



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0203 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – L'Enfant Plaza Station – September 1, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on March 7, 2023

Safety event summary:

A shooting following an altercation on the Green and Yellow Line platform level at L'Enfant Plaza Station on September 1, 2022 led to a partial station evacuation for life safety reasons.

A Rail Supervisor heard and reported the shots at approximately 4:03 p.m. Metro Transit Police Department officers were flagged down by riders fleeing the station moments later. The District of Columbia Office of Unified Communications contacted Metro Transit Police Department dispatch to communicate reports from riders of shots fired in the station.

At 4:06 p.m., the Radio Rail Traffic Controller responsible for Yellow and Green Line trains in this area directed Train Operators on those lines to pass through L'Enfant Plaza Station without stopping. At 4:07 p.m., the Radio Rail Traffic Controller responsible for Blue, Orange and Silver Line trains in this area directed those train operators to pass through L'Enfant Plaza Station without stopping.

The Rail Supervisor reported at 4:09 p.m. that a medical emergency response was required for injuries to riders that appeared to be non-life threatening. At 4:10 p.m., the Information Controller at the Rail Operations Information Center desk called for a D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services response.

At 4:19 p.m., the Radio Rail Traffic Controller for the Blue, Orange and Silver Lines in this area directed train operators to resume normal service on the lower level of L'Enfant Plaza Station.

At 5:05 p.m., the Radio Rail Traffic Controller for the Yellow and Green Lines in this area directed operators to make stops and service L'Enfant Plaza Station on Track 1 only.

At approximately 5:33 p.m., the Mission Assurance Coordinator advised Incident Command that the power had been de-energized on Track 2, within the platform limits and Crime Scene Technicians accessed the roadway to continue their investigation. Communications did not follow roadway worker protection and related requirements.

MTPD concluded the response effectively led to an arrest and the recovery of evidence. During the response, the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) requested that the On-Scene Commander contact the MAC for requests due to a radio transmission issue.

Safety Department Office of Emergency Preparedness personnel did not follow the incident command process or ensure they had clear, effective and accurate communication during the event.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this evacuation for life safety reasons was an altercation that led to a shooting in the station.

Corrective Actions:

Related open CAPs:



- C-0162 addressing that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. Further, Metrorail's training requirements are insufficient to prepare personnel to respond to and/or manage emergencies within the NIMS/ICS framework. These deficiencies have contributed to ineffective and improper emergency response and emergency management (Expected completion date January 2025).
- C-0164 addressing that Metro Transit Police Department personnel routinely enter the roadway despite not having Roadway Worker Protection qualifications required by Metrorail rules and procedures, exposing themselves and others to the risk of serious injury or death (Current expected completion date February 2024).
- C-0180 addressing that Metrorail does not assess and communicate radio system outages to Metro Transit Police Department officers (Expected completion date April 2023).

WMSC staff observations:

Metrorail did not follow safety communication processes such as the use of forward liaisons and similar personnel to ensure train movement, roadway worker protection, and power processes were followed safely.

Metrorail's Safety Department Office of Emergency Preparedness personnel did not adhere to Metrorail's emergency response procedures and communication requirements, including as it related to roadway worker protection elements such as ensuring third rail power was de-energized. In addition, these same personnel did not have the necessary situational awareness regarding the operating environment, such as incorrectly stating the Yellow Line was shut down and initially preventing Metrorail's on-scene commander from taking the actions she had determined were necessary. The WMSC is particularly concerned that Safety Department personnel in the Office of Emergency Preparedness would not have the understanding necessary to effectively address an emergency.

The Metro Transit Police Department hot wash for this event was extremely effective at identifying positive practices and areas for improvement for future responses. The WMSC appreciates this Metrorail work toward continuous safety improvement.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations
FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22572

Date of Event:	September 1, 2022
Type of Event:	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	16:03 Hours
Location:	L'Enfant Station
Time and how received by SAFE:	16:09 MAC Notification
WMSC Notification Time:	17:55
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: N/A WMSC: N/A Other: N/A
Rail Vehicle:	N/A
Injuries:	One Customer, Minor Injuries
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	MTPD, ERT, DCFEMS, OEP
SMS I/A Number	20220912#102812

L'Enfant Plaza Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Automated Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
DCFEMS	DC Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department
FLO	Fire Liaison Officer
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record.

On Thursday, September 1, 2022, at 16:03 hours, an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Station Manager and Rail Supervisor (Supervisor) reported hearing gunshots on the L'Enfant Plaza Station Platform Upper Level to an MTPD dispatcher.

At 16:04 hours, Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Officers in the area of the incident were flagged down by customers fleeing the station. At approximately the same time, an MTPD dispatcher advised that they had checked the cameras on the lower level and could not locate the incident there.

At 16:05, the District of Columbia's 911 service contacted the MTPD dispatch and advised customers had reported shots fired at L'Enfant Plaza. The MTPD Dispatcher advised MTPD Officers were on scene of the incident.

At 16:06 hours, a Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) advised all Yellow/Green Line Trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station due to police activity in the area. At 16:07 hours, the Radio RTC advised all Blue/Orange/Silver Line Trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station.

At 16:09 hours, an RTRA Supervisor stated they required medical response for injuries to customers as a result of the incident. The RTRA Supervisor noted that the injuries were non-life-threatening. At 16:10 hours, the Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) placed the call to the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department (DCFEMS).

At 16:15 hours, MTPD advised that a single victim was identified from the shooting and sustained non-life-threatening injuries. At the same time, MTPD dispatch advised that Crime Scene Technicians were en route to the scene with an estimated arrival time of 35 minutes.

At 16:19 hours, an RTC advised all Train Operators could commence servicing both Tracks of L'Enfant Plaza Station on the Orange/Blue and Silver Lines only.

At 16:24 hours, the MTPD On-Scene Commander advised the Fire Liaison Officer (FLO) that DCFEMS assessed the single victim with non-life-threatening injuries. It was unknown if the injuries were gunshot-related. At 16:28 hours, the injured customer refused further treatment and left the site under their own power.

At 17:05 hours, the OPS 3 Radio RTC advised that Train Operators could service Track 1 of the Yellow/Green line of L'Enfant Plaza Station only.

At 17:26 hours, Incident Command advised the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) that MTPD Crime Scene Technicians required access to the roadway to continue their investigation and that third-rail power would need to be de-energized on Track 2 in the area of the incident. The MAC advised that they were in the process of de-energizing third-rail power.

At 17:33 hours, the MAC advised Incident Command that the power had been de-energized on Track 2, within the platform limits allowing Crime Scene Technicians access to the roadway to continue their investigation.

- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Note: Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - MTPD Hot wash Report
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback [Radio and Landline Communications]
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Thursday, September 1, 2022, at 16:03 hours, an RTRA Station Manager and Rail Supervisor (Supervisor) reported hearing gunshots on the L'Enfant Plaza Station Platform Upper Level to an MTPD dispatcher.

A review of the ARS and CCTV footage determined that at 16:03 hours, an altercation occurred between multiple customers that ended with the discharge of a handgun.

At the same time, a Station Manager and Rail Transportation RTRA Supervisor reported hearing shots fired in the station to an MTPD dispatcher as they observed customers fleeing the scene.

At 16:04 hours, MTPD Officers in the area of the incident were flagged down by customers fleeing the station. At the same time, an MTPD dispatcher advised MTPD personnel on scene that they had checked the cameras on the lower level and could not locate the incident there.

At 16:06 hours, a Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) advised all Yellow/Green Line Trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station due to police activity in the area. At 16:07 hours, the Radio RTC advised all Blue/Orange/Silver Line Trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station.

At 16:09 hours, an RTRA Supervisor stated they required medical response for injuries to customers as a result of the incident. The RTRA Supervisor noted that the injuries were non-life-threatening. At 16:10 hours, ROIC placed the call to DCFEMS.

At 16:12 hours, MTPD advised MTPD Dispatch they had established Incident Command on the Track 1 side of the Upper Level of the platform. MTPD further advised MTPD Dispatch that Track 2 would need to be bypassed. At 16:13 hours, MTPD Dispatch aired a description of one subject over the radio after consulting CCTV.

At 16:15 hours, MTPD advised that a single victim was identified from the shooting and sustained non-life-threatening injuries. At the same time, MTPD dispatch advised that Crime Scene Technicians were en route to the scene with an estimated arrival time of 35 minutes.

At 16:19 hours, an RTC advised all Train Operators they could commence servicing both Tracks of L'Enfant Plaza Station on the Orange/Blue and Silver Lines only.

At 16:24 hours, the MTPD Incident Commander advised the Fire Liaison Officer (FLO) that DCFEMS assessed the single victim with non-life-threatening injuries. It was unknown if the injuries were gunshot-related. At 16:28 hours, the injured customer refused further treatment and left the site under their own power.

At 17:05 hours, the OPS 3 Radio RTC advised that Train Operators could service Track 1 of the Yellow/Green line of L'Enfant Plaza Station only.

At 17:26 hours, Incident Command advised the MAC that MTPD Crime Scene Technicians required access to the roadway to continue their investigation and that third-rail power would need to be de-energized on Track 2 in the area of the incident. The MAC advised that the Power Operations Center were in the process of de-energizing third-rail power.

At 17:33 hours, the MAC advised Incident Command that the Third-Rail power had been de-energized on Track 2, within the platform limits allowing Crime Scene Technicians access to the roadway to continue their investigation.

At 18:31 hours, the RTRA Supervisor advised that all personnel were clear of the roadway and power could be restored to Track 2 of L'Enfant Plaza Station.

At 18:33 hours, the Radio RTC advised power had been restored to the third-rail of Track 2, L'Enfant Plaza Station.

At 18:35 hours, Incident Command advised all personnel that a hot wash summary would be conducted on the Mezzanine Level of the 7th and Maryland Entrance of L'Enfant Plaza Station. At 18:36 hours, the RTC advised the Power Desk that all personnel were clear of the roadway and that third rail power could be restored.

MTPD Hot wash and Investigation:

A review of the MTPD Hot Wash Report determined that MTPD initially requested priority assistance at L'Enfant Plaza Station for a shooting report. Units responded to the scene, located and secured a crime scene, stopped two suspects, and located a victim with non-life-threatening injuries who ultimately declined medical transport.

MTPD consulted with RTRA to close off the north-western quadrant of the Upper Level, Track 2 platform, and have trains bypass that particular platform. The MAC assisted with establishing single tracking via Track 1.

MTPD stated that WMATA assets were requested and responded appropriately. MTPD remarked that the crime scene could have been secured faster, and the extent of the perimeter could have been larger.

MTPD surmised that over the course of the four-hour and six-minute incident, the efforts of all personnel led to the arrest of a suspect in the shooting, and evidence was secured and recovered. Patrons were diverted to the opposite platform, maintaining sufficient operations. [See Appendix A.](#)

Chronological Event Timeline

Time	Description
16:03:39 Hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : advised MTPD dispatcher of shots fired at L'Enfant Plaza Station, inside the station. The supervisor placed a call from the intersection of 7 th and D Streets, outside of the Station. [Phone, SOCC Console]
16:04:16 Hours	<u>MTPD Officer</u> : advised they had received a report of shots fired at L'Enfant Plaza Station from customers fleeing the station. [Radio, MTPD 1-X]
16:04:41 Hours	<u>MTPD dispatcher</u> : advised MTPD Officers that nothing was observed on the lower level of L'Enfant Plaza. [Radio, MTPD 1-X]
16:05:04 Hours	<u>DC 911</u> : advised customer called 911 in response to shooting <u>MTPD dispatcher</u> : advised MTPD Officers were on scene. [Phone, SOCC Console]
16:06:47 Hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : advised Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) of shots fired at L'Enfant Plaza Station inside the station. [Phone, RCOM 1]
16:06:50 Hours	<u>RTC</u> : advised Trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station on both Tracks due to police activity. Advised Train ID 303 at Gallery Place of action. Also advised bus bridge requested. [Radio, OPS 3]
16:07:25 Hours	<u>RTC</u> : advised Train ID 621 Track 1, Smithsonian Station, to make announcements to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. Further advised all Train Operators to bypass L'Enfant Station. [Radio, OPS 2]
16:08:59 Hours	<u>ROIC</u> : advised Bus Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) that trains are bypassing L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Phone, RCOM-ASST]
16:09:01 Hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : advised RTC of shots fired at L'Enfant Plaza Station and that multiple customers had been struck by gunfire on the Branch Avenue side of the platform and requested medical. [Phone, RCOM 2]
16:10:37 Hours	<u>ROIC</u> : placed the 911 call for DCFEMS. [Phone, RCOM 2]
16:12:20 Hours	DCFEMS was dispatched to the incident. [Phone, Open MHZ]
16:12:51 Hours	<u>MTPD Officer</u> : advised they had established Incident Command on the Track 1 side of the upper platform. The MTPD Officer advised that Track 2 would need to be bypassed. [Radio, MTPD 1-X]
16:13:35 Hours	<u>MTPD Officer</u> : advised on suspect information and advised suspect no longer on scene. [Radio, MTPD 1-X]
16:15:34 Hours	<u>MTPD Officer</u> : advised was with a single victim. MTPD dispatcher advised all units to transition to the Secondary Radio Channel. MTPD dispatcher advised Crime Scene Technicians en route, 35-minute ETA. [Radio, MTPD 1-X]
16:19:04 Hours	<u>RTC</u> : advised all Train Operators on the Orange/Blue and Silver lines to service L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Radio, OPS 2]

Time	Description
16:24:39 Hours	Incident Command advised the FLO that a single victim was identified as having been shot in the foot and was being assessed by medical. [Radio, OEM]
17:05:57 Hours	RTC: advised Trains to single track by way of Track 1 at L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Radio, OPS 3]
17:26:22 Hours	Incident Command advised that the MAC Crime Scene Technicians required access to the roadway for investigative purposes. MAC stated they were working on de-energizing the third rail power. [Radio, MTPD 2-X]
17:33:47 Hours	MAC advised power was de-energized Track 2 power within the platform limits. [Radio, MTPD 2-X]
18:31:41 hours	RTRA Supervisor: advised that Power can be restored to Track 2, L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Radio, OPS 2]
18:35:14 Hours	Incident Command advised all personnel that a hot wash summary would be conducted on the Mezzanine Level of the 7 th and Maryland Entrance of L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Radio, MTPD 2-X]
18:36:31 Hours	RTC: advised the Power Desk that all personnel were clear of the roadway and that they could restore the third rail power. [Phone, MOC]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Automated Information Management System (AIMS)

A review of the AIMS log revealed that the third rail power was de-energized at 17:30 hours and re-energized at 18:40 hours.




Figure 7: Third rail power was de-energized at 17:30 hours.




Figure 8: Third rail power was restored at 18:40 hours.

Weather

On September 1, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 77° F, with light cloud cover, an average of 53% humidity, and an average windspeed of 6.1 MPH. This incident occurred inside of a tunneled area within the system, and therefore the weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC)

Related Rules and Procedures

- SOP 1A: Command, Control and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System
- SOP 2: Emergency Removal and Restoration of Third Rail Power Mainline

Human Factors

Fatigue

Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Findings

- Customers began to evacuate the station immediately after the firearm was discharged. WMATA personnel facilitated further evacuation of part of the platform on the Track 2 side of the upper level.
- Two suspects were detained quickly after the event, during the evacuation.

- One bystander was injured during the event and assessed by medical personnel on scene but refused transport to hospital by medical personnel on scene.
- MTPD established a crime scene and liaised with the MAC to de-energize the third rail power in order to retrieve evidence on the roadway.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Two suspects were detained on site by MTPD
- A partial evacuation of L'Enfant Plaza Station was conducted to retrieve evidence.
- Incident command was established to preserve evidence once the threat was contained.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of this event was the unlawful firearm discharge on WMATA property, leading to the causing of a minor injury to a customer and prompting the subsequent partial evacuation of L'Enfant Plaza Station and activation of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 1A.

Recommended Corrective Actions

There are no Recommended Corrective Actions related to this event.

Appendices

Appendix A – MTPD Hot Wash Summary (Redacted and Abridged):



Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary



ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. **Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.**

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:		L'Enfant Plaza Station – Shooting (ADW Gun)	
*Incident Commander (IC):		[REDACTED]	
MTPD CCN:	2022-04987	Local CCN:	22-126-448
*Date ICS Initiated:	September 1, 2022	*Time ICS Initiated:	1613 Hours
*Date ICS Terminated:	September 1, 2022	*Time ICS Terminated:	1919 Hours
*Duration of Incident:	4 Hours, 6 Minutes	*Service Disrupted (Type and Time):	4 Hours, 6 Minutes
Incident Location:	L'Enfant Plaza Metro, Branch Avenue Platform	Command Post Location:	L'Enfant Plaza, 7 th / Maryland Mezzanine
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	[REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	N/A
Forward Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Unified Command:	N/A
OCC Liaison:	ROCC M.A.C.	Alternate Channel:	MTPD-2X
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	Established at 1705 hours on Track 1 (ARCH-WTRF)	Bus Bridge Established (From /To):	Requested but cancelled prior to being established
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	L'Enfant Plaza Metro, Branch Avenue Platform	Power De-energized:	Track 2 Power Only
Entry/Exit Log:	Yes	CID Response:	Yes

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Incident Date: 09/01/2022 Time: 16:03 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
E22572

Drafted By: SAFE 705 - 10/31/22
Reviewed By: SAFE 70 - 10/31/22
Approved By: SAFE 70 - 10/31/22

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

OBSERVATIONS

██████████ requested priority assistance at L'Enfant Plaza for a shooting that had just occurred. Units responded to the scene, located and secured a crime scene, stopped two suspects, and located a victim. The victim sustained non-life-threatening injuries and declined medical transport. A video review was conducted to assist with establishing probable cause for arrest. To preserve evidence, the decision was made to close portions of the Branch Ave platform and have trains bypass that platform. The MAC assisted with establishing a single tracking event on the opposite platform (Track 1 Greenbelt).

A hot wash was conducted, which relayed the following information.

Command transfer was successful. WMATA assets were requested and responded appropriately. Securing the crime scene could have been faster, and the extent of the perimeter could have been larger. Overall, the efforts of all Personnel led to the arrest of a violent individual, evidence was secured and recovered, and patrons were diverted to the opposite platform, maintaining a sufficient level of operations.

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

NOTES

A hot wash was conducted, which relayed the following information:

Command transfer was successful from Sergeant ████████ to Captain ██████. Captain ██████ assumed command.

WMATA assets were requested and responded appropriately.

Crime scene security should've been faster in addition to the extent of the scene perimeter.

Implementation of an entry/exit log is a priority at major scenes.

The observation and quick apprehension of the suspect was imperative to ensure system safety.

Officers maintained their position to ensure scene security after it was established.

OEP did not acknowledge Captain ██████ as the OSC. When questioned regarding why a bus bridge was initiated, OEP advised the action was standard protocol of any scene prior to the any request from the OSC.

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Effective: 12/30/20

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

The MAC requested the OSC to contact him regarding requests due to radio transmission issue.

The OEP reps inquired about the scene from Lt [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED]. The advised OEP, Captain [REDACTED] was the OSC and all communication must go through her.

Captain [REDACTED] requested single tracking on the Branch Avenue side. She was advised this was not possible due to the "L" line which was out of service. Captain [REDACTED] contacted the MAC to confirm the information. The MAC advised the "L" line was not out of service. This information was relayed to the OEP reps. The OEP reps then advised there was not a need to single track because all passengers can utilize the bus bridge of GNBT train for transfers.

There was confusion due to Captain [REDACTED] contacting the MAC directly. It was unsure who was the OSC.

Captain [REDACTED] contacted the MAC directly who advised the request of single tracking would be accommodated.

Power was deenergized at the request of the OSC for evidence and CSS processing. The OSC advised OEP to place WSADs and utilize the hot sticks to ensure power was de-energized. After this was confirmed, the OSC was not the initial member to receive this information. Lt [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED] was advised by OEP prior to notification to the OSC.

The OSC directed ALL personnel to communicate to her regarding all matters for the scene. She had to reiterate this numerous time with OEP.

OEP did not initially work with the OSC to determine a plan to transport passengers, minimize an interruption to service without compromising the crime scene.

PLNT/MOC quickly responded to the scene to standby.

RTRA Supervisors were receiving mixed communication regarding the station opening. They quickly

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
Effective: 12/30/20

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

contacted the OSC for clarification,

In the future, all personnel on the scene must remember that during emergency incidents MTPD is the On-Scene Commander per SOP-1A. To ensure that passengers and employees remain safe and are transported efficiently, WMATA personnel must follow the directions of MTPD officials on scene. MTPD officials are highly trained to mitigate the emergency incidents when life and safety measures have been resolved.

Appendix B - Root Cause Analysis



Root Cause Analysis

