



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0198 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station – September 19, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on January 24, 2023

Safety event summary:

On September 19, 2022, Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station was evacuated, and trains were instructed to bypass the station, due to a threat to blow up the station.

At approximately 4:59 p.m., the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) received a report from Metrorail's Customer Service Call Center that a customer had called and threatened to blow up Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station. MTPD did not report this threat to the Rail Operations Control Center, instead, at 5:06 p.m. the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) heard a radio announcement made by MTPD instructing units to respond to Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station for a threat to blow up the station. The MAC notified the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM), who notified the Operations Manager and then informed MTPD that a train was on the platform at the station. MTPD instructed ROCC to hold the train, however the train had already departed the station before the instructions could be given to the Train Operator. Trains at Fort Totten and Judiciary Square stations were also instructed to hold. At approximately 5:09 p.m. train service was suspended at Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station, with Red Line Trains turning back at Judiciary Square and Fort Totten stations. MTPD personnel arrived and began conducting a sweep of the station without establishing an incident command post.

At 5:10 p.m., Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) personnel attempted to contact the Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station Manager via radio, unsuccessfully. The Station Manager contacted ROIC via phone and was instructed to standby for evacuation instructions.

At 5:17 p.m., MTPD attempted to contact the Office of Customer Service Call Center, the department that initially received the threat to blow up the station, for additional information, however the call center, which is not a 24-hour operation, had closed for the day.

During this time, there was inadequate communication between MTPD, ROIC and the Station Manager and a series of errors caused by Metrorail's failure to implement its emergency response procedures, including incident command procedures. From 5:20 p.m. to 5:23 p.m., ROIC again tried to contact the Station Manager via radio, this time making three unsuccessful attempts. Both MTPD and ROCC personnel reported experiencing radio communications system issues during the event.

At 5:23 p.m. MTPD stated that the station had not been evacuated. At 5:25 p.m. the Station Manager contacted ROIC via telephone and was instructed to evacuate the station nearly 20 minutes after the event began. Simultaneously, MTPD reported it had concluded its search and that no suspect or explosive device was found, and that train service could resume.

At 5:27 p.m., before the Station Manager could fully evacuate the station, ROIC provided instructions to reopen the station. Normal service resumed at the station at 5:31 p.m. with the first train servicing the platform at 5:41 p.m.

Probable Cause:



The probable cause of this evacuation for life safety reasons was a threat to blow up the Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station.

Corrective Actions:

- Due to this investigation:
 - WMATA posted a reminder to Station Managers via Station Manager Direct, an internal webpage that provides Station Managers with pertinent information such as safety messages and updates, to monitor handheld radios during emergencies.
- Other related corrective actions (CAPs)
 - In development
 - CAPS are in development for several findings related to communications systems deficiencies identified during an audit of the systems published in September 2022. Finding 4 (C-0217) of the WMSC's audit found that Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Metrorail closes communications related "corrective maintenance" (repair) tickets without effectively identifying, documenting, and addressing issues.
 - Ongoing
 - CAP C-0162 was created to address a 2021 emergency management and fire and life safety audit finding that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements. For this CAP, which has an expected completion date of January 2025, WMATA has committed to creating and implementing an Incident Management System Framework in alignment with the NIMS/ICS.
 - CAP-0165 requires MTPD to review, update and submit general orders associated with incident management processes to reflect current operational realities, rules and procedures. This CAP is expected to be complete by September 2023.
 - CAP C-0177 addresses a WMSC recommendation that MTPD does not have a usable incident checklist for emergencies. Under this CAP, MTPD will develop, train personnel and implement a checklist for use during emergency response. This CAP is expected to be completed by September 2023.

WMSC staff observations:

The ability to communicate between internal departments is critical to safety. This event demonstrates deficiencies as evidenced by the failed communications between ROIC and the Station Manager and between MTPD and the Office of Customer Service Call Center. For example, there were four failed attempts by ROIC to contact the Station Manager during this event. When the Station Manager contacted ROIC via phone after the first failed attempt, ROIC personnel made no attempt to conduct a radio check with the Station Manager while they were on the phone to ensure any subsequent radio communications could be transmitted and received, including evacuation instructions.



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Despite communications issues being experienced in the field during this event, WMATA communications systems and radio branch reported that there were no radio communications issues found during inspection following the event at Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station. Corrective action plans to address this and other communications systems issues are currently in development by WMATA and will be submitted for WMSC review.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22607

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Date of Event: | September 19, 2022 |
| Type of Event: | Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Bomb Threat |
| Incident Time: | 16:59 Hours |
| Location: | Rhode Island Avenue Station |
| Time and How received by SAFE: | 17:07 Hours – SAFE/MAC |
| WMSC Notification Time: | 18:06 Hours |
| Responding Safety Officers: | WMATA: None WMSC: None Other: None |
| Rail Vehicle: | None |
| Injuries: | None |
| Damage: | None |
| Emergency Responders: | Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) |
| SMS I/A Incident Number: | 20220919#102979MX |

Rhode Island Avenue Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

September 19, 2022

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|--------------|---|
| AOM | Assistant Operations Manager |
| ARS | Audio Recording System |
| CAP | Corrective Action Plan |
| CCTV | Closed-Circuit Television |
| CSVC | Office of Customer Service |
| MAC | Mission Assurance Coordinator |
| MSRPH | Metro Transit Police Department |
| MTPD | Corrective Action Plan |
| NOAA | National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |
| OM | Operations Manager |
| RTRA | Office of Rail Transportation |
| ROCC | Rail Operations Control Center |
| ROIC | Rail Operations Information Center |
| RTC | Rail Traffic Controller |
| SAFE | Department of Safety |
| SMS | Safety Measurement System |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedures |
| WMATA | Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority |
| WMSC | Washington Metrorail Safety Commission |

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

Executive Summary

Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record.

On Monday, September 19, 2022, at 16:59 hours, an Office of Customer Service (CSVC) Call Center Representative reported to the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) that they received a call from a customer stating they were frustrated by not being able to retrieve property from the tracks and threatened to blow up Rhode Island Avenue Station. At 17:06 hours, the Department of Safety (SAFE) Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) heard via the radio the announcement that MTPD made for Units to respond to Rhode Island Avenue Station for a reported bomb threat. At 17:07 hours, the MAC notified MTPD that the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Operations Manager (OM) advised that a train was currently on the platform at Rhode Island Avenue Station and inquired how to proceed. MTPD responded that two Units were responding and to hold the trains until they receive a report otherwise. At 17:09 hours, the Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) announced that train service was suspended at Rhode Island Avenue Station. At 17:10 hours, MTPD Units arrived on scene at Rhode Island Avenue Station, advised to suspend service at Rhode Island Avenue Station and conducted a sweep of the station.

At 17:25 hours, the Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) instructed the Station Manager to evacuate the station; however, MTPD reported that train service could resume so no evacuation was initiated. At 17:36 hours, MTPD reported that nothing was found during the sweep. Rhode Island Avenue Station was reopened, and train service resumed. There were no injuries or damage as a result of this event.


During the event, an incident command post was not established. MTPD Officers responded and conducted a sweep of the station. Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisors were dispatched to Fort Totten and Judiciary Square Stations in anticipation of turning trains at those locations. MTPD advised that the station was not yet evacuated as they were performing the sweep. Personnel were unable to locate the person reporting the bomb threat and advised that nothing was found after the sweep of the interior and exterior of the station.

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Rhode Island Avenue Station was criminal activity by an unknown party verbally making a bomb threat. The subsequent investigation revealed no presence of the person making the threat nor evidence of an explosive or incendiary device.

Incident Site

Rhode Island Avenue Station

Field Sketch/Schematics



**Locations are approximate. Not to scale.*

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through video and document review
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
 - MTPD Event Report
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - Metrorail Stations Standard Operating Procedures Handbook
 - Rail Operations Control Center Procedures Manual
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - ARS (Audio Recording System) playback [Radio and Landline Communications]
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Monday, September 19, 2022, at 16:59 hours, a CSVC Call Center Representative reported to MTPD that they received a call from a customer stating they were frustrated by not being able to retrieve property from the tracks and threatened to blow up Rhode Island Avenue Station¹. At 17:06 hours, the MAC heard via the radio an announcement that MTPD made for Units to respond to Rhode Island Avenue Station for a reported bomb threat. At 17:07 hours, the SAFE MAC notified the ROCC OM. The MAC notified MTPD that the OM advised that a train was currently on the platform at Rhode Island Avenue Station and inquired how to proceed. MTPD responded

¹ According to the CSVC Call Center Representative report, they reported believing that the caller was a teenager and not currently located at the station.

that two Units were responding and to hold trains until they receive a report otherwise. At 17:09 hours, the Radio RTC announced that train service was suspended at Rhode Island Avenue Station. Train ID 103 was instructed to hold at Fort Totten Station, track two. Train ID 108 was instructed to hold at Judiciary Square Station, track one. At 17:10 hours, ROIC attempted to contact the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station and received no response. At the same time, an MTPD Unit reported arriving on scene at Rhode Island Avenue Station and advised to suspend service at Rhode Island Avenue Station and began to conduct a sweep of the station. The MTPD Unit did not request a station evacuation at that time.

At 17:10 hours, the Station Manager contacted ROIC via landline phone and was instructed to stand by for evacuation instructions. At 17:25 hours, ROIC instructed the Station Manager to evacuate the station, and MTPD reported the K-9 initial sweep was negative and visual inspection was negative; train service could resume. At 17:27 hours, ROIC instructed the Station Manager to reopen the station. At 17:31 hours, the Radio RTC made an announcement of normal service at Rhode Island Avenue Station. At 17:36 hours, MTPD again reported to dispatch that nothing was found during the sweep. There were no injuries or damage as a result of this event.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) playback indicated that at 17:06 hours, MTPD announced the threat of a bomb at Rhode Island Avenue Station and dispatched units. At 17:07 hours, the ROCC OM notified the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) of the reported bomb threat. At 17:09 hours, the ROCC Radio RTC announced that service was suspended at Rhode Island Avenue Station and began to turn trains back at Judiciary Square and Fort Totten Stations.

At 17:10 hours, MTPD notified dispatch that they were on the scene at Rhode Island Avenue Station.




Image 1 - MTPD arriving at Rhode Island Avenue Station, encountering the Station Manager at 17:10 hour.

At 17:10 hours, ROIC attempted to contact the Station Managers via radio at Rhode Island Avenue Station and was waiting for a response. The Station Manager contacted ROIC via landline phone and was instructed to standby for station evacuation. At 17:13 hours, the ROCC Radio RTC instructed a Rail Supervisor to report to Judiciary Square Station. MTPD advised that the Station Managers at Rhode Island Avenue did not have any information of the report. At 17:15 hours, ROIC requested shuttle bus service.




Image 2 - Customer entering Rhode Island Avenue Station at 17:17 hours.

At 17:17 hours, MTPD advised that they would contact CSVC for additional information. The ROCC Radio RTC instructed a Rail Supervisor to report to Fort Totten Station. At 17:18 hours, MTPD reported that nothing was found on tracks one and two, then advised that they were unable to contact the CSVC Call Center Representative². The MTPD K-9 Unit had not completed their sweep at this time. MAC inquired with MTPD if Incident Command was set up and received no response.




Image 3 - MTPD K-9 Unit arrived at Rhode Island Avenue Station at 17:19 hours. Station Manager with a handheld radio.

At 17:20, 17:22, and 17:24 hours, ROIC attempted to contact the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station via radio to advise them to evacuate the station, with no response.

² The CSVC Call Center Representative working hours were 08:30 hours to 17:00 hours on the day of this event.




Image 4 - MTPD conducting K-9 Unit sweep with customers on the platform at 17:22 hours.

At 17:23 hours, MTPD advised that the station was not shut down and that K-9 would continue the sweep. However, at 17:25 hours, the Station Manager contacted ROIC via landline phone and was instructed by ROIC personnel to evacuate Rhode Island Avenue Station. Also at 17:25 hours, MTPD reported to dispatch that the K-9 initial sweep and visual inspection were negative; and train service could resume. The OM notified the AOM that normal service could resume at Rhode Island Avenue Station. At 17:27 hours, the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station contacted ROIC and was instructed to reopen the station. At 17:31 hours, the ROCC RTC announced that train service could resume at Rhode Island Avenue Station.

At 17:36 hours, MTPD reported that nothing was found on the platform during the sweep. No trains serviced Rhode Island Avenue Station between 17:08 hours and 17:40 hours. At 17:41 hours, Train ID 105 arrived and serviced Rhode Island Avenue Station, track two. At 17:43 hours, Train ID 110 arrived and serviced Rhode Island Avenue Station, track one.

During the investigation, OSI determined through CCTV review that an evacuation of Rhode Island Avenue Station was not fully implemented during the event. The On-Scene Commander was not identified via radio transmissions, and local emergency responders were not requested. Based on their assessment, MTPD did not request the station to be evacuated, as is within their scope of responsibility per MSRPH SOP #14; however, ROCC determined to suspend service following the initial report. Once advised by MTPD that service could resume, ROCC personnel coordinated the restoration of service.

The On-Scene Commander was not readily identified via radio traffic; however as noted in MSRPH SOP #1A – 3.8 *On-Scene Commander (OSC): The first MTPD Officer or Official that arrives at the scene of the incident will be the OSC and control WMATA resources and assist the IC in managing the scene.*

Chronological Event Timeline

| Time | Description |
|----------------|---|
| 16:59:24 hours | Department of Customer Service notified MTPD of a call of a bomb threat. According to the CSVC Call Center Representative report, they reported believing that the caller was a teenager and not currently located at the |

| Time | Description |
|----------------|--|
| | station [SOCC Radio] |
| 17:06:53 hours | MTPD made an announcement for Units to respond to Rhode Island Avenue Station for a reported bomb threat. [MTPD 1X] |
| 17:07:33 hours | OM notified the AOM of the reported bomb threat. [Phone] |
| 17:07:57 hours | MAC notified MTPD that the OM advised that a train was currently on the platform at Rhode Island Avenue Station and inquired how to proceed. MTPD advised that Units were en route and to hold service until advised. [MTPD 1X] |
| 17:09:07 hours | ROCC Radio RTC announced that train service was suspended at Rhode Island Avenue. Train ID 103, instructed to hold at Fort Totten Station, track two. Train ID 108, instructed to hold at Judiciary Square Station, track one. [Ops 1 Radio] |
| 17:10:27 hours | ROIC attempted to contact the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station, no response. [Ops 5 Radio] |
| 17:10:34 hours | MTPD arrived and conducted a sweep at Rhode Island Avenue Station, advised to suspend service to Rhode Island Avenue Station. [MTPD 1X] |
| 17:10:54 hours | ROIC instructed the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station to stand by for evacuation instructions. [Phone] <i>*Note: Station Manager was also in contact with MTPD units at the scene.</i> |
| 17:13:18 hours | ROCC Radio RTC instructed a Rail Supervisor to report to Judiciary Square Station. [Ops 1 Radio] |
| 17:13:24 hours | MTPD reported that the Station Managers at Rhode Island Avenue Station had no information regarding the report. [MTPD 1X] |
| 17:15:32 hours | ROIC requested shuttle bus service. [Phone] |
| 17:17:15 hours | MTPD advised that they would contact CSVC for information. [MTPD 1X] |
| 17:17:40 hours | ROCC Radio RTC instructed a Rail Supervisor to report to Fort Totten Station. [Ops 1 Radio] |
| 17:18:00 hours | SAFE MAC inquired with MTPD if Incident Command was set up. [MTPD 1X] |
| 17:18:15 hours | MTPD reported that nothing was found on tracks one and two. [MTPD 1X] |
| 17:18:56 hours | MTPD reports being unable to contact CSVC. [Radio] |
| 17:20:51 hours | ROIC attempted to contact the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station, no response. [Ops 5 Radio] |
| 17:22:37 hours | ROIC attempted to contact the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station, no response. [Ops 5 Radio] |
| 17:23:06 hours | MTPD advised that the station is not shut down, and K-9 is continuing their sweep. [MTPD 1X] |
| 17:24:40 hours | ROIC attempted to contact the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station, no response. [Ops 5 Radio] |
| 17:25:00 hours | ROIC advised the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station to evacuate the station. [Phone] |
| 17:25:05 hours | MTPD reported to dispatch that the K-9 initial sweep was negative and visual inspection was negative; train service could resume. [MTPD 1X] |
| 17:25:30 hours | OM notified AOM of normal service at Rhode Island Avenue Station. [Phone] |
| 17:27:24 hours | ROIC instructed the Station Manager at Rhode Island Avenue Station to reopen. [Phone] |
| 17:31:27 hours | ROCC RTC made an announcement of normal service at Rhode Island Avenue Station. [Ops 1 Radio] |
| 17:36:00 hours | MTPD reported that nothing was found on the platform after the sweep. [MTPD 1X] |

| Time | Description |
|----------------|--|
| 17:41:43 hours | Train ID 105 arrived and serviced Rhode Island Avenue Station track two. [SPOTS] |
| 17:43:25 hours | Train ID 110 arrived and serviced Rhode Island Avenue Station track one. [SPOTS] |

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

On October 3, 2022, COMR performed testing at Rhode Island Avenue Station; details from the testing are as follows:

The radio used to perform the testing was the APX8000 handheld Model 3, testing was completed to OPS-1 and to the COMR Tech located at Carmen Turner Facility on COMR Radio D talk group channel. The entire Rhode Island Avenue Station was tested from the platform, to the mezzanine area including the new kiosk and farecard machines. All radio checks were loud and clear at that time.

Weather

On September 19, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 85° F, with scattered clouds. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident. (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC)

Related Rules and Procedures

- WMATA SOP #1A -Command, Control, and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System.
 - 3.8 *On-Scene Commander (OSC): The first MTPD Officer or Official that arrives at the scene of the incident will be the OSC and control WMATA resources and assist the IC in managing the scene. The OSC Commander may be appointed by ROCC until the arrival of the MTPD.*
- WMATA SOP #14 - Bomb Threats/Suspicious Packages/Unattended Items
 - 14.5.1.4 *MTPD will be responsible for the overall coordination of Bomb Threat or related incidents. If local police and/or Fire Department personnel are required to respond to the threat location, MTPD will be the WMATA OSC per SOP 1A.*
 - 14.5.1.5 *MTPD is responsible for determining if facilities are to be evacuated or closed.*

Human Factors

Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied to this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Findings

- In response to the call of a bomb threat, train service was suspended between Fort Totten and Judiciary Square Stations.
- ROCC advised Train Operators that Rhode Island Avenue Station was closed due to Police activity.
- ROIC was unable to make radio contact with either of the two Station Managers located at Rhode Island Avenue Station, although one of the Station Managers had their handheld radios.
- MTPD advised dispatch that the station was not shut down as they performed the sweep.
- MTPD and ROCC experienced communication deficiencies during the event.
- No evidence was found of an explosive device or the person that reported the bomb threat following the sweep of the interior and exterior of the station.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- MTPD and K-9 personnel conducted a sweep of Rhode Island Avenue Station.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Rhode Island Avenue Station was an unknown party verbally making a bomb threat. The subsequent investigation revealed no presence of the person making the threat nor evidence of an explosive or incendiary device.

SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

| Corrective Action Code | Description | Responsible Party | Estimated Completion Date |
|---------------------------------|--|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 102979_SAFE CAPS_RTRA 001 | Reminder to Station Managers via Station Manager Direct to monitor handheld radios during emergencies. | RTRA | Completed |

Appendices

Appendix A – MTPD Event Report



| Event Report | | | |
|---------------------------------|------------|----------------------|-----------|
| Metro Transit Police Department | | ORI-DCMTP0000 | |
| Type of Report | MTPD CCN | Local Jurisdiction | Local CCN |
| Open | [REDACTED] | District of Columbia | |

| Event Location | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------|----------------|
| Street | Station Acronym | City, State | County | MTP District | Local District |
| 801 Rhode Island Ave NE | RIAV - RHODE ISLAND AVE | WASHINGTON, DC 20018 | D05-District 5 | District 1 | D05-District 5 |
| Date and Time of Event | | | Date and Time Reported | | |
| From To | | | 9/19/2022 5:06:00 PM 9/19/2022 5:06:13 PM | | |
| Category | | | | | |
| Rail Station, Line or Right-of-Way | On Bus | Property | Other | | |
| RIAV - RHODE ISLAND AVE Red | | Rail Station | MSA2 | | |
| Specific Location (Foot Bridge, Kiosk, Platform, Tracks, Etc.) | | | For Burglary or B&E Only | | |
| Platform | | | If Hotel Rule Applies, #Premises or Facilities Entered: | | |
| Location Description | | | | | |
| Rail Station | | | | | |

| Event Information | | |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| If Incident Use This Block | Offense # | Bomb Threat |
| Incident Classification | Offense Classification | A |
| Incident Description | Description | Bomb Threat |
| | Weapon/Force Type of Activity | / |
| Entry Type: | | Number Premises Entered: |
| Hate Crime Motivation: None (no bias) (mutually exclusive) | | |
| Bias Motivation | | |
| None (no bias) (mutually exclusive) | | |
| Offender Suspected of Using: | Modus Operandi (MO): | |
| Case Status Information | | |
| Case Status (Completed by the Official who signs this report): | If Case Cleared Exceptionally, | Clearance Date |
| Reporting Officer (Print) | Badge # | Second Officer (Print) Badge # |
| [REDACTED] | | |
| Supervisor's Name (Electronically Approved) | Teletype | Investigator Notified ID# |
| | # | |

| Victim Information | | | | |
|--|--|---|--|--------------------------------|
| Victim Sequence #: 001 | | Victim Assistance Provided: N - No | | |
| Last Name, First MI [REDACTED] | | | | DOB |
| Address Type W - Work | Address (Street) City, State Zip 600 5th St Nw DC | | | |
| Type Phone W - Work | Phone Number [REDACTED] | | | |
| Entity Name | | | | |
| Work/School Address - Adtl. Contact info | | | | |
| Age of Victim 30-35 | Sex Male | Race White | Ethnicity N - Not of Hispanic Origin | Resident Status Nonresident |
| Classification of Victim 9935 - DC - Bomb Threat | | Type of Victim Law Enforcement Officer | This Victim is Related to Which Offense 9935 - DC - Bomb Threat | |
| Is suspect information available at the time of this report: | | | | |
| Relationship: [REDACTED], Unknown - Victim Was Stranger | | | | |
| Injury Type | Responding Ambulance: | | Taken Where | |
| Aggravated Assault/Homicide Information | | | | |
| Aggravated Assault/Homicide Circumstances | | | Additional Justifiable Homicide Circumstances | |
| | | | | |

| Other Person Information | | | | | |
|--|----------------------------|------|-----------|--------------------------------|-----|
| Last Name, First MI [REDACTED] | | | | Entity Type Reporting Party | DOB |
| Type Phone M - Mobile | Phone Number [REDACTED] | | | | |
| Work/School Address - Adtl. Contact info | | | | | |
| Age | Sex Male | Race | Ethnicity | DL State/Number | |

MTPD Event Report, Page 2 of 4

| | |
|---|--|
| <p>Has a DVR been requested?</p> <p>Narrative Information</p> <p>Bomb threat made against Rhode Island Ave station. Station swept by canine with nothing found.TSOC Notification-[REDACTED] at 2047 hours</p> | |
| <p>If second CCN is available, insert here:</p> | <p>Additional Narrative on Supplemental Report</p> |

MTPD Event Report, Page 3 of 4

Additional Narrative

On 09/19/2022 at 1706 hours, WMATA customer service relations call taker [REDACTED] received an anonymous phone call from [REDACTED] who advised [REDACTED] that he was frustrated with WMATA for not being allowed to retrieve property he dropped on the tracks at 801 Rhode Island Ave NE and could blow up the Rhode Island Ave station. [REDACTED] notified MTPD of the threat. As MTPD units were responding, ROCC advised service was being suspended at Rhode Island Ave station located at 801 Rhode Island Ave NE Washington, DC as of 1710 hours. [REDACTED] arrived on scene and conducted a canine sweep of the exterior and interior of the station with nothing found. Attempts to call the bomb threat suspect back were unsuccessful. [REDACTED] was notified and the station was reopened at 1747 hours.

TSOC Notification- [REDACTED] at 2047 hours.

Appendix B - Root Cause Analysis

