



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0201 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Court House Station – November 7, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on March 7, 2023

Safety event summary:

Smoke entered the passenger platform area at Court House Station at approximately 7:46 p.m. on November 7, 2022 as a train was on the platform. Additional smoke entered the station as that train departed. Evidence suggests this was not initially noticed by Metrorail riders or employees. After two other trains arrived and departed, each drawing more smoke into the passenger platform area, a rider exiting a fourth train identified and reported the smoke to the Station Manager, who had just returned to the kiosk area. The Train Operator of the next train to enter the station (at approximately the same time the rider was speaking to the Station Manager) reported to the Rail Operations Control Center at 7:56 p.m. "a lot of smoke" and that "the whole platform is smoking up." The Rail Traffic Controller asked the Train Operator "Is it dust?" The Train Operator said "No, it's actually smoke. Smoke. Fire smoke. I turned off EV [environmental/ventilation system] and kept moving." System records show station ventilation fans were activated at 7:58 p.m. The station was later closed and evacuated as part of the response.

The Station Manager reported smelling smoke on the platform, and said that one possibility was that the smoke was coming from the pylons on the platform.

At 8:01 p.m., approximately 5 minutes after the report from the Train Operator of "a lot of smoke," the Rail Operations Information Center called Arlington County's 911 call center requesting an Arlington County Fire Department response for smoke coming from a platform pylon. The station was closed and evacuated. Managers in the Rail Operations Control Center later directed that trains continue to move through the station on both tracks without stopping.

After the report of smoke, the Rail Controller initially contacted the Train Operator of Train 609 on the platform at Rosslyn Station, but then moved on to other communications. The Train Operator of Train 609 continued toward Court House Station. The Rail Controller then directed the Train Operator to stop in the tunnel between stations. A following train moved toward and into Rosslyn Station. The Rail Controller directed the Train Operator of Train 609, contrary to Metrorail safety procedures, to operate the train with passengers on board to Court House Station where there was smoke. The Rail Controller gave the Train Operator permission to proceed through Court House Station without stopping with the ventilation system turned off.

Other Orange and Silver Line trains were directed via blanket radio announcements on both the Ops 4 (8:03 p.m.) and Ops 2 (8:08 p.m.) radio channels to bypass Court House Station with ventilation systems turned off.

Metrorail dispatched Low Voltage Electrical Maintenance personnel for a report of fire from a platform light pylon.

Arlington County Fire Department personnel reached the Court House Station platform at approximately 8:10 p.m. and found no evidence of the smoke or fire from a pylon that had been reported to them. Therefore, they left the scene to maintenance personnel.

While the station was evacuated for life-safety reasons, Metrorail data systems show Train 901 serviced the station platform.



During the event, Metrorail did not immediately utilize available data, specifically closed circuit television video, to identify that the smoke was entering the passenger platform area through a ceiling dome vent. These vents allow air to flow between the passenger area of the station and ancillary areas of the station or ventilation shafts. Metrorail later identified via that video review at approximately 8:45 p.m. that the smoke had entered the passenger platform area of the station via the ceiling dome vent. This was identified after the Arlington County Fire Department had departed after their investigation of what had been reported as the possible smoke from light pylons. The source of smoke was not further communicated to the Arlington County Fire Department.

Starting at approximately 8:34 p.m., a Metrorail Office of Emergency Preparedness responder checked station vent shafts and rooms and communicated the location that the smoke entered the station to other Metrorail personnel on scene. In addition to a smoke smell in the station, the individual identified a smoke smell at some shaft grates above the station, but did not observe smoke at that point. The individual did not investigate inside the shaft. Low Voltage Electrical Maintenance personnel did not identify any smoke source from a station pylon. Metrorail's Emergency Response Team did not identify any smoke source on the roadway. They performed this inspection from a passenger train, which Metrorail used for such an inspection contrary to Metrorail's safety procedures. The personnel on scene stated that the Plant Maintenance Department was responsible for the area where smoke had been coming from. Personnel on scene suggested the smoke may have been coming from a shaft with an open grate to the street, but did not confirm this.

Low Voltage Electrical Maintenance personnel identified at approximately 9:09 p.m.-9:14 p.m. that multiple fan breakers were tripped. Low Voltage Electrical Maintenance Personnel, Rail 1 in the Rail Operations Control Center, the Mission Assurance Coordinator in the Rail Operations Control Center, and the Office of Emergency Preparedness responder spoke about this issue. Metrorail opted to keep the breakers off and to schedule repairs after the scheduled end of passenger service.

Metrorail reopened the station at 9:10 p.m.

Further investigation identified the vent where the smoke entered displayed signs of dirt or soot when compared to other similar vents in the station.

Metrorail initially reported this event to the WMSC (just outside of the required two-hour notification window) as fire or smoke in the station. Following discussion with the WMSC, the notification was corrected the following day to an evacuation for life safety reasons, and Metrorail also reported the event to the Federal Transit Administration as required for such an evacuation.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was discarded smoking or similar materials from outside the Metrorail system into a grate that led to burning of debris built up in the Metrorail shaft. Contributing to deficiencies in response was Metrorail not consistently following the incident command system structure.

Corrective Actions:



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Improve ROCC training by tailoring quarterly training for the ROCC about SOP 1A posture whenever Rail Transportation Supervision is dispatched in response to a critical event or when MTPD assumes command. (Status: Expected completion date extended to April 30, 2023)

Provide instructor-led incident management training to ROCC personnel to demonstrate ideal incident command practices. (Status: Expected completion date extended to July 1, 2023)

Issue memorandum covering key SOP 1A benchmarks. (Status: Expected completion date extended to April 30, 2023)

Examples of related open CAPs:

- C-0049 addressing finding related to ROCC environment and staffing (Scheduled completion date December 2023)
- C-0056 addressing finding that Metrorail's ROCC recruitment and retention approach is failing. (Scheduled completion date August 2024)
- C-0162 addressing that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. Further, Metrorail's training requirements are insufficient to prepare personnel to respond to and/or manage emergencies within the NIMS/ICS framework. These deficiencies have contributed to ineffective and improper emergency response and emergency management. (Scheduled completion date January 2025)
- C-0166 addressing that Metrorail's calls to public safety answering points (911 call centers) are inconsistent, incomplete and contribute to delayed or ineffective emergency response. (Scheduled completion date February 2024)
- C-0177 addressing that MTPD does not have a useable incident checklist for emergencies. (Scheduled completion date September 2023)

WMSC staff observations:

The Fire Liaison Officer radio was not functioning during the event. The Fire Liaison was patched through to units on scene by phone.

Metrorail did not follow the incident command system throughout the response, leading to a lack of clear determination of how to proceed as additional information was identified by responding personnel. This included not clearly handing off command of the scene as specified in Metrorail's SOP #1A. During the investigation, ROCC management stated that Rail Controllers no longer stated on the radio when the procedure is in effect. Despite the report of smoke and the evacuation, there was confusion about whether SOP #1A governing command and control of emergencies was in effect, and there was no clearly designated incident command throughout the event. Metro Transit Police Department personnel did not conduct a hot wash for this event. Safety issues in this area of command and control relate to a lack of coordination among personnel on scene, and between the ROCC and personnel on scene.

The Radio Rail Traffic Controller was on a brief break at the time the event was first reported, which contributed to the Buttons Rail Traffic Controller performing elements of both roles during the event. However, the Buttons Rail Traffic Controller did not return duties to the Radio Rail Traffic Controller when the Radio Rail Traffic Controller returned, and



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therefore did not perform all elements of Buttons Controller responsibilities such as those related to fan operations and red signal protection.

Metrorail has said it would require more than 60 certified rail traffic controllers to provide a fully professionalized control center environment including scheduled breaks and training during normal shifts, and at least 42 controllers to cover all required shifts with full 8-hour shifts without those breaks. As of February 2023, Metrorail has fewer than 42 controllers. Metrorail is also filling mid-level managerial vacancies in the control center. The WMSC has identified and raised this safety concern regarding inadequate staffing to Metrorail as part of other oversight activities, has increased the frequency of discussions with an expanded group of ROCC leadership, and has again elevated this safety issue to the Chief Safety Officer and General Manager.

Metrorail carried out an after-action review for this event involving responding entities, which is a positive practice.

The Office of Emergency Preparedness responder noted that Metrorail personnel determining the source of smoke or responding to similar emergencies would benefit from easier, timely access to engineered drawings of vent shafts and proximity to street addresses to assist with timely identification and resolution of hazards. Metrorail has recently added or improved address signage at some locations across the system.

Metrorail's corrective actions for this event were initially scheduled to be complete by the end of January. These corrective actions are not complete, and are now scheduled to be completed by the end of April (2) and by July 1 (1).



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)
FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22724

| | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Date of Event: | November 7, 2022 |
| Type of Event: | Evacuation for Life Safety (Smoke) |
| Incident Time: | 19:46 hours |
| Location: | Court House Station |
| Time and How received by SAFE: | 21:57 hours, MAC |
| WMSC Notification Time: | 21:57 hours 11/07/2022 (I-11) 10:12 hours 11/08/2022 (A-4) |
| Responding Safety Officers: | OEP Primary Responder |
| Rail Vehicle: | Train ID 909 (Lx3094/95x2049/48x3286/87T) |
| Injuries: | None |
| Damage: | None |
| Emergency Responders: | ACFD, MTPD |
| SMS I/A Number | 20221107#104048MX |

Court House Station – Evacuation for Life Safety
November 7, 2022
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|--------------|---|
| ACFD | Arlington County Fire Department |
| ARS | Audio Recording System |
| BOCC | Bus Operations Control Center |
| CAP | Corrective Action Plan |
| CCTV | Closed-Circuit Television |
| COMR | Office of Radio Communications |
| ERT | Emergency Response Team |
| MOC | Maintenance Operations Center |
| MSRPH | Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook |
| MTPD | Metro Transit Police Department |
| NOAA | National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |
| OEP | Office of Emergency Preparedness |
| PLNT | Plant Maintenance |
| RTC | Rail Traffic Controller |
| RTRA | Office of Rail Transportation |
| ROCC | Rail Operations Control Center |
| ROIC | Rail Operations Information Center |
| SAFE | Department of Safety |
| SMNT | Systems Maintenance |
| WMATA | Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority |
| WMSC | Washington Metrorail Safety Commission |

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

At 19:56 hours on November 7, 2022, the Train Operator of Train ID 909 reported smoke on the platform at Court House Station.

A review of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) revealed that before the report, at 19:46 hours, smoke began emitting from a ceiling vent while Train ID 603 serviced the platform on track 1, which was not observed by personnel or customers. As Train ID 603 departed the platform, more smoke was drawn from the vent.

After Train ID 603 cleared the station, the light-colored smoke remained above the light pylons and appeared to dissipate. Train ID 608 arrived at Court House Station on track 2 at 19:49 hours. As the train departed the station, more smoke was drawn from the vent.

After Train ID 608 cleared the station, the smoke dissipated again. At 19:53 hours, Train ID 903 arrived at Court House Station and serviced the platform on track 2. As the train departed the station, more smoke was drawn from the ceiling vent and lingered above the light pylons.

Several customers that alighted Train ID 903 reacted to the smoke as they ascended the escalator. One customer encountered the Station Manager as they returned to the kiosk and pointed toward the platform.

At 19:55 hours, Train ID 909 arrived at Court House Station and serviced the platform on track 1. The Train Operator reported significant smoke to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC), stated they turned off their Environmental (EV) System, and departed. The Station Manager arrived on the platform and reported a lingering smell of smoke, believing it was coming from the top of a light pylon.

While the Station Manager was investigating the report, Train ID 609 was servicing the platform at Rosslyn Station on track 2. A ROCC Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) attempted to contact Train ID 609 but stopped and returned to Train ID 909 to gather more information. Train ID 609 then departed Rosslyn Station in the direction of Court House Station before being stopped by the RTC. The initial instructions to ID 609 were to key down and reverse ends for a move back to the platform at Rosslyn Station. At approximately the same time, the Station Manager of Court House Station reported smelling smoke on the platform of Court House Station. The Station Manager reported the source of the smoke was unknown but that a customer stated it might be from one of the light pylons. The RTC then instructed Train 609 to turn off their EV system and bypass Court House station.

At 20:01 hours, ACFD was contacted via 911 by the ROIC, who reported smoke emitting from a pylon. They then contacted the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and reported smoke at the Court House Station platform.

At 20:06 hours, Plant Maintenance (PLNT) advised the Buttons RTC that the fans were operating appropriately. The RTC then relayed this information over the radio. The Buttons RTC then requested Shuttle Bus support from Rosslyn to Clarendon from the Bus Operations Communication Center (BOCC). At approximately the same time, the MOC dispatched Low-Voltage Power personnel to Court House Station for a report of fire from an illumination pylon. At

approximately 20:08 hours, the RTC advised all Orange and Silver Line Trains to bypass Court House Station with EV turned off.


At 20:10 hours, ACFD arrived on the platform at Court House Station and inspected the illumination pylons. At 20:25 hours, the MAC updated the On-Call SAFE Director and advised ACFD was on the scene for approximately five minutes and had cleared the scene. Inspection efforts continued by maintenance personnel, but no source was identified, and no additional smoke was observed. At 21:10 hours, the RTC advised Court House Station could be serviced by all Orange and Silver Line Trains.

The Probable Cause for the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons was the presence of smoke that entered Court House Station from a dome vent due to an undetermined source.

Incident Site

Court House Station Platform, Track 1.

Field Sketch/Schematics



**Not to Scale. Oriented North. The approximate location of the dome vent is notated by a red star.*

Purpose and Scope

This accident investigation and candid self-evaluation aim to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Evacuation for Life Safety Event on November 7, 2022, SAFE dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The preliminary investigative methodologies included the following:

- Physical site inspection and assessment through video and documents review.
- Formal Interviews of the following personnel:
 - ROCC Operations Manager
 - MAC
 - Buttons RTC
 - Radio RTC
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor Report
 - Emergency Response Team (ERT) Timeline Report
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback includes OPS 2, OPS 4 and OPS 5 Radio
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

CCTV revealed that on November 7, 2022, at 19:46 hours, light-colored smoke began emitting from a ceiling vent while Train ID 603 serviced the platform on track 1; however, personnel or customers did not observe this. As Train ID 603 departed the platform, more smoke was drawn from the vent.



Figure 1: An initial plume of smoke billowed from a dome vent at approximately 19:46 hours. The ceiling vent is inside the top of the red circle.

After Train ID 603 cleared the station, the smoke remained above the light pylons and appeared to dissipate. Train ID 608 arrived at Court House Station on Track 2 at 19:49 hours. As the train departed the station, more smoke was drawn from the vent.



Figure 2: A second plume of smoke was observed coming from a dome vent at approximately 19:51 hours. The customers on the platform did not react to the smoke.

After Train ID 608 cleared the station, the smoke dissipated again. At 19:53 hours, Train ID 903 arrived at Court House Station and serviced the platform on track 2. As the train departed the station, more smoke was drawn from the vent and lingered above the light pylons. Several customers who alighted Train ID 903 ascended the escalator and reacted to the smoke. One customer encountered the Station Manager as they passed the kiosk and pointed toward the platform.

At 19:55 hours, Train ID 909 arrived at Court House Station and serviced the platform on track 1. The Train Operator reported significant smoke to the ROCC and stated they turned off their EV System and departed. The Button RTC contacted the MOC desk and requested fan activation. They then attempted to clarify if the Train Operator observed dust, to which the Train Operator responded that it was smoke. The Station Manager arrived on the platform and reported a lingering smell of smoke, believing it was coming from the top of a light pylon.



Figure 3: Train ID 909 noticed the smoky haze of Court House Station at approximately 19:56 hours.

While the Station Manager was investigating the report, Train ID 609 was servicing the platform at Rosslyn Station on Track 2. An RTC attempted to contact Train ID 609 but stopped and returned to Train ID 909 to gather more information. Train ID 609 then departed Rosslyn Station in the direction of Court House Station before being stopped by the RTC. At approximately the same time, the Station Manager of Court House Station reported smelling smoke on the platform of Court House Station. The Station Manager reported the source of the smoke was unknown but that a customer had stated it might have been coming from one of the light pylons.



Figure 4: A third plume of smoke was observed coming from a dome vent at approximately 19:57 hours.

At approximately the same time, the RTC contacted the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) to activate the fans at Court House Station (110-ROCC-ALL-04-00). At approximately 19:59 hours, the RTC requested Train ID 609 to perform a visual inspection from their location to Court House Station.



Figure 5: Station Manager on scene investigating at approximately 19:59 hours.

At 20:00 hours, the RTC ordered Train ID 609 to stop, clear the interlocking at Rosslyn Station, key down and stand down for an absolute block back to Rosslyn Station.

The ACFD was notified by the ROCC at 20:01 hour by the Button RTC, who reported smoke emitting from a pylon. The station was evacuated by the Station Manager, and trains bypassed it with their EV system disabled. At approximately 20:06 hours, a bus bridge was requested, and MOC dispatched Power Units to Court House Station for a report of smoke from a light pylon.

At 20:03 hours, the OPS 4 Radio RTC advised all trains to bypass Court House Station. At 20:04 hours, the Buttons RTC requested the Station Manager to evacuate Court House Station. The Station Manager advised the Buttons RTC that they could smell smoke but could not observe any or determine a point of origin. At approximately 20:06 hours, MTPD Officers were dispatched to the scene. At approximately 20:08 hours, the RTC advised all Orange and Silver Line Trains to bypass Court House Station.

CCTV footage determined ACFD arrived on the scene at approximately 20:10 hours. At 20:12 hours, the OPS 4 Radio RTC advised the RTRA Supervisor to go to Court House Station. At 20:16 hours, MTPD Officers on the scene reported ACFD was commencing clearing the scene

At approximately 20:25 hours, the MAC updated the On-Call SAFE Director and advised that ACFD was on scene for about 5 minutes and then cleared the scene, unable to locate the source of the smoke. The MAC further reported the smoke had dissipated.

The OEP Primary Responder arrived on location at 20:34 hours and conducted visual inspections of the rooms on the Mezzanine level, and vent shafts on the street level. An odor was found

outside the grates off Clarendon Boulevard to the east of the elevator. No smoke was observed at that time.



Figure 6: ACFD on scene investigating at approximately 20:10 hours.

At 20:37 hours, the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) confirmed that the Emergency Response Team (ERT) was on the scene at 20:30 hours. The MOC then received information from the Station Manager of Court House Station that smoke was coming from a dome vent. MOC reported that Low-Voltage Power personnel were called to assess the event. MOC was advised of the point of origin again at 20:42 hours.

At 20:51 hours, Low-Voltage Power personnel arrived on the scene. Personnel unsuccessfully attempted to locate the smoke source. At 21:10 hours, the RTC advised Court House Station could be serviced by all Orange and Silver Line Trains.




Figure 7: The Subject Dome Vent




Figure 8: An example of a clean Dome Vent located nearby.

Chronological Event Timeline

| Time | Description |
|----------------|---|
| 19:56:15 hours | Train Operator Train ID 909 reported "A lot of smoke" at Court House Station and requested fan activation. Train Operator Train ID 909 stated "The whole platform is smoking up." RTC asked if it was "A dusty kind of smoke. Is it dust?" Train Operator Train ID 909 replied "No, it's actually smoke. Smoke. Fire Smoke. I turned off EV and kept moving, over." [Radio, OPS-2] |
| 19:56:36 hours | RTC contacted MOC desk and requested fan activation at Court House Station. [Phone, ROCC-Plant] |
| 19:56:58 hours | RTC attempts to contact Train ID 609 but stops and contacts Train ID 909 again to clarify conditions. [Radio, OPS-2] |
| 19:57:59 hours | RTC attempted to contact a Rail Supervisor in the area without success. [Radio, OPS-2] |
| 19:59:18 hours | The Station Manager reported a smoke smell on the Court House Station platform. The Station Manager reported that the source was unknown and that a customer reported it was emanating from a pylon. Station Manager requested the Fire Department be contacted. The controller asked if train movement is safe and stated the Fire Department had just been notified. [Radio, OPS-5] |
| 20:00:05 hours | RTC ordered Train ID 609 to stop their train, clear the interlocking at Rosslyn Station, key the train down and stand down for an absolute block back to Rosslyn Station. [Radio, OPS-2] |
| 20:00:30 hours | RTC advised Train ID 409 they had a permissive block to the Eight-Car Marker of Rosslyn Station, Track 1 [Radio, OPS-2] |
| 20:01:00 hours | The ROIC contacted ACFD and reported smoke from pylons on the platform at Court House Station. [Phone, ROCC COPS] |
| 20:01:10 hours | RTC advised Train ID 609 to key back up on the train's outbound end and bypass Court House Station. [Radio, OPS-2] |
| 20:02:00 hours | Buttons RTC contacted MTPD and reported smoke from pillars. [Phone, ROCC COPS] |
| 20:02:58 hours | Buttons RTC advised the ROIC to dispatch the Station Manager. <i>*Note: Station Manager was on the platform at 19:59 hours.</i> [Phone, ROCC BO2] |
| 20:03:14 hours | Radio RTC advised all trains to bypass Court House Station. [Radio, OPS-4] |
| 20:04:26 hours | ROIC Information Controller advised the Station Manager to evacuate Court House Station. The station manager advised the RTC they can smell smoke but could not ascertain point of origin. [Phone, ROCC COPS] |

| | |
|----------------|---|
| 20:05:03 hours | Buttons RTC advised the ROIC that Train ID 604 and Train ID 609 were the first trains to bypass Court House Station. RTC also advised ACFD had been called to the scene. [Phone, ROCC BO2] |
| 20:05:26 hours | ROCC OM advised MOC of the smoke event at Court House Station and that Low Voltage Power had been dispatched. [Phone, ROCC BO2] |
| 20:06:00 hours | PLNT Desk contacted OPS 2 Buttons RTC and confirmed that fans were requested and turned on for the area of Court House Station. [Phone, ROCC COPS] |
| 20:06:00 hours | Buttons RTC requested for Shuttle Bus support from Rosslyn to Clarendon to BOCC. [Phone, ROCC COPS] |
| 20:06:09 hours | RTC advised AOM fans had already been activated. <i>*Note: Fans were activated at the initial report of smoke, 19:57 hours.</i> [Phone, ROCC BO2] |
| 20:06:13 hours | MOC dispatched Power Units to Court House Station for a report of smoke from a light fixture. [Phone, ROCC COPS] |
| 20:06:16 hours | MTPD dispatcher dispatched MTPD units to the report of fire at Court House Station. [Radio, MTPD 1X] |
| 20:06:52 hours | The ROCC OM advised Senior Rail Operations Staff of the bypass of Court House Station and the request for a bus bridge of the area. [Phone, ROCC COPS] |
| 20:08:21 hours | RTC advised all Orange and Silver Line Trains to bypass Court House Station at no more than 15 MPH. [Radio, OPS-2] |
| 20:10:00 hours | ACFD arrived on platform and inspected light pylons. [Radio, Open MHZ] |
| 20:12:17 hours | The Radio RTC advised the RTRA Supervisor to respond to Court House Station. [Radio, OPS-4] |
| 20:13:37 hours | FLO advised ACFD dispatch that their radio was not operational and offered further assistance to units on scene. ACFD Dispatch placed the FLO through to the ACFD units on scene. ACFD units on scene did not require anything further from the FLO. ACFD stated they were uncertain of the point of origin of the smoke. [Phone, FLO] |
| 20:16:23 hours | MTPD advised ACFD were in the process of clearing the scene. [Radio, MTPD 1X] |
| 20:25:15 hours | MAC updated the On-Call SAFE Director and advised ACFD was on the scene for approximately 5 minutes and had cleared the scene. They were unable to locate the source of the smoke. The MAC further advised the smoke had dissipated. [Phone, ROCC PWR ASST] |
| 20:37:04 hours | MOC confirmed ERT on scene. [Phone, ROCC PLNT-2] |
| 20:37:57 hours | Station Manager informed MOC the smoke was coming from a dome vent within Court House Station. MOC confirmed Low-Power personnel responded and fielded the report about the smoke event. |

| | |
|----------------|---|
| | [Phone, ROCC PLNT-2] |
| 20:42:00 hours | MOC was advised that smoke came from a dome vent above the escalators at Court House Station and not from a light fixture. [Phone, ROCC PLNT-2] |
| 20:51:41 hours | Low-Voltage Power Personnel advised the RTC that they had arrived on the scene. [Phone, ROCC Silver-2] |
| 21:09:05 hours | MOC was advised by Low-Voltage Power personnel that multiple fan-breakers had been tripped. Low-Voltage Power requested to reset the breakers; however, MOC advised liaising with SAFE on scene to coordinate the reset of the breakers. [Phone, ROCC Silver-2] |
| 21:10:34 hours | RTC Advised Court House Station could be serviced. [Radio, OPS-2] |
| 21:10:50 hours | ERT advised MOC that no arcing or sparking was observed and that they could not determine the smoke's source. [Phone, ROCC Silver-2] |

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

Consultation of AIMS determined at 19:56 hours, Train ID 909 serviced Court House Station and reported the smoke in the station. At the same time, Train ID 457 serviced Rosslyn Station



Figure 9: Train ID 909 and 457 servicing Court House and Rosslyn Stations, respectively.

At approximately 19:58 hours, fans were activated at Court House Station while Train ID 909 approached and Train ID 609 serviced Rosslyn Station. Train ID 409 can be observed leaving Foggy Bottom Station at this time.




Figure 10: Train ID 909, 609 and 409. Fans were activated at Court House Station

| | | | |
|--------------|----------|----------------|--|
| 19:57:02.399 | 11/07/22 | Arlington Cem | Signal C06-4 COMMANDED Prohibit Exit BY 035431 AT jgwksyg-wkstpp |
| 19:57:35.119 | 11/07/22 | Court House | UPE IB Fan Exhaust COMMANDED Exhaust BY 006286 AT jgwksfacil1pp |
| 19:57:35.119 | 11/07/22 | Court House | UPE IB Fan On COMMANDED Emergency On BY 006286 AT jgwksfacil1pp |
| 19:57:41.368 | 11/07/22 | Court House | UPE OB Fan Exhaust COMMANDED Exhaust BY 006286 AT jgwksfacil1pp |
| 19:57:41.368 | 11/07/22 | Court House | UPE OB Fan On COMMANDED Emergency On BY 006286 AT jgwksfacil1pp |
| 19:58:03.803 | 11/07/22 | Court House | K01-1 Fresh Air AHU Fan CURRENT STATE = Abnormal |
| 19:58:10.889 | 11/07/22 | Court House | UPE IB Fan Status COMMANDED CHANGE = Emergency On |
| 19:58:10.889 | 11/07/22 | Court House | K01-1 Fresh Air AHU Fan CURRENT STATE = Normal |
| 19:58:10.889 | 11/07/22 | Court House | K01-2 Fresh Air AHU Fan CURRENT STATE = Abnormal |
| 19:58:17.950 | 11/07/22 | Court House | UPE OB Fan Status COMMANDED CHANGE = Emergency On |
| 19:58:17.950 | 11/07/22 | Court House | K01-2 Fresh Air AHU Fan CURRENT STATE = Normal |
| 19:58:29.001 | 11/07/22 | Potomac Yard | C11-2 AC Transformer Overtemp Stage 2 CURRENT STATE = POINT FAILURE |
| 19:58:29.001 | 11/07/22 | Potomac Yard | C11-2 AC Transformer Overtemp Stage 1 CURRENT STATE = POINT FAILURE |
| 19:58:37.511 | 11/07/22 | Potomac Yard | C11-2 AC Transformer Overtemp Stage 2 CURRENT STATE = POINT ONLINE |
| 19:58:37.511 | 11/07/22 | Potomac Yard | C11-2 AC Transformer Overtemp Stage 1 CURRENT STATE = POINT ONLINE |
| 19:58:46.848 | 11/07/22 | Huntington | TRAIN 455 TURNBACK ON TRACK C15-C2-623 |
| 19:58:51.233 | 11/07/22 | Shady Grove | TRAIN 115 TURNBACK ON TRACK A15-A1-942 |
| 19:59:10.921 | 11/07/22 | Court House | K01-1 Fresh Air AHU Fan CURRENT STATE = Normal ALARM FINAL ACK. BY SYSTEM AT jgsc-hostapva |
| 19:59:11.896 | 11/07/22 | Huntington | DESTINATION CODE OF TRAIN 455 ON TRACK C15-C1-613 CHANGED BY 035431 AT jgwksyg-wkstpp |
| 19:59:11.896 | 11/07/22 | Huntington | CONSIST OF TRAIN 455 ON TRACK C15-C1-613 CHANGED BY 035431 AT jgwksyg-wkstpp |
| 19:59:12.510 | 11/07/22 | Court House | FK1 Fan On COMMANDED Emergency Off BY 006286 AT jgwksfacil1pp |
| 19:59:12.934 | 11/07/22 | Rosslyn | C05-6 Signal Set Auto Route COMMANDED Cancel Auto Ro BY 014329 AT jgwksob-wkstpp |
| 19:59:13.566 | 11/07/22 | Court House | FK1 Fan Status COMMANDED CHANGE = Emergency Off |
| 19:59:15.433 | 11/07/22 | Rosslyn | C05-6 Signal Automatic Routing COMMANDED CHANGE = Manual |
| 19:59:16.436 | 11/07/22 | Branch Avenue | TRAIN 504 TURNBACK ON TRACK F11-F2-540 |
| 19:59:17.491 | 11/07/22 | Court House | K01-2 Fresh Air AHU Fan CURRENT STATE = Normal ALARM FINAL ACK. BY SYSTEM AT jgsc-hostapva |
| 19:59:18.622 | 11/07/22 | Brentwood Yard | TRAIN U37 ENTERED MONITORED TERRITORY AT TRACK CIRCUIT: B99-141TR |

Figure 11: Fan activation log.

SPOTS Report

The following tables reflect train movement through K01 through the event. Trains highlighted in red are those that traveled through the station after smoke appeared (19:46) and were reported to ROCC (19:56).

Select Platform: and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Select Times (0-24HRS): From To

| Generate Report | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|----------|--------|-------|-----------------|------------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|-------|--------------|--------------|---|--|--------------------------------|
| ID | Platform | length | dcode | Right door open | Right door close | dwelt | Left door open | Left door close | dwelt | Head Arrived | Tail cleared | cars | | Headway door open to door open |
| 906 | K01-1 | 6 | 20 | | | | 19:07:51 | 19:08:09 | 18 | 19:07:22 | 19:08:32 | 3290-3291 2024-2025 3086-3087 | | - |
| 601 | K01-1 | 6 | 51 | | | | 19:15:08 | 19:15:27 | 19 | 19:14:42 | 19:15:55 | 3242-3243 3214-3215 3230-3231 | | 7:17 |
| 907 | K01-1 | 6 | 20 | | | | 19:24:49 | 19:25:05 | 16 | 19:24:09 | 19:25:30 | 6145-6144 6002-6003 6052-6053 | | 9:41 |
| 602 | K01-1 | 6 | 51 | | | | 19:32:16 | 19:32:31 | 15 | 19:31:49 | 19:32:55 | 6074-6075 6164-6165 6106-6107 | | 7:27 |
| 908 | K01-1 | 6 | 20 | | | | 19:39:11 | 19:39:51 | 40 | 19:38:37 | 19:40:12 | 6022-6023 6063-6062 6021-6020 | | 6:55 |
| 603 | K01-1 | 6 | 51 | | | | 19:45:53 | 19:46:43 | 50 | 19:45:17 | 19:47:07 | 2069-2068 3226-3227 3152-3153 | | 6:42 |
| 909 | K01-1 | 6 | 20 | | | | 19:56:03 | 19:56:32 | 29 | 19:55:25 | 19:57:03 | 3094-3095 2049-2048 3286-3287 | | 10:10 |
| 604 | K01-1 | 6 | 51 | | | | | | | 20:05:06 | 20:05:43 | 3246-3247 3084-3085 3249-3248 | | - |
| 910 | K01-1 | 6 | 20 | | | | | | | 20:12:09 | 20:12:37 | 3275-3274 2033-2032 3235-3234 | | - |
| 605 | K01-1 | 6 | 51 | | | | | | | 20:16:57 | 20:17:49 | 2004-2005 3104-3105 2047-2046 | | - |
| 901 | K01-1 | 8 | 20 | | | | 20:25:01 | 20:25:07 | 6 | 20:24:30 | 20:25:58 | 7394-7395 7667-7666 7534-7535 7693-7692 | | 28:58 |
| 606 | K01-1 | 8 | 51 | | | | | | | 20:32:54 | 20:33:47 | 7584-7585 7735-7734 7662-7663 7623-7622 | | - |
| 902 | K01-1 | 6 | 20 | | | | | | | 20:39:45 | 20:40:30 | 3188-3189 2061-2060 3031-3030 | | - |
| 607 | K01-1 | 6 | 51 | | | | | | | 20:51:20 | 20:51:58 | 2074-2075 3250-3251 3073-3072 | | - |
| 903 | K01-1 | 6 | 20 | | | | | | | 20:55:28 | 20:56:19 | 6099-6098 6080-6081 6174-6175 | | - |

Figure 12: Court House Station Track 1.

Select Platform: and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Select Times (0-24HRS): From To

| Generate Report | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|----------|--------|-------|-----------------|------------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|-------|--------------|--------------|---|--|--------------------------------|
| ID | Platform | length | dcode | Right door open | Right door close | dwelt | Left door open | Left door close | dwelt | Head Arrived | Tail cleared | cars | | Headway door open to door open |
| 605 | K01-2 | 6 | 64 | | | | 19:04:35 | 19:04:51 | 16 | 19:04:06 | 19:05:18 | 2046-2047 3105-3104 2005-2004 | | - |
| 910 | K01-2 | 6 | 23 | | | | 19:09:20 | 19:09:36 | 16 | 19:08:46 | 19:10:03 | 3234-3235 2032-2033 3274-3275 | | 4.45 |
| 606 | K01-2 | 0 | 64 | | | | | | | 19:16:16 | 19:17:44 | 7622-7623 7663-7662 7734-7735 7585-7584 | | - |
| 901 | K01-2 | 8 | 23 | | | | 19:24:11 | 19:24:28 | 17 | 19:23:34 | 19:24:54 | 7692-7693 7535-7534 7666-7667 7395-7394 | | 14.51 |
| 607 | K01-2 | 6 | 64 | | | | 19:30:20 | 19:30:38 | 18 | 19:29:52 | 19:31:01 | 3072-3073 3251-3250 2075-2074 | | 6.09 |
| 902 | K01-2 | 6 | 23 | | | | 19:42:06 | 19:42:23 | 17 | 19:41:25 | 19:42:48 | 3030-3031 2060-2061 3189-3188 | | 11.46 |
| 608 | K01-2 | 6 | 64 | | | | 19:50:08 | 19:50:23 | 15 | 19:49:36 | 19:50:51 | 3160-3161 3054-3055 3159-3158 | | 8.02 |
| 903 | K01-2 | 6 | 23 | | | | 19:53:43 | 19:53:59 | 16 | 19:53:09 | 19:54:24 | 6175-6174 6081-6080 6098-6099 | | 3.35 |
| 609 | K01-2 | 6 | 64 | | | | | | | 20:03:57 | 20:04:17 | 3219-3218 3020-3021 3098-3099 | | - |
| 904 | K01-2 | 6 | 23 | | | | | | | 20:11:15 | 20:11:47 | 3005-3004 3119-3118 2043-2042 | | - |
| 610 | K01-2 | 6 | 64 | | | | | | | 20:16:22 | 20:16:54 | 6014-6015 6024-6025 6152-6153 | | - |
| 905 | K01-2 | 6 | 23 | | | | | | | 20:26:13 | 20:27:00 | 3066-3067 3277-3276 3267-3266 | | - |
| 611 | K01-2 | 6 | 64 | | | | | | | 20:33:24 | 20:34:14 | 3262-3263 3034-3035 3205-3204 | | - |
| 906 | K01-2 | 6 | 23 | | | | | | | 20:39:12 | 20:40:06 | 3087-3086 2025-2024 3291-3290 | | - |
| 601 | K01-2 | 0 | 64 | | | | | | | 20:45:04 | 20:45:58 | 3242-3243 3214-3215 3230-3231 | | - |
| 907 | K01-2 | 6 | 23 | | | | | | | 20:58:19 | 20:58:58 | 6053-6052 6003-6002 6144-6145 | | - |

Figure 13: Court House Station Track 2.

Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) Timeline

The OEP Primary Responder arrived on the scene at 20:34 hours. Once on scene, they contacted the ERT Supervisor, RTRA Supervisor, and Power Supervisor. At the time of arrival, MTPD and Arlington FD had both cleared the scene.

The MAC sent a video to the OEP Primary Responder's cell showing smoke from a vent in the ceiling of the tunnel within the platform limits of Court House Station. The OEP Primary Responder shared this video with the on-scene crews. ERT and Low-Voltage Power conducted inspections and determined that it was an area under control of PLNT. At this time, the smoke and smell cleared the station.

The OEP Primary Responder conducted visual inspections of the rooms on the Mezzanine level, and vent shafts on the street level. An odor was found outside the grates off Clarendon Boulevard to the east of the elevator. This information was relayed to the MAC to provide it to Rail 1/PLNT (yet to arrive). At that time, smoke was no longer seen.

At approximately 21:06 hours, a discussion was held with the crews on the scene, and it was agreed to resume revenue service to the station. This decision was relayed back to the MAC and Rail 1 via telephone.

At approximately 21:14 hours, the OEP Primary Responder was informed by Power personnel that they located two tripped breakers in Room K01 MC#1. The OEP Primary Responder was informed these were to control fans. A joint phone call was held with Low-Voltage Power, the MAC, and Rail 1. The decision was made to keep the breakers off and to schedule emergency service after revenue concluded.

Emergency Response Team (ERT) Timeline

ERT's Maximo entry (8633346) stated they responded to the scene at approximately 20:00 hours. At approximately 20:22 hours, ERT received the ROCC advised a report of smoke from a pylon light and trains to bypass Court House Station.

At approximately 20:30 hours, ERT arrived on the scene. Sixteen minutes later, ERT requested CCTV footage of the dome vent. At approximately 21:03 hours, ERT concluded their inspection via train, could not track any burning or arcing in the dome vent and completed their investigation.

An informal conversation with the responding ERT Supervisor determined that the root cause could not be determined.

Informal conversations with OEP management determined that after ACFD had cleared the scene, Incident Command was established by MTPD and ERT to investigate the root cause of the smoke. This command quickly dissolved once life-safety objectives were met and ERT concluded their scene review.

Office of Plant Maintenance (PLNT)

The Assistant Director of PLNT determined PLNT personnel were not dispatched to the scene by the MOC. PLNT would assemble a team of personnel in conjunction with Low-Voltage Power to assess potential root causes.

Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) and Systems Maintenance (SMNT)

The MOC dispatched SMNT Low-Voltage Power Personnel in response to the incident. Upon referring to the Maximo report (17467855), personnel responded to the MOC Alert about smoke from platform pylon lights. Upon arrival, Low-Voltage Power met with other personnel and found that smoke did not come from the lights but from vents above the tunnel.

SMNT personnel referred to ERT and conducted no further investigation on the scene.

Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)

MTPD advised no Hot-Wash, or After-Action Report was compiled for the incident.

A review of the CCTV footage and informal conversations with MTPD revealed ACFD personnel cleared the scene as MTPD arrived.

Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

COMR determined no network communications issues were present during the incident at both Court House Station (K01) and Rosslyn Station (C06). Further, a radio check of the area was performed, and no issues were observed.

Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA)

The RTRA Supervisor Provided the following Timeline:

At approximately 20:10 hours the ROCC contacted the RTRA Supervisor to respond to Court House Station for reports of smoke. At approximately 20:23 hours, the RTRA Supervisor arrived at Court House Station. Fire/EMS was dispatched and cleared before they arrived and could not locate the smoke source. MTPD were also on scene.

At approximately 20:30 hours, ERT arrived and began searching for the source of the smoke. At this time, the RTRA Supervisor and OEP walked the station, parking garage, and outside station areas. At this time, the smell of smoke was not as intense as when the RTRA Supervisor arrived. The RTRA Supervisor stated they checked all pylons and determined that smoke was not being emitted.

At approximately 20:45 hours, the location of the vent blowing smoke smell was determined, and breakers were tripped to turn off the fan. At approximately 21:10 hours, OEP deemed the Court House Station safe to service and reopened. At that time, a lingering smoke smell was present but far less noticeable than before.

At approximately 21:20 hours, the smell of smoke seemed to be most prominent on the outside grates; OEP notified all appropriate departments.

The RTRA Supervisor reported Court House Station was clear as of 21:35 hours.

Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) After-Action Review (11/30/2022)

On November 30, 2022, OEP held an After-Action Review about the above incident, including representatives from all the responders present at the incident, including ACFD. The exact cause of the smoke was not identified, but it was likely an ignition source outside of the Station. This source was inadvertently placed in leaves and debris gathered in a grate, which led to the station dome vents.

Further, representatives on the scene believe SOP #1A was enacted for the incident, including ROCC Senior Management representatives. The ROCC Senior Management representatives also provided a memorandum detailing that "SOP #1A is in effect" is no longer required to be mentioned by RTCs.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE interviewed four people. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

ROCC Operations Manager

- The ROCC Operations Manager (OM) stated their role was to provide oversight and supervision for the ROCC. The ROCC OM said they oversee the assistant OPS Supervisors, the maintenance Supervisor, and the information lead.
- The ROCC OM stated at approximately 19:55 hours, the AOM reported that Train ID 909 observed smoke in Rosslyn Station. The ROCC OM said they got the Station Manager to check Rosslyn Station. The ROCC OM stated approximately 2 minutes later, the Station Manager of Court House Station reported a customer complaint of smoke, potentially coming from a pylon.
- The ROCC OM stated they then had the Station Supervisor on the scene inspect the Station. The ROCC OM stated they had Train ID 604 on Track 1, approaching Clarendon station halt in position at Clarendon Station. The ROCC OM said they had Train ID 609 on Track 2 on approach to Court House station halt in the tunnel.
- The ROCC OM stated they and the FLO conducted checks of the CCTV footage and could not observe smoke in the area of Court House Station.
- The ROCC OM stated they had Court House Station evacuated, and trains continued movement through the station without stopping and unloading customers and ensuring their EV Systems were turned off.
- The ROCC OM stated SOP 1A was not implemented due to the lack of smoke observed on the scene.

Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC)

- The MAC stated that they had heard a report on the radio saying that smoke was reported at Rosslyn Station. The MAC said they pulled up the cameras for that station. After receiving a second call, approximately 2 minutes later, they stated they looked at the cameras at Court House Station and did not observe any smoke.
- The MAC contacted the On-Call SAFE Director and reported the information to them.
- The MAC stated they observed ACFD arrive on the scene to assess the origin of the smoke. The MAC noted the FLO was experiencing communication issues with their radio during the incident.
- The MAC stated MTPD arrived on the scene, followed by an OEP representative and other WMATA personnel. The MAC Operator said SOP 1A was not implemented; however Court House Station was evacuated.

Buttons RTC

- The Buttons RTC stated they heard a report of smoke at what sounded like Rosslyn Station. This was later corrected to Court House Station.
- The Buttons RTC stated Train ID 604 was at Court House Station, Track 1, at the same time the smoke announcement was reported. The Buttons RTC stated they sent out their required notifications, canceled signals, and took automatics off signals.

- The Buttons RTC stated the RTC called to activate the fans in Court House Station. The Buttons RTC stated the ROCC OM authorized trains to bypass Court House Station on both tracks, so long as each train's EV was switched off.
- The Buttons RTC stated SOP 1A should have been implemented but was not. The Buttons RTC stated the Radio RTC had the responsibility of implementing SOP 1A.
- The Buttons RTC and the Radio RTC jumped back and forth between the roles during the incident as the Radio RTC was on a break at the initial smoke report time. The Buttons RTC stated they felt it was necessary to take on additional responsibilities from the Radio RTC due to their inexperience.
- The Buttons RTC stated notifications to individual trains to bypass Court House Station was unnecessary and blanket statements to all Train Operators notifying them of the bypass were sufficient.
- The Buttons RTC stated Train ID 609 departed Rosslyn Station before the issuance of the report of smoke at Court House Station.

Radio RTC

- The Radio RTC originally stated they were assigned as the "As Directed" individual for the shift, but they were the assigned Radio RTC for that shift; they switched seats during the incident with the Buttons RTC.
- The Radio RTC stated they called the fan desk to have the fans turned on at Court House Station after the initial radio traffic from Train ID 909.
- The Radio RTC stated they had a Train on Track 2 of Rosslyn Station, en route to Court House Station that needed to be "Stopped and turned around."
- The Radio RTC stated they did not enact SOP #1A during the incident. The Radio RTC said there was a shortage of Supervisors in the ROCC to direct resources on the ground.
- The Radio RTC stated they were unaware that the Station was evacuated and advised they did not enact SOP #1A due to the decision to utilize both tracks, and bypass Court House Station.
- The Radio RTC stated the RTCs no longer announce SOP #1A over the radio. The RTC stated they are still responsible for assigning personnel as On-scene Commander and other functions affiliated with SOP #1A. The RTC stated that during the incident, this did not occur.
- The Radio RTC stated they then announced for all Orange and Silver Line Trains to bypass Court House Station, at 15 MPH, with their EV systems off.
- The Radio RTC stated a Supervisor was dispatched but was not assigned as an On-scene commander.
- The Radio RTC stated there was some confusion about the severity of the incident. The Radio RTC said they based their decision process on not enacting SOP #1A on the ROCC OM's decision to allow trains to bypass Court House Station and continue to use both tracks.
- The Radio RTC stated they believed SOP #1A was in effect due to emergency responders being on the scene, even though they did not announce SOP #1A.
- The Radio RTC advised guidance was in place by ROCC leadership articulating that RTCs no longer need to announce "SOP #1A is in effect."

Weather

On November 7, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 66°F, with light cloud cover. The event occurred within a tunneled section of the rail system. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Washington, DC.)

Related Rules and Procedures

- MSRPH SOP #1A - Command Control and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System
- MSRPH SOP #678 – Fire and Smoke on the Metrorail System

Human Factors

Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event due to an absence of evidence of fatigue present in the personnel interviewed.

Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event due to review of the schedules of personnel interviewed. Further, personnel interviewed reported no confounding issues with sleep, nor any abnormalities to the quality or quantity of sleep.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Findings

- Smoke was first observed, in retrospect, on CCTV at 19:46 hours from a ceiling vent. Two trains serviced the platform on track 1 but did not report the observation of smoke. Customers departing the trains did not report smoke to the Train Operator or Station Manager. Station Manager was not in the area of the kiosk until 19:55 hours.
- Train ID 909 reported the smoke to the Radio RTC after arriving on the platform on track 2 at 19:56 hours.
- The Station Manager initially reported smoke from the light pylons and requested ACFD response.
- Initial reports of severity varied between the Train Operator and the Station Manager.
- The ROCC OM, MAC, and FLO observed conditions via a CCTV review after the initial smoke report from the Train Operator of Train ID 909.
- The ROCC OM advised the RTC to have the Station Manager evacuate the Station and allow trains to bypass with the EV disabled.
- Approximately five minutes elapsed from the Train Operator's first report before the 911 call was placed by the ROIC, who reported smoke emitting from a pylon.
- Train ID 609 departed the Rosslyn platform in approach to Court House Station on track 1 after Train ID 909 first reported smoke. The Radio RTC attempted to contact them while they were on the platform but did not provide instructions.
- MTPD arrived on the scene as ACFD cleared the scene.
- Most personnel interviewed did not believe SOP #1A was initiated during the event.
- The Station Manager and OEP Primary Responder walked the platform and surrounding garages and checked the vents but could not determine the smoke's cause. TRPM, SMNT, and PLNT responded to the scene; however, no one could determine the cause of the smoke.

- The FLO reported issues with their radio and had to liaise with ACFD through their dispatch, via telephone.
- COMR reported no network issues with the radios at either Court House Station or Rosslyn Station.
- The OEP After-Action Review determined the source of the smoke was most likely an external, accidental ignition of debris inside the exhaust grate of the dome vent.
- The OEP After-Action Review also determined that first-responders assumed SOP #1A was in effect, including senior ROCC management; however, no MTPD Hot Wash was conducted, no announcement over the radio was observed, and most personnel interviewed believed SOP #1A was not in place.
- OEP management advised that once ACFD was clear of the scene, Incident Command was established with MTPD and ERT. However, IC was quickly dissolved, leaving ERT to investigate.
- The Radio RTC advised guidance was in place by ROCC leadership articulating that RTCs no longer need to announce "SOP #1A is in effect," which was confirmed through liaison with ROCC Senior Management.
- Third-Rail Power was not de-energized at any point.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Trains were initially stopped in place while the cause of the smoke was assessed via CCTV.
- ACFD, MTPD, the Station Manager, OEP Primary Responder, and ERT were dispatched to assess the cause of the smoke.
- Trains were advised to bypass the Court House Station platform and leave their EV Systems off.
- Follow-up inspections of the mechanical rooms and shafts around the station were conducted.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause for the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons was the presence of smoke that entered Court House Station from a dome vent due to an undetermined source.

SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

| Corrective Action Code | Description | Responsible Party | Estimated Completion Date |
|-------------------------------|---|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 104048_SAFE_CAPS_ROCC 001 | Tailor quarterly training for the ROCC about SOP 1A posture whenever RTRA Supervision is dispatched in response to a critical event or when MTPD assumes command. | ROCC | 04/30/2023 |
| 104048_SAFE_CAPS_ROCC 002 | Provide Instructor-led IMF training to demonstrate ideal Incident Command practices. | ROCC/OEP | 07/01/2023 |
| 104048_SAFE_CAPS_ROCC 003 | Construct a Memorandum covering key SOP 1A benchmarks until IMF is implemented. | ROCC/ RTRA/MTPD | 04/30/2023 |

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

ROCC Operations Manager (OM)

The ROCC OM stated they had been with WMATA for 16 years, 1.5 years as a ROCC OM.

The ROCC OM stated their role, before and during the incident, was to provide oversight and supervision for the ROCC. The ROCC OM stated they oversee the assistant OPS Supervisors, the maintenance Supervisor, and the information lead.

The ROCC OM stated at approximately 19:55 hours, the AOM reported that Train ID 909 had observed smoke in Rosslyn Station. The ROCC OM stated they then got the Station Manager to check Rosslyn Station. The ROCC OM stated approximately 2 minutes later, the Station Manager of Court House Station reported a customer saw smoke in the station, potentially coming from a pylon.

The ROCC OM stated they then had the station manager inspect the Station. The ROCC OM stated they had Train ID 604 on Track 1, approaching Clarendon station halt in position at Clarendon Station. The ROCC OM stated they had Train ID 609 on Track 2 on approach to Court House station halt in position in the tunnel.

The ROCC OM stated they and the Fire Liaison Officer conducted checks of the CCTV footage and could not observe smoke in the area of Court House Station.

The ROCC OM stated they had Court House Station evacuated, and trains continued movement through the station without stopping and unloading customers and ensuring EV Systems were turned off.

The ROCC OM stated SOP 1A was not implemented due to the lack of smoke observed on the scene.

The ROCC OM stated the vent fans were activated manually [by MOC Desk]; however, it was reported to the ROCC OM that the source of the smoke was the dome vents.

Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC)

The MAC stated they had been with WMATA for ten years. The MAC said they are a Prevention and Mitigation Specialist within the OEP.

The MAC stated that they had heard a report on the radio saying that smoke was initially reported as being sighted at Rosslyn Station. The MAC stated they pulled up the cameras for that station; however, after receiving a second call, approximately 2 minutes later, they pulled up the cameras at Court House Station and did not observe any smoke.

The MAC stated they called the On-Call SAFE Director and reported the information to them.

The MAC stated they observed Arlington County Fire Department appear on the scene to assess the origin of the smoke. The MAC Operator said the FLO was experiencing communication issues with their radio during the incident.

The MAC stated MTPD arrived on the scene, then an OEP representative and other WMATA personnel. The MAC Operator said SOP 1A was not put into practice; however, Court House Station was evacuated.

The MAC Operator stated "Rail 1" decided to bypass Court House Station and establish a bus bridge.

Buttons RTC

The Buttons RTC stated they had been with WMATA for ten years, with three years as an RTC.

The Buttons RTC stated they worked with the Radio RTC on OPS 2 to allow the Radio RTC to focus on answering the radio and coordinating assets. The Buttons RTC said one person could perform both the Buttons RTC and the Radio RTC roles.

The Buttons RTC stated they heard a report of smoke at what sounded like Rosslyn Station. This was later corrected to Court House Station.

The Buttons RTC stated Train ID 604 was at Court House Station, Track 1 when the smoke announcement was reported. The Buttons RTC said they sent out their required notifications, canceled signals, and took automatics off signals.

The Buttons RTC stated the Radio RTC called to activate the fans in Court House Station. The Buttons RTC said the ROCC OM authorized trains to bypass Court House Station on both tracks, so long as each train's EV was switched off.

The Buttons RTC stated SOP 1A should have been implemented; however, it was not. The Buttons RTC said the Radio RTC was responsible for implementing SOP 1A.

The Buttons RTC stated they and the Radio RTC shared roles during the outset of the incident, as the Radio RTC was on break during the initial reporting of smoke in the Station. The Buttons RTC stated they felt it was necessary to take on additional responsibilities from the Radio RTC due to their inexperience.

The Buttons RTC stated sending notifications to individual trains to bypass Court House Station was unnecessary and that blanket statements to all Train Operators notifying them of the bypass was sufficient.

The Buttons RTC stated Train ID 609 had left Rosslyn Station prior to the issuance of the report of smoke at Court House Station.

Radio RTC

The Radio RTC stated they had been with WMATA for 17 years, with two years as an RTC.

The Radio RTC originally stated they were assigned as the "As Directed" individual for the shift; however, they later said they were the assigned Radio RTC for that shift and switched seats during the incident with the Buttons RTC.

The Radio RTC stated at the commencement of the incident, they received a call from an "Orange Line Train" to advise of smoke in Court House Station. The Radio RTC stated they called the fan desk to have the fans turned on at Court House Station.

The Radio RTC had a Train on Track 2 of Rosslyn Station, en route to Court House Station that needed to be "Stopped and turned around."

The Radio RTC stated they did not enact SOP #1A during the incident. The Radio RTC said there was a shortage of Supervisors in the ROCC to direct resources on the ground. The Radio RTC stated they were unaware that the Station was evacuated and advised they did not enact SOP #1A due to the ROCC Supervision's decision to continue to utilize both tracks and bypass Court House Station. The Radio RTC later stated SOP #1A was in effect due to emergency responders being on the scene.

The Radio RTC stated they then announced for all Orange and Silver Line Trains to bypass Court House Station, at 15 MPH, with their EV systems off.

The Radio RTC stated they no longer announce SOP #1A over the radio. They are still responsible for assigning personnel as Incident Commander and other functions affiliated with SOP #1A. The Radio RTC stated that during the incident, this did not occur.

The Radio RTC stated a Supervisor was dispatched but was not assigned as an incident commander.

The Radio RTC stated there was some confusion about the severity of the incident. The Radio RTC said they based their decision process on not enacting SOP #1A on the ROCC OM's decision to allow trains to bypass Court House Station and continue to use both tracks.

Appendix B – OEP Report Timeline (Redacted)

Clear Form



SAFE OEP Incident Response Report

This report is to be completed **immediately** after the completion of any response to a WMATA incident and sent to the OEP Senior Response & Recovery staff member overseeing incident responses. All information is to be obtained from ROCC Alerts, MTPD Alerts, BOCC Alerts, MAC, CADWatch, or personal notes taken during the response.

Save this document to your PC under the file name: "SAFE OEP Incident Response Report-XXXXXXmonthdayyearinitials. Fill in the location in place of the "XXXXX" followed by the date as: 01012022, then your initials.

| | | | |
|--|-----------------------|------------|--|
| 1. Incident Date/Time: | 11/07/2022 | 20:07 | OPS Channel: |
| 2. Incident Location/Line: | Courthouse | K | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. Responder 1 (Name): | [Redacted] | | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. Responder 2 (Name): | [Redacted] | | 3 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. Responder 3 (Name): | [Redacted] | | |
| 6. Responder 4 (Name): | [Redacted] | | |
| 7. MAC 1/MAC 2 (Name): | [Redacted] | [Redacted] | |
| 8. Response Type: | Fire/Smoke In Station | | |
| 9. Initial Incident Time: | 20:07 | | |
| 10. Response Time: | 20:21 | | |
| 11. On-Scene Time: | 20:34 | | MTPD Channel: |
| 12. Disregard Time: | | | |
| 13. Time Incident moved to Recovery: | 20:30 | | 1X <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2X <input type="checkbox"/> 3X <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 14. In-Service Time: | 21:30 | | |
| 15. MIC (Name/Call Sign): | N/A | | |
| 16. Jurisdictional Incident Commander: | Arlington | | |
| 17. Fire Liaison/Dept: | [Redacted] | | |
| 18. Sup. IC Liaison Name: | | | Power: Supervisory or Red Tag (Y/N) (If red tag, provide #) |
| 19. Sup. Fwd Liaison Name: | | | |
| 20. MTPD Forward: | | | |
| 21. Maintenance Lead: | [Redacted] | | N |
| 22. Investigations MTPD: | | | |
| 23. Investigation SAFE/Other: | | | |
| 24. Transportation Lead: | | | |

SAFE OEP Incident Response Report

Incident narrative

At approximately 20:17 hrs I contacted the MAC desk in reference to a ROCC alert at Courthouse Station. I spoke with [REDACTED] who informed me that there was smoke in the station, Fire Department was clearing and ERT was on scene. At this point in time he informed me that [REDACTED] was enroute as responder. I made contact with [REDACTED] and we decided that due to my proximity I would arrive quicker.

I arrived on scene at approximately 20:34 hrs. Once on scene I made contact with ERT supervisor [REDACTED], RTRA supervisor [REDACTED] and Power Supervisor [REDACTED]. At time of arrival MTPD and Arlington FD had both cleared the scene.

A video was sent by MAC to my cell showing smoke from a vent in the ceiling of the tunnel within platform limits. I shared this video with the on scene crews. ERT and power conducted inspections and determined that it was an area under control of Plant. At this time the smoke and smell had cleared the station and trains were single tracking. I conducted visual inspections of the rooms on Mezzanine level, and vent shafts on street level. An odor was found outside the grates off clarendon blvd to the east of the elevator. This information was relayed to the MAC to provide to Rail 1/Plant (yet to arrive). At this time smoke was no longer seen.

At 20:06hrs a discussion was held with the crews on scene, and we agreed to resume revenue service to the station. This decision was relayed back to the MAC and Rail 1 via telephone.

At 21:14hrs I was informed by Power that they located two tripped breakers in Room K01 MC#1. I was informed these were to control fans. A joint phone call was held with Power, MAC, and Rail 1. The decision was made to keep the breakers off, and to schedule emergency service after revenue concluded.

What went well during the incident?

All parties communicated effectively. Decisions were made jointly, and information was shared freely. Safety was a priority for the crews involved. All units on scene consulted with me prior to demobilizing.

What can be improved?

I would have benefited from engineered drawings of the vent shafts and their proximity to street side addresses.

Submit

Appendix C – ERT Maximo Report Timeline

Incident Tracking

Server: CPU10204

Query

Find Maximo Incident #:

Select Action

List View

Incident

Related Records

Timeline

Incident: 8633346

Station Location: K01

Incident Description: REPORT OF SMOKE FROM PYLON LIGHT FIXTURE ON

Total Delay (mins)

Line Delay Total:

Passenger Delay Total: 1

Train / Bus Delay Total:

Timelines

Filter

1 - 6 of 6

| | Time And Date | | Summary | Trouble Code | Tra |
|---|---------------|--|------------------------------------|--------------|-----|
| ✓ | 11/7/22 20:00 | | ERT █████ DISPATCHED | | |
| > | 11/7/22 20:22 | | REPORT OF SMOKE FROM PYLON LIGH | SMKS | 60% |
| > | 11/7/22 20:30 | | ERT █████ ON SITE | | |
| > | 11/7/22 20:46 | | ERT █████ REQUESTED THE VIDEO FROM | | |
| > | 11/7/22 21:03 | | ERT FINISHED HIS INSPECTION FOR B | | |
| > | 11/7/22 21:03 | | ERT █████ REPORTED NOTHING ARCING | | |

Details

Time And Date: 11/7/22 20:00

Train ID:

Direction:

Line Delay:

Passenger Delay:

Train / Bus Delay:

Trouble Code:

INCIDENT - Facility Location:

Incident level code (for ROCC use):

Partial:

Offload:

Late Dispatch:

No Dispatch:

Created By: █████

Created Date: 11/7/22 20:44

Appendix D – SMNT Maximo Report (Redacted)



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 2
MXTSPROD

Work Order #: 17467855
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
11/08/2022 07:29

Work Description: K01 (STATION), REPORT OF SMOKE COMING FROM PYLON LIGHT ON THE PLATFORM
Job Plan Description:

| Work Information | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|------------|---|----------|--------------------------------|------------------|---------------|-----------|
| Asset: LVEIMK01 | | K01, LVEIM SYSTEM ASSETS, COURT HOUSE, STATION | | Owning Office: LVEIM | | Parent: | | | |
| Asset Tag: LVEIMK01 | | | | Maintenance Office: POWR-LVEIM | | Create Date: 11/07/2022 20:12 | | | |
| Asset S/N: LVEIMK01 | | | | Labor Group: LVEIMAPC | | Actual Start: 11/07/2022 22:31 | | | |
| Location: 6976 | | K01, COURT HOUSE, STATION | | Crew: | | Actual Comp: 11/08/2022 07:29 | | | |
| Work Location: | | | | Lead: | | Item: | | | |
| Failure Class: LVEIM001 | | LIGHTING SYSTEM | | GL Account: WMATA-02-33571-60499950-042 | | CPR: | | | |
| Problem Code: 2219 | | LIGHTS DIM | | Supervisor: | | Target Start: | | | |
| Requested By: [REDACTED] | | | | Requestor Phone: [REDACTED] | | Target Comp: | | | |
| Chain Mark Start: | | | | Chain Mark End: | | Scheduled Start: | | | |
| Create-Mileage: 0.0 | | | | Complete-Mileage: 0.0 | | | | | |
| Task IDs | | | | | | | | | |
| Task ID | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 see description | | | | | | | | | |
| MOC ALERT: Responded to MOC Alert about smoke coming from pylon lights on platform. Upon arrival met with other personnel and found that smoke did not come from lights, it actually came from vents above in tunnel due to video. Not was recorded. | | | | | | | | | |
| Component: Work Accompl: Reason: Status: CLOSE Position Warranty?: N | | | | | | | | | |
| Actual Labor | | | | | | | | | |
| Task ID | Labor | Start Date | End Date | Start Time | End Time | Approved? | Regular Hours | Premium Hours | Line Cost |
| 10 | [REDACTED] | 11/07/2022 | 11/07/2022 | 20:00 | 22:00 | Y | 02:00 | 00:00 | \$93.20 |
| 10 | [REDACTED] | 11/07/2022 | 11/07/2022 | 20:00 | 22:00 | Y | 02:00 | 00:00 | \$91.82 |
| Total Actual Hour/Labor: | | | | | | | 04:00 | 00:00 | \$185.02 |
| Related Incidents | | | | | | | | | |
| Ticket | Description | Class | | Status | | Relationship | | | |
| 8633346 | REPORT OF SMOKE FROM PYLON LIGHT FIXTURE ON THE PLATFORM, TRAIN BYPASSED STATION | SR | | CLOSED | | RELATED | | | |
| Related Work Orders | | | | | | | | | |
| WO | Description | Class | | Status | | Relationship | | | |
| 17467934 | K01/ REPORT OF A SMOKE IN THE STATION | WORKORDER | | CLOSE | | RELATED | | | |
| WT_plust_woprint.ptdesign | | | | | | | 11/22/2022 17:10 | | |



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Page 2 of 2
MX7SPROD

Work Order #: 17467855
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
11/08/2022 07:29

Work Description: K01 (STATION), REPORT OF SMOKE COMING FROM PYLON LIGHT ON THE PLATFORM

Job Plan Description:

| Failure Reporting | | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|------------|--------|------------|
| Cause | Remedy | Supervisor | Remark | Date |
| 5079 DISCOLORED / DIRTY LENS / SIGN | 5003 REMOVED/CLEANED/REINSTALLED | | | 11/08/2022 |
| Remarks: Addressed by others (not a power asset) | | | | |

WT_plust_woprint.pttdesign

11/22/2022 17:10

Incident Date: 11/07/2022 Time: 19:46 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Event
E22724

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 01/06/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 70 – 02/17/2023
Approved By: SAFE 70 – 02/17/2023

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Appendix E – COMR Maximo Report (Redacted)



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 1
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17475089
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
11/10/2022 22:15

Work Description: K01, Safety request comprehensive radio operation test in Station area, Track1&2
Job Plan Description:

| Work Information | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|--------------------------------|------------|--------------|-----------|---------------|---------------|-----------|
| Asset: 60335 | RADIO, CRCS, REMOTE SITE, T38 | Owning Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO | Parent: | | | | | | |
| Asset Tag: | | Maintenance Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO | Create Date: 11/10/2022 12:20 | | | | | | |
| Asset S/N: CRCSRST38 | | Labor Group: COMMR3RADO | Actual Start: 11/10/2022 20:25 | | | | | | |
| Location: 3952 | T38, CARMEN TURNER FACILITY, BUILDING (G) SVMT BODY, 2ND FLOOR | Crew: | Actual Comp: 11/10/2022 20:25 | | | | | | |
| Work Location: | | Lead: [REDACTED] | Item: N60040086 | | | | | | |
| Failure Class: COMR003 | RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS | GL Account: WMATA-02-33540-50499280-042-*****-OPR** | | | | | | | |
| Problem Code: 3669 | COMMS FAILURE | Supervisor: | Target Start: | | | | | | |
| Requested By: [REDACTED] | | Requestor Phone: [REDACTED] | Target Comp: | | | | | | |
| Chain Mark Start: | | Chain Mark End: | Scheduled Start: | | | | | | |
| Create-Mileage: 0.0 | | Complete-Mileage: 0.0 | | | | | | | |
| Task IDs | | | | | | | | | |
| Task ID | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | ALL RADIO CHECKS MADE FROM MEZZ/KIOSK AREAS; PLATFORM AREAS (TRK1 & 2) INBOUND END, MIDDLE & OUTBOUND END WITH UNIT 321 OUTSIDE THE STATION WERE LOUD AND CLEAR. | | | | | | | | |
| Component: | Work Accom: | Reason: | Status: CLOSE | Position: | Warranty?: N | | | | |
| Actual Labor | | | | | | | | | |
| Task ID | Labor | Start Date | End Date | Start Time | End Time | Approved? | Regular Hours | Premium Hours | Line Cost |
| 10 | [REDACTED] | 11/10/2022 | 11/10/2022 | 16:00 | 19:00 | Y | 03:00 | 00:00 | \$137.73 |
| 10 | [REDACTED] | 11/10/2022 | 11/10/2022 | 16:00 | 19:00 | Y | 03:00 | 00:00 | \$143.93 |
| Total Actual Hour/Labor: | | | | | | | 06:00 | 00:00 | \$281.66 |
| Failure Reporting | | | | | | | | | |
| Cause | Remedy | Supervisor | Remark | Date | | | | | |
| 1397 | COMM OPS RADIO SYSTEM PROBLEM | 1061 | ALIGNED | 11/10/2022 | | | | | |
| Remarks: ALL RADIO CHECKS WERE LOUD AND CLEAR | | | | | | | | | |

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11/22/2022 17:12

Incident Date: 11/07/2022 Time: 19:46 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Event
E22724

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 01/06/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 70 – 02/17/2023
Approved By: SAFE 70 – 02/17/2023

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Page 1 of 1
MKTSPROD

Work Order #: 17475093
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
11/10/2022 22:13

Work Description: C06, Safety request comprehensive radio operation test in Station area, Track 1&2
Job Plan Description:

| Work Information | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|---|--------------------------------|------------|------------|-----------|---------------|---------------|-----------|
| Asset: 60335 | RADIO, CRCS, REMOTE SITE, T38 | Owning Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO | Parent: | | | | | | |
| Asset Tag: | | Maintenance Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO | Create Date: 11/10/2022 12:24 | | | | | | |
| Asset S/N: CRCSRST38 | | Labor Group: COMM/R3RADO | Actual Start: 11/10/2022 20:05 | | | | | | |
| Location: 3952 | T38, CARMEN TURNER FACILITY, BUILDING (G) SVMT BODY, 2ND FLOOR | Crew: | Actual Comp: 11/10/2022 20:05 | | | | | | |
| Work Location: | | Lead: [REDACTED] | Item: N60040086 | | | | | | |
| Failure Class: COMR003 | RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS | GL Account: WMATA-02-33540-50499280-042 | CPR: | | | | | | |
| Problem Code: 3541 | NO TX AUDIO | Supervisor: | Target Start: | | | | | | |
| Requested By: [REDACTED] | | Requestor Phone: [REDACTED] | Target Comp: | | | | | | |
| Chain Mark Start: | | Chain Mark End: | Scheduled Start: | | | | | | |
| Create-Mileage: 0.0 | | Complete-Mileage: 0.0 | | | | | | | |
| Task IDs | | | | | | | | | |
| Task ID | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | RADIO CHECKS LOUD AND CLEAR | | | | | | | | |
| TECHS 3129 AND 317 PERFORMED RADIO CHECKS AT C06 PLATFORM TRACKS 1 AND 2 ALL RADIO CHECKS PERFORMED WERE LOUD AND CLEAR. | | | | | | | | | |
| Component: | Work Accompl: | Reason: | Status: CLOSE | Position: | Warranty?: | N | | | |
| Actual Labor | | | | | | | | | |
| Task ID | Labor | Start Date | End Date | Start Time | End Time | Approved? | Regular Hours | Premium Hours | Line Cost |
| 10 | [REDACTED] | 11/10/2022 | 11/10/2022 | 18:00 | 18:00 | Y | 02:00 | 00:00 | \$93.20 |
| 10 | [REDACTED] | 11/10/2022 | 11/10/2022 | 18:00 | 18:00 | Y | 02:00 | 00:00 | \$93.66 |
| Total Actual Hour/Labor: | | | | | | | 04:00 | 00:00 | \$186.86 |
| Failure Reporting | | | | | | | | | |
| Cause | Remedy | Supervisor | Remark Date | | | | | | |
| 2500 | NO PROBLEM FOUND | 3191 | TESTED - NO TROUBLE FOUND | 11/10/2022 | | | | | |
| Remarks: RADIO CHECKS LOUD AND CLEAR | | | | | | | | | |

WT_plust_woprint.ptdesign

11/22/2022 17:11

Appendix F – RTRA Supervisor Report (Redacted)

| RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT | | | | |
|--|-------------------------------|---|-------------------------|---------------|
| Date 11/07/2022 | Incident Time Appx 8:02 pm | Incident Location (Station Mezzanine #) Courthouse | Track/Mezzanine # 96 | |
| Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) N/A | | | | |
| Incident Description Medical Dispatch | | | | |
| WMATA Personnel Involved | Employee # | Rule Violation? | Home Division | Post Incident |
| | | | WFC | N/A |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Name | Address | | | Injury? |
| | | | | |
| Name | Address | | | Injury? |
| | | | | |
| Name | Address | | | Injury? |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Arrival Time | Unit Number | Person In Charge | | Remarks |
| 8:20 pm | 36 | | | |
| | | | | |

Chronological Account of Incident

Approx 8:10 pm

Contacted by ROCC to respond to Courthouse for reports of smoke.

Approx 8:23 pm

Arrived at Courthouse. Fire/EMS had been dispatched and cleared before I arrived and were unable to locate source of smoke. Also arrived around the same time. Transit Police we're also on scene.

Approx 8:30 pm

ERT arrived and began searching for source of smoke. At this time, myself and were walking the entire station, parking garage and outside station areas. Smell of smoke wasn't as intense as when I arrived. Checked all pylons and determined that smoke was not being emitted.

Approx 8:45 pm

Location of vent blowing smoke smell was determined and breakers were tripped to turn off the fan.

Approx 9:10

Per EP10, station was deemed safe and reopened as smoke smell was present but far less noticeable than before.

Approx 9:20

Location of outside grates where smell of smoke seemed to be most prominent was found and all appropriate departments were notified of findings via .

Station clear as of 9:35 pm

(Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)

Your Arrival Time: 8:20 pm

| Supervisor Submitting Report | (Payroll #) | Date | Report Reviewed By | Date |
|--|-------------|------------|--------------------|------|
| | | 11/07/2022 | | |
| Report must be faxed to ROCC 202-962-2808 at end of Tour | | | | |

Appendix G – PLNT Fan Activation Report



SCANNED
Participant Guide

M PLNT Desk Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Form
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

110-ROCC-ALL-04-00

Incident Description: *Along Insulator / Trash Fire, etc.*

OPS2 REPORTED OF A SMOKE AT K01

K01

Nearest Station: *Metro Center AD1*

K1/K2-201+00

Chainmarker: *1000 + 00*

1&2

Track #:

Train ID:

STATION

Proposed Evacuation Route: *(towards which station)*

K16

Playbook/Page Reference:

STATION

Incident Zone(s)

SOW

Fan Controller:

11-07-22 @ 19:59

Date:

*Maintenance Manager will archive this form for record keeping purposes. 51.931

Approved: 06/24/2021

Note: Press firmly through all five (5) carbon copies.

MOC Tunnel Ventilation Fan Training
Rev.0 July 30, 2021

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M E M O R A N D U M

SUBJECT: Discontinuance of SOP 1A Announcement

DATE: 8/11/2022

FROM: ROCC Director

Digitally signed by [Redacted]
Date: 2022.08.11 07:43:53 -04'00'

TO: ROCC Personnel

Effective immediately, the phrase "SOP #1A is in effect" will cease to be broadcast by RTCs during emergency radio announcements.

SOP #1A states - *The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure is to delineate responsibilities and procedures for the control and coordination of all responses to emergency situations on the Rail System utilizing the National Incident Management System/Incident Command System (NIMS/ICS).*


ROCC Assistant Operations Managers (AOM) oversee all emergency practices and procedures on the Rail system, except at the incident scene. **SOP #1A is enacted once an On-Scene Commander (OSC) is assigned**, and thus stating "SOP 1A is in effect" is not necessary.

Revisit SOP #1A - Command, Control and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System for a refresher. Notify your direct supervisor if you require additional assistance.

Washington
Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority

700-ROCC-ADM-16-00 Approved: 2/17/2021

Appendix I – Root Cause Analysis



Root Cause Analysis

