

<b>CAP ID</b>	<b>Expected Completion</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Finding/Recommendation/Action</b>
NTSB R-8-004-A	12/31/22	<a href="#">Safety Directive 16-2 (12/15/2015)</a>	WMATA to implement appropriate technology that will automatically alert wayside workers of approaching trains and that will automatically alert train operators when approaching areas with workers on or near the track.
WMSC-19-C0026	04/14/23	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training Audit (2/13/2020)</a>	WMATA does not conduct annual culvert inspections as specified in Section 105.1 of the TRST-1000.
WMSC-20-C0042	07/14/23	<a href="#">RWP Audit (6/18/2020)</a>	WMATA employees are not consistently following RWP Rule 5.12 for equipment calibration.
WMSC-20-C0049	12/01/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	ROCC management contributes to a chaotic environment. Use of profanities, threats and racial, sexual or other forms of harassment are regular features of the control centers environment, which makes it difficult for controllers to do their jobs and drives low morals and significant turnover.
WMSC-20-C0051	11/17/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	Metrorail does not record all critical ROCC communications, limiting the lessons that can be learned from safety events.
WMSC-20-C0052	08/28/24	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	There is no consistent, clear, concise, immediate and reliable Metrorail communication process for safety-critical information between Metrorail personnel and fire liaison.
WMSC-20-C0056	08/30/24	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	Metrorail's ROCC recruitment and retention approach is failing. Some controller trainees have left the ROCC immediately after or shortly after the training course, which is scheduled to last nine months.
WMSC-20-C0059	03/14/25	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	WMATA has failed to regularly update the Rail Operations Control Center Procedures Manual.
WMSC-20-C0065	02/17/23	<a href="#">ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)</a>	Not all controllers experience emergency drills. If each ROCC controller does not get this experience, it diminishes the value of the drills.
WMSC-20-C0070	10/27/23	<a href="#">WMSC Directive (10/20/2020)</a>	Metrorail puts the integrity of safety event investigation at risk by not following procedures requiring proper chain of custody and control of evidence as outlined in SOP 800-01 and Policy/Instruction 10.4/1, not following procedures requiring direct access for investigators to all information, recordings and other evidence that is potentially relevant to the investigation, and not fully training all personnel on the steps they are required to take when a safety event occurs.
WMSC-21-C0072	04/14/23	<a href="#">Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)</a>	WMATA does not have load ratings for its bridges and aerial structures.
WMSC-21-C0083	03/29/24	<a href="#">Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)</a>	Ten Metrorail structures have steel rocker bearings, which created a seismic risk in the event of an earthquake other seismic events.
WMSC-21-C0084	07/19/24	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Audit (3/9/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not following and does not have effective safety certification and acceptance procedures for new RMMs. There is no Metrorail-wide safety certification procedure to implement the SSCP.
WMSC-21-C0098	06/06/25	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Audit (3/9/2021)</a>	Several Metrorail preventive maintenance instructions do not include acceptable tolerances for required measurements.
WMSC-21-C0099	04/07/28	<a href="#">WMSC Directive (3/31/2021)</a>	Metrorail lacks an Intrusion Detection Warning (IDW) system where WMATA's own criteria require it.
WMSC-21-C0100	10/30/26	<a href="#">WMSC Directive (4/30/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not maintaining a fully functioning radio communications system in all rail yards and shops.

WMSC-21-C0101	05/03/24	<a href="#">WMSC Directive (4/30/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not have, provide training on, or otherwise follow specific rules related to rail vehicle and switch movement in non-signalized territory. Further, Metrorail provides no controls on or oversight of movement in dark territory.
WMSC-21-C0111	01/12/24	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not have adequate replacement parts or materials and has not planned for the obsolescence of critical equipment.
WMSC-21-C0113	09/29/23	<a href="#">ATC Audit (5/12/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not effectively managing turnover, vacancies and experience levels of ATC personnel.
WMSC-21-C0118	09/29/23	<a href="#">WMSC Directive (8/13/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not consistently follow its safety certification process, which leads to project activation and use without proper hazard identification and mitigation, putting Metrorail customers, personnel and first responders at risk.
WMSC-21-C0120	07/18/25	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Metrorail ignores the minimum daily release period (rest period) requirements in its Fatigue Risk Management Policy.
WMSC-21-C0121	10/25/24	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	There is not adequate access to, documentation of, or compilation of data for WMATA to assess compliance with its hours of service requirements.
WMSC-21-C0124	12/02/22	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Many follow up and random drug and alcohol tests required by Metrorail policies and federal regulations were not completed with no documented reason why the tests were missed.
WMSC-21-C0125	12/16/22	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	WMATA does not have written criteria for post-incident testing and does not consistently implement post-event testing.
WMSC-21-C0129	04/25/25	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	WMATA does not have a documented procedure for and training to carry out fitness for duty checks prior to or during shifts on a regular basis for all covered employees as specified in the APTA Fitness for Duty Standard.
WMSC-21-C0130	08/23/24	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not collect fitness for duty data in a manner that allows for identification, tracking and trending of issues.
WMSC-21-C0131	12/19/25	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not providing medical oversight of contractors and does not include any requirement in contracts that contractors meet WMATA medical, fatigue or hours of service standards.
WMSC-21-C0134	08/11/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail's 6000-Series rehabilitation program, including coupler overhaul work, was implemented by CMOR, CENV and CMNT without safety certification and approvals required by WMATA's SSCPP.
WMSC-21-C0136	05/19/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	6000 Series cars that underwent rehabilitation were put into service without SAFE approval.
WMSC-21-C0137	05/19/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail removed the coupler overhaul from the 6000 Series SMP process without documenting that change or completing a review of that change by the SCRC.
WMSC-21-C0138	09/08/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not require or receive all necessary OEM documentation, parts or tools.
WMSC-21-C0139	03/14/25	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	The 7000 Series rehabilitation and subsystems overhaul program is being developed without full SAFE coordination, involvement or approval.
WMSC-21-C0142	09/29/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not have a systematic process to ensure that mechanics and engineers are trained for the specific tasks they are assigned to perform.

WMSC-21-C0143	02/25/26	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not consistently follow a standard process to address wheels out-of-round, to prevent cars with wheels out-of-round from operating, and to identify and address the root causes of wheels out-of-round.
WMSC-21-C0144	03/24/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail does not clearly define the proper use of engineering modification instructions (EMIs), service bulletins (SBs), and other railcar engineering change documents.
WMSC-21-C0146	02/05/27	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Metrorail railcars do not include inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders in all operating compartments.
WMSC-21-C0147	06/30/23	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>	Part numbers are not being consistently entered in Maximo Work Orders for 7000 Series railcars.
WMSC-21-C0149	03/24/23	<a href="#">FTA Safety Directive 16-5 from investigation to stop signal overruns; WMSC requested modification to FTA-RED16-003-B (8/15/2016)</a>	WMATA has not fully implemented sufficient protections against the unauthorized movement of trains with zero speed commands.
WMSC-21-C0150	09/29/23	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not complying with its safety certification and approval requirements that are specified in its SSCPP before installing and placing traction power systems into service.
WMSC-21-C0151	07/12/24	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not documenting, tracking and conducting all preventive maintenance inspections that are required by WMATA policy, manuals and instruction.
WMSC-21-C0154	05/12/23	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Traction Power Maintenance employees do not get all required information and training to maintain equipment that they are directed to work on, and there is no process in place to ensure that personnel are trained on specific equipment prior to working on that equipment.
WMSC-21-C0155	09/30/22	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail is not effectively identifying, tracking and mitigating hazards related to high voltage and traction power.
WMSC-21-C0156	04/24/26	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail is behind schedule on its floating slab testing to monitor for deterioration due to stray current.
WMSC-21-C0157	03/24/23	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	The latest as-built schematics are not available in each traction power facility, as required by the TRPM-1000 and Metrorail preventive maintenance instructions.
WMSC-21-C0159	10/13/23	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>	Metrorail risks equipment quality and availability issues that impact operational safety due to gaps in materials tracking, storage, and procurement practices.
WMSC-22-C0162	01/17/25	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. Further, Metrorail's training requirements are insufficient to prepare personnel to respond to and/or manage emergencies within the NIMS/ICS framework. These deficiencies have contributed to ineffective and improper emergency response and emergency management.

WMSC-22-C0163	08/11/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail created and implemented an "Incident Management Official" (IMO) position without documented training, responsibilities, communication or coordination, and without adequate staffing to ensure other emergency management and preparedness activities were not interrupted.
WMSC-22-C0164	02/16/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	MTPD personnel routinely enter the roadway despite not having RWP qualifications required by Metrorail rules and procedures, exposing themselves and others to the risk of serious injury or death.
WMSC-22-C0165	12/01/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	MTPD general orders do not reflect current operational realities and procedures, and areas for improvement from prior events are not effectively communicated to frontline MTPD personnel.
WMSC-22-C0166	04/05/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail's calls to public safety answering points (911 call centers) are inconsistent, incomplete and contribute to delayed or ineffective emergency response.
WMSC-22-C0167	12/14/22	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail has not clearly defined and communicated the authority and duties of its Fire Marshal and any other fire prevention roles or positions, and does not have effective continuity plans in the event the Fire Marshal is unavailable.
WMSC-22-C0168	10/18/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail does not ensure that experts in fire and life safety are included in and have a documented role in Metrorail project development, planning, review and approvals, which contributes to hazards being introduced into the Metrorail system or hazards being allowed to continue to exist without adequate mitigation.
WMSC-22-C0169	04/12/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	There is inadequate coordination among organizational units charged with developing, inspecting and maintaining critical fire and life safety assets, and there is no unified process to identify, prioritize and address fire and life safety risks.
WMSC-22-C0170	08/11/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail does not routinely conduct hazard assessments to evaluate and prioritize fire and life safety and emergency management issues. Further, Metrorail has not established a fire and life safety and emergency management hazard identification, tracking and open item resolution process for prioritizing and implementing safety improvements.
WMSC-22-C0171	10/20/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Emergency equipment in station medical cabinets is expired and covered in dirt. There is no inspection procedure or responsible party assigned to inspect and maintain this safety equipment.
WMSC-22-C0173	04/17/26	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	The exit stairwell from Rosslyn Station is not protected from obstructions, which creates a risk that the hatch will not be able to be opened in an emergency, trapping customers inside.
WMSC-22-C0174	10/13/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail does not consistently inspect and maintain current certification status of all fire extinguishers, particularly those on the roadway.
WMSC-22-C0175	09/22/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail does not consistently perform or document all elements of its Fire & Intrusion Alarm System Inspection Preventive Maintenance Instructions.
WMSC-22-C0176	03/15/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail has opportunities to improve and expand training and training coordination related to fire and life safety and emergency management.

WMSC-22-C0177	09/20/23	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	MTPD does not have a useable incident checklist for emergencies.
WMSC-22-C0178	09/27/24	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>	Metrorail fire and life safety signage is not consistent throughout the system.
WMSC-22-C0181	10/25/24	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Elements of Metrorail have a culture that accepts noncompliance with written operational rules, instructions, and manuals.
WMSC-22-C0182	06/27/25	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail does not effectively identify, track, communicate and address operational hazards as required by its Agency Safety Plan.
WMSC-22-C0183	10/25/24	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard.
WMSC-22-C0184	10/25/24	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail has inadequate internal communication, coordination and processes to effectively manage change as required by its PTASP, the WMSC and the FTA.
WMSC-22-C0185	10/27/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail is not effectively training and certifying personnel authorized to operate trains on all active railcar fleets.
WMSC-22-C0187	08/25/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail has not documented procedures for terminal supervisors, and has not established the effective formal training for terminal supervisors needed to safely perform their duties.
WMSC-22-C0189	07/25/25	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail does not ensure personnel serving as on-the-job training instructors, including those personnel described as line platform instructors (LPs), are effective and have specific training and direction on what to teach and how to assess their assigned students.
WMSC-22-C0191	08/18/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Some RTRA QA/QC audits contain conclusions that do not match actual conditions. RTRA's QA/QC procedures do not include complete work instructions for all audits or specific instructions for removing personnel from service.
WMSC-22-C0192	06/16/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail closes internal corrective actions and identified issues, including those related to RTRA QA/QC audits, without fully identifying or completing required improvements or changes.
WMSC-22-C0193	11/03/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	With frequent modifications due to temporary and permanent orders, and outdated versions of Metrorail's rulebook being distributed to personnel when hard copies are available, the latest Metrorail rules are not easily accessible to train operators. This creates document control issues and makes a rule requiring personnel to carry the latest version of the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) unrealistic.
WMSC-22-C0195	11/29/24	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail operations departments do not have effective processes to consider and act upon safety input from employees at all levels of the organization.
WMSC-22-C0198	09/22/23	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>	Metrorail has an opportunity to improve the integrity of its certification process by establishing a procedure providing for QA/QC personnel to be certified by an entity other than their own colleagues.

WMSC-22-C0199	11/29/24	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail has not developed and implemented a comprehensive water intrusion and remediation program covering stations, elevators and escalators, which contributes to damage and deterioration of structures and other assets, to electrical hazards and to other safety risks.
WMSC-22-C0201	01/12/24	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail is not ensuring that ELES personnel work only on the specific types of equipment that they are trained to inspect, maintain, and repair.
WMSC-22-C0202	08/11/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail has not reviewed its ELES standard operating procedures on a regular basis as required by WMATA policy, and has conflicting procedures for elevator and escalator employees.
WMSC-22-C0204	09/08/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail does not ensure that ELES personnel sign in on log books as required by WMATA SOP to ensure their safety.
WMSC-22-C0207	09/08/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	ELES Supervisors are not completing all aspects of required QA checks.
WMSC-22-C0210	02/24/23	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>	Metrorail has an opportunity to improve data collection and analysis necessary under its Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) by providing more PLNT and ELES personnel with improved, formal training on the use of Metrorail's maintenance management information system (Maximo).
WMSC-22-C0212	02/16/24	<a href="#">Improper Power Restoration Order (5/17/2022)</a>	This CAP builds on C-0037, which was originally issued on May 12, 2020: Third rail power restoration is routinely rushed by ROCC management with a focus on restoring train service rather than a focus on following safety procedures.
WMSC-22-C0213	07/17/26	<a href="#">ATC Room inspection, maintenance and cleaning program (8/4/2022)</a>	Metrorail has an ineffective and insufficient inspection, maintenance and cleaning program for Automatic Train Control equipment, particularly including a lack of required tools, procedural compliance, and supervisory oversight for care of vital equipment housed in train control rooms, and is not maintaining the structural integrity of these ancillary rooms.
WMSC-22-C0214	03/14/25	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Metrorail does not have adequate supervisory oversight and safety promotion to ensure that approved preventative maintenance inspections (PMI) are properly completed to ensure the safety of the rail system. Communications personnel are not using correct and current forms and processes necessary to ensure that safety-critical communications systems are appropriately and safely maintained.
WMSC-22-C0215	05/09/25	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Metrorail does not have sufficiently detailed instructions and procedures specifying how to inspect and maintain each communications asset. For some assets, there are no instructions or procedures at all.
WMSC-22-C0216	11/01/24	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Metrorail is closing preventative maintenance work orders without correcting known deficiencies, which does not comply with its Systems Maintenance (SMNT) Maintenance Control Policy.
WMSC-22-C0217	05/02/25	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Metrorail closes communications related "corrective maintenance" (repair) tickets without effectively identifying, documenting and addressing issues.
WMSC-22-C0218	11/15/24	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Metrorail hazard logs are not being kept or maintained.

WMSC-22-C0219	06/06/25	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Metrorail has insufficient training for communications personnel, including on-the-job training (OJT) that SMNT itself describes as deficient, and a lack of requirements to ensure that personnel only work on equipment they are trained on and capable of maintaining as required by the PTASP.
WMSC-22-C0220	06/28/24	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Metrorail does not have schematics, manuals, and other materials in each Communications Room required by Metrorail's Communications Room Bi-weekly Cleaning and Inspection PMI.
WMSC-22-C0221	02/09/24	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Metrorail lacks the safety assurance and safety promotion activities required to ensure that only current and calibrated radios are in use as required by Metrorail instruction and procedure, creating a risk that this safety equipment will not properly function when needed.
WMSC-22-C0222	10/25/24	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Metrorail communications rooms have signs of recurring water, dirt and dust intrusion. Metrorail is also improperly storing equipment in these rooms. Components in these rooms therefore may not function as required for the safety of riders, workers and first responders.
WMSC-22-C0223	01/05/24	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	There is no comprehensive plan to maintain staffing of existing positions at all grades through timely hiring practices.
WMSC-22-C0224	03/15/24	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>	Some job descriptions have not been updated since the 1970s and 1980s and do not reflect current job responsibilities and necessary qualifications.
WMSC-22-C0225	02/28/25	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>	Metrorail's organizational structure prevents Metrorail from effectively ensuring that its track is maintained in a state of good repair as specified by Metrorail policies, procedures and standards.
WMSC-22-C0226	09/20/24	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>	Metrorail is not maintaining track infrastructure in rail yards in accordance with TRST-1000 requirements and related standards. This has introduced operational hazards.
WMSC-22-C0227	11/17/23	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>	Metrorail is not meeting its training requirements and there are inconsistencies in on-the-job training documentation for TRST personnel.
WMSC-22-C0228	12/15/23	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>	WMATA is not ensuring that personnel wear the proper personal protective equipment as required by its Hot Work Program Manual.
WMSC-22-C0229	12/15/23	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>	Metrorail risks key maintenance work performed on rail lubricators coming to a halt due to insufficient succession planning and training for personnel responsible for ensuring they are properly maintained in accordance with its written procedures.
WMSC-22-C0230	02/07/25	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>	Metrorail lacks the capability to complete required rail grinding activities across the system to ensure safe operations.
WMSC-22-C0231	08/30/24	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>	WMATA does not ensure excess hazardous materials are properly labeled, stored and disposed of.
WMSC-22-C0232	09/06/24	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>	WMATA does not have a weed spraying program consistent with industry standards.
WMSC-22-C0234	10/27/23	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>	Metrorail can ensure the safety of the system and quality of materials installed on the roadway by conducting lifecycle monitoring of reserve rail components stored in maintenance yards.
WMSC-23-C0235	02/16/24	<a href="#">Internal Safety Review Program (1/4/2023)</a>	Findings from the internal safety review program are not yet systematically incorporated into Metrorail's Safety Management System (SMS) as specified in Metrorail's PTASP.

WMSC-23-C0236	10/25/24	<a href="#">Internal Safety Review Program (1/4/2023)</a>	Metrorail has not yet implemented training requirements in system safety, hazard management and SMS training for personnel responsible for internal safety reviews as required by the WMSC Program Standard.
WMSC-23-C0237	10/18/24	<a href="#">Internal Safety Review Program (1/4/2023)</a>	Metrorail does not have a process for, and has not conducted or scheduled, a triennial internal safety review of its internal safety review program as required by the WMSC Program Standard.