

Inspection Form

Form WMSC-IR-1

Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Agency/Department Information

Increation Date	YYYY/MM/DD	Donart Number	20240618-WMSC-DLB-1				
Inspection Date	2024/06/18	Report Number					
Rail Agency Name	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	Rail Agency Department	Name				
Rail Agency Department	Power	Contact Information					
Inspection Location	Forest Glen Station (B09)						

Inspection Summary

Inspection Activity #	1
Activity Code	QAI-CON-PI
Inspection Units	1
Inspection Subunits	0
Defects (Number)	1
Recommended Finding	No
Remedial Action Required ¹	Yes
Recommended Reinspection	Yes

Activity Summaries

Mobile Compute Safety Briefing Employee Safety Briefing Safety Brie	Inspection Activity #	1	Ins	spection Subj	ect	Complian RWP	ce inspe	ction of the	Bravo Line	Activity Code				QAI-CON-PI			
Related Rules, SOPs, Standards, or Other / Title	Employee				Accompanied Inspector?			No		Yes	Time		07:30 AM			I NO	
N/A. N/A. N	Related Reports	N/A.			Related CA	APS / Findin	gs		N/A.				•				
SOPs, Standards, or Other Main Yard Station OCC RTA Facility WMSC Office Track Type At-grade Tune Elevated N/A	Related Rules.	Ref		Rule	or SOP Standard				Гitle			Checklist Reference					
Inspection Location Track Yard Station OCC RTA Facility Office Track Type At-grade Tune Elevated N/A		N/A. N/i			۸.			N/A.		N/A.				N/A.			
Chain Marker and/or Station (809) Chain Marker and/or Station(s) N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. Station(s) N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. SACKGROUND: Two inspection teams comprising of two WMSC inspectors and three Metrorail SAFE personnel received a Roadway Job Safety Briefing (RJSB) at the Silver Spring (B08) Station. Upon completion of the (RJSB), the inspectors were given green sticker bands to affixed to their person and allowed to enter the ACS. The inspection was a part of the Authorized Construction Site (ACS) B Line/Red Line Shutdown 2024 between Glemmont (811) and Takoma (807). The ACS was established by Metrorail via Temporary Order TO-24-04 is issued to establish limits for the Authorized Construction Sites (ACS) within the B Line/Red Line Shutdown. As quoted from Metrorail, "Temporary Order TO-24-04 is issued to establish limits for the Authorized Construction Sites (ACS) within the B Line/Red Line Shutdown between Forest Glen (B09) and Takoma (B07) Stations, starting on June 1st at 7:00am and ending on August 25th at 6:00 am." The ACS is being operated under the authority of Maryland Transit Solutions (MTS). All personnel that would require access to the ACS attended and completed the necessary Safety training class that was provided by MTS. The inspection was a compliance inspection to ensure that Metrorail was implementing and following its procedures within the ACS area. The working limits of the ACS in this report (2) included (B08) Silver Spring Station to the Spring Street Bridge. Additionally, the Silver Spring Station conforms to electrical power outages that includes third rail and DC power since it was part of the ACS. METHOD: The Inspection teams traversed the ACS from chain markers Bravo One and Bravo Two -451+ 00 to 473+ 00. The working limits of the ACS were physically represented by two chained wooden rail tie barriers, shunt straps, four red e-flares and end of work mats. While walking through the ACS observations were made, and photos taken for data gatherin	Inspection Location		Yard	Station	occ	RTA F	acility		Track Type	At-grade Tu		Tunne	nel Elev		ited N/A		
Number Forest Glen Station (B09) Station(s) N/A.				Х								Х					
No.		Forest Glen	Station (B	09)				or		From				То			
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Remedial Action Follow and implement all recommendations mentioned in this report. For example, replace or repair the leaking electrical junction box.																	
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Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Photos:





Forest_Glen_Leaking_Electrical_Junction_Box_Water_from_ceiling_on_floor_061824.jpg






Inspection Form

Form WMSC-IR-1
Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Forest_Glen_RJSB_MCC_Script_061824.jpg



1 The rail transit agency must provide WMSC with the necessary evidence (e.g. maintenance work order system records, photos, documentation, records, data, or other evidence) to close out the Remedial Action. Closeout of Remedial Actions may also be subject to ongoing WMSC verification inspections to ensure corrections are sufficient and effective.

Action. Closeout of Remedial Actions may also be subject to ongoing winsc verification inspections to ensure corrections are sufficient and effective.						
Inspector in Charge's Signature	Date 2024/06/18					
Inspector in Charge's Name	Inspection Team					
Darrell Braxton	Bruce Walker					