each piece of equipment and must maintain and monitor operator certification expiration for each piece of equipment to ensure that the minimum number of trained operators continues to be met.</p>
WMSC-21-C0098	06/06/25	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Inspection (3/9/2021)</a>	<p>Several Metrorail preventive maintenance instructions do not include acceptable tolerances for required measurements.</p>
WMSC-21-C0099	04/07/28	<a href="#">C Directive (3/31)</a>	<p>Metrorail's intrusion detection warning (IDW) system is not in place at all locations required by Metrorail design criteria, safety policies or procedures, including all locations in common corridors shared with other transportation modes. Metrorail must address the hazard and deficiencies between Union Station and Rhode Island Ave Station, identify all areas of the Metrorail system (both mainline and in yards) where WMATA design criteria, safety policies or procedures require IDW systems and any other locations where Metrorail determines IDW or equivalent protection systems are required for safe operations, and must develop and implement plans to ensure all identified locations have those systems installed and operational.</p>
WMSC-21-C0100	10/30/26	<a href="#">C Directive (4/30)</a>	<p>Metrorail is not maintaining a fully functioning radio communications system in all rail yards and shops. Metrorail must identify and resolve radio communications gaps in rail yards so that radio communication fully functions as intended within, to and from all yard and shop spaces where there is or may be rail vehicle traffic and must actively record and resolve additional reported radio communications gaps, going forward. Until upgrades are complete, Metrorail must determine and implement interim steps to mitigate risk such as creating and maintaining an up-to-date map of areas with poor or no radio communication and specifying alternate means of communication or safety protections in those areas.</p>

WMSC-21-C0101	11/16/22	<a href="#">C Directive (4/30)</a>	Metrorail does not have, provide training on, or otherwise follow specific rules related to rail vehicle and switch movement in non-signalized territory. Further, Metrorail provides no controls on or oversight of movement in dark territory. Metrorail must clearly specify safety-based rules and procedures governing vehicle and switch movement in dark (non-signalized) territory, including all aspects of coordination, cooperation, communication, and movement. Metrorail must fully train employees on these rules and procedures.
WMSC-21-C0102	09/23/22	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail has not adequately trained ATCM employees on safety procedures to ensure that all employees fully understand their roles with respect to safety. Metrorail must implement safety promotion practices to build trust and a strong safety culture through positive and responsive safety communications and a collaborative process with employees to help identify safety issues and effective means to address those issues to ensure that work as performed comports with work as required.
WMSC-21-C0103	10/28/22	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail has continued efforts to return to Automatic Train Operation without following its safety certification procedures. Metrorail must comply with its safety certification procedures, which includes the development and use of a comprehensive CIL and CEL based on complete and updated hazard analyses, detailed review by safety working group(s) including all relevant departments, a final Safety and Security Verification Report (SSCVR) and other aspects for projects that, like ATO, fall into Category 1 safety certification.
WMSC-21-C0104	11/18/22	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	WMATA is not conducting all inspections and maintenance required by its ATC manuals and ATC manuals have incorrect or incomplete information and outdated references. Metrorail must conduct its required inspections, preventive maintenance and testing, and must demonstrate that this work will continue to be conducted long-term. Metrorail must review and update manuals to ensure the manuals are up-to-date and accurate, must ensure that manual reviews are scheduled, must ensure that the manuals are reviewed and updated as scheduled, and must ensure that information about each update is clearly communicated to ATC personnel.
WMSC-21-C0105	08/12/22	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail allows employees to use tools that have not gone through any safety review or approval process. Metrorail must develop, communicate, implement, and monitor compliance with safety-based rules and procedures governing the use of non-WMATA tools on the roadway, including allowable and prohibited tool lists that are updated regularly and a sufficient approval or rejection process.
WMSC-21-C0106	08/12/22	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not have a standardized determination of which preventive maintenance work must be prioritized as safety critical. Metrorail must develop a safety-based procedure that specifies which, if any, PMIs may or may not be bypassed, the circumstances that must occur in order to safely bypass a PMI, how the justification for the bypass must be documented, the frequency with which a specific PMI may be bypassed, who is responsible for analyzing and reviewing those bypass logs, and what corrective action is required if a PMI is bypassed.

WMSC-21-C0107	01/13/23	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	There is no formal process for ATCM, the department that performs the work in the field, to initiate or request an engineering modification or manual change from ATCE.
WMSC-21-C0108	11/18/22	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Departments responsible for ATC do not have clear, documented, effective working relationships which contributes to communication and coordination challenges that limit safety improvements.
WMSC-21-C0109	11/18/22	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	WMATA does not have a standardized process to prioritize and advance ATC capital projects.
WMSC-21-C0110	03/17/23	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Training and parts needed for maintenance appear to be an afterthought in WMATA procurements. WMATA must ensure that SAFE, departments responsible for procurement, and departments responsible for installation, maintenance, operations, engineering and training properly coordinate from the earliest stages of project development to provide for and include adequate review, approval, training and any parts or other features required to maintain the project and related systems in a state of good repair.
WMSC-21-C0111	08/25/23	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not have adequate replacement parts or materials and has not planned for the obsolescence of critical equipment. Metrorail must develop inventories of parts and materials and their availability and lead times or unavailability and identify those parts that require immediate or near-term action to procure in order to maintain a state of good repair. Metrorail departments must cooperatively develop and implement midterm and long-term plans to replace equipment nearing or exceeding its useful life to maintain a state of good repair.
WMSC-21-C0112	12/16/22	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail has no specific minimum training course requirements, documented OJT requirements or equipment certifications for ATCM employees, or requirements that individuals be trained on a system element prior to conducting maintenance work on it. Metrorail must specify, implement and document training requirements that must be met prior to work on specific equipment in the field, and must provide basic and ongoing higher-level training to ensure that employees have the required level of expertise for their positions. Metrorail must utilize its available or future technology, such as ELM and Maximo, to ensure that these requirements are followed
WMSC-21-C0113	09/29/23	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not effectively managing turnover, vacancies and experience levels of ATC personnel. Metrorail must identify technical skills and experience required, and must develop, finalize, implement and continuously improve an effective recruitment and hiring process. Metrorail must also identify and provide any training necessary for current employees to gain the higher level of knowledge and understanding necessary to fill the gaps left by those who have left the departments.
WMSC-21-C0115	08/04/23	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail's written procedures do not reflect changes that employees are being directed to implement. Metrorail must ensure that all written procedures, such as those governing cranking and clamping, match the direction given to ATC personnel and that the procedures go through the proper safety review and approval process.

WMSC-21-C0118	07/07/23	<a href="#">C Directive (8/13)</a>	<p>Metrorail does not consistently follow its safety certification process, which leads to project activation and use without proper hazard identification and mitigation, putting Metrorail customers, personnel and first responders at risk. Metrorail must clearly communicate requirements of, and take active, recurring steps to ensure compliance with, its safety certification procedures and processes from the initiation of a project through project completion, activation, final verification and acceptance.</p> <p>As part of a self-assessment to identify and resolve specific gaps in the safety certification process, Metrorail must also assess and document whether this process has been complied with for each project put into service (with or without a TUN or certificate of compliance) in 2020 and 2021. Metrorail must specify mitigations and corrective actions for each project that did not comply with this process to address the hazards and risks introduced due to a lack of compliance with the process and to address any other hazards identified during the assessment of each project.</p>
WMSC-21-C0119	01/27/23	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Safety sensitive physicals are not conducted as required by Metrorail policy, and Metrorail does not document or track when these physicals are due for all existing employees.
WMSC-21-C0120	07/18/25	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Metrorail ignores the minimum daily release period (rest period) requirements in its Fatigue Risk Management Policy. Metrorail must comply with its fatigue management policies. OHAW, SAFE and other departments must share information related to fatigue policy implementation and trends in order to improve safety.
WMSC-21-C0121	10/25/24	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	There is not adequate access to, documentation of, or compilation of data for WMATA to assess compliance with its hours of service requirements. Metrorail must capture and maintain in a useable form all data necessary to assess hours of service compliance, must ensure that the data is accurate, and must utilize this data to identify and implement safety improvements.
WMSC-21-C0122	09/16/22	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	WMATA does not conduct safety sensitive physicals at the time of or soon after hire as required by its policies. Metrorail must implement a process that ensures that new employees are not permitted to act in a safety sensitive position until all required medical evaluations are completed and their safety sensitive medical card has been issued.

WMSC-21-C0123	12/30/22	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Not all safety sensitive employee position have fully documented and up-to-date physical and medical requirements. Metrorail must update its job descriptions to be full and complete, including all current medical and physical requirements to carry out the job. Metrorail must develop and implement a process for this and all future updates that ensures medical experts in departments such as Occupational Health and Wellness (OHAW) are consulted each time job descriptions for positions covered by WMATA's fitness for duty and related requirements are reviewed and updated.
WMSC-21-C0124	10/21/22	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Many follow up and random drug and alcohol tests required by Metrorail policies and federal regulations were not completed with no documented reason why the tests were missed. Metrorail must document and implement a step by step process to fully document the reason(s) why any test is not completed and must document when a delayed test has been conducted. Metrorail must assess any trends in tests that are not completed and address the root causes of those issues in order to improve compliance.
WMSC-21-C0125	12/16/22	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	WMATA does not have written criteria for post-incident testing and does not consistently implement post-event testing. Metrorail must document and disseminate the criteria for post-incident testing. Metrorail must ensure that all departments, employees and contractors understand that required testing must be completed, and that any requirement are included in Metrorail contracts. Metrorail must share safety event information with appropriate departments and must provide real-time accident information to OHAW staff or designate someone within SAFE to ensure the appropriate type of post-accident/incident test is completed.
WMSC-21-C0126	11/18/22	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Supervisors are not receiving reasonable suspicion training, as required by Metrorail policy and federal regulation. Metrorail must ensure that all personnel acting in a supervisory role receive reasonable suspicion training as soon as possible. Metrorail must designate a responsible individual for ensuring this is completed on an ongoing basis.
WMSC-21-C0128	12/30/22	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	WMATA does not have procedures to confirm that employees are consistently removed from service for positive drug and alcohol test results in a timely manner as required by federal regulations.
WMSC-21-C0129	06/21/24	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	WMATA does not have a documented procedure for and training to carry out fitness for duty checks prior to or during shifts on a regular basis for all covered employees as specified in the APTA fitness for Duty Standard.

WMSC-21-C0130	08/23/24	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not collect fitness for duty data in a manner that allows for identification, tracking and trending of issues.
WMSC-21-C0131	12/19/25	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not providing medical oversight of contractors and does not include any requirement in contracts that contractors meet WMATA medical, fatigue or hours of service standards.
WMSC-21-C0132	12/15/23	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	WMATA does not have a policy in place to test employees or contractors involved in a safety event who are hospitalized but conscious and providing consent.
WMSC-21-C0133	02/17/23	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not confirm the accuracy of new hires' self-reported list of prior DOT-covered employers.
WMSC-21-C0134	12/02/22	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail's 6000-Series rehabilitation program, including coupler overhaul work, was implemented by CMOR, CENV and CMNT without safety certification and approvals required by WMATA's SSCPP.
WMSC-21-C0135	08/26/22	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	SAFE approved 6000-Series scheduled maintenance program documentation that was incomplete and that did not match approved forms, and Metrorail did not comply with safety certification requirements defined in the SSCPP.
WMSC-21-C0136	12/02/22	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	6000 Series cars that underwent rehabilitation were put into service without approval by Metrorail's Safety Department. Metrorail must demonstrate that SAFE has approved the complete documentation specified in the SMP, including SAFE certification of coupler work, prior to each railcar returning to revenue service.
WMSC-21-C0137	12/02/22	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail removed the coupler overhaul from the 6000 Series scheduled maintenance program process without documenting that change or completing a review of that change by the Safety Certification Review Committee (SCRC).

WMSC-21-C0138	12/02/22	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not require or receive all necessary original equipment manufacturer documentation, parts or tools. Metrorail must establish procedures to ensure that WMATA contracts or otherwise works with the original equipment manufacturer as part of the development of purchase, rebuild, rehabilitation or overhaul programs to identify and supply any necessary special tools and parts.
WMSC-21-C0139	05/24/24	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	The 7000 Series rehabilitation and subsystems overhaul program is being developed without full SAFE coordination, involvement or approval.
WMSC-21-C0141	08/26/22	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not have adequate document control practices for car maintenance job plans.
WMSC-21-C0142	01/06/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not have a systematic process to ensure that railcar mechanics and engineers are trained for the specific tasks they are assigned to perform. Metrorail must establish the minimum training requirements to conduct each specific type of work on each specific railcar series. Metrorail must then develop and implement a process requiring regular supervisory checks of those certifications, which may include checks during the pick process and automatic notifications of expiring certifications. Metrorail must review the training required for mechanics, determine if refreshers or recurring training are necessary for each type, and define what requires a refresher.
WMSC-21-C0143	07/26/24	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not consistently follow a standard process to address wheels out-of-round, to prevent cars with wheels out-of-round from operating, and to identify and address the root causes of wheels out-of-round. Metrorail must implement a consistent procedure for reporting and addressing wheels out-of-round, including processes to identify and mitigate root causes and to prevent cars with wheels out-of-round from operating, and must train personnel appropriately, including any relevant guidance for wheel lathe operators and their supervisors on the depth of cuts.
WMSC-21-C0144	03/24/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not clearly define the proper use of engineering modification instructions (EMIs), service bulletins (SBs), and other railcar engineering change documents.

WMSC-21-C0145	05/24/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail utilizes multiple versions of the same inspection form that do not all include the same pass/fail criteria.
WMSC-21-C0146	02/05/27	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail railcars do not include inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders in all operating compartments.
WMSC-21-C0147	02/17/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Part numbers are not being consistently entered in Maximo Work Orders for 7000 Series railcars.
WMSC-21-C0148	01/04/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Some WMATA job descriptions have not been reviewed in more than 20 years. Metrorail to develop and implement a procedure to ensure that job descriptions and responsibilities are reviewed on a specified regular basis to reflect current operating realities.
WMSC-21-C0149	11/30/22	<a href="#">FTA Safety Directive 16-5 from investigation to stop signal overruns; WMSC requested modification to FTA-RED16-003-B (8/15/2016)</a>	WMATA has not fully implemented sufficient protections against the unauthorized movement of trains with zero speed commands. This CAP specifically addresses an element of work related to Metrorail implementing stop and proceed mode on 2000 and 3000 Series railcars
WMSC-21-C0150	02/24/23	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not complying with its safety certification and approval requirements that are specified in its SSCPP before installing and placing traction power systems into service. Metrorail must follow its own safety certification processes outlined in Metrorail's SSCPP, including as it relates to Temporary Use Notices. (Also see C-0118).

WMSC-21-C0151	07/12/24	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not documenting, tracking and conducting all traction power preventive maintenance inspections that are required by WMATA policy, manuals and instruction.
WMSC-21-C0152	11/25/22	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail is relying on vital traction power equipment that is beyond its useful life and has not fully followed through on implementation of prioritized renewal plans to ensure a state of good repair. Metrorail must develop and fully implement plans and processes to ensure the traction power system is in and will remain in a state of good repair.
WMSC-21-C0153	08/26/22	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	There is inadequate awareness, documentation, interdepartmental coordination, training and supervisory oversight to ensure knowledge of and compliance with documented procedures. Metrorail must specify requirements for, develop and implement adequate initial and refresher training for all traction power personnel (frontline employees and supervisors/managers) to ensure that they have a complete understanding of and fully and accurately document the tasks, processes, procedures and other responsibilities that they are required to carry out. These requirements may vary based on position and role. Metrorail must establish and implement a process to ensure that engineering and operations departments collaborate to provide oversight of procedures, test results and other activities, such as regular spot checks.
WMSC-21-C0154	05/12/23	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Traction Power Maintenance employees do not get all required information and training to maintain equipment that they are directed to work on, and there is no process in place to ensure that personnel are trained on specific equipment prior to working on that equipment.
WMSC-21-C0155	09/30/22	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not effectively identifying, tracking and mitigating hazards related to high voltage and traction power. Metrorail must take definitive steps including training personnel to implement safety management systems principles such as hazard identification, tracking, mitigation and monitoring, and must develop, implement and monitor procedures to ensure that hazards are properly identified and addressed.
WMSC-21-C0156	04/24/26	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail is behind schedule on its floating slab testing to monitor for deterioration due to stray current. Metrorail must assess whether additional resources are needed to complete floating slab testing on schedule, and to ensure that the program continues as required. If such resources are required, Metrorail must implement the appropriate changes.
WMSC-21-C0157	11/18/22	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	The latest as-built schematics are not available in each traction power facility, as required by the TRPM-1000 and Metrorail preventive maintenance instructions.
WMSC-21-C0158	11/18/22	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not have a policy, process or procedure to ensure effective prioritization of corrective maintenance work orders

WMSC-21-C0159	05/26/23	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail risks equipment quality and availability issues that impact operational safety due to gaps in materials tracking, storage, and procurement practices.
WMSC-21-C0160	01/13/23	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail databases include many electrical tools that are beyond their required calibration dates.
WMSC-21-C0161	12/30/22	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Some WMATA job descriptions have not been reviewed in more than 30 years. Metrorail to develop and implement a procedure to ensure that job descriptions and responsibilities are reviewed on a specified regular basis to reflect current operating realities, current code requirements, and current regulatory requirements.
WMSC-22-C0162	01/17/25	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. Further, Metrorail's training requirements are insufficient to prepare personnel to respond to and/or manage emergencies within the NIMS/ICS framework. These deficiencies have contributed to ineffective and improper emergency response and emergency management. WMATA must develop and implement unified, Metrorail-wide procedures that comply with NIMS and ICS to provide for the safe and efficient resolution of incidents and emergencies, and ensure that these procedures apply and are used for all emergencies, regardless of whether external agencies are involved in an emergency response. Metrorail must provide adequate and ongoing training for all personnel who may act as incident commander or in another role in the unified command on the necessary skills to carry out those roles. Metrorail must review, update and provide training to all personnel on NIMS and ICS principles and requirements, and ensure adequate safety promotion efforts are in place to make the changes necessary to become NIMS compliant as an organization that responds to and manages emergencies in a coordinated and unified fashion.

WMSC-22-C0163	08/11/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>Metrorail created and implemented an “Incident Management Official” (IMO) position without documented training, responsibilities, communication or coordination, and without adequate staffing to ensure other emergency management and preparedness activities were not interrupted. Metrorail must define the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and tasks of each position in the emergency management and fire and life safety process, including (if it or a successor position continues to exist) the IMO/MAC. This must include clear definitions of what each role does and how those duties that are incorporated into each relevant procedure are accomplished, associated training requirements and curricula. Each person performing in those roles must be fully trained and qualified to serve in that capacity, and each person who may interact with those individuals must be trained on their own role, responsibility and authority. Metrorail must clearly communicate these responsibilities and authorities to all individuals who may fall under the incident command system.</p>
WMSC-22-C0164	01/12/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>MTPD personnel routinely enter the roadway despite not having RWP qualifications required by Metrorail rules and procedures, exposing themselves and others to the risk of serious injury or death. Metrorail must determine the appropriate level of RWP training and qualification for all MTPD personnel who may enter the roadway and ensure that those personnel receive and maintain that training and qualification required to ensure the safety of passengers, workers and first responders. Metrorail must also ensure that these personnel are appropriately trained on any other aspects of the emergency environment and procedures that they may need to carry out as part of their critical life-safety activities.</p>

WMSC-22-C0165	09/29/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>MTPD general orders do not reflect current operational realities and procedures, and areas for improvement from prior events are not effectively communicated to frontline MTPD personnel.</p> <p>Metrorail must review and update MTPD general orders to reflect current best practices for safety and to reflect current operational realities, rules and procedures, and provide training on each revision to ensure personnel have a clear and complete understanding of how to properly implement these processes. Metrorail must ensure that MTPD orders and procedures are regularly reviewed against the rules and procedures of other operational departments. Metrorail must also establish a process to compile and implement lessons learned from after action reports and incident debriefs and ensure that the information is clearly communicated to and understood by all MTPD and other Metrorail personnel and to ensure that they are incorporated into training and procedures. Metrorail must establish a documented process to evaluate the implemented improvements for effectiveness.</p>
WMSC-22-C0166	02/09/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>Metrorail's calls to public safety answering points (911 call centers) are inconsistent, incomplete and contribute to delayed or ineffective emergency response. Metrorail must, in consultation with 911 call centers and first responders in the region, develop a script for Metrorail 911 calls to guide personnel to clear and concise reporting in an effective manner understandable to 911 call takers, and a process to ensure that other relevant personnel are notified when the call is completed. Metrorail must establish initial and recurring training on this script and associated procedures, and must specify the personnel who are required to receive this training.</p>
WMSC-22-C0167	12/14/22	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>Metrorail has not clearly defined and communicated the authority and duties of its Fire Marshal and any other fire prevention roles or positions, and does not have effective continuity plans in the event the Fire Marshal is unavailable.</p>
WMSC-22-C0168	03/22/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>Metrorail does not ensure that experts in fire and life safety are included in and have a documented role in Metrorail project development, planning, review and approvals, which contributes to hazards being introduced into the Metrorail system or hazards being allowed to continue to exist without adequate mitigation.</p>

<p>WMSC-22-C0169</p>	<p>04/12/24</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</u></a></p>	<p>There is inadequate coordination among organizational units charged with developing, inspecting and maintaining critical fire and life safety assets, and there is no unified process to identify, prioritize and address fire and life safety risks. Metrorail must develop and implement a formal, integrated process for the inspection, maintenance and repair of fire and life safety and emergency management assets, including the process to receive, document and address safety issues identified by external entities such as jurisdictional fire departments and authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs). Metrorail must provide adequate training on these processes, including the requirements for how frontline employees are to gather, access and communicate information that is necessary to carry out the integrated inspection, maintenance and repair process. Metrorail must specify responsibilities, roles and required coordination for each position and department with responsibilities related to fire and life safety and emergency management and preparedness.</p>
<p>WMSC-22-C0170</p>	<p>08/11/23</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</u></a></p>	<p>Metrorail does not routinely conduct hazard assessments to evaluate and prioritize fire and life safety and emergency management issues. Further, Metrorail has not established a fire and life safety and emergency management hazard identification, tracking and open item resolution process for prioritizing and implementing safety improvements. Metrorail must establish, communicate and provide training on a process to ensure that all hazards and safety deficiencies identified by external and internal entities are tracked, addressed and reported. Metrorail must conduct regular hazard assessments to prioritize fire and life safety and emergency management issues, and must act on that assessment. The assessments must be conducted on a recurring basis, including current risk assessments, hazard identification, mitigation reviews, trend analysis and other documentation. Metrorail must act on these updated assessments to proactively prevent safety events and mitigate safety risks, including by tracking and resolving open items.</p>

WMSC-22-C0171	10/20/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>Emergency equipment in station medical cabinets is expired and covered in dirt. There is no inspection procedure or responsible party assigned to inspect and maintain this safety equipment. Metrorail must develop and implement a procedure to ensure regular, recurring inspections and maintenance of emergency medical cabinets (including gaskets or seals), and of equipment in emergency medical cabinets, and to ensure proactive replacement of expiring materials. Metrorail must assess whether the existing cabinets are fit for their current purpose and must act upon that assessment in accordance with Metrorail's safety certification and interdepartmental review processes.</p>
WMSC-22-C0172	04/07/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>Metrorail does not conduct systematic underground inspections to ensure safe egress and fire and life safety response, and has set minimum tunnel emergency lighting levels that are not compliant with NFPA minimum standards. Metrorail must develop and implement effective, systematic underground inspection processes by personnel with fire and life safety expertise to ensure safe egress, emergency preparedness and effective fire and life safety response. This must include review and approval of inspection criteria and requirements by subject-matter experts in fire and life safety, and a demonstration that all criteria comply with current NFPA standards.</p>
WMSC-22-C0173	03/27/26	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>The exit stairwell from Rosslyn Station is not protected from obstructions, which creates a risk that the hatch will not be able to be opened in an emergency, trapping customers inside. Metrorail must ensure that bollards or other appropriate physical protection are installed to prevent the blocking of this emergency exit. Metrorail must assess any similar locations elsewhere in the Metrorail system, and act on the findings of that assessment if any additional protections are required.</p>
WMSC-22-C0174	10/13/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	<p>Metrorail does not consistently inspect and maintain current certification status of all fire extinguishers, particularly those on the roadway. Metrorail must establish a comprehensive process to track, inspect, document maintenance and testing, and ensure replacement of expired fire extinguishers in the Metrorail system.</p>

WMSC-22-C0175	09/22/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail does not consistently perform or document all elements of its Fire & Intrusion Alarm System Inspection Preventive Maintenance Instructions. Metrorail must conduct all testing required by its procedures, and ensure that this testing is scheduled and completed on an ongoing basis by scheduling this work, by providing appropriate opportunities and documentation to conduct the work, and by effectively training assigned employees to conduct the work. Until testing is up to date, Metrorail must inventory overdue testing and prioritize work with appropriate urgency to ensure that the risks introduced by the failure to conduct required testing are mitigated as expeditiously as possible.
WMSC-22-C0176	03/15/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail has opportunities to improve and expand training and training coordination related to fire and life safety and emergency management.
WMSC-22-C0177	09/20/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	MTPD does not have a useable incident checklist for emergencies.
WMSC-22-C0178	09/27/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail fire and life safety signage is not consistent throughout the system.
WMSC-22-C0179	05/26/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail's organizational structure contributes to mismatches between fire and life safety and emergency management personnel and their responsibilities.
WMSC-22-C0180	04/14/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail does not assess and communicate radio system outages to MTPD officers.

WMSC-22-C0181	10/25/24	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> (4/7/22)	Elements of Metrorail have a culture that accepts noncompliance with written operational rules, instructions, and manuals. Metrorail must provide consistent supervisory oversight and effective training and safety promotion to ensure that personnel follow all rules and procedures, document compliance with rules and procedures, and ensure that the “just culture” and other principles embodied in the safety management system Metrorail has committed to in its Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) are implemented.
WMSC-22-C0182	10/25/24	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> (4/7/22)	Metrorail does not effectively identify, track, communicate and address operational hazards as required by its Agency Safety Plan. WMATA must develop, document and effectively communicate processes to ensure that hazards are identified, tracked, communicated and addressed on a consistent, ongoing basis. This must include the documentation, review and consideration of these hazards, risk ratings and mitigation plans by personnel from frontline workers and line managers through middle management and departmental leaders to ensure that all reported hazards, even those reported verbally to frontline or middle managers, are documented, tracked and appropriately managed. Metrorail must assess all locations (towers, terminals, etc.) with digital control boards to determine whether adequate protections are in place and available to ensure safety of personnel, and must address any improvements required and ensure that such improvements are incorporated into all future similar projects.
WMSC-22-C0183	06/28/24	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> (4/7/22)	Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard.
WMSC-22-C0184	10/25/24	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> (4/7/22)	Metrorail has inadequate internal communication, coordination and processes to effectively manage change as required by its PTASP, the WMSC and the FTA. Metrorail must develop and implement effective processes to manage change and risk as specified in its PTASP.

WMSC-22-C0185	10/27/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail is not effectively training and certifying personnel authorized to operate trains on all active railcar fleets. Metrorail must institute sufficient, specific, specialized certification training and standards to operate each type of revenue vehicle, and must provide that training, refresher training, and certification to each individual who may operate a vehicle in revenue service. Metrorail must ensure that only those individuals trained and certified on that type of vehicle operate the vehicle. Metrorail must develop and implement a program that provides for the appropriate availability of trains for required training and certification.
WMSC-22-C0186	12/30/22	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail is not meeting its operational refresher training and recertification requirements. Metrorail must develop and implement a plan to meet all of its training and certification requirements. Metrorail must also develop and implement a procedure to ensure only certified and trained personnel are working, and to ensure that any personnel not meeting training and certification requirements are not acting in roles they are not fully trained and certified on. Metrorail must ensure that all documents, such as SOP 406-01, are reviewed and updated in a timely fashion as required by Metrorail procedures.
WMSC-22-C0187	08/25/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail has not documented procedures for terminal supervisors, and has not established the effective formal training for terminal supervisors needed to safely perform their duties.
WMSC-22-C0188	05/05/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail does not have documented criteria to determine student proficiency in practical demonstrations of safety critical operational tasks.
WMSC-22-C0189	07/25/25	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail does not ensure personnel serving as on-the-job training instructors, including those personnel described as line platform instructors (LPis), are effective and have specific training and direction on what to teach and how to assess their assigned students.
WMSC-22-C0190	01/13/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail does not provide safety oversight of all safety equipment that is or may be past its calibration date that may be in use by operations personnel. Metrorail must provide safety oversight of and adequately train operations personnel on requirements for all safety equipment that is or may be past its calibration date to ensure that only properly calibrated safety equipment is in use.
WMSC-22-C0191	08/18/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Some RTRA QA/QC audits contain conclusions that do not match actual conditions. RTRA's QA/QC procedures do not include complete work instructions for all audits or specific instructions for removing personnel from service.

WMSC-22-C0192	04/14/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail closes internal corrective actions and identified issues, including those related to RTRA QA/QC audits, without fully identifying or completing required improvements or changes. Metrorail must develop and implement a process to ensure that when a potential systemic improvement is identified it is integrated into its safety risk management and corrective action process to ensure effective, Metrorail-wide implementation. Metrorail must provide training on root cause analysis and systemic corrective actions to each individual in the organization who is responsible for that process. Metrorail must ensure that corrective actions are only closed when the systemic safety improvement is completed and fully documented.
WMSC-22-C0193	09/15/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	With frequent modifications due to temporary and permanent orders, and outdated versions of Metrorail's rulebook being distributed to personnel when hard copies are available, the latest Metrorail rules are not easily accessible to train operators. This creates document control issues and makes a rule requiring personnel to carry the latest version of the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) unrealistic. Metrorail must ensure that only current copies of the rulebook are available and in use. Metrorail must provide operational employees with immediate access to the current rules relevant to their work during their work assignments, including any modifications due to temporary or permanent orders.
WMSC-22-C0194	12/16/22	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail does not conduct effective oversight of training instructors. Metrorail must require and implement consistent, effective supervisory oversight of training instructors, including of their work in the field.
WMSC-22-C0195	08/02/24	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail operations departments do not have effective processes to consider and act upon safety input from employees at all levels of the organization.
WMSC-22-C0196	05/26/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail has an opportunity to improve training by assigning dedicated instructors to each division.
WMSC-22-C0197	02/24/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Interlocking operators are authorized to hand crank switches, are not being certified to take this action.
WMSC-22-C0198	09/22/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations</a> <a href="#">(4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail has an opportunity to improve the integrity of its certification process by establishing a procedure providing for QA/QC personnel to be certified by an entity other than their own colleagues.

WMSC-22-C0199	11/29/24	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail has not developed and implemented a comprehensive water intrusion and remediation program covering stations, elevators and escalators, which contributes to damage and deterioration of structures and other assets, to electrical hazards and to other safety risks.
WMSC-22-C0200		<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail does not consistently communicate and follow its procedures governing change management and requiring interdepartmental coordination. Metrorail must ensure that its change management procedures are followed to prevent future changes to stations, elevators and escalators from introducing hazards to the Metrorail system. As part of this effort, Metrorail must ensure that all frontline, supervisory and management employees with responsibilities related to these areas are provided with initial and recurring training appropriate to their roles and responsibilities on change management principles, procedures and requirements to ensure proper review and coordination on the identification and treatment of hazards. This must include examples of issues that must be elevated to management and that must be reviewed by other departments. This training must be consistent with WMATA's established change management processes in the PTASP and related procedures.
WMSC-22-C0201		<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail is not ensuring that ELES personnel work only on the specific types of equipment that they are trained to inspect, maintain, and repair. Metrorail must ensure that all personnel who may work on an elevator or escalator have all necessary training. This must include providing the training on current models and each new model installed, tracking that training, and establishing processes to ensure that personnel have the necessary training to safely carry out each assigned task.
WMSC-22-C0202	06/23/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail has not reviewed its ELES standard operating procedures on a regular basis as required by WMATA policy, and has conflicting procedures for elevator and escalator employees. Metrorail must review and update all ELES procedures as required by WMATA policies. Metrorail must implement a log and/or other system to ensure that each procedure is reviewed as required in the future.
WMSC-22-C0203	07/14/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail does not clearly define what helpers (entry-level ELES personnel) are authorized to do or prohibited from doing, including whether helpers are permitted to work alone and any restrictions required to ensure that work is done safely.

WMSC-22-C0204	09/08/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail does not ensure that ELES personnel sign in on log books as required by WMATA SOP to ensure their safety.
WMSC-22-C0205	04/28/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail has not maintained a formalized, documented training process for ELES mentors (on-the-job training instructors) who play a key role in the training of entry-level ELES personnel.
WMSC-22-C0206	04/28/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail began new inspections referred to as “visual” or “routine” ELES inspections prior to finalizing, communicating and formally implementing an effective procedure. Metrorail must define procedures and standards for all ELES inspection and maintenance work, and provide all necessary training on those procedures to all relevant personnel.
WMSC-22-C0207	09/08/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	ELES Supervisors are not completing all aspects of required quality assurance (QA) checks. Metrorail must include training requirements on QA checks for all ELES supervisors, and must ensure that these QA checks are being properly completed.
WMSC-22-C0208	11/18/22	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail has an opportunity to improve safety by ensuring an adequate number of trained personnel are available to perform tasks that are assigned to Plant Maintenance.
WMSC-22-C0209	02/24/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail has effective training instructors for ELES personnel, however their experience does not match the written requirements for the positions.
WMSC-22-C0210	02/24/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail has an opportunity to improve data collection and analysis necessary under its Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) by providing more PLNT and ELES personnel with improved, formal training on the use of Metrorail’s maintenance management information system (Maximo).
WMSC-22-C0211	03/17/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail can improve the safety of escalators by formalizing procedures to ensure that escalators are regularly operated opposite their normal direction when safe to do so.

WMSC-22-C0212	02/16/24	<a href="#">Improper Power Restoration Order (5/17/2022)</a>	<p>CAP required due to Metrorail not effectively implementing change under C-0037 that was required to lead to additional protections to ensure that third rail power is not restored prematurely including, but not limited to, ensuring that managers and leadership permit all power restoration checklists and procedures to be followed to be certain that power is only restored when it is safe to do so. These additional protections in this revised corrective action plan include providing an independent approval from an appropriately qualified employee so that safe power restoration is always placed ahead of service metrics such as on-time performance. Revisions required in this CAP include necessary IT upgrades to ensure that power is only restored when it is safe to do so, demonstration of use of all current, available features that should be used to improve safety, a schedule for implementation, implementation of adequate Power Desk staffing, compliance with Metrorail's Fatigue Risk Management policies, medical examinations, revisions to procedures to address identified safety issues and concerns raised by Metrorail personnel, appropriate initial and refresher training on power restoration procedures and systems, supervisory oversight and cultural improvement changes, and SMS implementation for traction power personnel. In addition, Metrorail restarted its safety certification process for the Power Desk.</p>
WMSC-22-C0213		<a href="#">ATC Room inspection, maintenance and cleaning program (8/4/2022)</a>	<p>Metrorail has an ineffective and insufficient inspection, maintenance and cleaning program for Automatic Train Control equipment, particularly including a lack of required tools, procedural compliance, and supervisory oversight for care of vital equipment housed in train control rooms, and is not maintaining the structural integrity of these ancillary rooms. Corrective action plan designed to address training, supervisory oversight, required equipment, required processes and procedures, hazard identification and mitigation, and analysis and trending of safety data,</p>