



**WMSA Commissioner Brief: W-0268 – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement – Federal Triangle Station – January 6, 2023**

*Prepared for Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on April 9, 2024*

**Safety event summary:**

During delays on the Blue, Orange and Silver Lines due to a person on the roadway on January 6, 2023, a Rail Traffic Controller attempted to contact the Train Operator of Train 452 approaching Federal Triangle Station, but did not receive a response. The Rail Traffic Controller planned to direct the Train Operator to hold at Federal Triangle Station. The Rail Traffic Controllers then utilized a “turnback” feature in Metrorail’s signaling system that can prevent trains from receiving speed commands, the indications of the maximum allowable speed. However, the Train Operator then moved the train toward Metro Center despite the train showing a zero speed command, without the permission from the Rail Traffic Controller that Metrorail rules require for such movement with zero speed commands.

The Rail Traffic Controllers detected this improper movement, and communicated with the Train Operator at 11:02 a.m. The Train Operator reported to the Radio Rail Traffic Controller that the train had not lost speed commands. A Rail Supervisor boarded the train at Rosslyn Station and spoke to the Train Operator.

However, Metrorail did not remove the Train Operator from service for post-event testing until 1:09 p.m. and did not remove the train from service for event downloads until 1:56 p.m. Metrorail personnel stated they were gathering additional information.

The vehicle data shows the train did show zero speed commands, and that the Train Operator, contrary to Metrorail rules and procedures, closed the train doors when the train had zero speed commands.

The Train Operator then activated Stop and Proceed Mode to bypass the zero speed commands after servicing Federal Triangle Station. The Train Operator entered the acknowledgement code that the system requires to move with zero speed commands twice, at 10:59:05 a.m. and 10:59:24 a.m. Stop and Proceed Mode permits movement at up to 15 mph with zero speed commands. Metrorail requires this mode to be used only in those situations where movement with zero speed commands is permitted by a control point such as a Rail Traffic Controller and a protective block has been established.

The Train Operator improperly moved the train to Metro Center Station, passing the turnback location at 13 mph. After passing the turnback, the regulated speed changed to 29 mph, and the Train Operator increased speed as the train moved toward Metro Center Station.

Turnback locations are marked on the Metrorail system with a green sign. In some locations, the turnback marks the point that the lead car of an eight-car train must reach in order for the rear end of the train to be clear of a switch or interlocking so that the train can safely be moved back in the opposite direction, crossing to the adjacent track if needed. At other locations, such as this one, the turnback is farther from the interlocking. This turnback is approximately the equivalent distance to the length of a six-car train beyond the Federal Triangle Station platform.

**Probable Cause:**

The probable cause of this event was that the train operator activated stop and proceed mode two times without the permission of the control center and moved their train with passengers without permission.



**Corrective Actions:**

Metrorail provided refresher training to the train operator.

Example of other related open CAPs

- C-0181 addresses the Rail Operations Audit finding that elements of Metrorail have a culture that accepts noncompliance with written operational rules, instructions, and manuals. (Completion of final actionable item scheduled October 2024)

**WMSC staff observations:**

The data review demonstrated that there was a lack of communication between the vehicle friction brake system and the vehicle monitoring system. This did not affect this investigation due to the circumstances of this event, but was corrected by Metrorail's Car Maintenance personnel prior to placing the railcars back into service.

The WMSC commends the Rail Traffic Controllers for identifying this improper movement.

Rail Traffic Controllers do not have physical characteristics training to understand the exact locations where turnbacks hold trains. At some locations, Advanced Information Management (AIM) system displays suggest a turnback holds trains at a platform, however the speed commands actually drop to zero beyond the platform.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety (SAFE)  
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)  
**FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23016**

<b>Date of Event:</b>	01/06/2023
<b>Type of Event:</b>	Improper Rail Vehicle Movement
<b>Incident Time:</b>	10:59 hours
<b>Location:</b>	Federal Triangle Station, Track 2
<b>Time and How received by SAFE:</b>	13:02 hours via MAC
<b>WMSC Notification Time:</b>	14:44 hours
<b>Responding Safety Officers:</b>	WMATA SAFE: No WMSC: No Other: No
<b>Rail Vehicle:</b>	Train ID 452 [L3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243T]
<b>Injuries:</b>	None
<b>Damage:</b>	None
<b>Emergency Responders:</b>	None
<b>SMS I/A Number</b>	20230106#105333

Federal Triangle Station – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement  
January 6, 2023

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AIMS</b>	Advanced Information Management System
<b>ARS</b>	Audio Recording System
<b>CAP</b>	Corrective Action Plan
<b>CCTV</b>	Closed-Circuit Television
<b>CMOR</b>	Office of Chief Mechanical Officer
<b>CMNT</b>	Office of Car Maintenance
<b>I/A</b>	Incidents/Accidents
<b>IIT</b>	Incident Investigation Team
<b>MAC</b>	Mission Assurance Coordinator
<b>MSRPH</b>	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
<b>RC</b>	Root Cause
<b>ROCC</b>	Rail Operations Control Center
<b>ROCS</b>	Rail Operations Control System
<b>RTC</b>	Rail Traffic Controller
<b>RTRA</b>	Office of Rail Transportation
<b>SAFE</b>	Department of Safety
<b>SMS</b>	Safety Measurement System
<b>SRC</b>	Safety Risk Coordinator
<b>VMS</b>	Vehicle Monitoring System
<b>WMATA</b>	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
<b>WMSC</b>	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)  
Department of Safety (SAFE) – Office of Safety Investigations**

*\*Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record.\**

**Executive Summary**


On Friday, January 6, 2023, at 10:59 hours, an Alexandria Division Train Operator operating inbound revenue Train ID 452 [L3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243T] operated their rail vehicle without having speed commands and permission from the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) after the Train Operator serviced Federal Triangle Station on Track 2. The ROCC Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) contacted the Train Operator to discover if the Train Operator had speed commands after they departed Federal Triangle Station en route to Metro Center Station. Upon further review from ROCC, it was determined that the Train Operator operating Train ID 452 did not have speed commands after servicing Federal Triangle Station. The Radio RTC dispatched an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor to assist with the incident, and the Train Operator was removed from service for post-incident testing. There were no injuries or damages reported as a result of this incident.

The probable cause of the event was a human factors error of inattention that resulted in the Train Operator bringing the train to a point of power without having speed commands and excluding permission from ROCC.

**Incident Site**

Federal Triangle Station, Track 2

**Field Sketch/Schematics**



## **Purpose and Scope**

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

## **Investigative Methods**

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Formal Interview – SAFE interviewed one individual as part of this investigation. Interviews include persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process. Representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) were present during the interview. SAFE interviewed the following personnel:
  - Train Operator
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
  - Train Operator Incident Statement
  - Train Operator Training Record
  - Train Operator 30-day Work History
  - Management Incident Report
  - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
  - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
  - Rail Operations Control System (ROCS) SPOTS Report
  - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
  - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
  - Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
  - Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) Incident Investigation Team (IIT) Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS)
  - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) playback

## **Investigation**

On Friday, January 6, 2023, at 10:59 hours, an Alexandria Division Train Operator operating inbound revenue Train ID 452 [L3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243T] operated their rail vehicle while not having speed commands and without permission from the ROCC. The Train Operator completed the train service at Federal Triangle Station on Track 2. Data from the CMOR IIT Report revealed that the Train Operator entered Stop and Proceed Mode with speed readouts at 0 MPH at 10:59 hours. The Radio RTC contacted the Train Operator at 11:02 hours and asked the Train Operator if they had speed readouts upon departing Federal Triangle Station en route to Metro Center Station.

Utilizing Operations Channel 2, the Train Operator responded to ROCC and reported that they did not lose their speed commands. The Radio RTC observed, via AIMS playback, the turnback in front of the Train Operator of Train ID 452 had been taken after the train serviced Federal Triangle Station.

The RTC took the turnback which would give the train zero-speed commands. The RTC can do this action in an emergency or if the train operator has not responded to radio transmissions. In this case, it was due to traffic control after an emergency (person on the roadway) at another station. The RTC attempted to contact the train two times at 10:57 hours and 11:02 hours, to instruct them to hold (this was to prevent train congestion and crowded platforms).

Based on the ROCC Incident Report, at 11:09 hours, the Radio RTC dispatched an RTRA Supervisor to assist, and they boarded Train ID 452 at Rosslyn Station on Track 2 to investigate. The Train Operator was removed from service at New Carrollton Station at 13:00 hours. The ROCC reported using subsequent trains to verify that the turnback was operating normally. The train was removed from service at Huntington Station and transported to the Alexandria Yard for VMS download and further investigation by the Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT). There were no reported injuries or damages during this incident. Additional analyses by the ITT and CMNT did not find any anomalies with the train consist.

### Chronological ARS Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
10:57:00 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the Train Operator of Train ID 452. <u>Train Operator of Train ID 452</u> : No response. [Radio OPS 2]
11:02:38 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the Train Operator of Train ID 452. [Radio OPS 2]
11:02:52 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the Train Operator of Train ID 452. <u>Train Operator of Train ID 452</u> : Train Operator acknowledged ROCC and informed them to proceed with their message. [Radio OPS 2]
11:03:01 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked the Train Operator of Train ID 452 if they had speed commands while leaving Federal Triangle Station and proceeding to Metro Center Station. <u>Train Operator of Train ID 452</u> : Train Operator reported they had speed commands while leaving Federal Triangle Station. [Radio OPS 2]
11:03:08 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked the Train Operator of Train ID 452 if they had lost their speed commands at any point between Federal Triangle Station and Metro Center Station, Track 2. <u>Train Operator of Train ID 452</u> : Train Operator reported negative; they did not lose their commands at any point. [Radio OPS 2]
11:09:50 hours	<u>Train Operator of Train ID 452</u> : Train Operator arrived at Rosslyn Station, Track 2. RTRA Supervisor boarded the train to investigate further. [SPOTS Report]
12:44:03 hours	<u>Train Operator of Train ID 452</u> : RTRA Supervisor and Train Operator arrived at New Carrollton Station, Track 1. Train Operator is removed at 13:09 hours by RTRA Supervisor. Train ID 452 en route to Huntington Station in revenue service and will be taken out of service for further investigation by ITT and CMNT. [SPOTS Report]
13:56:57 hours	<u>Train ID 452</u> : Train ID 452 arrived at Huntington Station on Track 2 and was taken out of service for transport to Alexandria Yard. [SPOTS Report]

*\*\*Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.*

# Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Image 1 - Train ID 452 arrived at Federal Triangle Station Track 2 platform at 10:58 hours.




Image 2 - Train ID 452 departed the Federal Triangle Station Track 2 platform at approximately 11:00 hours without speed commands.

# ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Thu Jan 12 20:13:15 2023

Select Platform:  and/or Select ID:  Leave blank to remove criteria  
 and/or Select 4-digit car number:  Leave blank to remove criteria  
 Select Date:    Select Times (0-24HRS): From  To

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Travel Time door open to door open
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D01-2</a>	6	21				10:58:48	10:59:34	46	10:58:11	11:00:43	3048-3049.3239-3238.3282-3283	-

Image 3 - ROCS SPOTS Report showing when Train ID 452 departed Federal Triangle Station.

# ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Thu Mar 2 18:08:11 2023

Select Platform:  and/or Select ID:  Leave blank to remove criteria  
 and/or Select 4-digit car number:  Leave blank to remove criteria  
 Select Date:    Select Times (0-24HRS): From  To

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Travel Time door open to door open
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C01-2</a>	6	21				11:01:26	11:01:54	28	11:00:56	11:02:16	3048-3049.3239-3238.3282-3283	-
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D13-2</a>	6	21	11:03:15	11:03:37	22	11:12:44	11:15:31	167	11:02:38	11:16:02	unknown	1:49
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C02-2</a>	6	21	11:03:29	11:03:54	25				11:02:45	11:04:32	3048-3049.3239-3238.3282-3283	0:14
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C03-2</a>	6	21	11:05:12	11:05:32	20				11:04:46	11:05:53	3048-3049.3239-3238.3282-3283	1:43
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C04-2</a>	6	21				11:06:54	11:07:19	25	11:06:25	11:07:47	3048-3049.3239-3238.3282-3283	1:42
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C05-2</a>	6	21				11:09:50	11:10:13	23	11:09:20	11:10:37	3048-3049.3239-3238.3282-3283	2:56

Image 4 - ROCS SPOTS Report showing the time Train Operator of Train ID 452 arrived at Rosslyn Station.

# ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Wed Jan 18 19:53:00 2023

Select Platform:  and/or Select ID:  Leave blank to remove criteria

and/or Select 4-digit car number:  Leave blank to remove criteria

Select Date:    Select Times (0-24HRS): From  To

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Travel Time door open to door open
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C07-1</a>	6	19				12:01:23	12:01:38	15	12:00:54	12:02:08	unknown	-
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C06-1</a>	6	19	12:04:17	12:04:32	15				12:03:51	12:04:51	unknown	2:54
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C05-1</a>	6	19				12:06:28	12:06:45	17	12:06:00	12:07:09	unknown	2:11
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C04-1</a>	6	19				12:09:18	12:09:33	15	12:08:47	12:09:56	unknown	2:50
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C03-1</a>	6	19	12:10:54	12:11:10	16				12:10:28	12:11:31	unknown	1:36
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C02-1</a>	6	19	12:12:12	12:12:44	32				12:11:47	12:13:10	unknown	1:18
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">C01-1</a>	6	19				12:14:05	12:14:24	19	12:13:36	12:14:55	unknown	1:53
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D01-1</a>	6	19				12:15:39	12:15:57	18	12:15:06	12:16:22	unknown	1:34
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D02-1</a>	6	19	12:17:11	12:17:45	34				12:16:45	12:18:08	unknown	1:32
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D03-1</a>	6	19				12:19:01	12:19:21	20	12:18:30	12:19:47	unknown	1:50
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D04-1</a>	6	19				12:20:31	12:20:48	17	12:20:00	12:21:14	unknown	1:30
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D05-1</a>	6	19				12:22:22	12:22:37	15	12:21:50	12:23:01	unknown	1:51
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D06-1</a>	6	19				12:24:05	12:24:21	16	12:23:35	12:24:42	unknown	1:43
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D07-1</a>	6	19				12:25:50	12:26:05	15	12:25:20	12:26:27	unknown	1:45
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D08-1</a>	6	19				12:27:46	12:27:59	13	12:27:17	12:28:21	unknown	1:56
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D09-1</a>	6	19				12:31:41	12:32:00	19	12:31:10	12:32:22	unknown	3:55
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D10-1</a>	6	19				12:33:43	12:33:58	15	12:33:15	12:34:19	unknown	2:02
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D11-1</a>	6	19	12:35:53	12:36:09	16				12:35:29	12:36:29	unknown	2:10
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D12-1</a>	6	19				12:38:47	12:39:10	23	12:38:21	12:39:31	unknown	2:54
<a href="#">452</a>	<a href="#">D13-1</a>	6	21	12:58:04	13:01:16	192	12:44:25	12:44:43	18	12:44:03	13:01:48	unknown	5:38

Image 5 - ROCS SPOTS Report showing when the Train Operator of Train ID 452 was removed from service at New Carrollton Station.

# ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Wed Jan 18 19:48:38 2023

Select Platform:  and/or Select ID:  Leave blank to remove criteria

and/or Select 4-digit car number:  Leave blank to remove criteria

Select Date:    Select Times (0-24HRS): From  To

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwll	Left door open	Left door close	dwll	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Travel Time door open to door open
452	D12-2	6	21				13:04:01	13:04:20	19	13:03:27	13:04:41	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	-
452	D11-2	6	21	13:07:11	13:07:27	16				13:06:42	13:07:48	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	3:10
452	D10-2	6	21				13:09:36	13:09:50	14	13:09:03	13:10:18	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	2:25
452	D09-2	6	21				13:11:45	13:12:05	20	13:11:11	13:12:26	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	2:09
452	D08-2	6	21				13:15:38	13:15:56	18	13:15:03	13:16:18	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	3:53
452	D07-2	6	21				13:17:50	13:18:04	14	13:17:14	13:18:31	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	2:12
452	D06-2	6	21				13:19:47	13:20:04	17	13:19:12	13:20:27	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:57
452	D05-2	6	21				13:21:33	13:21:47	14	13:20:58	13:22:10	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:46
452	D04-2	6	21				13:23:15	13:23:31	16	13:22:42	13:23:56	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:42
452	D03-2	6	21				13:24:42	13:24:57	15	13:24:09	13:25:25	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:27
452	D02-2	6	21	13:26:23	13:26:39	16				13:25:56	13:27:11	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:41
452	D01-2	6	21				13:28:19	13:28:33	14	13:27:41	13:28:59	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:56
452	C01-2	6	21				13:29:43	13:30:01	18	13:29:10	13:30:27	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:24
452	C02-2	6	21	13:31:27	13:31:43	16				13:30:58	13:32:09	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:44
452	C03-2	6	21	13:32:59	13:33:15	16				13:32:24	13:33:41	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:32
452	C04-2	6	21				13:34:48	13:35:03	15	13:34:15	13:35:27	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:49
452	C05-2	6	21				13:37:37	13:37:53	16	13:37:05	13:38:18	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	2:49
452	C06-2	6	21	13:39:55	13:40:12	17				13:39:27	13:40:32	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	2:18
452	C07-2	6	21				13:42:51	13:43:05	14	13:42:17	13:43:28	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	2:56
452	C08-2	6	21	13:44:32	13:44:48	16				13:44:04	13:45:10	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:41
452	C09-2	6	21	13:46:26	13:46:49	23				13:45:58	13:47:14	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:54
452	C10-2	6	21				13:48:21	13:48:38	17	13:47:45	13:49:02	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	1:55
452	C11-2	6	21							13:51:11	13:51:33	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	-
452	C12-2	6	21				13:53:44	13:54:00	16	13:53:08	13:54:22	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	5:23
452	C13-2	6	21							13:54:59	13:56:13	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	-
452	C14-2	6	21	13:57:32	14:00:31	179				13:56:57	14:00:52	3050-3051.3076-3077.3242-3243	3:48
452	C14-1	6	19	14:16:41	14:16:57	16				14:16:02	14:17:23	3143-3142.3144-3145.3261-3260	19:09

Image 6 - ROCS SPOTS Report showing the time Train ID 452 was removed from service at Huntington Station.

## Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) / Incident Investigation Team (IIT)

Adopted from the CMOR IIT report with minor grammatical and formatting edits:

“Based on the VMS data, Train ID 452 Speed Commands dropped to 0 MPH as the train was coming to a stop onto Federal Triangle Station’s platform on Track 2. After servicing the station by cycling the doors, Train ID [452’s] Stop and Proceed Mode was activated. The Master Controller was moved, but the train did not move. Stop and Proceed Mode was terminated. The train entered Stop and Proceed Mode again and moved while under Stop and Proceed Mode for 479 feet before the Limiting and Regulated Speed limits increased to 50 MPH and 29 MPH, respectively. The Master Controller was moved to P5 Power Mode, and the train increased speed and continued to Metro Center Station, passing the turnback at 13 MPH. Based on VMS data, CMOR IIT did not identify any faults with the train that contributed to the cause of this incident. The train performed and designed and commanded.” See the timeline of events below:

<b>Time</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Train Speed</b>
10:58:01 hours	Train ID 452 came to a complete stop on Track 2. Limiting and Regulated Speed limits dropped to 0 MPH.	3 MPH
10:58:02 hours	Train ID 452 came to a complete stop at Federal Triangle Station, Track 2.	0 MPH
10:58:09 hours	Left Door Open Pushbutton activated, and the left doors opened.	0 MPH
10:58:50 hours	Left Door Close Pushbutton activated, and the left doors began to close.	0 MPH
10:58:57 hours	DCKR signal goes HIGH, indicating all doors are closed and locked.	0 MPH
10:59:05 hours	Train ID 452 entered Stop and Proceed Mode with Speed Readouts all 0 MPH.	0 MPH
10:59:06 hours	Master Controller placed in a B1 Braking Mode.	0 MPH
10:59:06 hours	Brakes released.	0 MPH
10:59:07 hours	Master Controller placed in a P2 Power Mode.	0 MPH
10:59:08 hours	Master Controller moved to a B5 Braking Mode after not moving at all.	0 MPH
10:59:10 hours	Master Controller placed in a B1 Braking Mode.	0 MPH
10:59:10 hours	Master Controller moved to a B4 Braking Mode.	0 MPH
10:59:11 hours	Stop and Proceed Mode ended.	0 MPH
10:59:24 hours	Train ID 452 entered Stop and Proceed Mode with Speed Readouts all 0 MPH.	0 MPH
10:59:37 hours	Train ID 452 moved towards Metro Center Station while in Stop and Proceed Mode.	1 MPH
11:00:05 hours	Master Controller moved to a P5 Power Mode, and Train ID 452 increased speed towards Metro Center Station.	12 MPH
11:00:09 hours	Train ID 452 passed Turnback at 13 MPH with the Master Controller in a P5 Power Mode.	13 MPH
11:00:45 hours	Train ID 452 came to a complete stop 11 feet from the 8-Car Marker at Metro Center Station.	0
11:00:48 hours	Left Door Open Pushbutton activated, and the left doors opened.	0
11:01:09 hours	Left Door Close Pushbutton activated, and the left doors began to close.	0
11:01:17 hours	DCKR signal goes HIGH, indicating all doors are closed and locked.	0
11:01:19 hours	Master Controller moved to P5 Power position, and Train ID 452 moved towards McPherson Square Station.	1 MPH




Figure 1 – IIT analysis of the Train Operator actions of Train ID 452.


## Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Playback



*Image 6 – Train ID 452 [Lead car 3050] arrives near the 8-Car Marker at Federal Triangle Station, Track 2, at 10:58:36 hours.*



*Image 7 – Train ID 452 serviced the Federal Triangle Station, Track 2 platform, and doors opened at 10:58:47 hours.*



*Image 8 – Train ID 452 serviced the Federal Triangle Station, Track 2 platform, and doors closed at 10:59:33 hours.*



*Image 9 – Train ID 452 departed Federal Triangle Station, Track 2, at 11:00:12 hours.*

### **Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)**

CMNT personnel performed the necessary operation checks and inspections as recommended by CMOR IIT. CMNT reestablished communications between the Friction Brake System and the VMS. CMNT also performed tests on the Master Controller Operations and Brake Rates with no defects found. CMNT cleared the train for service and released it. ([See Appendix B](#)).

## Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA)

RTRA's administrative investigation found that the Train Operator violated several established rules and procedures related to operating the train without speed commands, as well as closing platform-side doors without verifying that they had speed commands. The Train Operator was assessed disciplinary action in accordance with the Disciplinary Administration Program, which included retraining.

### Interview Findings

*As part of the investigation launched into the Improper Rail Vehicle Movement at Federal Triangle Station, SAFE conducted one interview with the Train Operator. The interview was conducted electronically via Microsoft Teams and identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from interviews and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.*

The Train Operator reported they were servicing Federal Triangle Station on Train 2 and were in the process of changing the train ID before they attempted to proceed to the next station. The Train Operator reported they assumed they had speed commands but did not verify visually if they had speed commands before leaving the station. The Train Operator stated they lost their awareness and did not verify speed commands before moving the train. *(Note: there was no evidence that they changed the Train ID or were instructed to change the Train ID.)*

### Weather

On January 6, 2023, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 49° F, 17 MPH winds, partly sunny, and visibility of 10 miles. This event occurred within a tunneled section of the rail system. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC)

### Human Factors

#### Fatigue

Evidence of Fatigue:

The incident data were evaluated for evidence of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The Train Operator reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk:

The incident data were evaluated for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigued were identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Train Operator reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The Train Operator performed day shift work in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 6.7 hours at the time of the incident. The Train Operator reported 8 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 8.5 hours which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than a comparable amount of sleep to the employee's regular workday sleep durations. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

## Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Train Operator was not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/7.

## Work History

The Train Operator is a WMATA employee with over ten years of total service: six years as a Bus Operator and four years of service as a Train Operator. The Train Operator was last certified in July 2022. This employee has no history of sleep issues to report. As noted in the RTRA Investigative report, the Train Operator had two prior infractions, both in 2020. The infractions included opening doors off of the platform and failing to clear their train at the end of the line, which resulted in a customer being brought into the rail yard.

## Certifications

The Train Operator completed their train qualification on July 14, 2022, with 94% on the MSRPH Exam and 90% on the TVOIM Exam. The Train Operator successfully completed the practical application portion on July 17, 2022.

## Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- RTRA removed the Train Operator service for post-incident toxicology testing.
- RTRA removed the incident consist from service for CMNT inspection and CMOR ITT analysis.

## Related Rules and Procedures

- MSRPH Section 3 – Operating Rules Ver 2.0 – 3.18 – "Employees shall not operate any vehicle in a reckless or unsafe manner."
- MSRPH Section 3 – Operating Rules Ver 2.0 – 3.79 – "Train Operators shall not move trains with zero speed commands except after notifying ROCC or Terminal Supervisor and being given permission to move with zero speed commands and either a permissive block going with traffic or an absolute block going against traffic."
- MSRPH Section 3 – Operating Rules Ver 2.0 – 3.79.1 – "Upon losing speed commands on the platform, the operator may NOT adjust the train in the same direction of traffic to service the station without contacting ROCC or Terminal Supervisor for permission. After servicing the station, the operator must keep their train doors open until such time when the operator has received speed commands, a proper signal aspect (Lunar or Flashing Lunar), along with contacting ROCC or Terminal Supervisor for permission to leave and an absolute block for the move if speed commands do not return (Reference SOP # 40)."
- MSRPH Section 3 – Operating Rules Ver 2.0 – 3.79.3 – "Legacy Trains - Operators shall contact ROCC or terminal supervisor anytime the train loses speed commands and comes to a stop, even within the platform limits. Before moving the train, a permissive or absolute block must be established."
- SOP 40.5.3.1 – "Prior to initiating the Close Door Button, the train operator shall check the operator console for speed commands and check Roadway ahead of the train to ensure it is clear."

## **Findings**

- Train ID 452's Limiting and Regulated Speed limit dropped to 0 MPH in approach to Federal Triangle Station, Track 2.
- Train ID 452 entered Stop and Proceed Mode, with Speed Readouts all 0 MPH after servicing Federal Triangle Station.
- The Train Operator did not contact ROCC and receive permission to proceed when speed commands were at 0 MPH before departing Federal Triangle Station.
- Train Operator proceeded to Metro Center Station while in Stop and Proceed Mode.
- No mechanical defects were identified with the train that would have contributed to the event.

## **Probable Cause Statement**

The probable cause of the event was a human factors error of inattention that resulted in the Train Operator bringing the train to a point of power without having speed commands and excluding permission from ROCC.

## **Recommended Corrective Actions**

The following are the recommended corrective actions identified as a result of this investigation. These are tracked using WMATA's Safety Measurement System Incidents/Accidents (SMS I/A) Module and are verified by SAFE upon completion. The responsible department is identified in the corrective action code, and the respective departmental Safety Risk Coordinator (SRC) will manage the mitigation.

<b>Corrective Action Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Responsible Party</b>	<b>Estimated Completion Date</b>
105333_SAFE CAPS_RTRA _001	(RC-1) RTRA Management will ensure the Train Operator attends refresher training.	RTRA SRC	Completed

## Appendices

### **Appendix A – Interview Summary**

*The narrative below summarizes the interview with SAFE and represents the statements made by the individual involved. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.*

#### Train Operator

The Train Operator is a WMATA employee with over ten years of total service: six years as a Bus Operator and four years of service as a Train Operator. The Train Operator was last certified in July 2022. This employee has no history of sleep issues to report.

During the interview, the Train Operator stated they were servicing Federal Triangle Station on Train 2, outbound, and did not notice they did not have speed commands before leaving the station. They reported that the ROCC contacted them to ascertain if they had speed commands. The Train Operator stated they witnessed a lunar signal and assumed they had speed commands before operating the train in revenue service. The Train Operator said they lost focus and were not aware of the status of the train. The Train Operator said the incident may have been prevented if they had taken their time and not rushed through the procedures.

# Appendix B – Maximo Inspection Report



## Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 1  
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17594808  
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE  
01/10/2023 08:19

Work Description: TRAIN ID 452 IMPROPER RAIL VEHICLE MOVEMENT AT FEDERAL TRAINGLE  
Job Plan Description:

Work Information	
Asset: R3050	3050, RAIL CAR, BREDA, 3000 AC, A CAR
Asset Tag: R3050	
Asset S/N: 3050	
Location: 1437	E99, GREENBELT YARD
Work Location: 1213	C99, ALEXANDRIA YARD
Failure Class: CMNT001	RAIL CAR
Problem Code: 2424	N/A CODE (GENERAL SYMPTOM)
Requested By:	
Chain Mark Start:	
Create-Mileage: 2453782.0	
Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:
Maintenance Office: CMNT-GRBT-INSP	Create Date: 01/06/2023 20:51
Labor Group: CMNT	Actual Start: 01/06/2023 20:53
Crew:	Actual Comp: 01/06/2023 22:01
Lead:	Item: L18050002
GL Account: WMATA-02-33392-50499160-041-*****-OPR**	
Supervisor:	Target Start:
Requestor Phone:	Target Comp:
Chain Mark End:	Scheduled Start:
Complete-Mileage: 2453782.0	

Task ID	Task ID
10	RE-ESTABLISHED COMM. BETWEEN FRICTION BRAKE SYSTEM AND VMS. PERFORMED MASTER CONTROLLER OPS CHECK GOOD. PERFORMED BRAKE RATES WITHIN SPEC. DST PASSED.

Component: 000-300 RAIL CAR, 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accompl: CHECKED	Reason: NO TROUBLE FOUND	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N
--	-----------------------	--------------------------	---------------	-----------	--------------

Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10		01/06/2023	01/06/2023	20:30	21:00	Y	00:30	00:00	\$24.68
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							00:30	00:00	\$24.68

Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark Date
1588	DIAGNOSTIC FAIL; RESET	3192 TESTED / INSPECTED	01/06/2023

Remarks: RE-ESTABLISHED COMM. BETWEEN FRICTION BRAKE SYSTEM AND VMS. PERFORMED MASTER CONTROLLER OPS CHECK... GOOD. PERFORMED BRAKE RATES WITHIN SPEC. DST PASSED.

WT\_plust\_woprint.rpdesign

01/12/2023 20:38

Figure 2 – CMNT work order details for Train ID 452, page 1 of 1.

Incident Date: 01/06/2023 Time: 10:59 hours  
Final Report – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement  
E23016

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 03/05/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 704 – 03/07/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 03/07/2023

# Appendix C – Train Operator and RTRA Supervisor Investigative Documents (Abridged)

## WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page \_\_\_ of \_\_\_

**Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents**

Date: 1/6/23 Incident Time: 11:01 Time Reported: \_\_\_\_\_ Reported by: Customer  Employee   
 ROCC  Other

**Location**  
 Station: McPherson Mezzanine #: \_\_\_\_\_ Track #/Destination: 2 Chain Marker/Signal Number: \_\_\_\_\_

**TYPE OF INCIDENT**  
 Property Damage  Smoke  Fire  Customer Complaint  
 Customer injury  Customer Illness  Employee Injury  Employee Illness  
 Criminal Activity  Elevator Entrapment  Rail Vehicle Incident  Other (Explain in description of incident)

**WEATHER** **LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)** **LIGHTING (artificial lighting)**  
 Clear  Rain  Dawn/Dusk  Daylight  Lights On  Lights Off   
 Snow  Sleet/Ice  Dark  Tunnel/Underground  Lights Not Working

**STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC**

Elevator/Escalator #: \_\_\_\_\_ AFC #: \_\_\_\_\_ Room Number/Location: \_\_\_\_\_

Failure Number(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Parking Lot  Paid Area  Free Area  Garage  Station Entrance  Stairway # \_\_\_\_\_  Platform  Ancillary Room   
 Injury/Illness reported aboard Train  Other

Name of Responding Supervisor: \_\_\_\_\_ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder: \_\_\_\_\_

**TRAIN INCIDENTS**

Train ID: 452 Destination: Huntington Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 3243 3077 3051 Lead Car: 3050

Name of Responding Supervisor: \_\_\_\_\_ Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: \_\_\_\_\_

**DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.**

Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

*I serviced McPherson Track #2. Proceed to move after changing the ID with no speed commands. Once I noticed my speed commands returned.*

BT:END 9 AM 1/8/23

**Employee Completing Report**  
 Name: [Redacted] Employee #: [Redacted] Date: 1/6/23  
 Run #: 34 Assigned Days: M/T

**To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager**  
 Supervisor Name (print): \_\_\_\_\_ Supervisor Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Employee #: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Action taken/needed: \_\_\_\_\_

SMS Number: \_\_\_\_\_

50.753A 09/11 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors



# RTRA Supervisors' Report

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS-RAIL SERVICE

Office of Rail Transportation

Date 1-06-2023	Incident Time: 11:01am	Incident Location (Station Mezzanine#) <i>Federal Triangle</i>	Track/Mezzanine# <i>#2</i>
-------------------	---------------------------	---	-------------------------------

Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #, Room #)

*452 3243 3077 3051*

Incident Description

*Moving with out speed commands*

WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
<i>[Redacted]</i>	<i>[Redacted]</i>		<i>Alexandria</i>	<i>Yes</i>

Name	Address	Injury?

Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks

Chronological Account of Incident

Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion

*I transported M Short for post incident and did the safety interview.*

Supervisor/ Submitting Report (include payroll #) <i>[Redacted]</i>	Date <i>1-6-2023</i>	Report Reviewed by	Date
--	-------------------------	--------------------	------

RTRA Supervisor's Report

Page 2 of 2

50.437 09/10

REPORT MUST BE FAXED TO ROCC 301-618-1012 at end of tour

Incident Date: 01/06/2023 Time: 10:59 hours  
Final Report – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement  
E23016

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 03/05/2023  
Reviewed By: SAFE 704 – 03/07/2023  
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 03/07/2023

Page 21



# WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

INVESTIGATION REPORT		DIVISION Alexandria	GARAGE N/A	FILE NO. 20230106-016152	
DATE OF OCCURRENCE January 6, 2023	TIME 11:00am	VEHICLE NO. (L) 3050-3051-3076-3077-3242-3243	RUN # AX-380034	SHIFT AM	BLOCK NO. ID 452
LINE: Blue	LOCATION: Between Federal Triangle and Metro Center Track #2		DESTINATION: Huntington		
TYPE OF CASE Violation: MSRPH 1.46, 3.79.1, 3.79.3, SOP 40.5.3.1 Cardinal Rule 1.3, OR 3.79,			REPORTED BY ROCC		
NAME OF EMPLOYEE INVOLVED [REDACTED]				EMPLOYEE NO. [REDACTED]	
NATURE OF OCCURRENCE Train moving without speed commands					
1. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION 2. STATEMENT OF EMPLOYEE 3. SUMMARY OF VIOLATION. 4. ANALYSIS OF FACTS / EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF RULE VIOLATION 5. ASSESSMENT OF DISCIPLINE					
1. On Friday, January 6, 2023 at approximately 11:01am, ROCC reported that Train Operator [REDACTED] moved his train without speed commands between Federal Triangle and Metro Center on track 2. ROCC had cancelled the turnback between the two stations and the turnback was confirmed operational.					
2. Operator [REDACTED] you stated in your incident report, "I serviced McPherson Track #2. Proceed to move after changing the ID with no speed commands. Once I noticed my speed commands returned."					
ACTION TAKEN: Level III violation with Written Reprimand, ten (10) points assessed under the Disciplinary Administration Program (DAP) and Refresher Training with ROQT					
DATE 2/2/23	ACTION TAKEN BY: [REDACTED]			TITLE Superintendent	
EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE [REDACTED]					
I certify that the above has been called to my attention, and I understand that my signature does not imply admission of guilt					
EMPLOYEE MAY WRITE A STATEMENT IN THIS SPACE					

4.21 (6/79) Orig: Office of Bus Service (BUSV) or RAIL Yellow: Employee  
Green: Employee Division File Pink: Union Gold: Marketing/MARK

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Investigation Report Continuation Sheet

3. Based on the above investigation you violated the following MSRPH Rules:

Cardinal Rule 1.3- Acceptance of employment signifies the individual's willingness to comply with all WMATA's rules and regulations and orders; and to perform specific job duties and requirements in a safe, orderly and efficient manner.

G.R. 1.46- Employees shall not permit unnecessary conversation, reading, lounging or any other action or condition of mind to divert their attention from the safe and efficient performance of duty.

O.R. 3.79 – Train Operators shall not move trains with zero speed commands except after notifying ROCC or Terminal Supervisor and being given permission to move with zero speed commands and either a permissive block going with traffic or an absolute block going against traffic.

O.R. 3.79.1 – Upon losing speed commands on the platform, the operator may NOT adjust the train in the same direct of traffic to service the station without contacting ROCC or Terminal Supervisor for permission. After servicing the station, the operator must keep their train doors open, until such time when the operator has received speed commands, a proper signal aspect (Lunar or Flashing Lunar), along with contacting ROCC or Terminal Supervisor for permission to leave and an absolute block for the move if speed commands do not return.

O.R 3.79.3 – Legacy Trains – Operators shall contact ROCC or Terminal Supervisor anytime the train loses speed commands and comes to a stop, even within the platform limits. Before moving the train, a permissive block or absolute block must be established.

SOP 40.5.3.1 – Prior to initiating the Close Door Button, the train operator shall check the operator console for speed commands and check Roadway ahead of the train to ensure it is clear.

4. An investigation was conducted by Alexandria Division Managers. The investigation included your incident report, ROCC's incident report, and data analyzed from your train ID 452 by the Incident Investigation Team (IIT) engineers. The data provided revealed that train ID 452's speed commands dropped to 0 MPH as the train was coming to a stop onto Federal Triangle Station's platform on Track #2. After servicing the station, the train's Stop and Proceed mode was activated. The Master Controller was moved, but the train did not move. Stop and Proceed Mode was terminated. The train was entered into Stop and Proceed again and moved while under Stop and Proceed for 479 feet with zero speed commands.

5. Operator [redacted] in determining the appropriate disciplinary penalty for your actions, the Division considered many factors. The records of WMATA indicate you have been an employee since February 3, 2014. The records indicate that you have been a train operator since March 1, 2020. Since becoming a train operator, you have committed several operational violations to include an improper door operation on August 21, 2020 and failure to follow established procedures for checking out of service trains at the end of the line, resulting in a customer being brought into the rail yard on April 22, 2020.

As a result of the above referenced infraction/violation, you are being issued a Level 3 violation with twelve (12) points assessed under the Discipline Administration Program (DAP). You must use two (2) of your available six (6) positive points towards this violation which brings your total accumulative points to ten (10). Ten (10) points constitutes a written reprimand under the DAP issued June 1, 2022. You are reminded that any future violation(s) may result in more progressive disciplinary action to include disqualification and/or discharge from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.

Post incident drug and alcohol testing results \_\_\_ Positive \_\_\_ X \_\_\_ Negative

Employee Initials: [redacted] Date: 2/2/23

## Appendix D – Rail Operations Control Center Incident Report (Abridged)

### View Approved Incident Report

INCIDENT ID: 2023006BLUE7					
<b>DATE</b> 2023-01-06	<b>TIME</b> 1101	<b>LINE</b> Blue	<b>ITEM</b> 7		
<b>LOCATION (STATION/YARD)</b> Federal Triangle (D01)		<b>LOCATION/CHAIN MARKER (If Applicable)</b>	<b>REPORTED BY</b> AIM Display		
<b>TRAIN ID</b> 452	<b>DIRECTION</b> I/B	<b>TRACK NUMBER</b> 2	<b>DEPTS NOTIFIED</b> Everbridge Alert/Messaging		
<b>CAR NUMBERS (XXXX-XXXX)</b>					
<b>Lead Car</b>					
-	-	-	-		
Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>	Caused Issue <input type="checkbox"/>		
<b>TRBL CODE</b> OPER- OPERATOR ERROR	<b>RESP CODE</b> RTR				
<b>TYPE INCIDENT</b> Operator Moved Train Without Speed Commands.					
<b>ACTION PLAN</b> Dispatch RTRA Supervisor. Remove Operator from Service.					
DELAYS IN MINUTES					
LINE	INCIDENT	TRAIN	TOTAL DURATION		
0	0	0	0		
TRIPS MODIFIED					
PARTIAL	GAP TRAIN	LATE DISPATCHES	REROUTED	NOT DISPATCHED	OFFLOADS
0	0	0	0	0	0
FIVE PRIMARY CONSOLE INDICATIONS					
BCP	BRAKES ON ILLUMINATED	ALL DOORS CLOSED ILLUMINATED	AUTO\MANUAL ILLUMINATED	BPP	
			AUTO		

## View Approved Incident Report

<b>INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY</b>	
<b>TIME</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1101	Train Operator [REDACTED] was observed moving his train without speed commands between Federal Triangle and Metro Center track two. The turnback in front of Operator [REDACTED] train had been taken before his train had serviced the platform. ROCC instructed Unit 32, RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] to standby to intercept the train and investigate. AOM, ROIC, CMNT and all other concerned personnel were notified.
1109	Supervisor [REDACTED] boarded train 452 at Rosslyn. Supervisor [REDACTED] reported, after interviewing Operator [REDACTED], that the operator stated that they did not remember if his train had speed commands at Federal Triangle.
1300	Operator [REDACTED] was removed from service at New Carrollton, transported for post-incident analysis and instructed to submit an incident report.
0000	Note: It was confirmed with subsequent trains that the turnback was operating normally.

**MAXIMO TICKET#**  
8644965

<b>REPORT PREPARED BY</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>CLICK TO SIGN</b>
<b>RADIO CONTROLLER 1</b>	[REDACTED]	✓
<b>BUTTON CONTROLLER 1</b>	[REDACTED]	✓
<b>RADIO CONTROLLER 2</b>		
<b>BUTTON CONTROLLER 2</b>		

<b>SUPERINTENDENTS OR ASSISTANTS SECTION</b>
--

**ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP CORRECTIVE ACTIONS OR REMARKS**

**FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS**

**NOTIFICATIONS/PAGE GROUPS**                      #1/CEO  #2/DGM & BELOW

**ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS MADE BY PHONE**

<b>APPROVED BY</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>CLICK TO SIGN</b>
<b>REPORT APPROVED BY SUPT. OR ASST SUPT.</b>	[REDACTED]	✓

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# Appendix E – Root Cause Analysis

## E23016 – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement – Federal Triangle Station

