



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0230 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons – Georgia Ave-Petworth Station – February 10, 2023

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on June 13, 2023

Safety event summary:

A rider departing a train at Hyattsville Crossing Station left a bag on the train. The rider reported this to the Station Manager at Hyattsville Crossing, who contacted the Rail Operations Information Center. The train continued to Georgia Ave-Petworth Station where someone on the train threw the bag off the train near the access between the platform and mezzanine. Riders at Georgia Ave-Petworth Station reported this to a Station Manager there, who in turn reported the suspicious bag to Metro Transit Police Department dispatch. This was not communicated to anyone in the Rail Operations Control Center as required by Metrorail procedure.

Approximately 10 minutes after the Georgia Ave-Petworth Station Manager's report to Metro Transit Police (there was an ongoing emergency at Southern Ave Station at this time that the Rail Traffic Controllers were assisting with), when the train was at or near L'Enfant Plaza Station, a Rail Traffic Controller dispatched a Rail Supervisor to the train to check for the lost bag that had been reported to the Station Manager at Hyattsville Crossing. The Train Operator overheard this dispatch, and responded that the bag had been thrown at Georgia Ave-Petworth Station. The Train Operator had not reported this at the time the bag was thrown. The Train Operator was at Waterfront Station by this time.

A Rail Operations Information Center Information Controller attempted to contact the Georgia Ave-Petworth Station Manager by radio, but did not get a response.

Metro Transit Police Department personnel arrived at Georgia Ave-Petworth Station, located the bag, and directed that trains bypass the station (continue through without stopping). This was communicated to the Rail Operations Control Center via Metro Transit Police Department dispatch. A Station Manager reported at 6:02 p.m. that the station was being closed.

During the response and inspection of the bag, Metrorail personnel determined that it was likely that this bag was the lost bag that had been reported by a rider.

At 6:21 p.m., the Jurisdictional Fire Liaison Officer in the Rail Operations Control Center informed D.C. Fire and EMS of the event, with a plan to be on standby if needed for a response.

At 6:24 p.m., Metro Transit Police Department personnel stated the station was cleared to reopen.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was a rider forgetting a bag on a train.

Corrective Actions:

Metrorail trained the Station Manager and Train Operator on safety reporting procedures.

Examples of related open CAPs:



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Office: 202-384-1520 • Website: www.wmsc.gov

- C-0181 developed to address the finding that Elements of Metrorail have a culture that accepts noncompliance with written operational rules, instructions, and manuals.

WMSC staff observations:

It is important that Metrorail ensure through safety promotion activities such as training and through safety assurance activities such as supervisory oversight that all personnel who observe hazards, such as a bag that has been thrown off a train into a station, understand their opportunity and obligation to report such hazards when they occur.

The Station Manager's report to Metro Transit Police Department dispatch did not lead to or include follow up communication between Metro Transit Police Department personnel and the Rail Operations Control Center or between the Station Manager and the Rail Operations Information Center necessary to achieve action and necessary situational awareness.

The Mission Assurance Coordinator attempted to communicate with personnel on scene but experienced radio transmission issue, which personnel reported to be a known communication problem that had not been repaired. Since the time of this event, Metrorail has stopped using the Jackson Graham Building Rail Operations Control Center facility, which is where these problems had existed.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23092

Date of Event:	February 10, 2023
Type of Event:	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons (Suspicious Package)
Incident Time:	17:20 Hours
Location:	Georgia Avenue Station
Time and How received by SAFE:	17:31 Hours – SAFE/MAC
WMSC Notification Time:	18:25 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: None WMSC: None Other: None
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 510 - L3215-3214.3173-3172.3040-3041T
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20230223#106381

Georgia Avenue Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

February 10, 2023

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire Emergency Medical Services
EOD	Explosive Ordinance Detection
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
ROIC	Rail Operations Information Center
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On February 10, 2023, at 17:20 hours, Station Manager #1, located at Hyattsville Crossing Station, contacted the Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) and reported that a customer left a bag aboard an inbound train that just departed the station. The ROIC Controller contacted the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Button Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) and reported that the customer left a bag aboard Train ID 510. At 17:25 hours, Train ID 510 arrived at Georgia Avenue Station. At 17:41 hours, the Radio RTC instructed the Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisor, located at Congress Heights Station, to board and check Train ID 510, track 2 for a lost bag. In response, the Train Operator of Train ID 510 reported that a customer threw the bag from the train at Georgia Avenue Station near the escalator.

At 17:29 hours, Station Manager #2 located at Georgia Avenue Station contacted Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and reported a customer advised that someone tossed a suspicious black bag from Train ID 510 onto the platform. At 17:48 hours, the MTPD Explosives and Ordnance Detection (EOD) Unit arrived on scene and advised MTPD Dispatch that the suspicious package was located. MTPD EOD requested that trains bypass Georgia Avenue Station.

At 18:01 hours, MTPD established Incident Command at Georgia Avenue Station. The Radio RTC instructed a Rail Supervisor to respond to Georgia Avenue Station. At 18:02 hours, Station Manager #2 contacted ROIC and advised that they were closing the station. At 18:04 hours, an ROIC Controller requested a bus bridge. EOD inspected the bag and determined that it was not a threat.


At 18:21 hours, the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Services (DCFEMS) was notified of the event. At 18:24 hours, MTPD advised that Georgia Avenue Station was clear to reopen. At 18:26 hours, normal service resumed at Georgia Avenue Station. There were no injuries or damage as a result of this event.

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event on February 10, 2023, at Georgia Avenue Station was a bag left behind on the train by a customer and was later thrown from the train onto the platform by an unknown party.

Incident Site

Georgia Avenue Station

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event at Georgia Avenue Station on February 10, 2023, SAFE dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through video and document review.
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - RTRA Supervisor's Report
 - MTPD Event Report
 - MTPD Hotwash Report

- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) Playback
 - System Performance On-Time Summary (Spots)
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On February 10, 2023, at 17:20 hours, Station Manager #1, located at Hyattsville Crossing Station, contacted the ROIC and reported that a customer left a bag aboard a train that had departed the station. The Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that the ROIC Controller advised Station Manager #1 that an emergency was ongoing, and they would try to have someone retrieve the bag. The ROIC Controller contacted the Button RTC and reported a customer left a bag aboard Train ID 510. At the time the lost bag was reported, the Ops 3 desk was supporting power operations for an MTPD investigation at Southern Avenue Station. According to the System Performance On-Time Summary (Spots), at 17:25 hours, Train ID 510 arrived at Georgia Avenue Station. Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) revealed that at 17:26 hours, a black bag was tossed from Train ID 510 at Georgia Avenue Station by an unknown party.

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Fri Feb 24 09:26:16 2023

Select Platform: and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Select Times (0-24HRS): From To

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	Travel Time door open to door open
510	E10-2	0	44							17:01:21	17:11:10	-
510	E09-2	0	43				17:14:05	17:14:31	26	17:13:33	17:14:56	-
510	E08-2	6	43	17:17:31	17:17:48	17				17:17:04	17:18:07	3:26
510	E07-2	6	43	17:19:53	17:20:10	17				17:19:24	17:20:33	2:22
510	E06-2	6	43				17:23:05	17:23:26	21	17:22:36	17:23:52	3:12
510	E05-2	6	43				17:26:06	17:27:38	92	17:25:33	17:28:02	3:01
510	E04-2	6	43				17:29:39	17:31:33	114	17:29:04	17:31:55	3:33
510	E03-2	6	43				17:33:29	17:33:43	14	17:33:00	17:34:10	3:50
510	E02-2	6	43				17:35:06	17:35:25	19	17:34:37	17:35:49	1:37
510	E01-2	6	43				17:36:46	17:37:02	16	17:36:10	17:37:23	1:40
510	F01-2	6	43				17:38:27	17:38:50	23	17:37:54	17:39:13	1:41
510	F02-2	6	43				17:39:55	17:40:11	16	17:39:25	17:40:35	1:28
510	F03-2	6	43	17:41:33	17:42:09	36				17:41:02	17:42:30	1:38
510	F04-2	6	43				17:43:57	17:44:14	17	17:43:28	17:44:38	2:24
510	F05-2	6	43							17:45:10	17:46:22	-
510	F06-2	6	43				17:48:06	17:48:27	21	17:47:37	17:48:49	4:09
510	F07-2	6	43				17:50:42	17:50:59	17	17:50:09	17:51:25	2:36
510	F08-2	6	43				17:53:12	17:53:30	18	17:52:37	17:53:55	2:30
510	F09-2	6	43				17:55:45	17:56:02	17	17:55:12	17:56:29	2:33
510	F10-2	6	43				17:58:40	17:58:55	15	17:58:08	17:59:17	2:55

Total number of trains that opened doors: 18

Table 1 – Spots Report depicting movement of Train ID 510.

At 17:29 hours, Station Manager #2 located at Georgia Avenue Station contacted MTPD and reported that a customer advised that someone threw a suspicious black bag from Train ID 510 onto the platform. MTPD advised Station Manager #2 that MTPD Units would respond. Station Manager #2 did not subsequently notify ROIC of the event.



Image 1 – Black bag tossed from Train ID 510 at 17:26 hours.

At 17:30 and 17:33 hours, the Button RTC advised the Radio RTC of the report of a lost bag on Train ID 510. At 17:41 hours, the Radio RTC instructed the Rail Supervisor located at Congress Heights Station to board and check Train ID 510, track 2 for a lost bag. In response, at 17:44 hours, the Train Operator of Train ID 510, located at Waterfront Station, reported that a customer tossed a black bag from the train at Georgia Avenue Station near the escalator. The Train Operator did not report to ROCC observing a bag being tossed from the train when they were located at Georgia Avenue Station. At 17:46 hours, the ROIC Controller attempted to contact Station Manager #2 via Ops 5 but received no response.

At 17:48 hours, MTPD EOD Unit arrived on scene and advised MTPD Dispatch that the suspicious package was located. MTPD EOD requested that trains bypass Georgia Avenue Station. At 17:59 hours, the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) contacted the Button RTC and instructed trains to bypass Georgia Avenue Station. The Radio RTC announced that trains would begin bypassing Georgia Avenue Station. The Button RTC contacted ROIC and advised that trains were bypassing Georgia Avenue Station. At 18:01 hours, the ROIC Controller announced via Ops 5 that trains were bypassing Georgia Avenue Station.

At the same time, MTPD established Incident Command at Georgia Avenue Station. At 18:02 hours, the Radio RTC instructed a Rail Supervisor to respond to Georgia Avenue Station. Station Manager #2 contacted ROIC and advised that they were closing the station. The ROIC Controller instructed Station Manager #2 to give a landline after the station was verified clear of customers. At 18:04 hours, an ROIC Controller requested a bus bridge. At 18:08 hours, Station Manager #2 contacted ROIC via landline and reported that the station was closed. During an informal interview, the Incident Commander reported becoming aware of the earlier report of a similar bag being left on the train by the bag's owner.

At 18:21 hours, DCFEMS was notified of the event and advised that they would be on standby if needed to respond. At 18:24 hours, after investigation and examination of the bag, MTPD advised that Georgia Avenue Station was clear to reopen. At 18:26 hours, the Radio RTC announced that normal service could resume at Georgia Avenue Station, instructed Train ID 508 on track 1 and Train ID 503 on track 2 to service Georgia Avenue Station. The Rail Supervisor was instructed to disregard the response to Georgia Avenue Station. There were no injuries or damage as a result of this event.

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System
Current date/time: Fri Feb 24 10:23:41 2023

Select Platform: E05-2 and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
Select Date: Feb 10 2023 Select Times (0-24HRS): From 18:00 To 19:00

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwell	Left door open	Left door close	dwell	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	Headway (door open to door open) door open to door open
518	E05-2	6	43							18:04:21	18:04:49	-
521	E05-2	6	43							18:14:16	18:14:41	-
502	E05-2	6	43							18:22:13	18:22:44	-
503	E05-2	6	43				18:29:57	18:30:16	19	18:29:26	18:30:35	-
506	E05-2	6	43				18:46:39	18:47:03	24	18:46:14	18:47:25	18:52
506	E05-2	6	43				18:55:54	18:56:12	18	18:55:21	18:56:35	19:15

Total number of trains that opened doors: 4

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System
Current date/time: Fri Feb 24 10:24:51 2023

Select Platform: E05-1 and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
Select Date: Feb 10 2023 Select Times (0-24HRS): From 18:00 To 19:00

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwell	Left door open	Left door close	dwell	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	Headway (door open to door open) door open to door open
505	E05-1	6	44							18:06:53	18:07:34	-
506	E05-1	6	44							18:16:16	18:16:51	-
508	E05-1	6	44				18:31:30	18:31:47	17	18:30:54	18:32:11	-
510	E05-1	6	44				18:38:23	18:38:50	27	18:37:52	18:39:11	18:43
510	E05-1	6	44				18:46:13	18:46:28	15	18:45:19	18:46:07	-
511	E05-1	6	44				18:58:13	18:58:28	15	18:57:42	18:58:50	19:50

Total number of trains that opened doors: 3

Table 2 – Spots Report depicting Train ID 508, track 1 and Train ID 503, track 2 as the first trains to service Georgia Avenue Station.

The investigation revealed that the Train Operator of Train ID 510 did not immediately report that a bag was thrown from the train while at Georgia Avenue Station, as required according to MSRPB Section 4 – Safety Rules 4.166, *Employees are required to immediately inform ROCC of any condition they have observed, which, in their opinion, will adversely affect the safe and orderly transportation of customers.* Additionally, Station Manager #2 did not immediately report the suspicious package to ROIC, as required according to the Station Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 4.5.2.1. *The Station Manager shall report all emergencies immediately to ROIC (x21970). Emergency communications have priority over all other types.* Immediate and proper reporting may have allowed ROCC the opportunity to make the correlation between the customer reporting leaving a bag on the train, a bag being thrown from the train and the report of an unattended bag on the platform.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
17:20:41 hours	<u>Station Manager #1:</u> (Located at Hyattsville Crossing) Contacted ROIC and reported a customer left a bag aboard a train. <u>ROIC Controller:</u> Advised that an emergency was ongoing and would try to have someone retrieve the bag. [ROIC AD – 2 12054 CTNIR Phone]
17:21:21 hours	<u>ROIC Controller:</u> Contacted the Button RTC and reported a customer left a bag aboard Train ID 510. <u>Radio RTC:</u> Acknowledged and repeated. [ROIC AD – 2 12054 CTNIR Phone]
17:25:33 hours	Train ID 510 arrived at Georgia Avenue Station. [Spots]
17:26:05 hours	Black bag was tossed from Train ID 510. [CCTV]
17:28:02 hours	Train ID 510 departed at Georgia Avenue Station. [Spots]

Time	Description
17:29:40 hours	<u>Station Manager #2</u> : (Located at Georgia Avenue) Contacted MTPD and reported a customer advised that someone threw a suspicious black bag from the train onto the platform. <u>MTPD</u> : Acknowledged and advised that MTPD would respond. [SOCC Console 5E ext 12045 Phone]
17:30:49 hours	Button RTC advised the Radio RTC of the report of a lost bag on Train ID 510. [Ambient]
17:33:30 hours	Button RTC reminded the Radio RTC of the report of a lost bag on Train ID 510. No Response from the Radio RTC. [Ambient]
17:41:16 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the Rail Supervisor located at Congress Heights Station to board and check Train ID 510, track 2 for a lost bag. <u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 3]
17:42:08 hours	EOD advised MTPD Dispatch that they were en route to Georgia Avenue Station for the suspicious package. [MTPD 1X]
17:44:50 hours	<u>Train ID 510</u> : Reported that a customer threw the bag from the train at Georgia Avenue Station near the escalator. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 3]
17:46:19 hours	ROIC Controller attempted to contact Station Manager #2, no response. [OPS 5]
17:48:04 hours	EOD arrived on scene and advised MTPD Dispatch that they located the suspicious package. [MTPD 1X]
17:58:32 hours	EOD contacted MTPD Dispatch and requested trains to bypass Georgia Avenue Station. [MTPD 1X]
17:58:57 hours	MTPD contacted the Button RTC and requested trains to bypass Georgia Avenue Station. [SOCC Console 5E ext. 12045 Phone]
17:59:05 hours	AOM contacted the Button RTC and instructed trains to bypass Georgia Avenue Station. [ROIC LEAD 12057 Phone]
17:59:26 hours	Radio RTC announced that trains would begin bypassing Georgia Avenue Station. [Ops 3]
17:59:39 hours	Button RTC contacted ROIC and advised that trains would bypass Georgia Avenue Station. [ROIC PR 12055 CTDMCC Phone]
18:01:08 hours	ROIC Controller announced that trains were bypassing Georgia Avenue Station. [Ops 5]
18:01:13 hours	MTPD established Incident Command at Georgia Avenue Station kiosk. [MTPD 1X]
18:02:31 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the Rail Supervisor to respond to Georgia Avenue Station. <u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 3]
18:02:51 hours	<u>Station Manager #2</u> : Contacted ROIC and advised they were closing the station. <u>ROIC Controller</u> : Instructed Station Manager #2 to give a landline after the station is verified clear of customers. [Ops 5]
18:04:14 hours	ROIC Controller contacted BOCC to request a bus bridge. [ROIC AD – 2 12054 CTNIR Phone]
18:05:08 hours	MTPD advised MTPD Dispatch that the command post relocated to Georgia Avenue Station breezeway. [MTPD 1X]
18:08:51 hours	Station Manager #2 contacted ROIC and advised Georgia Avenue Station was closed. [ROIC AD – 2 12054 CTNIR Phone]
18:21:00 hours	DCFEMS was notified and would be on standby if needed to respond. [FLO 54404 CTDMCC Phone]

Time	Description
18:24:48 hours	MTPD advised that Georgia Avenue Station was clear to reopen. [MTPD 2X]
18:26:09 hours	Radio RTC announced that normal service could resume at Georgia Avenue Station, instructed Train ID 503 on track 2 and Train ID 508 on track 1 to service Georgia Avenue Station, and the Rail Supervisor to disregard the response to Georgia Avenue Station. [Ops 3]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE conducted an informal interview with the MTPD Incident Commander. The interview identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

Incident Commander

- Established Command Post and staged EOD response.
- During the investigation, the Incident Commander learned of the earlier report of the lost bag by the property owner and observation by the Train Operator.
- Incident Commander determined to continue inspection process due to loss of control by the owner.

Weather

At the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature at 55 °F. with passing clouds.-Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident as Georgia Avenue Station is an underground station and is not exposed to outside elements. Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC.

Related Rules and Procedures

- SOP #14 – Bomb Threat/Suspicious Package/Unattended Package
- SOP #1A – Command, Control and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System
- SSOP #4 – Emergency, 4.5.2. Reporting Emergencies Procedures
- MSRP Section 4 – Safety Rules 4.166, *Employees are required to immediately inform ROCC of any condition they have observed, which, in their opinion, will adversely affect the safe and orderly transportation of customers.*

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Findings

- At the time the lost bag was reported, the Ops 3 desk was also supporting power operations for an MTPD investigation at Southern Avenue Station.
- Train Operator did not initially report observing a bag being tossed from train.
- The lost bag report was not linked to the suspicious package report initially.
- Station Manager # 2 reported the suspicious package directly to MTPD without notifying ROIC.
- Incident Commander linked the report of lost property to the suspicious package report during the EOD response and inspection.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- MTPD EOD Unit responded to examine the bag.
- Georgia Avenue Station was evacuated.
- Trains bypassed Georgia Avenue Station.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event on February 10, 2023, at Georgia Avenue Station was a bag left behind on the train by a customer and later thrown from the train onto the platform.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
106381_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_001	Verbal Re-Instruction was conducted for the Train Operator and Station Manager on MSRP Section 4 – Safety Rules 4.166 contacting ROCC regarding potentially unsafe activities.	RTRA	Completed
106381_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_002	Verbal Re-Instruction was conducted for the Train Operator and Station Manager on SOP #14 and SSOP #4 regarding reporting emergencies specific to suspicious packages.	RTRA	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Informal Interview Summary

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

MTPD

Sergeant/Incident Commander

The Sergeant is a WMATA employee with 12 years of service as a sworn Transit Police Officer/Sergeant.

During the informal interview the Sergeant stated Transit (MTPD) had received a call from the Station Manager regarding a suspicious package, a backpack style bag on the Georgia Avenue Station platform. Transit responded and coordinated the closing of the station and evacuation of passengers via trains departing the station. An EOD unit assisted with inspecting and determining the package was not a threat. While in the process of staging and inspecting the package, MTPD became aware of the sequence of events involving the report of a lost bag and an operator observing it being thrown from the train to the platform. Transit continued the inspection given the potential for any tampering with the bag once it left the owner's control.

Appendix B – MTPD Event Report



Event Report		
Metro Transit Police Department		ORI-DCMTP0000
Type of Report Closed	MTPD CCN 2023-01173	Local Jurisdiction District of Columbia

Event Location	
Street 3750 Georgia Ave NW	City, State WASHINGTON, DC 20010
Date and Time of Event From 2/10/2023 5:31:00 PM To	Date and Time Reported 2/10/2023 5:31:41 PM
Reporting Officer (Print) [REDACTED] Badge # [REDACTED]	Second Officer (Print) [REDACTED] Badge # [REDACTED]
Supervisor's Name (Electronically Approved)	
Incidents	
Incident: Suspicious Package	Location Type: Rail Station
Incident Detail:	

Property Information							
Type	Code	Class	WMATA Owned	Age	Fair Market Value	Recovered Value	Recovered Date
Backpack/Duffer Bag	77						
Value Totals							
Veh. Year	Make	Model	Color	Style	Tag #	State	VIN
			BLU-Blue				
Property Recovered Date		# Stolen Vehicles	# Recovered Vehicles	Is any property in custody of a police agency? (If Yes, explain below)			
Property Status							
Abandoned							
Suspected Drug Type (If this event is a drug case, check up to three applicable boxes and write the estimated amount on the line.)							
<p>Note: If more than 3 drug types, select the 2 most important listing amounts. Then select "Over 3 Drug Types", as the third, to represent the remaining drugs.</p>							
Property Notes:							

MTPD Event Report, Page 1 of 3

Incident Date 02/10/2023 Time:17:20 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
E23902

Drafted By: SAFE 709 03/30/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/11/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/14/2023

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Narrative Information

R/O responded to GEOP for a susp. pkg. R/O xrayed the bag. No visible hazards. Discarded. R/O notified TSOC Mr. [REDACTED] @ 1921 hrs. TSA-02-04444-23.

If second CCN is available, insert here:

Additional Narrative on Supplemental Report

MTPD Event Report, Page 2 of 3

Additional Narrative

On February 10, 2023 at approximately 1731 hours R/O responded to The Georgia Ave-Petworth Metro Rail Station, located at 3750 Georgia Ave. Washington, DC 20010, for the report of an Suspicious bag that was thrown from the train. DVEU was unable to assist with specific details due to insufficient camera coverage. Once on scene R/O was informed that the bag was in the path of ingress/egress for all patrons utilizing the Georgia Ave-Petworth station. The bag was underneath of the granite steps closest to the kiosk. R/O requested the station to be by passed base on this information. R/O x-rayed the bag. There were no visible explosive hazards. A physical inspection revealed personal items. The bag and its contents were discarded in a station trash receptacle. The station was closed at 1759 hours. Trains bypassed the station from 1803 hours to 1825 hours. The station was reopened at 1825 hours.

Ofc. [REDACTED] notified TSOC Mr. [REDACTED] at 1921 hours, TSA-02-04444-23.

MTPD Event Report, Page 3 of 3

Incident Date 02/10/2023 Time:17:20 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
E23902

Drafted By: SAFE 709 03/30/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/11/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/14/2023

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. **Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.**

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:		Suspicious Package	
*Incident Commander (IC):		SGT [REDACTED]	
MTPD CCN:	2023-01173	Local CCN:	
*Date ICS Initiated:	2/10/2023	*Time ICS Initiated:	6:01:00 PM
*Date ICS Terminated:	2/10/2023	*Time ICS Terminated:	6:30:00 PM
*Duration of Incident:	29 Minutes	*Service Disrupted Disrupted Type: Disrupted Time:	Y - Yes Bypass for EOD 2/11/2023 6:02:00 PM
Incident Location:	3750 Georgia Ave NW	Command Post Location:	Breezeway
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	[REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	
Forward Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Unified Command:	
OCC Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Alternate Channel:	Y - Yes MTPD 2x
Single Tracking Track No.: Time Started: Time End:	N - No	Bus Bridge Established From: To:	Y - Yes FTTO COLH
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	Lower Level Whole station	Power De-energized: De-energized Time:	N - No


MTPD Hot Wash Report, Page 1 of 4

OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name	N - No	Medical Attention Required/Requested:	N - No
Dept:		CID Response: N - No	

For Official Use Only

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA and EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
		Forward Liaison
		EOD Function
		OSC
		Accountability
		Perimeter
		perimeter
		EOD1 Assistant

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

MTPD Hot Wash Report, Page 2 of 4

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Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	N - No
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	N - No
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	

OBSERVATIONS

1731- Bag reported thrown off a train at GEOP.

1748- Bag located

1801- Command initiated

1801- Station closed, bypass initiated

1804- MAC unable to transmit, ROCC2 relaying messages

1805- RTRA supervisor advised not to key off the train due to proximity to bag, directed to FTTO for pick up by officer.

1821- EOD1 descending stairs in full gear/equipment to examine bag.

1822- DCDF Briefed on situation in case of escalation.

1825- Scene declared safe by EOD1, station re-opened.

1826- Hot was Conducted.


Hot wash notes:

Communication breakdown with MAC is a known issue (had experienced on scenes two previous days/separate incidents).

Communication between officers was good, station shut down went smoothly.

MTPD Hot Wash Report, Page 3 of 4

Scene was relatively short, with no other departments involved. No other reported issues.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date

2/10/2023 6:01:00 PM

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

Patrol Operations Bureau Commander's Printed Name and Signature/Date

Office of Emergency Management Director's Printed Name and Signature/Date

MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

MTPD Hot Wash Report, Page 4 of 4

Appendix D – ROCC Incident Report

View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT ID: 2023041GREENB

DATE 2023-02-10	TIME 1759	LINE Green	ITEM 8
LOCATION (STATION/YARD) Georgia Ave-Petworth (E05)		LOCATION/CHAIN MARKER (If Applicable)	REPORTED BY MTPD Dispatcher
TRAIN ID 505	DIRECTION O/B	TRACK NUMBER 1	DEPTS NOTIFIED Everbridge Alert/Messaging
CAR NUMBERS (XXXX-XXXX) Lead Car			
-	-	-	-
Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>
TRIBL CODE MTPD-METRO TRANSIT POLICE DEPT		RESP CODE POL	

TYPE INCIDENT
Train Bypassed Station.

ACTION PLAN
Supervisor Dispatched, Metro Bus Route 60 serviced from Ft. Totten to Georgia Avenue.

DELAYS IN MINUTES			
LINE	INCIDENT	TRAIN	TOTAL DURATION
0	29	0	29

TRIPS MODIFIED					
PARTIAL	GAP TRAIN	LATE DISPATCHES	REROUTED	NOT DISPATCHED	OFFLOADS
0	0	0	0	0	0

FIVE PRIMARY CONSOLE INDICATIONS				
BCP	BRAKES ON ILLUMINATED	ALL DOORS CLOSED ILLUMINATED	AUTO\MANUAL BPP ILLUMINATED	BPP
			AUTO	

INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY	
TIME	DESCRIPTION
1759	MTPD Dispatcher requested trains to bypass Georgia Avenue tracks one and two due to a suspicious package in the station. Assistant Operations Manager, ROIC, MTPD, MOC and all concerned personnel were notified.
1802	Train ID 505 was the first train to bypass Georgia Avenue track one.

ROCC Incident Report Page 1 of 2

View Approved Incident Report

1804	Train ID 515 was the first train to bypass Georgia Avenue track two.
1826	MTPD deemed Georgia Avenue Station was safe for revenue service.
1831	Train ID 508 was the first train to service Georgia Avenue track one. Normal service resumed.
0000	ROCC instructed train operators to make announcement for customers to use the 60 Line Metrobus from Fort Totten to Georgia Avenue to minimize customer delays.

MAXIMO TICKET#
8652083

REPORT PREPARED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
RADIO CONTROLLER 1	[REDACTED]	✓
BUTTON CONTROLLER 1	[REDACTED]	✓
RADIO CONTROLLER 2		
BUTTON CONTROLLER 2		

SUPERINTENDENTS OR ASSISTANTS SECTION

ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP CORRECTIVE ACTIONS OR REMARKS

FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS

NOTIFICATIONS/PAGE GROUPS #1/CEO ☐ #2/DGM & BELOW ☒

ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS MADE BY PHONE

APPROVED BY	NAME	CLICK TO SIGN
REPORT APPROVED BY SUPT. OR ASST SUPT.	[REDACTED]	✓

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ROCC Incident Report Page 2 of 2

Incident Date 02/10/2023 Time:17:20 hours
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Appendix E – RTRA Incident Report

WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 1 of 2

Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents

Date: 2/10/23 Incident Time: 5:34 PM Time Reported: 5:34 PM Reported by: Customer ☒ Employee ☒ ROCC ☐ Other ☐

Location

Station: Greenbelt Mezzanine #: 26 Track #/Destination: 2 Branch Ave Chain Marker/Signal Number: NA

TYPE OF INCIDENT

☐ Property Damage ☐ Smoke ☐ Fire ☐ Customer Complaint
☐ Customer Injury ☐ Customer Illness ☐ Employee Injury ☐ Employee Illness ☒ Other (Explain in description of incident) suspicious package
☐ Criminal Activity ☐ Elevator Entrapment ☐ Rail Vehicle Incident ☐ Lights Not Working ☐

WEATHER Clear ☐ Rain ☐ Snow ☐ Sleet/Ice ☐ **LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)** Dawn/Dusk ☐ Daylight ☐ Dark ☐ Tunnel/Underground ☐ **LIGHTING (artificial lighting)** Lights On ☐ Lights Off ☐ Lights Not Working ☐

STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC

Elevator/Escalator #: NA AFC #: NA Room Number/Location: Platform

Failure Number(s): NA

Parking Lot ☐ Paid Area ☐ Free Area ☐ Garage ☐ Station Entrance ☐ Stairway # ☐ Platform ☒ Ancillary Room ☐

Injury/Illness reported aboard Train ☐ Other ☐

Name of Responding Supervisor: NA Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder: NA

TRAIN INCIDENTS

Train ID: Unknown Destination: Branch Ave Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): Unknown Lead Car: NA

Name of Responding Supervisor: NA Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: NA

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.

Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

AT Approximately 5:30 pm on 2/10/23 I was notified by multiple customers that a man just threw a backpack off the train and the doors was closing I called transit and was told they was in route and was already notified of the situation. 5:45 MTPD officer [redacted] arrived taped off the area at approx 6:00 pm officer [redacted] from MTPD bomb squad arrived at 6:04 train service was suspended and I was informed to evacuate the station at 6:30 pm normal service resumed

Employee Completion Report

[redacted] Date: 4/12/23

Division: Greenbelt Rail #: 513 Block #: Assigned Days: Sat Sun

To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager

[redacted] Date: 4-13-2023

Verbal Re-Instruction to contact ROIC + MTPD during an incident of this nature.

SMS Number:

50.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

RTRA Station Manager Written Statement Page 1 of 2

Incident Date 02/10/2023 Time: 17:20 hours
 Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
 E23902

Drafted By: SAFE 709 03/30/2023
 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 04/11/2023
 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 04/14/2023

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WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 2 of 2

Additional Information- Complete this page for any incident where the information is available and when additional space is needed for incident description.

Customer Involved ☐ **Employee Involved** ☒ **Witness** ☐

Last Name, First Name

Employee #

Date of Birth

Sex

Home Phone

Work Phone

Cell Phone

Home Address

Email Address

Nature of Injury/Illness

Assistance Offered: Accepted ☐ Declined ☐

If Transported:

Hospital:

Ambulance Number:

Arrival:

Departure:

Customer Involved ☐ **Employee Involved** ☒ **Witness** ☐

Last Name, First Name

Employee #

Date of Birth

Sex

Home Phone

Work Phone

Cell Phone

Home Address

Email Address

Nature of Injury/Illness

Assistance Offered: Accepted ☐ Declined ☐

If Transported:

Hospital:

Ambulance Number:

Arrival:

Departure:

Police/Fire/Other Agencies Involved

Jurisdiction/Arrival Time

MTPD 5:45

Jurisdiction/Arrival Time

MTPD

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT (continue on witness statement). Include what you saw, what you heard, who you notified and when. Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

MA

[Redacted Signature]

Date:

4/12/23

Escalator Inspectors

RTRA Station Manager Written Statement Page 2 of 2

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Appendix F – Why-Tree Analysis

