

W-0355 – Improper Roadway Worker Protection – Anacostia Station – May 7, 2024

Document Purpose:

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigations and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation reports that have undergone WMSC staff review and, if necessary, feedback and revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the safety events, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation reports) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on January 28, 2025.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

Roadway Worker Protection

The <u>WMSC's audit of Metrorail's Roadway Worker Protection Programs</u>, issued on July 31, 2024, demonstrates that although Metrorail has established policies and procedures, rules, training, and oversight of its RWP program, there are still deficiencies that put the safety of workers at risk. During this audit, WMSC personnel observed unsafe practices contrary to Metrorail policies and procedures at every observation activity conducted. As further explained in Finding 1 of the audit report, Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety. This increases the risk that personnel may be injured or killed. Between 2005 and 2010, eight Metrorail employees were struck and killed by rail vehicles. In the years since, there have been several near miss collisions with roadway workers, including a 2016 safety event where Federal Transit Administration (FTA) track inspectors were forced to jump out of the path of a train to avoid being hit. Since then, there have been near misses that include workers narrowly escaping a fatal collision, including events that occurred in 2021, 2022, and 2023.

Metrorail developed and the WMSC is currently conducting the review and approval process for corrective action plans created in accordance with the Program Standard to address the 13 findings of the RWP Audit issued in July 2024. These build on immediate mitigations and initial steps to correct outdated materials and communicate the importance of safety rules that Metrorail took based on the WMSC's communication of safety issues as those issues were observed and validated during the audit process. Corrective action plans associated with the RWP audit have scheduled dates of completion between June 2025 and October 2027.

Safety event summary:



A Station Manager at Anacostia Station entered the roadway without permission and without proper protection against train movement or electrocution. Prior to this roadway worker protection violation, the Station Manager identified a wet floor sign on the roadway, on track 2 near the 8-car marker. A review of closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage showed that the sign had been thrown to the roadway by a rider the day prior.

The Station Manager notified a Communications Agent in the Control Center and was instructed to standby. A Rail Traffic Controller instructed a Train Operator, operating a train toward Anacostia Station to perform a track inspection at restricted speeds to determine if the sign was impeding train movement. The Train Operator confirmed that the sign was not impeding train movement with the Rail Traffic Controller.

A later investigative review of CCTV footage showed a brief interaction between the Station Manager and the Train Operator while the train was berthed on the platform. The Station Manager then went beyond the end gate, retrieved the sign from in front of the train and exited the roadway back onto the platform without permission and the required personal protective equipment. During this time, the Rail Traffic Controller inquired why the train was holding and the Train Operator stated a supervisor (actually the station manager) was retrieving the sign from the roadway. The Station Manager was instructed to contact the Control Center and was then informed of the roadway worker protection violation. When asked by the Communications Agent if they were familiar with RWP procedures, the Station Manager responded, "kind of sort of." The Station Manager was removed from service for post-incident toxicology testing.

The causes and contributing factors include:

- Non-compliance with written operational rules and procedures
- Insufficient understanding of operational rules and procedures leading to non-compliance

As a result of this investigation, the Station Manager received reinstruction regarding RWP requirements.

Related corrective action:

• CAP C-0280 addresses the 2024 RWP audit finding that Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Department of Safety (SAFE) Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E24355

Date of Event:	May 07, 2024
Type of Event:	Improper Roadway Worker Protection (RWP)
Incident Time:	15:34 hours
Location:	Anacostia Station, track 2
Time and How received by SAFE:	15:40 hours, Safety Information Officer (SIO)
WMSC Notification Time:	16:16 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	None
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 514
	(L7742-7743.7651-7650.7540-7541.7357-7356T)
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	None
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20240507#116705

May 7, 2024

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ARS	Audio Recording System
САР	Corrective Action Plan
ссти	Closed-Circuit Television
I/A	Incidents/Accidents
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rules
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
ООР	Office of Operating Practices
OSI	Office of Safety Investigations
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
ROCS	Rail Operations Control System
RVO	Rail Vehicle Operator
RWP	Roadway Worker Protection
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
SIO	Safety Information Officer
SRC	Safety Risk Coordinator
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

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Executive Summary

*Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. *

On Tuesday, May 7, 2024, at 15:34 hours, an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Station Manager entered the roadway without authorization and retrieved a yellow pyramid-style, plastic wet floor sign from the roadway at Anacostia Station, track 2.

Prior to the event, at 15:24 hours, the Station Manager at Anacostia Station observed the wet floor sign in the roadway and notified a Metro Integrated Command and Communications (MICC) Communications Agent via radio. The Communications Agent instructed the Station Manager to stand by. At 15:25 hours, the Communications Agent notified the Button Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) that the Station Manager at Anacostia had reported a wet floor sign in the roadway at the 8-car marker of track 2. The Button RTC acknowledged.

At 15:27 hours, the Radio RTC, contacted Train ID 514 (L7742-7743.7651-7650.7540-7541.7357-7356T), track 2 at Navy Yard Station, and instructed the Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) to perform a track inspection at restricted speed when entering Anacostia Station, to ensure the wet floor sign was not impeding train movement. The RVO acknowledged the instruction. At 15:31 hours, Train ID 514 arrived at Anacostia Station, the RVO informed the Radio RTC, that the wet floor sign was not impeding train movement.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) revealed that the RVO and Station Manager were engaged in a discussion while the train was stopped at the 8-car marker. At 15:33 hours, the Station Manager walked beyond the end gate and onto the roadway at Anacostia Station on track 2 to retrieve the wet floor sign.

At 15:33 hours, the Radio RTC asked the RVO of ID 514 why they were holding and were advised by the RVO that a supervisor (actually the Station Manager) was on the roadway retrieving a wet floor sign. After returning to the platform, the Station Manager was instructed to contact the MICC via landline and was informed by the Communication Agent that they had entered the roadway without authorization.

At 15:40 hours, the Operations Manager (OM) notified the Safety Information Officer (SIO) and the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM).

There were no injuries or damage as a result of this incident.


In adherence to Standard Operating Procedure 102-01-02, which outlines the protocol for Removing an Employee from Service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio RTC dispatched a Rail Supervisor to relieve the Station Manager from duty for post-incident testing.

The probable cause of the Improper Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) event was a misapplication of established rules and procedures. The Station Manager entered the roadway and retrieved the wet floor sign while it was in close proximity to the energized third rail, without permission which was a violation of established procedures. The possibility of incidental contact existed, and to minimize this risk, the third rail power should have been de-energized or other preventive measures enacted.

Incident Site

Anacostia Station, track 2.

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment through video and document review
- Formal Interviews SAFE interviewed one (1) individual as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the following individual:
 - Station Manager
- Informal Interviews Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Station Manager 30-day work history review

- Rail Supervisor Report
- Rail Operation Control Center (ROCS) SPOTS Report
- Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- Metro Integrated Command and Control (MICC) Incident Report
- Maximo Data
- RTRA Division Management Report
- RTRA Incident Report
- System Data Recording Review A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback [Radio and Landline Communications]
 - Closed-circuit television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Tuesday, May 7, 2024, at 15:34 hours, a Station Manager retrieved a wet floor sign from the roadway at Anacostia Station, track 2.

CCTV revealed that the wet floor sign was tossed into the roadway by a customer on Monday, May 6, 2024, at 00:07 hours.



Image 1 – Image of a customer throwing the wet floor sign onto the roadway at Anacostia Station on track 2 on May 6, 2024, at 00:07:00 hours.

Prior to the event, at 15:24 hours, the Station Manager at Anacostia Station observed the wet floor sign in the roadway and notified a MICC Communications Agent via radio on OPS 5. At 15:27 hours, the Communications Agent notified the Button RTC on OPS 3 by telephone.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that at 15:27 hours, the Radio RTC on OPS 3 notified Train ID 514 which was located at Navy Yard Station on track 2 of the issue. The Radio RTC directed the RVO to perform a track inspection at a restricted speed to Anacostia Station to ensure that the sign would not impede train movement. The RVO acknowledged the instruction. At 15:31 hours, Train ID 514 arrived at Anacostia Station, track 2.

At 15:31 hours, CTV footage shows the Station Manager located at Anacostia Station on track 2 at the 8-car marker having a conversation with the RVO through the train's cab window.

At 15:33 hours, the Station Manager walked past the 8-car marker, continued onto the catwalk, and into the roadway to retrieve the wet floor sign before returning to the platform. Train ID 514 was stopped at the platform and was not keyed down at the time.



Image 2 – Image of the Station Manager on the roadway in front of Train ID 514 removing the wet floor sign.

At 15:33 hours, the Radio RTC inquired of Train ID 514 why they were holding and were advised by the RVO that a supervisor (actually the Station Manager) was in the roadway retrieving a wet floor cone (sign).

The Station Manager cleared the roadway and returned to the platform at 15:35 hours. Train ID 514 departed at 15:36 hours.

At 15:40 hours, the Operations Manager (OM) notified the Safety Information Officer and the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM).

At 15:40 hours, the Station Manager contacted the Communications Agent on the phone and was advised of the Improper RWP issue and instructed to complete an Incident Report. At 16:30 hours, the RTRA Managerial Investigative report identified the Station Manager was removed from service.

Rail Operations Control System (ROCS) Spots Report

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

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<u>514</u>	F06-2	8	43				15:31:55	15:35:45	230	15:31:11	15:36:10	7742-7743.7651-7650.7540-7541.7357-7356	-

Figure 1 - ROCS Spots Report displaying Train ID 514 arrival, dwell and departure from Anacostia Station, track 2.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
15:23:23 hours	The Station Manager walked down the escalator from the Mezzanine to the Anacostia Station platform. [CCTV]
15:24:29 hours	The Station Manager noticed the wet floor sign on the roadway on track 2. [CCTV]
15:24:55 hours	<u>Station Manager</u> : Contacted the Communication Section and reported a wet floor sign on the roadway at Anacostia Station, track 2. <u>Communications Agent</u> : Instructed the Station Manager to stand by. [Radio, Ops 5]
15:25:22 hours	<u>Communications Agent</u> : Asked the Station Manager to repeat. <u>Station Manager</u> : Stated a wet floor sign was located at the 8-car marker on track 2 at Anacostia Station on the Branch Avenue side on the roadway. <u>Communications Section</u> : Acknowledged transmission. [Radio, Ops 5]
15:25:27 hours	Communications Agent: Notified Ops 3, Button RTC. Button RTC: Acknowledged. [Phone, Ops 3]
15:27:00 hours	The Station Manager performed a station inspection. [CCTV]
15:27:41 hours	Radio RTC: Contacted Train ID 514 at Navy Yard Station on track 2 and instructed the RVO to perform a track inspection at restricted speed to Anacostia Station to ensure the wet floor sign was not impeding train movement.
15:31:40 hours	<u>Train ID 514:</u> Acknowledged transmission. [Radio, Ops 3] Train ID 514: Arrived on the platform at Anacostia Station, track 2, and informed the Radio RTC that the wet floor sign was not impeding train movement. [Radio, OPS 3]
15:33:06 hours	Radio RTC: Train 514 why are you holding? RVO of Train ID 514: There is a supervisor (Station Manager) in the roadway retrieving a wet floor sign. [Radio, OPS 3]
15:33:29 hours	The Station Manager entered the roadway at Anacostia Station, track 2 to retrieve the wet floor sign [CCTV]
15:35:34 hours	The Station Manager cleared the roadway. [CCTV]
15:36:10 hours	Train ID 514 departed Anacostia Station, track 2. [SPOTS]
15:37:37 hours	Radio RTC: Dispatched an RTRA Station Supervisor to Anacostia Station. [Radio, Ops 3]
15:41:21 hours	<u>Metro 1</u> : Notified the SIO and AOM. [Phone, Metro 1]
15:40:59 hours	Station Manager: Contacted the Communications Agent: Communications Agent: Inquired if the Station Manager entered the roadway. Station Manager: Replied yes. Communications Agent: Informed the Station Manager they were not granted permission to enter the roadway. Station Manager: No response. Communications Agent: Inquired if the Station Manager was familiar with RWP Procedures. Station Manager: Replied, "kind of sort of." Communications Agent: Informed the Station Manager of the severity of the violation. Reinstructed the Station Manager on RWP Procedures.

Time	Description
15:42:19 hours	<u>Communications Agent:</u> Instructed the Station Manager to complete an incident report. <u>Station Manager:</u> Acknowledged and expressed concern that the item was impeding train movement. Advised the issue would not happen again. [Phone, Comms]
16:47:00 hours	An RTRA Supervisor arrived at Anacostia Station. [RTRA Report]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the Improper RWP at Anacostia Station, SAFE conducted one interview with the Station Manager. The interview was conducted via Microsoft Teams and identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from interviews and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

Station Manager

- The Station Manager stated they observed the wet floor sign in the roadway of Anacostia Station, track 2 and reported it to the Communication Agent via radio on OPS 5. The Communication Agents had acknowledged.
- The Station Manager stated Train ID 514 arrived on track 2 and properly berthed. The Station Manager stated they had a conversation with the RVO of Train ID 514 regarding the wet floor sign in the roadway.
- The Station Manager stated they went into the roadway of track 2 via the catwalk. The Station Manager had no PPE related to 3rd rail power.
- The Station Manager stated they removed the wet floor sign, placed it on the platform and returned to the platform via the catwalk. The Station Manager radioed the Communications Agent the track was now clear.
- The Station Manager stated Train ID 514 departed Anacostia Station.
- The Station Manager stated they called the Communications Agent landline as they requested and was advised of the Improper RWP issue.
- The Station Manager stated they were removed from service and taken for a PIME.

Weather

On May 7, 2024, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 75°F, with clear skies, winds 8 mph, and 71% humidity. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC).

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

We evaluated conditions at the time of the incident to distinguish whether evidence of fatigue was present. The Station Manager reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The Station Manager reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident. The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event. Signs of fatigue were not observed during video review.

Fatigue Risk

We evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Station Manager reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The Station Manager worked one day in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 4.01 hours at the time of the incident. The Station Manager reported 9 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 14.75 hours, providing an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was a comparable amount to the employee's usual workday sleep reported no issues with sleep. The employee worked day shifts in the days leading up to the incident. The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event. No significant risk was identified.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Station Manager was not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/7.

Work History

The Station Manager is a WMATA employee with 20 years of service and less than 1 year of experience as a Station Manager. The Station Manager holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in May of 2025.

Related Rules and Procedures

Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)

17.1.1 - WMATA has a "Zero Tolerance" policy regarding safety infractions. As a condition of employment with WMATA, all Roadway personnel, regardless of rank or title, shall acknowledge, comply with and be knowledgeable of the rules and procedures set forth in this section.

17.1.2 - Failure of Roadway personnel to abide by WMATA rules, procedures, regulations that intentionally compromise safety will result in disciplinary actions that may lead to termination from service.

17.1.3 - All WMATA employees are responsible for understanding and compliance with all Roadway Worker Protection associated rules in the Metrorail Operating Rulebook.

17.11 - Personal Protective Equipment Standard for On-Track Safety 17.11.1 WMATA PPE requirements apply to all personnel entering or traversing WMATA's roadway. All PPE must meet or exceed Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards. OSHA standards are available at OSHA.gov.

17.11.2 - For safety and security reasons, all personnel (employees and contractors) shall wear WMATA approved and required PPE when they enter the roadway.

17.11.3 - All personnel are required to wear, while on the roadway:

- Hard Hat/Helmet (Not applicable to Class 1 Rail Vehicle Operators)
- Safety Glasses METRORAIL OPERATING RULEBOOK Page 129 of 276
- Safety Footwear
- High Visibility Yellow Safety Apparel
- High Visibility Orange Safety Apparel

18.9.11 - When it is necessary for employees to walk beyond the platform end gate where the walkway is not protected by a handrail, or to walk or work on tracks around moving trains or track equipment, they shall:

a. Expect rail vehicle movement at any time, in either direction, on either track.

b. All personnel entering the roadway must be knowledgeable of and follow all RWP Rules and Procedures.

18.9.11.1 - Contact the Rail Traffic Controller, prior to entering the track area, for mainline access and /or the appropriate tower for yard access, indicating the work area to include the beginning and ending station and track number or entry point and track number and the purpose of the work. Permission to enter the roadway is required from the control point.

<u>Findings</u>

- The wet floor sign was thrown by a customer into the roadway in close proximity to the energized third rail.
- The Train ID # 514 remained keyed up while the Station Manager entered the roadway.
- The Station Manager entered the roadway, track 2 at Anacostia Station without authorization from the MICC.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

• The Station Manager was removed from service.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Improper Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) event was a misapplication of established rules and procedures. The Station Manager entered the roadway and retrieved the wet floor sign while it was in close proximity to the energized third rail, without permission which was a violation of established procedures. The possibility of incidental contact existed, and to minimize this risk, the third rail power should have been de-energized or other preventive measures enacted.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
116705_SAF ECAPS_RT RA_001	(RC-1) The Station Manager is to attend re- instruction on entering the roadway without permission and proper methods to retrieve items in close proximity of the third rail and the required PPE.	RTRA SRC	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

The narrative below summarizes the incident and represents the statements made by the individual involved. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

Station Manager

The Station Manager is a WMATA employee with 20 years of service and less than 1 year of experience as a Station Manager. The Station Manager holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in May of 2025.

The Station Manager arrived for work at Anacostia Station and began making rounds of the kiosk, and mezzanine, and then they went to the platform. While on the platform they observed a wet floor sign lying in the roadway of track 2.

The Station Manager radioed the Communications Agent on OPS 5 and notified them of the issue. The Communications Agent acknowledged the report. The Station Manager observed Train ID 514 arrive on track 2 and properly berth several feet before the sign. The Station Manager had a conversation with the RVO regarding the sign being in the roadway and being a potential hazard to train movement.

The Station Manager entered the catwalk via the gate at the 8-car marker to track 2 and walked into the roadway to retrieve the sign. The Station Manager placed the sign on the platform before returning to the platform via the catwalk and gate. Train ID 514 then departed.

The Station Manager heard a radio transmission asking to landline the Communications Agent. The Station Manager called the Communications Agent and was advised of the Improper RWP issue. A Rail Supervisor responded and removed the Station Manager from service and a PIME was performed.

Incident Informatio	n. This page m	ust be c	completed	d for all incidents			
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Document 1 - Station Manager's RTRA Incident Report, Page 1 of 1, redacted.

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Assistance Offered: Acc	epted 🗆 De	eclined 🗆	5	0	-			
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Customer Involved ast Name, First Name	Emp	lloyee involved	Witness	<u>_</u>			Employ	00 ž
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who you notified a								ino provioni unu
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Document

2 – RVO's RTRA Incident Report, Page 1 of 1, redacted.

Appendix C – RTRA Managerial Investigative Report (Redacted) Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority



Incident Status: PRELIMINARY

Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

G

ENERAL IN	CIDENT INFORMATION		
Incident	Employee enter roadway without MICC	Delay	N/A
Type:	permission	(Minutes):	N/A
Incident	Tuesday, May 07, 2024	Vehicles	N/A
Date:	Tuesday, May 07, 2024	Involved:	N/A
Incident	3:31pm	First Reported	Operator
Time:	5.51pm	By:	Operator
Location:	Anacostia Station		
	IDTION.		

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

At approximately 3:31pm, Train Operator notified the MICC that an employee enter the roadway at Anacostia Station track #2. Station Manager went to the roadway, without receiving permission from the MICC, to remove the wet floor sign. No injuries were reported.

Key Employees Involved & Employee Statements:

- 1. Station Manager - Stated "While on a station check, a yellow wet floor sign was observed in the center of roadway track #2 8car marker. I notified Central, remained at endgate until train arrived at station, responded and notified Central again, had a brief conversation with train operator about the sign, situation/clearance, notified central again, object was removed/sign, notified central roadway was cleared."
- "Was instructed by Central Control to do restricted speed in 2. Train Operator approach for an obstruction upon reaching the 8car marker notice a wet floor sign laying on the inner rail. Station Manager walked down to remove the sign."

Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

Page 1 of 3

Document 3 – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigative Report, Page 1 of 3, redacted.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority



Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

Post Incident Testing & Employee History:

Post Incident Medical Examination was conducted. was removed from service.

Station Manager WMATA Employee Hire Date: Station Manager since: RWP Expiration Date: No safety violation related incidents on file to date.

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT TIMELINE:

3:31pm Operator and an otified the MICC unknown employee was on roadway. 3:33pm Station Manager and an otified the MICC he removed the wet floor sign from roadway. 4:27pm Station Supervisor arrived on the scene to conduct the investigation. 4:30pm Employee was removed from service. 4:55pm Employee transported for Post Incident Medical Examination.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS & PENDING ISSUES:

All reports were completed and submitted.

Station Manager will be held off pending Post Incident Results.

No 8-hour violations involved.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Supervisor's Report and Violation was submitted. Disciplinary actions will be administered including Refresher training.

Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

Page 2 of 3


Document 4 – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigative Report, Page 2 of 3, redacted.





Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

INCIDENT PHOTOS: ATTACH ANY SIGNIFICANT PHOTOS BASED ON THE INITIAL INCIDENT INVESTIGATION.




Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report Document 5 – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigative Report, Page 3 of 3, redacted. Page 3 of 3

Appendix D – RTRA – Report of Rule Violation

M	WASHINGTON	REPORT OF		N	AUTHORITY	
DATE	DIVISION		BLOCK N	0.	VEHICLE NO.	DESTINATION
5-7-24	BRANCH	Ave 50		2	NIA	N/A
ANACOSTIA		1		ACTUA	LARRIVAL TIME	OPERATOR REPORTS HIS WATCH READS AT TIME OF CHECK:
9,		EMPLOYEE NO	o.	ROUTE	IA	SUPERVISOR'S WATCH READS: 4:27PM
NATURE OF VIOLATION:	mployee	ENII TE	Le TO	NAV	MITANT	- DED MICSION
Employee el ANO RECEIVIO	itered the vg permise	sion.	way i	VITH	OUT CON	TACTING MICC
			C		· · · · · ·	
					SIGNATURE	FSUPERVISOR
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ACTION TAKEN		ACTI	ON TAKEN	BY SIGN.	ATURE:	DATE
	fy that the above ha					I that my
EMPLOYEE NO.	EMPLOYE	E SIGNATURE:				
EMPLOYEE MAY MAKE REM	ARKS IN THIS SPACE.					

Document 6 – RTRA Report of Rule Violation, Page 1 of 1, Redacted.

Appendix E – Root Cause Analysis



Document 7 – Root Cause Analysis.