

Inspection Form

Form WMSC-IR-1

Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Agency/Department Information

| Inspection Date | YYYY/MM/DD | Daniel Ministry | 20231019-WMSC-LBW-1 | | | |
|------------------------|--|------------------------|---------------------|--|--|--|
| Inspection Date | 2023/10/19 | Report Number | | | | |
| Rail Agency Name | Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority | Rail Agency Department | Name | | | |
| Rail Agency Department | RTRA | Contact Information | | | | |
| Inspection Location | Red Line between Shady Grove and Glenmont Statio | ns | | | | |

Inspection Summary

| Inspection Activity # | 1 |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| Activity Code | PI-SAFE-QAI |
| Inspection Units | 1 |
| Inspection Subunits | 8 |
| Defects (Number) | 0 |
| Recommended Finding | No |
| Remedial Action Required ¹ | No |
| Recommended Reinspection | Yes |

Activity Summaries

| Related Reports NA Related CAPS / Findings NA Related Rules, SOPs, Standards, or Other Other Ref Rule or SOP Standard Other / Title Checklist Reference Temporary Use Notice Temporary Tem | Related Reports NA Related CAPS / Findings NA Related CAPS / Findings NA NA NA NA NA NA NA N | Inspection Activity # | 1 | 1 Inspection Subject | | | Auto Door Train Operator Certification | | | Activity Code | | | PI-SAFE-QAI | | | | | |
|--|---|-----------------------|---|----------------------|------------|------------------------|--|---------|----------|---------------|---------------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|--------|-----------|------|--|
| Related Rules, SOPs, Standards, or Other / Title | Related Rules, SOPs, Standards, or Other / Title | Employee | NA Ac | | | Accompanied Inspector? | | | No | | Yes Time | | 06:45 AM | | | Yes | | |
| Temporary Use Notice (TUN) ADO-23-04 dated October 13, 2023 SOP 40 | Related Rules, SOPs, Standards, or Other Other Other Other (TUN) ADO-23-04 dated October 13, 2023 Inspection Location Main Track Yard Station OCC RTA Facility Office Track Type At-grade Tun Elevated N/A | Related Reports | NA | | | Related CA | APS / Findin | ıgs | | NA | | • | | • | • | | | |
| SOPs, Standards, or Other Temporary Use Notice (TIN) ADO-23-04 dated October 13, 2023 SOP 40 | Temporary Use Notice TUN, ADO-23-04 dated October 13, 2023 Track Track Tyne Station OCC RTA Facility Office Track Type At-grade Tunnel Elevated N/A | Polated Pules | Ref | | Rule | or SOP | | | Standard | | Other / 1 | Γitle | | | Checkl | ist Refer | ence | |
| Inspection Location Track Yard Station OCC RTA Facility Office Track Type At-grade Tunnel Elevated N/A | Inspection Location Track Yard Station OCC RTA Facility Office Track Type At-grade Tunnel Elevated N/A | SOPs, Standards, or | (TUN) ADO-23 | 3-04 dated | | 40 | | | NA | | INA | | | | | | | |
| Line(s) & Track Number Red Line between Shady Grove and Glenmont Stations Head Car Number NA NA The WMSC Inspectors conducted a second train operator Auto Door Operation (ADO) certification inspection on the RED line between the Shady Grove and Glenmont Stations. In preparation for the return to auto doors, all operations personnel assigned to the Alpha and Bravo lines will have to complete computer-based training (CBT) and a practical certification. The certification of operations personnel was to be completed in compliance with Temporary Use Notice (TUN) ADO-23-04 dated October 13, 2023, and include the use of the Checklist for Certification by the Quality Assurance Quality Control examiners. Prior to the second day inspection activity, the inspection team reviewed the prior day inspection results. The WMSC inspectors arrived on the Red at 0645 and no briefing with WMATA safe was conducted before the inspection activities. At 0700 the inspectors contacted the Rail Operation Control Center (ROCC) to alert them of the inspection and determine the location of the Quality Assurance Quality Control (QAQC) examiner. The inspection team observed Auto Door Certification of multiple train operators. The QA/QC examiner was approaching trains after the platform was serviced and confirming that each operator had completed the required CBT before starting the certification review. The examiner contacted the ROCC to request permission to break the sealed switch and move the door mode selector switch to Auto-Manuel. Each train operator was observed to determine if they were following procedures as they entered six rail stations. After the sixth station, the QA/QC examiner resealed the door mode selector switch in Manual-Manual and notified the ROCC. The QA/QC examiner and all Train Operators were observed in possession of all required Person Protection | Line(s) & Track Number Red Line between Shady Grove and Chain Marker and/or Station(s) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA N | Inspection Location | Track | Yard | | occ | RTA F | acility | | Track Type | At-grade T | | | innel Ele | | ted N/A | | |
| Number Glenmont Stations Station(s) NA | Number Glenmont Stations Station(s) NA | | | | | | | | | | | | Х | | | | | |
| Na | Head Car Number Number of Cars | | | | dy Grove a | nd | | | or | ALA. | | | | | | То | | |
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| Compliance with Temporary Use Notice (TUN) ADO-23-04 dated October 13, 2023, and include the use of the Checklist for Certification by the Quality Assurance Quality Control examiners. Prior to the second day inspection activity, the inspection team reviewed the prior day inspection results. The WMSC inspectors arrived on the Red at 0645 and no briefing with WMATA safe was conducted before the inspection activities. At 0700 the inspection and determine the location of the Quality Assurance Quality Control (QAQC) examiner. The inspection team observed Auto Door Certification of multiple train operators. The QA/QC examiner was approaching trains after the platform was serviced and confirming that each operator had completed the required CBT before starting the certification review. The examiner contacted the ROCC to request permission to break the sealed switch and move the door mode selector switch to Auto-Manuel. Each train operator was observed to determine if they were following procedures as they entered six rail stations. After the sixth station, the QA/QC examiner resealed the door mode selector switch in Manual-Manual and notified the ROCC. The QA/QC examiner and all Train Operators were observed in possession of all required Person Protection | compliance with Temporary Use Notice (TUN) ADO-23-04 dated October 13, 2023, and include the use of the Checklist for Certification by the Quality Assurance Quality Control examiners. Prior to the second day inspection activity, the inspection team reviewed the prior day inspection results. The WMSC inspectors arrived on the Red at 0645 and no briefing with WMATA safe was conducted before the inspection activities. At 0700 the inspectors contacted the Rail Operation Control Center (ROCC) to alert them of the inspection and determine the location of the Quality Assurance Quality Control (QAQC) examiner. The inspection team observed Auto Door Certification of multiple train operators. The QA/QC examiner was approaching trains after the platform was serviced and confirming that each operator had completed the required CBT before starting the certification review. The examiner contacted the ROCC to request permission to break the sealed switch and move the door mode selector switch to Auto-Manuel. Each train operators was observed to determine if they were following procedures as they entered six rail stations. After the sixth station, the QA/QC examiner resealed the door mode selector switch in Manual-Manual and notified the ROCC. The QA/QC examiner and all Train Operators were observed in possession of all required Person Protection | | | | | | | | | | Remedial Action Required? | | | | N | No | | |
| Equipment (PPE). A follow-up inspection is recommended. | | Description | compliance with Temporary Use Notice (TUN) ADO-23-04 dated October 13, 2023, and include the use of the Checklist for Certification by the Quality Assurance Quality Control examiners. Prior to the second day inspection activity, the inspection team reviewed the prior day inspection results. The WMSC inspectors arrived on the Red at 0645 and no briefing with WMATA safe was conducted before the inspection activities. At 0700 the inspectors contacted the Rail Operation Control Center (ROCC) to alert them of the inspection and determine the location of the Quality Assurance Quality Control (QAQC) examiner. The inspection team observed Auto Door Certification of multiple train operators. The QA/QC examiner was approaching trains after the platform was serviced and confirming that each operator had completed the required CBT before starting the certification review. The examiner contacted the ROCC to request permission to break the sealed switch and move the door mode selector switch to Auto-Manuel. Each train operator was observed to determine if they were following procedures as they entered six rail stations. After the sixth station, the QA/QC examiner resealed the door mode selector switch in Manual-Manual and notified the ROCC. The QA/QC examiner and all Train Operators were observed in possession of all required Person Protection | | | | | | | | Yes | | es ! | | | | | |

¹ The rail transit agency must provide WMSC with the necessary evidence (e.g. maintenance work order system records, photos, documentation, records, data, or other evidence) to close out the Remedial Action. Closeout of Remedial Actions may also be subject to ongoing WMSC verification inspections to ensure corrections are sufficient and effective.

| Inspector in Charge's Signature | Date 2023/10/19 | | |
|--|----------------------------|--|--|
| Inspector in Charge's Name LeBon Bruce Walker | Inspection Team Fred Diven | | |