



**WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0241 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at L’Enfant Plaza Station – March 2, 2023**

*Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on August 8, 2023*

**Safety event summary:**

On Thursday, March 2, 2023, L’Enfant Plaza Station was evacuated due to a bomb threat. Initially, relevant Rail Operations Control Center personnel were not aware of the threat, because the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) did not communicate this information.

At 12:59 pm, the District of Columbia Office of Unified Communications (D.C. 911 call center) informed an MTPD dispatcher of a bomb threat at L’Enfant Plaza Station. The Metro Transit Police Department dispatcher directed MTPD personnel to respond to the station

At 1:06 p.m., personnel in the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) overheard transmissions on an MTPD radio about the emergency, and, at 1:07 p.m., the Operations Manager directed personnel to have trains bypass (continue through without stopping) the station.

The Rail Traffic Controllers instructed trains to bypass L’Enfant Plaza Station on both levels.

At 1:08 p.m., MTPD established the Incident Command Post and began searching the station.

A Rail Operations Information Controller directed a Station Manager to evacuate the station.

During the response, a ROCC Assistant Operations Manager directed that the Rail Traffic Controller instruct the Rail Supervisor at L’Enfant Plaza Station to leave the emergency scene and go to Waterfront Station to remind train operators to bypass L’Enfant Plaza Station. Based on direction from the Assistant Operations Manager, the Rail Traffic Controller told the Rail Supervisor that MTPD personnel would give them a ride to Waterfront Station as trains were bypassing L’Enfant Plaza Station. The Rail Supervisor went to the Green Line platform, and had Train 507 stop. At 1:18 p.m., the Rail Supervisor advised the Rail Traffic Controller that they keyed themselves onto Train 507 towards Waterfront Station. This train had been instructed to bypass the station due to the evacuation for life safety reasons, but stopped at L’Enfant Plaza Station with riders aboard for the Rail Supervisor. Other than the door the Rail Supervisor used to access the train, no other doors were opened and passengers remained on board the train. The Rail Traffic Controller then told the Rail Supervisor to stay at L’Enfant Plaza Station, but the train was already moving to Waterfront. Personnel in the Rail Operations Control Center had realized that the Rail Supervisor should be sent to the Incident Command Post and that the Incident Command Post was located at 7<sup>th</sup> St. SW and Maryland Avenue SW, which is outside of L’Enfant Plaza Station. As a result of the supervisor on scene being directed to leave, there was no Rail Supervisor present at the Incident Command Post to act as the Rail Forward Liaison during this event.

At 1:27 p.m., MTPD reported that nothing was found and that the station was clear and could reopen.

**Probable Cause:**

The probable cause of this event was the report of a bomb threat. The probable cause for deficiencies related to Metrorail’s operational response was insufficient communication and coordination among Metrorail departments and Metrorail not following its command and control procedures.



**Corrective Actions:**

Metrorail issued a memorandum for ROCC Management to review command roles under SOP 1A, especially as it pertains to the Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Forward Liaison.

Examples of other related open CAPs

- C-0162 addresses the finding that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. Metrorail has begun to implement parts of this corrective action plan.
- C-0176 developed to address the recommendation that Metrorail has the opportunity to improve and expand training and training coordination related to fire and life safety and emergency management (Expected completion date March 2024)

**WMSC staff observations:**

MTPD did not immediately notify the ROCC of the reported bomb threat. For approximately 10 minutes after MTPD received the report of the bomb threat, trains were allowed to service L'Enfant Plaza Station. Effective and timely interdepartmental communication among all Metrorail organizational units is critical to the safety of passengers and personnel.

Conflicting instructions during this event resulted in passengers being stopped in an area that had been deemed unsafe and led to the absence of a Rail Supervisor to serve as the Office of Rail Transportation Forward Liaison at the Incident Command Post as required by Metrorail procedure.

Metrorail should ensure that Rail Traffic Controllers and other frontline personnel properly and safely carrying out their duties are permitted to do such work without managers providing direction outside of Metrorail procedures.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety (SAFE)  
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)  
**FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23146**

<b>Date of Event:</b>	March 2, 2023
<b>Type of Event:</b>	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
<b>Incident Time:</b>	12:59 Hours
<b>Location:</b>	L'Enfant Plaza Station
<b>Time and How received by SAFE:</b>	13:07 hours – SAFE/MAC
<b>WMSC Notification Time:</b>	13:47 hours
<b>Responding Safety Officers:</b>	None
<b>Rail Vehicle:</b>	N/A
<b>Injuries:</b>	None
<b>Damage:</b>	None
<b>Emergency Responders:</b>	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), District of Columbia Fire Department Special Operations (DCFSD)
<b>SMS I/A Number</b>	20230302#106535MX

# L'Enfant Plaza Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Events

## March 2, 2023 Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms-----	3
Executive Summary -----	4
Incident Site -----	5
Field Sketch/Schematics -----	5
Purpose and Scope -----	5
Investigative Methods-----	5
Investigation -----	6
Chronological Event Timeline-----	7
Weather -----	8
Human Factors -----	8
Evidence of Fatigue -----	8
Fatigue Risk -----	8
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing -----	8
Findings -----	8
Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence -----	9
Probable Cause Statement-----	9
Recommended Corrective Actions -----	9
Appendices -----	10
Appendix A – MTPD Event Report -----	10
Appendix B – MTPD After-Action Report -----	14
Appendix C – Why-Tree Analysis-----	18

## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

<b>AOM</b>	Assistant Operations Manager
<b>CAP</b>	Corrective Action Plan
<b>CCTV</b>	Closed-Circuit Television
<b>DCFDSO</b>	District of Columbia Fire Department Special Operations
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
<b>FLO</b>	Fire Liaison Officer
<b>MSRPH</b>	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
<b>OM</b>	Operations Manager
<b>OUC</b>	Office of Unified Communications
<b>RTRA</b>	Office of Rail Transportation
<b>ROCC</b>	Rail Operations Control Center
<b>ROIC</b>	Rail Operations Information Center
<b>RTC</b>	Rail Traffic Controller
<b>SAFE</b>	Department of Safety
<b>SMS</b>	Safety Measurement System
<b>WMATA</b>	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
<b>WMSC</b>	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

---

**Executive Summary**

*\*Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. \**

On March 2, 2023, at 12:59 hours, the District of Columbia 911 Office of Unified Communications (OUC) contacted the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and reported receiving a telephone call of a bomb threat at L'Enfant Plaza Station. MTPD dispatched units to respond to L'Enfant Plaza Station. The Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Operations Manager (OM) notified the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) of the event. The AOM notified the Radio Rail Traffic Controllers (RTC) of the event and instructed that trains bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station on both levels. The Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) Controller instructed the Station Manager to evacuate the station.

At 13:06 hours, MTPD established the Incident Command Post and requested MTPD Explosives and Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units to sweep the station. At 13:09 hours, the Fire Liaison Officer notified the District of Columbia Fire Department Special Operations (DCFDSO) Battalion Chief of the report. At 13:11, an ROIC Controller requested a bus bridge. At 13:27 hours, EOD Units reported the station was clear and nothing was found. At 13:28 hours, MTPD advised that L'Enfant Plaza Station could reopen.


There were no injuries or damage resulting from this event.

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event on March 2, 2023, at L'Enfant Plaza Station was a reported bomb threat against the station. No significant deficiencies were identified with the response to the event and adherence to policies and procedures.

## Incident Site

L'Enfant Plaza Station

## Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

## Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

## Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Physical Site Assessment through video and document review.
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
  - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
  - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
  - MTPD After-Action Report
  - MTPD Event Report
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
  - ARS (Audio Recording System) playback [Radio and Landline Communications]
  - System Performance On-Time Summary (Spots)

- Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

## **Investigation**

On March 2, 2023, at 12:59 hours, the District of Columbia 911 OUC contacted the MTPD and reported receiving a telephone call of a bomb threat at L'Enfant Plaza Station.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that at 13:05 hours, MTPD Dispatch requested units respond to L'Enfant Plaza Station. One minute later, an MTPD unit responded and reported that they were located at L'Enfant Plaza Station and requested the MTPD EOD Unit, Rail, and Bus Supervisors to respond, then requested trains to bypass the station and for the station to be evacuated.

At 13:06 hours, the OM and Fire Liaison Officer (FLO) can be heard discussing the event to include specifics of evacuating both levels of L'Enfant Plaza Station. The OM can then be heard placing multiple calls to multiple parties advising of the incident. The FLO can be heard advising an unknown party that they were aware of the event and that they were currently reviewing CCTV footage.

At 13:07 hours, the ROCC OM notified the AOM of the event. The AOM notified the Radio RTC's of the event and instructed trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station on both levels. The AOM instructed the Ops 2 and Ops 3 Radio RTCs to announce that trains would bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. At 13:08 hours, MTPD established the Incident Command Post at 7<sup>th</sup> Street & Maryland Avenue SW. The OM notified ROIC of the event and the ROIC Controller instructed the Station Manager to evacuate the station. The DCFDSO Battalion Chief was notified and dispatched units to L'Enfant Plaza Station.

At 13:09 hours, an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisor #1 advised Ops 3 Radio RTC that they were located at L'Enfant Plaza Station. Rail Supervisor #1 was instructed by the Radio RTC to assist with the evacuation of the station; however, they did not acknowledge the transmission.

At 13:10 hours, Rail Supervisor #2 advised Ops 2 Radio RTC that they were located at L'Enfant Plaza Station. Rail Supervisor #2 was instructed to board the train located on track 1 and to advise the trains at Federal Center SW Station, track 2 to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. Rail Supervisor #2 acknowledged and repeated.

At 13:11 hours, an ROIC Controller requested a bus bridge.

At 13:14 hours, the AOM advised the RTC to assign the RTRA Supervisor to go to Waterfront Station.

At 13:18 hours, Rail Supervisor #1 advised Ops 3 Radio RTC that they keyed aboard a train on track 2 towards Waterfront Station. The Ops 3 Radio RTC instructed Rail Supervisor #1 not to board the train, advised that the Incident Command Post was located 7<sup>th</sup> & Maryland Avenue, and instructed Train ID 507 to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. Rail Supervisor #1 continued aboard Train ID 507 towards Waterfront Station.

At 13:20 hours, MTPD advised that the station was clear of customers and the sweep of the station had begun. At 13:27 hours, EOD Units reported the station was clear and that nothing was found. At 13:28 hours, MTPD advised that L'Enfant Plaza Station could reopen.



## Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
12:59:07 hours	DC 911 contacted MTPD and reported a person contacted them and reported a bomb threat at L'Enfant Plaza Station and that MPD were en route to L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Phone]
13:05:07 hours	MTPD Dispatch requested Units to respond to L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Radio, MTPD 1X]
13:06:10 hours	MTPD Unit advised they were located at L'Enfant Plaza Station, requested EOD Unit to respond, Rail and Bus Supervisors, trains to bypass the station and station evacuation. [MTPD 1X]
13:06:15 hours	The OM and MAC can be heard conversing in reference to the incident and the bypass of both levels of L'Enfant Plaza Station. The OM then makes multiple calls to parties advising of the incident. The FLO can be heard advising an unknown party that they were advised of the event and that they were reviewing the CCTV footage. [Ambient, Fire Liaison]
13:07:26 hours	OM notified the AOM and was instructed to have trains bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Phone]
13:08:00 hours	AOM instructed Ops 2 Radio RTC to have trains bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Phone]
13:08:03 hours	MTPD Unit advised they were the On-Scene Commander and Incident Command Post was located at 7 <sup>th</sup> & Maryland Avenue. [MTPD 1X]
13:08:11 hours	Ops 3 Radio RTC announced trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Radio, Ops 3]
13:08:16 hours	Ops 2 Radio RTC announced trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Radio, Ops 2]
13:08:21 hours	OM notified ROIC. [Phone]
13:09:17 hours	FLO notified the DCFDSO Battalion Chief of the report. [Phone]
13:09:21 hours	ROIC instructed Station Managers to evacuate the station. [Phone]
13:09:57 hours	<u>Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Reported to Ops 3 Radio RTC that they were located at L'Enfant Plaza Station. <u>Ops 3 Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Rail Supervisor #1 to assist with evacuation of the station. <u>Rail Supervisor #1</u> : No Response. [Radio, Ops 3]
13:10:16 hours	<u>Rail Supervisor #2</u> : Reported to Ops 2 Radio RTC that they were located at L'Enfant Plaza Station. <u>Ops 2 Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Rail Supervisor #2 to key aboard the train on track 1 and report to Federal Center SW Station to advise trains to bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. <u>Rail Supervisor #2</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio, Ops 2]

Time	Description
13:10:45 hours	AOM instructed Ops 3 Radio RTC to have trains bypass L'Enfant Plaza Station. [Phone]
13:11:51 hours	ROIC requested a bus bridge. [Phone]
13:14:35 hours	AOM advised the RTC to assign RTRA Supervisor #1 to go to Waterfront Station. [Phone]
13:18:02 hours	<u>Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Advised to Ops 3 Radio RTC that they keyed aboard a train on track 2 towards Waterfront Station. <u>Ops 3 Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Rail Supervisor #1 to not board the train; the Incident Command Post was located at 7 <sup>th</sup> & Maryland Avenue. <u>Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Reported they were aboard Train ID 507 heading towards Waterfront Station. [Radio, Ops 3]
13:20:56 hours	MTPD reported the station was clear of customers and EOD Units were performing a sweep of the station. [MTPD 2X]
13:27:15 hours	EOD reported station clear. [MTPD 2X]
13:27:53 hours	MTPD advised that L'Enfant Plaza could reopen. [MTPD 2X]
13:28:40 hours	MTPD advised that they would remain on scene and train service could resume. [MTPD 2X]

*Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.*

## Weather

On March 2, 2023, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 49° F, with light cloud cover. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC).

## Human Factors

### Evidence of Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

### Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

### Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

## Findings

- Unified Command was utilized among WMATA and DCFEMS responders.
- A Rail Supervisor was not present at the Command Post for the duration of the event.
  - Rail Supervisor #1 was initially instructed to remain at L'Enfant Plaza Station by the RTC but was then tasked by the AOM to proceed to Waterfront Station.
  - Train ID 507 stopped at L'Enfant Plaza Station for Rail Supervisor #1 to board after being instructed to bypass the station.

- Rail Supervisor #2 was dispatched away from the event at L'Enfant Plaza Station to assist with station bypass.

**Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence**

- MTPD EOD personnel performed a sweep of the station.

**Probable Cause Statement**

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event on March 2, 2023, at L'Enfant Plaza Station was a reported bomb threat against the station.

**Recommended Corrective Actions**

<b>Corrective Action Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Responsible Party</b>	<b>Estimated Completion Date</b>
106535MX_ SAFECAPS_ ROCC_001	Memorandum for ROCC Management (AOM and above) to review Command Roles under SOP 1A especially RTRA Forward Liaison.	ROCC SRC	07/01/2023

# Appendices

## Appendix A – MTPD Event Report



Event Report			
Metro Transit Police Department		ORI-DCMTP0000	
Type of Report	MTPD CCN	Local Jurisdiction	Local CCN
Open	2023-01746-001	District of Columbia	

Event Location					
Street	Station Acronym	City, State	County	MTP District	Local District
650 Maryland Ave SW (7th & Md)	LFPL - L'ENFANT PLAZA	WASHINGTON, DC 20024	D01-District 01	District 2	D01-District 01
Date and Time of Event			Date and Time Reported		
From To			From To		
3/2/2023 1:02:00 PM			3/2/2023 1:02:17 PM		
Category					
Rail Station, Line or Right-of-Way	On Bus	Property	Other		
LFPL - L'ENFANT PLAZA Green		Rail Station	MSA4		
Specific Location (Foot Bridge, Kiosk, Platform, Tracks, Etc.)			For Burglary or B&E Only		
Platform			If Hotel Rule Applies, #Premises or Facilities Entered:		
Location Description					
Rail Station					

Event Information		
If Incident Use This Block	Offense #	Bomb Threat
Incident Classification	Offense Classification	A
Incident Description	Description	Bomb Threat
	Weapon/Force Type of Activity	/None/Unknown
Entry Type:		Number Premises Entered:
Hate Crime Motivation: None (no bias) (mutually exclusive)		
Bias Motivation: None (no bias) (mutually exclusive)		
Offender Suspected of Using:	Modus Operandi (MO):	
Case Status Information		Clearance Date
Case Status (Completed by the Official who signs this report):		If Case Cleared Exceptionally:
Reporting Officer (Print)	Badge #	Second Officer (Print)
Supervisor's Name (Electronically Approved)		Investigator Notified
		ID#

MTPD CCN:  
ORI-DCMTP0000

Event Report Page 1 of 5

Document 1 – MTPD Event Report, Page 1 of 4

Incident Date: 03/02/2023 Time: 12:59 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23146

Completed By: SAFE 705 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023

Page 10

Victim Information				
Victim Sequence #:		Victim Assistance Provided: Y - Yes		
Last Name, First MI		[REDACTED]		DOB
Address Type	Address (Street) City, State Zip			
W - Work	[REDACTED]			
Type Phone	Phone Number			
W - Work	[REDACTED]			
Entity Name				
Work/School Address - Adff. Contact info				
Age of Victim	Sex	Race	Ethnicity	Resident Status
42	Male	White	H - Hispanic Origin	Nonresident
Classification of Victim		Type of Victim	This Victim is Related to Which Offense	
9935 - DC - Bomb Threat		Individual	9935 - DC - Bomb Threat	
Is suspect information available at the time of this report:				
Relationship: [REDACTED] - Victim Was Stranger				
Injury Type	Responding Ambulance:		Taken Where	
Aggravated Assault/Homicide Information				
Aggravated Assault/Homicide Circumstances			Additional Justifiable Homicide Circumstances	
Other Person Information				

MTPD CCN:  
ORI-DCMTP0000

Event Report Page 2 of 5

Document 2 - MTPD Event Report, Page 2 of 4

Incident Date: 03/02/2023 Time: 12:59 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23146

Completed By: SAFE 705 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023

Page 11

Has a DVR been requested?  
Narrative Information

Suspect called MPD and would only state his name, bomb and LFPL. Incident Command was established at 1305 hrs and EOD/K9 units cleared the scene safe. CID will have further investigation for suspect and incident.

If second CCN is available, insert here:

Additional Narrative on Supplemental Report

MTPD CCN:  
ORI-DCMTP0000

Event Report Page 3 of 5

Document 3 - MTPD Event Report, Page 3 of 4

Incident Date: 03/02/2023 Time: 12:59 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23146

Completed By: SAFE 705 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023

Page 12

Additional Narrative

On 03-02-2023 at approximately 1302 hours at 650 Maryland Avenue SW Washington DC (L'Enfant Metro Station) I [REDACTED], responded for a radio run for a bomb threat inside the station. Further investigation revealed MPD received a phone call from a party that stated only their name, bomb and L'Enfant.

[REDACTED], established Incident Command at 1305 hours and made the decision to bypass train service and evacuate the station until cleared by EOD and K9 personnel. Incident Command was held outside of the station at 7th/Maryland SW where DC Special Operations [REDACTED] staged and directed his personnel. [REDACTED], assisted as forward liaison and coordinated the evacuation of the station and elevators with multiple MTPD units. Multiple K9/EOD units cleared the station and area safe with no hazardous detected at which time the station was placed in full operational service at 1328 hours. Station was closed from 1309-1332 hours and normal service resumed at 1332 hours.

Criminal Investigations Division broadcasted a BOLO of the potential caller and was being identified at the time as [REDACTED] having a date of birth of [REDACTED] TSOIC notifications were done by [REDACTED] at 1350 hours (TSOC-03-06666-23).

MTPD CCN:  
ORI-DCMTP0000

Event Report Page 4 of 5

Document 4 - MTPD Event Report, Page 4 of 4

Incident Date: 03/02/2023 Time: 12:59 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23146

Completed By: SAFE 705 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023

Page 13

**Appendix B – MTPD After-Action Report**

**Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary**

**ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS**

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. Items marked with an asterisk (\*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:	9935 - DC - Bomb Threat		
*Incident Commander (IC):	SGT		
MTPD CCN:		Local CCN:	
*Date ICS Initiated:	3/2/2023	*Time ICS Initiated:	1:07:00 PM
*Date ICS Terminated:	3/2/2023	*Time ICS Terminated:	1:32:00 PM
*Duration of Incident:	25min	*Service Disrupted Disrupted Type: Disrupted Time:	Y - Yes Station closed, trains bypass 3/2/2023 1:09:00 PM
Incident Location:	650 Maryland Ave SW (7th & Md)	Command Post Location:	7th/MD Top Side
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	[REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	[REDACTED]
Forward Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Unified Command:	
OCC Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Alternate Channel:	Y - Yes MTPD 2X
Single Tracking Track No.: Time Started: Time End:	N - No	Bus Bridge Established From: To:	N - No



Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	Inside station Outside entire station	Power De-energized: De-energized Time:	N - No
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name	Y - Yes	Medical Attention Required/Requested:	N - No
Dept:		CID Response: N - No	

**For Official Use Only**

The information in this document marked FOUO is the property of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) to law enforcement, public safety and protection, intelligence officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution to other entities without prior MTPD authorization is prohibited. Precautions shall be taken to ensure this information is stored and destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the FOUO marking may not be used in legal proceedings without prior authorization from the originator. Recipients are prohibited from posting information marked FOUO on a website or unclassified network.

## Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA and EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
		Entry Exit
		EOD D2 A
		K9 D2 B
		EOD D1 A
		D2 A
		Forward Liasion D2 A
		Scribe D2 A

Document 6 - MTPD After-Action Report, Page 2 of 4

Incident Date: 03/02/2023 Time: 12:59 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23146

Completed By: SAFE 705 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023

[REDACTED]		
[REDACTED]		D2 A
[REDACTED]		D2 A
[REDACTED]		

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

## Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	N - No
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	N - No
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	

### OBSERVATIONS

-1302hrs MTPD CD received call from MPD ref. Bomb threat at LFPL

-1307hrs [REDACTED] On scene and requested Rail and Bus SUPV

-1308hrs [REDACTED] est. command post 7th/MD topside

-1309hrs Trains bypassing the station

-1310hrs Switched to MTPD 2X

Document 7 - MTPD After-Action Report, Page 3 of 4

Incident Date: 03/02/2023 Time: 12:59 hours  
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons  
E23146

Completed By: SAFE 705 – 04/23/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 05/01/2023

Page 16

-1331hrs [REDACTED] disseminated potential BOLO for suspect

-1332hrs [REDACTED] reopened station. Rail back to normal service

MPD received a phone call from a subject who was only understood as stating their name, bomb and LFPL. Several MTPD units to include [REDACTED] were currently at LFPL at the time MTPD dispatch advised of the call. [REDACTED] established Incident Command and made the decision to bypass train service and evacuate the station until cleared by K9/EOD assets. [REDACTED] w/ assistance from MTPD units cleared and evacuated the station. DCFD Special Operation Battalion Chief [REDACTED] responded and staged top side 7/MD. Station was closed from 1309-1332hrs. Normal service resumed at 1332hrs. CID broadcasted a BOLO of the potential caller and is investigating further. MTPD K9/EOD cleared the station with nothing hazardous detected.

Hot wash was conducted top side 7/MD. AAR will be submitted by end of tour.

TSOC notification made to [REDACTED] at 1350hrs  
(TSA-03-06666-23)


\*\*\*\*RTRA Supervisor was never identified nor responded to the command post. Responding Emergency personnel arrived on scene safely and promptly. Station was evacuated and swept by K9/EOD swiftly.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date
3/2/2023 1:07:00 PM

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and signature/Date
[REDACTED]
3/2/2023 7:51:12 PM

Document 8 - MTPD After-Action Report, Page 4 of 4

## Appendix C – Why-Tree Analysis



## Root Cause Analysis

