

CAP ID	Finding/Recommendation	Expected Completion	Source	Status Notes
NTSB R-8-004-A	Promptly implement appropriate technology that will automatically alert wayside workers of approaching trains and will automatically alert train operators when approaching areas with workers on or near the tracks.	12/31/22	Safety Directive 16-2 (12/15/2015)	
WMSC-20-C0042	Finding 5. WMATA employees are not consistently following RWP Rule 5.12 for equipment calibration.	07/14/23	RWP Audit (6/18/2020)	This CAP is pending modification request from WMATA. Expected to be received by March 8, 2024.
WMSC-20-C0049	Finding 1. ROCC management contributes to a chaotic environment. Use of profanities, threats and racial, sexual or other forms of harassment are regular features of the control centers environment, which makes it difficult for controllers to do their jobs and drives low morals and significant turnover.	12/15/23	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)	This CAP is pending modification request from WMATA. Expected to be received by March 24, 2024.
WMSC-20-C0056	Finding 8. Metrorail's ROCC recruitment and retention approach is failing. Some controller trainees have left the ROCC immediately after or shortly after the training course, which is scheduled to last nine months.	02/16/24	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)	This CAP is pending modification request from WMATA. Expected to be received by March 24, 2024.
WMSC-20-C0059	Finding 11. WMATA has failed to regularly update the Rail Operations Control Center Procedures Manual.	09/13/24	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)	
WMSC-20-C0068	Finding 20. WMATA does not have a standardized training program for personnel working at desks such as the MOC or ROIC. Metrorail could not provide any documentation of MOC training materials, a curriculum or a training description. Metrorail provided only a study guide for the ROIC.	03/15/24	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)	
WMSC-20-C0070	Metrorail puts the integrity of safety event investigation at risk by not following procedures requiring proper chain of custody and control of evidence as outlined in SOP 800-01 and Policy/Instruction 10.4/1, not following procedures requiring direct access for investigators to all information, recordings and other evidence that is potentially relevant to the investigation, and not fully training all personnel on the steps they are required to take when a safety event occurs.	10/24/24	WMSC Directive (10/20/2020)	
WMSC-21-C0072	WMATA does not have load ratings for its bridges and aerial structures.	04/14/23	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)	This CAP is pending a modification request from WMATA.
WMSC-21-C0083	Ten Metrorail structures have steel rocker bearings, which created a seismic risk in the event of an earthquake other seismic events.	11/14/25	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0084	Metrorail is not following and does not have effective safety certification and acceptance procedures for new RMMs. There is no Metrorail-wide safety certification procedure to implement the SSCPP.	07/19/24	Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Audit (3/9/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0098	Several Metrorail preventive maintenance instructions do not include acceptable tolerances for required measurements.	06/06/25	Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Audit (3/9/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0099	A lack of an Intrusion Detection Warning (IDW) system where WMATA's own criteria require it.	04/07/28	WMSC Directive (3/31/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0100	Metrorail is not maintaining a fully functioning radio communications system in all rail yards and shops.	10/30/26	WMSC Directive (4/30/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0101	Metrorail does not have, provide training on, or otherwise follow specific rules related to rail vehicle and switch movement in non-signalized territory. Further, Metrorail provides no controls on or oversight of movement in dark territory.	05/03/24	WMSC Directive (4/30/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0118	Metrorail does not consistently follow its safety certification process, which leads to project activation and use without proper hazard identification and mitigation, putting Metrorail customers, personnel and first responders at risk.	04/05/24	WMSC Directive (8/13/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0120	Finding 2. Metrorail ignores the minimum daily release period (rest period) requirements in its Fatigue Risk Management Policy.	07/18/25	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0121	Finding 3. There is not adequate access to, documentation of, or compilation of data for WMATA to assess compliance with its hours of service requirements.	10/25/24	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0129	Finding 11. WMATA does not have a documented procedure for and training to carry out fitness for duty checks prior to or during shifts on a regular basis for all covered employees as specified in the APTA fitness for Duty Standard.	04/25/25	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0130	Recommendation 1. Metrorail does not collect fitness for duty data in a manner that allows for identification, tracking and trending of issues.	08/23/24	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0131	Recommendation 2. Metrorail is not providing medical oversight of contractors and does not include any requirement in contracts that contractors meet WMATA medical, fatigue or hours of service standards.	12/19/25	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0134	Metrorail's 6000-Series rehabilitation program, including coupler overhaul work, was implemented by CMOR, CENV and CMNT without safety certification and approvals required by WMATA's SSCPP.	11/29/24	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0136	6000 Series cars that underwent rehabilitation were put into service without SAFE approval.	11/29/24	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0137	Metrorail removed the coupler overhaul from the 6000 Series SMP process without documenting that change or completing a review of that change by the SCRC.	11/29/24	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0139	The 7000 Series rehabilitation and subsystems overhaul program is being developed without full SAFE coordination, involvement or approval.	03/14/25	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0143	Metrorail does not consistently follow a standard process to address wheels out-of-round, to prevent cars with wheels out-of-round from operating, and to identify and address the root causes of wheels out-of-round.	05/29/26	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)	

WMSC-21-C0144	Metrorail does not clearly define the proper use of engineering modification instructions (EMIs), service bulletins (SBs), and other railcar engineering change documents.	02/22/24	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)	This CAP has been submitted and is currently in review with the WMSC.
WMSC-21-C0146	Metrorail railcars do not include inward-and-outward-facing audio and image recorders in all operating compartments.	08/19/26	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0150	Metrorail is not complying with its safety certification and approval requirements that are specified in its SSCPP before installing and placing traction power systems into service	04/05/24	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0151	Metrorail is not documenting, tracking and conducting all preventive maintenance inspections that are required by WMATA policy, manuals and instruction.	07/12/24	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0154	Traction Power Maintenance employees do not get all required information and training to maintain equipment that they are directed to work on, and there is no process in place to ensure that personnel are trained on specific equipment prior to working on that equipment.	02/13/26	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0155	Metrorail is not effectively identifying, tracking and mitigating hazards related to high voltage and traction power.	04/18/25	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0156	Metrorail is behind schedule on its floating slab testing to monitor for deterioration due to stray current.	01/17/25	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)	
WMSC-21-C0157	The latest as-built schematics are not available in each traction power facility, as required by the TRPM-1000 and Metrorail preventive maintenance instructions.	08/15/25	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)	
WMSC-22-C0162	Finding 1. Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management System (NIMS)/ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. Further, Metrorail's training requirements are insufficient to prepare personnel to respond to and/or manage emergencies within the NIMS/ICS framework. These deficiencies have contributed to ineffective and improper emergency response and emergency management.	01/17/25	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	
WMSC-22-C0164	Finding 3. MTPD personnel routinely enter the roadway despite not having RWP qualifications required by Metrorail rules and procedures, exposing themselves and others to the risk of serious injury or death.	02/16/24	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	This CAP is in review for closure with the WMSC.
WMSC-22-C0165	Finding 4. MTPD general orders do not reflect current operational realities and procedures, and areas for improvement from prior events are not effectively communicated to frontline MTPD personnel.	12/01/23	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	This CAP is pending a modification request from WMATA.
WMSC-22-C0166	Finding 5. Metrorail's calls to public safety answering points (911 call centers) are inconsistent, incomplete and contribute to delayed or ineffective emergency response.	06/07/24	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	
WMSC-22-C0167	Finding 6. Metrorail has not clearly defined and communicated the authority and duties of its Fire Marshal and any other fire prevention roles or positions, and does not have effective continuity plans in the event the Fire Marshal is unavailable.	12/14/22	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	This CAP is pending a modification request from WMATA.
WMSC-22-C0168	Finding 7. Metrorail does not ensure that experts in fire and life safety are included in and have a documented role in Metrorail project development, planning, review and approvals, which contributes to hazards being introduced into the Metrorail system or hazards being allowed to continue to exist without adequate mitigation.	01/10/25	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	
WMSC-22-C0169	Finding 8. There is inadequate coordination among organizational units charged with developing, inspecting and maintaining critical fire and life safety assets, and there is no unified process to identify, prioritize and address fire and life safety risks.	04/12/24	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	
WMSC-22-C0170	Finding 9. Metrorail does not routinely conduct hazard assessments to evaluate and prioritize fire and life safety and emergency management issues. Further, Metrorail has not established a fire and life safety and emergency management hazard identification, tracking and open item resolution process for prioritizing and implementing safety improvements.	08/11/23	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	This CAP is pending a modification request from WMATA.
WMSC-22-C0171	Finding 10. Emergency equipment in station medical cabinets is expired and covered in dirt. There is no inspection procedure or responsible party assigned to inspect and maintain this safety equipment.	10/25/24	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	
WMSC-22-C0173	Finding 12. The exit stairwell from Rosslyn Station is not protected from obstructions, which creates a risk that the hatch will not be able to be opened in an emergency, trapping customers inside.	04/17/26	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	
WMSC-22-C0174	Finding 13. Metrorail does not consistently inspect and maintain current certification status of all fire extinguishers, particularly those on the roadway.	10/13/23	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	This CAP is currently in review for closure with the WMSC.
WMSC-22-C0175	Finding 14. Metrorail does not consistently perform or document all elements of its Fire & Intrusion Alarm System Inspection Preventive Maintenance Instructions.	09/22/23	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	This CAP is in review for closure with the WMSC.
WMSC-22-C0176	Recommendation 1. Metrorail has opportunities to improve and expand training and training coordination related to fire and life safety and emergency management.	03/15/24	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	
WMSC-22-C0177	Recommendation 2. MTPD does not have a useable incident checklist for emergencies.	09/20/23	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	This CAP is in review for closure with the WMSC.
WMSC-22-C0178	Recommendation 3. Metrorail fire and life safety signage is not consistent throughout the system.	09/27/24	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)	
WMSC-22-C0181	Finding 1. Elements of Metrorail have a culture that accepts noncompliance with written operational rules, instructions, and manuals.	10/25/24	Rail Operations (4/7/22)	
WMSC-22-C0182	Finding 2. Metrorail does not effectively identify, track, communicate and address operational hazards as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	06/27/25	Rail Operations (4/7/22)	

WMSC-22-C0183	Finding 3. Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard.	10/25/24	Rail Operations (4/7/22)	
WMSC-22-C0184	Finding 4. Metrorail has inadequate internal communication, coordination and processes to effectively manage change as required by its PTASP, the WMSC and the FTA.	10/25/24	Rail Operations (4/7/22)	
WMSC-22-C0185	Finding 5. Metrorail is not effectively training and certifying personnel authorized to operate trains on all active railcar fleets.	10/27/23	Rail Operations (4/7/22)	
WMSC-22-C0189	Finding 9. Metrorail does not ensure personnel serving as on-the-job training instructors, including those personnel described as line platform instructors (LPIs), are effective and have specific training and direction on what to teach and how to assess their assigned students.	07/25/25	Rail Operations (4/7/22)	
WMSC-22-C0193	Finding 13. With frequent modifications due to temporary and permanent orders, and outdated versions of Metrorail's rulebook being distributed to personnel when hard copies are available, the latest Metrorail rules are not easily accessible to train operators. This creates document control issues and makes a rule requiring personnel to carry the latest version of the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) unrealistic.	11/03/23	Rail Operations (4/7/22)	This CAP is pending a modification request from WMATA.
WMSC-22-C0195	Recommendation 1. Metrorail operations departments do not have effective processes to consider and act upon safety input from employees at all levels of the organization.	11/29/24	Rail Operations (4/7/22)	
WMSC-22-C0199	Finding 1. Metrorail has not developed and implemented a comprehensive water intrusion and remediation program covering stations, elevators and escalators, which contributes to damage and deterioration of structures and other assets, to electrical hazards and to other safety risks.	11/29/24	Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)	
WMSC-22-C0201	Finding 3. Metrorail is not ensuring that ELES personnel work only on the specific types of equipment that they are trained to inspect, maintain, and repair.	01/12/24	Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)	This CAP is in review for closure with the WMSC.
WMSC-22-C0204	Finding 6. Metrorail does not ensure that ELES personnel sign in on log books as required by WMATA SOP to ensure their safety.	09/08/23	Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)	Re-submission of this CAP was submitted on 2/16/24 and is under review for closure with the WMSC.
WMSC-22-C0207	Finding 9. ELES Supervisors are not completing all aspects of required QA checks.	02/16/24	Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)	This CAP is pending a modification request from WMATA.
WMSC-22-C0210	Recommendation 3. Metrorail has an opportunity to improve data collection and analysis necessary under its Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) by providing more PLNT and ELES personnel with improved, formal training on the use of Metrorail's maintenance management information system (Maximo).	02/24/23	Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)	This CAP is in review for closure with the WMSC.
WMSC-22-C0212	This CAP builds on C-0037, which was originally issued on May 12, 2020: Third rail power restoration is routinely rushed by ROCC management with a focus on restoring train service rather than a focus on following safety procedures.	08/23/24	Improper Power Restoration Order (5/17/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0213	Metrorail has an ineffective and insufficient inspection, maintenance and cleaning program for Automatic Train Control equipment, particularly including a lack of required tools, procedural compliance, and supervisory oversight for care of vital equipment housed in train control rooms, and is not maintaining the structural integrity of these ancillary rooms.	07/17/26	ATC Room inspection, maintenance and cleaning program (8/4/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0214	Finding 1. Metrorail does not have adequate supervisory oversight and safety promotion to ensure that approved preventative maintenance inspections (PMI) are properly completed to ensure the safety of the rail system. Communications personnel are not using correct and current forms and processes necessary to ensure that safety-critical communications systems are appropriately and safely maintained.	03/14/25	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0215	Finding 2. Metrorail does not have sufficiently detailed instructions and procedures specifying how to inspect and maintain each communications asset. For some assets, there are no instructions or procedures at all.	05/09/25	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0216	Finding 3. Metrorail is closing preventative maintenance work orders without correcting known deficiencies, which does not comply with its Systems Maintenance (SMNT) Maintenance Control Policy.	11/01/24	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0217	Finding 4. Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Metrorail closes communications related "corrective maintenance" (repair) tickets without effectively identifying, documenting and addressing issues.	04/15/26	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0218	Finding 5. Metrorail hazard logs are not being kept or maintained.	11/15/24	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0219	Finding 6. Metrorail has insufficient training for communications personnel, including on-the-job training (OJT) that SMNT itself describes as deficient, and a lack of requirements to ensure that personnel only work on equipment they are trained on and capable of maintaining as required by the PTASP.	06/06/25	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0220	Finding 7. Metrorail does not have schematics, manuals, and other materials in each Communications Room required by Metrorail's Communications Room Bi-weekly Cleaning and Inspection PMI.	06/28/24	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0221	Finding 8. Metrorail lacks the safety assurance and safety promotion activities required to ensure that only current and calibrated radios are in use as required by Metrorail instruction and procedure, creating a risk that this safety equipment will not properly function when needed.	07/12/24	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0222	Finding 9. Metrorail communications rooms have signs of recurring water, dirt and dust intrusion. Metrorail is also improperly storing equipment in these rooms. Components in these rooms therefore may not function as required for the safety of riders, workers and first responders.	10/25/24	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0224	Recommendation 2. Some job descriptions have not been updated since the 1970s and 1980s and do not reflect current job responsibilities and necessary qualifications.	03/15/24	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0225	Finding 1: Metrorail's organizational structure prevents Metrorail from effectively ensuring that its track is maintained in a state of good repair as specified by Metrorail policies, procedures and standards.	02/28/25	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0226	Finding 2: Metrorail is not maintaining track infrastructure in rail yards in accordance with TRST-1000 requirements and related standards. This has introduced operational hazards.	09/20/24	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)	

WMSC-22-C0227	Finding 3: Metrorail is not meeting its training requirements and there are inconsistencies in on-the-job training documentation for TRST personnel.	06/21/24	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0228	Finding 4: WMATA is not ensuring that personnel wear the proper personal protective equipment as required by its Hot Work Program Manual.	12/15/23	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)	This CAP is pending a modification request from WMATA.
WMSC-22-C0230	Finding 6: Metrorail lacks the capability to complete required rail grinding activities across the system to ensure safe operations.	06/13/25	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0231	Finding 7: WMATA does not ensure excess hazardous materials are properly labeled, stored and disposed of.	08/30/24	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)	
WMSC-22-C0232	Finding 8: WMATA does not have a weed spraying program consistent with industry standards.	09/06/24	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)	
WMSC-23-C0235	Finding 1. Findings from the internal safety review program are not yet systematically incorporated into Metrorail's Safety Management System (SMS) as specified in Metrorail's PTASP.	08/30/24	Internal Safety Review Program (1/4/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0236	Finding 2. Metrorail has not yet implemented training requirements in system safety, hazard management and SMS training for personnel responsible for internal safety reviews as required by the WMSC Program Standard.	10/25/24	Internal Safety Review Program (1/4/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0237	Finding 3. Metrorail does not have a process for, and has not conducted or scheduled, a triennial internal safety review of its internal safety review program as required by the WMSC Program Standard.	10/18/24	Internal Safety Review Program (1/4/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0238	Finding 1: Metrorail is not carrying out the safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion for the structures program required by Metrorail's Agency Safety Plan to ensure safe and effective structural engineering, maintenance, and operation.	04/18/25	Structures Program (7/25/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0239	Finding 2: Metrorail's Structures Maintenance and Inspections department has not formalized and documented its on-the-job training process for structural inspection.	09/13/24	Structures Program (7/25/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0240	Finding 1. Metrorail does not ensure the use of adequate fall protection when working on or around RMM.	08/22/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0241	Finding 2. Metrorail is not effectively tracking and mitigating hazards related to RMM maintenance and operations in accordance with its PTASP.	12/12/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0242	Finding 3. Metrorail has not documented its practices regarding adjustments to its contractor RMM inspection procedures.	06/20/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0243	Finding 4. Metrorail does not have a process and assigned resources to inspect and maintain the hi-rail gear on hi-rail vehicles owned by WMATA as required to ensure the vehicles' safe operation.	03/14/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0244	Finding 5. Metrorail is not reviewing its RMM-related procedures as required.	07/18/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0245	Recommendation 1. Metrorail has the opportunity to more effectively collect and proactively utilize reliability data to ensure safe and effective operations.	04/16/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0246	Recommendation 2. Metrorail can improve safety and reliability by documenting and formalizing a process for starting and checking equipment on a regular basis that is not being regularly used.	09/06/24	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0248	Recommendation 4. Metrorail has not implemented a documented process for decommissioning RMMs, including a process to ensure that vehicles to be decommissioned are no longer needed to carry out work activities and that those vehicles are properly and safely disposed of.	09/13/24	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0249	Recommendation 5. Metrorail can improve the effectiveness of training and available operational manuals by providing a consistent, complete format that documents operational restrictions and allows personnel to identify where to look for such information, and by incorporating these improvements into a recurring troubleshooting training.	3/8/2025	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	
WMSC-23-C0250	Recommendation 6. Metrorail has an opportunity to improve safety through effective interdepartmental coordination to fully utilize available safety data, technology, and contracts.	02/07/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)	