



Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

Farragut West, Dupont Circle and Stadium-Armory stations

October 14, 2023 – December 18, 2023 – February 19, 2024

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on December 10, 2024.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of these investigations.

Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

The three evacuation for life safety reason events presented for consideration at the December 10, 2024 public meeting demonstrate deficiencies regarding communication between personnel, as well as communication, coordination, and compliance with the Incident Management Framework. Multiple safety events have demonstrated that personnel in the field communicating with multiple points of contact in the Control Center and other departments exacerbates confusion, delays responses, and can be detrimental to employee and passenger safety. The WMSC conducted an audit related to Metrorail's fire and life safety preparedness and emergency management programs. A final audit report will be issued in early 2025.

The causes and contributing factors include:

- Non-compliance with written operational rules and procedures
- Loss of situational awareness
- Lack of supervisory oversight regarding radio communications, including to ensure:
 - Radio communications were kept to a minimum during emergency event
 - Personnel provided repeat back of the correct instructions
 - Personnel communicated on the incorrect radio channel as outlined in the Incident Management Framework Playbook



Investigations W-0341, W-0342, and W-0343 being considered at the December 10, 2024, meeting led to specific corrective actions including:

- MTPD conducted a thorough evaluation of their General Order and Standard Operating Procedures concerning bomb threats and concluded that no revisions were necessary
- A Lessons Learned regarding escort and contractor inspection of Switchgears and similar equipment to reduce the likelihood of personnel and/or equipment contacting energized equipment
- All Office of Rail Transportation Supervisors are required to complete a refresher training on the Incident Management Framework and their role

Metrorail is in the process of implementing the following related corrective action plan (CAP):

- C-0162 addressing the finding that Metrorail does not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and has procedures that do not comply with National Incident Management Systems (NIMS)/ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. Further, Metrorail's training requirements are insufficient to prepare personnel to respond to and/or manage emergencies within the NIMS/ICS framework. These deficiencies have contributed to ineffective and improper emergency response and emergency management.

Safety event summaries:

W-0341 – Farragut West Station – October 14, 2023 (WMATA ID: E23717)

Riders aboard Blue Line Train 402 were evacuated at Farragut West Station due to the report of an unknown explosive device being thrown onto the train at Arlington Cemetery Station.

The Station Manager at Arlington Cemetery Station received a report from a rider that three other riders had thrown an object that exploded, possibly fireworks, onto Train 402. The Station Manager contacted Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) dispatch and reported the incident. MTPD personnel were dispatched to intercept the train, and the Rail Operations Control Center was notified. A Rail Traffic Controller instructed the Train Operator of Train 402 to hold the train at Foggy Bottom Station for MTPD. After holding at Foggy Bottom Station for approximately 4 minutes, the Train Operator, without permission from the Control Center or MTPD moved the train, continuing in service with passengers aboard to Farragut West Station. In a written statement regarding this event, the Train Operator of Train 402 stated that increased radio traffic caused them to believe instruction given to another train was meant for them, leading to the train movement from Foggy Bottom Station to Farragut West Station. During an investigative interview, the Train Operator stated they repeated back to the Rail Traffic Controller the instructions meant for another train and continued to Farragut West Station. Review of audio determined the Operator did repeat back instructions intended for another train operator. The Train Operator did not identify using their Train ID number during their repeat back of instructions, therefore the Rail Traffic Controller was unable to identify the mistake. When the Rail Traffic Controller inquired about the train's location and status, the Train Operator indicated that MTPD did not arrive at Foggy Bottom Station and that they continued in service. This action was contrary to the direction intended for the Train Operator of Train 402, and increased MTPD response time and the amount of time a potentially hazardous object may have been aboard the train. The Train Operator was then directed to hold the train for MTPD at Farragut West Station.



Riders were evacuated from the train approximately 24 minutes after the initial report from the Station Manager at Farragut West Station. MTPD's Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit responded to the station, searched the train and did not find a hazardous device or object. The train was cleared to go back into passenger service. There were no injuries or damage reported.

The Train Operator received re-instruction following this safety event.

W-0342 – Dupont Circle Station – December 18, 2023 (WMATA ID: E23899)

Dupont Circle Station was closed three times due to the report of smoke in the station. During the event, personnel did not follow established communication procedures, and there was a lack of coordination, leading to confusion during the event response and concerning service restoration.

An Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor contacted the Control Center to report smoke emitting from the interlocking on track 1 at Dupont Circle Station. The Rail Supervisor was not immediately able to identify the cause of the smoke but reported that it had begun to dissipate on its own. The Rail Traffic Controller instructed a Rail Supervisor, who was in the station, to evacuate riders from the station, including those aboard Train 109, which was stopped on the station's platform. Approximately 4 minutes after receiving the initial report of smoke, the Buttons Rail Traffic Controller contacted the Maintenance Operations Control Fan Desk and requested fan activation. An emergency response was requested from DC Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) and the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD).

Third rail power was not deenergized, and no personnel entered the roadway during the event. DCFEMS determined the event to be a maintenance issue and departed the station. A test train conducted a track inspection with no noted issues. The Assistant Operations Manager in the Control Center determined the station was safe to reopen for passenger service.

One minute after reopening, MTPD personnel reported haze in the station. Train traffic on approach to the station was stopped and the station was again closed. A stud bolt was removed from the roadway, a test train performed a track inspection with no noted issues, and the station was reopened.

Approximately 3 minutes after reopening for the second time, the Operations Manager in the Control Center directed the station be closed for the third time as Automatic Train Control (ATC) personnel conducted ATC equipment checks, and test trains were sent through the area.

During the incident, Incident Command did not initially communicate on Radio Ops 6, a channel Metrorail has begun using as the designated emergency operations channel according to its Incident Management Framework Playbooks. This contributed to confusion and ineffective communication. Additionally, an MTPD Lieutenant at the station authorized the station to be opened, without communicating with the Incident Commander.

The cause of the smoke was later determined to be a stud bolt with a negative return that began to arc after making contact with rebar.



W-0343 – Stadium-Armory Station – February 19, 2024 (WMATA ID: E24137)

Stadium-Armory Station was evacuated due to an explosion inside an AC Switchgear Room that caused a power outage and smoke in the station. One employee, a contractor, sustained an ankle fracture during the event.

The electrical contractors, escorted by a WMATA Department of Power employee, were removing de-energized cables from the de-energized Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) in the AC Switchgear Room, when the switchgear panel next to the UPS exploded. One contractor, who was being spotted by another contractor, was on a wooden ladder positioned three inches from the switchgear, pulling feeder cable when the explosion occurred, causing them to jump from the ladder to avoid the sparks. Prior to the event a contractor supervisor who had entered the room with the crew, left to retrieve rope from their vehicle and was not present during the explosion. After the explosion all personnel exited the room and the WMATA Escort reported the event to the Power Desk in the Control Center. The Metro Transit Police Department, D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Department of Power and other Metrorail personnel responded.

Shortly after the explosion, the Train Operator of Train 610 on track 2 reported a power outage at Stadium-Armory to the Radio Rail Traffic Controller in the Control Center. Seconds later, the Train Operator of Train 907 reported power had been restored and that there was smoke in the tunnel on track 1. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller instructed Train 907's Operator to turn off the trains environmental system and continue to the next station. Other trains in the vicinity were instructed to stop. The Buttons Rail Traffic Controller notified the Maintenance Operations Center and fans were activated. Service was suspended at the station.

The injured contractor was transported to a medical facility and treated for their injury.

There was damage to equipment in the room, including a panel, switch board and breaker.

The cause of the explosion was due to inadvertent pressure applied to the side of the switchgear by personnel as evidenced by a footprint left on the panel of the switchgear, which caused the unit to contact energized components within the bus bar, leading to a direct arc. The switchgear was not deenergized because it was not in the scope of the contractor's work.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23717

Date of Event:	October 14, 2023
Type of Event:	A-4: Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	15:29 hours
Location:	Farragut West Station, Track 1
Time and How received by SAFE:	15:29 hours via the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC)
WMSC Notification Time:	16:08 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA SAFE: No WMSC: No Other: No
Rail Vehicle:	Train 402 [L7744.7745-7321.7320-7640.7641-7533.7532]
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA)
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20231212#113335

Farragut West Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

October 14, 2023

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CM	Chain Marker
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
I/A	Incidents/Accidents
MAC	Mission Assurance Coordinator
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OSI	Office of Safety Investigations
ROCS	Rail Operations Control System
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
SPOTS	System Performance On-Time Summary
SRC	Safety Risk Coordinator
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between record systems. **

On Saturday, October 14, 2023, at 15:29 hours, a Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Communications Specialist received a report from the Arlington Cemetery Station Manager that three customers were seen throwing an object that exploded on Train ID 402 [L7744.7745-7321.7320-7640.7641-7533.7532], which was traveling in the direction of New Carrollton. The MTPD Communications Specialist notified the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) and dispatched MTPD personnel to intercept the train. The ROCC Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) subsequently dispatched an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor to assist.


MTPD personnel responded with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units to assess the incident train. The ROCC RTC instructed the Train Operator to hold at Foggy Bottom Station. After several minutes, the Train Operator advised the Radio RTC that MTPD had not arrived yet. The Train Operator subsequently departed Foggy Bottom Station. The Radio RTC reminded the Train Operator that their instructions were to hold their location. They then instructed the Train Operator to hold at Farragut West Station. EOD units conducted a sweep of Train ID 402 at Farragut West Station on Track 1 with negative results. MTPD cleared the train, and the RTC instructed the Train Operator of Train ID 402 to resume normal revenue service in the direction of New Carrollton Station. There were no reported injuries or damages as a result of this incident.

The probable cause of the call for evacuation for life safety reasons at Farragut West Station was due to a report of customers igniting fireworks aboard the train. MTPD personnel conducted a search of the train and yielded negative explosive hazard results. The investigation identified a deficiency in understanding between the RTC and the Train Operator, which resulted in the Train Operator departing from Foggy Bottom Station before MTPD personnel reached Foggy Bottom Station to conduct the sweep. The train proceeded to the next station, Farragut West, where the inspection was conducted.

Incident Site

The incident site is an underground station featuring split platforms and a Direct Fixation Track. Positioned to the west of the station are two turnback's denoted by Chain Markers (CM) at coordinates C1 52+25 and C2 50+10. Additionally, there are two turnback's situated to the east of the station, marked by Chain Markers (CM) at coordinates C1 40+51 and C2 46+51.

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Train Operator Incident Report
 - MTPD Event Report
 - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Rail Operation Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback, [Radio and Landline Communications]
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

- Rail Operations Control System (ROCS) System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS) Report

Investigation

On Saturday, October 14, 2023, at precisely 15:29 hours, an alert MTPD Communications Specialist received a report from the Arlington Cemetery Station Manager detailing an incident involving three customers who had thrown an object—suspected to be a firework—resulting in an explosion on Train ID 402. This train was en route to New Carrollton. Swiftly responding to this report, the MTPD Communications Specialist promptly informed the ROCC and deployed MTPD personnel to intercept the affected train. Concurrently, the RTC dispatched an RTRA Supervisor to facilitate the evacuation process.

The Station Manager relayed information received from a concerned customer, reporting that three individuals had ignited an explosive object and thrown it onto the train, resulting in an explosion. Initial assessments by MTPD suggested that the object in question was likely a firework.

At 15:30 hours, MTPD personnel received updated information from MTPD Communications indicating that the three implicated customers were currently on-board Train ID 407 at Pentagon Station, headed towards Franconia-Springfield Station. Responding to this development, the RTC directed the Train Operator of Train ID 402 to hold the train at Foggy Bottom Station, awaiting the arrival of MTPD personnel.

Based on the ARS playback, at approximately 15:44 hours, the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) reported that Train ID 407 was being held at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Station, while Train ID 402 was being held at Foggy Bottom Station. Subsequently, at 15:45 hours, the Radio RTC initiated contact with the Train Operator of Train ID 402, seeking a status update. The Train Operator responded, indicating that MTPD personnel had not yet arrived, and the train was still holding on Track 1 at Foggy Bottom Station.

At 15:57 hours, the implementation of single tracking operations from Foggy Bottom Station to McPherson Square Stations via Track 2 commenced. Train ID 603 was the first train to undergo single tracking.

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Tue Oct 24 15:14:23 2023

Select Platform: and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Select Times (0-24HRS): From To

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwll	Left door open	Left door close	dwll	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Headway door open to door open
610	C03-2	2	68	15:02:52	15:03:10	18				15:02:15	15:03:34	7360-7361.7583-7582.7662-7663.7441-7440	-
909	C03-2	8	23	15:04:55	15:05:10	15				15:04:22	15:05:35	7404-7405.7619-7618.7378-7379.7385-7384	2:03
406	C03-2	2	16	15:09:00	15:09:16	16				15:08:28	15:09:37	7208-7209.7339-7338.7626-7627.7635-7634	4:05
611	C03-2	6	68	15:15:55	15:16:13	18				15:15:24	15:16:35	6074-6075.6013-6012.6108-6109	6:55
901	C03-2	8	23	15:17:38	15:17:57	19				15:17:08	15:18:21	7740-7741.7671-7670.7544-7545.7643-7642	1:43
407	C03-2	8	16	15:19:56	15:20:07	11				15:19:20	15:20:29	7600-7601.7197-7196.7608-7609.7341-7340	2:18
612	C03-2	6	68	15:28:18	15:28:36	18				15:27:47	15:28:58	3245-3244.3082-3083.2072-2073	8:22
902	C03-2	8	23	15:30:35	15:31:27	52				15:29:55	15:31:50	7596-7597.7377-7376.7512-7513.7075-7074	2:17
408	C03-2	8	16	15:32:41	15:33:04	23				15:32:12	15:33:27	3000-3001.3103-3102.3158-3159.3116-3117	2:06
613	C03-2	6	68	15:39:33	15:39:56	23				15:39:01	15:40:15	3015-3014.3090-3091.3045-3044	6:52
903	C03-2	8	23	15:42:20	15:42:37	17				15:41:45	15:43:02	7588-7589.7661-7660.7712-7713.7743-7742	2:47
601	C03-2	2	68	15:46:25	15:46:49	24				15:45:50	15:47:18	7090-7091.7431-7430.7152-7153.7061-7060	4:05
409	C03-2	8	16	15:49:18	15:49:35	17				15:48:32	15:49:58	7610-7611.7425-7424.7718-7719.7633-7632	2:53
904	C03-2	2	23	15:53:33	15:53:52	19				15:53:03	15:54:14	7418-7419.7325-7324.7280-7281.7427-7426	4:15
603	C03-2	2	22				16:00:22	16:00:44	22	15:59:31	16:01:20	7562-7563.7285-7284.7638-7639.7393-7392	6:49
402	C03-2	8	65				16:03:21	16:03:37	16	16:02:31	16:04:07	7268-7269.7291-7290.7398-7399.7715-7714	2:59
907	C03-2	8	54				16:07:03	16:07:22	19	16:06:16	16:08:26	7310-7311.7467-7466.7344-7345.7523-7522	3:42

Table 1 - ROCS SPOTS Report displaying the Train IDs that single-tracked around Train ID 402 on Track 2 at Farragut West Station.

Following this sequence of events, Train ID 402 initiated movement, prompting the RTC to inquire whether MTPD had granted clearance for the train's departure. The Train Operator of Train ID 402 conveyed that they were proceeding to Farragut West. In response, the RTC issued a reminder to the Train Operator, emphasizing that their instructions were to hold until officially released by MTPD. The RTC directed the Train Operator of Train ID 402 to maintain their position at Farragut West Station until released by MTPD.

During this period, the Train Operator reported experiencing a high volume of radio communications, contributing to an inadvertent response to a communication intended for another train. This miscommunication resulted in the movement of their train from Foggy Bottom Station to Farragut West Station.

At 15:58 hours, recognizing the need for identification adjustment, the Train Operator of Train ID 402 received instructions to modify their identification marker to Train ID 702 at the Farragut West Station 8-car Marker.

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Tue Oct 17 13:13:37 2023

Select Platform: and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Oct 14 2023 Select Times (0-24HRS): From 15:00 To 17:00

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Headway door open to door open
402	J02-1	8	65				15:16:02	15:16:21	19	15:15:24	15:16:46	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	-
402	C13-1	8	65				15:21:43	15:21:57	14	15:21:01	15:22:24	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	5:41
402	C12-1	8	65				15:23:31	15:24:01	30	15:22:53	15:24:25	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	1:48
402	C11-1	8	65	15:26:27	15:26:45	18				15:25:52	15:27:04	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	2:56
402	C10-1	8	65				15:29:44	15:30:03	19	15:29:01	15:30:35	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	3:17
402	C09-1	8	65	15:31:39	15:31:55	16				15:31:06	15:32:15	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	1:55
402	C08-1	8	65	15:33:33	15:33:48	15				15:32:59	15:34:12	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	1:54
402	C07-1	8	65				15:35:26	15:35:38	12	15:34:44	15:36:01	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	1:53
402	C06-1	8	65	15:37:39	15:38:22	43				15:37:33	15:38:44	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	2:13
402	C05-1	2	65				15:40:24	15:40:48	24	15:39:46	15:41:13	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	2:45
402	C04-1	2	65				15:44:07	15:45:46	99	15:42:33	15:47:07	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	3:43
702	C03-1	2	77	15:48:39	16:07:30	1131	16:07:12	16:07:23	11	15:47:42	16:08:24	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	4:32
402	C02-1	8	65	16:11:24	16:11:41	17				16:10:47	16:12:04	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	22:45
402	C01-1	8	65				16:13:05	16:13:25	20	16:12:26	16:13:50	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	1:41
402	D01-1	8	65				16:14:33	16:14:44	11	16:13:55	16:15:08	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	1:28
402	D02-1	8	65	16:15:57	16:16:15	18				16:15:25	16:16:41	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	1:24
402	D03-1	8	65				16:18:52	16:19:27	35	16:18:11	16:19:50	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	2:55
402	D04-1	8	65				16:20:41	16:21:06	25	16:19:50	16:21:31	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	1:49
402	D05-1	8	65				16:23:58	16:25:00	62	16:22:37	16:25:31	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	3:17
402	D06-1	8	65				16:28:45	16:29:21	36	16:27:46	16:30:04	7744-7745,7321-7320,7640-7641,7533-7532	4:47
402	D06-2	8	16				16:35:11	16:35:40	29	16:34:19	16:36:13	7532-7533,7641-7640,7320-7321,7745-7744	6:26
402	D05-2	8	16				16:37:19	16:37:36	17	16:36:39	16:38:04	7532-7533,7641-7640,7320-7321,7745-7744	2:08
402	D04-2	8	16				16:40:47	16:41:12	25	16:40:03	16:41:37	7532-7533,7641-7640,7320-7321,7745-7744	3:28
402	D03-2	8	16				16:42:27	16:42:45	18	16:41:45	16:43:09	7532-7533,7641-7640,7320-7321,7745-7744	1:40
402	D02-2	8	16	16:44:05	16:44:23	18				16:43:33	16:44:44	7532-7533,7641-7640,7320-7321,7745-7744	1:38
402	D01-2	8	16							16:44:58	16:46:24	7532-7533,7641-7640,7320-7321,7745-7744	-

Table 2 - ROCS SPOTS Report displaying Train ID 402/702 arrival and departure times at Farragut West Station.

Utilizing CCTV playback data, the following events unfolded in the aftermath of the incident. At 15:53 hours, the RTRA Supervisor efficiently cleared Train ID 402 of all customers. Subsequently, at 15:54 hours, an EOD Technician boarded Lead Car 7744, initiating a comprehensive sweep of the train. The thorough search extended to Trailing Car 7532, where, at 16:02 hours, the EOD Technician successfully concluded their examination, confirming the absence of any explosive hazards.

Following the clearance process, MTPD personnel officially declared the train fit for normal service. The RTC, aligning with the resolution, instructed the Train Operator of Train ID 702 to modify their Train ID to 402 and resume regular revenue service at McPherson Square Station on Track 1. The single tracking operations persisted until 16:10 hours when they were officially discontinued. There were no reported injuries or damages resulting from the incident.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 1 – Train 402 arriving at Farragut West Station, Track 1 at 15:48 hours.




Figure 2 – Train ID 402 changed their identification marker to Train 702 at 15:58 hours.




Figure 3 – Train ID 603 single tracking around incident Train ID 702 and servicing Farragut West Station on Track 2 in the direction of New Carrollton at 15:59 hours.




Figure 4 – Train ID 403 single tracking around incident Train ID 702 and servicing Farragut West Station on Track 2 in the direction of New Carrollton at 16:02 hours.




Figure 5 – Train ID 907 single tracking around incident Train ID 702 and servicing Farragut West Station on Track 2 in the direction of New Carrollton at 16:06 hours.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
15:29:00 hours	<u>Station Manager</u> : The Station Manager at Arlington Cemetery received a report from a customer that three customers threw an object on the train that exploded. The Station Manager reported the incident to the MTPD Communications Dispatcher. [MTPD 1X]
15:41:44 hours	Operations manager called Ops 2 console and requested they hold Train ID 402 for MTPD. (Phone Ops 2)
15:41:55 hours	<u>RTC</u> : "402, I need you to hold at Foggy Bottom for Transit. How do you copy 402?" <u>Train Operator of Train ID 402</u> : "402, copy that. Holding at Foggy Bottom for Transit. Over." <u>RTC</u> : "Affirm. Keep me posted. [Ops 2]"
15:44:13 hours	<u>MAC</u> : The MTPD dispatcher contacted the MAC to confirm the location of the incident train. The MAC confirmed that two trains were being held. Train ID 407 was being at National Airport Station, and believed the customers boarded this train after they threw the object that exploded. Train ID 402 was being held at Foggy Bottom Station and was the train where the customers ignited the object that exploded. [MTPD 1X]
15:45:02 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Train ID 402 to ask for a status update. <u>Train Operator of Train ID 402</u> : The Train Operator reported that MTPD personnel were not in sight. [Ops 2]
15:45:55 hours	<u>RTC</u> : The RTC contacted Train ID 402 and asked if MTPD released them from the station. <u>Train Operator of Train ID 402</u> : The Train Operator replied they heard 402 continue on. <u>RTC</u> : The RTC informed the Train Operator they were to hold at Foggy Bottom until released by MTPD personnel. The RTC directed the Train Operator to hold at Farragut West Station for MTPD personnel. <u>Train Operator of Train ID 402</u> : The Train Operator acknowledged the instructions to hold at Farragut West Station. [Ops 2]
15:53:41 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : An RTRA Supervisor verified all customers were clear of Train ID 402 at Farragut West Station, Track 1. [CCTV]
15:54:55 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : The MTPD EOD unit boarded Train ID 402 at Farragut West Station on Track 1 to conduct a sweep of the train. [CCTV]
15:58:30 hours	<u>Train Operator of Train ID 402</u> : The Train Operator changed their identification marker to Train ID 702. [AIMS]
16:00:22 hours	<u>RTC</u> : The RTC implemented single-tracking operations around Train ID 402. Train ID 603 was the first train to single track at Farragut West Station on Track 2 in the direction of New Carrollton Station. [SPOTS]
16:02:30 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : The MTPD EOD unit completed a sweep of all train cars. No explosive devices were found and MTPD cleared the train for revenue service. [CCTV]
16:07:00 hours	<u>RTC</u> : The RTC instructed the Train Operator to proceed to McPherson Square Station, Track 1, and go back in service as Train ID 402. <u>Train Operator of Train ID 702</u> : The Train Operator acknowledged. [Ops 2]

****Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.**

Weather

On October 14, 2023, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 62°F, mostly cloudy, winds 5 mph, and 90% humidity. This incident occurred within the tunneled section of the system. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC).

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Related Rules and Procedures

- Metrorail Operating Rulebook – Customer Evacuations - 15.1 – Train Evacuations

Findings

- The Station Manager at Arlington Cemetery Station received a report that customers ignited and threw an object on the train that exploded.
- Train ID 402 was identified as the incident train.
- Train ID 402 was initially instructed to hold at Foggy Bottom Station. The Train Operator proceeded without MTPD or ROCC permission and then held at Farragut West Station.
- MTPD conducted a sweep with negative results.
- Farragut West Station was not evacuated. Only Train ID 402 was evacuated.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Single tracking around Train ID 402 was initiated by ROCC.
- Train ID 402 underwent offloading procedures.
- Dispatched MTPD and RTRA Supervisors provided assistance at the incident scene.
- MTPD Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel conducted a comprehensive sweep of the train.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the call for evacuation for life safety reasons at Farragut West Station was a report of customers igniting fireworks aboard the train. MTPD personnel conducted a search of the train, which yielded negative explosive hazard results. The investigation identified a deficiency in understanding between the RTC and the Train Operator, which resulted in the Train Operator departing from Foggy Bottom Station before MTPD personnel reached Foggy Bottom Station to conduct the sweep. The train proceeded to the next station, Farragut West, where the inspection was conducted.

Recommended Corrective Actions

The MTPD conducted a thorough evaluation of their General Order and Standard Operating Procedures concerning bomb threats. They concluded that no revisions were necessary, as the documents were found to be consistent and complementary to each other.

Appendices

Appendix A – Train Operator Incident Report (Abridged)

WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page ___ of ___

Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents

Date: 10-14-23	Incident Time: 3:29 P	Time Reported: 3:29 P	Reported by: Customer <input type="checkbox"/> Employee <input type="checkbox"/> ROCC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>
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Location

Station Foggy Bottom	Mezzanine # N/A	Track #/Destination 1 Largo	Chain Marker/Signal Number
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TYPE OF INCIDENT

<input type="checkbox"/> Property Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Smoke	<input type="checkbox"/> Fire	<input type="checkbox"/> Customer Complaint
<input type="checkbox"/> Customer injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Customer Illness	<input type="checkbox"/> Employee Injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Employee Illness
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Criminal Activity	<input type="checkbox"/> Elevator Entrapment	<input type="checkbox"/> Rail Vehicle Incident	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Explain in description of incident)

WEATHER

Clear <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rain <input type="checkbox"/>	LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)	LIGHTING (artificial lighting)
Snow <input type="checkbox"/> Sleet/Ice <input type="checkbox"/>	Dawn/Dusk <input type="checkbox"/> Daylight <input type="checkbox"/>	Lights On <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lights Off <input type="checkbox"/>
	Dark <input type="checkbox"/> Tunnel/Underground <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Lights Not Working <input type="checkbox"/>

STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC

Elevator/Escalator#:	AFC #:	Room Number/Location:

Failure Number(s):

Parking Lot Paid Area Free Area Garage Station Entrance Stairway # ___ Platform Ancillary Room

Injury/Illness reported aboard Train Other

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder _____

TRAIN INCIDENTS

Train ID 402	Destination Largo	Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 7744-7321-7640-7533	Lead Car: 7744
Name of Responding Supervisor: N/A	Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder N/A		

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.

Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

Central contacted Train 402 in which I was operating on track 1. Foggy bottom. Central requested 402 to hold for transit track 1 foggy bottom. I responded Central that 402 will hold for transit on the platform. I continued to hold on the platform for transit for about 3 to 4 minutes. I contacted Central that 402 was still holding Track 1 foggy bottom but no transit was in sight or on the platform. The radio communication was continuous and constant do the blue/silver/orange shot down on Saturday 10/14/23. I responded to central with repeat back for another train to continue on. Central contacted 402 wanting to know if 402 cleared/released by transit. Central requested 402 to hold at Farragut West for transit which Transit arrived on the platform. Transit cleared the train of customer of 402 to walk thru with K-9 to check for unknown substance or items.

Employee Completing Report

Employee Name: (print) [Redacted]	Employee Signature: (sign) [Redacted]	Employee #: [Redacted]	Date: 10-20-23
Division: Alexandria	Run #: DAY Board	Block #: 402	Assigned Days: Wed 1 hr

To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager

Document 1 – Train Operator Incident Report.

Incident Date: 10/14/2023 Time: 15:29 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
E23717

Drafted By: SAFE 702 – 12/10/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 707 – 12/13/2023
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 12/13/2023



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23899

Date of Event:	December 18, 2023
Type of Event:	A-4: Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	15:56 hours
Location:	Dupont Circle Station, A1 072+00
Time and How received by SAFE:	15:59 hours - MAC Desk
WMSC Notification Time:	17:45 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)
Rail Vehicle:	None
Injuries:	None
Damage:	Stud bolt
Emergency Responders:	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS)
SMS I/A Number	20240102#113700

Dupont Circle Station – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

December 18, 2023

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
AOM	Assistant Operations Manager
ARS	Audio Recording System
ATC	Office of Automatic Train Control
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CM	Chain Marker
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
ERT	Emergency Response Team
IC	Incident Commander
MAC	Mission Assurance Coordinator
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOC	Maintenance Operations Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OEP	Office of Emergency Preparedness
OM	Operations Manager
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
TRST	Office of Track and Structures
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On December 18, 2023, at 15:56 hours, an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisor contacted the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) to advise that there was smoke emitting from the interlocking on track 1 at Dupont Circle Station. The Buttons RTC contacted the Maintenance Operations Control (MOC) to request fan activation at Dupont Circle Station.

The Radio RTC requested the RTRA Rail Supervisor to provide information on the station conditions. The RTRA Rail Supervisor responded that they were unsure what was causing the smoke and advised the smoke was dissipating from the station. The MICC instructed the RTRA Supervisor and Rail Instructor to evacuate the customers from the station.


The District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) and Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) were dispatched to the station. The station was closed until the source of the smoke was identified and it was deemed safe for customers.

The probable cause for the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Dupont Circle Station on December 18, 2023, was equipment failure. A stud bolt with a negative return was causing the arcing and smoke in the station due to making contact with the rebar in the invert.

Incident Site

The incident site is an indoor station with a center platform, direct fixation tracks, and an interlocking on the outbound end of the station.

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

Incident Date: 12/18/2023 Time: 15:56 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons Rev. 1
E23899

Drafted By: SAFE 703 02/13/24
Reviewed By: SAFE 704 – 02/16/2024
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 02/19/2024

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment through document review
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - MTPD Event Report
 - RTRA Rail Supervisor Written Statement
 - Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) Incident Report
 - OEP Incident Response Report
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback, including Ops. 1 Radio and Telephone, MAC Line, Rail 2, MTPD, Fire Liaison
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

Investigation

On December 18, 2023, at 15:56 hours, an RTRA Rail Supervisor contacted the MICC to advise that smoke was emitting from the interlocking on track 1 at Dupont Circle Station. The Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that at 15:58 hours, the Radio RTC instructed the RTRA Rail Supervisor to offload the customers from Train ID 109, evacuate and close the station until more information was known.

At 16:01 hours, the Button RTC contacted MOC to request for the fans to be activated at Dupont Circle Station. The Radio RTC requested the RTRA Rail Supervisor to provide information on the station conditions. The RTRA Rail Supervisor reported that they were unsure what was causing the smoke but advised that the smoke was dissipating from the station.

At 16:02 hours, the Radio RTC instructed the RTRA Rail Supervisor and Training Instructor to evacuate the customers from the station. At 16:06 hours, the RTRA Rail Supervisor advised that all customers were evacuated from the station. At 16:10 hours, the RTRA Rail Supervisor informed the Radio RTC that the DCFEMS were on the scene.

The Radio RTC informed the RTRA Rail Supervisor that they were the Incident Commander and to escort the DCFEMS to where they saw the smoke emitting. There was a brief discussion about de-energizing third rail power for DCFEMS to access the roadway, but third rail power was never de-energized for DCFEMS. DCFEMS initially requested third power be de-energized to enter the

roadway and assess the source of the smoke. The smoke dissipated before third rail power was de-energized. DCFEMS never entered the roadway.

At 16:57 hours, DCFEMS deemed the event a maintenance issue, cleared the scene, and turned over Command to MTPD. At 16:59 hours, Train ID 105 was re-blocked to Train ID 705 and assigned as the first test train. Train ID 705 was granted a permissive block to the 8-car marker at Dupont Circle Station on track 1. At 17:09 hours, Train ID 705 reported a good track inspection. The Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) instructed the Training Instructor to open the station. The Incident Commander should have determined when the station was reopened. At 17:30 hours, both entrances to Dupont Circle Station were re-opened. At 17:31 MTPD contacted the MAC to report haze in the station and instructed all rail vehicle movement to be stopped. At 17:32 the RTC stopped all trains in approach to Dupont Circle Station. At 17:36 hours, the Radio RTC instructed the RTRA Rail Supervisor at Dupont Circle Station to evacuate and close the station again. At 17:40 hours, the Office of Track and Structures (TRST) Senior Director informed the Incident Commander that the stud bolt was removed, and they could send another test train. The Radio RTC re-blocked Train ID 101 to Train ID 701 and assigned it as the second test train. At 18:01 hours, the TRST Senior Director informed the Incident Commander of a good track inspection and that service could be restored. There was confusion regarding the authorization to re-open the station. Personnel were not following established emergency communication procedures which caused confusion. At 18:15 hours, the RTRA Rail Supervisor informed the Radio RTC that the station was open, and MTPD turned over Incident Command.

At 18:18 hours, ATC personnel were checking the ATC equipment when they requested the Radio RTC to stop the train on approach to Dupont Circle Station on track 1. The train was stopped, and Dupont Circle Station was closed again. The Operations Manager (OM) decided to close the station while test trains traversed the area without customers on board.

At 19:27 hours, Dupont Circle Station was re-opened, and revenue service resumed.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
15:55:19 hours	<u>RTRA Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Contacted the MICC and reported smoke emitting from the interlocking on Track 1 at Dupont Circle. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 109 to hold at Woodley Park and Train ID 110 to hold at Van Ness Station when they arrive. The Radio RTC asked RTRA Supervisor #1 to provide a Chain Marker (CM) [Radio Ops 1]
15:56:25 hours	<u>RTRA Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Reported smoke near CM A1 072+00. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Repeated and confirmed CM A1 072+00. The RTC asked RTRA Supervisor #1 if an arcing insulator was the source of the smoke. <u>RTRA Rail Supervisor #1</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]
15:58:10 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Asked RTRA Supervisor #1 to report the conditions on the platform. <u>RTRA Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Reported that the platform was clear of smoke, but there was still smoke in the tunnel on Tracks 1 and 2. [Radio Ops 1]
15:58:48 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed RTRA Supervisor #1 to evacuate the customers from Train ID 109 and close the station until further investigation is conducted.

Time	Description
	<u>RTRA Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Affirmed the station closure. [Radio Ops 1]
15:58:48 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Made announcements to all train operators on Ops 1 that service was suspended at Dupont Circle Station, Tracks 1 and 2 due to a report of smoke in the station and tunnel and to make good announcements to customers. [Radio Ops 1]
16:01:02 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Contacted the MOC desk to request the fans be turned on at Dupont Circle Station. [Phone Ops. 1]
16:01:10 hours	<u>Fire Liaison</u> : Received a report from DCFEMS dispatch that the DC Fire Department has responded to Dupont Circle Station for smoke in the tunnel on Track 1. The Fire Liaison dispatched MTPD units to the scene [Phone Fire Liaison]
16:02:23 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the Training Instructor to evacuate the station of customers. [Phone Ops. 1]
16:04:07 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Contacted the OEP Director to inform them of the situation at DuPont Circle. [Phone MAC]
16:06:26 hours	<u>RTRA Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Reported all customers had been evacuated from the Q Street side of Dupont Circle Station. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged all customers have been evacuated. [Radio Ops 1]
16:10:43 hours	<u>RTRA Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Reported DCFEMS arrived on the scene at Dupont Circle Station on Track 2. Personnel are getting ready to go into the roadway to investigate. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged DCFEMS on the scene. [Radio Ops. 1]
16:11:22 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed RTRA Supervisor #1 to establish command and lead DC FEMS to the source of the smoke. <u>RTRA Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Affirmed to establish command and to direct DCFEMS to the source of the smoke. [Radio Ops 1]
16:12:45 hours	<u>Incident Commander (IC)</u> : Asked the RTC if the third rail power was down on Track 2 at Dupont. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Replied, no, third rail power is not down. What CM do they need the third rail power to be down? <u>Incident Commander (IC)</u> : Replied radio communications were not clear and to repeat their transmission. [Radio Ops 1]
16:15:46 hours	<u>Incident Commander (IC)</u> : Reported the smoke had dissipated; there was no longer any visible smoke. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Asked the IC to confirm that their message of smoke was clear. <u>Incident Commander (IC)</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]
16:16:52 hours	<u>Incident Commander (IC)</u> : Requested to have third rail power de-energized on Track 2 to hot stick. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Affirmed the request and instructed the IC to stand by. [Radio Ops 1]
16:17:31 hours	<u>OEP Director</u> : Contacted the MAC to inquire if the fans were activated and if the incident command post was established. <u>MAC</u> : Informed them that the Fire Department and TRST personnel were on the scene and stated that the MTPD unit was on the platform and established Command. [MAC Line]

Time	Description
16:17:44 hours	<p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Asked the IC why third rail power needed to be de-energized on Track 2.</p> <p><u>Incident Commander (IC)</u>: Stated the DCFEMS requested to enter the roadway to investigate.</p> <p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Asked the IC why third rail power needed to be de-energized on Track 2 if the smoke was on Track 1.</p> <p><u>Incident Commander (IC)</u>: Stated the smoke was between the interlocking at the switch point.</p> <p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Asked again why third rail power needed to be de-energized on Track 2.</p> <p><u>Incident Commander (IC)</u>: Stated the DCFEMS no longer requested third rail power to be de-energized. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
16:27:35 hours	<p><u>ERT</u>: Reported they have checked in with the IC, and they were currently on the roadway on Track 2. ERT requested permission to cross over to Track 1.</p> <p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Affirmed the request. The RTC then asked ERT, who gave them permission to enter the roadway. ERT stated they were with the IC. The RTC asked the IC, who gave them permission to enter the roadway.</p> <p><u>Incident Commander (IC)</u>: No response. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
16:30:40 hours	<p><u>ERT</u>: Reported holding at the end gate and not in the roadway.</p> <p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Asked if they were on Track 1 or 2.</p> <p><u>ERT</u>: Replied Track 2.</p> <p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Made multiple attempts to contact the IC or ERT with intermittent success. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
16:36:23 hours	<p><u>Incident Commander (IC)</u>: Stated they are aboard Train ID 708 on Track 2 at Dupont to perform a track inspection.</p> <p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Instructed the Train Operator of Train ID 708 to perform a track inspection with RTRA Supervisor #1 (IC) on board from Dupont Circle Station to Woodley Park Station on Track 2.</p> <p><u>Train Operator of Train ID 708</u>: Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
16:39:16 hours	<p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Requested an update on the track inspection.</p> <p><u>Incident Commander (IC)</u>: Reported a good track inspection between Dupont Circle Station and Woodley Park Station on Track 2.</p> <p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and instructed the IC and Train ID 708 to hold at Woodley Park Station on Track 2 and wait for further instructions. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
16:40:00 hours	<p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Made announcements to all train operators on Ops 1 that service was suspended at Dupont Circle Station, Tracks 1 and 2 due to an emergency situation, and to make good customer announcements. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
16:47:57 hours	<p><u>ERT</u>: Contacted the Radio RTC and requested permission to enter the roadway to perform an interlocking inspection at Dupont Circle Station on Track 2 on the Shady Grove Station end.</p> <p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and asked for chain markers and form of protection.</p> <p><u>ERT</u>: Stated A2 072+00 and they would use foul time.</p> <p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Instructed ERT to stand by. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
16:49:15 hours	<p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Granted ERT foul time to perform an interlocking inspection at CM A2 72+00.</p>

Time	Description
	<u>ERT</u> : Acknowledged and stated they would notify Central when they were clear of the roadway. [Radio Ops 1]
16:50:31 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the IC to exit Train ID 708 at Woodley Park Station. <u>Incident Commander (IC)</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]
16:52:16 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed RTRA Supervisor #2 to verify that Train ID 105 at Van Ness Station, Track 1, was clear of customers and to perform a track inspection from Van Ness Station to Dupont Circle Station on Track 1. <u>RTRA Supervisor #2</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
16:54:17 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Contacted TRST Unit #3 and asked for an update on the interlocking inspection. <u>ERT</u> : No response [Radio Ops 1]
16:55:30 hours	<u>PLATFORM SUPPORT</u> : Reported in place at Gallery Place Station. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
16:57:37 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Asked RTRA Supervisor #2 if the train was clear of customers on Track 1 at Van Ness Station. <u>RTRA Supervisor #2</u> : Responded, assisting a customer with excessive luggage off the train should be clear in a few minutes. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
16:59:02 hours	<u>Train ID 105</u> : The train is now offloaded back to the lead car. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed Train ID 105 to re-block to Train ID 705 and to perform a track inspection from the current location to Dupont Circle Station. Granted a permissive block no closer than 10 feet of A03-02 signal red. <u>Train ID 105</u> : Acknowledged. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Advised crew at Dupont Circle Station on track 2 side of foul time to have a test train headed that way. [Radio Ops 1]
17:02:00 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Contacted ERT and asked if they were still under foul time. <u>ERT</u> : Responded they were relinquishing their foul time. Performed an inspection and did not find anything. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Asked for confirmation if they were relinquishing foul time, and personnel were clear from the roadway. <u>ERT</u> : Responded, personnel were clear of the roadway and relinquished foul time at 17:03 hours. [Radio Ops 1]
17:06:49 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Granted Train ID 705 a permissive block 8-car marker Dupont Circle Station on track 1. <u>Train ID 705</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:08:16 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Advised TRST Unit #3 that the test train was on the platform was anything else needed. <u>ERT</u> : Reported that the test train had passed them. Requested foul time again. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged, requested CM. <u>ERT</u> : Advised CM A2 072+00. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged, instructed to stand by and stand clear. [Radio Ops 1]
17:09:08 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Asked Train ID 705 are you keyed down at Dupont Circle Station. <u>Train ID 705</u> : Reported a good track inspection from Woodley Park Station to Dupont Circle Station, track 1. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged, verified keyed down, to grant foul time. <u>Train ID 705</u> : Verified keyed down. [Radio Ops 1]

Time	Description
17:09:35 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Contacted the WMSC to advise them of the incident at Dupont Circle Station. Requested an event scene authorization but would wait until ERT cleared the scene. [MAC Line]
17:10:10 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ERT to verify Train ID 705 keyed down, foul time granted, permission to enter the roadway at CM A2 072+00. <u>ERT</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:11:09 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 108 to offload the train and clear the interlocking. <u>Train ID 108</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:22:12 hours	<u>MICC AOM</u> : Contacted the Training Instructor and directed them to open the station. [MICC Rail 3]
17:23:55 hours	<u>ERT</u> : Relinquished foul time on track 2, all personnel clear. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:24:21 hours	<u>Training Instructor</u> : Dupont Circle Station, 21 Street side open, will walk to Q Street side to ensure open. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:25:25 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Advised Train ID 705 and RTRA Supervisor #1 on track 2 to continue in service to Shady Grove Station, all set to go normal. <u>Train ID 705</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:27:23 hours	<u>Train ID 705</u> : Advised keyed up at Dupont Circle Station on track 2. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed to dial in Train ID 105 and continue to Shady Grove Station on track 2; advised a lunar coming to you, and when it's safe to do so, service and continue. [Radio Ops 1]
17:28:50 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Made blanket announcement that all Red Line trains headed to Dupont Circle Station from Shady Grove Station would be servicing the station. [Radio Ops 1]
17:30:55 hours	<u>Training Instructor</u> : Reported Q Street side of Dupont Circle Station was now open. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:36:00 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : The Rail Supervisor at Medical Center Station was instructed to report to Van Ness Station. Instructed Train ID 110 at Van Ness on track 1, to ensure the train was offloaded. <u>Train ID 110</u> : Acknowledged. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train IDs 101 and 102 to make good announcements that trains were turning around at Woodley Park Station and Van Ness Station. Instructed Train IDs 103, 104, and 105 to hold two minutes each on the platform. [Radio Ops 1]
17:36:15 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Advised the RTRA Supervisor #1 at Dupont Circle Station and all Red Line trains that Dupont Circle Station was evacuating again. Instructed the Train Operators to monitor the radio, and trains were turning around at Woodley Park Station and Van Ness Station. Advised that a shuttle bus service was requested at Dupont Circle Station. [Radio Ops 1]
17:40:47 hours	<u>ERT</u> : Advised they have removed the defective stud and they were ready for another train to pass the location. [Ops. 6]
17:41:19 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 101, at Tenleytown Station on track 1 to offload at Van Ness Station. They would be the test train going back to Dupont Circle Station. <u>Train ID 101</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:44:36 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Granted Train ID 101 a permissive block to Van Ness Station 8-car marker. Advised that A06-02 signal was red.

Time	Description
	<u>Train ID 101</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:49:17 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Advised Train ID 101 to return to the Glenmont Station end of the train, and clear the interlocking at Van Ness Station. Advised Train ID 102 to remain in service to Woodley Park Station, track 1 from Tenleytown Station. <u>Train ID 101 and 102</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:50:00 hours 17:53:26 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Advised Train ID 101 of another change in plans. Instructed that once verified clear of customers and keyed up on Glenmont Station end, move to Dupont Circle Station and hold. Advised that they would be the test train. <u>Train ID 101</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
17:57:17 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Announced that the situation was ongoing at Dupont Circle Station and will update when possible. [Radio Ops 1]
17:59:47 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 701 to verify a lunar at signal A03-02. Granted a permissive block, crossing over from track 1 to 2, standby that location. <u>Train ID 701</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
18:01:05 hours	<u>ERT</u> : Advised it was a good test train and service could be restored. [Radio Ops. 6]
18:01:48 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 701 to return in service and advise when keyed up on the Shady Grove Station end. [Radio Ops 1]
18:02:54 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Announced that trains were about to go normal. Asked Train ID 101 if they were keyed up and ready to go at Dupont Circle Station back to Shady Grove Station. <u>Train ID 101</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
18:03:12 hours	<u>Incident Commander</u> : Advised that everything is cleared, they were breaking down Command, all personnel should meet at the Kiosk for a hot wash, and the station could be reopened. [Radio Ops. 6]
18:04:26 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Advised that the train on track 2 would be in service. Asked the RTRA Instructor at Dupont Circle Station if the station was open. Advised the train on track 2 to leave. <u>Training Instructor</u> : Advised it is ok to leave, RTC's discretion but no passengers aboard. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Inquired if the station was open. <u>Training Instructor</u> : Advised in the process of opening. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Inquired if Train ID 101 was keyed up. <u>Training Instructor</u> : Advised keyed up, no customers. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the train to depart the station, and the next train would take the passengers. <u>Train ID 101</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
18:05:00 hours	<u>MICC AOM</u> : Instructed the Training Instructor to reopen Dupont Circle Station. <u>Training Instructor</u> : Acknowledged. [Phone VAHQ MICC Rail 2]
18:05:38 hours	<u>MICC AOM</u> : Contacted the Training Instructor again and asked if they received permission from the IC to reopen Dupont Circle Station. <u>Training Instructor</u> : Responded, "No, they did not receive permission." <u>MICC AOM</u> : Directed the Training Instructor to receive authorization from the IC before the station is reopened, <u>Training Instructor</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio MICC Rail 2]
18:07:05 hours	<u>Train ID 101</u> : Verified in service and en route to Shady Grove Station. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Confirmed. [Radio, Ops 1]
18:08:46 hours	<u>MICC AOM</u> : Contacted the Training Instructor and asked if the station was open.

Time	Description
	<p><u>Training Instructor</u>: Responded, "No, something flared up again when the test train went through on Track 1. <u>MICC Rail 2</u>: Acknowledged. [Phone VAHQ MICC Rail 2]</p>
18:08:49 hours	<p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Announced to all trains that regular service was restored to Dupont Circle Station, Shady Grove Station trains to Dupont Circle Station, Glenmont trains turn at Gallery Place Station, normal service with the exception of the shutdown returned. [Radio, Ops1]</p>
18:10:32 hours	<p><u>MICC AOM</u>: Contacted the Training Instructor and informed them that the train coming through on Track 2 had customers aboard. They will need to offload the train and direct them out of the station. <u>Training Instructor</u>: Acknowledged. [Phone VAHQ MICC Rail 2]</p>
18:11:43 hours	<p><u>MICC AOM</u>: Contacted the Training Instructor and asked for an update. <u>Training Instructor</u>: Reported they witnessed a flare-up on Track 2 as the test train went through the interlocking and crossed over from Track 1. They stated the Rail Supervisor did not see anything. <u>MICC AOM</u>: Asked the Training Instructor if they were near the IC. <u>Training Instructor</u>: Reported they were at the 19th Street entrance to prepare the station for reopening. The IC is located on the Q Street side with the Rail Supervisor. <u>MICC AOM</u>: Informed the Training Instructor that the IC stated nothing flared up and the station could be reopened. <u>Training Instructor</u>: Located the Rail Supervisor and was informed the station could be reopened. [Phone VAHQ MICC Rail 2]</p>
18:13:11 hours	<p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Instructed that all Red Line trains standby for updates. Advised there may be an arcing insulator incident at Dupont Circle Station. Instructed to make announcements to customers. Inquired of the Rail Supervisor at Dupont Circle Station if the station was open. <u>RTRA Rail Supervisor</u>: Advised opening both Q and 19th Street sides of the station now. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
18:15:49 hours	<p><u>RTRA Rail Supervisor #1</u>: Advised Dupont Circle Station was open; and the command was turned over. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged. Advised releasing Track 2, Dupont Circle Station. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
18:18:50 hours	<p><u>ATC</u>: Directed the RTC to stop the train on approach to Dupont Circle Station on track 1. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Instructed Train ID 103 to stop. <u>Train ID 103</u>: Acknowledged and stopped. <u>ATC</u>: Advised arcing insulator on track 1. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Instructed Train ID 103 to shut down the EV. <u>Train ID 103</u>: Acknowledged. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Instructed Train 103 and 104 to stop the train, reverse ends, and make good announcements. <u>Train ID 103 and 104</u>: Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
18:22:00 hours	<p><u>MICC Radio RTC</u>: Announced to all Red Line operators to clear the interlocking at Van Ness Station, and offload at Woodley Park Station. Van Ness Station and every other train to Woodley Park Station coming from Shady Grove Station. [Radio Ops1]</p>
18:23:31 hours	<p><u>MICC AOM</u>: Contacted MTPD Dispatch and advised them that Dupont Circle Station was back closed. [Phone Rail 2]</p>
18:26:00 hours	<p><u>RTRA Rail Supervisor</u>: Reported located at Dupont Circle Station.</p>

Time	Description
	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Granted Train ID 103, an absolute block to Woodley Park Station. <u>Train ID 103</u> : Acknowledged and advised they were moving. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Granted Train ID 104 an absolute block no closer than 10 feet to A06-04 signal. <u>Train ID 104</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
18:33:20 hours	<u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 105 to continue non-revenue on track 2 from Cleveland Park Station to Dupont Circle Station. <u>Train ID 105</u> : Acknowledged and advised ready to move. [Radio Ops 1]
18:35:45 hours	<u>Train ID 105</u> : Advised no speed commands. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Granted Train ID 105 a permissive block to Dupont Circle Station, instructed to re-block to Train ID 705. [Radio Ops 1]
18:43:00 hours	<u>Train ID 105</u> : Advised standing by at signal A03-06, and lost speed commands. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed to re-block to Train ID 705, granted a permissive block Dupont Circle Station 8-car marker, key down, and reverse ends. <u>Train ID 705</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
18:45:24 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Received an update stating the ERT drilled out the bolt with the negative return, and test trains were running through the area. They noticed a possible flare-up and Rail 1 decided to close the station to conduct more test runs without customers after the Incident Command Post was closed. IC was not set up for the second closure, and TRST managed the incident as a maintenance issue. [Phone VAHQ ROCC MAC]
19:01:01 hours	<u>ERT</u> : Contacted the RTC and requested a test train on Track 2. <u>MICC Radio RTC</u> : Informed ERT that a test train was en route. [Radio Ops 1]
19:17:26 hours	<u>MICC</u> : Received notification from ERT that normal operations could resume at Dupont Circle Station. [Phone VAHQ MICC Metro 1]
19:27:52 hours	<u>Training Instructor</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that both entrances to Dupont Circle Station were opened.

***Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources.*

Weather

On December 18, 2023, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 51.8°F, with clear skies, winds 15 mph, and 40.24% humidity. The weather did not contribute to this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Washington, DC.

Related Rules and Procedures

- Metrorail Operating Rulebook – Customer Evacuations - 15.1 – Train Evacuations

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-incident toxicology testing was not conducted for this event.

Findings

- The RTRA Supervisor was notified by a customer that there was smoke in the station.
- The RTRA Supervisor investigated and noticed smoke coming from the interlocking and reported it to the MICC.
- The MICC contacted the MOC Desk to have the fans activated.
- The MICC instructed the RTRA Supervisor to evacuate the station.
- The RTRA Supervisor was the first person assigned as the Incident Commander.
- DCFEMS and MTPD were dispatched to the scene.
- A stud bolt had a negative return, causing the arcing.
- Incident Command was established by the kiosk.
- Incident Command was established but did not switch to Ops. 6 for an extended period
- Ineffective communication during event.
- The station was closed three times.
- A MTPD Lieutenant authorized the station be reopened but did not communicate that with the Incident Commander.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- RTRA personnel evacuated and closed Dupont Circle Station
- ERT removed the stud bolt that was causing the arcing.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause for the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Dupont Circle Station on December 18, 2023, was equipment failure. A stud bolt with a negative return was causing the arcing and smoke in the station due to making contact with the rebar in the invert.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
113700_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_ 001	All RTRA Supervisors need to complete a refresher training on the Incident Management Framework and their role.	RTRA SRC	08/30/2024

Appendices

Appendix A – OEP Incident Response Report

Submitted by: [REDACTED]



SAFE OEP Incident Response Report

Overview

<u>Incident Date/Time:</u>	<u>Responder 1:</u>	<u>Additional Responders:</u>
2023-12-18 15:59	[REDACTED]	NA
<u>Incident Location:</u>	<u>MAC 1:</u>	<u>Incident Type:</u>
DuPont Circle	[REDACTED]	Arcing Insulator
	<u>MAC 2:</u> N/A	
	<u>MAC Log #:</u> 9902	

Incident Metrics

<u>OPS Channel:</u> ["OPS 1 ", "OPS 6"]	<u>On Scene Time:</u> 17:22
<u>MTPD Channels:</u> ["MTPD 1x ", "MTPD 2x"]	<u>Disregard Time:</u> N/A
<u>Bus/Rail Yard Channel:</u> N/A	<u>Time of Recovery:</u> 16:59
<u>Incident Start Time:</u> 15:56	<u>In-Service Time:</u> 19:50
<u>PR Dispatch Time:</u> 16:00	<u>Command Est. Time:</u> 16:19
<u>Response Time:</u> 16:01	<u>Transfer of Command Time:</u> 16:43

Incident Personnel

Metro IC: CR 122 [REDACTED] MTPD	Maintenance Lead (ERT): ERT Supervisor [REDACTED]
Jurisdictional IC: District of Columbia	[REDACTED]
Fire Liaison ROCC: DCFD Capt. [REDACTED]	Investigations Lead (MTPD): N/A
Transportation Group Supervisor- RAIL:	Investigations Lead (Safety): N/A
Operations Section Chief: MTPD Cr. [REDACTED]	Transportation Lead (Bus TFS): Unknown

Submitted by: [REDACTED]

Incident Overview

Was Power removed: No Red Tag (if applicable):N/A

Incident Narrative:

EP11 called at 16:00 hours for a report of an arcing insulator at DuPont Circle just off of the platform towards Woodley Park at CM A1 072+00. RTRA, Bus, ERT, MTPD, & DCFD. Upon my arrival at 17:22, DCFD had cleared the scene, a bus bridge with shuttle busses was in effect, and MTPD Cruiser 122 was in command. EP11 noted that various bus and rail personnel were outside of the station, advising patrons. EP11 entered the station and found the Cruiser 122 [REDACTED] on the platform on the Track 1 side. He advised EP11 that he was the current WIC. EP11 noted that ERT was in the interlocking working just off the platform limits and MTPD [REDACTED] and various other track personnel were on the Track 2 side opposite of where EP11 found the [REDACTED] who was the acting WMATA Incident Commander. As EP11 was meeting with Sgt. [REDACTED], the station was reopened, and patrons began entering for single-tracking operations on the Track 2 side. Announcements were being made inside and outside of the station. Conversations with Sgt. [REDACTED] discovered that [REDACTED] had not given the order to the MICC to reopen. That order came from Lt. [REDACTED] via 2X to MTPD Communications. Sgt. [REDACTED] reported that ERT was operating on Ops 1 and MTPD was operating on 2X. Communications to ERT were verbal through the Lt., who was acting as Operations. There was a basic verbal IAP. I asked that Sgt. [REDACTED] reorganized and moved all communications to Ops 6. Organize through the MAC to coordinate communications. We moved the ICP to the Mezzanine, near the Kiosk. ERT [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] reported to the ICP. They reported that the issue was a stud bolt and that they had corrected the issue and needed a test train to verify. At 1728 a test train was ran through the area and more smoke/flare was observed. A discussion with ERT advised Command that we could single-track while they worked without issue. It was determined that ERT would assume command. Command was transferred to ERT and Rail. At this point the station was closed a second time. At this time ERT completely removed the stud bolt. Another test train was sent at 1751 hours without incident. The test train stopped at the platform, reversed ends and then returned through the interlocking without incident. The station was reopened, and service returned to normal. A second hot wash with ERT was then performed with EP11 and ERT advised that they would leave staff on scene to watch the area.

Incident Successes:


1. Identification of the issue. 2. On-scene coordination to overcome radio issues (verbal, runners).

Submitted by: [REDACTED]

Opportunities for Improvement:

1. A single organized incident command with better control over the incident.
2. A single incident channel from the beginning.
3. More understanding and practice in incident command.
4. A collaborative IAP.
5. Better radio communications.
6. More coordination between incident command and the MICC.
7. Complete removal of the stud bolt initially.
8. The station possibly could have remained open for single tracking operations after the FD left.

Appendix B – Why-Tree Analysis



Root Cause Analysis





Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E24137

Date of Event:	February 19, 2024
Type of Event:	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	06:50:28 Hours
Location:	Stadium-Armory Station, track 1 AC Switch Room #1
Time and How received by SAFE:	06:52 Hours Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC)
WMSC Notification Time:	08:51 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: Office of Safety Oversight (OSO) Office of Safety Investigations (OSI) WMSC: None
Rail Vehicle:	None
Injuries:	Fractured Ankle – Contractor Employee
Damage:	Substantial Damage to D08 AC1 Switch Gear
Emergency Responders:	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS)
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20240220#114892

Stadium-Armory – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

February 19, 2024

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ARS	Audio Recording System
C3M	C3M Power Systems, LLC
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
MAC	Mission Assurance Coordinator
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOC	Maintenance Operations Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
UPS	Uninterruptible Power Supply
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Monday, February 19, 2024, at 06:00 hours, a work crew with C3M Power Systems (C3M) arrived at the Stadium-Armory Station (D08) to perform the removal of an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) and previously de-energized cables from AC Switch Gear Room 104. The work crew was comprised of three electrical personnel and a supervisor with C3M, who were escorted by a WMATA Power Escort. The C3M Supervisor exited the station while the work crew was performing cable pulling to retrieve supplies from their work vehicle.

At 06:50 hours, Electrical Personnel #1 was on an approved wooden “A” frame ladder pulling cables that had POWER had previously de-energized on February 16th, 2024. A contractor tested the cable to ensure it was de-energized (started with the UPS side and then switchgear side.) There was a contractor spotter in place. The scope of the contractor’s work was to remove the old UPS, cables and conduit. The contractor’s complied with relevant levels of protection regarding WMATA, NFPA 70E, as well as other electrical safety standards.

An explosion occurred causing Electrical Personnel # 1 to fall from the ladder, which resulted in a fractured ankle. All personnel exited the AC Switchgear Room after the incident.

Stadium-Armory Station lost power briefly before the backup generator power was activated. Train ID 610 (7538-7539.7201-7200.7286-7287.7193-7192) reported to the Metro Integrated Command and Communication Center (MICC) a loss of power on Tracks 1 and 2, and station power at Stadium Armory Station. Shortly after Train ID 907

(3094-3095.2074-2075.3055-3054.3076-3077) reported to the Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) that there was smoke in the tunnel on track 1.

The Power Escort notified the Power Desk of the event, and Power Desk Personnel notified the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) to respond. The Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) notified the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD). The Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) dispatched the Department of Power personnel to assist in de-energizing the UPS gear.


Unified Command was established on 19th and C Street, NE. Electrical Personnel #1 was transported to Patient First for a medical evaluation.

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event at Stadium-Armory Station on February 19, 2024, was inadvertent pressure applied to the side of the switchgear located near the bus bars. This action caused the unit to contact energized components within leading to a direct arc.

Incident Site

Stadium-Armory Station, Platform Level, AC Room 104

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through document review
- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed two individuals as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the following individuals:
 - WMATA Power Escort
 - Electrical Personnel #1 (pending return to work)
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
 - Electrical Personnel # 2 -Written Statement
 - Electrical Personnel # 3 – Written Statement
 - C3M Supervisor – Written Statement
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
 - Power Escort Training Records
 - Power Escort Certifications
 - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Metro Integrated Command and Control (MICC) Incident Report
 - Maximo Data
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Monday, February 19, 2024, at 06:50 hours, an explosion occurred at Stadium-Armory Station within the UPS gear located in the AC Switch Gear Room 104, which resulted in a loss of power at the station. When the explosion occurred Electrical Personnel #1 fell from a ladder, which resulted in a fractured ankle. All personnel exited the AC Switchgear Room after the incident.

Prior to the event, at 06:00 hours, a work crew with C3M arrived at the Stadium-Armory Station to remove the de-energized cables and conduit from the de-energized UPS in the AC Switch Gear Room 104.

The path from the AC Room 104 did not require RWP as it was protected by a continuous handrail.

These cables were previously de-energized by WMATA POWER on February 15th, 2024. The work crew was comprised of three electrical personnel and a supervisor with C3M, who were escorted by a WMATA Power Escort.

The Closed Circuit-Television (CCTV) revealed that at 06:49 hours, the C3M Supervisor exited the AC Switch Gear Room 104 located on track 1 side of the station at platform level. At 06:50 hours, the gearswitch panel adjacent to the de-energized UPS exploded, and the CCTV video feed was interrupted.



Image 1 – UPS Gear after the explosion.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that the Train Operator on Train ID 610 on track 2 reported to the MICC a power outage on tracks 1 and 2 at Stadium Armory Station, the Radio RTC acknowledged the transmission. Train ID 907 located on track 1 reported the power was back on and observed smoke in the tunnel on track 1.

The Train Operator of Train ID 907 advised that they asked the WMATA Power Escort and contractors who walked out of the tunnel what happened, and they responded they did not know.

At 06:51 hours, the Button RTC notified MOC of the event. The fans were activated according to the playbook and conformed to established procedure. (Appendix E).

At 06:52 hours, the Power Escort contacted the Power Desk and reported that they were escorting contractors when the power went out while pulling demo cables; something sparked, causing smoke in the room and the contractors were escorted out of the room.

At 06:52 hours, the Operations Manager (OM) notified the Communications Section.

At 06:52 hours, the Train Operator of Train ID 907 reported that personnel advised that the smoke was from the AC Switch Gear Room 104. The Radio RTC acknowledged and then instructed the Train Operator to turn off the Environmental System (EV), close the train doors, and continue to the next station. The OM instructed the AOM to suspend service between Stadium-Armory Station and Potomac Avenue Station. There was no transmission observed that advised trains to bypass Stadium-Armory Station.

At 06:56 hours, the MAC notified MTPD. MOC dispatched the Department of Power personnel to assist in de-energizing the UPS gear.

At 06:58 hours, the Power Escort contacted the Power Desk and advised that, "a mishap in D08 AC Room #1, RTUs down; was sitting down when they heard an explosion, the contractor was pulling cables. Everyone was out of the room safely and the generator was running."

The MTPD Event Report stated that Stadium-Armory Station was closed between 07:00 hours to 08:14 hours. The CCTV revealed that customers were still in the station at the time of the reported closure. Two trains serviced the platform on the track 1 and one train serviced the platform on track 2.

At 07:01 hours, the AOM contacted DCFEMS. At 07:06 hours, the Station Manager reported to Communications that personnel were working the AC Room pulling cable, no fire; light smoke; and no power on the North End Mezzanine.

At 07:08 hours, the CCTV video was restored.

At 07:09 hours, the Radio RTC instructed Train ID 722 located at the D&G Junction on track 2, and Train ID 413 (713) located at Eastern Market on track 1 to perform a track inspection. Both were non-revenue and were instructed to operate at restricted speed no greater than 15 mph.

At 07:11 hours, the Information Controller instructed Station Manager at Stadium-Armory Station to switch radio channels from Ops 5 to Ops 2. However, there were no transmissions on Ops 2 from the Station Manager. Also, at 07:11 hours, Allied Security Officers located at Stadium-Armory were observed on CCTV as they escorted customers from Stadium-Armory Station.

At 07:12 hours, DCFEMS arrived on the platform at Stadium-Armory Station.

At 07:14 hours, Train ID 722 performed a track inspection to Stadium-Armory Station on track 2. Train ID 722 reported clear track but cloudy conditions in the Stadium-Armory Station. At 07:15 hours, the Radio RTC instructed Train ID 722 to return to service at Potomac Yards Station.

At 07:19 hours, Train ID 713 performed a track inspection on track 1. Train ID 713 reported a clear track but cloudy conditions inside Stadium-Armory Station. At 07:19 hours, the Radio RTC instructed Train ID 713 to return to normal service between Benning Road Station and Largo Station.

At 07:20 hours, the injured contractor was observed on CCTV as they walked from the platform to the escalator and departed the station. The injured contractor was driven by their supervisor for a local medical facility for treatment of what was later identified as a fractured ankle.

At 07:27 hours, Power Department personnel arrived at that station and conducted an inspection, then reported that the panel, switch board and breaker were melted. The switchgear has two breakers which supply the normal and reserve feed to the UPS. The UPS does not feed into the switchgear.




Image 2 – Inside view of the UPS Gear after the explosion.

At 07:30 hours, the Emergency Response Team (ERT) arrived at Stadium-Armory Station.

At 07:33 hours, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) reported located at Stadium-Armory Station with DCFEMS and MTPD and advised that Unified Command was located at 19th & C Streets.

At 07:36 hours, an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisor reported located at Stadium-Armory Station and advised cloudy conditions in the station.

At 07:54 hours, DCFEMS turned the scene over to RTRA. At 08:13 hours, the Incident Commander reported had smoke dissipated, and normal service could resume.

At 08:32 hours, the Radio RTC announced that train returned to normal service and to turn off the EV prior to servicing Stadium-Armory Station.

At 08:51 hours, the MAC desk initiated a notification email of the event as an I-11 Smoke/Fire event, later updated to an A-4 Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons.



Image 3 – Footprint on the UPS Gear Panel Cover discovered after being removed.

On February 19, 2024, at 12:50 pm hours a WMATA Senior Safety Specialist met a C3M Construction Executive at Stadium-Armory Station and related based on the executive's observations and crew reports one or two individuals were on a ladder next to the switchgear, pulling cables for the new UPS when the incident occurred. The switches and equipment were not related to the work being completed and had not required inspection. C3M believed inadvertent pressure was applied to the side panel of the switchgear located near the bus bars which reportedly caused the unit to contact energized components within, leading to a direct arc across the A, B, and C phases.

The contractors were set up on the left side of a 277/480volt AC switchgear. The task was to remove an old feeder cable that had been previously removed from the AC gear and was partially rolled up above the AC gear in a trough. An A-frame step ladder was set parallel to the side of the switchgear. The contract employee was on the fourth or fifth step on the ladder in the process of pulling the feeder cable out of the trough when a loud explosion caused him to jump off the ladder towards the back side of the gear.

Three burn marks were identified on the outside section of the panel guarding the buses. At some point in removing the feeder cables the inside phasing bus encountered the outside metal skin creating a direct ground fault/phase to phase short causing an explosion. The internal distance from the live bus to the switchgear side panel was observed after the incident to be very close and was believed to have contributed to the incident.

The image of a footprint on the panel indicated the likely source of the pressure was a contractor on the ladder using the panel for leverage. This shoeprint evidence indicates from positioning the contractor on the ladder placed their foot as leverage in removing the cables. This action pressed the cover panel into the recessed bus bars creating the arc and explosion.

Crew reports identified the timing as the sound of an explosion, sparks, the lights going out and then the contractor jumping off the ladder. No other conclusions were reached given the equipment and staff positioning, the sequence of events reported, the shoeprint and resulting damage.

The existing design of the panel cover provided minimal protection of the equipment but were designed not to have pressure applied. The bus panels were replaced and further recessed into the housing.

WMATA Power Department personnel replaced the UPS gear with the new UPS as originally planned. Repairs to the gearswitch panels involved extraction of damaged copper, the fitting of new insulators and the overhaul of the cables and bus bars.




Image 4 - AC Room 1 Switch Room 1 -Side C



Image 5 - AC Switch Room Side B

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
06:00:00 hours	C3M Work Crew arrived at Stadium-Armory Station. A briefing with escort was held. The view did not identify any equipment being brought in such as a ladder. [CCTV]
06:49:05 hours	The C3M Supervisor exited the AC Switch Gear Room on track 1 side. [CCTV]
06:50:28 hours	Loss of power in the station no CCTV.
06:50:52 hours	<u>Train ID 610</u> : Reported a power outage on tracks 1 and 2 at Stadium Armory Station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. <u>Train ID 907</u> : Reported the power was back on. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 2]
06:51:42 hours	<u>Train ID 907</u> : Reported smoke in the tunnel at Stadium-Armory Station on track 1; asked the personnel that walked out of the tunnel what happened, and they said they did not know. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed Train ID 614, 915 and 403 to stop their train. [Radio Ops 2]
06:52:19 hours	<u>Power Escort</u> : Reported escorting contractors when the power went out while pulling demo cables. Something sparked, causing smoke in the room; Got the contractors out of the room. [Phone POC]
06:52:26 hours	<u>OM</u> : Notified Communications. [Phone Metro 1]

Time	Description
06:52:47 hours	<u>Train ID 907</u> : Reported personnel said the smoke was from AC Room 1. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed to turn off the EV, close the doors, and continue. [Radio Ops 2]
06:52:49 hours	<u>AOM</u> : Advised the OM of the event. <u>OM</u> : Instructed to suspend service at Stadium-Armory Station and Potomac Avenue Station. [Phone Metro 1]
06:52:01 hours	MOC was notified by Button RTC of reported smoke at Stadium Armory Station. [Phone, PDAS]
06:55:06 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Train ID 614 instructed to reverse ends. <u>Train ID 614</u> : Acknowledged [Radio, Ops 2]
06:53:36 hours	<u>OM</u> : Notified MOC. [Phone Metro 1]
06:56:22 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Notified MTPD. [Radio MTPD 1X]
06:56:30 hours	<u>MOC</u> : Dispatched Power personnel to Stadium-Armory Station. [Phone ROCC Power]
06:57:01 hours	<u>Train ID 920</u> : Reported they did not see any smoke at Stadium-Armory Station on track 2. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed to continue on. [Radio Ops 2]
06:57:05 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatcher</u> : Dispatched units to Stadium-Armory Station. [Radio MTPD 1X]
06:58:35 hours	<u>Power Escort</u> : Reported a mishap in D08 AC Room #1, RTUs down. Was sitting down when they heard an explosion, the contractor was pulling cables; Everyone was out of the room safely and the generator was running. [Phone POC]

07:00 hours to 08:14 hours	Stadium-Armory Station was closed. [MTPD Event Report]
07:01:01 hours	<u>AQM</u> : Contacted DCFEMS. [Phone Rail 2]
07:06:11 hours	<u>Station Manager</u> : Reported to Communications personnel working the AC Room pulling cable; No fire; light smoke; No power on the North End Mezzanine (63). [Radio, Ops 5] <u>Information Controller</u> : Instructed the Station Manager to “stand by the radio”. [Radio, Ops 5]
07:08:58 hours	Power restored in station. [CCTV]
07:09:06 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed non-revenue Train ID 722 located at the D&G Junction on track 2 and non-revenue Train ID 413 (713) located at Eastern Market on track 1 to perform a track inspection. [Radio Ops 2]
07:11:00 hours	Allied Security Guards escorted customers from the station. [CCTV]
07:11:04 hours	<u>Information Controller</u> : Instructed Station Manager at Stadium-Armory to switch radio channels from Ops 5 to Ops 2. <u>Station Manager</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 5]
07:12:56 hours	DCFEMS on platform for smoke response. [CCTV]
07:14:30 hours	<u>Train ID 722</u> : Reported cloudy conditions on track 2. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed return to service at Potomac Avenue Station. [Radio Ops 2]
07:19:15 hours	<u>Train ID 713</u> : Reported cloudy conditions on track 1. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed return to service at Benning Road Station. [Radio Ops 2]
07:20:03 hours	Injured contract worker departs platform and self-transport with supervisor to local medical facility. [CCTV]
07:21:26 hours	MICC requested Bus Bridge [MICC Bus Section Alert, Email]
07:27:29 hours	<u>Power Department #2</u> : Reported that the panel, switch board and breaker were melted. [Phone POC]
07:27:37 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed non-revenue Train ID 924 (724) located at the D&G Junction on track 2 and non-revenue Train ID 615 (715) located at Eastern Market Station on track 1 to perform a track inspection. [Radio Ops 2]
07:30:12 hours	<u>ERT</u> : Reported located at Stadium-Armory Station. [Radio Ops 2]
07:33:24 hours	<u>OEP</u> : Reported located at Stadium-Armory Station with DCFEMS and MTPD; Unified Command located at 19 th & C Streets. [Radio Ops 6]
07:35:45 hours	<u>Train ID 724</u> : Reported clear track inspection on track 2. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed return to service at Potomac Avenue Station. [Radio Ops 2]
07:36:05 hours	<u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Reported located at Stadium-Armory Station and advised cloudy conditions in the station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 2]
07:41:35 hours	<u>Train ID 715</u> : Reported clear track inspection on track 1 with cloudy conditions at the station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed return to service at Benning Road Station. [Radio Ops 2]
07:42:30 hours	Test Train ID 715 L7214 completed a track inspection on track 1. [CCTV]
07:54:42 hours	<u>Information Controller</u> : Reported DCFEMS turned the scene over to RTRA. [Radio Ops 6]

08:12:07 hours	<p><u>MAC</u>: Advised station reported smoke has dissipated, asked if normal service return both tracks.</p> <p><u>Operations</u>: Ok to resume revenue both tracks, all trains turn off EV due to residual odor.</p> <p><u>Incident Command</u>: Concur and repeats back. Return to both tracks full service authorized. [Radio Ops 6]</p>
08:12:54 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Instructed non-revenue Train ID 930 (730) located at the D&G Junction on track 2 perform a track inspection to Eastern Market Station and then from Eastern Market to Stadium-Armory Stations on track 1. [Radio Ops 2]</p>
08:18:32 hours	<p><u>Train ID 730</u>: Reported good track inspection on track 2. [Radio Ops 2]</p>
08:28:27 hours	<p><u>Train ID 730</u>: Reported good track inspection on track 1.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Instructed to return to service at Stadium-Armory Station. [Radio Ops 2]</p>
08:32:21 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Announced that train returned to normal service and to turn off the EV prior to servicing Stadium-Armory Station. [Radio Ops 2]</p>

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 1 – Star on the AIMS Playback indicates a loss of station and 3rd rail power.

Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

Radio communication issues were not identified.

Interview Findings and Written Statements

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE interviewed one person, the Power Escort. The interview identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report. C3M did provide a written transcript of a verbal statement from the injured contractor. That contractor remained off work recuperating during the investigation and submission of this report.

Power Escort

- The WMATA Escort stated they reviewed the TRMP CSP Briefing Form with Contract Supervisor and crew.
- The Escort, Supervisor and crew entered AC-01 after receiving permission from MOC.
- The Contract Supervisor left the room to go to their vehicle outside the station to retrieve rope to aid in pulling the wire.
- The Escort stated after about an hour they heard a “Boom, Boom, Boom” sound and saw the contractor on the ladder fall.
- The Escort stated the room filled with smoke and the light (emergency) kicked on.
- The Escort assisted the crew to the platform. The Escort noted the power was off within the station and trains were stopped.
- The Escort stated the Contract Supervisor returned from their truck and met the crew on the platform.
- The Escort stated they notified MOC they needed a Power crew to respond and was told one had been sent.
- The Escort stated there was no fire in the AC-01 Room.

Injured C3M Contractor Verbal Statement

- The Contractor stated they tested the cables on arrival to ensure they were de-energized.
- The Contractor placed their A-Frame ladder three inches from the switchgear and began to pull the cable from above the switchgear.
- The Contractor stated they heard a boom, saw sparks and then the lights went out.
- The Contractor stated they had to jump off the ladder towards the back (away) from the switchgear.
- The Contractor stated they “rolled” their ankle as they landed on a piece of pipe.

Weather

On February 19, 2024, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 34°F, with clear skies, winds 9 mph, and 34% humidity. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Washington, DC.)

Related Rules and Procedures

Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)

5.1.3 – Employees shall assist with the evacuation of customers as directed by the Rail Vehicle Operator or Rail Traffic Controller.

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 2 – Third Rail Power De-energization

Human Factors

Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Findings

- Work Crew received safety briefing and PPE review prior to performing duties.
- C3M Supervisor was not present at the time of the incident.
- The AC Switch Gear Room was evacuated.
- Proper PPE was worn and nature of injury (fractured ankle) indicates not relation.
- Electrical explosion indicates potential contact of bus bars and outside panel based on burn damage. A footprint on the actual panel of the gear switch, which was immediately adjacent to the right side of the de-energized UPS that was being worked on indicates an individual exerted pressure on the panel facilitating contact between the bus bars.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Train service suspended.
- DCFEMS and POWR were dispatched.
- Vent shaft fans were activated.
- Incident Command established by DCFEMS and MTPD 16th and C Street level
- Test Trains inspected tracks 1 and 2 at Stadium-Armory Station.
- C3M conducted a Safety Stand Down

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event at Stadium-Armory Station on February 19, 2024, was inadvertent pressure applied to the side of the switchgear located near the bus bars. This action caused the unit to contact energized components within leading to a direct arc.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
114892_SAFE CAPS_POWR _001	Develop a Lessons Learned - for Escort and Contractors' inspection of Gear Switches and similar equipment to reduce the likelihood of personnel and/or equipment contacting energized equipment.	POWR SRC	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

POWR

Power Escort

The AA Mechanic—High Voltage Tech (POWR Escort) is a WMATA employee with 23 years of service and 10 years of experience as an Escort. The AA Mechanic holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in December 2024.

The Power Escort stated that they reviewed the TRMP CSP Safety Briefing Form with C3M Supervisor and crew. The Escort, Supervisor, and crew entered AC-01 after receiving permission from MOC.

The Power Escort stated that they the crew entered AC Switch Gear Room 104 and began demo work pulling wire.

The Power Escort stated that they observed a contractor climb the ladder to access the wires. The two other contractors were out of the Escort's direct view. The Power Escort's role under SOP # 41 was to provide access and oversee work to ensure the safety of all crew members and the security of all WMATA assets or to facilitate work. The contractor crew members had an assigned contract supervisor assigned to the crew.

The Power Escort stated that the C3M Supervisor left the room to go to their vehicle outside the station to retrieve rope to aid in pulling the wire.

The Power Escort stated that after an hour they heard a “Boom, Boom, Boom” sound and saw the contractor on the ladder fall, the room filled with smoke and the light (emergency) kicked on. The Power Escort stated that they assisted the crew to the platform.

The Power Escort stated that power was off within the station and trains were stopped. The Power Escort stated that the C3M Supervisor returned from their truck and met the crew on the platform.

The Power Escort stated that they notified MOC, and that they requested a Power crew to respond.

The Power Escort stated that they observed the contractor that fell from the ladder walked with a limp.

The Power Escort stated that there was no fire in the AC-01 Room.

The Power Escort stated that there was speculation based on the footprint on the gear switch panel that a contractor may have pushed on it for leverage. The gear switch was not de-energized as it was not within the scope of the UPS work.

The Power Escort stated that their view of the contactor on the ladder led them to believe that employee could not have left the footprint.

The Power Escort stated the ladder was being supported by another contractor until the explosion occurred. The contractor holding the ladder, following safety practices but released it at the time of the explosion as the contractor on the ladder was falling.

Appendix B – Written Statements

Injured Contractor

Verbal Statement From [REDACTED] to 3 [REDACTED]

On Friday the cables were C3M [REDACTED] disconnected from the Switchgear and UPS. When we came in Monday morning [REDACTED] tested the cable at both UPS and Switchgear sides to confirm. Once confirmed [REDACTED] said he got on his A-frame ladder that was 3" away from the Switchgear and began to pull the cable from the coiled up terminated section above the Switchgear. While doing this [REDACTED] claims [REDACTED] heard a boom and saw sparks and the lights ~~went~~ went out. Because of this [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] had to jump off the ladder towards the back of the switch gear. When [REDACTED] landed he said [REDACTED] rolled his ankle on a piece of pipe on the ground.

Document 1 – Injured Contractor Written Transcript of Verbal Statement

POWER

AA Mechanic - High Voltage Tech (POWR Escort)

[REDACTED]

ON FEB, 19, 2024 between hours of 8AM & 9AM I WAS IN AC I Rm watching contractor [REDACTED] he was on ladder pulling cable, suddenly I heard 3 loud noises explosion type I immediately ran to where I heard noise individual [REDACTED] was limping and I escorted 3 M contractors out room. Then notice power down, lot smoke, and called MOC talked Tolla to get power crew to TD8 AC I then talk to station mgr, and transit & other Wmata Authority's Region responded to, deenergize AC gear generator, crew, and supervisors were on scene. Also [REDACTED] sprain ankle project mgr assist him for hospitalization report seeking sources get power up at 11:15AM

Document 2 - Power Escort Written Statement

[REDACTED] the events of Feb 19, 2024
 at D08 Stadium Armory Station AC ROOM 1.
 After bringing down tools and equipment into
 the AC Room, we went over the plan
 of how we would demo the old feeder
 wires and conduit. The plan was to cut
 the wires above the switch gear in the
 L-shaped trough to pull the cables away
 from the gear. I left the rope
 for the Tugger on my truck. I told
 the crew to prep to cables while I
 went up to get the rope. On my way
 back down I received a call from
 [REDACTED] that something had happened in the
 AC room and they evacuated to the
 plateform.

Document 3 – C3M Supervisor’s - Written Statement

Electrical Personnel #2

~~6:50 AM~~

2/20/2024

on 2/19/2024 at Stadium Armory
 Metro station, My crew enter the
 AC room. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
 were about to demo wires and
 conduit. [REDACTED] was on the ladder
 and [REDACTED] was spotting him. I
 was on the other side of the switch
 gear on the ground preparing my tools
 to do my job. I then heard a
 explosion sound so I then exited
 the room.

2/19/2024
6:52 AM

Document 4 - C3M Electrical Personnel #2 - Written Statement

Electrical Personnel #3

02/20/28

I [redacted] was holding the ladder
for [redacted] as he was ^{straightening} out the cables to be pulled
out the box outtop of the gear I heard
a boom ^{and} I ran. The ladder was located on
the side ~~the~~ where the dead short was.

Document 5 - C3M Electrical Personnel #3 - Written Statement identifying the worker supporting the ladder left the room after the explosion while the worker on the ladder fell to the ground.

Appendix C – Training Records

Power Escort

Title	Type	Status	Date
RWP REQUAL Level 2	CBT	Completed	1/31/2024
RWP Level 2	Certification	Completed	1/31/2024
Report Hazards	CBT	Completed	1/20/2024
Safety Management System(SMS) Certification Program for Employees	Certification	Completed	1/20/2024
Cybersecurity Awareness Training	CBT	Completed	1/5/2024
Annual Cybersecurity Awareness	Certification	Completed	1/5/2024
APX 8000 Portable Radio Training	CBT	Completed	1/4/2024
OneBadge: Your Role in Metro Access Control	CBT	Completed	12/4/2023
One Badge: Metro Access Control Annual Training	Certification	Completed	12/4/2023
Sexual Harassment Prevention For Employees	CBT	Completed	12/4/2023
CONFINED SPACE REFRESHER TRAINING QUALIFIED EMPLOYEES	Classroom	Completed	11/9/2023
RWP Level 2 Update	CBT	Completed	5/19/2023
CPR W/AED AND FIRST AID	Classroom	Completed	4/13/2023
IMF Metro Initial Responder Level 1	CBT	Completed	2/13/2023
RWP CBT LEVEL 2	CBT	Completed	1/9/2023
Ethics Biennial Training	Certification	Completed	1/2/2023
METRO EMPLOYEE CODE OF ETHICS	CBT	Completed	1/1/2023
FEMA ICS-100 Introduction to the ICS	Learning Activities	Completed	12/21/2022
FEMA IS-700 Introduction to the NIMS	Learning Activities	Completed	12/21/2022
FEMA IS-700 Introduction to the NIMS	Learning Activities	Completed	12/8/2022
FEMA ICS-100 Introduction to the ICS	Learning Activities	Completed	12/8/2022
RWP SAFETY STANDDOWN	Classroom	Completed	9/20/2022
RWP SSD 20-07-E	Classroom	Completed	8/1/2022
Cybersecurity Awareness Training	CBT	Completed	7/3/2022
MTPD TSA Security Training	CBT	Completed	4/8/2022
HEARING CONSERVATION PROGRAM	Classroom	Completed	3/11/2022
Sexual Harassment Prevention For Employees	CBT	Completed	3/9/2022
BLUE LINE INVERTER AND INVERTER TRANSFORMER TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	2/11/2022
RWP CBT Level 2 Retest CR & GK	CBT	Completed	1/27/2022
Cybersecurity Awareness Training	CBT	Completed	8/31/2021
OneBadge: Your Role in Metro Access Control	CBT	Completed	8/31/2021
RWP SAFETY STANDDOWN	Internet	Completed	8/1/2021
Maximo E-Learning - How to Add Materials to a WO	CBT	Completed	4/13/2021
Maximo E-Learning - How to Manage a CM WO	CBT	Completed	4/13/2021
Maximo E-Learning - How to Create a Work Order	CBT	Completed	4/13/2021
Maximo E-Learning - How to Obtain Field Information	CBT	Completed	4/13/2021
Maximo E-Learning - How to Log In	CBT	Completed	4/13/2021
Safety Investigation Awareness	CBT	Completed	3/31/2021
MetroTime Clock IVR and Kiosk Time Entry	CBT	Completed	3/30/2021
RWP CBT LEVEL 2	CBT	Completed	1/25/2021

Table 1 - Power Escort Training Record Page 1 of 3

HEARING CONSERVATION PROGRAM	Classroom	Completed	12/1/2020
RWP SAFETY STANDDOWN OCTOBER	Classroom	Completed	11/30/2020
METRO EMPLOYEE CODE OF ETHICS	CBT	Completed	11/5/2020
TSMT OJT MENTORING	Classroom	Completed	5/20/2020
RWP Stand-Down March 2020 (RIME)	Classroom	Completed	3/3/2020
RWP Initial Level 2	Blended	Completed	1/23/2020
FATIGUE MANAGEMENT FUNDAMENTALS - FM101	CBT	Completed	8/20/2019
RWP CBT LEVEL 4	CBT	Completed	8/20/2019
Cybersecurity Awareness Training	CBT	Completed	8/15/2019
HEARING CONSERVATION PROGRAM	Classroom	Completed	7/31/2019
Defensive Driving Course DDC 4	Classroom	Completed	4/30/2019
TSMT-TRACTION POWER SYSTEMS TRAINING OVERVIEW	Classroom	Completed	4/19/2019
CPR W/AED AND FIRST AID	Classroom	Completed	1/22/2019
RWP STAND-DOWN SEPT 2018	Classroom	Completed	9/25/2018
RWP REQUAL Level 4	Classroom	Completed	8/21/2018
Mathematics Review/104	Classroom	Completed	6/8/2018
METROTIME - CLOCK AND IVR TIME ENTRY	Classroom	Completed	5/11/2018
FATIGUE MANAGEMENT FUNDAMENTALS - FM101	CBT	Completed	8/22/2017
RWP CBT LEVEL 4	CBT	Completed	8/22/2017
RADIO COMMUNICATION COURSE	Classroom	Completed	8/22/2017
SAFETY STAND DOWN AMF (ADVANCE MOBIL FLAGGER)	Classroom	Completed	5/4/2017
Safety Stand-Down Hot Spot Protection	Classroom	Completed	11/8/2016
RWP CBT LEVEL 1-2-4	CBT	Completed	8/8/2016
SAFETY STAND-DOWN FTA DIRECTIVE 16-3	Classroom	Completed	6/8/2016
FORKLIFT TRAINING INITIAL - RAIL	Classroom	Completed	6/7/2016
RWP Initial Level 2	Classroom	Completed	12/4/2015
TRACK AND STRUCTURE MSRPH	CBT	Completed	11/16/2015
TRACK AND STRUCTURE MSRPH	CBT	Completed	3/3/2014
FATIGUE AWARENESS	CBT	Completed	11/18/2011
TRACK AND STRUCTURE MSRPH	CBT	Completed	4/11/2011
UPS GUTOR TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	4/7/2011
MOBILE GENERATOR CONN.	Classroom	Completed	4/5/2011
MOBILE GENERATOR CONN.	Classroom	Completed	3/23/2011
SAFETY CERTIFIED FORKLIFT-POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK	Classroom	Completed	3/8/2011
FORKLIFT TRAINING INITIAL - RAIL	Classroom	Completed	3/8/2011
ROADWAY PROTECTION (RWP) LEVEL 4	Classroom	Completed	1/21/2011
RWP Initial Level 4	Classroom	Completed	1/21/2011
SAFETY CERTIFIED LOCKOUT- TAGOUT	Classroom	Completed	9/3/2010
SUB STATION MAINTENANCE TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	9/3/2010
SAFETY CERTIFIED LOCKOUT- TAGOUT	Classroom	Completed	8/30/2010
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING "OPERATIONS" LEVEL	Classroom	Completed	2/26/2010
WMATA METRORAIL EMG RESPONSE TRAINING "OPS LEVEL"	Classroom	Completed	2/26/2010
THE ART OF TROUBLESHOOTING II	Classroom	Completed	11/16/2009
TRACK AND STRUCTURE MSRPH	CBT	Completed	3/30/2009

Table 2 - Power Escort Training Record Page 2 of 3

THE ART OF TROUBLESHOOTING II	Classroom	Completed	3/26/2009
SAFETY CERTIFIED LOCKOUT- TAGOUT	Classroom	Completed	2/7/2008
TRACTION POWER SOP AND SAFETY	Classroom	Completed	2/7/2008
UPS GUTOR TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	6/8/2007
SAFETY CERTIFIED HAZARD COMMUNICATION	Classroom	Completed	5/9/2007
SAFETY CERTIFIED FIRE EXTINGUISHER	Classroom	Completed	5/9/2007
SAFETY CERTIFIED PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT	Classroom	Completed	5/9/2007
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT	Classroom	Completed	5/9/2007
HAZARD COMMUNICATION	Classroom	Completed	5/9/2007
FIRE EXTINGUISHER	Classroom	Completed	5/9/2007
SAFETY CERTIFIED SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM PLAN	Classroom	Completed	5/9/2007
SAFETY CERTIFIED BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS	Classroom	Completed	5/9/2007
S BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS	Classroom	Completed	5/9/2007
MOBILE GENERATOR CONN.	Classroom	Completed	3/13/2007
SAFETY CERTIFIED FIRE EXTINGUISHER	Classroom	Completed	10/11/2006
FIRE EXTINGUISHER SAFETY TRAINING	CBT	Completed	10/11/2006
MAXIMO TRAINING FOR POWR MECHANICS	Classroom	Completed	1/26/2006
SAFETY STANDOWN	Classroom	Completed	1/4/2006
BASIC COMPUTER CONCEPTS TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	10/19/2005
AC - ALTERNATING-CURRENT ROOM TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	1/7/2005
SAFETY CERTIFIED CONFINED SPACE ENTRY - QUALIFIED PERSON	Classroom	Completed	5/19/2004
CONFINED SPACE ENTRY - QUALIFIED PERSON	Classroom	Completed	5/19/2004
ALTERNATING CURRENT SWITCH GEAR SIMULATOR	Classroom	Completed	1/13/2004
LEADING THE STELLAR CUST SERVICE INITIATIV	Classroom	Completed	9/26/2003
STELLAR CUSTOMER SERVICE	Classroom	Completed	9/25/2003
HR CERTIFIED STELLAR CUSTOMER SERVICE	Classroom	Completed	9/25/2003
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT AND SAFETY TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	5/30/2003
HIGH VOLTAGE BATTERY SAFETY TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	5/30/2003
DRUG AND ALCOHOL - REASONABLE SUSPICION EMPLOYEE TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	10/28/2002
NEW EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION AND SWITCHING	Classroom	Completed	1/31/2002
RIGHT OF WAY TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	12/19/2001
SAFETY CERTIFIED RIGHT OF WAY	Classroom	Completed	12/19/2001
WMATA DRUG & ALCOHOL PROGRAM FOR EMPLOYEES	Classroom	Completed	12/18/2001
SAFETY CERTIFIED BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS	Classroom	Completed	12/18/2001
SAFETY CERTIFIED PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT	Classroom	Completed	12/18/2001
HE BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS FOR NEO	Classroom	Completed	12/18/2001
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	12/18/2001
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE FOR EMP	Classroom	Completed	12/17/2001
SAFETY CERTIFIED SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM PLAN	Classroom	Completed	12/17/2001
SAFETY PLAN TRAINING	Classroom	Completed	12/17/2001
NEW EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION	Classroom	Completed	12/17/2001

Table 3 - Power Escort Training Record Page 3 of 3

REVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CREW SUPPORT POLICY AND SOP #41

All POWER Employees,

Crew Support Personnel (CSP) - any qualified individual who oversees work to ensure the safety of crew members, security of Metro assets, or to facilitate work (formerly referred to CSP as "escorts").

The purpose of this notice is to review the following:

- POLICY/INSTRUCTION: 1.21/0 - Crew Support Policy
- SOP #41 - WMATA CREW SUPPORT PERSONNEL PROCEDURES FOR NON-ROADWAY

By signing below, I acknowledge that I have received a copy of POLICY/INSTRUCTION: 1.21/0 - Crew Support Policy and SOP #41 - WMATA CREW SUPPORT PERSONNEL PROCEDURES FOR NON-ROADWAY. Furthermore, I acknowledge that it is my responsibility to read and comprehend the information and to consult with my supervisor/manager if I have any questions concerning its contents.

Employee Name (Printed)

Employee Signature

Date 4/27/23

Document 6 - Power Crew Support Personnel Acknowledgement Form - Redacted

Appendix D – TRPM CSP Daily Sign-In Sheet

WMATA TRPM-CSP DAILY SIGN IN SHEET

Date: 2/19/24 Day: Su/M Tu W Th F Sa Location: D08 TPS TBS/AC PS

Escort Arrived: Time: 5:23 Initials: [redacted] Escort Out: Time: 12:10 Initials: [redacted] Contractor Arrived: Time: 8:50 Initials: [redacted] Contractor Out: Time: 12:05 Initials: [redacted]

MOC CONTACT: [redacted] TIME CALLED IN: 5:25 hrs. TIME CALLED OUT: 12:10 hrs.

Work Performed: Demo, Putting UPS Together C3M

Delays/ Lost time: NO/ YES: How much time: Initials: [redacted]

Problems:

Safety Briefing :

1. Anyone can STOP work on the jobsite for an unsafe act or event
2. Wear ALL of your proper PPE while on the jobsite
3. Check your hardhats, eye protection, safety vest, gloves, clothing and work boots/safety shoes
4. Be careful of falling objects from overhead, tripping hazards and high voltage wiring
5. Report ALL accidents or injuries to your direct supervisor immediately
6. Please be safe and exercise the appropriate level of personal safety for yourself and your co-workers

Sign In Sheet

Name (Print)	Unit/ Badge #	Company	Signature
[redacted]	[redacted]	C3M	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	C3M	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	C3M	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	C3M	[redacted]

Visitors to Site	1.	2.	3.
WMATA Escort	1. [redacted]	2.	3.
Call Number	1. [redacted]	2.	3.
Signature	1. [redacted]	2.	3.

REVISED MAY 2020

Document 7 – TRPM Daily Sign-In Sheet indicating the Power Escort/Crew Support Personnel (CPS) documenting location, arrival/departure times, MOC notification work to be performed and general safety briefing for involved personnel. The CSP, crew (contract) personnel including supervisor sign acknowledging information. The form was the standard that was required at the time of even

Appendix E – MOC Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Form

FLO and Rail 1 are giving commands as well

MOC-FRM-0001-R00.0

Maintenance Section Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Form
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Approved: 1/24/2024

Call Time:	Incident Description: (Arcing Insulator / Trash Fire / etc.)		
06:50	Smoke by the 8 car marker on track 1		
Nearest Station: (Metro Center A01)	Chainmarker: (xxx-xx)	Track #:	Train ID:
Stadium Armory D08	8 car marker	1	907
Proposed Evacuation Route: (towards which station)		Playbook/Page Reference:	Incident Zone(s):
Stadium Armory		Pg 196/D71	Station
Fan Controller Name:	Date:	MAINT 1 Name:	Date:
[Redacted]	2/19/24	[Redacted]	2/19/24

Remote Fan Configuration

Station	Fan Name	Configuration (E/S/OFF)	Station	Fan Name	Configuration (E/S/OFF)
	FD9	off	D07	UPE/IB	off
D08	UPE/IB	E	D07	UPE/OB	off
D08	UPE/OB	Fault		FD7	off
	FDB	off	D06	IB/OB	off

Manually-Operated UPE Fan Configuration

Station ¹	Manual Fan (IB/OB)	Location	Room Sequence	Config. (E/S/OFF)	X ²
A01	UPE-A	North Mezzanine Level	#N200, #N200A, #300N		
	UPE-B	East Mezzanine Level	#E202		
A02	UPE-IB	Behind End Gate on Track 2	#301		
	UPE-OB	Behind End Gate on Track 2	#108		
A03	UPE-IB	Upper Mezzanine Level	#201, #222		
	UPE-OB	Upper Mezzanine Level	#201, #217		
B01	UPE-IB	East Mezzanine Level	#E222		
	UPE-OB	West Mezzanine Level	#W200, #W202		
B02	UPE-IB	Mezzanine Level	#200, #204		
	UPE-OB	Mezzanine Level	#201, #205		
B03	UPE-IB	Behind End Gate on Track 2	#113		
	UPE-OB	Behind End Gate on Track 2	#108		

¹Incidents occurring at stations with manual UPE fans may require remote operation of fans at adjacent stations (ex. A04 and A05)

²Mark "X" in the right-hand box for all fans that needed to be configured

MAINT 1 shall scan and save this form in the "R" Shared Network Drive.

Document 8 – MOC Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Form indicated compliance with the Fan Playbook.

Appendix F – MTPD Event Report



Event Report		
Metro Transit Police Department		ORI-DCMTP0000
Closed	MTPD CCN 2024-02684	Local Jurisdiction District of Columbia

Event Location	
Street 290 19th St SE (hospital Side)	City, State WASHINGTON, DC 20003
Date and Time of Event From 2/19/2024 6:55:00 AM To	Date and Time Reported 2/19/2024 6:58:05 AM
Reporting Officer (Print) Badge # [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	Second Officer (Print) Badge # [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Supervisor's Name (Electronically Approved) [REDACTED]	
Incidents	
Incident: Fire/Smoke Local Alarm	Location Type: Rail Station
Incident Detail: [REDACTED]	

Involved Party	
Last Name, First MI: [REDACTED]	
DOB: [REDACTED]	
Address Type: H - Home	Address (Street) City, State Zip: [REDACTED]
W - Work	Address (Street) City, State Zip: 600 5th St NW Washington, DC
Type Phone: M - Mobile	Phone Number: [REDACTED]
Email: [REDACTED]	
Age: [REDACTED]	Sex: [REDACTED]
Race: [REDACTED]	Ethnicity: Origin
Resident Status: Nonresident	
Description	Height: [REDACTED] Weight: [REDACTED] Eyes Color: Brown Complex: Medium Brown Clothing:
Driver's License #: [REDACTED]	D/L State: Maryland SSN:
Occupation: Rail Supervisor	Place of Employment: WMATA
Place of Birth:	
Work/School Address – Addl. Contact Info: 300 7th St SW DC 20024	
Notes: EMPLOYEE [REDACTED]	

MTPD CCN:
ORI-DCMTP0000

Event Report Page 1 of 3

Document 9 - MTPD Event Report, Page 1 of 3

Incident Date: 02/19/2024 Time: 06:50 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons Rev. 1
E24137

Drafted By: SAFE 709 - 08/28/2024
Reviewed By: SAFE 702 – 9/1/2024
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 09/03/2024

<i>Narrative Information</i>	
Local alarm / smoke in station	
If second CCN is available, insert here:	Additional Narrative on Supplemental Report

MTPD CCN:
ORI-DCMTP0000

Event Report Page 2 of 3

Document 10 - MTPD Event Report, Page 2 of 3

Incident Date: 02/19/2024 Time: 06:50 hours
 Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons Rev. 1
 E24137

<p>Drafted By: SAFE 709 - 08/28/2024 Reviewed By: SAFE 702 – 9/1/2024 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 09/03/2024</p>

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Additional Narrative

I Officer [REDACTED] (A-31) & Officer [REDACTED] reports on 02/19/24 at approximately 0658hrs, hearing a call dispatched for smoke in the station at Stadium Armory Metro Station located at 290 19th St SE. Upon arrival I was informed the smoke came from a box that had it's wires crossed in ATC room #104 and deemed a maintenance issue. Due to the smoke and fire personnel in the station, the station was closed form 0700-0814hrs until I was informed by rail supervisor [REDACTED] full service had resumed.

MTPD CCN:
ORI-DCMTP0000

Event Report Page 3 of 3

Document 11 - MTPD Event Report, Page 3 of 3

Incident Date: 02/19/2024 Time: 06:50 hours
Final Report – Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons Rev. 1
E24137

Drafted By: SAFE 709 - 08/28/2024
Reviewed By: SAFE 702 – 9/1/2024
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 09/03/2024

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Appendix G – Why Tree Analysis

