



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0212 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Southern Ave Station – November 21, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on April 11, 2023

Safety event summary:

At 5:11 p.m. on December 7, 2022, Metro Transit Police Department personnel evacuated customers from a Green Line Train at Southern Avenue station due to the report of a suspicious package aboard the train.

An MTPD Dispatcher received a report of a suspicious package with a chemical smell emanating from it aboard Train 505 from an anonymous caller and dispatched MTPD personnel to Southern Avenue Station to intercept the train and investigate. The Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) received and the Mission Assurance Coordinator in the ROCC provided MTPD with additional information indicating the package was in the middle of the train consist.

When the train heading in the direction of Branch Avenue, reached Southern Avenue Station at 5:15 p.m., MTPD personnel on the platform instructed the Train's Operator to offload the train of customers and keep the train doors open. Customers were evacuated by MTPD personnel from the train to the station's platform. Unaware that the train had already been offloaded, the ROCC Radio Controller instructed the Train Operator to offload the train. The Train Operator asked, "What's going on with this train?" but was not informed. The Controller did not inform the Train Operator of the suspicious package prior to the train reaching Southern Avenue Station or during the instructions to offload customers. The Train Operator then told the Radio Controller that the train had already been offloaded. During an interview for this event, the Train Operator expressed frustration at the lack of communication from the ROCC and an increased fear for their safety.

After ensuring the train was evacuated, MTPD personnel located the suspicious package, a bottle that was glued to the wall next to a train door, on car 7060, along with an empty bottle on a seat. At 5:18 p.m., as trains held at their various locations, the ROCC requested and was granted permission from MTPD field units via an MTPD Dispatcher to start single-tracking operations around the incident train (MTPD had not established incident command as required by Metrorail procedures). The ROCC Rail Traffic Controller instructed a Rail Supervisor to respond to Southern Avenue Station and incorrectly designated them On-Scene Commander. A person who is not yet at the location of the event cannot be designated the On-Scene Commander. The RTRA Supervisor did not arrive until after the incident had been resolved.

At 5:20 p.m. MTPD determined that there was no threat posed by this bottle. MTPD informed the MTPD Dispatcher that it was safe to resume normal operations and that passengers could reboard the train.

At 5:22 p.m., after MTPD informed the Train Operator that the train was released for movement, the Train Operator moved the train forward to continue their trip. The Rail Operations Control Center Rail Controllers were not aware that the Train Operator was going to move. The ROCC Operations Manager called MTPD dispatch to ask whether the train had been released.

The Radio Controller asked the Train Operator if they had been released by MTPD, and the Train Operator confirmed. The Buttons Controller set a red signal ahead of the train.



During an interview for this investigation, the Train Operator stated they had radio transmission difficulties at Southern Avenue Station.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was a suspicious item left on a train.

Corrective Actions:

- Due to this investigation:
 - Completed
 - WMATA developed a Lessons Learned document, reviewing proper steps for train movement after a Rail emergency/MTPD intervention, including communication requirements with ROCC personnel before train movement.
 - Train Operator was re-trained and completed a two-week observation period.
- Examples of other related corrective action plans (CAPs)
 - In development
 - C-0217 is being created to address the 2022 communications systems audit finding that Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Minimum corrective actions required of Metrorail include requiring personnel to document detailed information regarding identification and troubleshooting procedures attempted when responding to corrective maintenance work orders.
 - Ongoing
 - C-0162 was created to address a 2022 emergency management and fire and life safety audit finding that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements. For this CAP, which has an expected completion date of January 2025, WMATA has committed to creating and implementing an Incident Management System Framework in alignment with the NIMS/ICS.

WMSA staff observations:

There was a lack of communication between MTPD and the ROCC and between the ROCC and the Train Operator that resulted in a lack of coordination and situational awareness.

Not all radio transmissions during this event included full 100% repeat back as required by Metrorail procedure.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22765

Date of Event:	November 21, 2022
Type of Event:	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons - Suspicious Package
Incident Time:	17:11 hours
Location:	Southern Avenue Station, track 2
Time and How received by SAFE:	17:11 hours – Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC)
WMSC Notification Time:	17:45 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: N/A WMSC: N/A Other: N/A
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 505 L7438-7439x7091-7090x7060-7061x7289-7288T
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20221129#104537

Southern Avenue Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

November 21, 2022

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms-----	3
Executive Summary -----	4
Incident Site -----	5
Field Sketch/Schematics -----	5
Purpose and Scope -----	5
Investigation Methods-----	5
Investigation -----	6
Chronological Event Timeline-----	7
Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR) -----	8
Interview Findings-----	9
Weather -----	10
Human Factors -----	10
Fatigue-----	10
Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue -----	10
Fatigue Risk -----	10
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing -----	11
Findings -----	11
Appendices -----	13
Appendix A – Interview Summary -----	13
Train Operator (Formal Interview) -----	13
RTRA Rail Supervisor (Written Statement)-----	13
Radio RTC (Formal Interview)-----	14
Appendix B – Written Statement Train Operator#1 -----	15
Appendix C – ROCC After Action Review -----	16

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
MTPD	Metropolitan Transit Police Department
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety and Environmental Management
SMS	Safety Measurement System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record.

On Monday, November 21, 2022, at 17:11 hours, an Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) dispatcher notified all MTPD field units to intercept Train ID 505 (L7438-7439x7091-7090x7060-7061x7289-7288T) on track 2 at Southern Avenue Station to investigate a suspicious package. The dispatcher advised the responding units that, reportedly, a customer taped a plastic bottle to an unknown train car door, and a chemical smell was coming from the bottle.

The MTPD dispatcher received this call for service anonymously from an unidentified caller located in the Dallas, Texas area. The caller did not provide any pertinent identifiable information of the possible person involved.

At 17:12 hours, multiple MTPD units responded to Southern Avenue Station in a coordinated effort to investigate the reported suspicious package. At 17:13 hours, Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) broadcasted additional information that the alleged device was located in the middle of the train.

At 17:15 hours, Train ID 505 arrived and properly berthed on the platform at Southern Avenue Station, track 2. All customers were evacuated from the train to a place of safety on the platform. After the train was clear of customers, MTPD located the suspicious package on rail car 7060. The suspicious package appeared to be an 18.5 oz bottle that was super glued to the wall next to the train door. An empty bottle of glue was located on an adjacent seat near the bottle. MTPD units reported that there were no elements of possible bomb components observed on the bottle to indicate that it could detonate.

At 17:18 hours, a request was made by ROCC personnel to the MTPD field units personnel to establish single tracking procedures utilizing track 1. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) contacted and instructed an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisor to respond to Southern Avenue Station and designated them the On-Scene Commander.

At 17:20 hours, MTPD reported to the ROCC that the item was secured and advised that normal operations could resume. All passengers reboarded safely without incident.

At 17:21 hours, the Train Operator of Train ID 505 advised ROCC that they would board the inbound train at Southern Avenue Station, track 1, to begin their break. The Radio RTC advised the Train Operator not to abandon the train and to stand by. At 17:22 hours, Train ID 505 was released by MTPD and resumed normal service.


At 17:25 hours, the Rail Supervisor arrived at Southern Avenue Station and was briefed by the remaining MTPD units. The Rail Supervisor reported to ROCC that upon their arrival, Train ID 505 had resumed normal revenue service, and SOP 1A was not in effect.

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Suspicious Package event was the intentional action of a customer to attach an item to the side of a rail car, resulting in a suspicious odor and precautionary evacuation of the train.

Incident Site

Southern Avenue Station, track 2

Field Sketch/Schematics



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The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

This incident investigation and candid self-evaluation aim to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigation Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Evacuation for Life Reasons – Suspicious Package on November 21, 2022, SAFE dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment through video and document review.
- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed two individuals as part of this investigation. The interviews included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the following:
 - Train Operator
 - Radio RTC

- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed by personnel present during the event.
 - RTRA Supervisor
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - RTRA Supervisor Report
 - MTPD Incident Report
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback – Radio Ops 3
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Monday, November 21, 2022, at 17:11 hours, an MTPD Dispatcher notified MTPD field units to intercept Train ID 505 (L7438-7439x7091-7090x7060-7061x7289-7288T) on track 2 at Southern Avenue Station to investigate a suspicious package. The dispatcher advised the responding units that reportedly, a customer taped a plastic bottle to an unknown train car door and a chemical smell was coming from the bottle.

At 17:12 hours, multiple MTPD units responded to Southern Avenue Station in a coordinated effort to investigate the reported suspicious package. At 17:13 hours, ROCC broadcasted additional information that the alleged device was located in the middle of the train.

At 17:15 hours, Train ID 505 arrived and properly berthed on the platform at Southern Avenue Station, track 2. All customers were evacuated from the train to a place of safety on the platform. After the train was clear of customers, MTPD located the suspicious package on rail car 7060. The suspicious package appeared to be an 18.5 oz bottle that was super glued to the wall next to the train door. An empty glue bottle was located on an adjacent seat near the bottle. MTPD units reported that there were no elements of possible bomb components observed on the bottle to indicate that it could detonate.

At 17:18 hours, a request was made by ROCC personnel to establish single tracking procedures utilizing track 1. The Radio RTC contacted and instructed an RTRA Rail Supervisor to respond to Southern Avenue Station and designated them the On-Scene Commander.

At 17:20 hours, MTPD reported to the ROCC that the item was secured and advised that normal operations could resume. All passengers reboarded safely without incident.

At 17:21 hours, the Train Operator of Train ID 505 advised ROCC that they would board the inbound train at Southern Avenue Station, track 1, to begin their break. The Radio RTC advised the Train Operator not to abandon the train and to stand by. At 17:22 hours, Train ID 505 was released by MTPD and resumed normal service.

At 17:25 hours, the Rail Supervisor arrived at Southern Avenue Station and was briefed by the remaining MTPD units. The Rail Supervisor reported to ROCC that Train ID 505 had resumed normal revenue service upon their arrival, and SOP 1A was not in effect.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
17:11:37 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatcher 1X</u> : Need a unit to intercept 505 that's currently at Congress Heights in the direction of Branch Avenue for a suspicious package. Some unknown person taped a bottle to an unknown car door and there is a smell coming from it. ROCC will call back with a car number when they can. [Radio MTPD1x] <i>note: The MAC began to transmit an emergency message providing the same facts.</i>
17:12:00 hours	<u>MTPD Unit#1</u> : There are multiple units at Southern Avenue, we can check it there. <u>MTPD Dispatcher</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated. [Radio OPS3]
17:12:11 hours	<u>MTPD SRT Unit#1</u> : En route to Southern Avenue. <u>MTPD Dispatcher</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated. [Radio OPS3]
17:12:16 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Can you hold train 505 at Southern Avenue? <u>ROCC Operations Manager</u> : Acknowledged, what is the reason? <u>MAC</u> : A suspicious device. <u>ROCC Operations Manager</u> : Acknowledge and Repeated. [Phone]
17:12:26 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : 505 hold at Southern Avenue for Transit. <u>Train Op 505</u> : Acknowledged and Repeat. [Radio OPS3]
17:12:36 hours	<u>MTPD UNIT EOD#1</u> : En route, advise the unit to maintain a safe distance when observing the bottle. [Radio OPS3]
17:12:34 hours	<u>MAC</u> : It's car 7060 and they will be holding it at Southern Avenue. <u>MTPD Dispatcher</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated. [Radio OPS3]
17:12:47 hours	<u>MTPD Supervisor Unit#1</u> : Advised to evacuate the whole train. <u>MTPD Dispatcher</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated for units on the scene. [Radio OPS3]
17:12:54 hours	<u>ROCC Operations Manager</u> : We are holding 505 at Southern for a suspicious device for transit. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and Repeat. [Radio OPS3]
17:13:30 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatcher</u> : Be advised 505 is on the platform.
17:13:36 hours	<u>MTPD Unit#2</u> : Can you advise if we restrict patrons from entering the station? [Radio OPS3]
17:13:45 hours	<u>ROCC2</u> : They are advising it is in the middle of the train. [Radio OPS3]
17:14:06 hours	<u>MTPD Unit#3</u> : Advised train evacuated, patron will not be allowed to pass the affected car. <u>MTPD Dispatcher</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio OPS3]
17:14:34 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Train 505 are you still out at Southern Avenue? <u>Train Operator</u> : "What's going on with this train? You all are about to blow me." <u>Radio RTC</u> : I need you to off-load your train at this time. <u>Train Operator</u> : The train is off-loaded already, what do you want me to do? <u>Radio RTC</u> : Off-load and stand by. Transit should be on the scene. [Radio OPS 3]
17:16:14 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatcher 1X</u> : Units out at Southern Avenue, RAIL would like to know if they can single-track around the train. <u>MTPD Unit#1</u> : A-firm. [Radio OPS3]
17:18:22 hours	<u>MTPD Unit#1</u> : Advising single tracking on the opposite side. All passengers have been evacuated. [Radio]

Time	Description
17:18:30 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Contacted RTRA Supervisor #1. <u>RTRA Supervisor #1:</u> On 506 leaving Anacostia. <u>Radio RTC:</u> Exit at Southern- you will be on scene commander. <u>RTRA Supervisor #1:</u> Acknowledged & Repeated. [Radio OPS3]
17:19:37 hours	<u>Train Operator:</u> Central, I am going to get on 506. <u>Radio RTC:</u> Train Operator, repeat. <u>Train Operator:</u> I am getting on 506, I am supposed to be on break, I'm not taking the next train on my time. <u>Radio RTC:</u> Train Operator #1 you cannot abandon your train. I need you to stand by and stay with your train. [Radio OPS3]
17:20:09 hours	<u>MTPD Supervisor Unit#2:</u> The item has been located. A bottle of sweet tea was super glued to the door with a bottle of super glue next to it. There are no wires, no smell, and it has been removed. We can go back to normal service. <u>MTPD Dispatcher:</u> Acknowledged and Repeated. [Radio OPS3]
17:20:44 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Instructed Train Operator #1 not to abandon their train. [Radio OPS3]
17:21:04 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Requested the RTRA Supervisor upon his arrival to instruct the Operator not to abandon their train. <u>RTRA Supervisor:</u> Repeat-coming is distorted. <u>RTC Radio:</u> Repeated instructions. [RadioOPS3]
17:22:27 hours	<u>MTPD Crime Scene Unit#1:</u> On location awaiting EOD. [Radio OPS3]
17:22:44 hours	<u>ROCC Operations Manager:</u> Calls Transit to ascertain if the train was released from Southern Avenue. <u>MTPD Dispatcher:</u> Confirmed train release. [Phone]
17:22:48 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Train Operator, come into Central. Did transit release you, what's going on? <u>Train Operator:</u> That's why I'm moving. [Radio OPS3]
17:23:37 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatcher:</u> Supervisor Unit #2, Please confirm that the train has been released. <u>MTPD Supervisor Unit#2:</u> A-firm back to normal service. [RadioOPS3]
17:24:25 hours	<u>Train Operator:</u> Naylor Road, Red Signal. <u>Radio RTC:</u> Train Operator are you back in service? <u>Train Operator:</u> A-firm, Transit reboarded the train. <u>Radio RTC:</u> Permissive block to Naylor Road to the eight-car marker. <u>Train Operator:</u> Acknowledged and Repeated [Note Operator did complete a full read back to Central] [Radio OPS3]
17:27:15 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Train operator #1, track#2 in approach to Southern Avenue can you self-identify? <u>Train operator:</u> [Name] <u>Radio RTC:</u> [Name], over? <u>Train operator:</u> That's what I said. [Radio OPS3]

****Note:** Times above may vary from other system's timelines based on clock settings and reporting source.

Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

CMOR conducted comprehensive radio checks at Southern Avenue Station and bus bay areas. All tests were loud and clear.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE has interviewed three employees. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

Train Operator (Formal Interview)

- The Train Operator stated that Transit instructed them to off-load the train due to a possible suspicious package on their train and to keep the doors open.
- The Train Operator stated that ROCC never contacted them regarding their train being held. The Train Operator stated that the Radio RTC told them to off-load their Train.
- The Train Operator stated that they continued to ask ROCC why their train was off-loaded but did not receive an answer outside of unloading the train.
- The Train Operator stated that they began to get frustrated by the lack of communication with ROCC and increased fear for their safety.
- The Train Operator stated that because of their fear and frustration they made unprofessional comments relating to boarding another train and taking their break at Branch Avenue.
- The Train Operator stated that throughout the event, they encountered radio communication issues that are a constant issue at Southern Avenue Station.
- The Train Operator stated that they were released by Transit and told to close and go after the scene was cleared.
- The Train Operator stated that they tried to transmit the train movement after being instructed by MTPD but experienced further radio communication issues.
- The Train Operator stated they were finally able to communicate with ROCC when they came upon a red signal at Naylor Road Station.
- The Train Operator said they never intended to abandon their train during the event. The Train Operator stated that they feared for their life due to the lack of information.

Radio RTC (Formal Interview)

- The Radio RTC stated they received instruction from their Operations Manager to hold train #505 at Southern Avenue Train Station for a possible suspicious package.
- The Radio RTC stated that they received additional information that the suspicious package was a plastic bottle taped to a train car door and was emanating a strong chemical smell.
- The Radio RTC stated that the identified Train Operator was very uncooperative with following instructions given.
- The Radio RTC stated that throughout the incident, the Train Operator refused the instructions given and said the Train Operator was going to catch the next train to Branch Avenue.
- The Radio RTC stated that they instructed the Operator to stay with his train and stand by.
- The Radio RTC stated that they observed the train moving on their screens off platform at Southern Avenue Station.
- The Radio RTC stated that the Train Operator did not inform the ROCC that the MTPD units instructed the train to close and go.
- The Radio RTC stated that the Operator just keyed up and moved the train without instruction from anyone.
- The Radio RTC stated they placed a red signal at Naylor Road to force the Train Operator to contact the ROCC. The Radio RTC stated that the Operator asked for a permissive block to which they communicated their instructions from MTPD.

- The Radio RTC stated they did not encounter any radio transmission issues during this incident.

RTRA Rail Supervisor (Written Statement)

- The Rail Supervisor stated that ROCC contacted them and requested that they respond to Southern Avenue Station.
- The Rail Supervisor stated that they boarded Train ID 506 at Anacostia Station and while en route ROCC instructed Train ID 505 to off-load and trains would single track past Southern Avenue Station.
- The Rail Supervisor stated that while en route to Southern Avenue Station they heard the Train Operator of Train ID 505 transmit that they were going to key down and board Train ID 506, ROCC instructed them not to abandon the train.
- The Rail Supervisor stated upon approaching Southern Avenue Station, they heard ROCC ask Train ID 505 why they were leaving Southern Avenue Station. The Train Operator said that MTPD released them and told them to load the train and continue.
- The Rail Supervisor stated that they arrived at Southern Avenue Station and spoke with MTPD who updated them on the event and showed them the alleged device.
- The Rail Supervisor stated that the device was a water bottle with incense burning inside of it, which resembled a possible bomb.
- The Rail Supervisor stated that upon arrival at Southern Avenue Station, the incident concluded, and Train ID 505 continued in service.

Weather

On November 21, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 47°F, with clear skies. The weather was not a contributing factor in this incident. (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC.)

Human Factors

Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

Train Operator

OSI evaluated conditions at the time of the incident to distinguish whether evidence of fatigue was present. Video of the incident was not available for review of behaviors suggesting fatigue. The available data did not indicate signs of fatigue. The Train Operator reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The Train Operator reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

Train Operator

Incident data was evaluated for fatigue risk factors. There were no major risk factors for fatigue identified. The incident time of day (17:11 hours) does not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The employee worked a regular schedule without alternating shifts in the week leading up to the incident. Based on reported bed and wake times, the employee slept a calculated total of 10:00 hours in the last sleep period preceding the incident and was awake for

4.6 hours at the time of the incident. The off-duty period preceding the incident was 16 hours long, which provided the opportunity for 9-10 hours of sleep. The employee reported usual workday sleep durations of 10 hours and reported no issues with sleep.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

The WMATA Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6 was not applicable in this incident.

Findings

- Communications between on-scene personnel and ROCC were inconsistent. The release and movement of the Train ID 505 was not coordinated with ROCC after the disposal of the device.
- The Train Operator did not advise or communicate with ROCC regarding release and movement of the train after the device was disposed.
- Incident Command was not communicated during this event. The ROCC designated an RTRA Supervisor as the on-scene commander but arrived after the event concluded.
- The Train Operator did not complete a 100% repeat back of instructions.
- The Train Operator did not receive instruction from the Radio RTC before moving their train after being released by the MTPD.
- The Train Operator reported radio communication issues at Southern Avenue Station; however, communications checks found no deficiencies after the event.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Train ID 505 was off-loaded.
- MTPD responded and isolated the device and rail car.
- Suspicious device was removed without incident.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Suspicious Package event was the act of a customer attaching an item inside a rail car to appear as an incendiary device.

Recommended Corrective Actions

The following are the recommendations and corrective actions identified as a result of the incident response. These recommendations and corrective actions are tracked using WMATA's Safety Measurement System Incidents/Accidents (SMS I/A) Module and are verified by SAFE upon completion. The responsible department is identified in the corrective action code, and the respective departmental Safety Risk Coordinator (SRC) will manage the mitigation. Refer to the SMS I/A module for additional information

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
104537_SAFE CAPS_RTRA _001	Develop a Lessons Learned Document, reviewing proper steps for train movement after a Rail emergency / MTPD intervention, including communication requirements with ROCC personnel before Train movement	RTRA	Completed
104537_SAFE CAPS_RTRA _002	Train Operator to be re-trained and complete a two-week observation period.	RTRA	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

The narrative below summarizes the employee's accounts of the event and represents the involved individual's written statements. As such, times and details may conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

Train Operator (Formal Interview)

The Train Operator is a WMATA employee with nine years of service and six years of experience as a Train Operator. The Train Operator holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in August 2023.

The Train Operator stated that at approximately 17:11 hours, Transit instructed them to off-load the train due to a possible suspicious package located on their Train. The Train Operator stated that they were never contacted by the Radio RTC regarding their train being held at Southern Avenue or for what reason. The Train Operator stated the Radio RTC Controller only told them to off-load their Train and hold for Transit. The Train Operator stated they continued to ask the Radio RTC why their train was being off-loaded but did not receive an answer outside of off-loading the train and holding for Transit.

The Train Operator stated that they began to get frustrated by the lack of informative communication with the ROCC, which increased their fear and concern for safety. The Train Operator stated because of their fear and frustration, they made unprofessional comments relating to entering Train ID 506 and taking their break at Branch Avenue.

The Train Operator stated throughout the event, they encountered radio communication issues that are a constant issue at Southern Avenue Station. The Train Operator stated that they were released by Transit and were told to close and go after the scene was cleared. The Train Operator stated that they tried to transmit the train movement after being instructed by MTPD but experienced further radio communication issues. The Train Operator stated they could finally communicate with Central when they came upon a red signal at Naylor Road.

The Train Operator stated that they never intended to abandon their train during this incident but felt overwhelmed. The Train Operator stated that they were in fear for their life and the lack of information provided by the ROCC made them concerned for their safety.

RTRA Rail Supervisor (Written Statement)

The RTRA Supervisor stated that at approximately 1700 hours on November 21, 2022, ROCC contacted them and requested that they respond to Southern Avenue Station. The RTRA Supervisor said that they boarded Train ID 506 from Anacostia Train Station. While en route they heard ROCC instruct Train ID 505 to off-load all customers and verify and announced that trains would single track past Southern Avenue Train Station. The RTRA Supervisor stated that while en route to Southern Avenue Train Station, they heard the Operator of Train ID 505 transmit that they are going to key down and board Train ID 506, to which the ROCC instructed them not to abandon their train.

The RTRA Supervisor stated upon approach to Southern Avenue Station, they heard the Radio RTC controller contact Train ID 505 and ask why they were leaving Southern Avenue, to which the Operator stated that MTPD released them and told them to load the train and continue. The

RTRA Supervisor stated that they arrived at Southern Avenue Station at approximately 17:20 hours and spoke with the MTPD who updated them on the event and showed them the alleged device.

The RTRA Supervisor stated that the device was a water bottle with incense burning inside, which resembled a possible bomb. The RTRA Supervisor said that upon their arrival at Southern Avenue Station, the incident was concluded, and Train ID 505 continued in revenue service.

Radio RTC (Formal Interview)

The Radio RTC is a WMATA employee with four years of service and three years of experience as a Radio RTC controller. The Radio RTC controller holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in July 2023.

The Radio RTC stated they received instruction from their Operations Manager to hold train#505 at Southern Avenue Train Station for a possible suspicious package.

The Radio RTC controller stated that they received additional information that the suspicious package was a plastic bottle taped to a train car door and was emanating a strong chemical smell.

The Radio RTC controller stated that the identified Train Operator was very uncooperative with following his instructions. The Radio RTC controller said that throughout the incident, the Train Operator refused the instructions given and stated they were going to catch the next train to Branch Avenue.

The Radio RTC controller stated that they instructed the Operator to stay with their train and stand by.

The Radio RTC controller stated that they observed the Train moving on their screen off platform at Southern Avenue Train Station. The Radio RTC controller stated that the Train Operator did not inform the ROCC that the MTPD units instructed the Train to close and go.

The Radio RTC controller stated that the Operator just keyed up and moved the train without instruction from anyone. The Radio RTC controller stated they placed a red signal at Naylor Road to force the Train Operator to contact the ROCC.


The Radio RTC stated that the Operator asked for a permissive block to which they communicated their instructions from MTPD. The Radio RTC controller stated that they did not encounter any radio transmission issues during this incident.

Appendix B – Written Statement Train Operator#1

WMATA/RTA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 1 of 1			
Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents			
Date: 11/21/2022	Incident Time: 5:24pm	Time Reported: N/A	Reported by: Customer <input type="checkbox"/> Employee <input type="checkbox"/> ROCC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>
Location			
Station: Southern Avenue	Mezzanine #: N/A	Track #/Destination: 2/Branch Ave	Chain Marker/Signal Number: N/A
TYPE OF INCIDENT			
<input type="checkbox"/> Property Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Smoke	<input type="checkbox"/> Fire	<input type="checkbox"/> Customer Complaint
<input type="checkbox"/> Customer injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Customer Illness	<input type="checkbox"/> Employee Injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Employee Illness
<input type="checkbox"/> Criminal Activity	<input type="checkbox"/> Elevator Entrapment	<input type="checkbox"/> Rail Vehicle Incident	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Explain in description of incident)
WEATHER		LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)	
Clear <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rain <input type="checkbox"/>		Dawn/Dusk <input type="checkbox"/> Daylight <input type="checkbox"/>	
Snow <input type="checkbox"/> Sleet/Ice <input type="checkbox"/>		Dark <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tunnel/Underground <input type="checkbox"/>	
LIGHTING (artificial lighting)			
Lights On <input type="checkbox"/> Lights Off <input type="checkbox"/>			
Lights Not Working <input type="checkbox"/>			
STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC			
Elevator/Escalator #: N/A	AFC #: N/A	Room Number/Location: N/A	
Failure Number(s): N/A			
Parking Lot <input type="checkbox"/> Paid Area <input type="checkbox"/> Free Area <input type="checkbox"/> Garage <input type="checkbox"/> Station Entrance <input type="checkbox"/> Stairway # <input type="checkbox"/> Platform <input type="checkbox"/> Ancillary Room <input type="checkbox"/>			
Injury/Illness reported aboard Train <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>			
Name of Responding Supervisor: N/A		Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder: N/A	
TRAIN INCIDENTS			
Train ID: 505	Destination: Branch Ave	Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): N/A	Lead Car: N/A
Name of Responding Supervisor: N/A		Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: N/A	
DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.			
Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.			
<p>Around 5:35pm on 11/21/2022 was notified by Unit 17, that [REDACTED] was given incident time for failure to communicate to ROCC that MTPD released my train and assuming I would abandoned the train. Lack of communication by ROCC and disregard for the operator's SAFETY with a potential BOMB aboard the train led to my comments (B.O.) In that moment I feared for my life and SAFETY and making it home to my two young daughters. MTPD rectified the situation concerning the suspicious object and MTPD reloaded the train and instructed me to continue. Somehow ROCC missed message.</p>			
Employee Completing Report			
Employee Name (print): [REDACTED]	Employee Signature (sign): [REDACTED]	Employee #: [REDACTED]	Date: 11/21/2022
Division: Greenbelt	Unit #: 504	Block #: N/A	Assigned Days: Wed/Thurs
To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager			
Supervisor Name (print): [REDACTED]	Supervisor Signature: [REDACTED]	Employee #: [REDACTED]	Date: 11/25/22

Figure 1 Train Operator Written Statement

Appendix C – ROCC After Action Review



ROCC After Action Review

OPS 3 –Southern Avenue (F08), Suspicious Package, November 21, 2022, 17:11

This review was completed to understand the incident and to identify any nonconformance's, opportunities for improvement, lessons learned, and positives for how the incident was handled in the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC). This report is not meant to be used in place of any investigation being conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC), or the Department of System Safety and Environmental Management (SAFE).

ROCC Incident Report Timeline

Time	Event
11/21/2022	
17:12:20	[Button] RTC received instructions from Transit to hold Train 505 for a suspicious device. Assistant Operations Manager, ROIC and all concerned personnel notified.
17:12:33	[Radio] Train 505 instructed to hold for Transit Southern Avenue track two.
17:13	[ROCC Alert] Reports MTPD is holding train, track two for a suspicious object on board.
17:15:27	[Radio] ROCC instructed 505 track two Southern Avenue to offload and stand by.
17:17:58	[Radio] ROCC instructed Train 506, to single track via track one, Southern Avenue to Naylor Road. No implementation of single track.
17:18:53	[Radio] Unit 63 RTRA Supervisor, deemed OSC when arrived at Southern Avenue.
17:23:16	[Radio] Train 505 released by Transit and continued in revenue service.
17:24	Normal service resumed. Maximo item generated #8835960.

No Nonconformances:

Metro Internal Use OnlyPage | 1

Figure 2 ROCC's After Action Review

Appendix D – RTRA Supervisor's Report


 RTRA Supervisor's Report <small>WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY</small>		DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS-RAIL SERVICE Office of Rail Transportation	
Date 11/21/2022	Incident Time 5:00pm	Incident Location (Station Mezzanine#) Southern Avenue	Track/Mezzanine# Track 2
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #, Room #) Train ID 505-7438/7091/7060/7289			
Incident Description Smoke/Fire			
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division
		None	Greenbelt
Name		Address	
Name		Address	
Name		Address	
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks
N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Chronological Account of Incident			
Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion			
Your Arrival Time 5:20pm			
<p>5pm Rail Control Center contacted me and told me to respond to southern avenue, I was at Anacostia I boarded the next train on track two ID 506 and proceeded to southern avenue, on my I heard rocc instruct train ID 505 in front of me to offload and verify clear of customers. Rocc also made announcements that we will be single tracking and the train I was on ID 506 will be the first train to single track. Then I heard the operator of ID 505 say he is gonna Key down and board the the 506, rocc instructed him not to abandon the train. As 506 got close to Southern Avenue, I heard rocc ask 505 why he is leaving Southern Avenue the operator said metro transit police release him told him load the train and Continue on. ID 506 was rerouted to go normal.</p> <p>5:20pm I arrived on the scene and spoke with transit, the transit officer showed me the device, it was a water bottle with a incert burning in it that was taped to the train and someone thought it was a bomb. By the time I got there it was all over train ID 505 was gone and transit officer cleared the device as non threatening so I went back to my regular duties.</p>			
50.437 09/10REPORT MUST BE FAXED TO ROCC 202-962-2808 at end of tour			

Figure 3 RTRA Supervisor's Report PG-1

Figure 4 RTRA Supervisor's Report PG-2

Appendix E – Root Cause Analysis

