



**WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0228 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Van Ness-UDC Station – February 26, 2023**

*Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on June 13, 2023*

**Safety event summary:**

Smoke filled part of Van Ness-UDC Station on February 26, 2023. Trains and riders were in and approaching the station at the time. Metrorail closed and evacuated the station for life safety reasons.

Riders described hearing a loud bang and observing a flash followed by smoke at the south end of the station as Train 108 entered the station travelling outbound from Cleveland Park Station. Metrorail systems show this flash in the tunnel at 5:55 p.m. immediately followed by three breakers (A06-32, A06-36 and A06-42) opening. When the breakers tripped during the arcing and surge, two sections of third rail were de-energized. This included the section just outside the station past the interlocking on Track 2 and the section within the platform limits on Track 2 (where Train 108 was). The system automatically set the breakers to "prohibit close," which provides a safeguard against personnel remotely closing breakers when not safe to do so.

Approximately 14 seconds after the flash is visible in the tunnel outside the station on CCTV, the video shows smoke entered the station as Train 108 pulled into the platform. Four track circuits dropped out approximately 28 seconds after the breakers tripped. Follow-up inspections determined that, in addition to third rail power loss, there was a blown feed fuse (8 amp) in the Train Control Room. This led to the track circuits showing false occupancy after power was restored.

The Train Operator of Train 102, travelling toward the station from the opposite direction, reported to the Rail Operations Control Center at 5:55 p.m. that they had come upon a red signal approaching Van Ness Station. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller granted a permissive block to the station platform, reported that there were issues at the interlocking, then asked the operator of Train 108 on the opposite track whether they had lost third rail power as the Rail Controller's screen indicated third rail power had de-energized unexpectedly. The Train Operator of Train 108 responded that the train's lights had gone out (this can occur for various reasons. In this case, it was due to load shedding to save battery energy for other systems after a loss of third rail power). The Train Operator of Train 108 only later identified the smell of smoke while walking through the train to verify all riders had exited.

At 5:57 p.m., the Operator of Train 102 asked whether ventilation fans were on at Van Ness Station, but did not get an immediate response. The Train Operator of Train 102 then reported smoke in the station to the Radio Rail Traffic Controller ahead of their train and at the rear of Train 108 on the opposite track.

At the same time, the Van Ness Station Manager reported smoke in the tunnel on Track 2 to the Rail Operations Information Center by phone. The Information Controller directed the Station Manager to go to the platform to investigate and then provide an update to the Rail Traffic Controller via radio.

The Van Ness Station fire alarm activated at 5:57 p.m. approximately 2 minutes after the initial flash visible on CCTV.

The Rail Traffic Controller requested at 5:57 p.m. that the Maintenance Operations Center Plant Desk activate fans in the station, and the Plant Desk Controller activated the fans.



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The Maintenance Operations Center and ROCC Assistant Operations Manager made separate calls to the D.C. Office of Unified Communications (911 call center) at 5:59 and 6 p.m.

The Train Operator of Train 102 had stopped short of the eight-car marker at end of the platform when arriving at the station due to the smoke ahead. The leading cars of the train were on the platform and the trailing cars were in the tunnel. The Train Operator informed the Radio Rail Traffic Controller, and the Radio Rail Traffic Controller instructed the Train Operator to turn off the environmental (air circulation) system and to reverse ends, and provided an absolute block back to Tenleytown Station at approximately 5:57 p.m. At 6:05 p.m., 9 minutes after entering the station, Train 102 departed Van Ness Station to return to Tenleytown Station.

During the event, Metrorail did not follow its procedures for command and control of emergencies. A Safety Department employee assumed the role of on-scene commander as the Metro Transit Police Department departed the scene. Metrorail procedures specify it should have been a rail supervisor taking on this role.

On-board vehicle systems on Train 108 recorded the loss of third-rail power and the initiation of load shedding for the eight-car train. The systems recorded a loss of propulsion traction motor torque and dynamic braking when the train was travelling 20 mph. The train had erratic traction motor torque values when approximately the first 1.5 cars were on the platform and the remaining 6.5 cars were in the tunnel in the area where the flash occurred. The torque values then went to zero. Friction brakes applied when the train was travelling 16 mph with no change to the operator's actions of maintaining the Master Controller in B1-B3 (low braking modes). The vehicle data recorded a load shedding fault that indicates a loss of third rail power when the lead car was 72 feet (about one car length) from the eight-car marker. The train stopped with all cars on the platform, and the Train Operator opened the train's doors. The Train Operator then closed the doors and attempted to move the train. Each time the Train Operator moved the Master Controller to the P5 (maximum power) position, the train did not move. There was no third rail power. The Train Operator had not identified or acted upon the heavy smoke visible at the rear of the train. The Train Operator had attempted to service the station normally. Metrorail has set load shedding to include stopping data recording after the initial minutes of power loss. Therefore, this type of data was not recorded from 6:02 p.m. until power was restored at approximately 7:25 p.m.

The investigation could not determine with certainty what initiated this smoke event. The most likely source was an object or debris on the roadway being struck by Train 108 with the collision leading to electrical arcing from the third rail, power cables, and/or the train's power collector shoes. Inspections did not identify remaining material on the railcar or trackbed, suggesting that the object(s) was destroyed by the electrical arcing.

#### **Probable Cause:**

The probable cause of this event was electrical arcing due to Metrorail's insufficient control, monitoring, and prevention of undesired objects and debris on the roadway.

#### **Corrective Actions**

Metrorail issued reminders to Safety Department personnel about following Metrorail's procedures for command, control and coordination of emergencies.

Metrorail replaced the blown feed fuse in the Train Control Room

Examples of other related open CAPs



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- C-0162 was created to address a 2022 emergency management and fire and life safety audit finding that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements. For this CAP, which has an expected completion date of January 2025, WMATA has committed to creating and implementing an Incident Management System Framework in alignment with NIMS/ICS. Metrorail plans an initial transition to these updated procedures this summer.

**WMSC staff observations:**

Metrorail identified that decisions during the response to this event were made based on assumptions rather than known, accurate information during the response.

Metrorail has an opportunity to ensure Train Operators understand the information available to them on train control displays, and how to quickly utilize these systems to identify conditions such as a loss of third rail power.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety (SAFE)  
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

**FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23135**

<b>Date of Event:</b>	02/26/2023
<b>Type of Event:</b>	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
<b>Incident Time:</b>	17:56 hours
<b>Location:</b>	Van Ness – UDC Station, Track 2
<b>Time and How received by SAFE:</b>	17:59 hours via MAC
<b>WMSC Notification Time:</b>	19:37 hours
<b>Responding Safety Officers:</b>	SAFE 702
<b>Rail Vehicle:</b>	Train 108 [L7084-7085.7185-7184.7208-7209.7439-7438T]
<b>Injuries:</b>	N/A
<b>Damage:</b>	N/A
<b>Emergency Responders:</b>	DCFEMS, MTPD, ERT
<b>SMS I/A Incident Number:</b>	20230226#106447MX

# Van Ness – UDC Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

February 26, 2023

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## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

<b>AIMS</b>	Advanced Information Management System
<b>ARS</b>	Audio Recording System
<b>ATCM</b>	Automatic Train Control Maintenance
<b>ATP</b>	Automatic Train Protection
<b>CAP</b>	Corrective Action Plan
<b>CCTV</b>	Closed-Circuit Television
<b>CMNT</b>	Office of Car Maintenance
<b>CMOR</b>	Office of Chief Mechanical Officer
<b>DCFEMS</b>	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
<b>ER</b>	Event Recorder
<b>ERT</b>	Emergency Response Team
<b>ICP</b>	Incident Command Post
<b>IIT</b>	Incident Investigations Team
<b>MAC</b>	Mission Assurance Coordinator
<b>MSRPH</b>	Metro rail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
<b>MTPD</b>	Metro Transit Police Department
<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
<b>OEP</b>	Office of Emergency Preparedness
<b>OSC</b>	On Scene Commander
<b>RTRA</b>	Office of Rail Transportation
<b>ROCC</b>	Rail Operations Control Center
<b>ROCS</b>	Rail Operations Control System
<b>SAFE</b>	Department of Safety
<b>SMS</b>	Safety Measurement System

<b>SRC</b>	Safety Risk Coordinator
<b>TRST</b>	Office of Track and Structures
<b>VMDS</b>	Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System
<b>WMATA</b>	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
<b>WMSC</b>	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority**  
**Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

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**Executive Summary**

*\*Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. \**

On Sunday, February 26, 2023, at 17:55 hours, a Train Operator operating revenue Train ID 108 [L7084-7085.7185-7184.7208-7209.7439-7438T] contacted the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) and reported their lights went out while servicing Van Ness – UDC Station on Track 2. Simultaneously at 17:56 hours, the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) was notified of automatic fire alarm at Van Ness Station on Track 2 as third rail power went down in the area. The Station Manager confirmed there was smoke in the station. At 17:57 hours, the Station manager at Van Ness Station reported smoke to the Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC). ROCC notified the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS), Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), and Emergency Response Team (ERT).

ROCC instructed the Station Manager to close and evacuate the station. At 17:55 hours, Train ID 102, reported a red signal in approach to Van Ness Station on Track 1. The Radio RTC granted a permissive block to the 8-car marker, A06-02 red having issues at the interlocking. ROCC instructed Train ID 102 to reverse ends and was given an absolute block to return to Tenleytown-AU Station. ROCC requested a bus bridge and implemented SOP #1A.

Unified Command was established with DCFEMS and MTPD with the Incident Command Post (ICP) established at Connecticut Avenue and Veazey Terrace. DCFEMS investigated from the platform and reported no smoke or fire. After DCFEMS cleared the scene, the On Scene Commander (OSC) was transferred to the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). The OSC instructed ERT to perform a walking inspection from Cleveland Park to Tenleytown Station. ERT reported nothing was found. ROCC instructed non-revenue Train ID 704 to perform a track inspection on Tracks 1 and 2 between Van Ness and Dupont Circle Stations. Train ID 704 reported a good track inspection on both tracks. The OSC cleared the scene and reopened the station for normal service at 20:55 hours.

Additional inspections conducted the same night and the following day did not identify failed or damaged equipment or vehicles that would result in the sudden appearance of smoke and immediate dissipation.


The probable cause of the evacuation for life safety reasons at Van Ness – UDC Station was a smoke event of undetermined origin. The most likely causal factor was a foreign object that was struck by the train and momentarily arced on the third rail before dislodging or being consumed by the arcing event. The station was evacuated due to smoke; however, the smoke quickly dissipated. Post-incident inspections did not identify equipment failures that would likely result in the amount of smoke present. In addition, the smoke dissipated with the use of tunnel ventilation fans and did not continue.

**Incident Site**

Van Ness – UDC Station, Track 2



## Field Sketch/Schematics



*The above depiction is not to scale.*

## Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

## Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Physical Site Assessment
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information.
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
  - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
  - National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
  - Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) Incident Response Report
  - Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Event Report
  - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
  - Rail Operations Control System (ROCS) SPOTS Report
  - Automatic Train Control Maintenance (ATCM) Work Order
  - Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) Work Order

- Track and Structures (TRST) Work Order
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
  - ARS (Audio Recording System) playback [Radio and Landline Communications]
  - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) Playback
  - CCTV (Closed-Circuit Television)

### **Investigation**

On Sunday, February 26, 2023, at 17:55 hours, a Train Operator operating revenue Train ID 108 contacted the ROCC and reported their lights went out while servicing Van Ness – UDC Station on Track 2. At 17:59, the MAC was also notified of automatic fire alarm at Van Ness Station on Track 2 as the third rail power went down. The Station Manager confirmed there was smoke in the station. ROCC notified the DCFEMS, MTPD, and ERT.

The ROCC instructed the Station Manager to close and evacuate the station. Train ID 102 in approach to Van Ness Station on Track 1 reported a red signal and smoke in front of the train. ROCC instructed Train ID 102 turn off their EV, to reverse ends and was given an absolute block to Tenleytown Station. ROCC requested a bus bridge and implemented SOP #1A.

At 17:57 hours, the tunnel ventilation fans were activated at Van Ness – UDC Station. Unified Command was established with DCFEMS and MTPD and the ICP was set up at Connecticut Avenue and Veazey Terrace. DCFEMS investigated from the platform and reported no smoke or fire. After DCFEMS cleared the scene, the OSC was transferred to MTPD. ERT continued to investigate the possible source of the smoke. ERT then requested DCFEMS to return to the scene as a precautionary measure prior to the third rail power being re-energized at 19:40 hours, the OSC was transferred to the OEP. This transfer of OSC should not have taken place under SOP #1A. Per SOP #1A, if MTPD is not on the scene, the ROCC must appoint an OSC. If MTPD is the OSC and activities are transitioning to recovery such that MTPD is transitioning to a “maintenance issue” and leaving the scene, RTRA should be appointed as OSC until the issue is fully resolved. No command and control deficiencies were found during the period when OEP was assigned as the OSC.

The OSC instructed ERT to perform a ground walk inspection from Cleveland Park to Tenleytown Stations. ERT reported nothing was found. ROCC then instructed Train ID 704 to perform a track inspection on Tracks 1 and 2 between Van Ness and Dupont Circle Stations. Train ID 704 reported a good track inspection on both tracks. The OSC cleared the scene and reopened the station for normal service at 20:55 hours. A post-incident inspection of the rail cars did not identify any damage.

## Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
17:55:22 hours	Signal A06-02 on Track 1 changes from lunar to red as Train 108 enters the Station on Track 2 [CCTV]
17:55:24 hours	Train ID 108 arrived at Van Ness Station, track 2. [Spots]
17:55:28 hours	Flash observed in the tunnel outside of the station on Track 1 [CCTV]
17:55:29 hours	DC Feeders A06-32, -36, and -42 opened and are set to "Prohibit Close" by the system. Third rail power de-energized in sections A06-A18 and A06-A20A [AIMS Event Log]
17:55:42 hours	Smoke drawn into the station on Track 2 as Train 108 berths on the platform [CCTV]
17:55:43 hours	<p><u>Train ID 102</u>: Reported a red signal in approach to Van Ness Station, track 1.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Granted a permissive block to the 8-car marker, A06-02 red having issues at the interlocking.</p> <p><u>Train ID 102</u>: Acknowledged and repeated.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Contacted Train ID 108, track 2 at Van Ness Station. Inquired if the train had power, indication that third rail power was de-energized at Van Ness, track 2.</p> <p><u>Train ID 108</u>: Reported that the lights just went out.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Advised Train ID 108 to standby, make announcements, and power was en route. [Ops 1]</p>
17:55:57 hours	Track circuit failures A06-1ATR, -1BTR, 3ATR, 3BTR [AIMS Event Log]
17:56:15 hours	Train ID 102 arrived at Van Ness Station, track 1. [Spots]
17:57:02 hours	<p><u>Train ID 102</u>: Inquired if fans were activated at Van Ness Station.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: No response. [Ops 1]</p>
17:57:02 hours	Radio RTC notified ROIC that power was down at Van Ness Station. [Phone]
17:57:03 hours	<p><u>Station Manager</u>: Contacted ROIC and reported smoke in the tunnel on track 2.</p> <p><u>ROIC Controller</u>: Advised Station Manager to take their radio, perform a station check and contact Ops 1 to give an update. [Phone]</p>
17:57:18 hours	<p><u>Train ID 102</u>: Reported smoke in the area.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and repeated.</p> <p><u>Train ID 102</u>: Confirmed at the red signal, smoke in the area. The rear of the train on track 2 and ahead of their train on track 1.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Inquired if Train ID 102 was properly berthed.</p> <p><u>Train ID 102</u>: Reported they were not properly berthed. The RTC instructed them to turn off EV, gave permission to reverse ends, and an absolute block to Tenleytown Station.</p> <p><u>Train ID 108</u>: Reported that the lights just went out.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Advised the Train ID 108 to standby, make announcements, and power was en route. [Ops 1]</p>
17:57:21 hours	Van Ness Station Fire Alarm activates [AIMS Event Log]
17:57:29-43 hours	Tunnel Ventilation Fans activate [AIMS Event Log]
17:57:31 hours	AOM reported to OM that breakers commanded open on track 2, the track circuit is down at the interlocking at Van Ness and trains are reporting smoke. [Phone]

Time	Description
17:57:41 hours	Radio RTC contacted MOC and requested fan activation at Van Ness Station. [Phone]
17:59:22 hours	RTRA Supervisor dispatched from NoMa - Gallaudet U station [Ops 1]
17:59:43 hours	PDAS notified that power was down at Van Ness Station and instructed personnel to respond to Van Ness Traction Power. [Phone]
17:59:48 hours	MOC notification to DCFEMS. [Phone]
17:59:54 hours	MOC notification to COMR for response to Van Ness Station. [Phone]
18:00:25 hours	AOM notification to DCFEMS. [Phone]
18:00:41 hours	MTPD Dispatch requested units to respond to Van Ness Station. [MTPD 1X]
18:02:19 hours	Station Manager radio check [Ops 5]
18:02:43 hours	Station Manager reported station was evacuated. [Ops 5]
18:04:00 hours	MAC notified and dispatched OEP Primary Responder. [OEP Event Report]
18:05:08 hours	Train ID 102 departed at Van Ness Station, track 1. [Spots]
18:09:00 hours	DCFEMS and MTPD arrive on scene. Unified command is established. The incident command post is established at Connecticut Avenue and Veazey Terrace, NW. DCFEMS conducts investigation from the platform and reports no smoke or fire. Fire department demobilizes. [OEP Event Report]
18:33:00 hours	MAC notifies the Safety Director On-Call and WMSC. [OEP Event Report]
18:48:00 hours	Incident Command Post is relocated to the Van Ness Station platform. ERT arrives and requests DCFEMS to respond back to the scene as a preventative measure for planned third rail power re-energization. [OEP Event Report]
19:20:00 hours	ERT requests third rail power to be restored. MAC approves third rail power restoration on track 2. Radio RTC performs all power announcements in preparation for third rail power restoration. ERT requests foul time to perform a track inspection from Van Ness Station to Cleveland Park Station with DCFEMS. [OEP Event Report]
19:25:00 hours	Third rail power is restored. [OEP Event Report]
19:40:00 hours	On-Scene Commander transfers command to OEP [OEP Event Report]
19:55:00 hours	ERT reports nothing found between Van Ness and Cleveland Park on Tracks 1 and 2. [OEP Event Report]
20:15:00-20:40:00 hours	Test Train Inspections conducted on Tracks 1 and 2. [OEP Event Report]
20:24:36 hours	CMNT requested to cut trucks on Car 7209 due to stuck holding brake. Rolling and Rolling Brake Test was performed. [OPS 1] Train ID 108 (708) departed Van Ness Station, track 2. [Spots]
20:51:00 hours	Test Train 704 reblocked to ID 104 on Track 2 and goes in service at Van Ness. [OEP Event Report]
21:00:00 hours	Command Post demobilized and Command terminated. [OEP Event Report]

*Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.*

## Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

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17:55:29.763 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC A06-32 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
17:55:29.763 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC A06-36 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
17:55:29.763 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC A06-42 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
17:55:29.763 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC A06-A18 Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Deenergize
17:55:29.763 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC A06-A20A Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Deenergize
17:55:30.820 02/26/23 Yard West N98B-Precision Coded Output Processor MLK Processor C ACKNOWLEDGED BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:30.820 02/26/23 Plainfield N91 STBY Processor for Interlocking Problem CURRENT S ACKNOWLEDGED BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:30.820 02/26/23 Plainfield N91 NORM Processor for Interlocking Problem CURRENT S ACKNOWLEDGED BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:30.820 02/26/23 Quaker Lane J01 Processor for Interlocking Problem CURRENT STATE ACKNOWLEDGED BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:30.820 02/26/23 Van Dorn St J02 Processor for Station CURRENT STATE = Normal ACKNOWLEDGED BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:30.820 02/26/23 Baldwin Dr N92 STBY Processor for Interlocking Problem CURRENT S ALARM FINAL ACK. BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:30.820 02/26/23 Baldwin Dr N92 NORM Processor for Interlocking Problem CURRENT S ALARM FINAL ACK. BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:35.754 02/26/23 Dupont Circle A03-1 Subway Drainage Pumping Station CURRENT STATE = ALARM FINAL ACK. BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:35.754 02/26/23 W Hyattsville E07-1 Subway Drainage Pumping Station CURRENT STATE = ALARM FINAL ACK. BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:35.754 02/26/23 Columbia Hgths E04-1 Subway Drainage Pumping Station CURRENT STATE = ALARM FINAL ACK. BY 001969 AT ctwsasupmocpp
17:55:57.653 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC TRACK CIRCUIT A06-1ATR FAILED OCCUPIED
17:55:57.653 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC TRACK CIRCUIT A06-1BTR FAILED OCCUPIED
17:55:57.653 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC TRACK CIRCUIT A06-3ATR FAILED OCCUPIED
17:55:57.653 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC TRACK CIRCUIT A06-3BTR FAILED OCCUPIED
17:56:04.184 02/26/23 Franconia Spr J03 Interlocking Control CONTROL FAILURE = Central TIMEOUT
17:56:06.418 02/26/23 Addison Road TWC 003-----2 TRAIN 611 DESTINATION MISMATCH: TWC 68 - TRAIN 51
17:56:12.215 02/26/23 Franconia Spr J03 Interlocking Control CONTROL FAILURE = Central ACKNOWLEDGED BY 010569 AT ctwsatcpc
17:56:12.215 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC TRACK CIRCUIT A06-1ATR FAILED OCCUPIED ACKNOWLEDGED BY 010569 AT ctwsatcpc
17:56:12.215 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC TRACK CIRCUIT A06-1BTR FAILED OCCUPIED ACKNOWLEDGED BY 010569 AT ctwsatcpc
17:56:12.215 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC TRACK CIRCUIT A06-3ATR FAILED OCCUPIED ACKNOWLEDGED BY 010569 AT ctwsatcpc
17:56:12.215 02/26/23 Van Ness UDC TRACK CIRCUIT A06-3BTR FAILED OCCUPIED ACKNOWLEDGED BY 010569 AT ctwsatcpc

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Figure 1 - AIMS Event Log showing initial indications of the event




Image 1 - Train ID 108 approaching Van Ness – UDC Station, Track 2 at 17:55 hours. Third rail power is energized on the platform and interlocking.






Image 2 - AIMS Display showing third rail power deenergized in the interlocking and on the platform on Track 2.

## Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) / Incident Investigations Team (IIT)

*Adopted from the CMOR IIT report with minor edits:*

“Based on VMDS and ER data, Train ID 108 loss power upon entering Van Ness – UDC Station, Track #2. The train’s VMDS data indicated the loss of third rail voltage and load shedding conditions on the entire consist. With the removal or loss of third rail voltage, the train enters into a “Load Shedding” condition. Load Shedding shuts down the train’s low voltage circuits, including lighting, systematically, to decrease battery power drain. Based on review of VMDS fault logs from the entire consist, there were no faults with the train at, or near the reported time of the incident prior to losing third rail power.

As the train entered within the platform limits at Van Ness, traveling at a speed of 20 MPH, there was a loss of propulsion traction motor torque and dynamic braking. This was due to the removal of 3<sup>rd</sup> rail power, commanded to de-energize. The AIMS event logs show third rail power being removed at 1755 hrs. At that time, the train began to record erratic Traction Motor Torque Values, and soon after, all Traction Motor Torque Values went to 0 and remained at 0.

Once the train came to a stop at the 8-Car Marker at Van Ness – UDC Station, the left-side doors were opened, and the station was serviced. Upon closing the doors, the Master Controller was moved to P5 Power position, on 2 consecutive occasions, but each time failed to achieve a brakes release and point of power due to the absence of third rail voltage and Load Shedding conditions throughout the entire consist.

Based on data analysis, there were no faults with the train that contributed to the cause of the reported incident. Due to the loss of third rail voltage, and subsequent implementation of Load Shedding conditions on the entire consist. No data was recorded from 1802 hours to 1925 hours.”

<b>Time</b>	<b>Description of Events</b>	<b>Train Speed</b>	<b>Master Controller</b>	<b>ATP Speed Limit</b>	<b>ADU Regulated Speed Limit</b>
17:54:25.200	Train ID108, Lead car 7084. Master Controller placed in P5 Power position. Departed from Cleveland Park, track #2, in the direction of Van Ness track #2. Lead car show good Traction Motor Torque on each truck. Good brake released is detected, indicating no brake issue during this time. Log show No 3 <sup>rd</sup> fail issue.	0 MPH	P5	55 MPH	44 MPH
17:54:46.560	Train reached a top speed of 52.01MPH. Distance traveled from Cleveland Park Station 954.21ft. Traction Motor Torque show 0 as NO request of power.	52 MPH	Coast	55 MPH	44 MPH
17:54:46.560 to	Train shows good current and dynamic during this time. A Good Brake Released is maintain during braking indicating good dynamic braking. 2,593.23ft after departing Cleveland Park Station.	29 MPH	Coast	50 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:15.670	ATP speed limits drops to 0 MPH. Over speed Alarm activates and ATC applies Full-Service Brake (B4). Train speed 29Mph. 2,601ft after departing Cleveland Park Station.	29 MPH	Coast	0 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:16.510	ADU regulated speed limit drops to 0 MPH. Over speed Alarm still activated. 2,636ft after departing Cleveland Park Station.	29 MPH	Coast	0 MPH	0 MPH

Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Master Controller	ATP Speed Limit	ADU Regulated Speed Limit
17:55:16.770	ATP Speed Limit increases from 0 MPH to 50 MPH. 2,647ft after departing Cleveland Park Station.	29 MPH	Coast	50 MPH	0 MPH
17:55:17.290	ADU regulated speed limit increases from 0 MPH to 44 MPH. 2,668.4ft after departing Cleveland Park Station.	28 MPH	B1-B3	50 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:17.970	Over Speed Alarm deactivates and Full-Service Brake Releases, 2,694.6 ft. after departing Cleveland Park Station.	26 MPH	B4	50 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:19.090	ATP Speed Limits decrease from 50 to 45 MPH.	24 MPH	B1-B3	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:21.120	Train ID 108, Lead car 7084 cab entered the Van Ness station (A06) track #2. Traction Motor Torque shows normal. Brake Released indication remain high in braking. <b>600ft to 8-Car marker.</b>	22 MPH	B1-B3	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:24.890	An erratic Traction Motor Torque is detected between both cars. Brake Released remain high. <b>484ft to 8-Car marker.</b>	20 MPH	B1-B3	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:26.870	Car 7085 loss Traction Motor Torque. Brake Released indication remain high. <b>429ft to 8-Car marker.</b>	19 MPH	B1-B3	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:31.660	Car 7084 loss Traction Motor Toque. Brake Released indication remain high. 301ft to 8-Car marker.	18 MPH	B1-B3	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:33.860	Train loss Brake Released indication. Friction brake is applied. No Dynamic braking at this time. <b>243ft to 8-Car marker.</b>	16 MPH	B1-B3	45 MPH	44 MPH



Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Master Controller	ATP Speed Limit	ADU Regulated Speed Limit
17:55:43.000	Car 7084 logged a Load Shedding Stage A Fault, an indication of loss of third Rail Voltage, <b>72ft to 8-Car marker.</b>	10 MPH	B1-B3	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:55:53.930	Train comes to a completed stop at the 8-Car marker.	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:56:26.000	Lead Pair 7084-85 logged a "NO THRID Rail VOLTAGE"	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:56:57.000	"NO THRID Rail VOLTAGE" faults reset on Cars 7084-85	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:57:58.000	Lead Pair 7084-85 logged a "NO THRID Rail VOLTAGE" again	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:56:03.000	Door Open Left Pushbutton activated, and Left side doors open on the platform side.	0 MPH	B4	0 MPH	0 MPH
17:58:36.820	Door Close Left Pushbutton activated and Left Doors Close.	0 MPH	B4		
17:58:47.820	All Door Closed and Locked T/L Status show 1. Doors are closed and locked.	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:58:51.290	Master Controller is placed in P5. Brake Released show high, indicating Brake are released. Traction Motor Torque show 0. Train unable to moved.	0 MPH	P5	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:58:54.900	Master Controller is moved back to B4 rate. Train unable to move at this time.	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:58:57.180	Master Controller is placed in P5 again. Brake released goes high, Indicating good brake off. Traction Motor Torque show 0. Train unable to moved.	0 MPH	P5	45 MPH	44 MPH
17:59:00.090	Master Controller is moved back to B4. Train Unable to moved. Traction Motor Toque stay at 0 when request for power.	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH

Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Master Controller	ATP Speed Limit	ADU Regulated Speed Limit
17:59:16.920	Left Side Door Open Trainline goes high. Doors are open platform side.	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH
18:00:20.150	All doors closed and locked T/L status goes high. Doors are closed and locked at this time.	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH
18:00:45.040	Train 7084 lead car is keyed down.	0 MPH	B4	45 MPH	44 MPH

### Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)

The OEP Primary Responder responded to the incident to assist with the incident scene. After the DCFEMS arrived on scene, they established unified command and began investigating the cause of the smoke. Once the scene was cleared, MTPD assumed the role of OSC. ATC, ERT and High Voltage Power crews conducted various tests and inspections of the area with negative results. The OSC role was then transferred from MTPD to OEP as the track inspections continued to identify the source of the smoke. After the ROCC received good track inspections from trains on both tracks, OEP terminated the emergency and normal services resumed (See Appendix C).

### Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)

CMNT personnel responded to the incident to assist with identifying the cause of the smoke. The CMNT Mechanic reported Car 7209 had a reduced friction brake failure on the rear truck. The CMNT Mechanic requested to cut trucks on Car 7209 due to a stuck holding brake. The Train Operator was able to conduct a successful Rolling and Rolling Brake Test with the CMNT Mechanic aboard the train. The CMNT Mechanic remained on the train, and it was taken to the Shady Grove Yard for further inspection.

CMNT personnel performed an undercar and interior inspection of the consist with no findings. They also inspected the train for wiring damage and checked the propulsion and brake systems for signs of burning and damage. CMNT personnel found no deficiencies with the train and cleared the train for normal service (See Appendix D).

### Automatic Train Control Maintenance (ATCM)

ATCM personnel responded to the incident scene and conducted an inspection of the interlocking in the location where the smoke was visible. ATCM personnel found no damage to the interlocking. ATCM personnel reported finding a blown 8A fuse feed in the Train Control Room and replaced the fuse (See Appendix E).

### Office of Track and Structures (TRST)

ERT responded to the incident scene and assisted with track inspections to locate the source of the smoke. After completing various track inspections on both tracks, ERT found no trouble and cleared the scene (See Appendix F).

## **Weather**

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature at 52° F, winds at 9 MPH, passing clouds, and 59% humidity. This event occurred within a tunneled section of the rail system. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC)

## **Related Rules and Procedures**

- SOP #1A – Command, Control and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System.

## **Findings**

- Train Operator reported heavy smoke while servicing Van Ness, Track 2.
- CMNT Mechanic reported Car 7209 had reduced friction break failure on the rear truck.
- Walking and Riding Track inspections were performed on Tracks 1 and 2 with nothing found.
- OSI performed a follow-up site investigation in coordination with ATCM on the night of February 28, 2023, in the interlocking. No foreign objects or additional failed components were identified.
- CMNT performed an undercar inspection on Train ID 108, which traversed the interlocking as the flash occurred. No damage was observed to the rail cars.
- ATCM reported found a failed 8A fuse in the Train Control Room; however, smoke did not originate from the Train Control Room.
- OEP assumed the role of OSC. MTPD and RTRA Supervisors are authorized to assume OSC per SOP #1A.

### **Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence**

- Station Manager closed and evacuated the station.
- ROCC implemented SOP #1A.
- ROCC turned back trains and implemented a bus bridge to bypass the station.
- CMNT Mechanic requested to perform an assessment of the incident train.
- Multiple walking and riding inspections were conducted with negative findings of smoke or hazardous conditions.

### **Probable Cause Statement**

The probable cause of the evacuation for life safety reasons at Van Ness – UDC Station was a smoke event of undetermined origin. The most likely causal factor was a foreign object that was struck by the train and momentarily arced on the third rail before dislodging or being consumed by the arcing event. The station was evacuated due to smoke; however, the smoke quickly dissipated. Post-incident inspections did not identify equipment failures that would likely result in the amount of smoke present. In addition, the smoke dissipated with the use of tunnel ventilation fans and did not continue.

### **Recommended Corrective Actions**

<b>Corrective Action Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Responsible Party</b>	<b>Estimated Completion Date</b>
106447MX_ SAFECAPS_ SAFE_001	(RC-1, CF-1) SAFE will chair a collaborative meeting with all departments involved in order to discuss and determine the root cause of the smoke at Van Ness Station.	SAFE SRC	Completed
106447MX_ SAFECAPS_ OEP_002	(RC-1, CF-1) OEP Management will issue a reminder to OEP personnel regarding their responsibilities to provide guidance during the application of SOP #1A until the IMF is fully implemented authority wide.	OEP SRC	Completed
106447MX_ SAFECAPS_ OEP_003	(RC-1, CF-1) OEP Management will create Lessons Learned regarding topics discussed during the After-Action Meeting and distribute them throughout the department.	OEP SRC	Completed

## Appendices

### Appendix A – Rail Operations Control System (ROCS) Spots Report

2/27/23, 8:32 AM

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

#### ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Mon Feb 27 08:32:02 2023

Select Platform:  and/or Select ID: 108 Leave blank to remove criteria

and/or Select 4-digit car number:  Leave blank to remove criteria

Select Date: Feb  26  2023  Select Times (0-24HRS): From 17:00  To 21:00

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Travel Time door open to door open
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B08-1</a>	2	13				17:01:17	17:01:37	20	17:00:41	17:02:04	7084-7085.7185-7184.7208-7209.7439-7438	-
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B09-1</a>	2	13				17:04:47	17:05:02	15	17:04:08	17:05:32	7084-7085.7185-7184.7208-7209.7439-7438	3:30
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B10-1</a>	2	13				17:08:07	17:08:34	27	17:07:25	17:09:02	7084-7085.7185-7184.7208-7209.7439-7438	3:20
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B11-1</a>	2	12	17:12:34	17:13:38	64	17:11:55	17:12:11	16	17:11:08	17:14:18	7084-7085.7185-7184.7208-7209.7439-7438	3:48
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B10-2</a>	2	12				17:17:10	17:17:27	17	17:16:32	17:17:56	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	5:15
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B09-2</a>	2	12				17:20:19	17:20:36	17	17:19:42	17:21:02	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	3:09
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B06-2</a>	2	12				17:23:43	17:24:00	17	17:23:06	17:24:26	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	3:24
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B07-2</a>	2	12				17:26:30	17:26:45	15	17:25:54	17:27:11	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	2:47
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B06-2</a>	2	12				17:29:35	17:29:52	17	17:28:58	17:30:20	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	3:05
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B05-2</a>	2	12				17:32:17	17:32:33	16	17:31:38	17:32:59	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	2:42
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B04-2</a>	2	12				17:34:27	17:34:45	18	17:33:50	17:35:12	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	2:10
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B35-2</a>	2	12				17:36:59	17:37:16	17	17:36:19	17:37:41	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	2:32
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B03-2</a>	2	12				17:39:10	17:39:28	18	17:38:32	17:39:53	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	2:11
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B02-2</a>	2	12	17:41:11	17:41:29	18				17:40:36	17:41:52	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	2:01
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">B01-2</a>	2	12	17:42:47	17:43:03	16				17:42:07	17:43:28	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	1:36
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">A01-2</a>	2	12	17:44:09	17:44:29	20				17:43:32	17:44:51	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	1:22
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">A02-2</a>	2	12				17:47:21	17:47:34	13	17:46:03	17:48:00	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	3:12
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">A03-2</a>	2	12	17:49:00	17:49:18	18				17:48:25	17:49:41	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	1:39
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">A04-2</a>	2	12				17:51:49	17:52:02	13	17:51:06	17:52:35	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	2:49
<a href="#">108</a>	<a href="#">A05-2</a>	2	12				17:54:04	17:54:22	18	17:53:24	17:54:51	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	2:15

rocsgraph/cgi-bin/tremain?index=SPOTS

1/1

Image 3 – SPOTS Report showing Train ID 108 movement during prior to the incident 1 of 2.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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## ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Mon Feb 27 08:30:40 2023

Select Platform:  and/or Select ID: 708 Leave blank to remove criteria

and/or Select 4-digit car number:  Leave blank to remove criteria

Select Date: Feb ▼ 26 ▼ 2023 ▼ Select Times (0-24HRS): From 17:00 ▼ To 21:00 ▼

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Travel Time door open to door open
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A06-2</a>	2	87	19:54:38	19:54:39	1	17:56:10	19:51:42	6932	17:55:24	20:24:36	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A07-2</a>	8	87							20:27:31	20:28:31	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A08-2</a>	8	87							20:29:59	20:31:05	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A09-2</a>	8	87							20:34:12	20:35:30	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A10-2</a>	8	87							20:36:56	20:41:23	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A11-2</a>	8	87							20:44:47	20:45:55	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A12-2</a>	8	87							20:47:46	20:48:55	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A12-2</a>	8	87							20:48:58	20:49:02	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A13-2</a>	8	87							20:50:16	20:50:50	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-
<a href="#">708</a>	<a href="#">A14-2</a>	8	87							20:53:41	20:56:40	7438-7439.7209-7208.7184-7185.7085-7084	-

Image 4 - SPOTS Report showing Train ID 108 movement during prior to the incident 2 of 2.



## Appendix B – Rail Operations Control Center Incident Report (Abridged)

### View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT ID: 2023057RED7					
<b>DATE</b> 2023-02-26	<b>TIME</b> 1756	<b>LINE</b> Red	<b>ITEM</b> 7		
<b>LOCATION (STATION/YARD)</b> Van Ness-UDC (A06)		<b>LOCATION/CHAIN MARKER (If Applicable)</b>		<b>REPORTED BY</b> Operator [REDACTED]	
<b>TRAIN ID</b> 108	<b>DIRECTION</b> I/B	<b>TRACK NUMBER</b> 2	<b>DEPTS NOTIFIED</b> Everbridge Alert/Messaging		
<b>CAR NUMBERS (XXXX-XXXX)</b>					
<b>Lead Car</b>					
7084-7085	7185-7184	7208-7209	7439-7438		
Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>		
<b>TRBL CODE</b> SMKS-SMOKE IN STATION		<b>RESP CODE</b> OTH			
<b>TYPE INCIDENT</b> Smoke in Station					
<b>ACTION PLAN</b> Offload implement SOP 1A and turn back trains.					
DELAYS IN MINUTES					
<b>LINE</b>	<b>INCIDENT</b>	<b>TRAIN</b>	<b>TOTAL DURATION</b>		
26	26	148	183		
TRIPS MODIFIED					
<b>PARTIAL</b>	<b>GAP TRAIN</b>	<b>LATE DISPATCHES</b>	<b>REROUTED</b>	<b>NOT DISPATCHED</b>	<b>OFFLOADS</b>
10	0	0	0	0	5
FIVE PRIMARY CONSOLE INDICATIONS					
<b>BCP</b>	<b>BRAKES ON ILLUMINATED</b>	<b>ALL DOORS CLOSED ILLUMINATED</b>	<b>AUTO\MANUAL ILLUMINATED</b>	<b>BPP</b>	
No	Yes	Yes	MANUAL	Yes	
INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY					
<b>TIME</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>				
1756	Train 108 Operator [REDACTED] reported heavy smoke while servicing the platform at Van Ness Station and AIM displayed third rail power deenergized track two. Assistant Operations Manager, ROIC, MTPD, MOC and all concerned personnel were notified.				

Document 1 – ROCC Incident Report page 1 of 3.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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## View Approved Incident Report

1757	Train 108 Operator [REDACTED] was instructed to offload train and verify clear of customers. Train 102 in approach to Van Ness track one was instructed to key down and reverse ends and was given an absolute block back to Tenleytown Station in service to Shady Grove Station. Train 108 Operator [REDACTED] evacuated the Van Station with the customers due to safety concerns.
1759	SOP 1A was implemented. Terminals were established Friendship Heights Station and Dupont Circle to turn back trains in the direction of Shady Grove and Glenmont Stations.
1809	DC Fire Department arrived on the scene Van Ness Station. Command post was established Connecticut Ave and Easley St.
1822	Shuttle bus 7536 arrived on the scene at Friendship Heights Station picking up fifty customers, ending longest customer delay.
1850	ERT 650 and 6236 arrived on the scene standing by to assist. Command Post re-established Van Ness platform.
1853	CMNT [REDACTED] dispatched to Van Ness to assist.
1856	ERT 650 requested DCFD to respond to the scene a second time to be on standby for assistance when third rail power is restored.
1910	Train Operator [REDACTED] was instructed to report to the Command Post Van Ness platform.
1916	ATC 2097/ CMNT [REDACTED] arrived on the scene was instructed to report to the Command Post.
1920	ERT 650 requested foul time to perform a track inspection from Van Ness to Cleveland Park Stations with power restored and DCFD in place.
1921	ROCC performed all power announcements for third rail power restoration at Van Ness Station track two.
1925	Third rail power restored track two Van Ness. Operator [REDACTED] was instructed to board train 108 and await further instructions.
1934	RTRA Supervisor Unit 21 arrived on the scene and was appointed as the RTRA Forward Liaison.
1953	The incident scene was released to OEP 30.
1954	CMNT [REDACTED] reported car 7209 had a reduce friction brake failure on the rear truck.
1955	ERT 650 reported nothing found between Van Ness and Cleveland Park tracks one and two.
2004	ERT 650 requested a test train at Van Ness.
2013	Train 104 off loaded customers at Friendship Heights Station and verified clear of customers.
2015	Train 704 picked up ERT 650 from Van Ness platform and performed a track inspection track one Van Ness Station interlocking.
2024	CMNT [REDACTED] requested to cut trucks in car 7209 due to stuck holding brake. Rolling brake test performed, Train 708 departed Van Ness track two and continued non revenue to Shady Grove with CMNT [REDACTED] aboard.
2035	Train operator on 704 reported a good track inspection track one between Van Ness to Dupont Circle Stations.
2040	ERT 650 requested a track inspection from Dupont Circle to Van Ness Station track two. Train 704 reversed ends Dupont Circle and performed a track inspection to Van Ness Station track two.
2047	Train 704 reported a good track inspection from Dupont Circle to Van Ness track two.
2051	Train 704 ID changed to 104 and was instructed to go back in service track two at Van Ness to Shady Grove.
2058	Train 107 was the first train to go normal service track one to Glenmont Station.
2059	Normal service resumed.

Document 2 – ROCC Incident Report page 2 of 3.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023      Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By:   SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By:  SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By:  SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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## View Approved Incident Report

**MAXIMO TICKET#**  
8655301

REPORT PREPARED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
RADIO CONTROLLER 1		✓
BUTTON CONTROLLER 1		✓
RADIO CONTROLLER 2		
BUTTON CONTROLLER 2		

### SUPERINTENDENTS OR ASSISTANTS SECTION

**ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP CORRECTIVE  
ACTIONS OR REMARKS**

**FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM  
SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS**

**NOTIFICATIONS/PAGE GROUPS** #1/CEO ☐ #2/DGM &BELOW ☒

**ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS MADE BY  
PHONE**

APPROVED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
REPORT APPROVED BY SUPT. OR ASST SUPT.		✓

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Document 3 – ROCC Incident Report page 3 of 3.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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## Appendix C – Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) Incident Response Report (Abridged)

Submitted by: [REDACTED]



### SAFE OEP Incident Response Report

#### Overview

<u>Incident Date/Time:</u>	<u>Responder 1:</u>	<u>Additional Responders:</u>
2023-02-26	[REDACTED]	N/A
1759	<u>MAC 1:</u> [REDACTED]	<u>Incident Type:</u>
<u>Incident Location:</u>	<u>MAC 2:</u> N/A	Fire/Smoke in Station
Van Ness UDC		

#### Incident Metrics

<u>OPS Channel:</u> OPS 1	<u>On Scene Time:</u> 1848
<u>MTPD Channels:</u>	<u>Disregard Time:</u> N/A
["MTPD 2x"]	<u>Time of Recovery:</u> 1837
<u>Bus/Rail Yard Channel:</u> N/A	<u>In-Service Time:</u> 2100
<u>Initial Incident Time:</u> 1759	<u>Command Est. Time:</u> 1814
<u>Dispatch Time:</u> 1804	<u>Transfer of Command Time:</u> Approximately 1940
<u>Response Time:</u> 1814	

#### Incident Personnel

<u>Metro IC:</u> Sgt [REDACTED] Cruiser 121/ W [REDACTED] EP30	<u>Forward Liaison (MTPD):</u> Transit 879
<u>Jurisdictional IC:</u> District of Columbia	<u>Maintenance Lead (ERT):</u> [REDACTED]
<u>Fire Liaison ROCC:</u> [REDACTED]	<u>Investigations Lead (MTPD):</u>
	N/A
<u>Forward Liaison (RTRA Supervisor):</u>	<u>Investigations Lead (Safety):</u> [REDACTED]
UNK	Safe 707
	<u>Transportation Lead (Bus TFS):</u> UNK

Document 4 – OEP Incident Response Report page 1 of 2.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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Submitted by: [REDACTED]

## Incident Overview

**Was Power removed:** Yes - Supervisory

**Red Tag (if applicable):**N/A

### Incident Narrative:

MAC notified of automatic fire alarm at the same time third rail power went down on track 2. Station manager reported smoke in the station. DCFD notified. Station manager notified to evacuate the station including Train 108 on the platform. Train 102 was in approach to Van Ness on Track 1 and reported smoke in front of the train. That train reversed ends and was given an absolute block back to Tenleytown. Train 102 off loaded at Tenleytown. Service was suspended from Dupont Circle to Friendship Heights and bus bridge requested. Unified command established with fire department. Fire department investigated from the platform and reported no smoke or fire. All appropriate resources requested. Investigation continues. EP30 arrived on the scene at 1848 and reported to the ICP. ERT was on the scene requesting a Fire Department unit report back to the scene as a preventative measure when track was re-energized. ERT conducted a track walk on Track 2. At approximately 1940 the On Scene Commander transferred command to EP30. EP30 advised command that IMF was not in affect. EP30 was advised that command was being transferred. This was witnessed by transit Capt. [REDACTED]. Third rail power was re-energized on track two and train 108 was powered up. No smoke or fire presented however after several minutes there was an odor of smoke. ERT performed Track walks on both tracks and both were negative. A test train was sent down track one for inspection. While this was being done train 108 was allowed to move so that an inspection of the track within the platform limits could be conducted on track two. When the train was moved no circuits were blown and the inspection was negative. The inspection of track one with the test train was negative and Command allowed single tracking to take place. ATC, High Voltage and Track and Structure conducted various inspections, and all were negative. Once the test train completed its inspection on track two command was terminated and normal service was allowed to resume.

### Incident Successes:

Coordination among the various entities.

### Opportunities for Improvement:

Tactics and decisions being made on inaccurate information or misinformation. Transfer of command outside of SOP 1A.

*Document 5 – OEP Incident Response Report page 2 of 2.*

## Appendix D – Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) Work Order



### Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 2  
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17707270  
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE  
03/01/2023 07:34

Work Description: REPORT OF SMOKE IN STATION  
A06TP (BREAKER 32/36)  
A06TB (BREAKER 42)  
OPEN UNCOMMANDED

Job Plan Description:

Work Information									
Asset: R7084	7084, RAIL CAR, KAWASAKI, 7000 AC, A CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:						
Asset Tag: R7084		Maintenance Office: CMNT-SDYG-INSP	Create Date: 02/28/2023 12:36						
Asset S/N: 7084		Labor Group: CMNT	Actual Start: 02/28/2023 15:54						
Location: 1136	A99, SHADY GROVE YARD	Crew:	Actual Comp: 02/28/2023 22:55						
Work Location: 1136	A99, SHADY GROVE YARD	Lead:	Item: K18050001						
Failure Class: CMNT001	RAIL CAR	GL Account: WMATA-02-33320-50499160-041-*****-OPR**							
Problem Code: 3035	SMOKE OBSERVED	Supervisor: [REDACTED]	Target Start:						
Requested By:		Requestor Phone: [REDACTED]	Target Comp:						
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:	Scheduled Start:						
Create-Mileage: 458424.0		Complete-Mileage: 458424.0							
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10	PERFORM UNDERCAR & INTERIOR INSPECTION								
	PERFORMED UNDER CAR EQUIPMENT AND WIRING FOR DAMAGE AND/OR BURN. ALL LOOKS NORMAL. CHECKED INSIDE PROPULSION, BRAKE AND APS SYSTEM EQUIPMENT FOR SIGN OF BURNING AND DAMAGE. ALL NORMAL. NO ACTIVE FAULT ON TCD. RUN DST AND PASSED. GOOD FOR SERVICE. PERFORM UNDERCAR INSPECTION, CABLES / PADS / SHOES / EQUIPMENT. NO DEFECTS FOUND. INTERIOR INSPECTION CHECKS OK. GOOD DST AND DAILY INSPECTION								
Component: 000-300 RAIL CAR: 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accomplished: CHECKED	Reason: NO TROUBLE FOUND	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N				
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	02/28/2023	02/28/2023	19:30	20:30	Y	01:00	00:00	\$41.69
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							01:00	00:00	\$41.69
Related Incidents									
Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship					
8655304	REPORT OF SMOKE IN STATION A06TP (BREAKER 32/36) A06TB (BREAKER 42) OPEN UNCOMMANDED	SR	NEW	ORIGINATOR					

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03/1/2023 08:17

Document 6 – CMNT work order showing details of inspection conducted page 1 of 2.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Maintenance and Material Management System  
Work Order Details

Page 2 of 2  
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17707270  
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE  
03/01/2023 07:34

Work Description: REPORT OF SMOKE IN STATION  
A06TP (BREAKER 32/36)  
A06TB (BREAKER 42)  
OPEN UNCOMMANDED

Job Plan Description:

Failure Reporting			
Cause	Remedy		Supervisor
2475	NO DEFECT; NO REPAIRS PERFORMED	3192 TESTED / INSPECTED	
Remarks: GOOD UNDERCAR & INTERIOR INSPECTION, NO DEFECTS FOUND. GOOD DAILY INSPECTION			03/01/2023

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03/1/2023 08:17

Document 7 – CMNT work order showing details of inspection conducted page 2 of 2.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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# Appendix E – Automatic Train Control Maintenance (ATCM) Work Order



## Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 1  
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17703702  
Type: SPIN



Status: COMP  
03/02/2023 11:12

Work Description: ATCS, SPECIAL EVENT INTERLOCKING INSPECTION  
Job Plan Description: ATCS, SPECIAL EVENT INTERLOCKING INSPECTION

Work Information									
Asset: ATCSA06		A06, ATCS, TRAIN CONTROL ROOM, INTERLOCKING, VE		Owning Office: ATCS-TSSM		Parent: 17628151			
Asset Tag: ATCSA06				Maintenance Office: ATCS-TSSM-ARFO		Create Date: 02/27/2023 12:40			
Asset S/N: TCRA06				Labor Group: ATCSD1A99		Actual Start: 02/28/2023 21:00			
Location: 6090		A06, VAN NESS-UDC, STATION, PLATFORM, ROOM 105, TRAIN CONTROL ROOM (A06 OB BT)		Crew: ATCSA1S2		Actual Comp: 03/02/2023 11:12			
Work Location:				Lead:		Item: ATCSV0984			
Failure Class:				GL Account: WMATA-02-33530-50499270-042-*****-OPR**		Target Start: 03/01/2023 12:47			
Problem Code:				Supervisor:		Target Comp: 03/03/2023 12:47			
Requested By:				Requestor Phone:		Scheduled Start:			
Create-Mileage: 0.0				Complete-Mileage: 0.0					
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10 SPIN ATC PORTION									
Component:		Work Accompl:		Reason:		Status: COMP		Position: Warranty?: N	
20		ATC AND TRST INSPECT TRACK							
Component:		Work Accompl:		Reason:		Status: COMP		Position: Warranty?: N	
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10		02/28/2023	02/28/2023	17:30	22:00	Y	04:30	00:00	\$190.36
20		03/02/2023	03/02/2023	10:00	11:30	Y	01:30	00:00	\$61.92
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							06:00	00:00	\$252.28
Failure Reporting									
Cause	Remedy			Supervisor			Remark Date		
Remarks:									

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03/3/2023 11:45

Document 8 – ATCM work order showing details of inspection conducted page 1 of 3.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Maintenance and Material Management System  
Work Order Details

Page 1 of 2  
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17701638  
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE  
03/01/2023 05:06

Work Description: A06, track circuit 1-3T displaying false occupancy  
Job Plan Description:

Work Information									
Asset: 449096	ATCS, A06, TRACK CIRCUITS	Owning Office: ATCS-TSSM-ARFO	Parent:						
Asset Tag:		Maintenance Office: ATCS-TSSM-ARFO	Create Date: 02/26/2023 18:13						
Asset S/N:		Labor Group: ATCSD1A99	Actual Start: 02/26/2023 21:57						
Location: 6090	A06, VAN NESS-UDC, STATION, PLATFORM, ROOM 105, TRAIN CONTROL ROOM (A06 OB BT)	Crew:	Actual Comp: 02/27/2023 05:12						
Work Location:		Lead:	Item:						
Failure Class: ATCS002	HIGH FREQUENCY TRACK CIRCUITS	GL Account: WMATA-02-33530-50499270-042-*****-OPR**							
Problem Code: 3455	FALSE OCCUPANCY	Supervisor:	Target Start:						
Requested By: [REDACTED]		Requestor Phone:	Target Comp:						
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:	Scheduled Start:						
Create-Mileage: 0.0		Complete-Mileage: 0.0							
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10 Found Blown feed fuse 8 amp									
Component:	Work Accomp:	Reason:	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N				
20	Replace fuse								
Component:	Work Accomp:	Reason:	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N				
30	Interlocking inspection								
Component:	Work Accomp:	Reason:	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N				
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	20:00	21:30	Y	01:30	00:00	\$54.37
	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	20:00	21:30	Y	01:30	00:00	\$60.41
	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	19:00	21:30	Y	02:30	00:00	\$110.94
	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	19:00	21:30	Y	02:30	00:00	\$100.68
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							08:00	00:00	\$326.40

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03/9/2023 19:55

Document 9 – ATCM work order showing details of inspection conducted page 2 of 3.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Maintenance and Material Management System  
**Work Order Details**

Page 2 of 2  
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17701638  
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE  
03/01/2023 05:06

Work Description: A06, track circuit 1-3T displaying false occupancy

Job Plan Description:

Related Incidents				
Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship
8655305	A06, track circuit 1-3T displaying false occupancy	SR	NEW	RELATED
Failure Reporting				
Cause	Remedy		Supervisor	Remark Date
1166	BLOWN FUSE	0004 REPLACED		02/26/2023
Remarks: Found blown fuse feed from transformer				

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03/9/2023 19:55

Document 10 – ATCM work order showing details of inspection conducted page 3 of 3.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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## Appendix F – Office of Track and Structures (TRST) Work Order



### Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 1  
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17701644  
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE  
02/27/2023 11:57

Work Description: A06, ERT dispatch for reported smoke on platform limits  
Job Plan Description:

Work Information									
Asset: TA06		A06,VAN NESS STATION		Owning Office:		Parent:			
Asset Tag:				Maintenance Office: TRST-STRC		Create Date: 02/26/2023 18:20			
Asset S/N:				Labor Group: TRST-TRAK-ERT		Actual Start: 02/27/2023 11:57			
Location: A		ORIM, A Line, Shady Grove		Crew:		Actual Comp: 02/27/2023 11:57			
Work Location:				Lead: [REDACTED]		Item:			
Failure Class: TRSTSTRC		TRST, STRUCTURES		GL Account: WMATA-02-33630-50499360-042-*****-OPR**		Target Start:			
Problem Code: 0041		SPECIAL INSPECTION		Supervisor:		Target Comp:			
Requested By: [REDACTED]				Requestor Phone:		Scheduled Start:			
Chain Mark Start: 198				Chain Mark End: 257					
Create-Mileage: 0.0				Complete-Mileage: 0.0					
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10	Response to A05								
Personnel responded to Van Ness for a report of smoke within the platform limits. After getting in contact with the OSC, we were able to access the roadway and conduct an inspection. After inspection, there was nothing found.									
Component: 200 TRACK		Work Accompl: INSPECTED		Reason: NO TROUBLE FOUND		Status: CLOSE		Position: B	
Warranty?: N									
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	18:30	21:00	Y	02:30	00:00	\$118.83
10	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	18:30	21:00	Y	02:30	00:00	\$119.41
10	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	18:30	21:00	Y	02:30	00:00	\$117.07
10	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	18:30	21:00	Y	02:30	00:00	\$118.83
10	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	18:30	21:00	Y	02:30	00:00	\$119.41
10	[REDACTED]	02/26/2023	02/26/2023	18:30	21:00	Y	02:30	00:00	\$129.56
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							15:00	00:00	\$723.11
Failure Reporting									
Cause	Remedy			Supervisor			Remark Date		
Remarks:									

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03/3/2023 11:43

Document 11 – TRST work order showing details of inspection conducted.

Incident Date: 02/26/2023 Time: 17:56 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23135

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/27/2023

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