



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0211 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Gallery Place Station – November 23, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on April 11, 2023

Safety event summary:

Gallery Place Station was evacuated on November 23, 2022, due to the report of a suspicious bag on the lower level of the station. During this event, there was confusion about evacuation and train operations, and MTPD personnel improperly de-energized third rail power without notifying the Rail Operations Control Center.

At 5:09 p.m., a Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Dispatcher received a report from a customer that there was a suspicious package on the light grate adjacent to Track 2 of Gallery Place's lower level (the Green and Yellow line tracks). MTPD personnel were dispatched. They identified a backpack on the roadway and requested assistance from the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD).

An MTPD Officer was not designated On-Scene Commander until 5:39 p.m., approximately 14 minutes after the first officer arrived on scene.

At 5:29 p.m., a Rail Supervisor advised the Rail Operations Control Center that they were at the station and requested that third rail power be de-energized on Track 2. The Rail Supervisor later, at 5:43 p.m., advised the ROCC Radio Rail Traffic Controller that MTPD did not require train service to stop until the explosive ordinance disposal team arrived to evaluate the suspicious item. Train service continued for an additional 40 minutes. During that time, at 5:39 p.m. an MTPD Communications Technician reviewed CCTV footage and advised MTPD personnel that a customer threw a bag down from the Mezzanine level onto Track 2 at the station at 11:00 p.m. the previous evening, on November 22, 2022. The bag went unnoticed for over 18 hours, despite the requirement that Station Managers perform hourly station checks and a final station check when the system closes..

At 6:23 p.m., over an hour after the suspicious package was first reported, the On-Scene Commander informed the Mission Assurance Coordinator that service would be suspended, and riders evacuated from Gallery Place-Chinatown Station. At 6:26 p.m., the On Scene Commander stated that the lower level (Yellow and Green Line) would be evacuated, and service suspended for trains on those tracks, but that Red Line trains could continue to service the station.

At 6:30 p.m. MTPD Officers incorrectly confirmed that all customers had been evacuated from the lower level of the station. At 6:33 p.m. MTPD Officers found four additional customers on the platform and evacuated them.

Throughout the event, as the WMSC has identified in prior investigations and audits, there was confusion due to actions outside of Metrorail's SOP 1A emergency management process, including communications outside of the incident management process between personnel such as the Safety Department's Office of Emergency Preparedness individual on scene and personnel in the ROCC, including as it relates to third rail power. Investigative interviews suggest that this individual was not operating under current Metrorail procedures.

At 6:39 p.m., MTPD improperly de-energized third rail power using an Emergency Trip Station (ETS) box, which contains a button to push to de-energize power immediately in the event, for example, an individual falls onto the



roadway, a map, and a phone to contact ROCC. The ROCC Rail Controller received notification that the ETS had been used on their Advanced Information Management System (AIM) screen and the Rail Supervisor confirmed that MTPD had brought down power within the platform limits on Track 2 on the Yellow/Green Line using the ETS box rather than following the incident command structure and Metrorail's written power de-energization process that includes communication with the Rail Operations Control Center and Power Operations Center to ensure that there are no unintended consequences such as a train that gets stuck in a tunnel.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was an unattended item. The probable cause of deficiencies in Metrorail's response are deficiencies in Metrorail training requirements, internal communication, and incident management processes.

Corrective Actions:

- Due to this investigation
 - Completed
 - WMATA added to its Mandatory In-Service Retraining (MIR) plan for 2023 for MTPD Officers to include information on practices related to third rail power de-energization, including utilization of the ETS Box.
 - Metrorail created an RTRA Supervisor Notification to reinforce SOP 1A Incident Command specific to the RTRA Forward Liaison.
 - Metrorail created a Rail Operations Personnel Notice (ROPN) on the importance of vigilance during Station Closing Procedures and final walk-throughs.
 - Ongoing
 - C-0162 was created to address a 2022 emergency management and fire and life safety audit finding that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements. For this CAP, which has an expected completion date of January 2025, WMATA has committed to creating and implementing an Incident Management System Framework in alignment with the NIMS/ICS.
 - C-0165 was created to address the finding that MTPD general orders do not reflect current operational realities and procedures, and areas for improvement from prior events are not effectively communicated to frontline MTPD personnel.

WMSC Staff Observations:

Metrorail's response to this event is further evidence of previous WMSC findings that Metrorail is in the process of implementing corrective action plans to address, including those related to incident command, MTPD understanding of operational safety procedures, and the importance of operations personnel following written rules and procedures to identify and mitigate hazards in a timely fashion.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)
FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22768

Date of Event:	November 23, 2022
Type of Event:	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	17:09 hours
Location:	Gallery Place Station, Lower Level, Track 2
Time and How received by SAFE:	17:15 hours – Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC)
WMSC Notification Time:	18:58 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	OEP
Rail Vehicle:	N/A
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
SMS I/A Number	20221128#104477

**Gallery Place Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Event
November 23, 2022**

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms-----	3
Executive Summary -----	4
Incident Site -----	5
Field Sketch/Schematics -----	5
Purpose and Scope -----	5
Investigative Methods-----	6
Investigation -----	6
Chronological Event Timeline-----	11
Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) -----	14
Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) -----	17
Supervisor’s Report -----	17
Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) -----	18
Hot-Wash Report-----	18
Interview Findings-----	18
RTRA Supervisor -----	18
OEP Primary Responder-----	19
Weather -----	20
Related Rules and Procedures-----	20
Human Factors -----	20
Fatigue-----	20
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing -----	20
Findings -----	20
Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence -----	21
Probable Cause Statement-----	21
Recommended Corrective Actions -----	21
Appendices -----	22
Appendix A – Interview Summary -----	22
RTRA Supervisor -----	22
OEP Primary Responder-----	23
Appendix B – RTRA Supervisor Report (Redacted) -----	24
Appendix C - Root Cause Analysis-----	26

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
EOD	Explosive Ordinance Disposal
ETS	Emergency Trip Station
FT	Foul Time
MPD	Metropolitan Police Department
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OEP	Office of Emergency Preparedness
OSC	On-Scene Commander
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On November 23, 2022, at 17:09 hours, a customer placed a call to the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Communications Center alerting them that there was a black, leather bag in the roadway, on Track 2 of the lower-level at Gallery Place Station.

At 17:13 hours, an MTPD dispatcher called for units to respond at Gallery Place Station, for assessment of a suspicious package. An MTPD K-9 Officer was in the area and commenced the initial investigation. At 17:25 hours, the MTPD K-9 Officer advised that they had located the backpack in the roadway and requested a review of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) and Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) unit. At 17:29 hours, MTPD Dispatch liaised with MPD Dispatch in order to dispatch an MPD EOD Technician.

At the same time, the Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor advised they were on scene, observed the suspicious package in the roadway, and advised third-rail power would need to be de-energized in order to retrieve the item. At 17:36 hours, MTPD Dispatch assigned an MTPD Officer as the On-Scene Commander.

At 17:39 hours, the MTPD Communications Technician advised that the CCTV footage, determined that an unknown customer threw a bag down from the Mezzanine level and it landed on Track 2 at Gallery Place Station the previous evening, on November 22, 2022 at 23:00 hours.

At 17:43 hours, the RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that MTPD did not require revenue service to be suspended until MPD EOD arrived on scene. At 18:23 hours, the On-Scene Commander (OSC) advised the MAC that MTPD would perform a full station shut down of Gallery Place Station, to include the Red Line. At 18:24 hours, the RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that service would be suspended for the entire station, to include both tracks of the Red Line.

At 18:26 hours, the Button RTC notified Greenbelt Terminal that Green Line service was suspended at Gallery Place Station and trains were turning back at Mt. Vernon Square & L'Enfant Plaza Stations. At the same time, the OSC advised the MAC that MTPD had commenced evacuating customers from the Green Line Platform. The OSC then requested a rail service suspension at Gallery Place Station, with Red Line Trains able to continue to service Gallery Place Station. At 18:30 hours, MTPD officers confirmed that Gallery Place Station's lower-level platform was clear of all customers.

At 18:31 hours, the OSC advised that the entrance of 7th and H Streets and the lower-level platform had been closed with service suspended. The upper-level platform trains were free to continue service of both tracks and MPD EOD was on scene commencing their investigation.

At 18:39 hours, the Radio RTC inquired from the RTRA Supervisor if the Emergency Trip Station (ETS) box had been activated as the Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) was displaying that power had been de-energized at the platform limits of Gallery Place Station, Track 2. The RTRA Supervisor stated they would confirm. At 18:42 hours, the RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that MTPD de-energized the power via the ETS box button. At the same time, the MTPD Dispatcher advised Incident Command there was some confusion as to whether the Red Line, was servicing Gallery Place Station on both tracks.

At 18:48 hours, the MTPD K-9 Officer reported that MPD EOD had cleared the suspicious package, deemed it safe and removed it from the roadway. At 18:53 hours, the MTPD K-9 Officer advised all personnel were clear of both tracks of the roadway at Gallery Place Station.


At 18:55 hours, the RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that third rail power could be restored to the platform limits at Gallery Place Station, Track 2 and that all personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway. At 18:56 hours, the Radio RTC advised normal service had been resumed. No personnel were injured, or property damaged as a result of the incident.

The Probable Cause for the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Gallery Place Station was that an unknown customer dropped a bag from the mezzanine level onto Track 2 of the lower-level of Gallery Place Station. The platform was evacuated to allow law enforcement authorities to investigate and determine the threat level. No WMATA personnel or equipment contributed to this event.

Incident Site

Gallery Place Station, Lower-Level, Track 2

Field Sketch/Schematics



**The above depiction is not to scale. The Red Star represents the approximate location of the incident.*

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment through video and documents review.
- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed one individual as part of this investigation. The Interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the following individuals:
 - RTRA Supervisor
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - RTRA Supervisor's Report
 - MTPD Hot Wash Report
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On November 23, 2022, at 17:09 hours, a customer placed a call to the MTPD Communications Center alerting them that there was a black leather bag in the Roadway, on Track 2 of the lower level of Gallery Place Station.

CCTV footage revealed that on November 22, 2022, at 23:04 hours, an unknown customer threw the bag from the upper-level (Red Line) Mezzanine level to the lower-level (Green/Yellow Line) where it landed on the lighted grates on Track 2 of Gallery Place Station.



Figure 1: Suspicious package is observed on Track 2 of the lower level at Gallery Place Station. Red arrow denotes direction of train travel.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that at 17:09 hours, an unknown customer reported observing a black leather bag, the size of a backpack, located next to the wall, near a light, facing the elevator on Track 2 side of Gallery Place Station.

At 17:13 hours, an MTPD Dispatcher called for units to respond to Gallery Place Station, for assessment of a suspicious package. An MTPD K-9 Officer was in the area and commenced the initial investigation. At 17:14 hours, an MTPD Communications Technician advised the RTRA Supervisor that MTPD Officers on scene were requesting a supervisor to assist in locating a backpack on the roadway at Gallery Place Station. At 17:25 hours, the MTPD K-9 Officer advised they had located the backpack on the roadway and requested a review of CCTV and assistance from MPD EOD. At 17:29 hours, MTPD Communications liaised with MPD Communications in order to dispatch an MPD EOD Technician.

At the same time, the RTRA Supervisor advised ROCC that they were on scene, observed the suspicious package in the roadway, and advised third rail power would need to be de-energized in order to retrieve the item. At 17:36 hours, MTPD Dispatch assigned a Senior MTPD Officer as the On-Scene Commander. At the same time, the RTRA Supervisor requested FT within the platform limits of Gallery Place Station, Track 2 in order to retrieve the suspicious package. The Radio RTC approved the FT within the platform limits. At 17:38 hours, the RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that MTPD stopped them from entering the roadway to retrieve the backpack. The RTRA Supervisor also advised that they relinquished their FT.

At 17:39 hours, the MTPD Communications Technician advised that upon review of the CCTV footage, it was determined that an unknown customer threw the suspicious bag down from the Mezzanine level to where it landed on Track 2 at Gallery Place Station on November 22, 2022.

at 23:04 hours. The MTPD Dispatcher acknowledged and transferred the incident to MTPD Channel 2-X.

At 17:41 hours, MTPD K-9 Officer acknowledged the placement and time of the bag being unattended and stated they would hold position until MPD EOD arrived on scene. The MTPD K-9 Officer also reported that they had cordoned off the area with caution tape.

At 17:43 hours, the RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that MTPD did not require revenue service to be suspended until EOD arrived on scene.



Figure 2: MTPD commenced cordoning the area at 17:43 hours.

At 17:45 hours, the MTPD K-9 Officer advised no ETA on MPD EOD and that both tracks of the lower level were continuing to be serviced at Gallery Place Station.

At 18:15 hours, the OSC requested WSADs to the scene from the on-coming Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) Primary Responder. At 18:20 hours, the MTPD Dispatcher requested the Button RTC to hold Train ID 501 on the platform at Gallery Place Station due to an unattended bag reported onboard the train. No railcar number was given.

At 18:22 hours, a Rail Car Maintenance employee reported to the Button RTC that MTPD was closing Gallery Place Station. At the same time, the MTPD dispatcher updated the Button RTC that trains need to hold at L'Enfant Plaza Station instead of Gallery Place Station. At 18:23 hours, the OSC initially advised the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) that MTPD would perform a full station shut down at Gallery Place Station, to include the Red Line. At 18:24 hours, the RTRA

Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that service would be suspended for the entire station at Gallery Place Station, to include both tracks of the Red Line.

At 18:25 hours, the Radio RTC on OPS 1 advised all Red Line trains of service suspension between Farragut North and Judiciary Square Stations.

At 18:26 hours, the Button RTC notified the Greenbelt Terminal that Green Line service was suspended at Gallery Place Station and trains were to turn back at Mount Vernon Square & L'Enfant Plaza Stations. At the same time, the OSC advised the MAC that MTPD had commenced evacuating customers from the Green Line Platform. The OSC requested rail service suspension at Gallery Place Station, Red Line trains were able to continue to service Gallery Place Station.

At 18:30 hours, MTPD Officers confirmed that Gallery Place Station lower platform was clear of all customers. At the same time, the Radio RTC announced service had been suspended at Gallery Place Station and Archives Station. They further stated that Branch Avenue trains were turning at L'Enfant Plaza Station and Greenbelt trains were turning at Mount Vernon Square Station.

At approximately the same time the Radio RTC on OPS 1 advised all Red Line trains that Gallery Place Station would be bypassed only.

At 18:31 hours, the OSC advised the entrance of 7th and H Streets and the lower level platform were closed with service suspended. The upper level platform trains were free to continue service of both tracks and MPD EOD was on scene commencing their investigation. At the same time, the RTC nominated the RTRA Supervisor as the RTRA Forward Liaison.

At 18:33 hours, MTPD found four customers on the platform and coordinated evacuating them.



Figure 3: MTPD K-9 Officer observed de-energizing the third-rail power via the ETS box at approximately 18:36 hours.

At 18:39 hours, the Radio RTC inquired from the RTRA Supervisor if the ETS box had been activated, as AIMS was displaying that power had been de-energized at the platform limits of Gallery Place Station, Track 2. The RTRA Supervisor advised that they would confirm. At 18:40 hours, the Radio RTC advised a shuttle bus service was initiated between Mount Vernon and L'Enfant Plaza Stations.

At 18:42 hours, the RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that MTPD de-energized the power via the ETS box button. At the same time, the MTPD Dispatcher advised Incident Command there was some confusion as to whether the Red Line was servicing Gallery Place Station on both tracks. The MTPD Dispatcher further advised that MTPD Officers on scene advised trains were bypassing the station.



Figure 4: MPD EOD on scene at 18:42 hours.

At 18:46 hours, the RTRA Supervisor called the Button RTC and reported that MTPD had not evacuated both levels of the station. The Button RTC stated the MTPD Liaison Officer advised ROCC that the upper level at Gallery Place Station could resume service. The RTRA Supervisor further advised the power was de-energized by MTPD by activating the button on the ETS box.




Figure 5: MPD EOD investigating at 18:44 hours.

At 18:48 hours, the MTPD K-9 Officer advised that MPD EOD had cleared the suspicious package, deemed it safe and removed it from the roadway. The MTPD K-9 Officer advised that personnel could remove the Wayside Strobe and Alarm Device (WSAD) from the third rail. At 18:53 hours, the MTPD K-9 Officer advised MTPD dispatch that all personnel were clear of both tracks at Gallery Place Station.

At 18:55 hours, the RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that third-rail power could be restored to the platform limits at Gallery Place Station, Track 2 and that all personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway. At 18:56 hours, the Radio RTC advised normal service had been resumed.

An audio review of the phone logs did not locate a phone notification to the WMSC from the MAC. Consultation with WMSC indicated that a phone notification was not received for this event.

Chronological Event Timeline

Time	Description
17:09:30 hours	Customer placed a call to MTPD Communications Tech alerting them that there was a black, leather bag in the Roadway, on the "Branch Avenue Side." The customer stated the bag was placed next to the wall, near a light, facing the elevator. The Customer stated the bag was the size of a backpack. [SOCC5E, Phone]

Time	Description
17:13:53 hours	MTPD Dispatcher dispatched MTPD K-9 Officer to Gallery Place to investigate a report of an unattended bag on the "Branch Avenue side, near the tunnel," in the Roadway. MTPD K-9 Officer acknowledged and asked the MTPD Dispatcher to start an RTRA Supervisor their way and enquired if EOD was on standby. The MTPD Dispatcher acknowledged and stated no EOD on schedule. [MTPD1X, Radio]
17:14:48 hours	MTPD Communications Technician advised the RTRA Supervisor that MTPD Officers on scene were requesting a supervisor to assist in locating a backpack in the roadway of Gallery Place Station. [SOCC5E, Phone]
17:15:50 hours	Radio RTC advised RTRA Supervisor to respond to a report of an item in the Roadway at Gallery Place Station. [OPS 3, Radio]
17:25:48 hours	MTPD K-9 Officer advised they had located the backpack in the Roadway and requested review of CCTV and MPD EOD. [MTPD1X, Radio]
17:29:15 hours	MTPD Dispatch liaised with MPD Dispatch in order to dispatch an MPD EOD Technician. [SOCCA, Phone]
17:29:25 hours	RTRA Supervisor advised they were on scene, observed the suspicious package and advised third-rail power would need to be de-energized in order to retrieve the backpack. Radio RTC acknowledged. [OPS 3, Radio]
17:36:25 hours	MTPD Dispatcher advised senior MTPD Officer as on-scene commander. [MTPD1X, Radio]
17:36:59 hours	Radio RTC approved RTRA Supervisor's Foul Time request, within the platform limits of Track 2 of Gallery Place Station. [OPS 3, Radio]
17:38:40 hours	RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that MTPD stopped them from entering the roadway to retrieve the suspicious package. RTRA Supervisor also advised they relinquished foul-time as a result. [OPS 3, Radio]
17:39:12 hours	MTPD Communications Technician advised that upon review of the CCTV footage, they had determined an unknown customer threw the bag down from the Mezzanine on to Track 2 of Gallery Place on November 22, at 23:04 hours. MTPD Dispatcher acknowledged and advised all personnel attached to the Gallery Place unattended bag to switch to "2X." [MTPD1X, Radio]
17:39:59 hours	MTPD Officers relayed the above information to all personnel operating on "MTPD-2X" [MTPD2X, Radio]
17:41:17 hours	MTPD K-9 Officer acknowledged the placement and time of the bag being unattended, stated would hold position until EOD arrived on scene. MTPD K-9 Officer also stated they had cordoned off the area with caution tape. [MTPD2X, Radio]

Time	Description
17:43:34 hours	RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC MTPD does not require revenue service to be suspended until EOD is on scene. [OPS 3, Radio]
17:45:58 hours	MTPD K-9 Officer advised no ETA on EOD and that both tracks were continuing to be serviced at the lower level of Gallery Place. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:08:57 hours	Button RTC dispatched an RTRA supervisor to Gallery Place to assist with single tracking and delays. [ROCC Y/G, Phone]
18:15:07 hours	OSC requested WSADs to the scene from the OEP Primary Responder. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:20:46 hours	MTPD dispatcher requested the ROCC Button RTC to hold Train 501 on the platform at Gallery Place due to an unattended bag reported onboard the train. No railcar number was given. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:22:24 hours	Rail Car Maintenance reported to the Radio RTC that MTPD was closing Gallery Place Station. [OPS 3, Radio]
18:22:44 hours	MTPD updated ROCC Button RTC that Train needs to hold at L'Enfant Plaza station instead of Gallery Place. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:23:47 hours	OSC advised units on scene and the MAC that MTPD would perform a full station shut down of Gallery Place Station, to include the "Red Line." [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:24:21 hours	RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that service would be suspended for the entire station of Gallery Place Station, to include both tracks of the "Red Line." [OPS 3, Radio]
18:25:26 hours	Radio RTC advised all Red Line trains of service suspension between Farragut North and Judiciary Square Stations. [OPS 1, Radio]
18:26:06 hours	Button RTC notified Greenbelt terminal that Greenline service was suspended at Gallery Place and turning back at Mt. Vernon Square & L'Enfant Plaza. [ROCC Y/G, Phone]
18:26:54 hours	OSC advised the MAC that MTPD commenced evacuating customers off the "Green Line Platform." OSC requested rail service suspension to Gallery Place, "Red Line" Trains were able to continue to service Gallery Place Station. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:30:03 hours	Radio RTC advised all Red Line trains that Gallery Place Station would be bypassed only. [OPS 1, Radio]
18:30:05 hours	MTPD Officers confirmed Gallery Place Station lower platform was clear of all customers. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:30:16 hours	Radio RTC announced service had been suspended at Gallery Place Station and Archives Station. Branch Avenue Trains are turning at L'Enfant Station and Greenbelt Trains are turning at Mt. Vernon Square Station. [OPS 3, Radio]

Time	Description
18:31:10 hours	Incident Command advised the entrance of 7 th and H streets had been closed, the lower platform is closed with service suspended, however, the upper platform trains are free to continue service of both tracks and MPD EOD is on scene commencing investigation. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:31:21 hours	RTC nominated the RTRA Supervisor as the RTRA Forward Liaison. The RTRA Supervisor acknowledged. [OPS 3, Radio]
18:33:22 hours	MTPD found four customers on the platform and coordinated evacuating them. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:39:04 hours	Radio RTC inquired from RTRA Supervisor if the ETS box had been activated as the AIMS was displaying power had been de-energized at the platform limits of Gallery Place Station, Track 2. [OPS 3, Radio]
18:40:37 hours	Radio RTC advised a shuttle bus had been provided between Mt. Vernon and L'Enfant Plaza Stations. [OPS 3, Radio]
18:42:36 hours	RTRA Supervisor advised the Radio RTC that MTPD de-energized the power via the ETS button. [OPS 3, Radio]
18:42:40 hours	MTPD Dispatcher advised Incident Command there was some confusion as to whether the Red Line was servicing Gallery Place Station, both tracks. The MTPD Dispatcher further advised that MTPD Officers on scene advised trains were bypassing the station. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:46:22 hours	RTRA Supervisor called the Button RTC and asked about not evacuating both levels of the station. The Button RTC stated the MTPD Liaison Officer advised the ROCC that the upper level of Gallery Place Station could be serviced. The RTRA Supervisor further advised the power was de-energized by MTPD by activating the button on the ETS box. [ROCC ASST, Phone]
18:48:52 hours	MTPD K-9 Officer advised MPD EOD had cleared the suspicious package, deemed it safe and removed it from the scene. MTPD K-9 Officer advised that personnel could remove the WSAD from the third-rail. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:53:21 hours	MTPD K-9 Officer advised that all personnel were clear of both tracks of the roadway at Gallery Place Station. [MTPD2X, Radio]
18:55:37 hours	RTRA Supervisor advised Radio RTC that third-rail power can be restored to the platform limits of Gallery Place Station, Track 2, as all personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway. [OPS 3, Radio]
18:56:55 hours	RTC advised normal service resumed. [OPS 3, Radio]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

The AIMS display revealed that at 18:27 hours, trains were instructed to bypass the upper level of Gallery Place Station, both tracks.

Incident Date: 11/23/2022 Time: 17:09 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
E22768

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 01/17/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 01/23/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 01/23/2023

Page 14




Figure 6: Upper level of Gallery Place Station commenced bypass instructions at 18:27 hours

At 18:37 hours, power was de-energized from the lower level of Gallery Place Station, Track 2.



Figure 7: Power was de-energized to Gallery Place Station platform limits, Track 2 via ETS box at 18:37 hours.

At 18:47 hours, trains resumed service of the upper level of Gallery Place Station, both Tracks.




Figure 8: Service resumed on the Upper Level of Gallery Place Station at 18:47 hours.

At 19:00 hours, power was restored to the lower-level of Gallery Place Station, Track 2.



Figure 9: Power was restored to Gallery Place Station platform limits, Track 2 at 19:00 hours

At 19:04 hours, normal service resumed at the lower-level of Gallery Place Station, Track 2.




Figure 10: Normal service resumed at Gallery Place Station at 19:04 hours.

Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA)

Supervisor's Report

According to the written statement of the RTRA Supervisor, they arrived on the scene of the event at 17:29 hours. They contacted the MTPD Officers on scene who had located the suspicious package, a black backpack in the roadway.

The RTRA Supervisor notified ROCC of the package and requested FT to go and retrieve the backpack. The RTRA Supervisor was stopped by MTPD prior to retrieving the suspicious package. They relayed what had happened to ROCC and relinquished their foul time. ROCC advised them to continue to update the ROCC, as necessary.

MTPD was awaiting the arrival of EOD personnel prior to making contact with the package. MTPD then evacuated the lower level of Gallery Place Station. They attempted to convince the OSC that an evacuation of the entire station would allow for ease of containment. They expressed concern that by not evacuating the entire station, customers were attempting to access the lower level.*

**Note: The MTPD OSC reported that they had adequate personnel on scene to prevent customers from accessing the lower level platform*

MTPD personnel depressed the ETS Box button to de-energize the power to Track 2 of Gallery Place Station's lower level.

Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)

Hot-Wash Report

Sections adopted from MTPD Hot Wash:

At 17:12 hours, an unattended bag was located at Gallery Place Station's lower level, Track 2 on top of the lights adjacent to the third rail. At 17:14 hours, units located the bag and deemed it unattended, but out of an abundance of caution, EOD was requested.

At 17:31 hours, the RTRA Supervisor arrived on scene. At 17:33 hours, MPD EOD arrived on scene. At 17:37 hours, the OSC switched to MTPD's auxiliary radio channel, "MTPD 2X."

At 17:40 hours, MTPD Video Technicians located the suspicious package thrown from the upper level on November 22, 2022 at 23:04 hours.

At 17:47 hours, MTPD updated MTPD dispatch and advised that service will continue as normal until MPD EOD arrives. At 18:14 hours, additional personnel were requested for crowd control.

At 18:28 hours, the lower level of Gallery Place Station was closed, but the upper level remained open. Further, the entry point of 7th and H streets was also closed.

At 18:30 hours, the lower level was clear of customers and service was suspended to both tracks. At 18:37 hours, OEP arrived on scene and third-rail power was de-energized. At 18:41 hours, third-rail power was confirmed de-energized, and WSADs were placed. At 18:49 hours, a Bus Bridge was confirmed.

At 18:49 hours, EOD declared the suspicious package was safe. At 18:53 hours, Track 2 was clear of personnel and equipment, third-rail power was requested to be re-energized, and normal service was authorized.

The Hot-Wash Report further detailed that due to a heavy call-for-service volume, there was a deficit of available personnel to respond to Gallery Place Station in reference to the event. Once enough units were on scene, there were no issues. Incident Command was delayed due to the unattended nature of the suspicious package.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE interviewed two people. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

RTRA Supervisor

- The RTRA Supervisor stated they were dispatched to Gallery Place Station in response to a suspicious package.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated when they attempted to enter the roadway to retrieve the suspicious package, they were stopped by a MTPD K-9 Officer prior to retrieving the package.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated that they were not advised the suspicious package was being treated as explosive in nature until being stopped by the MTPD K-9 Officer.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated they then contacted Rail 2 of ROCC.

- The RTRA Supervisor stated they observed MTPD cordon off the area where the suspicious package was located.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated MTPD was awaiting the arrival of MPD EOD personnel prior to making contact with the package as MTPD EOD was unavailable.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated the MTPD OSC stated the lower level of Gallery Place Station was to be evacuated only; the upper level could continue service.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated they attempted to convince the OSC that an evacuation of the entire station would allow for ease of containment, to which the OSC disagreed.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated they then relayed this information to the Assistant Operations Manager of OPS 3, who advised the RTRA Supervisor to evacuate both levels of Gallery Place Station.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated Rail 2 advised the upper level of Gallery Place Station trains would bypass the station.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated the OEP personnel on scene advised them that MTPD personnel depressed the ETS Box emergency button in order to de-energize the power to Track 2 of the Gallery Place Station's lower level.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated they believed MTPD had the ability to de-energize the power by this method.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated they observed WSADs deployed but did not believe hot sticking had occurred.*
- The RTRA Supervisor stated MPD EOD cleared the suspicious package in five minutes.
- The RTRA Supervisor stated there was no explosive device recovered from the backpack.

**Note: Hot Sticking to confirm third rail was deenergized was performed by OEP Personnel.*

OEP Primary Responder

- The OEP Primary Responder stated they were sent to Gallery Place Station after being summoned to the scene after a report of a suspicious package requiring evacuation of Gallery Place Station.
- The OEP Primary Responder stated they arrived at the 7th and G Street entrance into Gallery Place Station and heard significant chatter on the Radio of both MTPD-2X and OPS 3. The OEP Primary Responder stated MTPD requested the OEP Primary Responder bring WSADs to the scene for use with the process of de-energizing the third-rail power.
- The OEP Primary Responder stated there was significant radio chatter and confusion as to what extent Gallery Place Station would be evacuated. The OEP Primary Responder stated they held a conference call, on speaker, with the ROCC Superintendent and OSC who clarified that only the lower-level would be evacuated.
- The OEP Primary Responder stated he then went down to the lower-level with two MTPD Officers including the K-9 Officer. The OEP Primary Responder stated he observed the MTPD K-9 Officer walk down the far end of the platform and use the ETS box to de-energize the third-rail power. The OEP Primary Responder stated the MTPD K-9 Officer was not ordered to de-energize the third-rail power in this way.
- The OEP Primary Responder stated he was responsible for applying the WSADs and hot-sticking to confirm third-rail power was de-energized and was granted permission to enter the roadway by Incident Command.
- The OEP Primary Responder stated the RTRA Supervisor continued to leave the Command Post during the course of the event.

Weather

On November 23, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 45°F, with clear skies and an average relative humidity of 46%. The event occurred within a tunneled section of the rail system. Conditions were dry. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident as the incident occurred underground. (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC.)

Related Rules and Procedures

SOP #1A – Command, Control and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System
SOP #14 – Bomb Threat/Suspicious Package/Unattended Package

Human Factors

Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event as no personnel required testing.

Findings

- A report of a suspicious package, observed in the roadway at Gallery Place Station, Track 2, was made by an unknown customer to MTPD Communications.
- The RTRA Supervisor attempted to retrieve the package from the roadway under foul time prior to checking in with the OSC. The RTRA Supervisor was stopped by MTPD prior to making entry onto the roadway.
- CCTV footage determined an unknown customer threw the bag down from the Mezzanine onto Track 2 at Gallery Place Station on November 22, 2022 at approximately 23:04 hours.
- The OSC initially advised units on scene and the MAC that a full station evacuation was necessary. Several minutes later, the order was changed to evacuate only the lower-level of Gallery Place Station and continue service to the upper-level.
- AIMS revealed that trains bypassed Gallery Place Station's upper level between 18:27 hours and 18:47 hours.
- In an effort to expedite removal of the backpack upon arrival of MPD EOD, the MTPD K-9 Officer de-energized power to the third-rail by activating the ETS box without notifying the OSC or being ordered to do so.
- There were several communications between parties regarding actions to be taken that did not go through the OSC.
- The RTRA Supervisor was nominated as the RTRA Forward Liaison but did not remain with the Command Post.

- The Station Manager did not observe the backpack in the roadway while conducting their final walkthrough of the area, prior to closure the previous day.
- The MAC did not notify the WMSC by phone about the incident.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- As part of a threat assessment, CCTV was reviewed to identify when the bag was first observed on Track 2.
- Trains were instructed to bypass the upper level of Gallery Place Station on both tracks while EOD assessed the bag.
- Power was de-energized from the lower level of Gallery Place Station, Track 2, in order to retrieve the suspicious package
- Power was restored and normal revenue service resumed after the package was determined to be safe and personnel cleared the roadway.

Probable Cause Statement

The Probable Cause for the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Gallery Place Station was that an unknown customer dropped a bag from the mezzanine level on to Track 2 of the lower-level of Gallery Place Station. The platform was evacuated to allow law enforcement authorities to investigate and determine the threat level. No WMATA personnel or equipment contributed to this event.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
104477_SAFECAPS_MTPD_001	Mandatory In-Service Retraining (MIR) for MTPD Officers on best practices related to third-rail power de-energization including utilization of the ETS Box.	MTPD	03/31/2023
104477_SAFECAPS_RTRA_001	Create an RTRA Supervisor Notification to reinforce SOP 1A Incident Command specific to the RTRA Forward Liaison.	RTRA	03/31/2023
104477_SAFECAPS_RTRA_002	Create a Rail Operations Personnel Notice (ROPN) on the importance of vigilance during Station Closing Procedures and final walk-throughs.	RTRA	03/31/2023

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

RTRA Supervisor

The RTRA Supervisor is a WMATA employee with 11.5 years of service and 6.5 years of experience as an RTRA Supervisor. The RTRA Supervisor holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in November 2023.

The RTRA Supervisor stated they were sent to Gallery Place Station in response to a suspicious package, a black backpack 12 inches by 12 inches. The RTRA Supervisor stated they requested foul time to go and retrieve the backpack. The RTRA Supervisor stated they were then stopped by a K-9 Officer with MTPD prior to retrieving the suspicious package. The RTRA Supervisor stated that they were not advised the suspicious package was being treated as explosive in nature until being stopped by the MTPD K-9 Officer. The RTRA Supervisor stated they were already in the roadway prior to being stopped by MTPD.

The RTRA Supervisor stated they then contacted the Assistant Superintendent of the ROCC for OPS 3 and advised them of the incident and relinquished their foul time. The RTRA Supervisor stated they observed MTPD cordon off the area where the suspicious package was located.

The RTRA Supervisor stated MTPD was awaiting the arrival of MPD EOD personnel prior to making contact with the package as MTPD EOD was unavailable. The RTRA Supervisor stated the MTPD OSC stated the lower level of Gallery Place Station was to be evacuated only; the upper level could continue service. The RTRA Supervisor stated they attempted to convince the OSC that an evacuation of the entire station would allow for ease of containment to which the OSC disagreed.

The RTRA Supervisor stated they then relayed this information to the “Assistant Superintendent” who advised the RTRA Supervisor to evacuate both levels of Gallery Place Station. The RTRA Supervisor stated the Assistant Superintendent advised the upper level of Gallery Place Station trains would bypass the station.

The RTRA Supervisor stated the OEP personnel on scene advised them that MTPD personnel depressed the ETS box button in order to de-energize the power to Track 2 of the Gallery Place Station’s lower level. The RTRA Supervisor stated they believed MTPD had the ability to de-energize the power by this method. The RTRA Supervisor stated they observed WSADs deployed but did not believe hot sticking had occurred.

The RTRA Supervisor stated MPD EOD cleared the suspicious package inside of five minutes. The RTRA Supervisor stated there was no explosive device recovered from the backpack.

OEP Primary Responder

The OEP Primary Responder is a WMATA employee with 5.5 years of service all of which assigned to OEP or its precursors. The OEP Primary Responder holds an RWP Level 4 certification that expires in March 2023.

The OEP Primary Responder stated they were sent to Gallery Place Station after being summoned to the scene after a report of a suspicious package requiring evacuation of Gallery Place Station.

The OEP Primary Responder stated they arrived at the 7th and G Street entrance into Gallery Place Station and heard significant chatter on the Radio of both MTPD-2X and OPS 3. The OEP Primary Responder stated MTPD requested the OEP Primary Responder bring WSADs to the scene for use with the process of de-energizing the third-rail power.

The OEP Primary Responder stated there was some confusion as to what needed to be closed and evacuated in reference to both levels of Gallery Place Station. The OEP Primary Responder confirmed with the OSC that they wanted the lower-level of Gallery Place Station evacuated and closed only.

The OEP Primary Responder stated the radio chatter and confusion continued as to what extent Gallery Place Station would be evacuated. The OEP Primary Responder stated they held a conference call, on speaker, with "Rail 1" and the OSC who clarified that only the lower-level would be evacuated.

The OEP Primary Responder stated they then went down to the lower-level with two MTPD Officers including the K-9 Officer. The OEP Primary Responder stated they observed the MTPD K-9 Officer walk down the far end of the platform and use the ETS box to de-energize the third-rail power. The OEP Primary Responder stated the MTPD K-9 Officer was not ordered to de-energize the third-rail power in this way.

The OEP Primary Responder stated they were responsible for applying the WSADs and hot-sticking to confirm third-rail power was de-energized and was granted permission to enter the roadway by Incident Command.

The OEP Primary Responder stated the RTRA Supervisor continued to leave the Command Post during the course of the event.

Appendix B – RTRA Supervisor Report (Redacted)



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Rail Operations Supervisor Report



Incident Date	Incident Time	Location (Station/Division)	Track/Mezz Number		
Nov. 23, 2022	5:32 PM	Gallery Place Platform (lower level)	Track 2		
Type of Incident					
Rule Violation (SOP #)	Commendation (Yes/No)	Other			
N/A	N/A	Suspicious Package			
Equipment Involved in the Incident					
Train ID and Car Numbers	Escalator Number	Elevator (Platform/Street)	Room Number		
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
WMATA Employee/Contractor Involved Information					
Name	Employee Number	Division			
N/A	N/A	N/A			
Customer Involved Information					
Name/Sex/D.O.B.	Address/Phone Number				
N/A	N/A				
Miscellaneous Information					
Customer Injury (Yes/No)		N/A			
Employee/Contractor Injury (Yes/No)		N/A			
Post Incident Transport (Yes/No)		N/A			
Responding Personnel					
Department	Arrival Time	Unit/Engine/Ambulance/Badge Number	Contact Person		
TPAS	?	Officer [REDACTED]			
RTRA	5:29PM	Supervisor [REDACTED]			

Page 1 of 2

Incident Date: 11/23/2022 Time: 17:09 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
E22768

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 01/17/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 01/23/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 01/23/2023

Page 24



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Rail Operations Supervisor Report




Please Provide a Chronological Account of the Incident

Around 5:10 PM I was contacted by ROCC to respond to Gallery Place for an item on the roadway. I arrived at Gallery Place around 5:29 PM and made contact with Officer [REDACTED] who discovered a black Backpack on the roadway which was on the grates. I notified ROCC of the situation and there after received Foul Time to retrieve the Backpack. As I was on track 2 walking towards the item another TPAS Officer from the Bomb Squad stop me and told me not to retrieve the item. I returned to the platform and relinquished my Foul Time and landline rail 3 and spoke to Assistant Superintendent [REDACTED] and informed her of the situation. I was told to standby and keep central updated. TPAS Officer informed me that they were waiting for an MPD Bomb Tech and that information was passed along to ROCC. LT. [REDACTED] arrived and became the Incident Commander and I was the RTRA Forward. At this time there was no interruption to service. Upon the arrival of the MPD Bomb Tech he asked LT. [REDACTED] why was the station not evacuated. LT. [REDACTED] informed me that the Green Line will be evacuated but the Red Line can still service. I in turn told LT. [REDACTED] respectfully I think the whole station should be evacuated it will be easier to contain. After the conversation with LT. [REDACTED] I informed Assistant Superintendent [REDACTED] of LT. [REDACTED] plan and she said that didn't really make sense. Assistant Superintendent [REDACTED] informed someone above her and they also said that it didn't make sense then [REDACTED] then told me to evacuate the whole station. While trying to evacuate the station transit was continuing to allow customer in the station. ROIC was making announcements throughout the station that station was closed but transit continued to allow customers in. The communication from transit was poorest at best. At one point ROCC asked me did someone depress the mushroom on ETS box on track 2 cause they lost power. I went to the green line to verify and Transit and MPD Officers were on track 2 and transit depressed the mushroom another example of poor communication. SOP 1A should have been in effect but transit did a very poor job. I've been a part of a lot incidents but never part of one so disorganized. I believe transit put WMATA most valuable asset (the customers) in harms way.

Supervisor Name and Payroll	Signature	Date
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Nov. 24, 2022
Reviewed By	Signature	Date

Page 2 of 2

Appendix C - Root Cause Analysis



Root Cause Analysis

