



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0199 - Collision - Foggy Bottom Station - August 28, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on January 24, 2023

Safety event summary:

A Metrorail rider placed themselves in front of an oncoming train at Foggy Bottom Station on Sunday morning, August 28, 2022. The Train Operator stopped the train with the front two cars on the platform. Riders on the train were led off the train directly onto the platform through those front cars. The individual struck by the train survived the collision and was able to move themselves out from under the train. The person suffered a hand injury.

Trains initially operated using single-tracking while bypassing Foggy Bottom Station. Trains were later allowed to service the station during single-tracking operations after first responders on scene confirmed it was safe and would not interfere with the response.

Third rail power was de-energized at 8:30 a.m. Metrorail did not have a hot stick and electrical gloves available to confirm that power was de-energized, and a rail supervisor with these tools was not yet present as the event was resolved quickly. The individual was brought to the platform by lifting them through the railcar door opposite the platform side.

Data demonstrates that the Train Operator initiated emergency braking when the train had slowed to 23 mph, just before the front of the train entered the station. The person was struck when the train was moving approximately 22.5 mph. The train stopped with two cars on the platform.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was a person placing themselves in the path of a train.

Corrective Actions:

- Ongoing
 - CAP C-0162 was created to address the WMSC's February 2022 audit report of WMATA's Emergency Management and Fire and Life Safety Program's finding that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements. Under this CAP Metrorail must develop, implement and provide ongoing training on unified, Metrorail-wide procedures that comply with NIMS and ICS. This CAP is due for completion in January 2025.
 - CAP C-0217 resulted from the 2022 communications system audit finding that Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Metrorail closes communications related "corrective maintenance" (repair) tickets without effectively identifying, documenting and addressing issues. At minimum Metrorail must require personnel to document detailed information regarding identification and troubleshooting procedures that were attempted when responding to corrective maintenance work orders. This CAP has an expected completion date of April 2024.





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WMSC staff observations:

Metrorail effectively communicated and generally acted in a timely manner to carry out this emergency response. There continues to be room for improvement in the timely and proper establishment of the incident command system.

The investigation again identified deficiencies related to Metrorail railcar onboard system communication. These did not contribute to the collision but represent gaps in Metrorail's opportunity to continuously improve safety.

During the investigation into this event, the WMSC identified that the initial vehicle data information analysis provided by Metrorail's vehicle engineering personnel in Metrorail's draft final report was incorrect. This is corrected in the final report.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Department of Safety (SAFE) Office of Safety Investigations (OSI) FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22554

Date of Event:	August 28, 2022
Type of Event:	A-3 Collision
Incident Time:	08:28 Hours
Location:	Foggy Bottom Station. Track 1
Time and How received by SAFE:	08:28 Hours – SAFE/MAC
WMSC Notification Time:	09:17 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: No
	WMSC: No
	Other: N/A
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 603, [L3232/3233x2034/2035x3251/3250]
Injuries:	Left Hand Laceration
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS), Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA), Emergency Response Team (ERT), Automatic Train Control (ATC), Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20220828#102484

Incident Date:08/28/2022 Time: 08:28 hours

Final Report – Collision Rev 2

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Foggy Bottom Station – Collision

August 28, 2022

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS Advanced Information Management System

AOM Assistant Operations Manager

ARS Audio Recording System

ATCM Office of Automatic Train Control Maintenance

BOCC Bus Operation Communication Center

CAP Corrective Action Plan
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CMNT Office of Car Maintenance

CMOR Office of Chief Mechanical Officer
COMR Office of Radio Communications

CPEP Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program

DCFEMSDistrict of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services

DVEUDigital Video Evidence Unit

ERT
Emergency Response Team

FLO Fire Liaison Officer

IIT Incident Investigation Team

MPD Metropolitan Police Department

MSRPH Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook

MTPD Metro Transit Police Department

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness

OSC On Scene Commander
RTC Rail Traffic Controller

RTRA Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC Rail Operations Control Center

ROIC Rail Operations Information Center

SAFE Department of Safety

SMS Safety Measurement System
SOP Standard Operating Procedure

VMDS Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System

WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

WMSC Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

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Executive Summary

On Sunday, August 28, 2022, Audio Recording System (ARS) playback revealed that at approximately 08:28 hours, the Operator of Train ID 603 notified the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) that a person jumped in front of their train at Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1. The train arrived at Foggy Bottom and immediately stopped with two cars on the platform. The Train Operator was operating a Silver Line Train [ID 603, [L3232/3233x2034/2035x3251/3250].

The ROCC Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) acknowledged and initiated emergency notifications to the respective internal and external departments. ROCC de-energized third rail power at Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1, and began single-tracking on the orange and silver line trains between Foggy Bottom and Clarendon Stations and blue line trains between Foggy Bottom Station and Arlington Cemetery Stations on Track 2. At 08:29 hours, the MAC notified Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) dispatch via radio. At 08:30 hours, the ROCC Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) placed a call to 911. At 08:30 hours, the Radio RTC dispatched an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor to Foggy Bottom Station. At 08:32 hours, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department (DCFEMS) were dispatched to Foggy Bottom Station. Also, at 08:32 hours, the Station Manager was instructed by Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) to assist with the offload of Train ID 603.

The Buttons RTC advised ROIC at 08:34 hours, that single tracking would commence. Initial reports at 08:35 hours, from the Train Operator to the Radio RTC and AOM were that the person crawled out from underneath the train and was uninjured, standing on the third rail coverboard and leaning against the wall. At 08:36 hours, the ROCC AOM requested that Bus Operations Communication Center (BOCC) dispatch a supervisor to assist as single-tracking trains were bypassing Foggy Bottom Station. At the same time, DCFEMS established Incident Command at 23rd Street. The Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) advised MTPD at 08:41 hours, that third rail power had been de-energized. No RTRA Supervisor was present to hot stick at that time. At 08:43 hours, MTPD advised of one person in custody with non-life-threatening injuries, only minor injuries to the left hand and right shin. The Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) advised that the person was retrieved from the roadway by opening the off-platform side door and escorting them to the platform where DCFEMS assessed their condition.

At 08:49 hours, an MTPD Unit assumed Unified Command. At 08:50 hours, MTPD advised that Train ID 603 was offloaded with no injuries reported. The RTRA Supervisor arrived on the scene at 08:51 hours. At 08:52 hours, DCFEMS concluded Unified Incident Command and turned the scene over to MTPD. At 08:53 hours, the MAC inquired with MTPD about the potential of resuming single-track operations, which commenced at 08:59 hours. MTPD directed Train 603 was not to be moved pending further processing. At 09:14 hours, the RTC advised the Power Desk that they had brought down power on Track 1 between the Traction Power and Tie Breaker Rooms at Foggy Bottom Station. At 09:22 hours, ATCM notified MOC that they were commencing a track inspection at Foggy Bottom Station. At that time, MTPD advised that they had concluded their crime scene analysis, and Train 603 was released, the scene had been turned over to RTRA, and third rail power could be re-energized when appropriate.

MTPD advised at 09:25 hours, that the person was transported by Medic 23 with an MTPD escort to the Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (CPEP) for follow-up care. At 09:30

hours, ROCC began making calls related to re-energizing third rail power which was initiating at 09:31 hours.


The probable cause of the Person Struck by Train at Foggy Bottom Station event on August 28, 2022, was that the person deliberately trespassed into the roadway on Track 1 in the path of Train 603 as it entered the Foggy Bottom Station. This resulted in the person entering the train's dynamic envelope and fouling the roadway.

Analysis of data collected from systems of record, interview results with staff, and MTPD event report review identified no safety deficiencies related to any WMATA station facility, vehicle, or human factor components that contributed to the person being struck by the train.

Incident Site

Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through document review
- Formal Interviews SAFE was unable to interview the Train Operator as part of this
 investigation due to extended administrative leave. A written statement by the Train
 Operator was reviewed and is included.
- Documentation Review Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
 - Employee Training Procedures & Records
 - Employee Certifications
 - Employee 30-Day work history
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

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- Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Procedures Manual
- Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)
- Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) / Incident Investigation Team (IIT) postincident analysis data
- Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) post-incident inspection data
- Maximo
- System Data Recording Review Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - ARS (Audio Recording System) playback [Radio and Landline Communications]
 - Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS)
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Sunday, August 28, 2022, ARS playback revealed that at approximately 08:28 hours, the Operator of Train ID 603 notified the ROCC that a person jumped in front of their train at Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1. The train arrived at Foggy Bottom and immediately stopped with two cars on the platform. The Train Operator was operating a Silver Line Train ID 603, [L3232/3233x2034/2035x3251/3250].

The Radio RTC acknowledged and initiated emergency notifications to the respective internal and external departments. ROCC de-energized third rail power at Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1, and began single-tracking on the orange and silver line trains between Foggy Bottom and Clarendon Stations and blue line trains between Foggy Bottom Station and Arlington Cemetery Stations on Track 2. At 08:29 hours, the MAC notified MTPD dispatch via radio. At 08:30 hours, the ROCC AOM placed a call to 911, the Buttons RTC de-energized third rail power on Track 1, and the Radio RTC dispatched an RTRA Supervisor to Foggy Bottom Station. At 08:32 hours, the MPD and DCFEMS were dispatched to Foggy Bottom Station. Also, at 08:32 hours, the Station Manager was instructed by ROIC to assist with the offload of Train ID 603.

The Buttons RTC advised ROIC at 08:34 hours, that single tracking would commence. Initial reports at 08:35 hours, from the Train Operator to the Radio RTC and AOM were that the person crawled out from underneath the train and was uninjured, standing on the third rail coverboard and leaning against the wall. The person was removed from the roadway at 08:35 hours, the person was retrieved from the roadway by opening the off-platform side door and escorting them to the platform with minor injuries. At 08:36 hours, the ROCC AOM requested that BOCC dispatch a supervisor to assist as single-tracking trains were bypassing Foggy Bottom Station. At the same time, DCFEMS established Incident Command at 23rd Street.

The MAC advised MTPD at 08:41 hours, that third rail power had been de-energized. No RTRA Supervisor was present to hot stick at that time. At 08:43 hours, MTPD advised of one person in custody with non-life-threatening injuries, only minor injuries to the left hand and right shin. OEP advised that the person was retrieved from the roadway by opening the off-platform side door and escorting them to the platform where DCFEMS assessed their condition.

Based on ARS playback, at 08:46 hours, the ROCC Radio RTC announced Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 1A was in effect per the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH). At 08:49 hours, an MTPD Unit assumed Unified Command. Additionally, upon arrival of the RTRA Supervisor at 08:50 hours, the ROCC Radio RTC appointed them as the RTRA Forward Liaison. RTRA removed the Train Operator from service for post-incident toxicology

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testing per RTRA's SOP 102-1, *Removing an Employee from Service*. At 08:50 hours, MTPD advised that Train ID 603 was offloaded with no injuries reported.

At 08:52 hours, DCFEMS concluded Unified Incident Command and turned the scene over to MTPD. At 08:53 hours, the MAC inquired with MTPD about the potential of resuming single-track operations, which commenced at 08:59 hours. MTPD directed Train 603 was not to be moved pending further processing. At 09:14 hours, the RTC advised the Power Desk that they had brought down power on Track 1 between the Traction Power and Tie Breaker Rooms at Foggy Bottom Station. At 09:22 hours, ATCM notified MOC that they were commencing a track inspection at Foggy Bottom Station. At that time, MTPD advised that they had concluded their crime scene analysis, and Train 603 was released, the scene had been turned over to RTRA, and third rail power could be re-energized when appropriate.

MTPD advised at 09:25 hours, that the person was transported by Medic 23 with an MTPD escort to the Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (CPEP) for follow-up care. At 09:30 hours, ROCC began making calls related to re-energizing third rail power which was initiating at 09:31 hours.

Based on the Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS) data, Train ID 603 entered Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1, with a train speed of 22 MPH. The Train Operator initiated the emergency brake sequence after the emergency push button was depressed with a train speed of 23 MPH and 8 feet before entering the station. The train came to a complete stop approximately 104 feet after entering the station, stopping with almost two full cars on the platform. The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) / Incident Investigation Team (IIT) post-incident analysis revealed that there was no data to support any anomalies with the consist that may have contributed to this incident.

In support of the incident investigation, MTPD provided SAFE their hot wash summary report that revealed at 08:28 hours, the person jumped into the roadway at the Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1, and was struck by a train. A review of CCTV confirmed the event and that the person was able to remove themselves from beneath the train after it passed over them. Per the MTPD report, the individual appeared to intentionally enter the roadway and placed their body in harm's way.

At 09:22 hours, Emergency Response Team (ERT) personnel reported a good track inspection, and all personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway. Based on ARS playback, at 09:24 hours, the RTRA Forward Liaison reported to the ROCC that MTPD personnel were clear of the roadway and completed their investigation. Normal rail service resumed at 09:30 hours.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)



Figure 1 - At 08:28:54 hours, Train ID 603 entered Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1, when the Train Operator advised that the person jumped in front of the train into the roadway per ARS.

Based on ARS playback, at 08:28 hours, Train Operator operating a Silver Line train [Train ID 603, [L3232/3233X2034/2035X3251/3250] notified the ROCC Radio RTC that their consist struck a person within the platform limits at Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1.




Figure 2 - At 08:30:06 hours, the green symbol on the AIMS power display shows that the third rail power was subsequently de-energized at Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1.

Based on ARS playback, at 08:35 hours, the fire department began treating the injured person on the platform and subsequently transported the person to a nearby facility (CPEP). At 09:32 hours, third rail power was restored on Track 1. Incident Train ID 603 moved towards West Falls Church Yard for post-incident inspection.

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Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone, ambient, and radio communications, revealed the following:

following:	
Time	Description
08:28:54 hours	<u>Train ID 603 Train Operator:</u> Reported to the Radio RTC a person jumped in front of the train.
	Radio RTC: Requested, "if the customer was struck by the train."
	Train ID 603 Train Operator: Reported, they were unsure, but the customer
	was under the train.
	Radio RTC: Asked how many cars were on the platform.
	<u>Train ID 603 Train Operator:</u> Reported two cars on the platform. [Radio Ops 2]
08:29:22 hours	Radio RTC: "Copy that Train ID 603, standby and make good announcements to your customers." [Radio Ops 2]
08:29:38 hours	Train ID 603 Train Operator: Notified the Radio RTC they had approximately two cars within the platform limits.
08:29:40 hours	MAC: Advised MTPD communications of a person struck at Foggy Bottom
	Station, track 1. Train Operator in the process of a ground walkaround. [MTPD-1X]
08:30:06 hours	ROIC Specialist: Called DCFEMS communications and advised of a person
	struck by a train at Foggy Bottom Station, located at 890 23rd street
	Northwest. The customer struck was located on Track 1, on the lower level
	in the direction towards Largo and New Carrollton Station.
	DCFEMS: Notified the WMATA personnel, emergency personnel and MPD
	were en route to the location. The DCFEMS requested if the person was
	conscious or breathing.
	ROIC Specialist: Reported, unknown if the person is
	conscious/breathing. The ROIC Specialist did not have any additional
00.00.40.1	information at the time to provide. [Phone]
08:30:16 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed Train ID 603 Train Operator to key down, apply handbrake and key customers off [offload] train. [Radio Ops 2]
08:30:37 hours	Radio RTC: RTC Dispatched an RTRA Supervisor for a person possibly
	struck by a train. [Radio Ops 2]
08:31:07 hours	Train ID 603 Train Operator: "Central, give me a chance to put the handbrake
	on."
	Radio RTC: Acknowledged radio transmission and instructed Train ID 603
	to notify what car number the brake is applied when complete. [Radio Ops
08:31:51 hours	Station Manager: Reported that they were on the platform for assist. [Radio
00.01.01 110010	OPS 2]
08:32:02 hours	Radio RTC: Requested an update from Station Manager on Foggy Bottom Platform. [Radio Ops 2]
08:32:08 hours	MAC: Advised MTPD Dispatch that one person is underneath the train. Third
13.32.00 110010	rail power was de-energized. The Station Manager was on the platform,
	organizing the offload of Train ID 603 through the lead car. [MTPD-1X]
08:32:17 hours	DCFEMS Dispatch: Dispatched local MPD, DCFEMS and EMS personnel to
	Foggy Bottom Station for a person struck by train. [Open MHz]

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Time	Description
08:34:50 hours	ROIC Specialist: Advised Metro Information Center that single tracking
	would commence between Foggy Bottom and Arlington Cemetery. [Phone]
08:35:26 hours	Train ID 603 Train Operator: Reported to the Radio RTC, "the customer did
	not make contact. They are walking down to the end gate." [Radio Ops 2]
08:35:35 hours	Radio RTC: Confirmed the transmission and advised the Train Operator
	MTPD was en route to their location. [Radio Ops 2]
08:32:41 hours	Station Manager: "Central, be advised I have the customer. He is over by
	the third rail." Station Manager heard advising the customer to "stay where you are." [Radio Ops 2]
08:33:06 hours	Station Manager: "Central, did you deenergize third rail or do you need me
	to do that?" [Radio Ops 2]
08:33:14 hours	Radio RTC: "That's a negative, You can standby. We have deenergized third
	rail, are there signs of life? over" [Radio Ops 2]_
08:33:20 hours	Station Manager: "He is standing over by the wall on track 1." [Radio Ops
	2]
08:33:45 hours	Station Manager: "Calling Central" No response [Radio Ops 2]_
08:33:48 hours	Radio RTC: I copy that, standby for me. 603 Operator come in to Control." [Radio Ops 2]
08:34:00 hours	Radio RTC: "Affirm, would you be able to try to get the customer back on
	platform" [Radio Ops 2]
08:34:50 hours	ROIC Specialist: Advised the Metro Information Center that single tracking
22.24.52.1	would commence.
08:34:58 hours	Radio RTC: "603 come in to Central over?" No response from 603. [Radio
22.25.24.1	Ops 2]
08:35:04 hours	Radio RTC: "Walk them down to" [Radio Ops 2]
08:35:06 hours	Radio RTC: "The tracks and get him on the platform that way." [Radio Ops 2]
08:35:12 hours	Radio RTC: Affirm, that's a good copy, just verify for me the train did not
	make contact; and I copy you did say you were going to walk customer down
	to end gate to platform." [Radio Ops2]
08:35:26 hours	Train ID 603 Train Operator: "Affirm, he didn't make contact, so I am going
00.05.441	to walk him down to end gate."_[Radio Ops 2]
08:35:44 hours	Train ID 603 Train Operator: Requested the Radio RTC send assistance
08:35:58 hours	with getting the customers off the train as they were getting impatient. Buttons RTC: Contacted the AOM and advised that the person was not
00.33.36 110015	struck, and they were still attempting to get the customer off the roadway.
	The AOM requested confirmation if the Train Operator applied a handbrake
	and engaged the mushroom due to power being de-energized under the
	train.
	The AOM notified the Buttons RTC they would be down at the console.
	[Phone]
08:36:00 hours	ROIC Specialist: Requested assistance from BOCC and advised that trains
	would single track from Rosslyn to Foggy Bottom Station but bypass Foggy
	Bottom Station due to a person struck by train. BOCC reported that they
	would send a supervisor to the location [Phone]
08:36:12 hours	Radio RTC: Dispatched RTRA Supervisor from Metro Center to Foggy
	Bottom Station [Radio Ops 2]
08:36:56 hours	DCFEMS: Engine 23 notified DCFEMS communications they were on scene
	and Incident Command was established at 23 rd Street [Open MHz]

Time	Description
08:41:01 hours	MAC: Advised MTPD Dispatch that third rail power had been de-energized,
	and they were sending an RTRA supervisor on the scene to hot stick. [MTPD-1X]
08:42:45 hours	Radio RTC: Reported single tracking around Foggy Bottom station and
	trains will not service the location. [Radio Ops 2]
08:43:18 hours	<u>DCFMES:</u> Notified Incident Command that MTPD had one person in custody [Open MHz]
08:43:22 hours	Radio RTC: Gave permission to Train ID 604 to stop at Foggy Bottom Station and allow the RTRA Supervisor to key off the train. [Radio Ops 2]
08:43:36 hours	Train ID 604 Train Operator: "Copy direct not going to service Foggy Bottom, let the supervisor key self-off." [Radio Ops 2]
08:43:43 hours	DCFEMS: Reported to communications they were keeping one engine on scene. [Open MHz]
08:44:06 hours	MAC: Advised OEP that the person crawled out from under the train and stood on top of the 3 rd Rail Cover. The person was pulled through the open door on the right side by MTPD of the Train to safety. Sustained lacerations to both hands only. [Phone]
08:44:45 hours	MTPD: Notified dispatch that they were out with a subject with injuries to their right shin and left hand, non-life threatening. MTPD advised that medical assets on the scene are attending to the Person. [MTPD-1X]
08:49:07 hours	MTPD: Assumed control of the Incident Command Post at the Station Kiosk and switched communications to MTPD 2X. [MTPD-1X]
08:50:51 hours	MTPD: Advised Train ID 603 offloaded, of 77 passengers. No customers complained of any injuries. [MTPD-2X]
08:51:28 hours	MTPD: Advised RTRA Supervisor had arrived on scene [MTPD-2X]
08:52:46 hours	MTPD: Advised that DCFEMS devolved Unified Incident Command and turned the scene over to MTPD. The person is still out with EMS on the platform. [MTPD-2X]
08:53:33 hours	MAC: Requested MTPD to advise on the commencement of single-track operations. MTPD advised still assessing the subject and that ERT and PLNT were both on scene. [MTPD-1X]
08:54:31 hours	<u>BOCC:</u> Advised ROIC Foggy Bottom Station would be serviced, however they would still be single tracking. BOCC advised ROIC buses were placed on standby for the bridge. [Phone]
08:59:59 hours	MTPD: Advised it was clear to commence single-track operations. [MTPD-2X]
09:00:28 hours	MTPD: Advised the MAC that Train ID 603 is not to move; still an active crime scene. MTPD also advised that CID is not on the scene yet. [MTPD-2X]
09:01:43 hours	MAC: OEP advised MTPD awaiting CID. [Phone]
09:14:24 hours	Buttons RTC: Notified Power Desk that they brought down power at Track 1, between the Traction and the Tie Breaker C04 and would call when they are ready to restore. [Phone]
09:17:54 hours	MAC: Called WMSC for code classification and advised the WMSC of series of events and injuries. The MAC did say the customer made contact with some type of equipment under the train. WMSC: Event Scene Release 09:19 hours. [Phone]

Time	Description
09:22:19 hours	MAC: Contacted Foggy Bottom command and reported the RTRA Supervisor confirmed third rail power de-energized. The MAC further requested if CID completed their efforts.
	MTPD: Advised the MAC that CID had concluded the crime scene analysis. [MTPD-2X]
09:24:34 hours	MTPD: Advised the MAC that Train ID 603 was released, the scene had been turned over to RTRA, and that third rail power could be brought back up. [MTPD-2X]
09:25:55 hours	MTPD: Advised dispatch the person was transported by Medic 23 to the Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (CPEP) with MTPD escort. [MTPD-2X]
09:30:33 hours	<u>Buttons RTC:</u> RTC made multiple calls to ops channels third rail power restoration track 1 Foggy Bottom and to make announcements. [Phone]
09:32:28 hours	Buttons RTC: Called Power Desk and reported Power Restoration ready to be commenced Foggy Bottom track 1.
	<u>Power Desk:</u> Authorized power restoration between Charlie Zero 4 Traction Power and Charlie Zero 4 Tie Breaker Track 1 only. [Phone]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) / Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS) Timeline

Event Recorder (ER) Data Graph/Sequence of Events

Based on the CMOR IIT analysis of the downloaded VMS and ER, details from the data analysis are as follows:

Train ID 603, Lead Car 3232 ATC was not communicating with the VMS at the Time of the Incident. The Belly Car 2034-35 VMS Data was used to analyze this incident. According to the Data, Lead Car 3232 initiated emergency Braking at a Speed of 23MPH 8 Feet before entering Foggy Bottom Station (C04) Platform, on Track-1. Train ID 603 entered Foggy Bottom Station (C04) at speed 22 MPH Master Controller in B5. Train ID 603 came to a complete stop 104 Feet on to the Foggy Bottom Platform, 496 Feet short of the Station 8 Car Marker on Track-1.

A combined use of VMS DATA and Foggy Bottom Double Track map confirmed the Train ID603 was 104 Feet into the Foggy Bottom Station Platform when it completely came to a stop which is approximately 2 Cars on the Station Platform as viewed in the Platform Video. This implies, Train ID 603 stopped 496 Feet short of the End of Station 8 car Marker.

Lead Car 3232 Master Controller was placed in P3 at 09:39:43:46 and the Train began to move in the direction of Farragut West Station.

Additional recommendation sent to CMNT to troubleshoot and fix the TL21 B not reporting to VMS. The interview with ROCC showed regular Door keys were used to open the doors to get the customers out. There were no faults in equipment logs that would have contributed to this incident. The emergency Brake system worked as designed."

Incident Date: 08/28/2022 Time: 08:28 hours

Final Report – Collision Rev 2

E22554

Rev 1 SAFE 709 - 10/26/2022 Drafted By: Reviewed By: Rev 1 SAFE 71 – 10/26/2022 Approved By: Rev 1 SAFE 71 – 10/27/2022

Time Event Chart VMS Belly Car 2032-35

**Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources


Time	Description of Event	MC Position	Speed	Distance to 8 Car Marker
08:28.25.32	Train ID 603 Master controller placed in B1, speed 39MPH, 336 Feet BEFORE Foggy Bottom Station Platform	B1	39MPH	936 Feet
08:28:25.51	Train ID603 speed 38MPH with Master Controller placed in B2, 325 Feet BEFORE Foggy Bottom Station Platform	B2	38MPH	925 Feet
08:28:28.26	Master Controller placed in B1, Train speed 33MPH, 181 Feet BEFORE Foggy Bottom Station Platform	B1	33МРН	781 Feet
08:28:29.83	Master controller placed in B5, speed 31MPH, 109 Feet BEFORE Foggy Bottom Station Platform	B5	31MPH	709 Feet
08:28:32.36	Emergency Braking initiated on Train ID 603, at SPEED 23MPH, 8 Feet BEFORE Foggy Bottom Station Platform	Emergency	23MPH	608 Feet
08:28:32.61	Train ID 603, Lead Car 3232 entered Foggy Bottom Station (C04) on Track-1 Platform at speed 22MPH with Master Controller in B5	B5	22MPH	600 Feet
08:28:38.46	Train ID 603 came to a complete stop 104 Feet on to the Foggy Bottom Platform	B4	00	496 Feet short of the 8 Car Marker
09:39:43.46	Master Controller placed in P3, and the Car began to move to the next Station	P3		

Note: The VMS data does not show any abnormalities with the railcar's operations contributing to this incident. All the subsystems' safety components, such as Automatic Train Control (ATC), brakes, and propulsion, acted as designed to bring the consist to a complete stop.


Incident Date:08/28/2022 Time: 08:28 hours Final Report – Collision Rev 2

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Belly Car 2034-35 VMS Data Analysis Graph #1



Lead Car 3232-33 VMS Data Analysis Graph #2



Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

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Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)

Upon arrival at the scene, CMNT performed an on-site exterior and interior inspection of the affected car. No damage was identified, and the train operated safely back via permissive block as Train ID 703 to West Falls Church Railyard. Additionally, CMNT performed a post-incident inspection on the brake system, propulsion system, and master controller operational checks. CMNT found these subsystems worked as designed. CMNT did note some communications issues with the lead car R3232, which are not in their report but did not impact the operation. CMNT did not identify any anomalous conditions that contributed to the collision event.

Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

COMR personnel performed a comprehensive radio operational test at Foggy Bottom Station, Tracks 1 and 2. The test was successful, and the signal was at an optimal level.

After reviewing the Audio Recording System playback, there did not appear to be any communication deficiencies over the radio.

Weather

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature at 86 ° F. Based on findings, weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC)

Related Rules and Procedures

- SOP # 1A COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF EMERGENCIES ON THE RAIL SYSTEM
- SOP # 102-1 REMOVING AN EMPLOYEE FROM SERVICE
- SOP # 26 PERSON HIT BY A TRAIN
- MSRPH Rule 3.82.3 Train Operators, operating in manual mode while in revenue service, shall enter the station at speed no greater than 40 MPH and be prepared to properly berth the train at the "8" car marker.

Human Factors

Fatigue

Evidence of Fatigue:

Conditions at the time of the incident were evaluated to distinguish whether evidence of fatigue was present. Video of the incident was reviewed for behaviors suggesting fatigue. No indications of fatigue were evident from the video. The Train Operator reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk:

Incident data was evaluated for fatigue risk factors. There were no major risk factors for fatigue identified. The incident time of day (08:28 hours) does not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The employee worked day shifts in the days leading up to the incident. The employee reported a total of 6 hours and 15 minutes of sleep in the last sleep period preceding the incident and was awake for 4.2 hours at the time of the incident. The off-duty period preceding

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the incident was 13.4 hours long, which provided the opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. The employee reported usual workday sleep durations of 8 hours and no issues with sleep.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Train Operator complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Findings

- The Train Operator entered Foggy Bottom station at 22 MPH, which is below the maximum speed of 40 MPH when entering a station.
- The AIMS display shows that at 08:30 hours third rail power was de-energized at Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1 within two minutes of the reported event.
- WMATA personnel complied with SOP #1A and SOP #26 procedures when responding to this event.
- Based on CCTV playback, the person appeared to have intentionally jumped on the roadway in front of the incoming Train ID 603.
- Based on a post-incident station inspection, SAFE did not identify any slip or trip hazards that may have contributed to this event.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Third rail power was de-energized for MTPD and other emergency services personnel to enter the roadway to rescue the person and conduct their investigation at Foggy Bottom Station. Track 1.
- RTRA removed the Train Operator from service for post-incident toxicology testing.
- RTRA removed Train ID 603 from service for post-incident inspection.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Person Struck by Train at Foggy Bottom Station event on August 28, 2022, was that the person deliberately trespassed into the roadway on Track 1 in the path of Train 603 as it entered the Foggy Bottom Station. This resulted in the person entering the train's dynamic envelope and fouling the roadway.

Analysis of data collected from systems of record, interview results with staff, and MTPD event report review identified no safety deficiencies related to any WMATA station facility, vehicle, or human factor components that contributed to the person being struck by the train.

Recommended Corrective Actions

The investigation did not identify major procedural or personnel actions requiring recommended corrective actions.

Incident Date:08/28/2022 Time: 08:28 hours Final Report – Collision Rev 2

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Appendices

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

Appendix A – Train Operator Incident Report

The Train Operator is a WMATA employee with fourteen years of service and eight years of experience as a Train Operator. The Train Operator holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in July 2023. The Train Operator successfully completed the Train Operator Job Task Proficiency Evaluation in September 2020.

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Train Operator Incident Report, Page 1 of 2

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Customer injury	☐ Customer Illnes		Employee Injury	☐ Employee	
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Train Operator Incident Report, Page 2 of 2

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NIA			n/2	n/2	n/a		172
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Name 17	12		Address n/				Injury? 17/4
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Incident Date:08/28/2022 Time: 08:28 hours Final Report – Collision Rev 2

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RTRA Supervisor Report, Page 2 of 2

Incident Date:08/28/2022 Time: 08:28 hours Final Report – Collision Rev 2

E22554

Drafted By: Rev 1 SAFE 709 – 10/26/2022 Reviewed By: Rev 1 SAFE 71 – 10/26/2022 Approved By: Rev 1 SAFE 71 – 10/27/2022

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.

	INC	IDENT	SUMMARY	
Incident Requiring ICS	Activation:	Other In	cident	
*Incident Commander (IC):		1 (L L 1 (L L L L L L L L L L	
MTPD CCN:	2022-04906		Local CCN:	
*Date ICS Initiated:	8/28/2022		*Time ICS Initiated:	8:46:00 AM
*Date ICS Terminated:	8/28/2022		*Time ICS Terminated:	9:24:00 AM
*Duration of Incident:	38 minutes		*Service Disrupted Disrupted Type: Disrupted Time:	Y - Yes
Incident Location:	Foggy Bottom Metro Station		Command Post Location:	Kiosk
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):			Command Aid for OSC:	
Forward Liaison:			Unified Command:	Other, Agency
OCC Liaison:			Alternate Channel:	Y - Yes MTPD 2X
Single Tracking Track No.: Time Started: Time End:	Y - Yes 2 8/28/2022 8:3 8/28/2022 9:5		Bus Bridge Established From: To:	N - No
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	Yes Yes		Power De-energized: De-energized Time:	Y - Yes 8/28/2022 8:40:00 AM

MTPD Hotwash Report, Page 1 of 4

Incident Date:08/28/2022 Time: 08:28 hours Final Report – Collision Rev 2


E22554

OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name Dept:	N - No	Medical Attention Required/Requested:	Y - Yes Medical Attention for potential injuries from being struct by a train
		CID Response: Y - Yes	

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary




MTPD Hotwash Report, Page 2 of 4

Incident Date:08/28/2022 Time: 08:28 hours Final Report – Collision Rev 2

E22554

Drafted By: Rev 1 SAFE 709 – 10/26/2022 Reviewed By: Rev 1 SAFE 71 – 10/26/2022 Approved By: Rev 1 SAFE 71 – 10/27/2022



Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS			
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	N - No		
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:			
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	N - No		
If "Yes," location where video is stored:			

OBSERVATIONS

0830 hours: MAC advise individual struck at Foggy Bottom Metro by train 603 direction of Largo

0834 hours: MAC advises that the individual climbed from underneath the train and is standing on the light fixtures

0834 hours: A-24 arrives on scene and confirms incident

0836 hours: A-2, 226 and 871 arrive on scene and assist with getting the individual back onto the platform

0838 hours: A-27 secures train operator in vehicle for arrival of CID

0840 hours: Power has been de-energized

0841 hours: Subject was assisted into the train car by A-2 and A-24 with non life threatening injuries.

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
0925 hours: MTP OSC broken down and hot wash conducted.

Hot wash of incident conducted following a person struck by train at FOGB:
All MTPD Officers and Officials were present at the hot wash along with OEP
Command post was not established in a timely manner leading rail to believe they were still in charge on the scene.
Radio communications was spotty throughout the event with transmissions and reception.
Only 1 CSS officer working for the entire Department during A-Section
All WMATA personnel responded to the command post to check in with OSC.
The MAC was providing pertinent updates as he was receiving them from rail.
The MAC knew that SOP 1A was put in place and was going through MTPD OSC for all decisions regarding movement of the train and power being brought back up.
On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date

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Appendix E - Root Cause Analysis



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