



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0226 – Serious Injury – Braddock Road Station – June 26, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on May 16, 2023

Safety event summary:

A dispute between two riders on the Braddock Road Station platform led to Alexandria Police Department personnel arresting one rider and the other rider running from the platform onto the Metrorail roadway, injuring their back.

The Rail Operations Control Center Operations Manager initially directed Rail Controllers to have trains enter the station at restricted speed on Track 1 and had a southbound train on Track 2 reverse ends and return to Reagan National Airport Station before reaching Braddock Road Station. Metro Transit Police then reported that a review of CCTV showed the rider who had run from the platform had crossed the tracks and appeared to jump from a wall between the Metrorail tracks and CSX property.

Metro Transit Police Department Dispatch, not personnel on scene, contacted the Mission Assurance Coordinator, not the Rail Operations Control Center or Power Operations Center personnel, to request power be de-energized at Braddock Road Station. The Mission Assurance Coordinator asked which track, and the Metro Transit Police Dispatcher did not know. Power remained energized.

Several minutes later, the Rail Operations Control Center de-energized power on Track 2. Metro Transit Police Department officers who arrived on scene later gave permission, after the Mission Assurance Coordinator's request, to single-track via Track 1 as they prepared to begin walking on Track 2 to search for the individual.

They found the person injured on the other side of the wall, and the Alexandria Fire Department established a plan to extricate the person.

The rescue did not impact the CSX roadway and CSX did not respond to the event.

During the response, there was confusion and miscommunication about the location of the command post. This included Metro Transit Police Department personnel stating that the command post was on the roadway, which would not have aligned with incident command principles. This also included personnel other than the incident commander and designated liaisons interacting with personnel such as the Mission Assurance Coordinator.

Further, Metro Transit Police Department personnel experienced radio communications issues that prevented them from transmitting messages, and instead they used cell phones. The investigation found that Metrorail personnel had, without coordination, unplugged communication equipment in the area during separate, unrelated power work that had been conducted at the station.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was a person entering the Metrorail roadway then jumping from a Metrorail wall.

Corrective Actions:

Radio equipment was plugged back in, and communication was restored.

Examples of other related open CAPs



- C-0162 addresses the finding that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. WMATA committed to developing and implementing the Incident Management Framework that aligns with the National Incident Management System/Incident Command System (NIMS/ICS) and provide safety promotion and training on it. (Expected date of completion January 2025)
- C-0214 addresses the finding that Metrorail does not have adequate supervisory oversight and safety promotion to ensure that approved preventative maintenance inspections (PMI) are properly completed to ensure the safety of the rail system. WMATA committed to reinstruct radio communications supervisors on how to properly complete forms, certify the accuracy of PMIs and the accuracy of the documentation in Maximo. Among other action items, WMATA will also update and distribute PMI forms for all communications systems. (Expected date of completion March 2025)
- C-0180 addresses the recommendation from the 2022 Emergency Management and Fire and Life Safety Programs audit that Metrorail does not assess and communicate radio system outages to MTPD officers. Under this CAP, which was submitted to the WMSC for closure in April 2023, WMATA committed to develop processes for resolving system-related outages and for notifying MTPD personnel and management of Metrorail radio outages and dead spots. The WMSC is reviewing this closure request and associated documentation in accordance with the Program Standard.

WMSC staff observations:

Metrorail has an opportunity to improve work planning and oversight to ensure that critical systems such as radio communications systems are not disabled unnecessarily during other repairs or maintenance, and that there is coordination and communication regarding such work.

The WMSC appreciates the meaningful Metro Transit Police Department hot wash that identified that having known access points and maps available for adjacent facilities such as the CSX property in this area and communication about those facilities would make response safer and more effective. Metrorail should consider taking this action to make such maps available to relevant personnel in the field.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22399

Date of Event:	June 26, 2022
Type of Event:	Serious Injury
Incident Time:	00:36 hours
Location:	CSX Property adjacent to Chain Marker C2 530+00 Braddock Road, Track 2
Time and how received by SAFE:	02:12 Hours
WMSC Notification Time:	02:32 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: Yes WMSC: None Other: None
Rail Vehicle:	N/A
Injuries:	Complaint of Injury
Damage:	No
Emergency Responders:	Alexandria Fire Department, Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Track and Structures (TRST), Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)
SMS I/A Number	20220626#101206MX

Braddock Road Station – Serious Injury

06/26/2022

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
COMR	Office of Radio Communications
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OEP	Office of Emergency Preparedness
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
ROIC	Rail Operations Information Center
SAFE	Department of Safety and Environmental Management
SMS	Safety Measurement System
TRPM	Traction Power Maintenance
TRST	Office of Track and Structures
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission
WSAD	Warning Strobe and Alarm Device

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

On Sunday, June 26, 2022, at approximately 00:36 hours, Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Dispatch received a call and advisement from Alexandria Police Dispatch, then advised MTPD officers that an active disturbance was in progress between two customers at the Braddock Road Station platform. The Rail Operations Communication Center (ROCC) received the report of an unauthorized person on the roadway at Braddock Road Station.

A review of the Audio Recording System (ARS) indicated that at approximately 12:38 hours, the Operations Manager (OM) advised the Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) of the report and instructed them to have trains to enter Braddock Road Station at restricted speed.

At approximately 00:39 hours, MTPD dispatch advised that Alexandria Police had one of the customers detained, but one fled the scene and was last observed running westbound, from the platform, across the roadway. At approximately 00:41 hours, an MTPD Officer reviewed Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) and advised the second customer ran west from the platform, across both tracks, and jumped over a wall dividing the WMATA roadway from CSX property.

At approximately 00:42 hours, the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) advised via radio that power was deenergized on Track 2.

At approximately 00:54 hours, MTPD officers on scene concluded clearance of Track 1 and gave permission for single-track operations. The MAC advised that Track 2 was still deenergized. At approximately 01:11 hours, MTPD officers commenced a track inspection of Track 2, from Braddock Road Station towards King Street Station with a Warning Strobe and Alarm Device (WSAD) in place. At approximately 01:12 hours, the MAC advised power was down on Track 2 between Chain Markers 554+82 and 494+53.

At approximately 01:21 hours, MTPD advised the missing individual was located on the CSX roadway, having fallen approximately “eight feet” from the dividing wall separating the WMATA roadway from the CSX roadway. At approximately 01:25 hours, MTPD advised that officers on scene were unable to lift the customer back over onto WMATA property and that the customer was complaining of back pain. MTPD also advised Alexandria Fire Department was en route to the scene for the extrication. At approximately 01:27 hours, MTPD advised the customer had climbed over the wall near Chain Marker (CM) C2 530+00.

At approximately 01:45 the MAC advised all operations conducted would be under a supervisory power outage and that Alexandria Fire Department was on scene setting up a plan for the extrication of the customer. The MAC also advised that CSX had been notified and the operation would not impact the CSX roadway. CSX did not send any personnel in response to the incident.

At approximately 02:10 hours, the customer was successfully extricated and assessed by the medics at the Braddock Road Station platform. Personnel commenced clearing from the roadway at that time.


At approximately 02:19 hours, MTPD advised that the customer was transported to The George Washington University Hospital. At approximately 02:21 hours, the MAC advised power restoration procedures were initiated for Track 2 of Braddock Road Station after all personnel confirmed clear from the roadway.

The root cause of this event was an intentional action of a trespassing customer, to climb a wall and jump onto CSX property in order to avoid police intervention, ultimately resulting in their injury. WMATA personnel and equipment did not contribute to this event.

Incident Site

CSX Property adjacent to Chain Marker C2 530+00
Braddock Road, Track 2

Field Sketch/Schematics



**Approximate location of event. Not to scale.*

Figure 1: Approximate Location of the Fall on CSX Property

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

Upon receiving the Serious Injury notification within the vicinity of Braddock Road Station on June 26, 2022, SAFE dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the

subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA customer matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Physical Site Assessment
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metro Safety Rules and Procedures handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data
 - MTPD Hot-Wash Report
 - ROIC Report
 - RTRA Supervisor's Report

Investigation

On Sunday, June 26, 2022, at approximately 00:36 hours, MTPD Dispatch received a call and advisement from Alexandria Police Dispatch, then advised MTPD officers that an active disturbance was in progress between two customers at the Braddock Road Station platform. ROCC received the report of an unauthorized person on the roadway at Braddock Road Station.

A review of the ARS indicated that at approximately 12:38 hours, the ROCC OM advised the Radio RTC of the report and instructed them to have trains to enter Braddock Road Station at restricted speed. The Radio RTC dispatched an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor to Braddock Road Station from National Airport Station. The OM also notified the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM), ROIC, MTPD and MAC at this time. The Radio RTC instructed Train 405 located between Braddock Road Station and National Airport Station, track 2 to make announcements to the customers, key down and reverse ends to go back to National Airport Station, Track 3.

At approximately 00:38 hours, MTPD dispatch requested the MAC take down power to the track. The MAC requested clarification as to which track, to which MTPD dispatch advised they would clarify.

At approximately 00:39 hours, MTPD dispatch advised that Alexandria Police had one of the customers detained, but one customer fled the scene and was last observed running westbound, from the platform, across the roadway. At the same time, the MAC advised power was still active to both tracks.

At approximately 00:41 hours, one of the MTPD Officers consulted CCTV and advised the second customer entered the roadway, ran across the tracks and jumped over the dividing wall onto CSX property. At approximately 00:42 hours, the MAC advised power was deenergized on Track 2 of Braddock Road Station.

At approximately 00:51 hours, the MAC requested MTPD officers to advise of clear track on Track 1 and advise whether single-track operations were viable. At the same time, the MAC advised

that the RTRA Supervisor was delayed from Ronald Reagan National Airport Station. At approximately 00:54 hours, MTPD officers concluded their visual clearance of Track 1 and gave permission for single-track operations. The MAC advised Track 2 only was still deenergized.

At approximately 00:57 hours, an MTPD supervisor came on scene and assumed incident command. At approximately the same time, Track and Structures (TRST) personnel arrived on scene and checked in at the command post.

At approximately 00:58 hours, Train 405 single-tracked from National Airport Station to Van Dorn Street Station utilizing Track 1 for service toward Franconia-Springfield Station. TRST was given foul time to hot stick Track 2 for MTPD to enter the roadway to begin a walking inspection towards King Street Station. At approximately 00:59 hours, TRST conducted hot sticking and confirmed Third Rail Power was deenergized at Chain Marker C2 530+00.

At approximately 01:05 hours, Train 406 arrived at National Airport Station, Track 3. At approximately 01:07 hours, Train 405 arrived at Braddock Road station.

At approximately 01:08 hours, TRST set up the WSAD for emergency personnel. At approximately 01:09 hours, the RTRA Supervisor was appointed the RTRA Forward Liaison.

At approximately 01:11 hours, MTPD Officers advised they would conduct a visual track inspection of Track 2, from Braddock Road Station towards King Street Station with a WSAD in place. At approximately 01:12 hours, the MAC advised power was down on Track 2 between Chain Markers C2 554+82 and C2 494+53. The Radio RTC granted foul time to the Rail Supervisor at approximately 01:19 hours.

At approximately 01:21 hours, MTPD advised the second individual was located on the CSX roadway, having fallen "eight feet" from the wall to the CSX roadway. At approximately 01:25 hours, MTPD advised officers on scene were unable to lift the customer back over on to WMATA property and that the customer was complaining of back pain. MTPD also advised Alexandria Fire Department was en route to the scene for the extrication. At approximately 01:27 hours, MTPD advised the customer had climbed over the wall near Chain Marker C2 530+00.

At approximately 01:39 hours, the MAC requested the location of the command post, to which MTPD officers on scene stated the command post was located in the roadway, nearest where the customer had jumped over the wall onto CSX property. Later review with the On-Scene Commander revealed that the Command Post remained on the platform and this communication was inaccurate. At approximately 01:41 hours, the MAC requested information from MTPD officers on scene as to whether the extrication would interfere with the CSX roadway, to which they responded that it would not interfere.

At approximately 01:45 the MAC advised all operations conducted would be under a supervisory power outage and that Alexandria Fire Department was on scene setting up a plan for the extrication of the customer. The MAC also advised CSX had been notified and the operation would not impact the CSX roadway. CSX did not send any personnel in response to the incident.

At approximately 02:10 hours, the customer was successfully extricated and assessed by the medics, at the Braddock Road Station platform as all personnel commenced clearing from the

roadway. At approximately 02:15 hours, the RTRA Supervisor notified the ROCC that all personnel and equipment were clear of the Roadway and Foul Time was relinquished.

At approximately 02:19 hours, MTPD advised the customer was transported to The George Washington University Hospital. At approximately 02:21 hours, the MAC advised power restoration procedures were initiated for Track 2 of Braddock Road Station after all personnel confirmed clear from the roadway.

At approximately 02:21 hours, the Radio RTC announced that third rail power would be restored between Braddock Road Station and King Street Station. At approximately 02:34 hours, Third Rail Power was restored for Track 2 of Braddock Road Station.

Chronological ARS Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
06-26-2022	
00:36:46 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatch</u> : Aired an active disturbance, no weapons, two parties at Braddock Road platform.
00:38:22 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatch to MAC</u> : Requested MAC take down power.
00:39:32 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Advised Alexandria PD on scene with one detained, did not observe any parties in track bed.
00:39:56 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Advised power still active on both tracks.
00:40:58 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatch</u> : Alexandria PD stated has one detained, one still on the track
00:41:26 hours	<u>MTPD to MTPD Dispatch</u> : Consulted footage, stated second party observed had ran across WMATA tracks, jumped over the wall, and disappeared onto CSX track.
00:42:18 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Aired description of customer. <u>MAC</u> : Power down track 2.
00:45:46 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Advised an RTRA supervisor was headed to Braddock Road Station and requested information as soon as available in order to commence single track operations.
00:50:09 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Alexandria PD notified customer jumped on to CSX side and they have not sighted since.
00:51:04 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Advised RTRA supervisor stuck at National Airport Station, requested MTPD clear track for single track operations.
00:54:05 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Track 1 was cleared <u>MAC</u> : Initiated single track operations on Track 1, Track 2 remained de-energized.
00:57:00 hours	TRST personnel arrived on scene and checked in at the command post
00:58:00 hours	Radio RTC granted foul time to TRST to hot stick Track 2.
01:07:00 hours	RTRA arrived at Braddock Road Station.

Time	Description
01:09:00 hours	RTRA Supervisor was appointed the RTRA Forward Liaison.
01:11:21 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Advised would conduct visual track inspection of Track 2 with WSAD towards King St.
01:12:03 hours	<u>MAC to MTPD</u> : Advised power down Track 2 between 554+82 – 494+53.
01:21:34 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Located second individual on CSX Roadway.
01:27:33 hours	<u>MAC to MTPD</u> : Location reported as adjacent to Track 2 approximate chain marker 530+00
01:25:58 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Reported customer fell approximately eight feet, complaining of lower back pain. Unable to lift individual up, over wall back on to WMATA property. Advised Alexandria Fire Department headed to the scene for extrication.
01:39:11 hours	<u>MAC to MTPD</u> : Requested command post for fire and rescue <u>MTPD</u> : Advised on the roadway with medics and the customer.
01:41:07 hours	<u>MAC to MTPD</u> : Had CSX on landline, requested if extrication would interfere with rail traffic. <u>MTPD</u> : Advised would not interfere with CSX traffic
01:45:22 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Supervisory power outage, fire was on scene setting up plan for rescue, CSX notified operation will not impact CSX.
02:10:20 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Customer rescued by Fire Department and on the platform, personnel clearing the roadway.
02:19:48 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Acquired a case number and accompanied the customer recovered from the CSX property to the hospital.
02:21:31 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Power restored to Braddock Road station.

****Note:** Times above may vary from other system's timelines based on clock settings and reporting source.

Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)

The MTPD hot-wash report determined Alexandria Police were the first units on scene of the incident. Alexandria Police detained one customer as the second fled on to the roadway, across the tracks and over a wall on to CSX property. The report further determined power was removed from Track 2 during the incident. Responding track personnel confirmed power was down by hot-sticking and placing a WSAD.

Once third-rail power was confirmed down, an inspection of Track 2 commenced to attempt to locate the second customer, in the direction Alexandria Police last saw them; southwest, away from Braddock Road Station, along Track 2, towards King Street Station.

MTPD and Alexandria Police quickly located the customer who had jumped a wall to the southwest of the station, falling approximately 10-15 ft on to CSX property. The customer advised he was injured and required medical care.

Alexandria Fire Department responded and extricated the customer from the CSX roadway onto the Braddock Road platform via Track 2. The customer was transported to The George Washington University Hospital for treatment.

Liaising with MTPD command determined the customer's injury was non-life-threatening with a primary complaint of back pain.

MTPD noted in the hot wash report they experienced communications issues with radios stating they were able to hear MTPD dispatch and the MAC, however, were unable to transmit, resorting to cellular phone communication.

MTPD also noted no access gates were available in the immediate vicinity of the incident onto CSX property. MTPD also noted the incident caused 30-40 min delays for remaining calls for service due to the volume of personnel required for the incident.

A follow-up, conversation with the MTPD Incident Commander on scene determined the Incident Command Post was not set up in the roadway, and was only ever set up on the Braddock Road Station platform.

Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

COMR investigated the MTPD claim of radio outages (Maximo Work Order 17147533) and determined communication equipment was unplugged within the vicinity of the issues due to ongoing power switching at the station.

COMR plugged the equipment back in and communications were restored.

Related Policies and Procedures

The following policies and procedures were adhered to during the course of the incident

- SOP 1A: Command, Control and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System
- SOP 2: Emergency Removal and Restoration of Third Rail Power Mainline
- SOP 47: Unauthorized Personnel on the Roadway Between Stations

Weather

On June 26, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the average temperature as 71°F, with light cloud cover. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Washington, DC.)

Human Factors

Fatigue Risk

WMATA personnel were not identified as contributory in this event. The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA personnel were not identified as contributory in this event. Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted.

Findings

- The incident was originally identified as an Unauthorized Person on the Roadway and developed into a Serious Injury as a result of the evasive actions of the customer.
- The customer sustained a fall injury after attempting to evade Alexandria Police by crossing to the southwest, over both Tracks 1 and 2 of Braddock Road Station's roadway.
- The customer fell approximately eight to fifteen feet onto the CSX roadway.
- While the incident started on WMATA property, the injury received was due to a fall onto CSX property.
- No other personnel were injured, and no property was damaged as a result of the incident.
- Customer injuries were non-life-threatening.
- Radio traffic appeared to indicate that Incident Command was set up on the roadway after the customer was discovered on CSX property, however, it was determined Incident Command was only ever set up at Braddock Road Station Platform.
- MTPD reported some of their units were unable to transmit over their radios, however, they were able to hear dispatch. COMR rectified the communication issue, post incident (Maximo: 17147533)
- MTPD also reported having a map of gateways on to the CSX roadway may have made extrication of the injured customer faster.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

The customer was removed from CSX property and given prompt medical treatment by Emergency Medical Personnel on scene.

Probable Cause Statement

The root cause of this event was an intentional action of a trespassing customer, to climb a wall and jump onto CSX property in order to avoid police intervention, ultimately resulting in their injury. WMATA personnel and equipment did not contribute to this event.

SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

SAFE has no recommendations or corrective actions at this time.

Appendices

Appendix A – MTPD Hot Wash (Redacted)



Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary



ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. **Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.**

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:		Person on CSX Roadway	
*Incident Commander (IC):		[REDACTED]	
MTPD CCN:	2022-03583	Local CCN:	220049970
*Date ICS Initiated:	6/26/2022	*Time ICS Initiated:	0045 hours
*Date ICS Terminated:	6/26/2022	*Time ICS Terminated:	0210 hours
*Duration of Incident:	94 mins	*Service Disrupted (Type and Time):	No
Incident Location:	CSX Right of Way	Command Post Location:	Platform
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	[REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	N/A
Forward Liaison:	N/A	Unified Command:	Yes
OCC Liaison:	N/A	Alternate Channel:	N/A
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	Single Tracking 0052-End of Revenue	Bus Bridge Established (From /To):	N/A
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	N/A	Power De-energized:	Track 2 0042 - 0224
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name Dept: _____	N/A	Medical Attention Required/Requested:	ALEX FD transported subject to local hospital
Entry/Exit Log:	N/A	CID Response:	No

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Incident Date: 06-26-2022
Final Report – Serious Injury
E22399

Time: 00:36 hours

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 08/24/2022
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 08/26/2022
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 08/26/2022

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
██████████	MTPD	IC
██████████	MTPD	IC
██████████	MTPD	Patrol Support
██████████	MTPD	Patrol Support
██████████	RTRA	Rail Supervisor
██████████	PWR	Power Supervisor
██████████	OEP	Support

EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Agency/Department	Title/Role
██████████	Alex PD	Supervisor
██████████	Alex PD	Reporting Officer
██████████	Alex FD	Support – Arrived when over
██████████	Alex FD	Fire / EMS Support
██████████	Alex FD	Fire / EMS Support
██████████	Alex FD	Fire / EMS Support
██████████	Alex FD	Fire / EMS Support
██████████	Alex FD	Fire / EMS Support

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

Incident Date: 06-26-2022
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Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 08/24/2022
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 08/26/2022
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 08/26/2022

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	N
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	N
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	

OBSERVATIONS
<p>MTPD units responded to the Braddock Road Metro station for the report of a fight. Alexandria PD was first on the scene and arrested (Drunk in Public) one male, and the other male fled onto the tracks. The subject who fled on the tracks disappeared from sight and was believed to have left the area via CSX tracks. ROCC removed power on track 2, the track adjacent CSX tracks, before MTPD arrival since Alex PD was on scene and reporting the subject was on the roadway. A rail supervisor ([REDACTED]) responded, and track personnel were already on the scene. Track personnel confirmed power was down via a hot stick and placed a WASD on track 2 pending an inspection for the subject. Once power was confirmed down, MTPD and Alex PD entered the trackbed and quickly located the subject on CSX property. The subject jumped over the fence and fell approximately 10-15 feet into a ravine. The subject advised he was injured and required medical care. Alex Fire Department responded and extricated the subject from CSX tracks onto the Braddock Road platform via track 2 after requesting specialized units. The subject was transported to a local hospital for treatment. Alexandria PD Officer [REDACTED] holding Report #220049970.</p>

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

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Time: 00:36 hours

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 08/24/2022
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 08/26/2022
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 08/26/2022

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

NOTES

Radio communication was an issue. Units were able to hear police communications and the MAC but unable to transmit during most of the event. A ticket was submitted by police communications. Phone communication became the best choice.

In the area of the event no access gates were available. The subject had to be hoisted up to track level from the ravine. No other access points were visible. A CSX map would have been helpful.

The timing of the call created a staffing shortage. Other midnight units had extended response times of 30-40 mins to the remaining calls for service.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

Patrol Operations Bureau Commander's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

Office of Emergency Management Director's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

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Effective: 12/30/20

Incident Date: 06-26-2022
Final Report – Serious Injury
E22399

Time: 00:36 hours

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 08/24/2022
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 08/26/2022
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 08/26/2022

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Appendix B – Root Cause Analysis

