



WMSC Commissioner Brief: W-0254 – Collision – Rhode Island Avenue-Brentwood Station – August 23, 2023

Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on January 23, 2024

Safety event summary:

Red Line Train 127 struck a rider who deliberately placed themselves in the path of the train as it entered Rhode Island Avenue-Brentwood Station at 10:40 a.m. on Wednesday, August 23, 2023.

The Train Operator adhered to Metrorail procedures by transmitting an emergency broadcast to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) via radio, notifying the Radio Rail Traffic Controller that a person was struck by their train at Rhode Island Avenue-Brentwood Station on track 1. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller instructed the Train Operator to offload riders from the train. At 10:41 a.m., a Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Officer already at the station located the rider, alive, under the second car of the train.

MTPD established an Incident Command Post in the bus bay area. Third rail power was de-energized on track 1.

At approximately 10:45 a.m., a rider at the station called 911 to report the event and a D.C. Office of Unified Communications Dispatcher dispatched multiple District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) units to the station for a person who fell onto the roadway. At 10:47 a.m., the dispatcher upgraded the call to a person struck by a train.

Riders were instructed to exit the train and the station was closed. At 10:55 a.m., the Station Manager confirmed that the incident train and the station were clear of riders.

Power was confirmed to be de-energized on track 1 by an Office of Rail Transportation Supervisor at 11:09 a.m. using a hot stick. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller announced power would be de-energized on track 2 and at 11:16 a.m. the Rail Supervisor entered the roadway and confirmed power was down on track 2 using a hot stick.

At 11:18 a.m., the person struck was removed from the roadway and eventually transported to an area hospital with life-threatening injuries.

Power was restored on track 2 at approximately 11:19 a.m.

DCFEMS personnel were confirmed clear of the roadway at 11:40 a.m. on track 1.

A Car Maintenance Mechanic requested and was granted foul time to enter the roadway on track 1 to perform a track inspection and to check for damage to the rail car. No damage was found, and the Office of Emergency Preparedness requested that power be restored on track 1 to move the incident train to Brentwood Yard. Power was restored at 12:07 p.m.

During the event, MTPD personnel experienced radio communication challenges with the Mission Assurance Coordinator in the ROCC and had to use cellphones to communicate. It is positive that Metrorail personnel identified this issue during the hot wash and this investigation; however, there is no evidence that this issue was subsequently



corrected by the responsible personnel. As noted below, Metrorail is implementing a CAP to address deficiencies in responding to and identifying communications systems problems.

Probable Cause:

The probable cause of this event was an individual deliberately placing themselves in the path of a train.

Corrective Actions:

Example of a related open CAP:

- C-0217 addresses the finding that Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Metrorail closes communications-related “corrective maintenance” (repair) tickets without effectively identifying, documenting and addressing issues. (Expected date of completion May 2025)



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23591

Date of Event:	August 23, 2023
Type of Event:	A-3 - Collision
Incident Time:	10:40 hours
Location:	Rhode Island Avenue Station (B04) Track one
Time and How received by SAFE:	10:41 hours Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC)
WMSC Notification Time:	11:20 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: Office of Emergency and Preparedness (OEP), Office of Operations Safety Oversight (OSO) WMSC: None Other: None
Rail Vehicle:	L3258.3259.3242.3243.3159.3158T
Injuries:	Severe lacerations to lower legs (Partial Bilateral Amputation)
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), District of Columbia Fire & Emergency Medical Services Department (DCFEMS)
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20230823#110876

Collision Rhode Island Avenue Station

August 23, 2023
Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms-----	3
Executive Summary -----	4
Incident Site -----	5
Field Sketch/Schematics -----	5
Purpose and Scope -----	5
Investigative Methods-----	5
Investigation -----	6
Chronological Event Timeline-----	9
Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) -----	12
The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) / Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS) -----	13
Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) -----	14
Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR) -----	14
Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) -----	14
Written Statement Findings – Interview Pending Involved Employee’s Return to Work-----	15
Train Operator (Written Statement) -----	15
RTRA Supervisor -1 (Written Statement) -----	15
Weather -----	15
Related Rules and Procedures-----	16
Human Factors -----	16
Evidence of Fatigue -----	16
Fatigue Risk -----	16
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing -----	16
Findings -----	16
Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence -----	16
Probable Cause Statement-----	17
Recommended Corrective Actions -----	17
Appendices -----	18
Appendix A – Interview Summary -----	18
Train Operator (Written Statement) -----	18
RTRA Supervisor -1 (Written Statement) -----	18
RTRA Supervisor -2 (Written Statement) -----	18
Appendix B – MTPD Incident Report -----	19
Appendix C – MTPD Hot Wash -----	26
Appendix D - RTRA Supervisor’s Report -----	29
Appendix E - RTRA Supervisor’s Incident Report #2-----	32
Appendix G – Train Operator’s Written Statement -----	33
Appendix H - Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report-----	34
Appendix I – Why-Tree Analysis -----	36

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording Services
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CENV	Office of Vehicle Program Services
CMOR	Office of Chief Mechanical Officer
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
DVEU	Digital Video Evidence Unit
ICP	Incident Command Post
IMF	Incident Management Framework
IIT	Incident Investigation Team
MAC	Mission Assurance Coordinator
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OAP	Operations Administrative Policy
OEP	Office of Emergency and Preparedness
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SPOTS	System Performance On-Time Summary
SMS	Safety Measurement System
VCU	VMS Central Unit
VMS	Vehicle Monitoring System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Wednesday, August 23, 2023, at 10:40 hours, the Train Operator of Red Line Train ID 127 (L3258-3259-3242-3243-3159-3158T), traveling on track one entering Rhode Island Avenue Station, transmitted an emergency broadcast to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) stating that “a customer just jumped in front of my train.” The Radio RTC asked for Train ID 127’s location and instructed the Operator to key down and offload all customers at Rhode Island Avenue Station. At 10:41 hours, Train 127 stated that a Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Officer was on the scene and located the customer underneath car 3259 (second car) with signs of life.

At 10:42 hours, the MTPD officer confirmed a “Person Struck by Train” event at Rhode Island Avenue Station. The MTPD Unit stated that there were signs of life, and the customer was communicating. At 10:43 hours, the MTPD Unit on the scene assumed the role of WMATA Incident Commander and established an Incident Command Post (ICP) outside Rhode Island Avenue Station in the bus bay. Third rail power was de-energized on Track 1 from Rhode Island Avenue to Brookland Stations. At 10:45 hours, the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department (DCFEMS) dispatcher was notified of a person who fell on the roadway and dispatched numerous Fire/EMS units to respond.

At 10:47 hours, the dispatcher upgraded the service call to a person struck by a train to all responding units. At 10:49 hours, the MTPD Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) identified and reported that at 10:38 hours, a person intentionally entered the tracks as the train approached.

At 10:50 hours, DCFEMS arrived on the scene and established a Unified Command at the Rhode Island Avenue Command Post. At 10:55 hours, the Rhode Island Avenue Station Manager announced that all passengers were evacuated from Train ID 127, and the station was closed.

At 10:59 hours, the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) announced that power was de-energized on track one and a bus bridge was established. At 11:05 hours, an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor hot-sticked and confirmed that power was de-energized on track one. At 11:09 hours, the Radio RTC announced a power de-energization alert for Rhode Island Avenue Station track 2 on radio channel Ops One. At 11:16 hours, an RTRA Rail Supervisor hot-sticked and confirmed power was de-energized on Track Two.

At 11:18 hours, the MAC confirmed through Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) that the person was off the roadway and was receiving medical attention from DCFEMS.

At 11:22 hours, the person was transported to MedStar Washington Hospital Center hospital with life-threatening injuries.

At 12:29 hours, Rhode Island Command was terminated, and the scene was returned to RTRA for further investigation.

At 12:53 hours, third rail power was re-energized on tracks one and two, and normal revenue service resumed.


The probable cause of the Person Struck by Train event at Rhode Island Avenue Station on August 23, 2023, was a person intentionally entering on the roadway, which subsequently led them to be struck by a train as it entered the station. There were no findings related to the vehicle or infrastructure that contributed to this event.

Incident Site

Rhode Island Avenue Station (B04)

This is an above-ground station with a center platform. Rhode Island Avenue Station contains a Direct Fixation Track, governed by signals B04-06, 08 signals, and B04-02,04 signals. There is an interlocking at CM B2 & B1 174+94 – 176+87. There are two turnback locations at CM B2 188+50 and B1 192+59.

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of an A-3 Collision – Person Struck by Train at Rhode Island Avenue Station (B04) on August 23, 2023, SAFE dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment - Field response and document review
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed by personnel present during the event.
 - Train Operator
 - RTRA Supervisors
- Formal Interviews – SAFE plans to interview one individual as part of this investigation. Interviews include persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE plans to interview the following individuals:
 - Train Operator – As of the date of this report, the Train Operator is on leave with no return date noted.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation in Metro record systems. These records include the following:
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Employee Training Records
 - Employee Certifications
 - Employee 30 Day Work History
 - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
 - Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Hot Wash Summary
 - Maximo Data
 - Office of Emergency and Preparedness (OEP)
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback, including OPS 1 Radio and Landline Communications.
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)
 - Office of Vehicle Program Services (CENV) Vehicle Monitoring Systems (VMS)
 - Closed-circuit television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Wednesday, August 23, 2023, at 10:40 hours, the Train Operator of Red Line Train ID 127 (L3258-3259-3242-3243-3159-3158T) traveling on track one entering Rhode Island Avenue Station transmitted an emergency broadcast to the ROCC Radio RTC stating that “a customer just jumped in front of my train.” The RTC asked for Train ID 127’s location and instructed the Operator to key down and offload all customers at Rhode Island Avenue Station. At 10:41 hours, Train ID 127 stated that an MTPD Unit was on the scene and located the customer underneath the second train car (3259) with signs of life. At 10:42 hours, the MTPD Officer confirmed a “Person Struck by Train” at Rhode Island Avenue Station. The MTPD Unit stated that there were signs of life, and the customer was communicating.

At 10:43 hours, the MTPD Unit on the scene assumed the role of WMATA Incident Commander and established the ICP outside Rhode Island Avenue Station in the bus bay. Third rail power was de-energized on Track 1 from Rhode Island to Brookland Stations. At 10:44 hours, secondary assistance from the Office of Emergency and Preparedness (OEP) and Automatic Train Control Maintenance (ATCM) were dispatched to assist in the recovery effort.

At 10:45 hours, the DCFEMS dispatcher was notified of a person who fell on the roadway and dispatched numerous Fire/EMS units to respond. At 10:46 hours, the Rhode Island Command post moved all communications to MTPD2x and assigned a dispatcher to assist.

At 10:47 hours, the dispatcher upgraded the service call to a person struck by a train to all responding units. At 10:49 hours, the MTPD DVEU identified and reported that at 10:38 hours, a person intentionally entered onto the tracks as the train approached.



Figure 1 - Injured person on the platform prior to entering the roadway at Rhode Island Avenue Station. The train is entering the platform limits at the top of the image.

At 10:50 hours, DCFEMS arrived on the scene and unified the Rhode Island Command Post, located on the top side of Rhode Island Avenue Station in the bus bay. At 10:55 hours, the Rhode Island Avenue Station Manager communicated that all passengers were evacuated from Train ID 127, and the station was closed for revenue service.

At 10:53 hours, Rhode Island Command requested all trains bypass the station and ordered a Bus and Rail Supervisor to respond. At 10:56 hours, the Ops one Radio RTC instructed all Train Operators to bypass Rhode Island Avenue Station due to an emergency. The Radio RTC further informed the red line Train Operators that a Bus Bridge was established for the customers.

At 10:59 hours, the MAC announced via radio that power was de-energized on track one. At 11:05 hours, an RTRA Supervisor hot-sticked and confirmed that power was de-energized on track one. At 11:09 hours, the Radio RTC announced a power de-energization alert for Rhode Island Avenue Station track 2 on radio channel Ops One. At 11:16 hours, an RTRA Rail Supervisor hot-sticked and confirmed power was de-energized on Track Two.

At 11:18 hours, the MAC confirmed via CCTV that the customer was off the roadway and was receiving medical attention from DCFEMS. At 11:19 hours, the Radio RTC announced a power re-energization alert for track two radio channel 'Ops 1.' At 11:20 hours, the MAC notified the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) of the event via telephone. At 11:22 hours, the person was transported to MedStar Washington Hospital Center hospital with life-threatening injuries.

At 11:33 hours, an RTRA Supervisor was assigned to transport the incident train to Brentwood Yard for further investigation. At 11:39 hours, additional RTRA Supervisors arrived to assist in this event. At 11:40 hours, DCFEMS verified that all Fire and EMS personnel were off the roadway and in a place of safety. At 11:42 hours, a mechanic from CMNT reported to the command post for their assignment.

At 11:52 hours, the CMNT mechanic requested Foul Time to enter the roadway to perform a track and rail car inspection of the incident train. At 11:54 hours, the CMNT mechanic was granted Foul Time by the Radio RTC to enter the roadway. At 12:02 hours, the CMNT mechanic reported a good track inspection with no damage to the train or tracks. Also, at this time, an OEP unit requested that all power be restored to transport the incident train to Brentwood Rail Yard.

At 12:03 hours, the Rhode Island Command requested that power be re-energized on track one for train movement. At 12:06 hours, a re-energization announcement was broadcast by the Radio RTC, and power was restored to the track one side.

At 12:15 hours, incident Train ID 127 was re-blocked to train 727 and was given an absolute block to Brentwood Rail Yard.

At 12:29 hours, the Rhode Island Command was terminated, and the scene was returned to RTRA for further investigation.

At 12:53 hours, third rail power was re-energized on tracks one and two, and normal revenue service continued.

A review of CCTV cameras and interview statements from the Train Operator found that the person appeared to enter the rail right-of-way intentionally as the train was entering the platform limits.

In adherence to Standard Operating Procedure 102-1, which outlines the protocol for Removing an Employee from Service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio RTC dispatched a Rail Supervisor to relieve the Train Operator from duty for post-incident testing.

The Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) responding members and emergency personnel conducted a hotwash after this event. The responders remarked on an efficient response and coordination effort related to the Incident Management Framework (IMF) utilized during this event. They did not encounter any significant deficiencies related to IMF during this event.

ROCC Management noted that all RTC personnel were briefed daily on the implementation and use of IMF before the turnover process.

In accordance with the Office of the Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) Incident Investigation Team (IIT) Operations Administrative Policy (OAP) 102.06, the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) promptly initiated the removal of Train ID 127 from revenue service for post-incident investigative measures. This action adhered to the Rail Vehicle Event Investigation Policy, ensuring a comprehensive incident examination.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
10:41:02 hours	<u>Train ID 127</u> : Transmitted an emergency message, which stated a patron jumped in front of their train on track one at Rhode Island Avenue Station. [Radio Ops 1]
10:41:32 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated. The RTC asked if the Train Operator could perform a ground walk-around. <u>Train ID 127</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the Train Operator to key down, apply a hand brake, and conduct a radio check on their handheld radio. [Radio Ops 1]
10:41:43 hours	<u>MTPD 1X</u> : The ROCC Liaison notified the dispatcher of a possible person struck by a train at Rhode Island Avenue Station. [MTPD1x]
10:41:49 hours	<u>Train ID 127</u> Stated that MTPD was present, and they had located the patron underneath the train. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio Ops 1]
10:42:04 hours	<u>MTPD Unit</u> : Confirmed jumper and reported that the train was halfway on the platform. They would verify if there were any signs of life. [MTPD1x]
10:42:30 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Notified SDOC regarding a person struck by a train. [SAFEMAC Phone]
10:42:49 hours	<u>Buttons RTC</u> : Contacted the MOC desk and requested assistance from ATC for a single tracking operation at Rhode Island Avenue Station for a person struck by a train. [Phone Ops 1]
10:43:20 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Dispatched OEP personnel to Rhode Island Avenue Station. [SAFEMAC Phone]
10:43:28 hours	<u>MTPD Unit</u> : Assumed role as WMATA Incident Commander. Patron showed signs of life-in communication. [MTPD1x]
10:43:39 hours	<u>Buttons RTC</u> : Contacted CMNT for support at Rhode Island Avenue Station. [Phone Ops 1]
10:44:26 hours	<u>Train ID 127</u> : Conducted handheld radio check. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated. [Radio Ops 1]
10:44:49 hours	<u>MTPD ROCC Liaison</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. (signs of life and assumed command). <u>MTPD Unit</u> : Requested all trains be held out of Rhode Island. The Fire Department is communicating with Patron. [MTPD1x]
10:45:21 hours	<u>MTPD Unit</u> : Updated- Patron communicated. The patron is located in a place of refuge. [MTPD1x]
10:45:24 hours	<u>DCFEMS</u> : Notified of a person who fell on the roadway at Rhode Island Avenue Station. Dispatched numerous units. [Open Mhz]
10:45:37 hours	<u>Train ID 127</u> : Stated patron is under car number 3259 with signs of life. [Radio Ops 1]

Time	Description
10:45:38 hours	<u>MTPD ROCC Liaison</u> : ROCC liaison transmitted that the On-Scene Commander requested that trains be held. <u>MTPD Unit</u> : Requested the DVEU Unit to review the cameras and event. [MTPD1x]
10:46:53 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatcher</u> : Advised Detail to move to MTPD 2X. [MTPD1x]
10:46:18 hours	<u>MTPD ROCC Liaison</u> : Power is down track 1- I confirmed track 2 is energized. [MTPD1x]
10:47:12 hours	<u>DCFEMS Dispatcher</u> : updated responding units of a patron struck by a train. [Open Mhz]
10:47:23 hours	<u>Train ID 127</u> : Confirmed signs of life. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated. Requested Train Operator to key down and offload customers to the platform. [Radio Ops 1]
10:47:41 hours	<u>MTPD Unit</u> : Operator secured in operator's cab, awaiting detectives. FD will be performing a rescue. [MTPD1x]
10:48:55 hours	<u>Buttons RTC</u> : Called Shady Grove for the Train Operator's information. [Phone Ops 1]
10:49:16 hours	<u>DVEU Unit</u> : Identified a (redacted) female at 10:38 hours intentionally entered the tracks as the train approached. [MTPD2x]
10:50:20 hours	<u>MTPD ROCC Liaison</u> : FD and EMS on scene. [MTPD2x]
10:51:15 hours	<u>Train ID 127</u> : Notified the RTC that the Incident Commander wanted them to remain in the cab for interviewing purposes. [Radio RTC]
10:51:50 hours	<u>DCFEMS</u> : Advised they were on the scene. The command is set up on the top side of Rhode Island Avenue Station (Rhode Island Command established) [Open Mhz]
10:52:50 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Station Manager to key off all remaining customers off the train to the platform. [Radio Ops 1]
10:53:30 hours	<u>MTPD ROCC Liaison</u> : Asked the Rhode Island Command to service or bypass the station. <u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Requested that all trains bypass the station. Have an RTRA Supervisor and Bus Supervisor respond. The Command Post is relocated to the top side of Rhode Island Avenue Station. [MTPD2x]
10:53:49 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Announced to all Ops 1 Operators regarding the emergency at Rhode Island. [Radio Ops 1]
10:54:16 hours	<u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Assigned PD Units to command post roles. DCFEMS Chief on the scene- present at Command Post. [MTPD2x]
10:55:03 hours	<u>Station Manager</u> : reported all customers cleared from Train ID 127. [Radio Ops 1]
10:55:20 hours	<u>MTPD CID unit</u> reported they were on the scene. [MTPD2x]
10:55:32 hours	<u>Station Manager</u> : Rhode Island Avenue Station is evacuated. [Radio Ops 1]
10:55:56 hours	<u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Confirmed patron under the train. [Open Mhz]
10:56:19 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Announced to all Ops 1 Operators regarding the emergency at Rhode Island; Bus services are available. [Radio Ops 1]
10:56:54 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : All passengers evacuated from the train. [MTPD2x]
10:59:01 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Power is down. Need to hot stick and confirm. [MTPD2x]
11:00:15 hours	<u>Ops Command</u> : Hot stick and WSAD placed. Power is confirmed down. <u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [MTPD2x]
11:04:12 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> arrived at the Command Post. [Radio Ops 1]

Time	Description
11:04:24 hours	Radio RTC: Advised that foul time has been granted to hot stick and confirm power is de-energized on track 1. RTRA Supervisor: Acknowledged and Repeated. [Radio Ops 1]
11:05:13 hours	Radio RTC: Advised RTRA Supervisor is assigned to RTRA Forward Liaison. RTRA Supervisor: Acknowledged and Repeated. [Radio Ops 1]
11:06:38 hours	MAC: Reported that power was down on tracks one and two. A Bus bridge was established, and trains were being turned around at Brookland. [MTPD2x]
11:07:42 hours	ROIC called BOCC to request a Bus Bridge. [Phone Ops5]
11:08:19 hours	RTRA Supervisor on scene. [MTPD2x]
11:09:02	OEP Units on the scene. [MTPD2x]
11:09:12 hours	RTRA Supervisor: Confirmed that Power is de-energized on track one. [Radio Ops 1]
11:09:26 hours	Radio RTC: Advised the RTRA Supervisor that power was being de-energized on Track Two. [Radio Ops 1]
11:14:02 hours	Ops Command: RTRA entered the roadway to hot stick and confirm power is down on track two. [MTPD2x]
11:14:06 hours	Radio RTC: Advised RTRA Supervisor that power was down on track 2, and Foul Time was granted to enter the Roadway track 2 side to Hot stick and confirm that power was de-energized. [Radio Ops 1]
11:16:04 hours	RTRA Supervisor: Relinquished foul time- confirmed third rail power is down. Radio RTC: acknowledged and repeated. [Radio Ops 1]
11:16:25 hours	MAC: OEP personnel on scene. [SAFEMAC PHONE]
11:16:45 hours	Ops Command: Power down on track two. [MTPD 2x]
11:17:08 hours	DCFEMS: Patron removed from the roadway. [Open Mhz]
11:17:56 hours	Rhode Island Command: Advised the MAC to bypass the station and not service the station. [MTPD2x]
11:18:16 hours	MAC: Acknowledged and repeated.
11:18:37hours	MAC: Confirmed patron was off the roadway and inside the train receiving medical aid. [MTPD2x-CCTV]
11:18:52 hours	Rhode Island Command: Acknowledged and repeated. [MTPD2x]
11:19:25 hours	Radio RTC: Announced a Power Energization alert for track 2. [Radio Ops 1]
11:20:11 hours	MAC: WMSC provided the Event Scene Release. [SAFEMAC Phone]
11:21:42 hours	Shuttle Bus routes were established at Rode Island. [Radio Ops 1]
11:22:22 hours	Ops Command: Fire/EMS transported the patron. [MTPD2x]
11:24:15 hours	Rhode Island Command: Confirmed person being transported by Medic 17 with life-threatening injuries. [MTPD2x]
11:33:06 hours	RTRA Supervisor: Advised that they will be transporting the incident train to Brentwood. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and Repeated. [Radio Ops1]
11:38:22 hours	RTRA Supervisor on scene. [MTPD2x]
11:39:40 hours	RTRA Mobile Supervisor on the scene. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and repeated [Radio Ops1]
11:40:43 hours	Rhode Island Command: Verified with Ops Command that all personnel were off the roadway. [MTPD2x]
11:40:56 hours	Ops Command: Affirmed – no personnel or equipment is on the roadway. [MTPD2x]

Time	Description
11:42:44 hours	<u>Rhode Island Command</u> : CMNT on the scene. [MTPD2x]
11:43:32 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Redesignated the Forward Liaison position-(Train operator) [Radio Ops1]
11:43:44 hours	<u>Ops Command</u> : Advised all equipment was removed from the roadway and requested permission to move the train to Brentwood. <u>Rhode Island Command</u> : CMNT just arrived for track inspection. Stand by. [MTPD2x]
11:52:39 hours	<u>Ops Command</u> : Requested permission for CMNT to enter the roadway for a car/track inspection. <u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Confirmed power was down-hot stick and confirmed used a WSAD. [MTPD2x]
11:53:44 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> instructed CMNT personnel to report to the command post and check-in. Instructed them to speak with the Incident Commander for permission to enter the roadway, check the TWC coil, and see if the train is safe for movement. [Radio Ops1]
12:02:18 hours	<u>OEP Unit</u> : CMNT has a good track inspection- no damage to the train and requested power be restored- all equipment and personnel are off the roadway. <u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [MTPD2x]
12:02:56 hours	<u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Good Track inspection-requested power to be energized on track one to move the incident train. [MTPD2x]
12:04:12 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Confirmed result for third rail power re-energizing track one. <u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Confirmed instruction to continue bypassing the station. [MTPD2x]
12:06:45 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Re-energization announcement for track one side. [Radio Ops1]
12:07:06 hours	<u>ROIC Specialist</u> : Announced third rail power re-energization notification. [Radio Ops5]
12:07:20 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatcher</u> : Third rail power has been restored to track one. <u>Ops Command</u> : Acknowledged and repeated-asked for an update on train movement. [MTPD2x]
12:08:31 hours	<u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Confirmed RTRA Supervisor will operate the train to Brentwood Yard. <u>OEP Unit</u> : Requested to the Rhode Island Command that the Operator request an absolute block to Brentwood. [MTPD2x]
12:11:02 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Power is restored to track one. [MTPD2x]
12:15:07 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Reblocked Train ID 127 to 727 and gave an absolute block to Brentwood yard. [Radio Ops1]
12:18:06 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised train 115- first train to service Rhode Island. Stand by. <u>Train 115</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated. [Radio Ops1]
12:27:01 hours	<u>OEP Unit</u> : Clear of wayside, in a place of safety. Requested power be re-energized and reported a good track inspection. [MTPD2x]
12:29:22 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed RTRA Supervisor to hot-stick and confirm that power is still energized on track#1. [Radio Ops1]
12:29:54 hours	<u>Rhode Island Command</u> : Scene turned over to RTRA-command terminated, and TAC released. [MTPD2x]

***Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources.*

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

Incident Date: 8/23/23 Time: 10:40 hours
Final Report – Collision A-3 Collision
E23591

Drafted By: SAFE 706 9/29/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 704 10/18/2023
Approved By: SAFE [ID] [DATE]

Page 12

10:41:59.690D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	B04-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Trip	BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp
10:41:59.893D 08/23/23	Brentwood Yard	B99-B11 Third Rail Power - Deenergize COMPLETED BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp	
10:42:00.190D 08/23/23	Friendship H	A08-32 DC Feeder Tie Breaker UNCOMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED	
10:42:00.190D 08/23/23	Friendship H	A08-32 DC Feeder Tie Breaker CLOSED WHILE PROHIBIT IS SET	
10:42:01.253D 08/23/23	Fort Totten L	Fort Totten ROUTE FROM E06-4 TO E06-6 REQUESTED BY 004984 AT ctwksyg-wkstpp	
10:42:01.521D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	B04-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = Tripped	
10:42:01.521D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	B04-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva	
10:46:42.806D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	B04-8 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Request Route	BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp
10:46:42.806D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	B04-8 Signal Request Fleet COMMANDED Cancel Fleet	BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp
10:46:44.588D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	B04-8 Signal Fleeting COMMANDED CHANGE = Not Fleeted	
10:46:55.060D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	TRACK CIRCUITS B04-B2-162 THROUGH B05-B2-201 UNBLOCKED BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp	

Figure 2 AIMS Log of Events

10:49:05.556D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	Rhode Island ROUTE FROM B04-6 TO B04-4 REQUESTED BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp	
10:49:06.635D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	B04-6 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Request Route	BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
10:49:06.635D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	Rhode Island ROUTE B04-6-4 IN PROGRESS	
10:49:07.291D 08/23/23	Cheverly	Signal D11-4 COMMANDED Prohibit Exit BY 017790 AT ctwksob-compp	
10:49:07.291D 08/23/23	Cheverly	D11-2-4 IS ESTABLISHED WHILE EXIT D11-4 IS PROHIBITED	
10:49:09.931D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	B04-4 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Request Route	BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
10:55:39.524D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	TRAIN ID OF TRAIN 127 ON TRACK B04-B1-159 CHANGED BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp	
10:55:39.540D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	DESTINATION CODE OF TRAIN 727 ON TRACK B04-B1-159 CHANGED BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp	
10:55:39.540D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	CONSIST OF TRAIN 727 ON TRACK B04-B1-159 CHANGED BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp	
10:55:39.540D 08/23/23	Rhode Island	TRAIN ID OF TRAIN 727 ON TRACK B04-B1-159 CHANGED BY 000086 AT ctwksr-wkstpp	




Figure 2 – AIMS Playback of Train ID 127 arriving at Rhode Island Avenue Station at 10:41 hours.

The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) / Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS)

Adopted from CENV Report with minor formatting and grammatical edits.

VMS data from lead car 3258 was unavailable during the incident. The VMS Central Unit (VCU) stopped recording data on 3/18/2023. The situation with VCU has since been resolved. Data was obtained from the trailing car 3158 for this report.

The VMS reveals the following:

<u>VMS time</u>	<u>Description</u>
10:40:20 hours	Train ID 127: The Train approached the station at a speed of 31mph in a B4 Brake Rate.
10:40:23 hours	Train ID 127: decelerated to 23 mph, traveling 104 ft. Emergency Braking was initiated.
10:40:30 hours	Train ID 127: Reached zero speed at about a deceleration rate of 3.3 MPH.

Per the VMS data, proper protocols were followed, Emergency Braking was initiated, and the Emergency Mushroom was activated.

The Railcar data does not show train operator error as a contributing factor in this incident.

VCU snapshot is included below:



Figure 3 VCU Snapshot of Incident Train Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)

CMNT personnel performed under-car inspections of all the consists were completed, and no structural or car body damage was found. All train cars successfully passed the Daily Inspection and were released for service.

Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

On August 30, 2023, testing was completed on the CRCS and PSRS systems at Rhode Island Avenue Station (B04) under Maximo work order# 1809677. The test was successful, and there were no failures observed.

Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA)

Adopted from RTRA report:

Train Operator

- Coming into Rhode Island Station track #1, I was scanning the platform.
- Once approaching the middle of the platform, a young lady jumped in front of my train.
- Slammed the master controller down and started to scream until the train came to a complete stop.
- I contacted Central by saying, "EMERGENCY, EMERGENCY." I gave Central my ID and the location of my train.
- Central asked if I was okay and if there was a sign of life. A transit officer was on the scene.

Post Incident Testing & Employee History:

- The Train Operator was hired at WMATA on June 24, 2013.
- Initial Train Operator certification on March 26, 2020.
- No safety violations in their work history.

Written Statement Findings – Interview Pending Involved Employee’s Return to Work

Train Operator (Written Statement)

Adopted from Written Incident Reports with minor formatting and grammatical edits.

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE attempted to interview the Train Operator; however, they were on leave due to this event. A review of their written statement was completed.

- Reported entering Rhode Island Avenue Station track one and scanning the platform.
- On approaching the middle of the platform, a person jumped in front of the train.
- They reported slamming the Master Controller down and started to scream until the train stopped.
- They contacted central by saying “Emergency, Emergency, Emergency” and gave central their train ID.
- Central asked if they were okay and if there were any signs of life.
- They notified Central that there were signs of life.

RTRA Supervisor -1 (Written Statement)

Adopted from Written Incident Reports with minor formatting and grammatical edits.

- “At 10:41 AM, While monitoring Ops 1, the operator of Train ID 127 on track 1 at Rhode Island Avenue gave the emergency call and informed ROCC that a person jumped in front of the train, and the train made contact with the person.
- The operator was instructed to key the train down and do a ground walk around to locate the person. The operator informed ROCC that an MTPD Officer was on the train and was able to locate the person under the second car (3259).
- The MTPD Officer reported that the person did show signs of life.
- ROCC instructed the 127 Operator to begin keying customers off the train as only five of the six cars were on the platform.
- At 11:05 AM, the Station Supervisor (redacted) and I arrived on train 102.
- Assumed the role of RTRA Forward Liaison and accompanied MTPD Sgt.(redacted) while Station Supervisor (redacted) assisted as Rail Shuttle Bus Coordinator.
- At 11:24 AM, Brentwood Superintendent (redacted) and Assistant Superintendent (redacted) arrived on the scene to transport me and the Train Operator (redacted) by vehicle to Union Station, where we met RTRA Supervisor (redacted), who escorted the Train Operator (redacted) to the Medical for Post Incident testing.”

Weather

On August 23, 2023, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 77° F, with clear skies. The weather did not contribute to this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Washington, D.C.

Related Rules and Procedures

MSRPH SOP 2A - Emergency Removal and Restoration of Third Rail Power
MSRPH SOP 26 - Person Hit by a Train
MSRPH SOP 47 – Unauthorized Personnel on The Roadway In Between Stations

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

Due to the unavailability of the Train Operator under the Employee Assistance Program, we could not administer an analysis. As of October 22, 2023, the operator has not returned to work, and consequently, an interview could not be conducted by Safe to gather essential information regarding fatigue factors. This lack of data hinders our ability to perform a comprehensive analysis currently.

Fatigue Risk

Due to the unavailability of the Train Operator under the Employee Assistance Program, we could not carry out an analysis. As of October 22, 2023, the operator has not returned to work, and consequently, an interview could not be conducted by SAFE to gather essential information regarding fatigue factors. This lack of data hinders our ability to perform a comprehensive analysis currently.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Train Operator complied with and was not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6

In adherence to Standard Operating Procedure 102-1, which outlines the protocol for Removing an Employee from Service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio RTC dispatched a Rail Supervisor to relieve the Train Operator from duty for post-incident testing.

Findings

- The person intentionally entered the roadway from the station platform, where they were ultimately struck by an oncoming train.
- No vehicle deficiencies were identified that may have contributed to the event.
- The Train Operator entered the platform limits below the maximum authorized speed.
- Multiple radio transmissions were inaudible and distorted. Cell phones were utilized to communicate throughout the incident. The communication issues caused delays throughout the incident.
- A Unified Command was established without deficiency per the IMF

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- ROCC de-energized third rail power as part of the mitigation measures.
- A Rail Supervisor and Road Mechanic inspected the affected area thoroughly to assess any visible issues or hazards.
- DCFEMS inspected Track 1 with MTPD to ensure safety and identify potential risks.

- In the interest of passenger safety, ROCC suspended train service temporarily until the situation could be fully assessed and necessary actions were taken.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Person Struck by Train event at Rhode Island Avenue Station on August 23, 2023, was a customer intentionally entering on the roadway, which subsequently led them to be struck by a train as it entered the station.

Recommended Corrective Actions

No corrective actions were identified regarding this event.

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

Train Operator (Written Statement)

The Train Operator is a WMATA employee with approximately ten years of service and three years of experience as a Train Operator. The Train Operator holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in November 2023. The Train Operator has no prior safety-related events on their record.

The Train Operator of Train ID 127 was unavailable for an interview and was on leave due to the traumatic event. The Train Operator did make statements to responding MTPD officers and provided a written statement to RTRA (Please see Appendix H). In the information, the Train Operator reported that upon entering Rhode Island Avenue Station, an individual jumped from the platform in front of the train. The Train Operator stopped the consist, notified ROCC of the incident, and assisted the customers in disembarking the train.

RTRA Supervisor -1 (Written Statement)

“At 10:41 AM, While monitoring Ops 1, the operator of Train ID 127 on track 1 at Rhode Island Avenue gave the emergency call and informed ROCC that a person jumped in front of the train, and the train made contact with the person. The operator was instructed to key the train down and do a ground walk around to locate the person. The operator informed ROCC that an MTPD Officer was on the train and was able to locate the person under the second car (3259). The MTPD Officer reported that the person did show signs of life. The ROCC instructed the 127 Operator to begin keying customers off the train as only five of the six cars were on the platform. At 11:05 AM, the Station Supervisor (redacted) and I arrived on train 102. I assumed the role of RTRA Forward Liaison and accompanied MTPD Sgt.(redacted) while Station Supervisor (redacted) assisted as Rail Shuttle Bus Coordinator. At 11:24 AM, Brentwood Superintendent (redacted) and Assistant Superintendent (redacted) arrived on the scene to transport me and the Train Operator (redacted) by vehicle to Union Station, where we met RTRA Supervisor (redacted), who escorted the Train Operator (redacted) to the Medical for Post Incident testing.”

RTRA Supervisor -2 (Written Statement)

“Supervisors (redacted) and (redacted) arrived at 11:03 AM. Supervisor (redacted) was instructed to go to the command center. Car maintenance was on the scene at 11:45 AM. Supervisor (redacted) was on the scene for RTRA forward Liaison (information). Supervisor (redacted) departed at 12:20 PM.”

Appendix B – MTPD Incident Report

Case Report Number: 2023-10054-001		METRO TRANSIT POLICE
Case Report		
Administrative		
Case Report Number	2023- [REDACTED]	Census/Geo Code
Case Number	2023- [REDACTED]	Call Source
Subject	PERSON STRUCK BY TRN	Related Cases
Disposition	B - Closed	Means
Entered On	8/23/2023 3:03:46 PM	Other Means
Entered By	[REDACTED]	Motives
Reported On	8/23/2023 10:42:34 AM	Other Motives
Reporting Officer	[REDACTED]	Vehicle Activity
Reporting Agency	MTP - METRO TRANSIT POLICE	Direction Vehicle Traveling
Report Type	B - Closed	Cross Street
Assisted By		Notified
Occurred On (Date and Time)	8/23/2023 10:42:00 AM	Supplemental Assignment
Or Between (Date and Time)		Assignment Date
Address	801 Rhode Island Ave NE	Assignment Type
CSZ	WASHINGTON, DC 20018	Assignment Active
Location Name	STA RHODE ISLAND AVE-BRENTWOOD	Status
Verification	V - Verified	Decline
Verification Level		Decline Notes
Precinct		Case Management
Jurisdiction	DC - District of Columbia	Beat
Grid	6	RIAV
Sector	Sector 6 - MSA2	
Map		
Coordinate X	-76.99594225	
Coordinate Y	38.92091576	
For Exceptional Clearances		
Clearance Basis		
Exceptional Clearance Date		
Solvability		
Solvability Code	Points	
Printed 8/27/2023 4:22 PM		Page 1 of 7

Figure 4 MTPD Incident Report

Incident Date: 8/23/23 Time: 10:40 hours
 Final Report – Collision A-3 Collision
 E23591

Drafted By: SAFE 706 9/29/2023
 Reviewed By: SAFE 704 10/18/2023
 Approved By: SAFE [ID] [DATE]

Narrative

On 08/23/2023, at approximately 1042 hours, I, Officer [REDACTED] 2 and Sgt. [REDACTED] was on a Fare Evasion Detail at Rhode Island Avenue Metro Station, located at 801 Rhode Island Avenue NE, Washington, DC 20018, when we received a call of a person possibly struck by a train on the track #1 side in the direction of Glenmont. Sgt and I located the injured person who was under train car #3259 and showed signs of life. Sgt. [REDACTED] immediately set up a command, and I stayed on the platform near the injured person until DC Fire Rescue and Medics showed up on scene.

Per video review, the adult female initially placed herself on the roadway.

DC Medics 17 arrived on scene.

Sgt. [REDACTED] requested the establishment of a bus bridge between Rhode Island Ave and Brookland metro stations. Officer [REDACTED] documented all ingoing and outgoing personnel on the entry/exit log.

At approximately 1111 hours, Detective [REDACTED] interviewed the train operator, Ms. [REDACTED]. The detective also responded to the hospital to gather more information from the injured person.

At approximately 1125 hours, DC Fire Rescue moved the injured person from the track bed onto the train car with medical attention. The wounded person was still showing signs of life. DC Medic 17 transported the individual to Washington Hospital with life-threatening injuries. Officer [REDACTED] rode in the ambulance with the individual. The individual will be treated for lower leg injuries. (Possible Partial Bilateral Amputation)

CSS Officer [REDACTED] and CSS [REDACTED] responded to the scene, photographed, and conducted on-scene investigations. Officer [REDACTED] responded to the Brentwood Rail Yard at the conclusion of the event for further crime scene investigations.

Train 127 was taken out of service and moved to the Brentwood Rail Yard. The scene was turned over to Rail Supervisor White Unit #18 at 1230 hours.

TSOC [REDACTED] notified by CR [REDACTED] (Sgt. [REDACTED] at 1405 hours reference TSA-08-28361-23.

All of the following events did occur in the District of Columbia on WMATA property.

Printed 8/27/2023 4:22 PM

Page 2 of 7

Figure 5 MTPD Incident Report Pg-2

Offense

Offense	9929 - INJURED/SICK PERSON TO THE HOSPITAL	Domestic Violence	(mutually exclusive)
Code Section		Premises Entered	N - No
IBR Code		Entry	
IBR Group		Using	N - Not Applicable (Mutually Exclusive)
Crime Against		Weapons	
UCR Hierarchy		Criminal Activity	
Location Type	R-01 - Rail Station	Type Security	
Completed	Completed	Tools	
Hate/Bias	88 - None (no bias)		

Offenders

Victims

Witnesses

Other Entities

Name: [REDACTED] Train Operator

Entity Type D - Driver

Aliases

Alias	Alias DOB	Alias SSN

Addresses

Address Type	Address	CSZ	County	Country
H - Home	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Prince George's County	USA - United States of America

Phones

Phone Type	Phone Number
M - Mobile	[REDACTED]

Email

Printed 6/27/2023 4:22 PM

Page 3 of 7

Figure 6 MTPD Incident Report Pg-3

Email Address
[REDACTED]

Registered Sex		Hand	
Offender		Resident	
EXP Date (RSO)		POB	
Marital Status		DLN	
Sex	Female	DL State	
Race	B - Black or African American	DL Country	
Ethnicity	N - Not of Hispanic Origin	SSN	
DOB	[REDACTED]	Attire	
Age	[REDACTED]	Employer/School	
Juvenile	N - No	Employer Address	[REDACTED]
Eye Color		Employer CSZ	[REDACTED]
Hair Color		Occupation/Grade	
Facial Hair		Immigration Status	
Complexion		Nationality	
Height		Accent	
Weight			

Scars, Marks and Tattoos

SMT	Type	Location	Description
-----	------	----------	-------------

Languages Spoken

Fluency	Language
---------	----------

Notes

Train Operator

Employee [REDACTED]

Name: Childress, Karen Injured Person

Entity Type I - Injured

Aliases

Alias	Alias DOB	Alias SSN
-------	-----------	-----------

Figure 7 MTPD Incident Report Pg-4

Addresses

Address Type	Address	CSZ	County	Country
H - Home	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	USA - United States of America

Phones

Phone Type	Phone Number

Email

Email Address

Registered Sex
Offender

EXP Date (RSO)

Marital Status

Sex Female

Race B - Black or African American

Ethnicity N - Not of Hispanic Origin

DOB [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Juvenile N - No

Eye Color BRO - Brown

Hair Color BLK - Black

Facial Hair

Complexion

Height 5' 5"

Weight 150

Hand

Resident

R - Resident

POB

DLN

[REDACTED]

DL Country

SSN

Attire

Employer/School

Employer Address

Employer CSZ

Occupation/Grade

Immigration

Status

Nationality

Accent

Scars, Marks and Tattoos

SMT	Type	Location	Description

Languages Spoken

Fluency	Language

Notes

Person Struck By Train

Figure 8 MTPD Incident Report Pg-5

[REDACTED]

Entity Type IN - Individual

Aliases

Alias	Alias DOB	Alias SSN
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Addresses

Address Type	Address	CSZ	County	Country
B - Business	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	USA - United States of America

Phones

Phone Type	Phone Number
W - Work	[REDACTED]

Email

Email Address
[REDACTED]

Registered Sex	Offender	Hand	Resident
EXP Date (RSO)	Marital Status	DLN	DL State
Sex Male	Race	DL Country	SSN
Ethnicity	DOB	Attire	Employer/School WMATA
Age	Juvenile	Employer Address	12750 Layhill Rd
Eye Color	Eye Color	Employer CSZ	Silver Spring, MD 20906
Hair Color	Facial Hair	Occupation/Grade	Rail Supervisor
Complexion	Height	Immigration Status	Nationality
Weight	Weight	Accent	

Scars, Marks and Tattoos

Printed 8/27/2023 4:22 PM

Page 6 of 7

Figure 9 MTPD Incident Report Pg-6

Incident Date: 8/23/23 Time: 10:40 hours
 Final Report – Collision A-3 Collision
 E23591

Drafted By:	SAFE 706 9/29/2023
Reviewed By:	SAFE 704 10/18/2023
Approved By:	SAFE [ID] [DATE]

SMT	Type	Location	Description
-----	------	----------	-------------

Languages Spoken

Fluency	Language
---------	----------

Notes

Unit #18

Properties

Figure 10 MTPD Incident Report Pg-7



Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary



ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:		Person Struck by a Train	
*Incident Commander (IC):		BAT [REDACTED]	
MTPD CCN:	202301054	Local CCN:	
*Date ICS Initiated:	08232023	*Time ICS Initiated:	1035
*Date ICS Terminated:	08232023	*Time ICS Terminated:	1228
*Duration of Incident:	1030	*Service Disrupted (Type and Time):	rail disruption
Incident Location:	919 Rhode Island Ave, NE	Command Post Location:	Bus bay
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	Sgt [REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	LT [REDACTED]
Forward Liaison:	Sgt. [REDACTED]	Unified Command:	
OCC Liaison:		Alternate Channel:	mtpd2x
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	1207/1208	Bus Bridge Established (From /To):	1107/1228
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	inner/platform outer/mezzanine	Power De-energized:	1107
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name <small>sup. White</small> Dept: <u>rail</u>		Medical Attention Required/Requested:	engine 17
Entry/Exit Log:	[REDACTED]	CID Response:	Sgt [REDACTED]

For Official Use Only

The information in this document marked FOUO is the property of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) to law enforcement, public safety and protection, intelligence officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution to other entities without prior MTPD authorization is prohibited. Precautions shall be taken to ensure this information is stored and destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the FOUO marking may not be used in legal proceedings without prior authorization from the originator. Recipients are prohibited from posting information marked FOUO on a website or unclassified network.

Figure 11 MTPD Hot Wash Pg-1

Incident Date: 8/23/23 Time: 10:40 hours
Final Report – Collision A-3 Collision
E23591

Drafted By: SAFE 706 9/29/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 704 10/18/2023
Approved By: SAFE [ID] [DATE]

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
	MTPD	OSC
	MTPD	Forward Liason
	MTPD	Ops Command
	MTPD	Ops
	MTPD	Ops
	MTPD	Ops/rode with medic
	MTPD	Ops outer perimeter
	MTPD	Ops outer perimeter
	MTPD	CSS
	MTPD	CSS
	WMATA	Rail Sup
	WMATA	Metro Power
	WMATA	ERT

EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Agency/Department	Title/Role
	WMATA	ERT
	WMATA	EP12
	MTPD	CID
	MTPD	CID
	MTPD	CID
	WMATA	PLNT
	WMATA	PLNT
	WMATA	Car Main
	WMATA	Safety

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

For Official Use Only

MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

Page 2 of 4

Effective: 12/30/20

Figure 12 MTPD Hot Wash Pg-2

Incident Date: 8/23/23 Time: 10:40 hours
Final Report – Collision A-3 Collision
E23591

Drafted By:	SAFE 706 9/29/2023
Reviewed By:	SAFE 704 10/18/2023
Approved By:	SAFE [ID] [DATE]

Page 27

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	yes
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	CCU
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	yes
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	CID

OBSERVATIONS
<p>Initial response was very fluid. Assets adjusted very well and assumed roles without error. Setup of the station being one entrance helped with being able to keep a steady entry/exit accountability accurate. Battalion Chief communicated needs very clear, descriptive and direct of what was needed. MTPD and WMATA personnel worked very well together to contain, support rescue and get service back. Transfer of command went very smooth due to the amount of resources there to assist with tasks as the incident progressed. Biggest issue is the radio problems we are challenged with. We lost radio contact with the MACC at 1117hrs and had to communicate via cell phone with alot of information. I also am reminded from this incident to clarify what is needed direct so misunderstanding of intent happens. All my request should be clear and legible to fit the focus of incident resolve.</p>

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

For Official Use Only

MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

Page 3 of 4

Effective: 12/30/20

Figure 13 MTPD Hot Wash Pg-3

Incident Date: 8/23/23 Time: 10:40 hours
 Final Report – Collision A-3 Collision
 E23591

Drafted By: SAFE 706 9/29/2023 Reviewed By: SAFE 704 10/18/2023 Approved By: SAFE [ID] [DATE]

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

NOTES

Discussed clear communications and intent.

Discussed the response time and procedure due to the incident taking place while MTPD was on scene at the location.

Discussed the need for foul time and roadway permissions when the scene is going and protections are already in place.

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date

Sgt [REDACTED]

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

Patrol Operations Bureau Commander's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

Office of Emergency Management Director's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

For Official Use Only

MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

Page 4 of 4

Effective: 12/30/20

Figure 14 MTPD Hot Wash Pg-4

Appendix D - RTRA Supervisor's Report

Incident Date: 8/23/23 Time: 10:40 hours
Final Report – Collision A-3 Collision
E23591

Drafted By: SAFE 706 9/29/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 704 10/18/2023
Approved By: SAFE [ID] [DATE]

Page 29

RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT				
Date August 23, 2023	Incident Time 10:41AM	Incident Location (Station Mezzanine #) Rhode Island Ave (B-04)	Track/Mezzanine # Track #1	
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) Train 127 Lead 3258/3259-3242/3243-3159/3158				
Incident Description Person Struck by Train				
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
		N/A	Brentwood Division	Yes
Name		Address		Injury?
N/A		N/A		N/A
Name		Address		Injury?
Name		Address		Injury?
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person in Charge	Remarks	
11:05AM		MTPD Sgt. [REDACTED]	Unit [REDACTED]	RTRA Forward Liason

Chronological Account of Incident

10:41AM While monitoring Ops 1, the operator of train 127 on track 1 at Rhode Island Avenue gave the emergency call and informed ROCC that a person jumped in front of the train and the train made contact with the person. The operator was instructed to key the train down and do a ground walk around to locate the person. The operator informed ROCC that an MTPD Officer was on the train and was able to locate the person under the second car (3259). The MTPD Officer reported that the person did show signs of life. ROCC instructed the 127 operator to begin keying customers off of the train as only five of the six cars were on the platform.

11:05AM Myself and Station Supervisor [REDACTED] arrived on train 102, I assumed the role of RTRA Forward Liaison and accompanied MTPD Sgt. [REDACTED] while Sta. Supv. [REDACTED] assisted as Rail Shuttle Bus Coordinator.

11:24AM Brentwood Superintendent [REDACTED] and Assistant Superintendent [REDACTED] arrived on scene to transport myself and operator [REDACTED] by vehicle to Union Station where we met RTRA Supv. [REDACTED] ylor, who escorted operator [REDACTED] to Medical for Post Incident testing.

(Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)

Your Arrival Time: 11:05AM

Supervisor Submitting Report	(Payroll #)	Date	Report Reviewed By	Date
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	8/23/2023	[REDACTED]	8/23/2023

Figure 15 RTRA Supervisor's Incident Report Pg-1

Appendix E - RTRA Supervisor's Incident Report #2

RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT					
Date 8/23/23	Incident Time N/A	Incident Location (Station Mezzanine #) RHODE ISLAND STATION	Track/Mezzanine # TRK-1		
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) N/A					
Incident Description CUSTOMER ON TRACK					
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident	
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Name	Address		Injury?		
N/A	N/A		N/A		
Name	Address		Injury?		
N/A	N/A		N/A		
Name	Address		Injury?		
N/A	N/A		N/A		
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge		Remarks	
N/A	5106-EST2	TRANSIS MALE HOUSE		N/A	
N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	
Chronological Account of Incident					
<p>Supv. [REDACTED] AND TRAC/H ARRIVED ABOUT 11:03AM. SUPV. [REDACTED] WAS INSTRUCTED TO GO TO THE COMMAND CENTER. SUPV. [REDACTED] INFORMATION IS TRANSIS MALE HOUSE 5106-EST2. CAR MAINTENANCE ARRIVED AT 11:45AM. SUPV. [REDACTED] ON THE SCENE RELAYING INFORMATION. SUPV. [REDACTED] DEPARTED AT 12:00PM</p>					
(Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)					
Your Arrival Time: 11:03AM					
Supervisor Submitting Report	(Payroll #)	Date	Report Reviewed By	Date	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	8/23/2023	
Report must be faxed to ROCC 202-962-2808 at end of Tour					

Figure 17 RTRA Supervisor #2 Incident Report Pg-1

Incident Date: 8/23/23 Time: 10:40 hours
 Final Report – Collision A-3 Collision
 E23591

Drafted By: SAFE 706 9/29/2023
 Reviewed By: SAFE 704 10/18/2023
 Approved By: SAFE [ID] [DATE]

WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 1 of 3

Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents

Date: Aug 23, 2023 Incident Time: 10:41AM Time Reported: 10:41AM Reported by: Customer Employee
 ROCC Other

Location
 Station: Rhode Island Ave. Mezzanine #: _____ Track #/Destination: 1 Chain Marker/Signal Number: _____

TYPE OF INCIDENT
 Property Damage Smoke Fire Customer Complaint
 Customer injury Customer Illness Employee Injury Employee Illness
 Criminal Activity Elevator Entrapment Rail Vehicle Incident Other (Explain in description of incident)

WEATHER: Clear Rain Snow Sleet/Ice
 LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting): Dawn/Dusk Daylight Dark Tunnel/Underground
 LIGHTING (artificial lighting): Lights On Lights Off Lights Not Working

STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC
 Elevator/Escalator #: _____ AFC #: _____ Room Number/Location: _____

Failure Number(s): _____
 Parking Lot Paid Area Free Area Garage Station Entrance Stairway # _____ Platform Ancillary Room

Injury/Illness reported aboard Train Other
 Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder: _____

TRAIN INCIDENTS

Train ID: 127 Destination: Greenmont Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 3258, 3259, 3242, 3243, 3159, 3158 Lead Car: 3258
 Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: _____

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.

Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.
 Coming into Rhode Island Station track #1 I was scanning the platform. Once approaching the middle of the platform a young lady jumped in front of my train. I slammed the master controller down and started to scream until train came to complete stop. I contacted central by saying "Emergency Emergency Emergency"; gave central my train ID and location. Central asked if I was okay and if there was sign of life. Transit officer was on scene asked him if there was any sign of life. Communicated with central that it

Employee Completing Report

Employee Signature: (sign) _____ Employee #: _____ Date: Aug 23, 2023
 Division: Brentwood Rail Yard Run #: 404 Block #: _____ Assigned Days: WTFH

To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager
 Super: _____ Date: 8/23/2023

Action taken/needed: incident was documented in SMS and investigated
 SMS Number: 8690653

50.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Figure 19 Train Operator Incident Report Pg-1

Appendix H - Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

Incident Date: 8/23/23 Time: 10:40 hours
 Final Report – Collision A-3 Collision
 E23591

Drafted By: SAFE 706 9/29/2023
 Reviewed By: SAFE 704 10/18/2023
 Approved By: SAFE [ID] [DATE]



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority



Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

Incident Status: PRELIMINARY

GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION

Incident Type:	Person Struck By Train	Delay (Minutes):	Unknown
Incident Date:	Wednesday, August 23, 2023	Vehicles Involved:	L-3258x3242x3159
Incident Time:	10:42 am	First Reported By:	Train Operator [REDACTED]
Location:	Rhode Island Station (B04) track #1		

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

At approximately 10:42 am train #127

Key Employees Involved & Employee Statements:

- Train Operator [REDACTED]
Coming into Rhode Island Station track #1, I was scanning the platform. Once approaching the middle of the platform a young lady jumped in front of my train. I slammed the master controller down and started to scream until the train came to a complete stop. I contacted Central by saying "EMERGENCY EMERGENCY" I gave Central my ID and the location of my train. Central asked if I was okay and if there was a sign of life. A transit officer was on the scene.

See the Attachment for additional information.

Post Incident Testing & Employee History:

[REDACTED] was hired on June 24, 2013
She became a train operator on March 26, 2020.
She has no safety violations in her records.

Recent Incidents

Figure 20 RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report Pg-1

Appendix I – Why-Tree Analysis

