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WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0188 – Collision, Customer Fatality – near Brookland-CUA Station – May 15, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on November 15, 2022

Safety event summary:

A member of the public who had entered the Metrorail tracks was struck and killed by a train between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood stations on May 15, 2022, at approximately 2:01 p.m. During the investigation into this event, it was learned that at the time of the event the Train Operator was not aware that their train had struck a person. Metrorail later discovered the individual on the roadway.

At approximately 2:02 p.m., the Train Operator of Red Line Train 104, unaware that they had made contact with the citizen, reported to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) that an inter-car barrier on their consist had become unattached while traveling on track 2 toward Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station. The ROCC Rail Traffic Controller instructed the Train Operator to reattach the barrier when the train arrived at Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station. At 2:06 p.m., the Train Operator discovered the inter-car barrier was in two pieces and advised the ROCC Controller that they were unable to secure it back in place and the train may have struck something. Two minutes later, the Train Operator reported they were able to semi-secure the inter-car barrier. The ROCC Controller permitted the Train Operator to continue operation and did not order a track inspection to address the Operator's concern that they may have struck something. An Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) Mechanic was dispatched to meet the train at Gallery Place Station to assist.

At approximately 2:12 p.m., the Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station Manager reported an emergency on the roadway to a Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) Information Controller. A Train Operator, who was not operating, but had been a passenger on Train 104 reported that after exiting the train while walking on the platform at Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station, a member of the public entered the platform from the roadway and stated another person that they were with on the roadway had been struck by a train. After receiving notification from the ROIC Information Controller, the Radio Rail Traffic Controller directed the Train Operator of Train 105 on track 2 at Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station to hold at that station. The Button Rail Traffic Controller notified the ROCC Assistant Operations Manager and dispatched an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor.

At approximately 2:16 p.m. a ROIC Information Controller notified District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) communications. During the event, Incident Command was established by both DCFEMS and Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), contrary to the framework set forth in the National Incident Management System, which allows for multiple incident command locations, but only one incident commander. DCFEMS arrived at Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station at approximately 2:28 p.m. and Incident Command was established by MTPD at Brookland-CUA Station at approximately 2:34 p.m. Trains 105 and 111 were offloaded to conduct initial track inspections. The Train Operator of Train 111, track 1 and the Train Operator of Train 105, track 2, reported clear track inspections. Later, Metrorail conducted another track inspection of the same area with a Train Operator and other personnel in the operating cab. At 2:46 p.m., approximately 45 minutes after the event occurred, an RTRA Supervisor, who was aboard Train 106 with MTPD personnel, reported the person struck was located on the roadway. The ROCC

Controller designated the RTRA Supervisor On-Scene Commander. This is not in accordance with Metrorail's emergency response procedures, including because MTPD personnel were present at the location.

At 2:50 p.m., third-rail power was deenergized by the ROCC on track 2 and at 2:53 p.m. power was deenergized by the ROCC on track 1 and Train 106 powered down. At approximately 3:08 p.m., the RTRA Supervisor was granted Foul Time on tracks 1 and 2 to confirm power was deenergized. Due to concern of lightning in the area, on-scene WMATA personnel refused to place the Warning Strobe and Alarm Device (WSAD), which is required to confirm third rail power is deenergized. DCFEMS personnel entered the roadway and at 3:17 p.m. confirmed the person was deceased.

At approximately 4:01 p.m. the Brookland Incident Commander reported all personnel were clear from the roadway and turned the scene over to MTPD. At 7:38 p.m. MTPD turned the scene over to RTRA and third-rail power was reenergized on tracks 1 and 2 at 8:20 p.m.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was an unauthorized person entering the roadway. A contributing factor was the lack of visibility in the tunnel where the collision occurred.

Corrective Actions:

WMATA conducted an after-action review with and distributed Lessons Learned to ROCC personnel regarding SOP 1A.

All Rail Traffic Controllers attended refresher training on SOP 11, train collision.

Metrorail will review and update procedures as needed to ensure track inspections from rail vehicles are performed in a consistent manner.

WMSC staff observations:

The WMSC's 2022 Audit of WMATA Emergency Management and Fire and Life Safety Programs included a recommendation regarding MTPD not having a usable incident checklist for emergencies. Under the CAP created to address this recommendation WMATA committed to developing a checklist for MTPD officers to use during emergency response in relation to the establishment and transfer of incident command in the Metrorail system. The expected completion date for the CAP is September 2023.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I – E22300

Date of Event:	05/15/2022
Type of Event:	A-1 Fatality (Person Struck by Train)
Incident Time:	14:02 hours
Location:	Between Brookland-CUA & Rhode Island Avenue Stations, Track #2 at Chain Marker (CM) B2 192+00
Time and How received by SAFE:	14:15 hours – SAFE/MAC
WMSC Notification Time:	14:22 hours (Event Scene Release issued)
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) WMSC: No Other: No
Rail Vehicle:	L3154-3155x3128-3129x3248-3149T
Injuries:	Fatal Injury of one person
Damage:	Inter-Car Barrier – Rail Car 3154
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA), Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT), DC Fire & EMS (DCFEMS)
SMS I/A Number	20220515#100345

Brookland-CUA Station – Person Struck by Train

May 15, 2022
Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAR	After Action Report
AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
AOM	Assistant Operations Manager
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CENV	Vehicle Program Services
CM	Chain Marker
CMNT	Office of Car Maintenance
COMR	Office of Radio Communications
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
ERT	Emergency Response Team
FLO	Fire Liaison Officer
MAC	Mission Assurance Coordinator
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OM	Operations Manager
OSC	On-Scene Commander
ROIC	Rail Operations Information Center
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SM	Station Manager
SMS	Safety Measurement System
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission
WSAD	Warning Strobe and Alarm Device

Executive Summary

On Sunday, May 15, 2022, at approximately 14:02 hours, Red Line Train ID 104 (L3154-3155x3128-3129x3248-3149T), track 2 traveling in the direction of Rhode Island Avenue Station, reported to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) that the inter-car barrier became unattached when they exited the portal between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Avenue Stations. The Train Operator conducted a ground walk around the consist and discovered inter-car barrier unattached and damaged on the lead car 3154. The RTC instructed the Train Operator to reattach the inter-car barrier upon arrival at Rhode Island Avenue Station. After inspection of the inter-car barrier at Rhode Island Avenue Station the Train Operator reported that they were unable to secure the inter-car barrier and they may have struck something; the inter-car barrier was in two pieces.

At approximately 14:08 hours, the RTC inquired if the train was safe to move. The Train Operator responded that the barrier was semi-secured, and they were able to continue train operation. At approximately 14:09 hours, the RTC instructed an Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) Road Mechanic (RM) to stand by at Gallery Place Station for Train ID 104 to inspect the inter-car barrier.

At approximately 14:12 hours, the Station Manager (SM) located at Rhode Island Avenue Station contacted the Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) and reported an emergency on track two. A second Train Operator, who alighted from Train 104, reported that a customer entered the platform from the roadway and informed them that someone was hit by a train.

At approximately 14:13 hours, the RTC instructed Train ID 105 to hold at Brookland-CUA Station, track 2. At approximately 14:17 hours, Rail Supervisor #1 was instructed to stand by at Metro Center Station, track 2 for Train ID 104 to inspect for damage to the inter-car barrier. At approximately 14:19 hours, Rail Supervisor #1 reported that the inter-car barrier was not properly secured.

At approximately 14:20 hours, the RTC instructed Train ID 105 to offload their train and perform a track inspection between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Avenue Stations, track 2. At approximately 14:23 hours, the RTC instructed Train ID 111 to offload their train and perform a track inspection between NoMa-Gallaudet and Rhode Island Avenue Stations, track 1. Train ID 105 reported a clear track inspection at approximately 14:37 hours and Train ID 111 reported a clear track inspection at approximately 14:38 hours.

At approximately 14:37 hours Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 1A was established with MTPD and Rail Supervisors #2 and #3 located at Brookland-CUA Station. At approximately 14:43 hours, Train ID 106 was instructed to conduct a track inspection with MTPD and Rail Supervisor #3 between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Avenue Stations, track 2. At approximately 14:46 hours, Rail Supervisor #3 reported that a person was located with no signs of life at CM B2 192+00.

Review of the Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) confirmed that at approximately 13:46 hours, two customers alighted Train ID 103 at Brookland-CUA Station, track 2. The two customers remained on the platform, sitting on a platform bench, and walking back and forth near the eight-car marker.

At approximately 13:53 hours, the two customers walked past the marked end-gate exiting the platform and entered the roadway from track 1. The customers walked between tracks one and two, in the direction of Rhode Island Avenue Station. They were last seen walking towards the portal on track 2 until they were no longer visible. Train ID 104 left the Brookland-CUA platform at approximately 14:01 hours and subsequently struck one person near the mid-point of the tunnel between the two stations. The second person on the roadway was not struck. After the event, they crossed over to track 1 and ran to the platform at Rhode Island Avenue station where they encountered the second Train Operator and reported the event.

While they did not contribute to the person being struck by the train, there were several findings related to the response and recovery phases of the event that are highlighted in the following sections.

There were no other reported injuries to persons aboard the train, the second person on the roadway, or WMATA personnel. RTRA removed the Train Operator from service for post-incident toxicology testing and subsequent MTPD interview. The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) authorized the Event Scene Release (ESR) at 20:20 hours.

The probable cause of the Brookland/Rhode Island Avenue Station person struck by train event was an intentional action by the person to bypass gates marked as “No Trespassing” to enter the rail right-of-way where they encountered Train ID 104 and encroached into the dynamic envelope of the train.

Incident Site

CM B2 192+00 – Between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Avenue Stations, track 2

Field Sketch/Schematics



Figure 1 – This image shows the approximate location where the customer was struck by Train ID 104.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Person Struck by Train event between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Avenue Stations on May 15, 2022, SAFE engaged with a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct a subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment

- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed six individuals as part of this investigation. Interviews included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the following individuals:
    - (4) Train Operators
    - (2) Rail Traffic Controllers

- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Note: Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event and an informal interview was conducted with the following:
    - On-Scene Commander

- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
    - Employee Training Procedures & Records
    - Train Operator Certifications
    - Train Operator 30-day Work History
    - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
    - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data
    - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
    - Maximo Data
    - Office of Radio Communications (COMR)
    - Vehicle Program Services (CENV)
    - Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) post-incident inspection data
    - Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Incident report
    - Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) report
    - After-Action Report (AAR)
    - Maximo Workorder Report

- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems and Open MHz. This data includes:
    - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
    - Open MHz
    - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
    - ROCC Spots Report

- Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

Investigation

On Sunday, May 15, 2022, at approximately 13:46 hours, two customers exited Train ID 103, track 2 onto the platform at Brookland-CUA Station. The customers remained on the platform, sitting on a platform bench, then walking back and forth near the eight-car marker. At approximately 13:53 hours, the two customers passed the marked end-gate and entered the roadway from the track 1 side of the platform. The customers walked in between tracks one and two, in the direction of Rhode Island Avenue Station. They were last seen walking towards the portal on track 2 until they were no longer visible. At approximately 14:00 hours, Train ID 104 entered and serviced the platform at Brookland-CUA Station. This was the first train to pass the area that the two customers were last seen.

Select Platform: B05-2 and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
Select Date: May 15 2022 Select Times (0-24HRS): From 13:00 To 15:00
Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwell	Left door open	Left door close	dwell	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Headway door open to door open
101	B05-2	6	12				13:03:47	13:04:07	20	13:03:14	13:04:30	3024-3025.3197-3196.3286-3287	-
114	B05-2	6	12				13:20:59	13:21:11	12	13:20:24	13:21:35	3131-3130.3054-3055.3105-3104	17:12
102	B05-2	6	12				13:33:37	13:33:52	15	13:33:01	13:34:15	3057-3056.3132-3133.3049-3048	12:38
103	B05-2	2	12				13:46:38	13:46:59	21	13:46:08	13:47:22	6072-6073.6023-6022.6024-6025	13:01
104	B05-2	6	12				14:00:40	14:00:58	18	14:00:06	14:01:28	3249-3248.3129-3128.3155-3154	14:02
105	B05-2	6	12				14:14:19	14:19:04	285	14:13:45	14:22:40	3039-3038.2014-2015.3241-3240	13:39
106	B05-2	6	12				14:29:02	14:40:34	692	14:28:32	14:44:46	3021-3020.3185-3184.3223-3222	14:43

Figure 2 – ROCC Spots Report depicting the arrival and departure times at Brookland-CUA Station for Train ID's 103 and 104 within the time of the incident.

At approximately 14:02 hours, Train ID 104, track 2 traveling in the direction of Rhode Island Avenue Station, entered the portal between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Avenue Stations. Upon exiting the portal, the Train Operator reported to ROCC that the inter-car barrier on lead car 3154 had become detached. Train ID 104 traveled at approximately 31 mph and properly berthed at the 8-car maker at Rhode Island Avenue Station. Upon inspection at Rhode Island Avenue Station, the Train Operator reported that they were unable to completely secure the barrier; it had separated into two pieces and advised that the train was able to continue in service. The RTC contacted the CMNT Road Mechanic to inspect the inter-car barrier on Train ID 104. Train ID 104 continued in service from Rhode Island Avenue Station.

Figure 3 – Train ID 104 traversing CM B2 192+00 at approximately 14:02 hours.

At approximately 14:12 hours, the SM located at Rhode Island Avenue Station contacted the ROIC and reported that there was an emergency on track two. The second Train Operator who had been riding on Train ID 104, who alighted after cushioning (riding) to Rhode Island Avenue Station, reported that a customer returned to the platform from the roadway and informed them that someone was hit by a train. At approximately 14:13 hours, Train ID 105 was instructed to hold at Brookland-CUA Station, Track 2.

At approximately 14:18 hours, the RTC instructed Train ID 105 and Train ID 111 to offload their trains to perform a track inspection on Tracks 1 and 2 in the area of Rhode Island Avenue Station. At approximately 14:19 hours, the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) communications dispatched EMS personnel to Rhode Island Avenue Station for a person struck by a train after receiving a notification from the ROCC. At approximately 14:28 hours, Train IDs 105 and 111 reported no findings. Medical Units arrived and MTPD personnel were in place at Rhode Island Avenue Station and Brookland-CUA Station.

At approximately 14:36 hours, SOP 1A was established and a request for a second track inspection was made through MTPD Mobile Command. ROCC initially denied the second track inspection on track 2. After discussion between the ROCC Management Team and the On-Scene Commander, Train ID 106 was given permission to perform the second track inspection. At approximately 14:43 hours, Train ID 106 departed Brookland -CUA Station with RTRA Supervisor #3 and MTPD personnel onboard. At approximately 14:46 hours, the track inspection resulted in confirmation of a person struck with no signs of life at CM B2 192+00, in the 9th Street tunnel.

At approximately 14:50 hours, third rail power was de-energized on Track 2 to commence the investigation and recovery of the decedent. At approximately 14:53 hours, third rail power was de-energized on Track 1.

Figure 4 – Third-rail power de-energized on track 2 at 14:50 hours and on track 1 at 14:53 hours.

At approximately 14:59 hours, DCFEMS upgraded their call for service and requested Special Operations Units to respond to Brookland-CUA Station for recovery efforts for the decedent. At approximately 15:17 hours DCFEMS confirmed the person was deceased. At approximately 16:02 hours, DCFEMS personnel were clear and the recovery scene was relinquished to MTPD. At approximately 16:20 hours, representatives from the District of Columbia Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) responded and worked with MTPD's Crime Scene Search (CSS) Unit to process and document the event scene. At approximately 16:46 hours, Train ID 104 was re-blocked to Train ID 704 and transported to Glenmont Yard for post-incident investigation.

At approximately 19:30 hours, the recovery efforts were completed, and the decedent was removed from the location. At approximately 19:38 hours, the all-clear was given and the recovery scene was relinquished to RTRA. RTRA Rail Supervisor #2 requested foul time to continue clean-up efforts with the Emergency Response Team (ERT) between CM B2 192+00 to B2 204+00. At approximately 20:15 hours, the Rail Supervisor #2 relinquished foul time and asked for third rail power restoration on tracks 1 and 2 between Rhode Island Avenue and Brookland-CUA Stations. At approximately 20:20 hours, third rail power was restored, and normal service resumed.

There were no other reported injuries to persons aboard the train, the second person on the tracks, or WMATA personnel. RTRA removed the Train Operator from service for post-incident toxicology testing and subsequent MTPD interview. The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) authorized the Event Scene Release (ESR) at 20:20 hours.

An analysis of data collected from the system data recording and documentation review determined that no safety deficiencies related to any WMATA station facility or rail vehicle failures contributed to the person being struck by the train. An examination of VMS data revealed that the Train Operator of Train ID 104 was operating below the regulated speed before striking the person.

Upon discovery by the Train Operator of the damage inter-car barrier, the Train Operator secured the barrier with zip-ties to ensure there would not cause injury to any employees or customers while enroute to Shady Grove.

A review of the incident response actions revealed minimal challenges with the transfer of command between ROCC, MTPD and DCFEMS once established. There were findings related to non-compliance to the SOP 1A Command, Control, and Coordination of emergencies.

Chronological Event Timeline
A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
14:02:44 hours	Train ID 104: Train 104, approaching the 8-car marker at Rhode Island Avenue Station, track 2. Radio RTC: You have a permissive block to the 8-car marker Rhode Island Avenue. Train ID 104: My outer, train connector is unattached. While coming out of the… In approach to Rhode Island, permission to attach properly. Radio RTC: You have permission, platform side only to reattach the inter-car barrier. Train ID 104: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:06:38 hours	Train ID 104: Unable to secure the outer-car barrier at this time, might have hit something, I'm not sure, maybe the ETS Box it's inspected and separated into two pieces. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and repeated. Car equipment will check it out. Is it safe for train movement? [Radio]
14:08:41 hours	Radio RTC: 104, is it safe for train movement? Train ID 104: I was able to semi-attach it so that it doesn't go flying coming into a station. I'm about to close and continue. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio]
14:09:01 hours	Radio RTC: Contacts MTPD dispatcher to notified them of the Person Struck at Brookland CUA Train Station.
14:09:09 hours	MTPD Dispatcher: Dispatched units to respond to Brookland CUA Train Station.
14:09:13 hours	Radio RTC: CMNT what's your location? Road Mechanic: Gallery Place. Radio RTC: Next train on Track 2, 104 check the lead car inter-car barrier. Road Mechanic: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:12:38 hours	SM Rhode Island Avenue: There's an emergency on track two. A Train Operator is reporting someone was hit by the train and a guy came off track two. The Train Operator is in the kiosk, they were cushioning. You need to stop the train on Track 2. ROCC ROIC: Acknowledged. [Phone]
14:13:12 hours	ROCC ROIC: Stop the train on track two on Rhode Island Avenue, someone was possibly hit by the train. Button RTC: Track 2, 105? ROCC ROIC: Yes. Button RTC: Ok. [Phone]
14:13:29 hours	Radio RTC: Train ID 105, hold at Brookland, track 2. Train ID 105: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:13:30 hours	Button RTC notification to the ROCC Assistant Operations Manager (AOM). [Phone]

Time	Description
14:15:16 hours	Button RTC: Head to Rhode Island for a report of a person struck by a train. RTRA Supervisor #1: Acknowledged. [Phone]
14:17:06 hours	RTRA Supervisor #1: Hold the train at Metro Center, track 1. Radio RTC: Negative, make contact with the next train on track 2 Metro Center, Train ID 104. [Radio]
14:18:10 hours	Radio RTC: Train ID 105, offload your train, confirm when clear. Train ID 105: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:19:00 hours	DCFEMS: Dispatched EMS Unit 12 to Rhode Island Avenue Station. [Open Mhz]
14:19:04 hours	Button RTC notification to MTPD. [Phone]
14:19:51 hours	Radio RTC: Train ID 104, could have made contact with a person. RTRA Supervisor #1: I am at the eight-car marker, the inter-car barrier is not all the way secure on the front of the train. [Phone]
14:20:36 hours	Train ID 105: All clear of customers. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. Train ID 105, perform a track inspection, track 2 Brookland to Union Station. Train ID 105: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:23:04 hours	Radio RTC: Train ID 111, restricted speed to NoMa. Offload and perform track inspection on track one. Train ID 111: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:28:00 hours	DCFEMS: EMS Unit 12 advised that they were on the scene with MTPD and WMATA personnel looking for the customer. [Open MHz]
14:28:54 hours	Train ID 105: Reported nothing found during track inspection. [Radio]
14:30:31 hours	Train ID 111: All clear of customers. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. Train ID 111, perform a track inspection, track 1 NoMa to Brookland. Train ID 111: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:31:37 hours	Road Mechanic: Train ID 104 has a broken inter-car barrier on lead car 3154, its secure with tie-wraps, recommended out of service after revenue. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:36:02 hours	MTPD established Incident Command at Brookland-CUA Station. [MTPD 2X]
14:36:08 hours	RTRA Supervisor #2: MTPD is on the scene, they want to board Train ID 106. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. Train ID 106: MTPD is requesting to off-load at Brookland. Radio RTC: Stand-by until we get approval. Train ID 106: Acknowledged. [Radio]
14:37:27 hours	MTPD established Incident Command at Rhode Island Avenue Station. [MTPD 2X]

Time	Description
14:39:30 hours	Train ID 106: All clear of customers ready for track inspection. Radio RTC: You were never given permission to off-load customers, load the customers back on your train. Train ID 106: Acknowledged. [Radio]
14:43:56 hours	Radio RTC: Train ID 106, if you are still off-loaded board MTPD on the train and continue with your track inspection, let us know when MTPD is aboard the train. Train ID 106: MTPD is aboard the train, we're going to start the track inspection. [Radio]
14:46:47 hours	RTRA Supervisor #3: We have located a person in the tunnel at B2 192+00. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and repeated. Are you on Train ID 106? RTRA Supervisor #3: Yes, on Train ID 106. [Radio]
14:48:03 hours	RTRA Supervisor #3: There are no signs of life. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and repeated. You are the On-Scene Commander. RTRA Supervisor #3: Acknowledged and repeated. We also have MTPD on the train. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio]
14:49:19 hours	Radio RTC: B04-08, red. Train ID 106: Acknowledged and repeated. Radio RTC: Secure your hand brake. Train ID 106: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:50:40 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power de-energized on track 2 and blue block in place.
14:53:20 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power de-energized on track 1.
14:55:57 hours	Train ID 106: Hand brake secured. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. Handbrake secured, power down at your location. Train ID 106: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
14:57:00 hours	DCFEMS: Engine 6, Truck 4, Battalion Special Ops Rescue Squad 1, EMS 7, Safety Officer Battalion Chief Engine 24, Ambulance 4, and Medic 24 respond for a person struck by a train at Brookland Metro Station. [Open Mhz]
15:02:00 hours	AIMS playback showed human form in place on track 2.
15:03:20 hours	AIMS playback showed blue block and human form in place on track 1.
15:08:55 hours	RTRA Supervisor #3 was granted foul time and confirmed third rail power de-energized at CM B2 197+00. [Radio]
15:10:47 hours	RTRA Supervisor #3 was granted foul time and confirmed third rail power de-energized at CM B1 197+00. [Radio]
15:17:00 hours	DCFEMS: Confirmed the person was deceased.

Time	Description
15:33:00 hours	Emergency Response Team reported on duty at the incident Command Post. [Radio]
15:53:07 hours	RTRA Supervisor #4 was granted foul time and confirmed placement of WSAD at CM B2 205+00. [Radio]
16:01:03 hours	Brookland Incident Command reported Fire Department and all personnel were clear of the roadway and third rail power could be restored. [MTPD 2X]
16:02:43 hours	Brookland Incident Command reported Battalion Chief turned over the incident scene to MTPD. [MTPD 2X]
16:20:01 hours	RTRA Supervisor #2 reported that the Medical Examiner arrived for escort to the incident scene. [Radio]
16:38:40 hours	AIMS playback showed blue block and human form removed from track 1.
16:34:19 hours	Radio RTC: Announcement that power is being restored on track one Brookland to Rhode Island. [Radio]
16:45:00 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power energized on track 1.
17:09:24 hours	RTC advised that a down track circuit on track 1 prevented single tracking train operations. [Radio]
17:31:20 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power de-energized on track 1.
17:38:07 hours	RTRA Supervisor #3 was granted foul time and confirmed third rail power de-energized at CM B1 193+00. [Radio]
17:32:40 hours	AIMS playback showed blue block and human form in place on track 1.
18:27:59 hours	RTRA Supervisor #3 reported track 2 was clear of personnel and equipment. [Radio]
18:31:00 hours	AIMS playback showed blue block and human form removed from track 2.
18:40:20 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power energized on track 2.
18:44:06 hours	Radio RTC: Announcement that power is restored on track two Brookland to Rhode Island. [Radio]
18:49:45 hours	Train ID 106: Train is recharged, and hand brakes released. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio]
18:52:05 hours	Radio RTC: Train ID 706, you have an absolute block to Brookland track two. Train ID 706: Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio]
19:12:00 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power de-energized on track 2.
19:16:50 hours	RTRA Supervisor #3 confirmed third rail power de-energized at CM B2 192+00. [Radio]
19:18:00 hours	AIMS playback showed blue block and human form in place on track 2.
19:34:13 hours	RTRA Supervisor #3 reported all personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway. [Radio]
19:38:55 hours	RTRA Supervisor #2 reported MTPD turned the scene over to RTRA. ERT personnel will be heading to the roadway to begin cleaning at the incident site. [Radio]

Time	Description
20:15:00 hours	RTRA Supervisor #2 reported personnel and equipment clear from the roadway and relinquished foul time. [Radio]
20:20:40 hours	AIMS playback showed Third rail power energized on tracks 1 and 2.

***Note: Times above may vary from other system's timelines based on clock settings and reporting source.*

Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)

MTPD Event Report *(minor grammatical revisions and removal of gendered language)*

On 05/15/2022 at approximately 14:14 hours ROCC received a notification from a station manager at Rhode Island Ave (919 Rhode Island Ave NE) that a customer reported that [they] and [their sibling] were walking on the tracks and that [they] saw [their sibling] get struck by a train going in the direction of Glenmont. A call for service was sent out from MTPD Communications that one person was possibly struck by a train in between Rhode Island Ave and Brookland Metro Station in a tunnel. A report was given at the time by a light duty train operator riding on train 104 hearing a strike and the train operator utilizing the horn just prior. At approximately 14:22 hours a train was utilized on track #2 to do a track inspection with negative findings.

An MTPD Cruiser arrived on scene and conducted a second inspection at 14:44 hours with positive finding at 14:46 hours in the tunnel at chain marker B2 192+00. Third rail power was shut down on both tracks. Brookland and Rhode Island Metro Stations were then clear and outer perimeters created. DCFD arrived on scene. After inspection of the person struck, it was determined this would be a recovery effort and the scene was turned over to MTPD for recovery. Two MTPD Officers arrived on scene at approximately 15:19 hours. At approximately 15:31 MTPD Cruiser assumed the role of forward liaison and MTPD Cruiser as On Scene Command.

OCME was contacted regarding the person not showing any signs of life. WSAD's were placed on the third rail near the platform at the rear of train 106 and past the crime scene. At approximately 16:30, crime scene arrived to process the scene. OCME arrived to process the scene and recover the decedent at approximately 17:15. After OCME concluded processing the scene the decedent was recovered from being wedged between the third rail and the portal in the tunnel by OCME. A plan to remove the decedent was made by placing [them] on the train.

After further investigation from MTPD Criminal Investigations Division, the decedent was identified through law enforcement data bases. WSAD's were removed from behind the crime scene and behind train 106 at Brookland platform. ROCC confirmed nobody was on Track #2 and began the process of putting power back on for the 3rd rail on track #2. Once power was brought up after a brief intermission to confirm the tracks being clear. Once clear the train began to travel back to the Brookland platform to conclude the recovery.

Crime Scene continued to process the scene and exited at approximately 19:37. At 20:14 hours all MTPD personnel cleared from the scene.

After-Action Report (AAR)

MTPD Hot Wash (minor grammatical revisions and removal of gendered language)

It was not immediately clear what incident had occurred. There was an unconfirmed report of a person struck at Rhode Island Avenue and an erratic patron on the platform. When MTPD arrived on scene at Rhode Island Avenue the witness provided the necessary information to prompt an inspection for a person possibly struck in the tunnel between Rhode Island Avenue and Brookland.

Even though command had been established at Rhode Island Avenue and then transferred to Brookland, Rail Ops was countermanding Incident Command orders. MTPD IC ordered train 106 at Brookland be offloaded for an inspection. Rail Ops ordered the operator and Rail Supervisors on scene to reload the train and continue revenue service. MTPD IC communicated directly with the MAC to ensure Rail Ops understood ICS had been established. This resolved the communication problems but delayed effective inspections being conducted.

The first inspection on track 2 conducted by train 105 prior to MTPD arrival failed to locate the decedent who was located on track 2 and was highly visible. Subsequent inspections conducted by MTPD on both tracks located the decedent at B2 192+00. First responding MTPD units quickly established IC and assigned units for accountability. Once Brookland was determined to be the closest access point to the incident resources to include the fire department were re-directed to Brookland.

Rail did not immediately locate and remove the incident train and train operator from service. The train continued to Shady Grove Rail Yard and the train operator was taken for post incident testing prior to CID being able to interview the operator. Radio and cell phone communication with units at the incident scene (in tunnel) was intermittent. Single tracking was attempted but was not possible due to a track circuit failure. A bus bridge was in place for the duration of the scene.

When CSS was conducting secondary processing, WSADs were ordered to be set up at the incident location and at the platform on track 2. RTRA Supervisor and ERT Supervisor refused to set up the platform WSAD due to inclement weather in the area and stated they were required to wait 45 min. after observing lightning. This caused CSS/RTRA personnel to walk back to the platform on track not protected by a WSAD. MAC and Rail 1 were not aware of this procedure when contacted by MTPD IC.

Units away from the incident scene did a good job of locating and securing the incident train, involved operator, and additional witnesses. CID made prompt notification to the OCME speeding up the recovery process. CSS processing was delayed briefly due to only one CSS officer working and initially being sent to locate the incident train. An additional officer was called in to assist and the first responding CSS officer was redirected to the incident scene. A patrol officer was dispatched to secure the incident train. The distance to the incident location from Brookland increased the time it took to get resources and personnel to and from the incident location.

Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)

CMNT technicians inspected the incident consist for damage and found the following: Based on the under-car inspection of Rail Car 3154, CMNT found damage to the left inter-car barrier and a substantial amount of blood splatter and biological matter on the belly/undercarriage of Rail Car 3154. Rail Car 3154 was placed in the blow-pit and pressure washed.

The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR)

Adopted from CMOR Incident Investigation Team (IIT) report:
The analysis of the Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS) data shows that Train ID 104 left Brookland Station towards Rhode Island Avenue Station at 13:59:35 following this scripted timeline as follows. Train ID 104 departed B05-2, master controller in P5, limiting speed 55 mph, regulated speed 44 at 13:59:46 the train accelerates to 36 mph, master controller moved to P2, limiting speed to 55 mph, regulated speed 44 at 13:59:55 road horn activated, CM 199+29,speed 45 mph 13:59:57 road horn activated again, master controller moved to B4, speed 47 mph, limiting speed 55 mph, regulated speed 44 13:59:59 maximum speed of 50 mph reached 14:00:06 CM 192+00 (reported incident location), speed 43 mph, limiting speed 65 mph, regulated speed 44 at 14:01:18 master controller moved from B4 into coast, speed 39 mph. Balance of the trip to B04-2, master controller cycled primarily between coast and B1 until stopping at B04-2 and opening the doors.



Figure 5 – VMS data representing the speed and actions of Train ID 104 as it traveled between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Avenue Stations.

Time	Description
13:59:35 Hours	Train ID 104 departed Brookland (B05-2), in the direction of Rhode Island Avenue Station on track 2, traveling at speeds not exceeding 55 mph, master controller in P5.
13:59:46 Hours	Train ID 104 accelerates to 36 mph, master controller at P2, limiting speed to 55 mph, regulated speed to 44.
13:59:55 Hours	Horn activated, CM 199+29, speeds 45 mph.
13:59:57 Hours	Horn activated again, master controller moved to B4, speed 47 mph, limiting speed 55 mph, regulated speed 44 mph.
13:59:59 Hours	Max speed of 50 mph reached.

Time	Description
14:00:06 Hours	Train 104 reached CM B2 192+00 (reported incident), speed 43 mph, limited speed 65 mph, regulated speed 44.
14:01:18 Hours	The master controller moved from B4 into coast speed 39 mph.

NOTE: For the balance of the trip to B04-2, the master controller cycled primarily between the coast and B1 until stopping at B04-2 and opening the doors.

Initial Inspection of Train ID 105

The Train Operator of Train ID 105 conducted the initial track inspection on track 2 alone in the operating cab. MSRPH dictates a maximum inspection speed of 15 mph. As the train traversed the area of the decedent, it was traveling approximately 16 mph, stopped a short distance beyond the location, and continued until reaching Rhode Island Avenue Station and reporting a clear track inspection.



Figure 6 – VMS Representation of Train ID 105's inspection between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Avenue Stations.

Office of Radio Communication (COMR)

COMR conducted a comprehensive radio check on Track 1 and Track 2 between Brookland-CUA and Rhode Island Avenue Stations and could not identify any issues with the communication system. The communication system operated as designed.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the Fatality - Person Struck by a Train event , SAFE conducted six interviews via Microsoft Teams, including the Investigations Team and the WMSC. The interview identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings

detailed below include reported information from interviews and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

***Train Operator of Train ID 104*:**

- The Train Operator stated that they did not see anything out of the ordinary.
- The Train Operator reported feeling alert to their surroundings at the time of the incident.
- Train Operator stated that as they were exiting the portal towards Rhode Island Avenue Station they heard a contact noise and believed it to be an ETS box.
- Train Operator stated that there were no issues with the train prior to the incident.
- Train Operator stated that an inspection was conducted damage observed to the inter-car barrier and possible bodily fluids noticeable.

Train Operator (Inactive) riding aboard Train ID 104 in passenger area:

- The Train Operator stated that they were sitting in the front passenger compartment of the operator's cab area facing away from the front of the cab.
- The Train Operator stated that when the train entered the portal, they heard a loud bang on his side of the train.
- The Train Operator stated they stood up and could not visually see anything that was struck.
- The Train Operator stated that they informed the Train Operator that the inter-car barrier was broken in two pieces.
- The Train Operator stated that they inspected the front of the rail car and observed the barrier broken and a small amount of biological matter on the train.
- The Train Operator stated that while walking on the platform after Train 104 departed, a customer appeared from the track bed and reported that his sibling was hit by a train.
- The Train Operator stated that they accompanied the customer to the Station Manager to make proper notification.

NOTE: Based on available CCTV, the Train Operator was not stationed inside of the operating cab during this incident. The Train Operator was on the train in light duty capacity.

Train Operator of Train ID 105:

- The Train Operator stated that on approach to Brookland Station they heard the transmission of train ahead of them having issues with the inter-car barrier.
- The Train Operator stated that they were instructed to off-load their train to prepared for a track inspection.
- The Train Operator stated that they conducted a track inspection operating less than 15 mph and did not see anything.
- The Train Operator stated that they heard transmissions that a person was found after they performed a track inspection.
- The Train Operator stated that it is impossible for some operators to perform a track inspection due to the limited visibility from the operating cab while sitting down.
- The Train Operator stated that limited visibility in the portal and the lack of knowledge of what they were looking for caused delays.

Train Operator of Train ID 106:

- The Train Operator stated that at Silver Spring Station two RTRA Supervisors boarded their train.

- The Train Operator stated that they heard the transmission between ROCC and the Train Operator of Train ID 104.
- The Train Operator stated that they continued to Brookland Station where MTPD instructed them to off-load the train.
- The Train Operator stated that approximately 10 minutes later, ROCC granted permission to conduct the track inspection.
- The Train Operator stated that an RTRA Supervisor, MTPD Officer and MTPD Captain were inside the cab while the track inspection was conducted.
- Train Operator stated that they departed Brookland Station in direction of Rhode Island Avenue at restricted speed.
- The Train Operator stated that when they entered the portal, they reduced their speed to 5 MPH due to the sight adjustment (sunshine to dark) and then to 3 MPH speed.
- The Train Operator stated that they traveled approximately 20 feet into the portal when they observed the person on the roadway.
- The Train Operator stated that on two occasions, power was re-energized while emergency personnel were still performing recovery efforts.
- The Train Operator stated that the train was energized prior to receiving the power re-energization announcement from the ROCC.

ROCC Button RTC:

- The RTC stated that Train ID 104 stated that they needed to repair the inter-car barrier. They reported having trouble understanding their radio communication due to the Train Operator's accent.
- The RTC stated that the Train Operator was given permission to repair the barrier at the next station if the repair can be done on the platform side.
- The RTC stated that the Train Operator reported that the barrier was broken, and they were not able to secure it.
- The RTC stated that they received a phone call from ROIC reporting that someone was hit by a train.
- The RTC stated that they informed the ROCC AOM and OM of a person possibly struck by a train.
- The RTC stated that ROCC Management was notified of Train ID 104 broken inter-car barrier and this was possibly the train.
- The RTC stated that the oversight and guidance by ROCC Management was lacking and could have assured the continuity of SOP 1A and recovery efforts which would have eased the confusion and stress for the RTC's.
- The RTC stated that a lack of personnel caused communication delays, which resulted in a chaotic atmosphere in the ROCC during this incident. They further stated that assigned personnel during this incident were performing multiple tasks within the ROCC because of under staffing. RTC Buttons stated on occasion they would have to seek out a person of authority(manager) to help direct their actions during the incident.

ROCC Radio RTC:

- The RTC stated that they received a radio transmission from Train ID 104 regarding barriers being unsecure.
- The RTC stated that they could not fully understand the radio transmission due to the Train Operator's accent.

- The RTC stated they never heard the Train Operator transmit that they may have struck something.
- The RTC stated that they gave the Train Operator permission to inspect the barriers once they were properly berthed at Rhode Island Avenue Station.
- The RTC stated that the Train Operator reported that the inter-barrier was broken.
- The RTC stated that Car Maintenance reported securing the barrier with zip-ties.
- The RTC stated they received a call for a person struck by a train from the ROIC.
- The RTC stated that there was confusion in ROCC delaying additional track inspections and granting foul time for recovery.
- The RTC stated that they waited for confirmation from ROCC Management and would leave the desk to obtain answers for requests from the personnel in the field.
- The RTC stated that they made mistakes in appointing the On-Scene Commander once the scene was established.
- The RTC stated that the process for energizing and de-energizing power during the recovery was not followed by RTRA Supervisors. The RTC stated that the supervisors would call directly via the landline to request Foul-Time and not follow the proper procedure to make authorized request via radio communication.

Weather

On May 15, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 77°F, with clear skies at the time of the event. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – Location: Washington, DC.)

Human Factors

Evidence of fatigue: Train Operator

We evaluated conditions at the time of the incident to distinguish whether evidence of fatigue was present. Video of the incident was reviewed for behaviors suggesting fatigue. No indications of fatigue were evident from the video. The Train Operator reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The Train Operator reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk: Train Operator

The incident data was evaluated for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were not present. Since fatigue evidence and risk factors were not present, the biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Train Operator was not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- RTRA removed the Train Operator of Train ID 104 from service for post-incident toxicology testing.
- Train ID 104 was removed from service for post-incident inspection.
- ROCC deenergized third rail power between Rhode Island Avenue and Brookland Stations on tracks 1 and 2 for rescue and recovery operations.
- MTPD, SAFE, RTRA, OCME and DCFEMS personnel conducted a post-event Hot Wash to capture positive and negative aspects of the field response and recovery.

Findings

- ROCC RTC did not immediately respond to Train Operator's initial report that they "may have hit something," and order a track inspection. However, the track inspection was initiated three minutes later after the witness reported the person struck by train.
- The initial track inspection by Train ID 105 was conducted by a single Train Operator. They were unable to locate the person, likely due to the decedent's position on the left side of the train, while the Operator's cab is on the right side of the train. Glare and light conditions in the portal area also likely contributed to their inability to observe the decedent.
- ROCC countermanded initial requests from the On-Scene Commander to conduct a second track inspection. This resulted in approximately a seven minute delay to begin the second inspection.
- SOP 1A was intiated upon the discovery of the decedent.
- At the outset of the incident, two separate Incident Commanders were utilized at separate locations. A Forward Liasion was not designated initially.
- At the time of the event, ROCC staffing was limited, as one person was performing the duties of Rail 2 and Rail 3. This limited the ability to continually assist the RTCs' management of the event support.
- During the event, multiple RTRA Supervisors and MTPD advised conflicting information.
- Procedures for energizing and de-energizing third rail power during the event were not followed.
- Personnel on-scene refused to install a WSAD due to lightning in the area. This resulted in a delay in concluding the event. *Note: The placement of a WSAD during this incident is not directly related to any procedure/policy. The refusal to place a WSAD was a personal choice by the WMATA employee involved. The manufacturer was contacted and stated weather does not play determining factor when a WSAD can be placed and the WSAD could have been placed in any weather condition.*
- Lack of compliance/awareness of SOP 1A. (MTPD and ROCC RTC personnel, these findings were discussed)

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Brookland/Rhode Island Avenue Station person struck by train event was an intentional action by the person to bypass gates marked as "No Trespassing" to enter the rail right-of-way where they encountered Train ID 104 and encroached into the dynamic envelope of the train.

SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

The following are the recommendations and corrective actions identified as a result of the incident response. These recommendations and corrective actions are tracked using WMATA's Safety Measurement System Incidents/Accidents (SMS I/A) Module and are verified by SAFE upon completion. The responsible department is identified in the corrective action code, and the respective departmental Safety Risk Coordinator (SRC) will manage the mitigation. Refer to the SMS I/A module for additional information.

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
100345_SAFECAPS_ROCC_001	ROCC to provide an After-Action Review and Lessons Learned with ROCC personnel on SOP 1A.	ROCC	Completed
100345_SAFECAPS_ROCC_002	RTCs to attend refresher training on SOP 11.	ROCC	Completed
100345_SAFECAPS_SAFE_001	Review and update procedures as needed to ensure track inspections are performed in a consistent manner.	SAFE/OOP	2/28/2023
101881_SAFECAPS_ROCC_002	Memorandum issued regarding collaborative and cohesive working relationship between Rail1 and the Mission Assurance Coordinator. (MAC)	ROCC	Completed
WMSC-22-C0165 (adopted by reference)	Complete previously issued CAP related to operational lessons learned, General Orders Updates	MTPD	09/30/2023
WMSC-C0162 (adopted by reference)	Complete previously issued CAP related to incident Management Framework, which addresses the need for a maintenance Lead among other roles.	SAFE/OEP	12/31/2022
WMSC-22-C0177 (adopted by reference)	Metrorail may develop, distribute and provide training on useable checklist or similar tool for MTPD officers to use during emergency response, including in relation to establishment and transfer of incident command.	MTPD	3/1/2024
WMSC-19-C0020 (adopted by reference)	WMATA must eliminate the dangerous dysfunction within the ROCC by taking actions that include, but are not limited to, requiring controllers to follow written protocols and checklist, improving communication and workflow, and avoiding oversaturating controller and distracting them with conflicting instructions.	ROCC	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

***Train Operator of Train ID 104*:**
The Train Operator is a WMATA employee with 10 years of service and 3.5 years of experience as a Train Operator. The Train Operator holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in January 2023.

The below narrative summarizes the interview with SAFE and represents the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

During the virtual interview, the Train Operator stated that they did not see anything out of the ordinary. The Train Operator stated that they were feeling alert to their surroundings at the time of the incident. The Train Operator stated that they did not experience any signs of fatigue leading up to the incident. The Train Operator stated that they always enter the station with the master controller in a B1 position to allow for exact control and smooth operational braking. The Train Operator stated that as they were exiting the portal to Rhode Island Avenue Station they heard a contact noise, believing it to be an ETS Box. The Train Operator stated that they conducted an inspection and reported that there were no issues with the train prior to or during the incident. The Train Operator stated that after the passengers exited the train, an inspection was conducted, and the Train Operator observed damage to the inter-car barrier and noticed possible bodily fluids. (Described as two specks)

Train Operator (Inactive) riding aboard Train ID 104:
The below narrative summarizes the interview with SAFE and represents the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

During the virtual interview, the Train Operator stated that they were sitting in the front passenger compartment of the operator's cab area facing away from the front of the cab. As the train entered the portal (Train ID 104), they heard a loud bang on his side of the train. The Train Operator stated that they stood up and could not visually see anything that was struck. The Train Operator stated that as they entered Rhode Island Avenue Station they let the Train Operator know that the barrier was broken in two pieces. The Train Operator stated that they examined the front rail car and observed the barrier broken and a small sign of biological matter on the train. The Train Operator stated that they exited the train and performed an inspection from the platform side and concluded that the Train Operator possibly struck a deer or some type of animal. The Train Operator stated that while walking on the platform, a man appeared from the track bed and stated that their sibling was hit by a train. The Train Operator stated they accompanied the man to the Station Manager to make proper notification. The Train Operator stated that they remained on the scene to assist and to make a statement to MTPD.

***Train Operator of Train ID 105*:**
The below narrative summarizes the interview with SAFE and represents the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

During the virtual interview, the Train Operator stated that they were in approach to Brookland Station they heard the train ahead of them state that they were having issues with his car barriers. The Train Operator stated that they were not sure if the train ahead had struck something, and could not determine or confirm that a person or object was struck. The Train Operator stated that they were asked to off-load their train, and walk-through to verify the train was clear and returned to the cab. The Train Operator stated that once the train was clear they were given instructions to conduct a train inspection between Brookland to NoMa Stations, looking for something out of the ordinary. The Train Operator stated that they conducted the track inspection traveling less than 15 mph and did not see anything out of the ordinary. The Train Operator stated that after they completed the track inspection, they heard radio transmissions stating that a person was found by the train behind them.

The Train Operator stated that after completing their day, they were informed that Management and MTPD had issues with the track inspection and was unhappy with their results. The Train Operator stated that it is impossible for some Train Operators to perform a single person track inspection due to the limited visibility from the cab while sitting down. The Train Operator stated that the limited visibility in the portal and the lack of knowledge of what they were looking for caused delays. The Train Operator stated that the RTC should give a reason and more descriptive information prior to beginning the track inspection to better help the Train Operators.

***Train Operator of Train ID 106*:**
The below narrative summarizes the interview with SAFE and represents the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

During the virtual interview, the Train Operator stated that they began their workday and departed Glenmont Station with a Rail Supervisor aboard. The Train Operator stated that while at Silver Spring Station two additional Rail Supervisors boarded their train. The Train Operator stated while traveling towards Fort Totten Station they heard the Train Operator of 104 state that they had a broken inter-car barrier and asked permission fix it at Rhode Island Avenue Station. The Train Operator stated that they heard Train ID 104 granted permission to secure the barrier. The Train Operator stated that they did not hear Train ID 104 state that they hit something. The Train Operator stated that while at Fort Totten Station Train 104 reported that they had secured the inter-car barrier and was given permission to continue. The Train Operator stated that further communication continued between car maintenance, Train ID 104 and a Rail Supervisor continued until the inter-car barrier was repaired at Farragut North Station. The Train Operator stated that they received information that two customers were on the roadway and one customer was struck by a train. The Train Operator stated that this information was known prior to Train ID 104 departed from Farragut North Station. The Train Operator stated that while they were at Fort Totten Station, track inspections were conducted by Train ID 105 on track 2 and Train ID 111 on track 1 with both trains confirming a clear track.

The Train Operator stated that speed commands and a lunar was provided, and they continued to Brookland Station where they were ordered by MTPD personnel to off-load their train. The

Train Operator stated that they confirmed clear of passengers with ROCC. The Train Operator stated that they were ready to conduct a track inspection. The Train Operator stated that they were instructed to load the passengers back on the train. The Train Operator stated that after approximately 10 minutes, ROCC granted permission to conduct the track inspection. The Train Operator stated that a Rail Supervisor, and two MTPD personnel were inside the cab while the track inspection was conducted. The Train Operator stated that they left the platform at Brookland Station heading into the portal at approximately 15 MPH. The Train Operator stated that once they entered the portal they reduced their speed to 5 MPH due to the sight adjustment (sunshine to dark) then reduced the train speed to 3 MPH. The Train Operator stated that about 20 feet into the portal they observed an object that looked like a ball of clothes. The Train Operator stated that they traveled approximately 10 feet further and was informed by MTPD to stop the train, that's where they observed the decedent.

The Train Operator stated that for the next five to six hours they were involved in the recovery efforts. The Train Operator stated that they had concerns with the de-energizing and energizing of power during the recovery process. The Train Operator stated that on two occasions power was re-energized while Emergency personnel were still performing recovery efforts. The Train Operator stated that his train was energized prior to receiving the announcement from the ROCC.

ROCC Button RTC:
The below narrative summarizes the interview with SAFE and represents the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

During the virtual interview, the Button RTC stated that they remembered Train ID 104 stating they needed to repair the inter-car barrier. The radio communications were limited because they were unable to understand the Operator clearly due to their accent. The Button RTC stated that permission was given to repair the barrier at the next station if the repair could be done on the platform side. The Button RTC stated that Train ID 104 contacted ROCC as they left Brookland en route to Rhode Island Avenue Station. The Button RTC stated that the Train Operator stated that the barrier was broken, and they were not able to secure it. The Button RTC stated that the Radio RTC replied that Car Maintenance would look at the barrier at the next station. The Button RTC stated that they received a phone call from ROIC stating that someone was hit by a train and kept going, the person reporting was a customer (sibling of the decedent). The Button RTC stated that they proceeded to figure out what train was involved. The Button RTC stated that Car Maintenance, called over the radio and stated that the barriers were secured. The Button RTC stated that a Rail Supervisor stated that the train was good and sent photos to confirm via email. The Button RTC stated that they informed ROCC Management of a person possibly struck by a train. The Button RTC stated that Train ID 104 was the train that reported damage to their inter-car barrier and reported that this was possibly the train.

The Button RTC stated that there was confusion due to a pre-shift briefing of a person being struck or fouling the roadway the day previous, but it had not been confirmed and this incident could be one and the same. The Button RTC stated that ROCC Management was notified of Train ID 104 broken inter-car barrier. The Button RTC stated that after the notification, ROCC Management instructed Train ID 104 to continue. The Button RTC stated that there was definite confusion in identifying the actual train and guidance from ROCC Management on how to proceed during the incident. The Button RTC stated that the lack of oversight and guidance by ROCC Management in this situation was lacking and could have prevented the correct use of SOP 1A

and recovery efforts and eased the confusion and stress for the RTC's. The Button RTC stated that the lack of sufficient personnel caused communication delays which caused a chaotic atmosphere in the ROCC during this incident. The Button RTC stated that they at no point were secondary searches or recovery efforts denied but they had to be approved by ROCC Management.

ROCC Radio RTC:
The below narrative summarizes the interview with SAFE and represents the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

During the virtual interview, the Radio RTC stated that they received a radio transmission from Train ID 104 regarding the inter-car barrier being unsecure. The Radio RTC stated that they could not fully understand the radio transmission due to their accent. The Radio RTC stated that they never heard the Train Operator transmit that they may have struck something. The Radio RTC stated that they gave Train ID 104 permission to inspect the inter-car barrier once they were properly berthed at Rhode Island Avenue Station, only on the platform side. The Radio RTC stated that the Train Operator reported that their car barrier was broken. The Radio RTC stated that they advised Train ID 104 to proceed to the next station for Car Maintenance inspect the train. The Radio RTC stated that Car Maintenance reported that they had secured the barrier with zip-ties and that they also received a good train notification from a Rail Supervisor. The Radio RTC stated that approximately 14:20 hours they received a call for a person struck by a train from the ROIC. The Radio RTC stated that they utilized Train IDs 105 and 111 for track inspections and both were good. The Radio RTC stated that there was loud confusion in the ROCC, which delayed an additional track inspection and granting foul time for recovery. The Radio RTC stated that they were waiting for confirmation from ROCC Management for next steps and at one point had to leave the desk to obtain answers on requests from the field.

The Radio RTC stated that the delay in instructions from ROCC Management caused the delay of the secondary track inspection for Train ID106. The Radio RTC stated that they made mistakes in the appointing of the On-scene Commander once the scene was established. The Radio RTC stated that better communication among ROCC Management could have alleviated the failed communications with all parties involved. The Radio RTC stated that the process for energizing and de-energizing during the recovery was not followed by Rail Supervisors. The Radio RTC stated that their concerns were not heard by ROCC Management when Train ID 104 was identified as the contact train.

Appendix B – MTPD Hot Wash Summary

Metro Transit Police Department
Hot Wash Summary

ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. **Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.**

INCIDENT SUMMARY

Incident Requiring ICS Activation:	Person Struck by Train		
***Incident Commander (IC):**	Lieutenant [redacted]		
MTPD CCN:	2022-02584	**Local CCN:**	
***Date ICS Initiated:**	05/15/2022	***Time ICS Initiated:**	1434 hours
***Date ICS Terminated:**	05/15/2022	***Time ICS Terminated:**	1939 hours
***Duration of Incident:**	5 Hrs 5 Min	***Service Disrupted (Type and Time):**	service suspended1434 hours
Incident Location:	BRKL (B2 192+00)	**Command Post Location:**	Platform>Bus Bay>Kiosk
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	Lieutenant [redacted]	**Command Aid for OSC:**	N/A
Forward Liaison:	Sgt. [redacted]	**Unified Command:**	DCFD/MTPD
OCC Liaison:	MAC [redacted]	**Alternate Channel:**	MTPD 2X
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	N/A	**Bus Bridge Established (From /To):**	FTTO/NOMA
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	Yes	**Power De-energized:**	1450 Hrs Tracks 1&2
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name [redacted] Dept:		**Medical Attention Required/Requested:**	DCFD
Entry/Exit Log:	Yes	**CID Response:**	Yes

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MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 1 of 4.

Metro Transit Police Department
Hot Wash Summary

WMATA ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	**Department/Office**	**Title/Role**
[redacted]	MTPD	Lieutenant, Incident Commander
	MTPD	Sergeant/Operations Commander
	MTPD	Sergeant, Operations
	MTPD	Sergeant, RIAV Operations
	MTPD	Officer, BRKL crowd control
	MTPD	Officer, Accountability
	MTPD	Officer, Accountability
	MTPD	CSS Officer
	MTPD	CSS Officer
	MTPD/CID	CID Detective
	MTPD/CID	CID Detective
	OEP	Safety Officer
	RTRA	Supervisor/ICS Liasion

EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	**Agency/Department**	**Title/Role**
[redacted]	DCFD	Battalion Chief
	DCFD	Lieutenant, Fire/Rescue Operations
	OCME	Medical Examiner
	OCME	Medical Examiner

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

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MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00 Page 2 of 4 Effective: 12/30/20

MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 2 of 4.

Metro Transit Police Department
Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	no
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	no
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	

OBSERVATIONS

1414 ROCC received notification from RIAV station manager that a customer reported a person struck.

1422 Train 105 conducted and inspection on track 2 with nothing found.

1431 hours A6 at RIAV establish ICS and advise a witness observed his companion struck by a train in the tunnel.

1434 Cr-30 Takes over ICS from BRKL.

1446 inspection trains on tracks 1&2 locate decedent at B2 192+00.

1450 Power confirmed down on tracks 1 & 2, bus bridge requested

1501 DCFD arrives at BRKL

1517 DCFD pronounces decedent and begins to clear scene.

1615 CSS and OCME stage for processing scene

1644 Power restored to Track 1 to facilitate single tracking

1710 Track Circuit malfunction prohibits single tracking, bus bridge resumes

1729 Power dropped to Track 1 to facilitate removal of decedent.

1840 Initial CSS and OCME processing complete. Decedent moved to inspection train. Power restored to track 2.

1852 inspection train moved to BRKL, Decedent transported. CSS and OCME resumed secondary processing.

1930 CSS and OCME processing complete.

1939 all personnel clear of roadway, scene turned over to RTRA Supervisor [redacted]

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

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MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00 Page 3 of 4 Effective: 12/30/20

MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 3 of 4.

Metro Transit Police Department
Hot Wash Summary

NOTES

It was not immediately clear what incident had occurred. There was an unconfirmed report of a person struck at RIAV and an erratic patron on the platform at RIAV. When MTPD arrived on scene at RIAV the witness provided the necessary information to prompt for inspections for a person possibly struck in the tunnel between RIAV and BRKL.

Even though command had been established by A6 at RIAV and then transferred to CR-30 at BRKL, Rail Ops was countermanding IC orders. CR-30 ordered train 106 at BRKL be offloaded for an inspection. Rail Ops ordered the operator and Rail Supervisors on scene to reload the train and continue revenue service. CR-30 communicated directly with the MAC to ensure Rail Ops understood ICS had been established. This resolve the communication problems but delayed effective inspections being conducted.

The first inspection on track 2 conducted by train 105 prior to MTPD arrival failed to locate the decedent who was located on track 2 and was highly visible. Subsequent inspections conducted by MTPD on both tracks located the decedent at B2 192+00.

First responding MTPD units quickly established IC and assigned units for accountability.

Once BRLK was determined to be the closest access point to the incident resources to include the fire department were re-directed to BRKL.

Rail did not immediately locate and remove the incident train and operator from service. The train continued to Shady Grove Rail Yard and the operator was taken for post incident testing prior to CID being able to interview the operator.

Radio and Cell phone communication with units at the incident scene(in tunnel) was intermittent.

Single tracking was attempted but was not possible due to a track circuit failure. A bus bridge was in place for the duration of the scene.

When CSS was conducting secondary processing WASADs were ordered to be set up at the incident location and at the platform on track 2. RTRA supervisor and ERT Supervisor refused to set up the platform WASAD due to inclement weather in the area and stated they were required to wait 45 min. after observing lightning. This caused CSS/RTRA personnel to walk back to the platform on track not protected by a WASAD. MAC and Rail 1 were not aware of this procedure when contacted by CI-30.

Units away from the incident scene did a good job of locating and securing the incident train, involved operator, and additional witnesses.

CID made prompt notification to the OCME speeding up the recovery process.

CSS processing was delayed briefly due to only one CSS officer working and initially being sent to locate the incident train. An additional officer was called in to assist and the first responding CSS officer was redirected to the incident scene. A patrol officer was dispatched to secure the incident train.

The distance to the incident location from BRKL increased the time it took to get resources and personnel to and from the incident location.

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date

[redacted]

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[redacted]

Patrol Operations Bureau Commander's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[redacted]

Office of Emergency Management Director's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

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MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00 Page 4 of 4 Effective: 12/30/20

MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 4 of 4.

Appendix C - Photos

Image 1 – Brookland-CUA Station End Gates on track 1 and track 2.

Image 2 – Rhode Island Avenue Station End Gates on track 1 and track 2.

Appendix D – ROCC Incident Report

View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT ID: 2022135RED1

DATE	TIME	LINE	ITEM
2022-05-15	1418	Red	1

LOCATION (STATION/YARD)
Brookland-CUA (B05)

LOCATION/CHAIN MARKER (If Applicable)
B2 197+00

REPORTED BY
Train Operator [redacted]
(Glenmont Division)

TRAIN ID	DIRECTION	TRACK NUMBER	DEPTS NOTIFIED
104	O/B	2	Everbridge Alert/Messaging

CAR NUMBERS (XXXX-XXXX)
Lead Car

3154-3155	3228-3229	3248-3249	-
Caused Issue ☑	Caused Issue ☐	Caused Issue ☐	Caused Issue ☐

TRBL CODE
JUMP-JUMPER: PERSON HIT BY TRAIN

RESP CODE
PUB

TYPE INCIDENT
Person Struck By Train.

ACTION PLAN
Dispatch RTRA Supervisors, Dispatch CMNT, De-energize Third Rail Power. Turn Back Trains.

DELAYS IN MINUTES

LINE	INCIDENT	TRAIN	TOTAL DURATION
15	15	254	488

TRIPS MODIFIED

PARTIAL	GAP TRAIN	LATE DISPATCHES	REROUTED	NOT DISPATCHED	OFFLOADS
4	0	0	0	0	3

FIVE PRIMARY CONSOLE INDICATIONS

BCP	BRAKES ON ILLUMINATED	ALL DOORS CLOSED ILLUMINATED	AUTO\MANUAL ILLUMINATED	BPP
Yes	Yes	Yes	MANUAL	Yes

ROCC Incident Report, Page 1 of 3.

View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY	
TIME	**DESCRIPTION**
1416	ROCC notifed by ROIC of a person possibly making contact with a train between Brookland and Rhode Island Avenue station. Unit 18, RTRA Supervisor [redacted] and Unit [redacted], RTRA Supervisor [redacted] were dispatched. ROCC Assistant Operations Manager, MTPD, CMNT, SAFE and all concerned personnel were notified.
1418	Train 105 instructed to offload train track two at Brookland to perform a track inspection from Brookland track two towards NoMa-Gallaudet.
1420	Train 105 operator reported train clear of customers and beginning track inspection from Brookland towards NoMa track two.
1425	Train 111 instructed to offload train track one at NOMA-Gallaudet to perform a track inspection from NoMa track one towards Brookland.
1429	Train 111 operator reported train clear of customers and beginning track inspection from NoMa towards Brookland track one.
1430	Unit 18 on scene at Brookland, also informed ROCC that MTPD is requesting to offload and utilize train 106 at Brookland to perform a track inspection towards Rhode Island ave on track two.
1430	Unit 25, RTRA Supervisor [redacted], dispatched to intercept train 104, interview operator and check train for visible damages.
1431	Train 106 instructed to offload train track two at Fort Totten for the purpose of a track inspection.
1440	Train 105 operator reported a good track inspection from Brookland track to NoMa track track two.
1444	Train 106 operator reported train clear of customers and performing a 2nd track inspection from Brookland towards NoMa track two. MTPD and Unit 18 onboard for the inspection area. Rail service adjustment implemented with trains turning back for service at Fort Totten towards Glenmont and NoMa-Galluadett towards Shady Grove. Shuttle bus service requested.
1448	Train 107 was the first train to offload and turnback for service at Fort Totten towards Glenmont. Bus bridge established between Fort Totten and NoMa-Galluadet.
1449	Unit [redacted] reported body found at chain marker B2-197+00 and no visible signs of life. Unit [redacted] appointed as the on scene comander. SOP-1A in affect.
1450	Third rail Power de-energized between Brookland and Rhode Island Ave track two.
1451	Train 111 reported a good track inspection from NoMa to Brookland track one.
1453	Train 111 instructed to go in service from Fort Totten towards Glenmont.
1457	Train 113 operator instructed to offload train at NoMa and turnback for service towards Shady Grove.
1459	ERT 633 on scene Brookland.
1505	Unit [redacted] granted foul time to hot stick and confirm third rail power is de-energized track two between Brookland and Rhode Island Ave. DCFD Engine 1 and 2 arrived on scene.
1507	Train 106 given instructions to apply handbrakes on the train.
1509	Third rail power de-energized track one between Rhode Island and Brookland.
1510	Unit 18 given foul time track one to confirm third rail power is de-energized. Third rail power confirmed de-energized at B1-192+00. Recovery efforts in progress.
1604	DCFD cleared the scene
1620	DC Medical Examiner arrived on the scene.

ROCC Incident Report, Page 2 of 3.

View Approved Incident Report

1640	Unit [redacted] verified track one was safe for train movement and third rail power may be restored between Rhode Island Ave and Brookland.
1654	Third rail power energization announcements made on all OPS and all notifications made. Third rail power restored track one between Rhode Island Ave and Brookland Station.
1657	Train 101 resumed normal service from NoMa to Glenmont track 1
1731	Thrid rail power de-energized track one Rhode Island Ave and Brookland upon request to safely remove the body form the roadway.
1738	Unit [redacted], Supervisor [redacted] reported third rail power was de-energized at chain marker B1-193+00
1800	Trains continue to turnback at Fort Totten towards Glenmont and NoMa towards Shady Grove.
1830	Unit [redacted], reported all personnel clear of roadway, customer removed and requested third rail power to be restored to move the train back to the platform at Brookland so MTPD can continue their investigation of the tracks. Third rail power restoration announcement made.
1845	Third rail power was confirmed restored track 2 between Rhode Island Ave and Brookland. Train 706 handbrakes released and train recharged. ROCC gave an absolute block towards Brookland track two.
1900	Unit [redacted] reported all personnel clear from train 706 at Brookland track two. Train 706 continued towards Glenmont non-revenue.
1939	Unit [redacted] reported the scene turned back over to RTRA.
1944	ERT [redacted] requested foul time to go to the roadway for the purpose of clean up efforts between chain markers B2-204+00 to B2-192+00.
2015	ERT [redacted] reported all personnel clear of the roadway, relinquishing foul time and third rail power may be restored tracks one and two between Rhode Island ave and Brookland.
2024	Third rail power energization announcement made on all OPS, and all notifications made. Third rail power was restored tracks one and two between Rhode Island Ave and Brookland Station. Normal service resume.
0000	Train 104 stored on track 13 at Shady Grove yard pending MTPD and CMNT investigation. Train operator [redacted] transported for post-incident and instructed to submit an incident report.

MAXIMO TICKET#
8602550

REPORT PREPARED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
RADIO CONTROLLER 1	[redacted]	✓
BUTTON CONTROLLER 1	[redacted]	✓
RADIO CONTROLLER 2		
BUTTON CONTROLLER 2		

SUPERINTENDENTS OR ASSISTANTS SECTION

ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP CORRECTIVE ACTIONS OR REMARKS

FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS

NOTIFICATIONS/PAGE GROUPS #1/CEO ☐ #2/DGM &BELOW ■

ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS MADE BY PHONE

ROCC Incident Report, Page 3 of 3.

Appendix E – Maximo Workorder

Page 1 of 2
MX76PROD

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Work Order #: 17058484
Type: CM

Status: CLOSE
05/20/2022 06:18

Work Description: PERSON STRUCK BY A TRAIN
Job Plan Description:

Work Information

Asset:	R3154	3154, RAIL CAR, BREDA, 3000 AC, A CAR	Owning Office:	CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:
Asset Tag:	R3154		Maintenance Office:	CMNT-NEWC-INSP	Create Date: 05/15/2022 21:22
Asset S/N:	3154		Labor Group:	CMNT	Actual Start: 05/15/2022 21:25
Location:	1230	D99, NEW CARROLLTON YARD	Crew:		Actual Comp: 05/19/2022 08:22
Work Location:	1136	A99, SHADY GROVE YARD	Lead:		Item: L18050002
Failure Class:	CMNT001	RAIL CAR	GL Account:	WMATA-02-33393-50499160-041-**********-*****-OPR**	
Problem Code:	2424	N/A CODE (GENERAL SYMPTOM)	Supervisor:	[redacted]	Target Start:
Requested By:			Requestor Phone:	[redacted]	Target Comp:
Chain Mark Start:			Chain Mark End:		Scheduled Start:
Create-Mileage:	2660013.0		Complete-Mileage:	2660295.0	

Task IDs

Task ID							
10	DOWNLOADED VMS LOGS						
Component:	000-300-V02 VEHICLE MONITORING SYSTEM; VMS; 2K/3K/6K	Work Accomp: DOWNLOADED	Reason: INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N	
20	see details Ok for service at this time Undercar inspection found damage to front lower left cowling. Also found blood splatter and biological material on and under the train. Car needs to be in the blowpit and then pressure cleaned. Did find left inter- car barrier broken . -R/R Left. barrier (bar assy.).						
Component:	000-300-K03 TRUCK&SUSPENSION: WHEEL & AXLE ASSY; TRUCK; 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accomp: INSPECTED	Reason: INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	Status: CLOSE	Position: 273	Warranty?: N	
30	performed undercar cleaning, see work order 17000481 task 10 for details.						
Component:	000-300 RAIL CAR; 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accomp: CLEANED	Reason: STAINED	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N	
40	performed brake rates in PI as per task 70, see work order 17000481 under measurements for details						
Component:	000-300-E00 SUBSYSTEM; FRICTION BRAKE; 2K/3K/ 6K/7K	Work Accomp: CHECKED	Reason: NO TROUBLE FOUND	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N	

Maximo Workorder Report, Page 1 of 2.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Work Order #: 17058484
Type: CM

Status: CLOSE
05/20/2022 06:18

Work Description: PERSON STRUCK BY A TRAIN
Job Plan Description:

Planned Materials

Task ID	Item	Description	Storeroom	Issue Unit	Quantity	Unit Cost	Line Cost
	B18325039	PAD,BRAKE:FLEET 2K, 3K, 4K	253	EA	12	$35.80	$429.62
	R18360166	BAR:BARRIER ASSEMBLY,1K,ROHR/BREDA INTERCAR	253	EA	1	$384.19	$384.19
						Total Planned Materials:	$813.81

Actual Labor

Task ID	Labor		Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[redacted]	[redacted]	05/16/2022	05/16/2022	04:00	05:00	Y	01:00	00:00	$38.09
20	[redacted]	[redacted]	05/16/2022	05/17/2022	23:30	00:00	Y	00:30	00:00	$20.98
20	[redacted]	[redacted]	05/16/2022	05/17/2022	23:30	00:00	Y	00:30	00:00	$22.33
30	[redacted]	[redacted]	05/18/2022	05/18/2022	04:00	05:00	Y	01:00	00:00	$35.57
40	[redacted]	[redacted]	05/19/2022	05/19/2022	17:00	19:00	Y	02:00	00:00	$72.89
							Total Actual Hour/Labor:	05:00	00:00	$189.87

Actual Materials

Task ID	Item	Assetnum	Description	Storeroom	Trans Date	Issue Unit	Quantity	Unit Cost	Line Cost
	B18325039		PAD,BRAKE:FLEET 2K, 3K, 4K	253	05/17/2022	EA	12	$35.80	$429.62
	R18360166		BAR:BARRIER ASSEMBLY,1K,ROHR/BREDA INTERCAR	253	05/17/2022	EA	2	$384.19	$768.38
							Total Actual Materials:		$1,198.00

Related Incidents

Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship
8602556	REPORT OF A PERSON STRUCK BY TRAIN 106 AT B2-192+00	SR	PENDING	ORIGINATOR

Failure Reporting

Cause		Remedy		Supervisor	Remark Date
2475	NO DEFECT; NO REPAIRS PERFORMED	3192	TESTED / INSPECTED	[redacted]	05/20/2022

Remarks: Dwnloaded VMS Logs and completed undercar inspection. Please see long description for the results. Inspection revealed damage to front lower left cowling. Also found blood splatter and biological material on and under the train. Found left inter- car barrier broken, replaced same.

Performed undercar cleaning, see work order 17000481 task 10 for details.
Performed brake rates in PI as per task 70, see work order 17000481 under measurements for details.

Maximo Workorder Report, Page 2 of 2.