



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0208 – Collision – Wheaton Station – October 4, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on March 7, 2023

Safety event summary:

A Metrorail rider fell onto the roadway at Wheaton Station, Track 2, at 11:06 p.m. on October 4, 2022, remained motionless on the roadway, and was then struck by a train that entered Wheaton Station at approximately 11:16 p.m.

Based on an investigative interview, a student operator observing the Train Operator alerted the Train Operator to the person on the roadway, and the Train Operator then applied an increased level of braking.

The Train Operator activated the highest level of braking when the train was moving 16 mph and the front of the train was approximately 300 feet from the person on the roadway, who was laying on the roadway approximately 41 feet (about half a car length) before the eight-car marker at the end of the platform where trains stop to service the station. The Train Operator did not sound the horn.

The front of the train stopped approximately 34 feet from the eight-car marker, approximately 7 feet after striking the person.

The Train Operator reported the event. However, the Train Operator, who Metrorail was utilizing as a Line Platform Instructor (on-the-job trainer for a student operator) did not report this event on the radio as an emergency as required by Metrorail procedure.

The Train Operator inspected from the station platform and reported that the rider had injuries to their left hand.

Video review after the event indicated no one on the platform witnessed the person fall, and that the Station Manager was performing duties outside of the station kiosk at approximately the time the person fell. Video also suggested that the person was walking unsteadily prior to the fall.

During the response, incident command authorized single-tracking on the opposite track, and Metrorail then initiated single-tracking in accordance with Metrorail's procedures for a person struck by a train.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this collision was a rider falling onto the roadway unnoticed.

Corrective Actions:

Related CAPs in progress:

- C-0162 addressing that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements (Expected completion date January 2025).
- C-0166 addressing that Metrorail's calls to public safety answering points (911 call centers) are inconsistent, incomplete, and contribute to delayed or ineffective emergency response (Expected completion date April 2024).

WMSC staff observations:



750 First St. NE • Ste. 900 • Washington, D.C. 20002

Office: 202-384-1520 • Website: www.wmsc.gov

Metrorail's call to the Public Safety Answering Point for Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Services response led to some confusion, but the Rail Operations Control Center provided relevant information that led to the proper response.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22647

Date of Event:	October 4, 2022
Type of Event:	Collision
Incident Time:	23:15 hours
Location:	Wheaton Station, Track
Time and How received by SAFE:	23:23 hours, MAC
WMSC Notification Time:	00:29 hours (October 5, 2022)
Responding Safety Officers:	N/A
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 110 L2005-2004 x 3050-3051 x 3064-3065T
Injuries:	Injuries to right hand
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service (MCFRS), Metro Transit Police Department
SMS I/A Number	20221005#103334

Wheaton Station – Collision

October 4, 2022

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CMOR	Office of Chief Mechanical Officer
FT	Foul Time
IIT	Incident Investigation Team
LPI	Line Platform Instructor
MCFRS	Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Services
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OM	Operations Manager
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
PLNT	Office of Plant Maintenance
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Tuesday, October 4, 2022, at 23:03 hours, a customer wearing dark clothing entered Wheaton Station's track 2 platform, walking unsteadily. The customer walked approximately 450 feet towards the inbound, downtown 8-car marker where the train would stop to service the station. At 23:06 hours, the customer stepped off of the granite edge, falling onto the roadway and landing between the left running rail and platform refuge area with their upper body [head and right hand] positioned on the running rail. At about the same time, the Station Manager exited the kiosk to address three fare evaders. The Station Manager returned to the kiosk at 23:10 hours. During those four minutes, the customer remained motionless on the roadway and no other customers were on the platform to witness the fall.

At 23:09 hours, a Line Platform Instructor (LPI), operating Train ID 110 and a Student Operator departed Glenmont Station towards Wheaton Station on track 2. As the train entered the station at 23:15 hours, the customer remained motionless next to the running rail. The Train Operator activated the Master Controller's emergency handle 347 feet within the station platform limits. Train ID 110 stopped approximately 34 feet from the 8-car marker and passed over the customer by approximately 7 feet before coming to a complete stop. The LPI Operator immediately notified the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) by radio.

At 23:19 hours, the Train Operator disembarked the train and identified a customer under the refuge area with injuries to their left hand and notified the Radio RTC. The Button RTC de-energized third rail power at 23:20 hours. At 23:20 hours, the ROCC Operations Manager (OM) contacted MCFRS and reported a person struck by a train. The LPI applied a handbrake on lead car 2005 at 23:23 hours.


MCFRS arrived on location at 23:29 hours and established incident command. An RTRA Supervisor confirmed that third rail power was de-energized at 23:38 hours. MCFRS removed the customer from under the refuge near lead car 2005 at 23:40 hours. The Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) conducted an investigation following the departure of MCFRS. The incident train departed Wheaton station after MTPD completed their investigation at 01:20 hours. The Office of Plant Maintenance (PLNT) began cleaning activities at 02:06 hours and completed cleaning the incident area per Standard Operating Procedure 26 at 02:47 hours.

The probable cause of the Wheaton Station person struck by train event was an accidental fall that resulted in a customer laying within the train's dynamic envelope. Contributing Factors to the event were the lack of witnesses to the fall and the customer wearing dark clothing, which prevented the Train Operator from observing the customer earlier. No mechanical defects or human-based errors were identified.

Incident Site

Wheaton Station is a 600-foot platform equipped with a direct fixation tangent track near the collision location. Video surveillance from the time of the event indicated that lighting of the station was adequate. The point of contact with the customer was approximately 34 feet from the end of the platform limits' 8-car marker.

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigation Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Wheaton Station Collision on October 4, 2022, SAFE assessed the site through document review and Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) to conduct the subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment [CCTV and document review].
- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed one individual as part of this investigation. The interview included the person present at, during, and after the incident and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the following individual.
 - LPI [Train Operator]
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed by personnel present during or after the event.
 - RTRA Supervisor
 - Division Manager
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - The 30-Day Work History
 - RTRA QA/QC Certification Record
 - Training Record

- ROC Report
- RTRA Managerial Report
- Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- Office of Radio Communications (COMR) data
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback, including OPS 1 Radio
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
 - Open MHz Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service (Radio Channel)
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) Incident Investigation Team (IIT)
 - Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) post-incident inspection

Investigation

On Tuesday, October 4, 2022, at 23:03 hours, CCTV showed a customer with dark colored clothing entering Wheaton Station's track 2 platform. They appeared to walk unsteadily as they traversed the platform. The customer walked approximately 450 feet toward the 8-car marker and, on several occasions, came close to the granite edge. At 23:06 hours, the customer fell onto the roadway between the running rail and platform refuge area with their upper body [head and right hand] positioned on the running rail. At about the same time, the Station Manager exited the kiosk to address three fare evaders.



Figure 1 - Fare Evader #1 climbs over fare gate




Figure 2 - Station Manager leaving the kiosk to communicate with fare evaders.

The Station Manager returned to the kiosk at 23:10 hours. During those four minutes, the customer remained motionless on the roadway and there were no other customers on the platform to witness the fall.

At 23:09 hours, an LPI operating Train ID 110 and a Student Operator observer departed Glenmont Station toward Wheaton Station on track 2. Train ID 110 entered Wheaton Station's platform limits at 23:15 hours at a speed of 32 mph. The customer remained motionless near the Area of Refuge, which is on the opposite side of the Operator's station. The Train Operator activated the Master Controller's emergency handle 347 feet within the station platform limits. Train ID 110 stopped approximately 34 feet from the 8-car marker and passed over the customer by approximately seven feet before coming to a complete stop.

At 23:19 hours, the Train Operator disembarked the train and identified a customer under the refuge area with injuries to their left hand and notified the Radio RTC that there were signs of life.

The Button RTC de-energized third rail power at 23:20 hours.




Figure 3 - AIMS Playback showed Power de-energized at 23:20 hours.

At 23:20 hours, the ROCC OM contacted MCFRS and reported a person struck by a train. The OM provided details as they became available while reporting the event to MCFRS. The LPI

applied a handbrake on lead car 2005 at 23:23 hours. Train ID 110 was then reblocked as Train ID 710 [out of service].




Figure 4 - Train ID 110 changed to Train ID 705 at 23:23 hours.

MCFRS arrived on location at 23:29 hours and established incident command. An RTRA Supervisor confirmed that third rail power was de-energized at 23:38 hours. MCFRS removed the customer from the roadway at 23:40 hours. At 23:42 hours, AIMS playback showed Train ID 192 was the first train to single-track Wheaton Station on Track 1 and serviced the station.




Figure 5 - First train to single-track and service Wheaton Station, track 1, at approximately 23:42 hours.

The Power Desk Controller re-energized third rail power to assist with moving the incident train Glenmont yard. At 00:15 hours, MCFRS transported the customer to Suburban Hospital for injuries to their right hand and further medical evaluation.




Figure 6 - Third rail power energized to move Train ID 710 to the nearest rail yard.

The incident train departed Wheaton station after MTPD completed their investigation at 01:21 hours.




Figure 7 - Incident train leaving the area at 01:21:20 hours.

The Button RTC de-energized third rail power in the incident area at 01:24 hours for scene cleanup.




Figure 8 - Power Desk de-energized third rail power.

CCTV showed that PLNT personnel began cleaning activities at 02:06 hours and completed cleaning the incident area per Standard Operating Procedure 26 at 02:47 hours.

In reviewing the incident response, it was confirmed that third rail power was de-energized beneath the entire consist of the train following the notification of the event. An analysis of data collected from the record systems, staff incident report review, and CCTV review determined that no safety deficiencies related to any WMATA station facility or rail vehicle failures contributed to the person being struck by the train. A review of the Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS) recordings

revealed that the Train Operator of Train ID 110 entered the station and applied an emergency braking application before striking the person.

Chronological ARS Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
23:03:00 hours	<i>Wheaton Station CCTV showed a customer appear on the track 2 platform unsteady on their feet, moving closer to the platform edge. The customer walks approximately 450 feet toward the 8-car marker.</i>
23:06:00 hours	<i>Wheaton Station CCTV showed the customer fall onto the roadway beside the running rail and platform refuge area. There were no other customers on the platform.</i>
23:06:00 hours	<i>Three customers fare evaded, and the Station Manager left the kiosk to address the customers for approximately four minutes before returning to the kiosk.</i>
23:16:00 hours	<i>Wheaton Station Showed Train ID 110 entering the platform limits while the customer's upper body [head and right hand] was lying on the running rail. The Train passed over the customer approximately 7 feet before coming to a complete stop. CCTV showed another employee in the cab with the Train Operator observing the roadway.</i>
23:16:45 hours	<u>Train ID 110 Train Operator:</u> Someone was on the track I saw them kind of late. <u>Radio RTC:</u> What is your ID and location? <u>Train ID 110 Train Operator:</u> Train ID 110 Wheaton, it looks like they were sleeping on the track. [Radio Ops 1]
23:17:16 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> "Asked for confirmation if the train made contact with the person. <u>Train ID 110 Train Operator:</u> That is affirmative; the train went over them. They were lying under the platform and the rails. I can check and see if they are ok." [Radio Ops 1]
23:17:30 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> "Are you still properly berthed, or have some cars off the platform? <u>Train ID 110 Train Operator:</u> I have six cars; I am not at the 8-car marker I have all the cars on the platform. I am about 15 to 20 feet from the 8-car marker. <u>Radio RTC:</u> Affirmative, make announcements to your customers, key down, and give ROCC a radio check." <u>Train ID 110 Train Operator:</u> Repeated instructions. [Radio Ops 1]
23:19:19 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> "110 Train Operator; to confirm, you said they are under your train. Can you provide a car number and confirm whether or not your train made contact with that person?" [Radio Ops 1]
23:19:30 hours	<u>Train ID 110 Train Operator:</u> "That is affirmative, lead car 2005." [Radio Ops 1]
23:19:38 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Confirmed transmission lead car 2005 and assigned Train ID 110 Train Operator as the on-scene commander. [Radio Ops 1]
23:19:59 hours	<u>Train ID 110 Train Operator:</u> Notified the Radio RTC they do see signs of life. <u>Radio RTC:</u> Confirmed the transmission.
23:20:00 hours	<i>AIMS Playback showed third rail power was de-energized.</i>

Time	Description
23:20:01 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Dispatched RTRA Supervisors to Wheaton Station [Ops 1]
23:20:04 hours – 23:21:35 hours	<u>OM</u> : Contacted MCFRS and stated they were at ROCC, and they have a person struck by train. There was a brief silence, and then the OM said, “Hello.” <u>MCFRS Communications</u> : “Yes, I am sorry. You said you were struck by a train.” <u>OM</u> : Responded, “Yes, are ready for the address?” <u>MCFRS Communications</u> : Responded, “yes.” <u>OM</u> : “Wheaton Metro Station address 11171 Georgia Avenue Silver Spring MD.” Repeated twice for verification. The OM provided a callback number. Requested the Operators call number and attempted to disconnect. <u>MCFRS Communications</u> : Said hold, “do you have any additional information?” <u>OM</u> : “No, it is track 2 Wheaton and the person is under the train. The train is in the station.” [Phone ROCC OM] <u>MCFRS Communications</u> : Acknowledged.
23:20:05 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 110 Train Operator to apply a handbrake on the lead car. [Radio Ops 1]
23:22:18 hours	<u>Train ID 110 Train Operator</u> : Notified Radio RTC that the Station Manager was on-scene and they were in the process of applying the handbrake. [Radio Ops 1]
23:23:20 hours	<i>AIMS Playback showed Train ID 110 changed to Train ID 710</i>
23:23:51 hours	<u>Train ID 110 Train Operator</u> : Notified Radio RTC that the hand brake was applied on car 2005. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Confirmed handbrake set on lead car 2005. [Radio Ops 1]
23:23:58 hours	<u>MCFRS Dispatch</u> : Metro Station Wheaton 11171 Georgia avenue, Cross street Reddie drive, metro pedestrian struck. Paramedic engine 718, Engine 705 Paramedic Engine 719 Tower 718, Tower 719 Rescue Squad 742 Bravo Ambulance 742 B Ambulance 705 Rescue support unit 725, Support unit 729, Support unit 731, and Battalion 701 operate box zero 4. [Open MHz]
23:29:30 hours	<u>Paramedic engine 718</u> : Notified MCFRS communications that they were on-scene and establishing command. [Open MHz]
23:29:46 hours	<u>Train ID 110 Train Operator</u> : Reported MCFRS on the scene. [Radio Ops 1]
23:30:56 hours	<u>ROCC Fire Liaison</u> : “Notified MCFRS command that the person was not hit by the train. They were already on the roadway, and the train ran over them or stopped short before the wheels got to them.” [Open MHz]
23:32:12 hours	<u>Battalion 701</u> : Reported on location, assumed command and requested an update. <u>Paramedic engine 718</u> : We do have a gentleman under the train who does not appear to be pinned by any portion of the train. Once we get WSADs on both sides of the train, we will get some personnel down to pull them up in a couple of minutes. [Open MHz]
23:32:00 hours	RTRA Supervisor arrived and assumed OSC responsibilities. [Radio Ops 1]
23:36:11 hours	<u>ROCC Fire Liaison</u> : Contacted Battalion 701 command and requested the location of the command post. <u>Battalion 701</u> : Notified the ROCC Liaison that the command post was moving to the platform with Battalion 702 themselves and the police. [Open MHz]

Time	Description
23:36:59 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted an RTRA Supervisor Foul Time (FT) and permission to hot stick and confirm the incident location de-energized on track 2 at Wheaton Station. <u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Confirmed the Radio RTC transmission with 100 percent repeat back. [Radio Ops 1]
23:37:00 hours	<u>Incident Command</u> : Authorized single-tracking operations.
23:38:29 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Notified the Radio RTC third rail was de-energized on track 2 Wheaton Station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Confirmed the transmission. [Radio Ops 1]
23:40:44 hours	<u>Battalion 701</u> : Notified MCFRS communications WSADs were placed on both sides of the train and the victim was removed from under the train. [Open MHz]
23:42:00 hours	<i>AIMs Playback showed Train ID 192 was the first train to single track and service Wheaton Station Track 1</i>
23:44:00 hours	MTPD arrived on-scene and assumed OSC responsibilities and the RTRA Supervisor was designated as the Forward Liaison. [Radio Ops 1]
23:51:00 hours	<i>Ambulance 705 departed Wheaton Station with customer.</i>
October 5 2022	October 5 2022
00:15:17 hours	Ambulance 705 Bravo: Notified MCFRS communications customer was being transported to Suburban hospital. [Open MHz]
01:15:20 hours	<i>AIMs Playback showed that third rail power was energized.</i>
01:21:20 hours	<i>AIMs Playback showed Train ID 710 leaving Wheaton Station Track 2</i>
01:24:40 hours	<i>AIMs Playback showed that third rail power was de-energized.</i>
01:49:00 hours	MTPD transferred command to the RTRA Supervisor. [Radio Ops 1]
02:06:00 hours	LNT maintenance began cleaning activities according to SOP 26 procedures. [CCTV]
02:47:00 hours	PLNT maintenance completed cleaning efforts at Wheaton Station, Track 2. [CCTV]

****Note:** Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources.

Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

COMR conducted comprehensive radio checks and reported no issues were found at this location.

Office of the Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR), Incident Investigation Team (IIT)


Adopted from CMOR IIT report:

“CMOR IIT downloaded and analyzed the VMS Data. VMS data determined that after the Master Controller was placed in emergency at 23:15:06.46 hours, the train came to a complete stop at 23:15:11; this indicated the train functioned as intended with a deceleration rate of -3.2 mph. VMS data does not show the road horn was activated at the time of the incident; however, the road horn was activated at 15:57 before the incident and at 04:30 hours on 10/5 after the incident. No additional logs are required at this time; however, CMNT should perform the recommendations below.”

Time	Description of Events
23:09:42 hours	2005 Cab Keyed on at Glenmont Station.
23:14:17 hours	Master Controller moved to P5; the Train speed was at 41 mph.
23:14:56 hours	Train Enters Wheaton Station at 32 mph (Distance 1701306)
23:14:58 hours	First F4 Marker detected (Distance 1701371)
23:15:05 hours	Master Controller moved to B5; Train speed is 16 mph.
23:15:06 hours	347 feet into the station, the TL 82 Emergency Trainline signal goes low (MC Handle in Emergency position) Speed 16 mph (Distance - 1701653)
23:15:07 hours	Second F4 Marker detected (Distance 1701664)
23:15:07 hours	After the Second F4 marker, 2005 travels an additional 6 feet before the Brakes applied signal goes high train speed 13 mph (Distance - 1701670)
23:15:11 hours	After the Brakes were applied, Train travels an additional 25 feet before coming to a complete stop, with the train stopping approximately 34 feet short of the 8-car marker (Distance - 1701695)

***Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources.*

Event Recorder Data



Recommendations:

- Perform complete under-car inspection.
- Perform Brake Rates and Master Controller checks.
- Visually inspect the wheels for flats on the lead car. If any flats and/or spalling are noted/found, the entire consist MUST have all wheels inspected.
- Document all inspections, findings, and corrective actions in Maximo.
- Re-establish VMS communication with all subsystems.
- Perform successful DI inspections.
- CENV has No Hold on cars.

Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)

CMNT Technicians performed an under-car inspection on the incident consist and performed the following corrective maintenance. CMNT inspected the collector shoe of the left front truck and discovered bodily fluids. This area was cleaned accordingly.

No damage found on lead car 2005. CMNT performed brakes rate tests and found the brake rates to be within the designed specification parameters. CMNT reported no issues found with Master Controller's operations. CMNT visually inspected the wheels and found no evidence of flat spots. The VMS communicated with all subsystems. CMNT performed a successful Daily Inspection.

Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA)

Adopted from RTRA report:

“On October 4, 2022, at approximately 23:20 hours, Operator [redacted] operating Train ID #110 reported that the train struck someone on the wayside at Wheaton Station Track #2. The Train Operator stated that they entered Wheaton Station at normal speed, and as they approached the 8-car marker, they saw a person lying down on the track in front of them, appearing to be asleep. The Train Operator dumped the train and pressed the emergency stop button. The train still struck this individual, causing injury to his head and hand. MCFRS assisted the on to the platform. It was also noted that the passenger smelled of alcohol. The Train Operator was removed from service as well as the Student Operator, and transported for Post Incident testing. MCFRS transported the customer was transported to Suburban Hospital.”

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE interviewed one Train Operator. The interview identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

The Student Operator alerted the LPI (Train Operator) of a person on the roadway. The Train Operator applied B5 braking and not an emergency to prevent the train from sliding and brakes to lock up to reduce extending the stopping distance. The Train Operator located the employee near lead car 2005 under the refuge area.

Weather

On October 4, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 51° F, with light rain. The event occurred within a tunneled section of the rail system. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Montgomery County, Md.)

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

SAFE evaluated conditions at the time of the incident to distinguish whether evidence of fatigue was present. No video of the Train Operator was available to ascertain whether evidence of fatigue was present. The Train Operator reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The Train Operator reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Train Operator reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The Train Operator worked the evening shift in the days leading up to the incident. The Train Operator was awake for 9.766 hours at the time of the incident. The Train Operator reported 11.5 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 14.51 hours, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. The employee reported no issues with sleep. This was 2.5 hours more than the employee's usual workday sleep durations.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Train and Student Operator was in compliance with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Work History

The Train Operator was hired as a Bus Operator on July 9, 2007. The Train Operator has held several positions, such as Bus Operator, Train Operator, and Line Platform Instructor. The Train Operator was first certified on December 8, 2013. The Train Operator has not had any safety incidents or violations in the past three years.

Certifications

The Train Operator's last train certification was June 16, 2022, with a QL-1 [highest qualification] and passed their MSRPH written exam. The Train Operator is an RWP Level 2 and is in compliance until August 1, 2023.

Findings

- A customer fell to the roadway accidentally after walking unsteadily on the track 2 platform.
- The Station Manager was outside the kiosk attending to fare evaders when the customer fell onto the roadway.
- There were no witnesses on the platform when the customer fell to the roadway.
- Student Operator alerted the Train Operator of a person on the roadway.
- Train Operator entered the station at 32 mph, which complies with Operating Rules. They applied braking in an attempt to prevent collision with the person.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- CMNT removed the Train ID 110 from service for post-incident inspection and CMOR IIT download and analysis.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Wheaton Station person struck by train event was an accidental fall that resulted in a customer laying within the train's dynamic envelope. Contributing Factors to the event were the lack of witnesses to the fall and the customer wearing dark clothing, which prevented the Train Operator from observing the customer earlier. No mechanical defects or human-based errors were identified.

Recommendations/Corrective Actions

No recommendations for this event. No response-related deficiencies, mechanical defects, or human-based errors were identified.

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

The narrative(s) below summarizes the interview statements made by the personnel involved. As such, times and details may conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

The Train Operator was hired as a Bus Operator on July 9, 2007. The Train Operator has held several positions, such as Bus Operator, Train Operator, and Line Platform Instructor. The Train Operator was first certified on December 8, 2013. The Train Operator has not had any rail incidents in the past three years. The Train Operator's last train certification was June 16, 2022, with a QL-1


The Train Operator ate a high-protein breakfast that morning and had a student operator that required more saddle time to certify. The Train Operator / LPI received their manifest. The Train Operator reported a normal day that included three trips. The student operator did the first two trips.

On the last trip from Glenmont, the Train Operator [LPI] left around 23:14 hours. It takes two to three minutes to get to Wheaton. The Train Operator entered the platform on the way to the eight-car marker; the Student Operator shouted, "Stop!" The Train Operator surveyed the roadway and saw a darkly-clothed person appearing to be taking a nap on the rail. His head and arm are on the rail. "I did not want to dump the train because it would probably hydroplane or skid."

The Train Operator reported they contacted central and reported the event. As instructed, the Train Operator left the cab and conducted a ground walk-around. The Train Operator reported seeing a lot of blood. The Train Operator made contact with the customer and observed them under the refuge area. After MCFRS removed the customer, it appeared the customer's hand was severely injured. The Train Operator reported the customer was located near the front left passenger door of their lead car.

During the interview, the Train Operator was distressed and needed to pause several times. The Train Operator expressed hurt and pain due to the event. Contact information for the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) was provided for the employee during the interview discussion.

Appendix B – Root Cause Analysis



Root Cause Analysis

Attachment 1 – Root Cause Analysis page 1 of 1.

