



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0233 – Station Overrun of Van Dorn Street Station, Unresponsive Operator of Train Stopped for Extended Period Between Stations, Operator Removed at Franconia-Springfield Station for Use of Alcohol – December 23, 2022

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on August 8, 2023

Safety event summary:

A train overran Van Dorn Street Station, which was not detected by Metrorail. The Train Operator continued on, and the train then stopped between stations for approximately 40 minutes with no communication from the Train Operator. The Rail Operations Control Center Rail Controller first attempted to contact the operator approximately 10 minutes after the train stopped without communication. Later, the Train Operator moved the train to Franconia-Springfield Station and attempted to begin operating back toward Downtown Largo Station. Metro Transit Police and other personnel removed the Train Operator from the cab before the Train Operator moved the train back toward Downtown Largo. They determined there were indications the operator had used alcohol, which was later verified through police breath tests.

- Train overran Van Dorn Street Station by nearly two car lengths
- The Train Operator continued on moments later without reporting this station overrun to the Rail Operations Control Center and without this safety event being identified by Metrorail
- The train then lost speed commands and braking automatically applied, leading to the train stopping approximately one mile outside the station at 10:34 p.m. Several minutes later, speed commands began fluctuating between 0, 65 and 59 mph. The train, in manual mode as required, remained stopped for approximately 40 minutes.
- The Train Operator did not respond to radio calls.
- The Train Operator then moved the train to Franconia-Springfield Station (dealing with fluctuating speed commands during this movement) and announced they were moving.
- The Train Operator serviced the Franconia-Springfield station (an end-of-line terminal), and proceeded to the opposite end of the train to operate back toward Downtown Largo.
- Metro Transit Police and other Metrorail personnel stopped the Train Operator from departing toward Downtown Largo and identified signs of alcohol use.
- Metrorail did not immediately take the Train Operator for WMATA toxicology testing. Instead, the Train Operator was placed in the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center and held until after the alcohol testing period expired. Field sobriety tests were conducted by police, and separate testing was administered that indicated the Train Operator had consumed alcohol.
- Metrorail did not report this event to the WMSC within the required 2 hours. The station overrun occurred at 10:33 p.m. Metrorail did not report the safety event to the WMSC until 7:33 a.m. the following day.



Operator Work Day

The Train Operator had reported for duty at 9:40 a.m. on December 23, 2022 and was assigned to work in the Alexandria Rail Yard from 10 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. and to then work “as directed” from Huntington Station from 5:28 p.m. to 1:06 a.m. December 24.

The Train Operator was not directed to operate any trains during their yard assignment. During this assignment, CCTV shows the Train Operator primarily sat in their personal vehicle. At 11:27 a.m., they departed the yard, returning at 12:11 p.m. They were then assigned to pick up a cake for the division holiday party, and left the yard again in their personal vehicle at 12:18 p.m. They returned to the yard with the cake at 1:40 p.m., dropped off the cake, then left the yard again at 1:46 p.m. Individuals who interacted with the Train Operator during this time stated during the investigation that the Train Operator did not appear to be intoxicated.

Metrorail does not require a Train Operator returning to work who has already received their manifest to report to a Depot Clerk or other individual upon returning to duty for the remainder of their work day. Metrorail also does not require Terminal Supervisors, Interlocking Operators or any other personnel to assess personnel prior to assigning them work when part of a second assignment of the day. The Train Operator was supposed to report to Huntington Station by 5:28 p.m. CCTV shows the Train Operator was not at Huntington Station or Alexandria Rail Yard between 5:28 p.m. and 7:53 p.m.

At 7:30 p.m., the Huntington Station Terminal Supervisor attempted to contact the Train Operator via radio, but got no response. In response to a subsequent, second communication attempt, the Train Operator responded that they were “at the yard.” CCTV shows the Train Operator drove back into the yard after this exchange. As the Train Operator briefly entered the Rail Transportation office then went toward the employee platform to board a train, the Terminal Supervisor again attempted to contact the Train Operator and got no response. The Train Operator apparently realized that they did not have their train key, and CCTV shows the Train Operator appearing to search for it on and around the employee platform while waiting for a train pickup. The video does not show signs of impairment.

The Train Operator was picked up by a train with a Train Operator and Rail Supervisor on board. In investigative interviews, neither the other Train Operator nor the Rail Supervisor (who remained on the train until Stadium-Armory Station) reported observing signs of intoxication. The Train Operator later involved in the station overrun took over train operation at King Street Station and operated the train to Downtown Largo Station. During this trip, the train stopped short of the end of the platform at several stations, such as stopping 32 feet short at Potomac Avenue and 28 feet short at Capitol South. As this was a six-car train rather than an eight-car train, this did not lead to any doors opening off the rear of the platform. These instances were not detected by Metrorail supervision.

The Train Operator got off the train at Downtown Largo Station, went toward the terminal area (Terminal Supervisor location, break room, etc.), briefly entered the blockhouse, then exited the blockhouse and remained on the elevated walkway beyond the platform end gate. As the Train Operator walked down the platform to board the train back toward Franconia-Springfield Station, CCTV shows the operator displaying signs of impairment, such as swaying and not walking in a straight line.

The Train Operator operated the train toward Franconia-Springfield Station.



At Eastern Market Station, the train stopped 46 feet short (nearly two-thirds of a car length) of the end of the station platform.

At Braddock Road Station, the Train Operator entered the station more slowly than previous stations, and almost stopped short of the required location.

At King Street Station, the Train Operator operated the doors without looking out the window as required to ensure that it was safe to do so.

At Van Dorn Street Station, the Train Operator operated the train past the end of the station platform, stopped momentarily with the front two cars beyond the platform, did not service the station, then continued toward Franconia-Springfield Station. There were approximately 18 passengers on board.

The train reached a location between stations with zero speed commands, and braking was automatically applied, slowing the train from 45 mph to a stop approximately one mile beyond Van Dorn Street Station. The Train Operator then moved the Master Controller into B5 (maximum braking) mode just after the train stopped at 10:34 p.m. Speed commands remained at zero for about five minutes, then fluctuated between 0, 65 mph, and 59 mph while the train was stopped. The Train Operator did not make any radio communications or take any other recorded actions. The train remained stopped until 11:14 p.m., 40 minutes later, when the Train Operator moved the master controller to a P5 (maximum) power mode and the train began moving toward Franconia-Springfield Station. During those 40 minutes, the Train Operator did not respond to repeated attempts to contact them. Passengers remained on the train for the entire period. Vehicle data demonstrates that a passenger used the emergency intercom to attempt to contact the operator. At 10:53 p.m., a rider on the train stopped between stations called Metro Transit Police to report that the train had been stopped for a long time and they could not contact the train operator. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller attempted to contact the operator numerous times, beginning with a communication to the Train Operator approximately 10 minutes after the train had stopped between stations.

The stopped train properly displayed on the Advanced Information Management (AIM) system screens used by Rail Traffic Controllers and Terminal Supervisors. Rail Traffic Controllers did not notice the train stopped for an extended period without communication or that the train had not serviced Van Dorn Street Station. The Huntington Terminal Supervisor subsequently identified that the train stopped between stations on the opposite line, and called the Rail Operations Control Center to ask what was occurring with that train. This call triggered the rail controllers to attempt to contact the Train Operator. By that time, another train was immediately behind Train 406. Rail Controllers directed the Train Operator of that other train, Train 407, to sound their horn to alert the other operator. At 10:51 p.m., the Rail Operations Control Center directed the Train Operator of Train 407 to bring their riders back to Van Dorn Street, then move to Track 1 to pull adjacent to Train 406.

The Rail Operations Control Center Assistant Operations Manager contacted Metro Transit Police to report that the train was stopped, and they could not contact the Train Operator. The MTPD Dispatcher stated they had received a text that riders had been stuck on the train and think the operator was under the influence.

At 10:57 p.m., 23 minutes after the train stopped, the Assistant Operations Manager requested a Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department response with a medic to Franconia-Springfield Station.



At 11:09 p.m., a rider on the train used the emergency call box to attempt to contact the operator. The call box reset at 11:11 p.m.

At 11:12 p.m., a Rail Transportation Supervisor, Metro Transit Police Department personnel and medics had boarded Train 407 at Van Dorn Street, and at 11:13 p.m. the Rail Traffic Controller instructed the Train Operator of Train 407 to proceed to Train 406 and perform close in procedures.

At 11:16 p.m., the Train Operator of the stopped train, Train 406, radioed “train moving, man.” The Train Operator confirmed there were passengers on board. Vehicle data shows that the Train Operator had started to move, then experienced automatic braking due to zero speed commands several times in the minute after beginning to move. The train arrived at Franconia-Springfield Station at 11:19 p.m.

After arriving at Franconia-Springfield Station, the Train Operator opened the doors on the correct side of the train, closed the doors 12 seconds later, then reversed ends and prepared to operate back toward Downtown Largo. Metro Transit Police Department personnel ran down the platform to stop the operator.

Metrorail personnel identified that the operator showed signs of intoxication. The operator was not taken for Department of Transportation alcohol testing. Instead, the operator was taken to the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center. Field sobriety tests and tests conducted following the operator’s arrest indicated that the Train Operator was under the influence of alcohol. Metrorail later tested the Train Operator for drugs. That drug test came back compliant with Metrorail policy.

The Train Operator was arrested and criminally charged with Driving While Intoxicated. The standard for such a criminal charge is different than Federal Transit Administration and Metrorail safety requirements. Virginia law provides for a criminal charge for operating with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 or higher. Field tests preliminarily indicated this level of intoxication even after the Train Operator had stopped between stations for an extended period then moved the train to the Franconia-Springfield Station platform. Later tests at the Adult Detention Center recorded a lower level of intoxication, as alcohol is processed through the human body, the person’s blood alcohol content decreases over time. Each test was above the Federal Transit Administration requirement of 0.04, and above Metrorail’s limit of 0.02 that trigger requirements to enter an employee assistance program in addition to disciplinary action. Further, Metrorail employees and contractors who perform safety-sensitive functions are not permitted to consume alcohol within four hours before performing such functions or while performing such functions. Metrorail policy provides for immediate termination of personnel found to use, sell or possess any intoxicant (drug or alcohol) while on duty.

Operator Work History

Metrorail recertified the Train Operator in July 2021 on a third certification attempt after the operator did not pass the first two attempts.

The Train Operator had experienced several safety events since becoming a train operator in March 2019. This included a collision in January 2020 and a failure to service a station in August 2022.

Other identified items

The vehicle data demonstrates numerous locations with loss of speed readouts.



The vehicle data also demonstrates the existence of locations with 75 mph as both the limiting and regulated speeds. Metrorail rules and procedures do not allow for this, and Metrorail has said that there should be no locations with 75 mph regulated speeds, particularly as Metrorail considers introducing automatic train operation which would be designed to follow those speeds.

The Vehicle Monitoring System was not communicating with the ATC subsystem, which has been observed in some past investigations. This prevented this investigation from confirming the speed of operations from King Street Station to Downtown Largo Station.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was Metrorail's program related to ensuring personnel are fit for duty, specifically allowing a Train Operator who was under the influence to return to and continue work without direct interaction with or observation by other Metrorail personnel.

Corrective Actions:

As interim mitigations Metrorail re-issued an Operations Personnel Notice reminding Rail Transportation personnel about general drug and alcohol rules and guidance.

Metrorail is evaluating enhancements to the verification form used by Depot Clerks and Terminal Supervisors to account for Train Operators at each assigned location.

Metrorail is highlighting Terminal Supervisor oversight of "as directed" operators at monthly meetings.

Metrorail fired the Train Operator.

Examples of related open CAPs:

- C-0129 to address the Fitness for Duty Audit finding issued in 2021 that WMATA does not have a documented procedure for and training to carry out fitness for duty checks prior to or during shifts on a regular basis for all covered employees as specified in the APTA Fitness for Duty Standard. (Expected completion date April 2025)
- C-0184 to address that Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard. (Expected completion date October 2024)

WMSA staff observations:

This is an example of a station overrun occurring as a result of underlying hazards. In this case, the investigation determined the direct underlying hazard to be primarily related to Metrorail's fitness for duty program and the operator's intoxication. Had Metrorail detected and acted upon the overrun and failure to service Van Dorn Street Station, Metrorail could have provided a timelier response. In other cases, investigations related to station overruns such as the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation into the 1996 Shady Grove collision have identified that underlying hazards indicated or caused by station overruns and their aftermath can be related to issues such as system conditions, uncorrected systems design deficiencies, or inaction on available safety data. As that investigation also documented,



station overruns can also lead to trains not receiving the intended speed commands due to a lack of communication with wayside systems positioned within the platform limits. In the 1996 Shady Grove collision, this led to the train defaulting to maximum (75mph /75 mph) speed commands. The ability of Metrorail to proactively identify and subsequently mitigate such hazards that may be underlying or result from station overruns through detailed investigation and analysis before an injury or fatality is a reason the WMSC Program Standard requires Metrorail to report these safety events when trains stop with a door or more beyond the platform limits. This summer, Metrorail has experienced an increase in station overrun events. The WMSC investigations team is working with Metrorail to evaluate this trend and Metrorail's planned mitigations.

Metrorail should consider procedures to ensure that personnel are properly tested for drug and alcohol use in accordance with its policy if Metro Transit Police Department personnel respond to an event.

Metrorail could consider developing and implementing procedures to address situations where a Train Operator is out of communication with the Rail Operations Control Center to ensure that Rail Operations Control Center take timely action, including on notifications that a train is holding in a position for an extended period.

A Rail Transportation Supervisor who was operating the train that picked up the Train Operator at the Alexandria Rail Yard did not have the training or physical characteristics knowledge to operate the train to the employee platform here. The Supervisor requested another Train Operator take over train operation, which is positive and appropriate, as they acknowledged the deficiency in Metrorail training and certification.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)
FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E22835

Date of Event:	12/23/22
Type of Event:	O-12 (b) – Operator Removed for Alcohol
Incident Time:	22:33 hours
Location:	Between Van Dorn Street and Franconia-Springfield Track 2
Time and How received by SAFE:	22:53 hours MAC Desk
WMSC Notification Time:	07:33 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	None
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 406– (L3159 X 3158 X 3199 X 3198 X 3268 X 3269T)
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	MTPD and Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department (FCFRD) and Police
SMS I/A Number	20221224#105072

Franconia-Springfield Station – Operator Removed from Service for Alcohol

December 23, 2022

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AD	As Directed
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
DWI	Driving While Intoxicated
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
FCFRD	Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
SRO	Speed Readout
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record

After midnight on December 24, 2022, a Train Operator was arrested by Fairfax County Police Department for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) for operating Train ID 406 from Downtown Largo Station to Franconia-Springfield Station. During the trip, the Train Operator overran Van Dorn Station by two rail cars, did not service the station, and proceeded to Franconia-Springfield Station. The Train Operator did not report the station overrun to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC), and there was no initial indication in the ROCC that an incident had occurred. At 22:32 hours, Train ID 406 entered Van Dorn Station and at 22:33 hours the last car cleared the station. Approximately 11 minutes later, the ROCC attempted to contact Train 406 without success because it was stopped between Van Dorn and Franconia-Springfield stations. ROCC notified the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) of the immobile train without communication with customers aboard Track 2. Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department (FCFRD) personnel were dispatched to Van Dorn Street Station to board a rescue train to intercept Train 406 and assist. The focus on the loss of radio communication with the Train Operator and subsequent investigation resulted in the WMSC notification to be beyond the two-hour window for notifications.

Approximately 43 minutes after overrunning Van Dorn Station and stopping between stations without communicating, the Train Operator of Train 406 reported to ROCC that the train was moving. The train arrived at Franconia-Springfield Station at 23:19 hours. The Operator serviced the station, closed the platform side doors, and reversed ends. MTPD Officers intercepted the Operator at the (now) lead car and held the train. The Operator stated that they were fine and refused medical attention. The rescue train arrived from Van Dorn Street Station seven minutes later, and emergency personnel assessed the Operator. MTPD attempted to interview the Operator, who repeatedly reported malfunctions with the train. The Operator stated their radio was in their bag. The Operator did not answer any further questions. An Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor stated the Operator reported to work at 17:30 hours but did not operate a train until 20:00 hours after boarding from the Alexandria Yard employee platform.

An on-scene investigation by Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and law enforcement did not identify any medical emergency with the Operator. Rail Supervisors and MTPD interacted with the Operator and detected an odor of alcohol, accompanied by other signs of impairment. MTPD inspected the Train Operator's cab and belongings but found no physical evidence of alcohol (e.g., open containers). Law enforcement officials performed field sobriety tests. After the tests, officers concluded that there was probable cause that the Operator was driving while intoxicated. The Operator was arrested and transported to Fairfax County Adult Detention Center, where they were administered an additional screening. An RTRA Supervisor transported the Operator for WMATA post-incident drug and alcohol testing after they were processed and released on December 24, 2022.

A review of the Train Operator's work for the day identified that they reported for duty at 09:40 hours and received two manifests for work on December 23, 2022. Their first assignment was "Yard Work" between 10:00 and 14:30 hours. Their second assignment was "As Directed" (AD) between 17:28 and 01:06 hours with a duty location at Huntington Station. After completing their Yard Work run, they departed Alexandria Yard in their personal vehicle at 13:46 hours.

At 19:30 hours, the Huntington Terminal Supervisor asked for the Operator's location via radio. On the second attempt, the Train Operator responded that they were "at the yard," however, the Train Operator did not enter Alexandria Yard until 19:53 hours. The Train Operator briefly entered the RTRA Division office, walked to the employee platform, and boarded Train ID 406 on Track 1 towards Downtown Largo Station. After arriving at King Street Station, they took over operations from another AD Train Operator. An RTRA Supervisor was on board the lead car and rode the train to Stadium-Armory Station before departing. The RTRA Supervisor reported that they did not observe signs of impairment during their interactions.

The Train Operator operated Train ID 406 to Downtown Largo on Track 1 without issue. After servicing the platform, the Train Operator walked passed the end gate towards the Terminal and remained there until walking the platform towards the inbound end of the train. As they walked the platform, they showed signs of impairment, including swaying and not walking in a straight line. Train ID 406 departed Downtown Largo Station at 21:25 hours with a destination of Franconia-Springfield. Two stations before Van Dorn Street Station, the Train Operator entered the station more slowly than previous stations and almost stopped 25 feet ahead of the eight-car marker before continuing and servicing the station. At King Street Station, before Van Dorn Station, the Train Operator was observed operating the platform side doors without opening the operator's window and looking down the platform.

There were no injuries or damage reported related to this event.

The probable cause for the Train Operator being removed from service event was a human factors error by the Train Operator for failing to follow established policies in the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook regarding the consumption of alcohol by employees while on duty or Metro property. A contributing factor to this event is that the Train Operator could return to work for their second assignment without having to check in with anyone, even though there were hours in between their work assignments.

Incident Site

The outbound, outdoor section of track on Track 2 towards Franconia-Springfield Station.

Field Sketch/Schematics




Figure 1: This sketch is not to scale and shows the approximate location where Train ID 406 stopped between stations.

Purpose and Scope

This accident investigation and candid self-evaluation aim to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment through video and document review.
- Formal Interviews – To date, SAFE interviewed five individuals as part of this investigation. Interviews included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). The following individuals have completed interviews as of the time of this report:
 - RTRA Supervisor (King Street to Stadium-Armory)
 - Huntington Terminal Supervisor
 - Franconia-Springfield Terminal Supervisor
 - Alexandria Yard Depot Clerk
 - As Directed Train Operator (Franconia-Springfield to King Street)
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
 - Largo Terminal Supervisor
 - RTRA Supervisors
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Train Operator 30-Day Work History
 - Train Operator Training Record
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of Metro Data Recording Systems information. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback, including OPS 3 Radio
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
 - SPOTS Report
 - Vehicle Monitoring System

Investigation

On December 23, 2022, the Train Operator reported for duty at 09:40 hours and received two manifests for work on December 23, 2022. Before receiving their manifests, they checked in with the Depot Clerk, who visually assessed their Fitness for Duty, time-stamped their manifests, and issued them. Their first assignment was "Yard Work" between 10:00 and 14:30 hours. During this run, the Train Operator made no Yard Moves and was observed sitting in their personal vehicle for most of their time on duty. They left the yard at 11:27 hours in their personal vehicle and returned at 12:11 hours. They entered the RTRA building and were assigned to pick up dessert

[cake] for the office holiday party. The Train Operator left in their personal vehicle at 12:18 hours and returned with the dessert at 13:40 hours. After delivering the dessert, they returned to their personal vehicle with a takeout food container and departed the yard at 13:46 hours. The video review did not indicate any obvious signs of impairment during this first assignment. The Depot Clerk and other personnel who interacted with the Train Operator reported that they did not appear intoxicated.

The Train Operator's second assignment was "As Directed" between 17:28 and 01:06 hours with a duty location at Huntington Station. As part of standard practice, the Train Operator received both manifests when they first reported for duty and were not required to check in again with the Depot Clerk for the second assignment. According to the manifest, the Train Operator was required to report to Huntington Station when they returned to duty. The video review did not find the Train Operator or their personal vehicle at Huntington Station or Alexandria Yard between 17:28 and 19:53 hours.

At 19:30 hours, the Huntington Terminal Supervisor contacted the Train Operator and asked for their location via radio. On the second attempt, the Train Operator responded that they were "at the yard." The Supervisor informed them they were to board a train at the employee platform, ride to Downtown Largo Station and contact the Franconia -Springfield Terminal for instructions. After arriving at 19:53 hours and parking their personal vehicle, the Train Operator briefly entered the RTRA Division office, walked to the employee platform, and boarded Train ID 406 on Track 1 towards Downtown Largo Station. During this time, the Huntington Terminal Supervisor again contacted the Train Operator via radio without success and issued an administrative write-up at 19:54 hours for failing to monitor the radio. The video review did not identify obvious signs of impairment. The Train Operator was observed walking back and forth near the employee platform looking for something, likely their train key.

At 18:51 hours, an RTRA Supervisor took over train operations of Train ID 406 at Stadium Armory Station and operated the train to Franconia-Springfield Station. This consist remained Train ID 406 for the duration of the event. Upon arrival, the Franconia-Springfield Terminal Supervisor asked if they could pick up a Train Operator from the Alexandria Yard employee platform. The RTRA Supervisor was unfamiliar with this location, so an AD Train Operator (Operator #2) operated Train ID 406 to the Alexandria Platform. When the Train Operator boarded Train ID 406, they asked the RTRA Supervisor and Operator #2 if they had an extra train key because they had dropped theirs. The RTRA Supervisor stated they exited the operator's cab to get an extra train key for the Train Operator. Operator #2 operated Train ID 406 to King Street Station, where they disembarked. At 20:14 hours, the Train Operator began operating Train ID 406 to Downtown Largo Station. The RTRA Supervisor reported that they did not observe signs of impairment but did note that the employee stuttered. The RTRA Supervisor stated they were unfamiliar with the Train Operator to know whether they stuttered normally. The Supervisor mainly rode in the passenger compartment but did enter the Operator's cab more than once. They did not observe any behaviors of concern and alighted at Stadium-Armory Station.

Train ID 406 arrived at Downtown Largo Station at 21:13 hours. The Train Operator alighted, walked beyond the end gate towards the Terminal, and briefly entered the blockhouse. They returned to the safety walk behind the continuous handrail and remained there. At 21:20 hours, the video review showed the Operator returning and walking down the platform to the lead car. The Operator's gait was unsteady, with apparent signs of swaying and an inability to walk in a straight line. Train ID 406 departed Downtown Largo Station at 21:25 hours.

At 22:33 hours, the Train Operator overran Van Dorn Station by two rail cars, did not service the station, and proceeded towards Franconia-Springfield Station. The Train Operator also did not report the incident to the ROCC, and there was no initial indication in the ROCC that an incident

had occurred. At 22:44 hours, the Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) attempted to contact Train 406 without success because it was stopped between Van Dorn and Franconia-Springfield stations. ROCC notified the MTPD of the immobile train without communication with customers aboard on Track 2. MTPD and FCFRD personnel were dispatched to Van Dorn Street Station to board a rescue train to intercept Train 406 and assist. At 22:53 hours, a customer contacted MTPD by phone and another by text message to report that the train was stopped, and the Train Operator hadn't made any announcements.

A rescue train with an RTRA Supervisor, police, and medical personnel aboard departed Van Dorn Street Station at 23:13 hours. However, at 23:16 hours, the Operator of Train 406 stated over the radio that the train was moving. The train arrived at Franconia-Springfield Station at 23:19 hours. The Operator serviced the station and reversed ends. MTPD Officers intercepted the Operator at the (now) lead car and held the train. The Operator stated that they were fine and refused medical attention. The rescue train arrived seven minutes later, and medical personnel assessed the Operator. MTPD attempted to interview the Operator, who repeatedly reported malfunctions with the train. The Operator stated their radio was in their bag. The Operator did not answer any further questions.

An on-scene investigation by EMS and law enforcement did not identify any medical emergency with the Operator. Rail Supervisors and MTPD interacted with the Operator and detected an odor of alcohol, accompanied by other signs of impairment. MTPD inspected the Train Operator's cab and belongings but found no physical evidence of alcohol (e.g., open containers). MTPD performed four (4) field sobriety tests. At the conclusion of the tests, officers concluded that there was probable cause that the Operator was driving while intoxicated. The Operator was arrested by MTPD and transported to Fairfax County Adult Detention Center, where they were administered an additional screening. An RTRA Supervisor transported the Operator for WMATA post-incident drug and alcohol testing after they were processed and released on December 24, 2022.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
09:38 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Operator entered Alexandria Yard in white sedan with no sunroof. The vehicle appears to have matching wheels/rims. There is hood damage and a scrape on passenger side front bumper. There is right rear quarter panel damage.
10:09 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Operator returned to their vehicle.
11:27 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Operator departed Alexandria Yard in white sedan
12:11 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Operator returned to Alexandria Yard in white sedan. Enters RTRA building
12:16 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Operator returned to vehicle.
12:18 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Operator left Alexandria Yard in white sedan.
13:40 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Operator returned to Alexandria Yard in white sedan. Enters RTRA building with large box (likely dessert).
13:46 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Operator returned to vehicle with a smaller box (takeout container). Departs Alexandria Yard in white sedan.
19:25:17 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Tried to contact the Train Operator but no answer. [YD1]

Time	Description
19:30:07 hours	<p><u>Terminal Supervisor</u>: Contacted the Train Operator to ask their location.</p> <p><i>The Train Operator informed them they were in Alexandria yard.</i></p> <p>Instructed the Train Operator ride a train to Largo and to contact Unit #25 (Franconia Terminal). [YD 1]</p>
19:53:35 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Made several attempts to contact the Train Operator but received no response. Terminal Supervisor issued an incident time of 19:54 hours. [YD 1]
19:53:44 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : The Operator was seen driving into the Alexandria Yard and parking at the RTRA building.
19:54-20:00 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : The Operator exited the vehicle and went inside the RTRA building for approximately five minutes. They exited the building, collected items from the vehicle, and walked towards the guard shack with radio in hand. Gait appears normal.
20:02-20:03 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : The Operator was seen walking past the guard shack, through a security turnstile, toward the employee pick-up platform along the J line, track 1. Gait is steady, with a few missteps.
20:03:50 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Train ID 406 because they had just left Franconia – Springfield Station. [Ops. 3]
20:05-20:07 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : The Operator walked from the employee pick-up platform, back through the security turnstile toward the guard shack, then turns and walks back to the platform. They appear to be looking for something.
20:06:11 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Train ID 406 again. [Ops. 3]
20:06:17 hours	<u>Train ID 406</u> : Contacted Radio RTC and asked how did they copy? [Ops. 3]
20:06:20 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Informed Train ID 406 they were trying to contact them, and they needed them to make a platform stop. [Ops. 3]
20:06:34 hours	<u>Train ID 406</u> : Asked Central to repeat their message. [Ops. 3]
20:06:39 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Informed Train ID 406 they were trying to contact them and needed them to make a platform stop. [Ops. 3]
20:06:47 hours	<u>Train ID 406</u> : Responded they copied and an RTRA Supervisor had told them. [Ops. 3]
20:10 hours	Train ID 406 approached the platform, stopped at the first set of doors, and the Train Operator boarded the train; it departed 30 seconds later. [CCTV]
20:14 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Train ID 406 arrived at King Street with two employees in the operating cab. Train Operator #2 (winter coat, vest) disembarked the train. Train Operator #2 boarded the train at Franconia. Train Operator #1 took control of the train.
20:14-21:13 hours	<u>CCTV/SPOTS</u> : Train ID 406 traveled to Downtown Largo in revenue service with no incidents or abnormal behavior.
21:14-21:20 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Operator walked beyond the Largo 8-car end gate and briefly entered the blockhouse. They then exited the blockhouse and stayed outside beyond the end gate. Camera angle cannot determine the Operator's activities.
21:20-21:25 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : The Operator switched ends and walked down the platform to the (now) lead car. The Operators gait was unsteady, with swaying and inability to walk in a straight line. The train departed.
21:25-22:20 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : Reviewed every station service via CCTV and AIMS playback showed compliant service.

Time	Description
22:21 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : At Braddock Road Station, the Operator approached the 8-car marker slower than the prior stations and appeared to stop 25 feet before the 8-car marker. The station was serviced.
22:23:40 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : At King Street Station, the Operator berthed at the 8-car marker and is seen slumping /leaning against the cab window. The Operator did not open the window to observe the platform before/after activating the doors (per SOP).
22:33:10 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : At Van Dorn Street Station, the Operator overran the station by two cars, stopped for approximately three seconds, and continued toward Franconia-Springfield.
22:44:22 hours	<u>Huntington Terminal Supervisor</u> : Contacted the Buttons RTC to ask what was going on with Train ID 406 because it was stuck. [Phone & Ambient Mic]
22:44:39 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Train ID 406. [Ops. 3]
22:44:47 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Train ID 406 and asked if they were experiencing any issues with their train. [Ops. 3]
22:45:12 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Train ID 406 again and then asked Train ID 407 if the train was moving slowly ahead. [Ops. 3]
22:47:01 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked Train ID 407 if the train ahead of them was moving? [Ops. 3]
22:48:07 hours	<u>Train ID 407</u> : Advised the train ahead was not moving. [Ops.3]
22:48:11 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Affirmed the train was not moving and instructed Train ID 407 to make announcements to customers. [Ops. 3]
22:48:17 hours	<u>Train ID 407</u> : Affirmed and they were making announcements. [Ops. 3]
22:48:20 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Contacted Train ID 406 for a radio check. [Ops. 3]
22:48:28 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 407 to lightly tap their horn to get the attention of Train ID 406. [Ops. 3]
22:48:34 hours	<u>Train ID 407</u> : Affirmed they would tap their horn. [Ops. 3]
22:49:24 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked Train ID 407 if they were able to get the attention of Train ID 406? [Ops. 3]
22:49:31 hours	<u>Train ID 407</u> stated they could not get the operator's attention, but the train was still keyed up. [Ops. 3]
22:50:52 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
22:50:55 hours	<u>Operations Manager</u> : Contacted Assistant Operation Manager #2 and instructed them to inform Train ID 406 they had a permissive block and see if they move. Assistant Operations Manager #2 informed the Operations Manager they spoke to RTRA Supervisor #1 and was advised this operator has a history of being in trouble. Operations Manager instructed the Assistant Operations Manager to have Train ID 407 to go back and offload at Van Dorn then move to track 1 to pull adjacent to Train ID 406. [Rail 1]
22:51:03 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 407 to make announcements to their customers, reverse ends, and take the train back to Van Dorn. [Ops. 3]
22:51:13 hours	<u>Train ID 407</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
22:51:25 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
22:52:01 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
22:53:16 hours	<u>Customer</u> : Contacted MTPD to tell them they had been sitting on a Blue line train for a long time and the train did not service Van Dorn Station. [Ext. 12042]

Time	Description
22:53:39 hours	<u>ROCC Assistant Operations Manager #1:</u> Contacted MTPD to inform them Train ID 406 was holding outside of Van Dorn Station, and they could not contact the train operator. The MTPD Dispatcher informed the ROCC they received a text stating customers had been on the train for about 45 mins and they think the operator was under the influence. [Ext.12041]
22:53:57 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
22:57:39 hours	<u>ROCC Assistant Operations Manager #1:</u> Contacted Fairfax County Police and Fire to request a medic dispatched to Franconia Metro Station. [Ext 11070]
22:59:03 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
23:00:41 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
23:00:59	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
23:03:01 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
23:03:01 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
23:06:26 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
23:10:31 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Contacted RTRA Supervisor #2. [Ops. 3]
23:10:35 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor #2:</u> Responded to Radio RTC. [Ops. 3]
23:10:38 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Instructed RTRA Supervisor #2 to exit the train at Van Dorn, move to track 2, and board Train ID 407 with MTPD and medics. [Ops. 3]
23:10:50 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor #2:</u> Gave 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
23:11:12 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Instructed RTRA Supervisor #2 to advise when they were safely on board the lead car with Transit and medics. [Ops. 3]
23:11:35 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Requested for Train ID 406 to give a radio check. [Ops.3]
23:12:17 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor #2:</u> Advised the Radio RTC they were on board Train ID 407 with MTPD and medics. [Ops. 3]
23:13:44 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Instructed Train ID 407 to verify RTRA Supervisor, MTPD, and medics were on board. They had a permissive block no closer than 10 feet to Train ID 406 and conduct safety stops for close in procedures. [Ops. 3]
23:14:02 hours	<u>Train ID 407:</u> Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
23:16:05 hours	<u>Train ID 406:</u> Train Operator states: " <i>Train moving man.</i> " [Ops. 3]
23:16:19 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Asked Train ID 406 if they still had passengers on their train? [Ops. 3]
23:16:24 hours	<u>Train ID 406:</u> Affirmed. [Ops. 3]
23:18:31 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor #2:</u> Contacted the Radio RTC and asked if Train ID 406 moved? [Ops. 3]
23:18:36 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Affirmed and stated the operator was moving to Franconia. [Ops. 3]
23:19:14 hours	<u>ROCC Assistant Operations Manager #1:</u> Contacted the Largo Blockhouse to ask who was operating Train ID 406 and obtain their name, payroll, and what time they took the train. [Ext 11070]
23:19:24 hours	<u>CCTV:</u> Train 406 arrived at Franconia-Springfield.
23:22:27 hours	<u>Radio RTC:</u> Instructed RTRA Supervisor #2 to have medical personnel attend to the operator when they arrive at the platform. [Ops. 3]
23:23:00 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor #2:</u> Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
23:25:00 hours	<u>CCTV:</u> MTPD was seen running down the platform to intercept the Operator after switching ends.

Time	Description
23:25:58 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor #2</u> : Advised the Radio RTC they had a good track inspection from Van Dorn to Franconia Track 2. [Ops. 3]
23:26:04 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Gave a 100% repeat back. [Ops. 3]
23:26:28 hours	<u>CCTV</u> : The Rescue train arrived at J03.
23:30:05 hours	<u>Operations Manager</u> : Contacted Assistant Operations Manager #2 and instructed them to ask RTRA Supervisor #1 how many customers were on the train and if any customers requested medical attention. There were 3 people on board the train and no one requested medical care. [Rail 1] <i>Note: CCTV was reviewed and approximately 18 passengers were counted; three were keyed off after the doors closed, as passengers boarded the train for inbound service.</i>
23:31:35 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor #1</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that MTPD wanted to take the train operator down ASAP. [Ops. 3]
23:31:44 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked why did the operator need to go down? [Ops. 3]
23:31:47 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor #1</u> : Responded for a post-incident testing. [Ops. 3]
23:37:39 hours	<u>Operations Manager</u> : Contacted the RTRA Supervisor #1 to ask if they had the incident operator with them and asked for the operator's contact information. [Rail 1]
23:38:58 hours	MTPD was interviewing the Train Operator of Train ID 406 and RTRA Supervisor #2. [Rail 1]
23:39-00:23 (December 24)	Field Investigation
00:23 hours	MTPD conducted four (4) field sobriety test on the Operator.
00:32 hours	The Train Operator was placed under arrest for DWI and transported from the station.

***Note: Times above may vary from other system's timelines based on clock settings and reporting source.*

SPOTS Report

Select Platform: C13-1 and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Dec 23 2022 Select Times (0-24HRS): From 20:00 To 22:00

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Headway door open to door open
455	C13-1	6	19							20:05:21	20:07:05	unknown	-
406	C13-1	6	72				20:13:50	20:14:29	39	20:13:12	20:15:09	3269-3268 3198-3199 3158-3159	-

Figure 2: Operator took over train operations for Train 406 at King Street Station.

Select Platform: G05-1 and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Dec 23 2022 Select Times (0-24HRS): From 20:00 To 22:00

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Headway door open to door open
402	G05-1	8	72				20:07:24	20:07:28	4	20:06:46	20:21:30	7678-7679 7665-7664 7422-7423 7421-7420	-
403	G05-1	6	16	20:35:07	20:39:50	283	20:23:10	20:23:21	11	20:22:38	20:40:33	2037-2036 3149-3148 3286-3287	15:46
404	G05-1	6	16	20:51:31	20:53:19	108	20:49:56	20:50:22	26	20:49:21	20:53:53	3204-3205 3250-3251 3258-3259	26:46
604	G05-1	6	68	21:11:28	21:11:42	14				21:07:36	21:12:10	6092-6093 6123-6122 6005-6004	21:32
406	G05-1	6	16	21:22:44	21:25:15	151	21:13:54	21:14:00	6	21:13:17	21:25:55	3269-3268 3198-3199 3158-3159	2:26

Figure 3 shows when Train 406 arrived at Downtown Largo Station as an outbound train.

Select Platform: J02-2 and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Dec 23 2022 Select Times (0-24HRS): From 22:00 To 23:00

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Headway door open to door open
405	J02-2	6	16				22:16:56	22:17:22	26	22:16:25	22:17:48	3115-3114 2045-2044 3276-3277	-
406	J02-2	6	16							22:32:56	22:33:34	3159-3158 3199-3198 3268-3269	-

Figure 4 shows when Train ID 406 overran Van Dorn Street Station.

Select Platform: and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Select Times (0-24HRS): From To

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwell	Left door open	Left door close	dwell	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Headway door open to door open
405	J03-2	6	72				22:21:57	22:22:12	15	22:21:23	22:30:07	3115-3114.2045-2044.3276-3277	-
706	J03-2	6	99							23:18:52	02:12:17	3159-3158.3199-3198.3268-3269	-

Figure 5 shows when the once immobile train 406, arrived at Franconia Springfield Station.

Office of the Chief Mechanical Officer, Incident Investigation Team (IIT)

Adopted from CMOR-IIT report

"Based on the VMS data, Train ID 406, with Lead Car 3269, entered Van Dorn Station's platform limits, track #2, traveling at a speed of 48 MPH with the Master Controller in the Coast position. The train passed the 8-Car Marker, traveling at a speed of 22 MPH, with the Master Controller in B4 Braking Mode.

Train ID 406 first came to a stop with the lead car stopping 121 feet beyond the 8-Car Marker at Van Dorn Station. After being stopped for less than a second, the Master Controller was placed in a P5 Power mode and the train continued. The train was eventually brought to a complete stop after traveling 5,231 feet beyond Van Dorn Station.

Though there were multiple losses of Speed Readouts (SROs) throughout the entire trip, this did not affect the braking commands and response of the train. Based on the VMS, no faults observed with the train contributed to the cause of this incident.

See Timeline of events below:

Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Master Controller	Distance from 8-Car Marker
22:23:49	Train ID406 departs King St. Track #2, headed towards Franconia-Springfield	1 MPH	P5	
22:24:17	Limiting and Regulated speeds drops to 0 MPH. Full-Service Brake Applies B4 Braking Mode.	29 MPH	B4	
22:24:18	Limiting and Regulated speeds increases to 28 MPH. Full-Service Brake Releases, MC in the P2 Power Mode.	26 MPH	P2	
22:24:21	Master Controller moved P3 Power Mode	20 MPH	P3	

Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Master Controller	Distance from 8-Car Marker
22:25:43	Limiting speed and Regulated speed drops to 0 MPH and Full-Service Brake Applies B4 Braking. Train Speed 16 MPH, Master controller was in P1 Power mode.	16 MPH	B4	
22:25:45	Limiting and Regulated speeds increases to 75 MPH. Full-Service Brake Releases, MC in the B4 Braking Mode.	16 MPH	B4	
22:28:44	Limiting speed and Regulated speed drops from 75 MPH to 0 MPH and Full-Service Brake Applies B4 Braking. Train Speed 60 MPH.	60 MPH	B4	8271
22:28:47	Limiting Speed and Regulated Speed increased to 75 MPH, Train Speed 57 MPH	57 MPH	B4	8024
22:28:50	Master Controller moved to P1 Power Mode	46 MPH	P1	7754
22:32:19	Master Controller moved to Coast, Train speed was 49 MPH, 1,730 ft. before Van Dorn Station Platform Limits.	49 MPH	Coast	2428
22:32:44	The train enters Van Dorn Station at a speed of 48 MPH, with the Master Controller in Coast Position.	48 MPH	Coast	699
22:32:46	Master Controller placed in B4 Braking Mode, Train speed 48 MPH.	48 MPH	B4	549
22:32:46	Limiting and Regulating Speed drops to 0 MPH and Full-Service Brake applied B4 Brake Rate, Train speed was 48 MPH.	48 MPH	B4	534
22:32:47	Limiting Speed and Regulated Speed increased to 50 MPH, Train Speed 48 MPH. Master Controller remained in B4 Braking Mode.	48 MPH	B4	502
22:32:57	The train passed 8-Car Marker, traveling at a speed of 22 MPH, with the Master Controller in B4 Braking Mode.	22 MPH	B4	0

Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Master Controller	Distance from 8-Car Marker
22:33:06	Train momentarily came to a complete stop 121 ft, beyond the 8-Car Marker at Van Dorn	0 MPH	B4	121
22:33:06	Master Controller is placed in P5 Power Mode, and the train begins moving past Van Dorn Platform.	0 MPH	P5	121
22:33:25	Limiting and Regulating Speeds increase to 65 MPH and 59 MPH, respectively. The train speed was 48 MPH.	48 MPH	P5	800
22:33:33	Master Controller is placed in "Coast", Train speed was 55 MPH.	55 MPH	Coast	1262
22:34:23	Limiting and Regulating Speed drops to 0 MPH and Full-Service Brake applied B4 Brake Rate, Train speed was 45 MPH.	45 MPH	B4	4729
22:34:39	Train come to a complete stop 5,231 ft. beyond the 8-Car Marker at Franconia-Springfield	0 MPH	B4	5231
22:34:42	Master Controller placed in B5 while stopped	0 MPH	B5	5231
22:39:32 - 23:10:03	Limiting and Regulated Speed limits bounce back and forth between 0 MPH and 65 and 59 MPH, respectively, while the train is stopped.	0 MPH	B5	5231
23:14:58	Master Controller placed in P5 Power Mode and Train moves towards Franconia Springfield.	1 MPH	P5	5232
23:15:01	Limiting and Regulated Speed drops to 0 MPH and the Full-Service Brake Applies B4 Braking Rate. The train speed was 3 MPH.	3 MPH	B4	5237
23:15:03	Limiting and Regulating Speeds increase to 65 MPH and 59 MPH, respectively. The train speed was 3 MPH.	3 MPH	P5	5243
23:15:04	Master Controller placed in B4 Braking Mode, Train Speed 1 MPH.	1 MPH	B4	5243

Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Master Controller	Distance from 8-Car Marker
23:15:04	The train comes to a complete stop after traveling an additional 11 ft.	0 MPH	B4	5243
23:15:05	Master Controller placed in P5 Power Mode and Train moves towards Franconia Springfield.	1 MPH	P5	5243
23:15:09	Limiting and Regulated Speed drops to 0 MPH and the Full-Service Brake Applies B4 Braking Rate. The train speed was 3 MPH.	3 MPH	B4	5250
23:15:10	Limiting and Regulating Speeds increase to 65 MPH and 59 MPH, respectively. The train speed was 3 MPH.	MPH	P5	5256
23:15:10	Master Controller placed in B5 Braking Mode, Train Speed 3 MPH.	3 MPH	B5	5258
23:15:11	The train comes to a complete stop after traveling another 15ft.	0 MPH	B5	5258
23:15:12	Master Controller placed in P5 Power Mode and Train moves towards Franconia Springfield.	1 MPH	P5	5259
23:15:16	Limiting and Regulated Speed drops to 0 MPH and the Full-Service Brake Applies B4 Braking Rate. The train speed was 5 MPH.	5 MPH	B4	5269
23:15:17	Limiting and Regulating Speeds increase to 65 MPH and 59 MPH, respectively. The train speed was 6 MPH.	6 MPH	P5	5279
23:15:18	Master Controller placed in B5 Braking Mode, Train Speed 5 MPH.	5 MPH	B4	5285
23:15:19	Master Controller moved to a B1 Braking Mode. The train Speed was 3 MPH.	3 MPH	B1	5288
23:15:19	Master Controller moved to P5 Power Mode, Train Speed 1 MPH.	1 MPH	P5	5288
23:15:20	Train comes to a complete stop after traveling an additional 29 ft.	0 MPH	P5	5288

Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Master Controller	Distance from 8-Car Marker
23:15:22	The train begins to move towards Franconia-Springfield.	1 MPH	P5	5289
23:19:18	Limiting and Regulating Speed drops to 0 MPH as the train stops at Franconia-Springfield.	3 MPH	B4	
23:19:19	Train comes to a complete stop at Franconia-Springfield Station	0 MPH	B4/B5	
23:19:22	Left Door Open Pushbutton Activated and Left Side Passenger doors open.	0 MPH	B4/B5	
23:19:34	Left Door Close Pushbutton Activated and Left Doors Close	0 MPH	B4/B5	
23:19:47	Car 3269 keyed down.	0 MPH	B5	

There were no emergency brake applications during the entire duration of the operator's control of the train. Additionally, there were no improper door operations observed during that same period. During the trip from Largo to Van Dorn where the incident occurred, there were 2 overspeed events observed and they occurred when the speed commands went to 0 and the train speed was 5 MPH or less. Unfortunately, overspeed alarms were unable to be verified when traveling in the direction of Largo from the opposite end, car 3159, due to the ATC subsystem not communicating with VMS.

There was no evidence of the train moving at any time without speed commands nor any activation of stop and proceed. There was also no evidence of the train stopping between stations for one minute or longer.

Based on AIMS Executive Traffic Display playback, there were no red signals overrun during the time frame in question.

There were no additional station overruns observed during that time either. The chart below shows the train arrival times and speeds at which the consist entered each respective station, and the distance from the 8-Car Marker at which the train stopped to service each station.

Time Stopped at Station	Station	Entering Station Train Speed	Stopping Distance to 8-Car Marker
Operator Began Operation from King St. to Largo			
20:16:16	Braddock Rd.	23 MPH	9 feet
20:21:32	Regan National Airport	28 MPH	9 feet
20:23:43	Crystal City	29 MPH	9 feet
20:25:47	Pentagon City	31 MPH	5 feet
20:27:45	Pentagon	29 MPH	14 feet
20:32:04	Foggy Bottom	28 MPH	8 feet
20:35:07	Rosslyn	31 MPH	6 feet

Time Stopped at Station	Station	Entering Station Train Speed	Stopping Distance to 8-Car Marker
20:37:13	Farragut West	29 MPH	4 feet
20:38:43	McPherson Sq.	29 MPH	3 feet
20:40:19	Metro Center	26 MPH	6 feet
20:42:17	Federal Triangle	26 MPH	4 feet
20:43:47	Smithsonian	27 MPH	7 feet
20:45:31	L'Enfant Plaza	26 MPH	3 feet
20:47:04	Federal Center SW	31 MPH	6 feet
20:49:03	Capital South	31 MPH	28 feet
20:50:51	Eastern Market	28 MPH	4 feet
20:52:56	Potomac Avenue	22 MPH	32 feet
20:55:17	Stadium-Armory	26 MPH	1 foot
20:59:31	Benning Rd.	28 MPH	3 feet
21:02:23	Capitol Heights	34 MPH	18 feet
21:04:45	Addison Road	30 MPH	16 feet
21:07:34	Morgan Boulevard	34 MPH	0 feet
21:13:40	Largo	20 MPH	7 feet
Time Stopped at Station	Station	Entering Station Train Speed	Stopping Distance to 8-Car Marker
Operators Return Trip from Largo to Van Dorn			
21:27:57	Morgan Boulevard	27 MPH	5 feet
21:31:09	Addison Road	28 MPH	15 feet
21:33:24	Capitol Heights	32 MPH	6 feet
21:36:24	Benning Road	28 MPH	9 feet
21:42:05	Stadium-Armory	20 MPH	3 feet
21:44:50	Potomac Avenue	21 MPH	9 feet
21:46:51	Eastern Market	29 MPH	46 feet
21:48:34	Capital South	29 MPH	19 feet
21:50:19	Federal Center SW	28 MPH	9 feet
21:51:43	L'Enfant Plaza (Lower)	27 MPH	12 feet
21:53:19	Smithsonian	27 MPH	7 feet
21:54:52	Federal Triangle	30 MPH	5 feet
21:56:18	Metro Center (Lower)	23 MPH	15 feet
21:58:04	McPherson Square	24 MPH	14 feet
21:59:33	Farragut West	31 MPH	6 feet
22:01:14	Foggy Bottom	30 MPH	17 feet
22:04:22	Rosslyn	19 MPH	5 feet
22:08:30	Pentagon	27 MPH	8 feet
22:10:29	Pentagon City	24 MPH	9 feet
22:12:36	Crystal City	25 MPH	3 feet
22:14:28	Reagan National Airport	22 MPH	2 feet

Time Stopped at Station	Station	Entering Station Train Speed	Stopping Distance to 8-Car Marker
22:21:18	Braddock Road	22 MPH	14 feet
22:23:27	King Street	19 MPH	9 feet
22:34:39	Van Dorn St.	48 MPH	-5,231 feet

"It was determined that only one call box activation occurred throughout the entire consist during the trip from Largo to Springfield. A Rear Emergency call box activation occurred on Car 3269 at 23:09 hours after the train had come to a complete stop 5,231 ft. beyond the 8-Car Marker at Van Dorn Station. The Emergency Call station was reset at 23:11 hours."

Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Master Controller	Distance from 8-Car Marker
23:09:15	Emergency Call station activated on Car 3269 while stopped 5,231 ft. beyond the 8-Car Marker.	0 MPH	B5	-5,231 feet
23:11:12	Emergency Call station reset, Audio Channel Closed	0 MPH	B5	-5,231 feet

Cars 3269-68 Trip from Largo to Van Dorn from 2127hrs to 2320hrs




Figure 6: This image shows when the rear emergency call station was activated.




Figure 7: This image shows there were no emergency calls prior to the Train ID 406 stopping between Van Dorn and Franconia-Springfield Stations.

Office Rail Transportation (RTRA)

A RTRA Supervisor reported that the Train Operator did not report to Huntington Terminal after arriving on duty and they could not be reached for over two hours via radio. The Train Operator was issued an administrative write-up for not reporting to the terminal at their assigned time. At approximately 22:45 hours, the Train Operator failed to service Van Dorn Station, Track 2. The Train Operator stopped outside of Van Dorn Station and the ROCC was unable to make contact with the Train Operator. The Train Operator responded to the ROCC after more than 40 minutes had past. A RTRA Supervisor and MTPD detected the smell of alcohol on the Train Operator when they arrived at Franconia – Springfield Station after incident. [\(See Appendix\)](#)

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE interviewed four individuals. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

On-board Rail Supervisor

During an interview, the RTRA Supervisor stated they were initially operating Train ID 406 from Stadium Armory to Franconia-Springfield. When they arrived at Franconia-Springfield Station, the Terminal Supervisor asked them to pick up a Train Operator from the Alexandria Platform. The RTRA Supervisor was unfamiliar with this location, so the Terminal Supervisor asked an AD Train Operator to operate Train ID 406 to pick up the Train Operator. The RTRA Supervisor stated when the Train Operator got on board they asked if someone had an extra train key.

The RTRA Supervisor stated they left the operator's cab to get an extra key, and the AD Train Operator operated Train ID 406 to King Street Station. Once the AD Train Operator disembarked Train ID 406, the Train Operator took over train operations to Downtown Largo Station. The RTRA Supervisor stated they disembarked Train ID 406 at Stadium-Armory Station and did not observe signs of impairment. They observed that the employee stuttered but did not know them well enough to know if that was their regular speech pattern.

Largo Terminal Supervisor

The Largo Terminal Supervisor stated they never made direct contact with the Train Operator when they arrived at Largo Station.

Franconia and Huntington Terminal Supervisors

Both Terminal Supervisors stated they do not have to see an AD Operator before they assign them to work physically. The Huntington Terminal Supervisor issued the Train Operator an administrative write-up at the beginning of their shift because they failed to respond to the radio when they attempted to contact them. They never reported to the terminal at the start of their shift.

Depot Clerk – Alexandria Day Shift

During the interview with the Depot Clerk, they stated they do not complete any formalized fitness for duty training (Note: a review of their training records indicated that they received Reasonable Suspicion training). The fitness for duty check is a visual check of the Train Operators' uniform because they issue the manifests from behind plexiglass. They stated they do not have any authority to remove an operator from service, but they can refuse to give them their manifest and make them go talk to a manager if there is a concern. With regards to the Train Operator involved,

the Depot Clerk issued them both manifests for their morning and evening work as per normal practice. When they gave the manifest, the Train Operator appeared fit for duty. They were not on duty when the Train Operator returned to work but were not required to check in with the Depot Clerk in the evening because they had their manifest.

Weather

On December 23, 2022, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 12°F. Weather did not contribute to this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Alexandria, VA.)

Related Rules and Procedures

General Rule 1.1: Failure of any employee to abide by established rules and procedures or failure to use sound judgement, regardless of the time, place or circumstances, so as to compromise the safety of the public or fellow employees will result in the employee's immediate removal from service, pending an investigation.

General Rule 1.24: Employees found consuming, possessing or under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, narcotic drug, depressant, stimulant, hallucinogenic drug, a prescription drug labeled for someone other than the employee, or other controlled substance, while on duty, on Metro property, or on call for duty, will subject to terms and conditions of existing Authority policies and procedures at the time of the incident.

General Rule 1.19: Employees shall not permit themselves to be relieved by another employee who is not in proper clothing/uniform, appears to be under the influence of any substance, or who appears to be physically unfit to perform his/her regular duties.

General Rule 2.1: Employees while on duty or off duty, shall not conduct themselves in a manner that gives just cause for arrest or indictment, or bring disgrace to co-workers or to WMATA.

General Rule 2.5: Employees shall not engage in immoral, indecent, or unlawful conduct while on duty or on or about Authority property or while in uniform whether on or off duty.

MSRPH 1.46: Failure to maintain attention to operational duties.

MSRPH 3.18: Employee shall not operate any vehicle in a reckless or unsafe manner and several other violations of the MSRPH.

PI 7.7.3/7: Metro is committed to maintaining an operational free of prohibited drugs and alcohol to protect the health and safety of employees, patrons, and the public. To accomplish this, it Metro's policy to maintain a workplace free from the misuse of alcohol and drugs.

Human Factors

Training and Discipline History

- Train Operator started in their position on March 14, 2019. They have been employed with WMATA since June 12, 2017.
- Last certification date: July 20, 2021 (3rd attempt)
- The Train Operator worked around 47.50 hours within the previous seven (7) days. There were no recorded instances of eight (8) hour rule violations.
- Incident History:
 - Six instances in which the Train Operator either failed to work as scheduled or they reported late for your scheduled run from February 2022 through November 2022.
 - January 19, 2020, 2-day suspension (Collision- Hard Coupling)
 - March 27, 2020, 5-day suspension and Final Warning (Failure to Maintain Attention to Operational Duties)
 - July 2020, uniform appearance.
 - July 2020, train announcement – Shady Grove.
 - August 2020, failed to follow instructions and left work 30 minutes early.
 - September 2020, train announcement – West Falls Church.
 - October 2020, train announcement – West Falls Church.
 - February 2021, failed to make announcements to passengers about what color line they were on or announcing the next station.
 - August 24, 2022, failed to service a station.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident toxicology testing was conducted for this event after the Train Operator was released and they passed the drug screening. This testing was not completed within the necessary time frame due to the Train Operator being arrested.

Findings

- The Train Operator was given an administrative write-up at the beginning of their shift for failing to respond to their radio and report to the terminal at the start of their shift.
- The Train Operator was not observed at Alexandria Yard or Huntington Station Terminal between 17:28 and 19:53 hours.
- The Train Operator operated Train ID 406 from King Street to Downtown Largo Station without incident and was observed by multiple RTRA personnel.
- When the Train Operator was walking to reverse ends at Downtown Largo Station, their gait was unsteady, not walking in a straight line and swaying.
- During the trip from Downtown Largo to Van Dorn Street Station, two overspeed events occurred when the speed commands went to 0, with the train speed was 5 MPH or less.
- At King Street Station, the Operator berthed at the 8-car marker and was seen slumping /leaning against the cab window. The Operator did not open the window to observe the platform before/after activating the doors per SOP #40.
- The Train Operator overran Van Dorn Station. Train ID 406 first came to a stop with the lead car stopping 121 feet beyond the 8-car marker at Van Dorn Station.
- Train ID 406 was eventually brought to a complete stop after traveling 5,231 feet beyond Van Dorn Station.
- The Train Operator did not respond to the Radio RTC between 22:44 and 23:16 hours.
- Train ID 406 continued moving towards Franconia-Springfield Station before the rescue train could reach them.
- Law Enforcement officials from MTPD and Fairfax County performed field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test before arresting the Train Operator. The result of the preliminary breath test was a .081 blood alcohol content level.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- The Train Operator was arrested.
- The Train Operator was taken for post-incident drug and alcohol testing following their release from custody.
- The Train Operator did not return to service and was terminated in January 2023.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause for the Train Operator being removed from service event was a human factors error by the Train Operator for failing to follow established policies in the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook regarding the consumption of alcohol by employees while on duty or Metro property. A contributing factor to this event is that the Train Operator could return to work for their second assignment without having to check in with anyone even though there were hours between their work assignments.

SAFE Recommendations/Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
105072_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_001	RTRA will re-issue a RTRA Operations Personnel Notice: Reminder Drug and Alcohol General Rules & Guidance	RTRA	Completed
105072_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_002	RTRA will evaluate enhancing the verification form.	RTRA	07/01/2023
105072_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_003	RTRA Management will address Terminal Supervisors during monthly meetings on the importance of AD Operator oversight.	RTRA	06/01/2023

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

RTRA Supervisor

The RTRA Supervisor is a WMATA employee with 32 years of experience, with six years as an RTRA Supervisor. The RTRA Supervisor previously worked as a Bus Operations Supervisor and Assistant Superintendent. The RTRA Supervisor is RWP Level 2 certified and last certified as a RTRA Supervisor on 6/30/2022. The RTRA Supervisor mentioned feeling fully alert while operating Train ID 406. The RTRA Supervisor stated they started operating Train ID 406 at Stadium Armory Station and thought they were going to Franconia Springfield Station and bringing it back because they were short of Train Operators that day. The RTRA Supervisor mentioned when they arrived at Franconia Springfield Station, the Terminal Supervisor asked them to make an operator pick up at the Alexandria Employee Platform.

The RTRA Supervisor was unfamiliar with this pick-up. The Franconia Springfield Terminal Supervisor asked their AD Operator to operate Train ID 406 from Franconia Springfield to the Alexandria Platform to King Street Station. The RTRA Supervisor stated the Train Operator keyed themselves onto Train ID 406 from the Alexandria platform and entered the Operator's cab. The RTRA Supervisor mentioned when the Train Operator opened the cab door; they did not realize the RTRA Supervisor was present and then asked if the AD Operator or supervisor had a spare train key. At that point, the RTRA Supervisor left the Operator's cab to retrieve a spare train key for the Train Operator while the AD Operator operated the train to King Street Station. The RTRA Supervisor mentioned having little direct contact with the Train Operator once they took over train operations at King Street Station but did not observe any concerns with their operations. The RTRA Supervisor mentioned the Train Operator was stuttering but they were not sure if the Train Operator had a speech impediment due to their lack of familiarity with them. They did not notice signs of impairment. The RTRA Supervisor disembarked Train ID 406 at Stadium Armory Station.

AD Operator (Train Operator #2)

The AD Operator is a WMATA employee with 18 years of experience, 15 years as a Train Operator. The AD Operator previously worked as a Bus Operator and Station Manager. The AD Operator is RWP Level 2 certified and must recertify in February 2023. The AD Operator mentioned feeling fully alert when operating Train ID 406 from Franconia Springfield Station. The AD Operator stated that once they retrieve their manifest, they are responsible for reporting to Huntington or Franconia Springfield Stations and waiting for the Terminal Supervisor to provide an assignment. The AD Operator stated they must stay at the terminal in case the Terminal Supervisor has an assignment for them. The AD Operator stated that while they were at Franconia Springfield Station, the Terminal Supervisor informed them they needed to operate Train ID 406 to perform a pick-up from the Alexandria Platform because the RTRA Supervisor was unfamiliar with the location.

The AD Operator operated Train ID 406 to the Alexandria Platform, where they said the Train Operator keyed themselves on the train and entered the Operator's cab. The Train Operator asked if they had a spare train key, and they told them they only had their key and could not give it to them. The AD Operator stated while they were in the Operator's cab, they did not smell alcohol on the Train Operator. The AD Operator mentioned they do not drink, so if the Train Operator had been intoxicated, then they would have smelled it. The AD Operator said there was a Christmas party at the division earlier in the day, but they do not engage with their coworkers in

those settings. After picking up the Train Operator from the Alexandria platform, the AD Operator operated Train ID 406 to King Street Station, where they disembarked the train.

Depot Clerk

The Depot Clerk is a WMATA employee with 20 years of experience, with three years as a Depot Clerk. The Depot Clerk has worked as an Assistant Superintendent and Transit Field Supervisor at numerous locations. The Depot Clerk was working overtime when they gave the Train Operator both their manifests for the day. The Depot Clerk stated per the contract, Train Operators are only required to report once a day. This means if the Train Operator has multiple assignments for the day, they will be given all their manifests needed to complete their assignments for the day.

The Depot Clerk stated once they give the Train Operator their manifest, they are no longer their responsibility. It is up to the Train Operator to report to where their assignment is scheduled for the day. The Depot Clerk mentioned during the morning shift, the Depot Clerk is responsible for sending the verification sheet to all necessary parties, prepare the manifests for the Train Operators, and schedule all work assignments for the day. The Depot Clerk mentioned there is no formal fitness for duty training.

The fit-for-duty check is a visual check of the Operators' uniform behind the plexiglass, which sometimes causes confrontations with the Train Operators. The Depot Clerk stated they do not have any authority to remove Train Operators from service; however, they can refuse to give them their manifest and send them to a manager.

Franconia – Springfield Terminal Supervisor

The Franconia – Springfield Terminal Supervisor is a WMATA employee with eight years of experience, with 3.5 years as an RTRA Supervisor. The RTRA Supervisor previously worked as a Train Operator and Bus Operator. The Terminal Supervisor is RWP Level 2 certified and must recertify in March 2023. The Terminal Supervisor stated a typical workday is dispatching trains in regular intervals to accommodate customers and the day of the incident was a normal workday. The Terminal Supervisor stated they know the AD Operators they are responsible for by reviewing the verification sheet and manifests at the beginning of their shift. The Terminal Supervisor stated they only communicate with the Depot Clerks as needed. The Train Operators are supposed to report to their assigned Terminal and give the Terminal Supervisor a radio check, so they know they are on duty for work.

The Terminal Supervisor stated they do not have to see a Train Operator when they assign them work physically. If there is no work, the Train Operators cannot leave the terminal unless the Terminal Supervisor permits them. The Terminal Supervisor has completed reasonable suspicion training more than once. The Terminal Supervisor stated they never had to remove a Train Operator from service for reasonable suspicion. The Terminal Supervisor instructed their AD Operator to operate Train ID 406 to complete a pick-up at Alexandria Platform because the RTRA Supervisor on board Train ID 406 was unfamiliar with the area. On the night of the incident, the Terminal Supervisor received a call from the Van Dorn Street Station Manager stating Train ID 406 did not service the station.

The Terminal Supervisor was going to ask the Train Operator what happened when they arrived but noticed the train was not moving. They then called the ROCC and informed them Train ID 406 did not service Van Dorn Station. That's when the ROCC started to contact the Train Operator but was unsuccessful. When the Train Operator finally arrived at Franconia – Springfield Station, the Terminal Supervisor approached them to inquire what happened, and they immediately smelled an odor of alcohol.

Huntington Terminal Supervisor

The Huntington Terminal Supervisor is a WMATA employee with nine years of experience, with one year as an RTRA Supervisor. They previously worked as a Bus Operator, Train Operator, Station Manager, and Interlocking Operator. They are RWP Level 2 certified and must recertify in February 2023. The Terminal Supervisor stated when they need to assign an AD Operator an assignment, they typically call them over the radio and inform them what they need to do. At Huntington Station, the Train Operators generally are in the break room next to Terminal Supervisor's office or in the break room at the far end of the platform. The Terminal Supervisor said they do not always physically see a Train Operator when they report or assign them work. The Terminal Supervisor stated they would attempt to contact an AD Operator several times. If they are unresponsive, they will contact the Depot Clerk to ensure the Train Operator is on duty.

On the night of the incident, the Terminal Supervisor received a call from Franconia-Springfield's Terminal Supervisor informing them Train ID 406 did not service Van Dorn Station. They changed their screen so they could see the location of Train ID 406, noticed Train ID 406 was not moving, and immediately realized who the Train Operator was. Earlier in the day, they had to write up the Train Operator because they could not reach them via radio and failed to report to the terminal at their scheduled time.

Once the Terminal Supervisor noticed Train ID 406 was still not moving, they contacted the ROCC and informed them they would board the train on the platform and head towards King Street Station to get on a recovery train to the immobile train. When the Terminal Supervisor got to King Street, they rode Train ID 408 to Van Dorn Station. Train ID 407, which they had changed to 707, was on the platform. The Terminal Supervisor and Emergency personnel boarded the train and proceeded to intercept the immobile train. As they were approaching, they heard the Train Operator of Train ID 406 say they were on the move. When the Terminal Supervisor arrived at Franconia – Springfield Station, MTPD was interviewing the operator. After that, the Train Operator was arrested for operating the train while intoxicated.

Appendix B – Largo Terminal Supervisor Written Statement

M		RTRA Supervisor's Report		DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS-RAIL SERVICE	
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY		Office of Rail Transportation			
Date	12/23/22	Incident Time		Incident Location (Station/Mezzanine#)	Track/Mezzanine#
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #, Room #)					
3269, 3198, 3158 ID 406 Track #1					
Incident Description					
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident	
Name	Address			Injury?	
Name	Address			Injury?	
Name	Address			Injury?	
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks		
Chronological Account of Incident					
Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion					
Your Arrival Time					
Operator [REDACTED] arrived at Downtown Largo Station at 9:13pm on ID 406. The train was due to arrive at 9:08pm. I instructed operator [REDACTED] that the train was due out at 9:25pm. At 9:25pm operator [REDACTED] departed the platform. I never made visual contact with operator [REDACTED].					
Supervisor Submitting Report (include payroll #)					
Date	12/26/22	Report Reviewed by		Date	12/27/22
RTRA Supervisor's Report					

50.437 0910

REPORT MUST BE FAXED TO ROCC 202-662-1012 at end of tour

Attachment 1 – Largo Terminal Supervisor Written Statement page 1 of 1

Incident Date: 12/23/2022 Time: 22:33 hours
Final Report Rev 1– O-12(b) –Operator Removed for D&A
E22835

Drafted By: SAFE 703 3/28/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 704 3/28/2023
Approved By: SAFE 70 – 3/31/2023

Page 30

Appendix C – RTRA Supervisor Written Statement

On December 23, 2022, Supervisor [REDACTED] contacted me stating ID 406 was opened and requested my support to operate the train. Due to the time restrictions, at approximately 6:39 pm, Operator [REDACTED] operated the train from Downtown Largo to Stadium Armory in which I took over operations at Stadium Armory to Franconia Springfield. Upon my arrival at Franconia Springfield, Rail Supervisor [REDACTED] informed me to pick up an operator at the Platform. Due to my uncertainty of the platform location, Operator [REDACTED] operated ID 406 at approximately 8:06 pm from Franconia Springfield to the platform. Operator [REDACTED] boarded the train and entered the cab with me and Operator [REDACTED]. Operator [REDACTED] requested an extra train key from Operator [REDACTED]. Due to the capacity of the cab, I departed the cab to retrieve my extra keys for Operator [REDACTED]. Operator [REDACTED] operated from the platform to King Street Station. Operator [REDACTED] took over operations from King Street Station to Largo Station. I re-entered the cab for a short period of time with Operator [REDACTED] operations, to discuss a shooting at Roslyn Station, listen to ROCC, and prepare to alight the train, if necessary, which later turned out to be an activity with a BB gun. During this brief encounter at no time did I notice any unusual behavior or smell alcohol. What I did notice was Operator [REDACTED] speak impediment (stuttering). As I stated, my prior conversations with Operator [REDACTED] were very brief (normally during the transfer of train operations) so prior to December 23, 2022, I was not aware that he had a speak impediment.

If you have any questions feel free to contact me.

Best Regards,

[REDACTED]
Rail Operations Supervisor
Largo Division
[REDACTED]@wmata.com

Attachment 1 – RTRA Supervisor Written Statement page 1 of 1

Appendix D – Franconia – Springfield Terminal Supervisor Written Statement

RTRA Alexandria Division Supervisor's Report

Date: December 23, 2022	Incident Time 10:36pm	Incident Location (Station) Between J02 and J03	Track/Mezzanine # 2
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car number: Escalator/ Elevator #: Room) 406 3269-3198-3158			
Incident Description Runaway Train—Unresponsive Operator			
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation/ List Rule	Home Division
		1.24	Alexandria
			Arrested
Customer Information (detailed information must be recorded on Station Manager Incident Report)			
Name:	Address:		Injury?
Name	Address		Injury?
Name	Address		Injury?
Fire Department/EMS/other External Agency Responding (Use supplemental sheet if necessary)			
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person in charge	Remarks:
11:23pm			

Chronological Account of Incident

(Note time of each entry: include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)

At 10:36pm Station Manager [REDACTED] at Van Dorn Station called Franconia terminal and informed me that train 406 did not service track 2 Van Dorn and passed through the station at a high rate of speed. At 10:45pm I called ROCC as I noticed the train appeared to not be moving. It was sitting about 200ft off the platform outside of Van Dorn track 2. After several attempts by myself and ROCC to reach the operator of 406, operator [REDACTED] responded to central at about 11:15pm saying he was moving. When his train arrived at Franconia platform track 2, I went outside to ask the operator was he okay and to see what happened. He initially said he couldn't move the train and I asked him why he didn't contact ROCC. I told him he could have used a ETS box or his handheld. I asked him again are you sure you are okay it seems as if you are under the influence. He said "Mannn I fell asleep and denied being intoxicated." At 11:23pm [REDACTED], Transit officer [REDACTED], Medical and a host of other transit officers arrived. They then questioned the operator and attempted to treat him for any medical conditions as they ran his vitals. At 12:23am transit administered a sobriety test which came back as showing he had alcohol in his system. At 12:32am [REDACTED] was placed under arrest. MTP Report Number 2022-07547

Attachment 1: Franconia – Springfield Terminal Supervisor Written Statement. Page 1 of 1.

Appendix E - Huntington Terminal Supervisor's Written Statement



RTRA Supervisor's Report

DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS-RAIL SERVICE

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Office of Rail Transportation

Date: 12/23/2022	Incident Time Est 10:30pm	Incident Location (Station Mezzanine#) Between Van Dorn and Franconia Springfield	Track/Mezzanine# Track 2
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #, Room #) Train #406			
Incident Description Train #406 was holding between Van Dorn and Franconia Springfield station			
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division
		N/A	Alexandria
Name N/A	Address N/A		Injury? N/A
Name N/A	Address N/A		Injury? N/A
Name N/A	Address N/A		Injury? N/A
Arrival Time Est: 11:45pm	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks
Alexandria Engine	210	N/A	Left Huntington Terminal to intercept train 406
Alexandria Medics	208	N/A	N/A
Metro Transit Police	804	N/A	N/A

Chronological Account of Incident

Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion

Received a call at approximately 10:30pm that said train #406 didn't service Van Dorn station, then I noticed that train #406 had stopped between Van Dorn and Franconia Springfield. I contacted ROCC and had them check on Id 406. ROCC called the operator numerous of times over the radio to receive no response. I then gave the ROCC Huntington Terminal interlocking board and went to intercept train ID 406. When I arrived at Van Dorn station Id 407 was offloaded and re-blocked to Id 707. Transit 804, Alexandria Engine 210, and Alexandria Medics 208 were all aboard train ID 707. ROCC gave us permission to close in with ID #406, however as were in approach to ID 406 operator then responds and says "Central 406 on a move". When we arrived at Franconia Springfield operator was with transit and medics. I asked him was he ok he responded and said yes, he was fine. When he spoke, I smelt alcohol. I then asked him was he drinking and he said no. He then says its nothing wrong with him the train just wouldn't move. I then asked him why didn't you contact central control he says "because his radio was in his bag". I then gave a statement to Transit police and they also stated that they also smelt alcohol. I then came back to Huntington terminal.

Attachment 1: Huntington Terminal Supervisor written statement. Page 1 of 1.



RTRA OPERATIONS PERSONNEL NOTICE

Tuesday, January 17, 2023

RTRA-603-63-00

Reminder Drug and Alcohol General Rules & Guidance

PI 7.7.3/7: Metro is committed to maintaining an operation free of prohibited drugs and alcohol to protect the health and safety of employees, patrons, and the public. To accomplish this, it is Metro's policy to maintain a workplace free from the misuse of alcohol and drugs.

As a reminder, please adhere to the following rules in the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH):

General Rule 1.24: Employees found consuming, possessing or under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, narcotic drug, depressant, stimulant, hallucinogenic drug, a prescription drug labeled for someone other than the employee, or other controlled substance, while on duty, on Metro property, or on call for duty, will be subject to the terms and conditions of existing Authority policies and procedures at the time of the incident.

General Rule 1.19: Employees shall not permit themselves to be relieved by another employee who is not in proper clothing/uniform, appears to be under the influence of any substance, or who appears to be physically unfit to perform his/her regular duties.

Employee Assistance Program (EAP):

WMATA provides **free** supportive services that promote mental, emotional and physical well-being and improves productivity, absenteeism, presenteeism and performance.

The EAP provides support services for (including but not limited to): stress, anxiety, depression, trauma, family conflicts or concerns, alcohol or drug problems, grief and loss, parenting, marital strain, homelessness, gambling, elder care issues, anger management, financial or budgeting difficulties, workplace issues, conflicts, and critical incidents.

You can come in voluntarily for substance abuse support, you don't have to wait until you test positive! EAP Contact (202) 636-7181.

Please contact a Rail Operations Supervisor or Division Management if you have questions.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report



Incident Status: **PRELIMINARY**

GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION

Incident	Immobile Train Between Stations	Delay	43 min
Type:	Unable to Contact Train Operator	(Minutes):	
	Failure to Service Station		
Incident	Friday, December 23, 2022	Vehicles	L3269-3198-3158
Date:		Involved:	
Incident	10:45pm	First Reported	ROCC
Time:		By:	
Location:	Between Van Dorn Street and Franconia-Springfield Track #2		

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

At approximately 10:45pm, Train Operator of #406 failed to service Van Dorn Station Track #2. The Train Operator of #406 stopped outside of Van Dorn Street and ROCC was unable to make contact with the operator. The Operator responded to ROCC after more than 40 minutes have past. Train Operator continued to Franconia-Springfield Station where he was evaluated by MTPD and a RTRA Supervisor.

Key Employees Involved & Employee Statements:

- RTRA Train Operator [REDACTED];

Damon Roberts

Written Statement currently not available (Employee arrested by MTPD)

Post Incident Testing & Employee History:

- Train Operator [REDACTED] was arrested after failing a field sobriety test conducted by MTPD.
- Train Operator [REDACTED] has been on the rail as a Train Operator since March 14, 2019. He has been employed with the Authority since June 12, 2017.
- Train Operator [REDACTED] was working Alexandria Run 519 (As Directed. This was the 2nd trip made by [REDACTED]).
- Train Operator [REDACTED] worked around 47.50 hours within the last seven (7) days. There were no recorded instance of eight (8) hour rule violations.
- Last certification date: 7/20/21 (3rd attempt)

Recent Incidents

- January 19, 2020-2 day suspension (Collision- Hard Coupling)
- March 27, 2020-5 day suspension and Final Warning (FAILURE TO MAINTAIN ATTENTION TO OPERATIONAL DUTIES)



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority



Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT TIMELINE:

1045pm-Train #406 was immobile between Van Dorn Street and Franconia-Springfield Track #2. Train #406 also failed to service Van Dorn Street Station. ROCC unable to contact the Train Operator [REDACTED].
1115pm- Train Operator [REDACTED] responds to ROCC and train #406 continues to move towards Franconia-Springfield Station.
1122pm-Train Operator [REDACTED] arrives at Franconia-Springfield Station.
1223am-MTPD conducts a sobriety test on Train Operator [REDACTED].
1232am- Train Operator [REDACTED] is placed under arrest by MTPD

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS & PENDING ISSUES:

RTRA Supervisor reported that Train Operator [REDACTED] did not report to Huntington Terminal after arriving on duty and he could not be reached for over two hours.

RTRA Supervisor and MTPD detected the smell of alcohol on Train Operator [REDACTED] when he arrived at Franconia-Springfield Station after incident

Investigation ongoing

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Root cause:

1. Under the influence (Alcohol)

Appendix H – MTPD Police Report



Event Report			
Metro Transit Police Department		ORI-DCMTP0000	
Type of Report Adult Arrest	MTPD CCN 2022-07547-001	Local Jurisdiction Fairfax County	Local CCN

Event Location					
Street 6880 Frontier Dr	Station Acronym FRSP - FRANCONIA- SPRINGFIELD	City, State Springfield, VA 22150	County FFX- Fairfax County	MTP District District 2	Local District FFX-Fairfax County
Date and Time of Event From To 12/23/2022 10:55:00 PM			Date and Time Reported 12/23/2022 10:55:16 PM		
Category					
Rail Station, Line or Right-of-Way FRSP - FRANCONIA- SPRINGFIELD Blue	On Bus	Property Rail Station	Other MSA4		
Specific Location (Foot Bridge, Kiosk, Platform, Tracks, Etc.) Rail Car			For Burglary or B&E Only If Hotel Rule Applies, #Premises or Facilities Entered:		
Location Description Rail Station					

Event Information			
If Incident Use This Block	Offense #	DWI- DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 1ST CONVICTION	
Incident Classification	Offense Classification	B	
Incident Description	Description	DWI- DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 1ST CONVICTION	
	Weapon/Force Type of Activity	/	
Entry Type:		Number Premises Entered:	
Hate Crime Motivation: None (no bias) (mutually exclusive)			
Bias Motivation None (no bias) (mutually exclusive)			
Offender Suspected of Using:		Modus Operandi (MO):	
Case Status Information Case Status (Completed by the Official who signs this report):		If Case Cleared Exceptionally,	Clearance Date
Reporting Officer (Print) [Redacted]		Second Officer (Print)	Badge #
Supervisor's Name (Electronically Approved)		Teletype #	Investigator Notified ID#

MTPD CCN:
ORI-DCMTP0000

Event Report Page 1 of 7

Attachment 1: MTPD Police Report. Page 1 of 7.

Incident Date: 12/23/2022 Time: 22:33 hours
Final Report Rev 1– O-12(b) –Operator Removed for D&A
E22835

Drafted By: SAFE 703 3/28/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 704 3/28/2023
Approved By: SAFE 70 – 3/31/2023

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Victim Information				
Victim Sequence #:		Victim Assistance Provided: Y - Yes		
Last Name, First MI		DOB		
Entity Name				
Work/School Address - Addl. Contact Info				
Age of Victim	Sex	Race	Ethnicity	Resident Status
Classification of Victim		Type of Victim	This Victim is Related to Which Offense	
9481 - VA - DWI- DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 1ST CONVICTION		Society/Public	9481 - VA - DWI- DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 1ST CONVICTION	
Is suspect information available at the time of this report:				
Injury Type				
Responding Ambulance:		Taken Where		
Aggravated Assault/Homicide Information				
Aggravated Assault/Homicide Circumstances		Additional Justifiable Homicide Circumstances		

Other Person Information				
Last Name, First MI		Entity Type	DOB	
		Other Entity (Business, Institution, Etc.)		
Address Type	Address (Street) City, State Zip			
W - Work	12300 Lee Jackson Memorial Hwy Fairfax, VA 22033			
Type Phone	Phone Number			
M - Mobile				
W - Work	Phone Number			
Work/School Address - Addl. Contact Info				
Email				
Age	Sex	Race	Ethnicity	DL State/Number
Last Name, First MI		Entity Type	DOB	
		Other Entity (Business, Institution, Etc.)		
Address Type	Address (Street) City, State Zip			
W - Work				
Type Phone	Phone Number			
W - Work				
W - Work	Phone Number			
Work/School Address - Addl. Contact Info				
Email				

MTPD CCN:
ORI-DCMTP0000

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Attachment 1: MTPD Police Report. Page 2 of 7.

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Age	Sex	Race	Ethnicity	DL State/Number

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Attachment 1: MTPD Police Report. Page 3 of 7.

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Has a DVR been requested?

Narrative Information

The operator of train 406 was suspected of operating the train car while intoxication. Probable cause was established to place the operator under arrest for the offense.

If second CCN is available, insert here:

Additional Narrative on Supplemental Report

MTPD CCN:
ORI-DCMTP0000

Event Report Page 4 of 7

Attachment 1: MTPD Police Report. Page 4 of 7.

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Additional Narrative

On December 23rd, 2022, at approximately 2255 hours, a call for service was dispatched for train #406 outside the Van Dorn Street Metro Station, which had stopped on track two, and rail operations could not contact the operator. As a result of the stopped train, [REDACTED] of train car #407, with permission from rail operations, reversed back to the platform to offload his patrons. [REDACTED] while speaking with officers [REDACTED] stated that he was operating his train car on the track two side toward Franconia when he observed train 406 completely stopped on track two. [REDACTED] blew his train horn approximately four times which elicited no response. [REDACTED] stated that the train still appeared to be keyed up.

Myself, [REDACTED] along with [REDACTED] responded priority to the Van Dorn Street Metro Station to get a rescue train. Law enforcement, the fire department (Alexandria Engine 210 and Alexandria Medic 208), and rail personnel responded to assist the stopped train to evacuate the passengers and assess any issues with the train and operator. Once all entities were on board train car 407, we disembarked from the platform in the direction of Franconia-Springfield on the track two side at approximately 0017 hours. At that time, we were advised that train car 406 was reportedly moving toward Franconia-Springfield. Accordingly, officers were dispatched to the updated station to intercept the train and the operator. We continued on train car 407, conducting a track inspection toward Franconia-Springfield, and observed no abnormalities on the tracks.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were on-scene at the Franconia-Springfield Metro Station (6880 Frontier DR Springfield VA 22150) with the train operator of train #406, who was later identified as [REDACTED] at approximately 2325 hours. When I approached the scene, [REDACTED] stated something to the effect that [REDACTED], who had been operating train #406, appeared to be under the influence of an intoxicant. My observations of [REDACTED] were that [REDACTED] eyes were bloodshot and watery, and [REDACTED] seemed to have slurred speech. Based on my training and experience, I know these are obvious signs of intoxication. Additionally, I could detect the odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from [REDACTED] person.

Rail supervisor [REDACTED], who responded with us via train car #407, upon contact when questioning [REDACTED] about the incident while [REDACTED] was on the platform, stated in my presence, "what is that smell on your breath" and indicated to [REDACTED] When questioned about it that she could detect the odor of an Alcoholic beverage emitting from [REDACTED] person. An investigation into the operation of train car #406 revealed that when [REDACTED] pulled into the Van Dorn Street Metro Station, [REDACTED] overshot the platform (went past the end of the platform) by approximately two train car lengths. At that point, [REDACTED] stopped for approximately four seconds without opening the doors, never servicing the station. After this occurred, [REDACTED] proceeded to leave the station in the direction of Franconia-Springfield, where the car was ultimately stopped for an undetermined reason. This happened while rail operations were trying to contact [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] was also evaluated by Alexandria Medic 208, refused any medical treatment, and claimed not to suffer from any medical ailments. I briefly left the scene to retrieve my patrol vehicle from the Van Dorn Metro Station. [REDACTED] did not leave the scene and remained in the presence of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Train car 406 was carrying approximately fifteen passengers at the time of the incident.

Based on the signs of intoxication and [REDACTED] atypical train operations, a standardized field sobriety test (FST) would conducted on [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] was suspected of operating train car 406 while intoxicated. I, [REDACTED] conducted the field sobriety tests. Fairfax County PFC. [REDACTED] was also on scene to provide a Preliminary Breath Test device if [REDACTED] elected to participate in the administering of the test. I began the FST by asking [REDACTED] if [REDACTED] would consensually participate in a battery of tests [REDACTED] consented to participate in the battery of tests. I then asked [REDACTED] what [REDACTED] highest level of education was, to which [REDACTED] replied [REDACTED] had graduated high school. I then inquired if [REDACTED] had any medical condition that would prevent [REDACTED] from performing tasks such as walking or standing. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had no medical issues preventing [REDACTED] from performing such tasks. [REDACTED] was also not wearing glasses during the administering of this test. Additionally, I requested that [REDACTED] count backward from forty to thirty before administering any FSTs. Which [REDACTED] was able to perform.

I advised [REDACTED] that I would be starting with a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. This began with the instruction phase when I held a pen approximately one and a half arm's length away from [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] eye level. I then instructed [REDACTED] to look at the tip of the pen and follow it with [REDACTED] eyes and not [REDACTED] head until I told [REDACTED] was completed with administering the test. I then proceeded to administer the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. I started the test with the pen approximately one and a half arm's length at eye level and checked for equal pupil dilation. Both appeared to be the same size. I then began moving the pen outward from the center of [REDACTED] vision to the far right of [REDACTED] vision and then to the far left in a slow and deliberate manner. I then repeated this motion a second time. During the pen's movement, I observed a lack of smooth pursuit in both [REDACTED] left and right eye. [REDACTED] eyes appeared to have a motion I would describe as jerking in order to follow the pen. Next, [REDACTED] was checked for distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation. Again, the pen was moved from the center of [REDACTED] vision to the far right of [REDACTED] vision and held at that position for a short period of time. The pen was then returned to the center of [REDACTED] vision and repeated on [REDACTED] left side. I moved the pen from the center of [REDACTED] vision to the far-left side of [REDACTED] vision and held in that position for a short time. This movement was repeated on both sides. During this portion of the test, I observed distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation as [REDACTED] eyes again appeared to jerk when looking at the pen at maximum deviation.

[REDACTED] was checked for the onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees. This was done by moving the pen from the center of [REDACTED] vision to [REDACTED] right side approximately and stopped approximately 45 degrees. This was also conducted for the left side in the same manner prescribed. This was also repeated. [REDACTED], during this test, showed onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees. I observed both of [REDACTED] eyes jerk while administering this portion of the test.

[REDACTED] presented six out six possible clues during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test.

MTPD CCN:
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Attachment 1: MTPD Police Report. Page 5 of 7.

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The next test performed was the walk-and-turn test. During the instruction phase of this test, I told [REDACTED] to stand with [REDACTED] hands by [REDACTED] side, place [REDACTED] feet heel to toe, imagine a straight line in front of [REDACTED]; and walk ten steps heel to toe, counting out loud as [REDACTED] took the steps. I then told [REDACTED]; once [REDACTED] was finished with [REDACTED] steps, to turn around utilizing short choppy steps and proceed back to [REDACTED] starting point in the same manner previously described. Along with a verbal explanation, I gave [REDACTED] a visual demonstration of the test during my explanation. After the demonstration and explanation, I told [REDACTED] may begin the test. During this test, I observed [REDACTED] fail to maintain a straight line and straight heel-to-toe steps in both directions. Additionally, after turning around after the first set of steps, [REDACTED] took a heel-to-toe step backward, and I instructed [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was meant to move forward. Additionally [REDACTED] took an improper eight step on [REDACTED] return.

[REDACTED] presented four out of eight possible clues on the walk-and-turn test.

The last test that was administered was the one-legged stand test. During the instruction phase of this test, I explained to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was to keep [REDACTED] hands by [REDACTED] side, raise [REDACTED] foot approximately 6 inches off the ground, and count out loud one thousand until I told [REDACTED] to stop. Again, during the instruction phase of this test, I gave [REDACTED] a visual demonstration. After the explanation, I told [REDACTED] may begin. During this test, [REDACTED] lost [REDACTED] balance and fell, causing [REDACTED] to reach out [REDACTED] arms to prevent [REDACTED] from falling by grabbing the seat to prop [REDACTED] back up. After this, [REDACTED] swayed during the remainder of this test.


[REDACTED] presented two out of four possible clues on the one-legged stand test.

Lastly, I asked if [REDACTED] wished to participate in a preliminary breath test. [REDACTED] consented to the test. Operation of the preliminary breath test was demonstrated to me by [REDACTED]. After the demonstration, I administered the test to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] generated a reading of .081 on the preliminary breath test which is beyond the legal limit.

As a result of [REDACTED] poor performance on the FST in conjunction with the preliminary breath test result, [REDACTED] was arrested for suspicion of DWI (18.2-266) at 0040 hours. Additionally, [REDACTED] WMATA keys, radio, and employee identification were confiscated by the rail supervisor on the scene. [REDACTED] was searched and transported to Fairfax Adult Detention Center for processing without incident. At the Fairfax Adult Detention Center, Fairfax County PFC. [REDACTED] administered a Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Forensic Science Certified Blood Alcohol Analysis, resulting in an alcohol content of .06 at approximately 0154 hours.

[REDACTED] was brought in front of Magistrate [REDACTED] who determined there was probable cause to issue one warrant of arrest for DWI (drive or operate a motor vehicle, engine, or train while having a blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (18.2-266)). The warrant was executed on December 24th, 2022, at approximately 0225 hours by Myself. [REDACTED] property was returned to [REDACTED] at Fairfax adult detention center. Magistrate [REDACTED] decided to hold [REDACTED] until 0500 in the morning to sober up as he observed [REDACTED] displaying slurred speech and appeared unsteady on feet.

All events took place in Fairfax County within the Commonwealth of Virginia.




MTPD CCN:
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Event Report Page 7 of 7

Attachment 1: MTPD Police Report. Page 7 of 7.

Appendix I – Why Tree



Root Cause Analysis

Attachment 1 – RCA Why Tree page 1 of 1

