



W-0377 – Improper Roadway Worker Protection – Southern Avenue Station – August 25, 2024

Document Purpose:

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigations and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation reports that have undergone WMSC staff review and, if necessary, feedback and revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the safety events, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation reports) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on June 10, 2025.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

Roadway Worker Protection

The [WMSC's audit of Metrorail's Roadway Worker Protection Programs](#), issued on July 31, 2024, demonstrates that although Metrorail has established policies and procedures, rules, training, and oversight of its RWP program, there are still deficiencies that put the safety of workers at risk. During this audit, WMSC personnel observed unsafe practices contrary to Metrorail policies and procedures at every observation activity conducted. As further explained in Finding 1 of the audit report, Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety. This increases the risk that personnel may be injured or killed. Between 2005 and 2010, eight Metrorail employees were struck and killed by rail vehicles. In the years since, there have been several near-miss events with roadway workers, including an October 2016 safety event during which Federal Transit Administration (FTA) track inspectors were forced to jump out of the path of a train to avoid being hit by the train near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. In 2017, Metrorail instituted an additional form of safety protection for Metrorail mobile roadway workers called Advanced Mobile Flagger (AMF). There have been near misses that include workers narrowly escaping a fatal collision, including events that occurred in 2021, 2022, 2023 and as recently as last month.

On May 13, 2025, three trains in Automatic Train Operations (ATO) came across a mobile work crew without warning due to the absence of an Advanced Flagger. The preliminary investigation determined the train operators saw the crews and tried to slow down from high speeds (in an area where they could travel up to 75mph) to safely pass the crews, who were able to move to a place of safety. Multiple roadway workers and train operators did not immediately report



the incident. On Tuesday, May 20, 2025, a roadway worker entered the roadway without protection and was nearly struck by a train traveling at speed.

In response to these two near miss events Metrorail conducted safety standdowns focusing on reinforcing roadway worker protection rules and forms of RWP protection along with emphasizing the need to comply with these safety rules for individual and system safety. The WMSC conducted observations of several of these standdowns to gauge the effectiveness. Details of the WMSC observations are noted in this inspection report which is also found on the [WMSC's website](http://www.wmsc.gov).

Metrorail developed and the WMSC approved corrective action plans created in accordance with the Program Standard to address the 13 findings of the RWP Audit issued in July 2024. These build on immediate mitigations and initial steps to correct outdated materials and communicate the importance of safety rules that Metrorail took based on the WMSC's communication of safety issues as those issues were observed and validated during the audit process. Corrective action plans associated with the RWP audit have scheduled dates of completion between December 2025 and October 2028.

On September 27, 2024, the WMSC issued an order requiring that Metrorail maintain its RWP program as it was written and implemented as of October 1, 2024. Thereafter, Metrorail may propose an annual schedule by which it intends to revise the RWP program and provide the WMSC with the package of revisions and accompanying training materials for WMSC approval. The intended goal here is to create an annual predictable revision cycle, with exceptions to address safety risks meeting certain conditions, and for any changes resulting from WMSC-required CAPs. Complying with the Order will allow Metrorail to focus on ensuring that employees are properly trained on rules that remain stable and for Metrorail to assess compliance for a reasonable duration of time before additional changes take effect.

In October 2024, the Federal Transit Administration issued 49 CFR Part 671 – Rail Transit Roadway Worker Protection regulation - establishing minimum safety standards for rail transit Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) to ensure the safe operation of rail transit systems and to prevent safety events, fatalities, and injuries to transit workers who may access the roadway in the performance of work. This regulation allows either rail transit agencies, such as Metrorail or state safety oversight agencies such as WMSC to prescribe additional or more stringent operating rules, safety rules, and other special instructions that are consistent based on risk profile of the rail operations. This regulation requires Metrorail to coordinate with the WMSC to establish a WMSC-approved RWP program that meets the requirements of the FTA regulation, by December 2025.

Safety event summary:

On Sunday, August 25, 2024, at approximately 2:03 a.m., an Office of Track and Structures Supervisor acting as the Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC), entered the roadway and placed shunts at the incorrect location, resulting in the RWIC having no protection against possible train collision.

At 11:53 p.m. on August 24, 2024, the RWIC contacted the Radio Rail Traffic Controller and incorrectly informed the Controller that they were located at "F06", which is the alphanumeric code for Anacostia Station. However, the RWIC and their crew were actually located at F08, Southern Avenue Station. The RWIC requested a supervisory power outage from F1 177+34 to F1 253+84 and F2 177+34 to F2 253+84. The RWIC was instructed to standby until 2:03



a.m. on August 24, 2025, when the Rail Traffic Controller granted the RWIC permission to enter the roadway to place shunts under Exclusive Track Occupancy. Exclusive Track Occupancy is a form of protection that prohibits any vehicle from entering a defined location. The RWIC confirmed with the Rail Traffic Controller that they had been granted Exclusive Track Occupancy on tracks 1 and 2, and then stated they were confused, informing the Rail Traffic Controller that a train had just traveled through the station while the crew were still on the platform. The Controller asked the RWIC for their location and again the RWIC incorrectly stated "F06." At no time during this exchange or previous communication was an actual station name identified by the Rail Traffic Controller or the Roadway Worker in Charge.

At 2:13 a.m., the Radio Rail Traffic Controller identified on their Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) screen display that shunts had been placed at Southern Avenue Station on tracks 1 and 2, not at Anacostia Station, where permission had been granted and protection had been established. The Rail Traffic Controller instructed the RWIC to contact them via telephone and deenergized third rail power at Southern Avenue Station. At 2:16 a.m., when the RWIC contacted the Rail Traffic Controller, they were informed that "F06" was Anacostia Station, not Southern Avenue Station, and advised that they were not under any form of protection. The Rail Traffic Controller provided Foul time protection for the crew to immediately clear the work location. At 2:20 a.m., the Roadway Worker in Charge requested and was granted Foul Time protection to retrieve the shunts they previously placed at Southern Avenue Station, mistaking the location for Anacostia Station. The RWIC collected the shunts and relinquished Foul Time. The Roadway Worker in Charge was removed from service for post-event toxicology testing.

The causes and contributing factors include:

- Ineffective communication due to failure to use plain language
- Lack of rail system physical characteristic familiarization
- Lack of situational awareness, resulting in incorrect location identification
- Non-compliance with written operational rules and procedures, regarding verification of chain markers prior to entering the roadway

As a result of this investigation, the Roadway Worker in Charge was required to attend Roadway Worker Protection Level 4 Refresher Training.

Related corrective action:

- CAP C-0280 addresses the 2024 RWP audit finding that Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety (Scheduled completion date October 2026).
- CAP C-0183 addressed the 2022 Rail Operations audit finding that Metrorail created safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard (Scheduled completion date December 2026). Metrorail has indicated that following successful implementation to operations personnel that it envisions expanding this training to other categories of Metrorail personnel.

WMSC staff observations



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Metrorail does not require and conduct territory familiarization and physical characteristics training and does not assess knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning roadway workers in charge (RWIC) work. The FTA regulation of Rail Transit Roadway Worker Protection requires that individuals such as RWICs, watchpersons, flaggers and other requiring specialized roadway worker training to be provided with training to cover the content and application of the additional RWP program requirements carried out by these positions and requires Metrorail to address the relevant physical characteristics of the rail system where on-track safety may be established.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E24676

Date of Event:	August 25, 2024
Type of Event:	O-23: Improper Roadway Worker Protection (RWP)
Incident Time:	02:03 hours
Location:	Southern Avenue Station (F08)
Time and How received by SAFE:	03:01 hours / MICC Notification
WMSC Notification Time:	03:38 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	None
Rail Vehicle:	N/A
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	None
SUDS I/A Incident Number:	20240827#119384

Southern Avenue Station – Improper Roadway Worker Protection

August 25, 2024

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
ETO	Exclusive Track Occupancy
GOTRS	General Orders and Track Rights System
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
RJSB	Roadway Job Safety Briefing
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RWIC	Roadway Worker In Charge
RWP	Roadway Worker Protection
SAFE	Department of Safety
SUDS	Safety Universal Data System
SPOTS	System Performance On-Time Summary
TRST	The Office of Track and Structures
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Sunday, August 25, 2024, at 02:03 hours, the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) OPS 3 Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) granted an Office of Track and Structures (TRST) Supervisor serving as the Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) permission to enter the roadway to place shunts¹ at “Foxtrot² 06” (F06); which is the alpha-numerical station name for the Anacostia Station. The RWIC was provided with Exclusive Track Occupancy³ (ETO) as their form of Roadway Worker Protection (RWP).

At 02:13 hours, the Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) identified Track Circuit F08-F1-312, on Track 1 at the Southern Avenue Station (F08) was down. At 02:14 hours, AIMS identified Track Circuits F08-F2-312 and F2-306, on Track 2 at the Southern Avenue Station (F08) were also down, indicating shunts had been placed at these locations. The Radio RTC instructed the RWIC to contact the OPS 3 Button RTC via a landline telephone. The RWIC contacted the Button RTC and was asked for their precise location, and they stated they were at “F06, Southern Avenue Station.” The Button RTC informed the RWIC that F06 was Anacostia Station, and they had no permission to enter the roadway at that location. The Button RTC instructed the RWIC to request foul time⁴ to remove their shunts. After foul time was granted and the shunts were removed, the RWIC was instructed to clear the roadway and wait for supervision.

This incident did not result in any injuries or damage to infrastructure. TRST removed the RWIC from service per Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 102-01, *Removing an Employee from Service*.

The probable cause of the Improper RWP event on August 25, 2024, at Southern Avenue Station, was the RWIC’s oversight in identifying the station’s location by the alphanumeric code and failing to verify their physical location.

¹ **Shunts** are a Safety-approved wire with clamping devices on both ends that when properly installed is designed to show a track occupancy light on the Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) display and to result in a zero-speed command for Class 1 rail vehicles.

² **Foxtrot** is the alpha phonetic name for the letter “F” used at WMATA

³ **Exclusive Track Occupancy** is a method of establishing working limits on controlled track in which the movement authority of trains and other equipment is withheld by the train dispatcher or control operator or restricted by flagmen. The authority for the movement of rail vehicles within the working limits rests solely with the Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) of said limits.

⁴ **Foul Time** is a method of establishing working limits on controlled track when that work will not disturb the track or third rail structure in a manner that would prevent movements at normal speeds, in which a qualified roadway worker is notified by the rail traffic controller that no trains will operate within a specific segment of controlled track until the roadway worker reports clear of a hot spot or the track.

Incident Site

Southern Avenue Station, Tracks 1 and 2

Field Sketch/Schematics




Figure 1 - depicts the locations where shunts were placed at Southern Avenue Station (F08). The above depiction is not to scale.




Figure 2 - depicts the work zone location under ETO protection. The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

Incident Date: 08/25/2024 Time: 02:03 hours
Final Report – Improper Roadway Worker Protection Rev.1
E24676

Drafted By: SAFE 708 – 9/20/2024
Reviewed By: SAFE 707 – 10/23/2024
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 10/24/2024

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through video and document review.
- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed two (2) individuals as part of this investigation. The interviews included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the following individuals:
 - RWIC
 - Radio RTC
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Structures Supervisor's 30-Day work history
 - General Orders Track Rights System (GOTRS) Request
 - Roadway Job Safety Briefing (RJSB)
 - Maximo
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

Investigation

On Saturday, August 24, 2024, at 23:53 hours, a TRST Supervisor serving as the RWIC, contacted the MICC OPS 3 RTC to establish their General Orders Track Rights System (GOTRS) work zone. The RWIC stated they were at "F06" (Anacostia Station) and were requesting a Supervisory Power Outage under ETO protection, on Tracks 1 and 2, between Chain Markers (CM) F1/F2 177+34 to F1/F2 253+84. The Radio RTC acknowledged the request with 100% repeat back and instructed the RWIC to stand by, stand clear, and contact the Power Desk. It was later revealed that the RWIC was at Southern Avenue Station and provided the incorrect alpha numeric Station ID.



Figure 3 - depicts the Structures Supervisor at Southern Avenue Station.

On Sunday, August 25, 2024, at 02:03 hours, the Radio RTC granted the RWIC permission to enter the roadway at Anacostia Station (F06) to place their shunts under ETO protection. The RTC would verify the shunts were in place and inform the RWIC. The RWIC asked the RTC if they had ETO for both tracks because a train had just passed through the station. When the Radio RTC asked the RWIC for their location they replied that they were "on the platform at F06".




Figure 4 - depicts Train ID 711 passing F08 - Southern Avenue Station at 02:03 hours with TRST crew standing by on the platform. The TRST crew was granted ETO protection for F06 – Anacostia Station.

At 02:13 hours, AIMS identified Track Circuit F08-F1-312, on Track 1 at the Southern Avenue Station (F08) was down. At 02:14 hours, AIMS identified Track Circuits F08-F2-312 and F2-306, on Track 2 at the Southern Avenue Station (F08) were also down, indicating shunts had been placed at these locations.



Figure 5 - depicts the RWIC placing a shunt on Track 1 at Southern Avenue Station at 02:12 hours.



Figure 6 - depicts the RWIC placing a shunt on Track 2 at Southern Avenue Station at 02:13 hours.

The Radio RTC instructed the RWIC to contact the OPS 3 Button RTC via a landline telephone. The RWIC contacted the Button RTC and was asked for their precise location and they stated they were at "F06, Southern Avenue Station." The Button RTC informed the RWIC that F06 was Anacostia Station, not Southern Avenue Station, and they had no permission to enter the roadway at that location. The Button RTC instructed the RWIC to contact the OPS 3 Radio RTC and request foul time to remove their shunts. At 02:20 hours the RWIC contacted the OPS 3 Radio RTC to request foul time. At 02:24 hours the RWIC informed the Radio RTC that all personnel and equipment was clear of the roadway. The work crew made their way to Anacostia Station and the RWIC was notified to contact their office. At 03:17 hours, the RWIC was removed from service and sent for post-incident testing.




Figure 7 - depicts all personnel and equipment cleared from the Southern Avenue Station roadway at 02:24 hours.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
Saturday, August 24, 2025	
23:53:00 hours	<p><u>RWIC</u>: Informed the Radio RTC that they were at F06, requesting a supervisory power outage from chain markers F1 177+34 to F1 253+84 and F2 177+34 to F2 253+84. No unit (rail vehicle) was being used.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Asked the RWIC what was their form of protection?</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Responded ETO (protection)</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged the request for a supervisory power outage on tracks 1 and 2 from CM 177+34 to 252+84. The request time was 23:54 (hours). The RWIC was instructed to stand by, stand clear and to contact the Power Desk.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Acknowledged the request time as 23:54 (hours), they would stand by, stand clear, and contact the Power Desk. [OPS 3 Radio]</p>
Sunday, August 25, 2024	
02:03:05 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Asked the RWIC to respond to the radio.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Acknowledged the message.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Informed the RWIC that they were now under ETO protection from F1 and F2 CM 177+34 to F1 and F2 CM 253+84. The Radio RTC granted the RWIC permission to enter the roadway to place their shunts according to SOP and Central will verify. The RWIC was reminded that third rail power was still hot and energized.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Radioed for the RWIC</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Stated they had to wait until the train went by. The acknowledged that they were granted ETO protection. The RWIC asked if they had tracks 1 and 2?</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Replied Affirmative. They had tracks 1 and 2 under ETO protection. CM 177+34 to F1 and F2 CM 253+84. They had permission to place their shunts according to SOP and Central will verify. The RWIC was reminded that third rail power was still hot and energized.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Acknowledged and stated that they were a little confused because a train just went through the station. They replied that they were granted ETO protection on tracks 1 and 2 from CM F1 and F2 177+34 to 252+84. Permission to install shunts and verify. Third rail power was still hot and energized.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Replied Affirmative and asked the RWIC for their current location.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Stated that they were at the platform at F06. [OPS 3 Radio]</p>
02:13:06 hours	AIMS display showed a track circuit down at Southern Avenue Station on track 1. [AIMS]
02:14:18 hours	AIMS display showed a track circuit down at Southern Avenue Station on track 2. [AIMS]
02:14:52 hours	Radio RTC: Radioed for the RWIC to answer their radio. [OPS 3 Radio]
02:15:28 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed the RWIC to contact them by landline telephone. [OPS 3 Radio]
02:15:48 hours	Third Rail Power was de-energized on Tracks 1 and 2 from Anacostia Station to Congress Heights Station [AIMS]
02:16:46 hours	<p><u>Button RTC</u>: Said, "Hello"</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Stated their call number.</p> <p><u>Button RTC</u>: Asked the RWIC for their location.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Stated they were at F06 Southern Avenue.</p>

Time	Description
	<p><u>Button RTC</u>: Instructed the RWIC to clear the work location and informed them that F06 was the alphanumeric station code for Anacostia Station, not Southern Avenue Station.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Stated F06 is Anacostia Station?</p> <p><u>Button RTC</u>: Replied, "Yes." The RTC informed the RWIC when they stated a train was passing, the reason the RTC asked was because there were no trains located at the work location (requested).</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Replied, "I got you."</p> <p><u>Button RTC</u>: Asked the RWIC if they realized that a serious incident almost occurred.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Stated that they weren't on the track yet.</p> <p><u>Button RTC</u>: Instructed the RWIC to clear the work location immediately.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Stated that they looked right at the thing on the wall and...</p> <p><u>Button RTC</u>: Instructed the RWIC to stand by and stand clear. The Radio RTC would give them foul time to clear the track and report to the correct work location. The Button RTC informed them that they were under no roadway worker protection.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Replied, "Okay, I'll clear right now." [OPS 3 Phone]</p>
02:18:30 hours	Blue Block and Human Form placed on Tracks 1 and 2 at Southern Avenue Station AIMS display. [AIMS]
02:20:39 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Instructed the RWIC to proceed with their message.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Stated that they were requesting foul time for tracks 1 and 2 at Southern Avenue to retrieve their shunts located on one end of the platform.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Granted foul time for track 1 and 2 at Southern Avenue and informed the RWIC that the third rail power was still hot and energized. Let us know once you clear.</p> <p><u>RWIC</u>: Acknowledged that they were granted foul time for tracks 1 and 2 at Southern Avenue Station. Third rail was still hot and energized and that they were sorry for the mix up. [OPS 3 Radio]</p>
02:21:30 hours	AIMS display showed a track circuit restored at Southern Avenue Station on track 2. [AIMS]
02:22:06 hours	AIMS display showed a track circuit restored at Southern Avenue Station on track 1. [AIMS]
02:23:54 hours	<p><u>RWIC</u>: Contacted the Radio RTC to relinquish their foul time and inform them that they were enroute to Anacostia Station.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged that all personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway at 02:24 hours and informed the RWIC to stand by/ stand clear once they arrived at Anacostia Station. [OPS 3 Radio]</p>
02:25:00 hours	Blue Block and Human Form removed from Tracks 1 and 2 at Southern Avenue Station AIMS display. [AIMS]
03:01:09 hours	The Safety Information Officer (SIO) was contacted by Rail 1 and informed of the RWP infraction conducted by the RWIC at Southern Avenue Station [Rail 1 Phone]
03:17:00 hours	RWIC removed from service [Rail 1 Phone]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

Time	Location	Alarm	Geographical partition	Functional partition	Priority level
Sun Aug 25 02:25:07 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUITS F08-F1-316 THROUGH F08-F1-310 UNBLOCKED BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:24:58 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUITS F08-F2-316 THROUGH F08-F2-305 UNBLOCKED BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:18:19 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUITS F08-F2-316 THROUGH F08-F2-305 BLOCKED BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:18:13 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUITS F08-F1-316 THROUGH F08-F1-310 BLOCKED BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:15:47 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUIT F08-F2-312 FAILED OCCUPIED ALARM FINAL ACK. BY [REDACTED] SYSTEM AT vasc-hostapva	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:15:47 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUIT F08-F2-306 FAILED OCCUPIED ALARM FINAL ACK. BY [REDACTED] SYSTEM AT vasc-hostapva	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:15:16 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave Signal F08-6 COMMANDED Prohibit Exit BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:15:05 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-8 Signal State COMMANDED CHANGE = Stop	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:15:03 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-8 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Cancel Route BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:14:59 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave Signal F08-2 COMMANDED Prohibit Exit BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:14:47 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUIT F08-F2-306 FAILED OCCUPIED	G	MR	4-MINOR
Sun Aug 25 02:14:47 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUIT F08-F2-312 FAILED OCCUPIED	G	MR	4-MINOR
Sun Aug 25 02:14:30 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUIT F08-F1-312 FAILED OCCUPIED ALARM FINAL ACK. BY [REDACTED] SYSTEM AT vasc-hostapva	G	MR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:13:30 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave TRACK CIRCUIT F08-F1-312 FAILED OCCUPIED	G	MR	4-MINOR
Sun Aug 25 02:08:23 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-2-4 IS ESTABLISHED WHILE EXIT F08-4 IS PROHIBITED ACKNOWLEDGED BY [REDACTED] AT vawksmetrolpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:04:50 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-2-4 IS ESTABLISHED WHILE EXIT F08-4 IS PROHIBITED ACKNOWLEDGED BY [REDACTED] AT vawksmetrolpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:03:22 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-2-4 IS ESTABLISHED WHILE EXIT F08-4 IS PROHIBITED ACKNOWLEDGED BY [REDACTED] AT vawksmetrolpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:03:20 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-2-4 IS ESTABLISHED WHILE EXIT F08-4 IS PROHIBITED ACKNOWLEDGED BY [REDACTED] AT vawksmetrolpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:00:52 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-2-4 IS ESTABLISHED WHILE EXIT F08-4 IS PROHIBITED ACKNOWLEDGED BY [REDACTED] AT vawksmetrolpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:00:40 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-2 Signal State COMMANDED CHANGE = Stop	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:00:38 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-2 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Cancel Route BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:00:29 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave Signal F08-8 COMMANDED Prohibit Exit BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN
Sun Aug 25 02:00:29 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave F08-2-4 IS ESTABLISHED WHILE EXIT F08-4 IS PROHIBITED	G	LAMR	3-MAJOR
Sun Aug 25 02:00:29 EDT 2024	Southern	Ave Signal F08-4 COMMANDED Prohibit Exit BY [REDACTED] AT vawksyg-commpp	G	LAMR	GREEN

Shunt Indications on Track 1 and 2 at Southern Avenue Station

System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Thu Sep 5 16:33:24 2024

Select Platform: and/or Select ID: 711 leave blank to remove criteria
and/or Select 4-digit car number: leave blank to remove criteria
Select Date: Aug 25 2024 Select Times (0-24HR): From 01:00 To 03:00

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwll	Left door open	Left door close	dwll	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Travel Time door open to door open
711	C15-1	6	99	01:25:39	01:25:59	20				01:25:04	01:30:27	7676-7677.7666-7667.7583-7582	-
711	E10-2	6	96	01:27:38	01:28:02	24				01:27:03	01:32:47	6117-6116.6100-6101.6135-6134	1:59
711	E09-2	6	96							01:35:50	01:36:18	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	E08-2	6	96							01:38:40	01:39:11	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	E07-2	6	96							01:40:51	01:41:27	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	E06-2	6	96							01:43:50	01:44:22	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	E05-2	6	96							01:46:30	01:47:00	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	E04-2	6	96							01:48:10	01:48:43	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	E03-2	6	96							01:49:55	01:50:25	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	E02-2	6	96							01:50:53	01:51:29	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	E01-2	6	96							01:52:02	01:52:35	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F01-2	6	96							01:53:19	01:53:51	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F02-2	6	96							01:54:07	01:54:40	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F03-2	6	96							01:55:18	01:55:52	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F04-2	6	96							01:56:49	01:57:16	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F05-2	6	96							01:57:55	01:58:28	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F06-2	6	96							01:59:50	02:00:17	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F07-2	6	96							02:01:43	02:02:13	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F08-2	6	96							02:03:34	02:03:59	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F09-2	6	96							02:05:37	02:06:07	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-
711	F10-2	6	96							02:08:40	02:09:08	6134-6135.6101-6100.6116-6117	-

Figure 8 - the Orange box denotes Train ID 711 passed Anacostia Station (F06) at 02:00 hours. The Red box denotes Train ID 711 passed Southern Avenue Station (F08) at 02:03 hours.

Interview Findings and Written Statements

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE interviewed two (2) people. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

RWIC's Written Statement

States that they were given their work location as alphanumeric station name F06. They looked at their Metro System Map and mistook F06 (Anacostia Station) as F08 (Southern Avenue Station). They went to Southern Avenue Station, instead of Anacostia Station and was granted ETO protection as a train was traveling through the station on track 2. The RWIC asked if they had ETO protection for both tracks. The RTC replied yes and asked the RWIC for their location. The RWIC replied "F06 Southern Avenue" Station. The RWIC stated that they were not corrected on their location by the RTC and began setting up their shunts at one (1) end of the work zone. The RWIC states that the RTC then called them on the telephone and asked once more for their location. The RWIC responded "F06 Southern Avenue" Station. The RTC then instructed the RWIC to clear the roadway immediately because they were in the wrong location.

RWIC Interview Findings

- Stated they use glasses for reading purposes only.
- They were wearing them when they looked at the Metro System Map and incorrectly identified F06 as Southern Avenue Station.
- There was no Rail Maintenance Machine (RMM) utilized by the RWIC for their work zone.
- The RWIC's work crew consisted of four employees including themselves.
- Stated after reporting the train passing their location the RWIC informed the Radio RTC that they were at "F06 Southern Avenue" Station.
- Stated that they were not informed by the RTC that they were in the incorrect location. They then began to place their shunts at one end of the work zone.

Radio RTC Interview Findings

- Stated during the incident they were working with a partner performing the Button RTC duties.
- Stated the RWIC called to establish their GOTRS track rights for Tracks 1 and 2 from F1/F2 177+34 to F1/F2 253+84. The RWIC stated they were at "F06."
- Stated they asked the RWIC for their location once they reported a train passing their location. The RWIC replied "F06."
- Granted the RWIC permission to enter the roadway under ETO protection to place their shunts. They stated they would verify that the shunts were visible.
- Stated they observed track circuits down on tracks 1 and 2 at Southern Avenue Station and believed the RWIC was at the incorrect location.
- They instructed the RWIC to contact them by telephone.
- The Radio RTC asked the RWIC for their location and they informed them that they were at "F06 Southern Avenue" Station.
- Once the RWIC was informed that they were at the incorrect station, they verified the information by looking at their RWP Quick Access Guide.
- The RWIC was instructed to clear the roadway immediately.
- After clearing the roadway, the RWIC requested and was granted Foul Time to remove their shunts from the roadway.

Weather

On August 25, 2024, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 69.8°F, with clear skies, winds seven (7) mph, and 64.32% humidity. The weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: [Washington, DC].

Related Rules and Procedures

Metro Rail Operating Rulebook, effective September 1, 2023

17.2 Roadway Worker Protection Cardinal Rules

5. There shall be no fouling of the WMATA's roadway unless it is necessary to perform your job.

Human Factors

Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. Video of the incident was reviewed for signs of the Structures Supervisor's fatigue. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were present. The incident occurred at a time of low circadian alertness. The employee reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked the overnight shift in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 8.05 hours at the time of the incident. The employee reported 10 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 15 hours which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the employee's usual workday sleep durations. The employee reported no issues with sleep. The employee worked the overnight shift in the days leading up to the incident.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Structures Supervisor complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Findings

- The RWIC called the OPS 3 RTC to request their GOTRS track rights on August 24, 2024, at 23:53 hours, for chain markers where they were not located.
- The RWIC was granted permission to enter the roadway at F06 under ETO protection on August 25, 2024, at 02:03 hours.
- The RWIC was physically located at F08 Southern Avenue Station, not F06 Anacostia Station.
- The RWIC stated that after reporting the train passing their location, the RWIC informed the Radio RTC that they were at “F06 Southern Avenue” Station. Upon listening to the ARS playback of this communication, the RWIC replied that they were at “F06” only.
- The RWIC failed to verify their work zone chain markers before entering the roadway to place their shunts.
- The OPS 3 RTCs observed downed track circuits at Southern Avenue Station, indicating shunts had been placed at that location.
- The RWIC had an RWP Quick Access Guide during the incident.
- As Train ID 711 traversed Southern Avenue Station on Track 2, all TRST personnel were on the platform at that time.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- The RWIC was removed from service and sent for post-incident testing.
- The track work was canceled.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Improper RWP event on August 25, 2024, at Southern Avenue Station, was the RWIC’s oversight in identifying the station’s location by the alphanumeric code and failing to verify their physical location.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
119384_SAFE CAPS_TRST_ 001	The RWIC to attend Roadway Worker Protection, level 4 Refresher Training (RC-1)	TRST SRC	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

RWIC

The RWIC is a WMATA employee with nine (9) years of service and three (3) total years of experience as a Structures Supervisor. The RWIC holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in May 2027.

During the formal interview, the RWIC provided some background regarding their duties as a Structures Supervisor and answered questions regarding their alertness during the incident. On the date of the incident, the RWIC stated they were scheduled to perform drain cleaning at F06 on track 1 near the interlocking. The RWIC looked at a Metro System Map and misidentified F06 (Anacostia Station) and F08 (Southern Avenue Station). The RWIC stated that they wore glasses to read and had them on at the time they were looking at the map. They then went to Southern Avenue Station with their work crew and waited until the station closed. Once the Station closed, they went down to the platform and performed their RJSB.

The RWIC stated that as Central⁵ granted them ETO protection a train began passing through the station on track 2. After the train passed the RWIC asked Central to verify that they were granted ETO protection for Tracks 1 and 2 and it was confirmed. The RWIC informed Central that a train had just passed their location. When asked for their location by Central, the RWIC replied F06 Southern Avenue Station. The RWIC stated that they were not informed that they were at the incorrect station and entered the roadway to begin setting up their work zone. Once they completed setting up one side of their work zone, they received a call from Central asking once more for their location. They replied that they were at F06 Southern Avenue Station and were instructed to clear the roadway immediately. Once the RWIC was informed that they were at the incorrect station, they verified the information by looking at their RWP Quick Access Guide. The RWIC then requested Foul Time to remove their shunts from the roadway. The TRST crew then went to Anacostia Station. Once at the station they contacted Central and were instructed to stand by and stand clear. The RWIC was then informed that they would be removed from service.

When asked the RWIC stated there were no issues with radio communication during this incident. When asked if the Chain Markers (CM) were identified during their RJSB the RWIC stated that they were not. They had the CMs written down from their GOTRS track rights request. They normally check the CMs once they enter the roadway to verify their work zone.

Radio RTC

The Radio RTC is a WMATA employee with two (2) years of service and 0.5 total years of experience as a Rail Traffic Controller. The Radio RTC holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in July 2025.

⁵ Central is a term used to describe the Rail Traffic Controllers or Metro Integrated Command and Communications personnel.

During the formal interview, the Radio RTC provided some background regarding their duties as an RTC and answered questions regarding their alertness during the incident. The Radio RTC stated during the incident they were working with a partner performing duties as the Buttons RTC. They stated that at the close of normal rail service, the Radio RTC communicates with Train Operators returning to rail yards, RWICs, and work crews. The Buttons RTC sets up work locations and provides RWP. The Radio RTC observed a work area set up between Anacostia Station and Southern Avenue Station with Blue Block areas, protected red aspects, and prohibited exits. The Radio RTC stated there was a train, enroute to Branch Avenue Yard that passed Anacostia Station. Once the train passed, a Human Form was placed on the AIMS screen at Anacostia Station allowing personnel to enter the protected area. The Radio RTC granted the RWIC permission to enter the roadway to place their shunts. Third rail power had remained energized.

The RWIC informed the Radio RTC that a Train had just passed their location and the Radio RTC was confused because there was no train showing at their location on the AIMS screen. They asked the RWIC for their location and the replied that they were at "F06" which was Anacostia Station. The Radio RTC verified via AIMS that the work zone was protected, and no trains were at the location. They then repeated the permission for the RWIC to enter the roadway at the prescribed CMs for the work zone (Tracks 1 and 2 from CM F1/F2 177+34 to CM F1/F2 253+84), and then moved on to the next work crew. Shortly thereafter the Radio RTC noticed downed track circuits at Southern Avenue Station. They verified that Automatic Train Control Maintenance (ATCM) personnel were not performing work at that location.

The Radio RTC then believed that the RWIC was placing shunts at the incorrect location and asked for them to call by telephone. The RWIC confirmed that they were at the incorrect location and were instructed to clear the roadway. Once clear of the roadway the RWIC was granted Foul Time to retrieve their shunts from the roadway. The Operations Manager (OM) informed the Radio RTC that the RWIC would be removed from service.

When asked do RWICs normally provide the station names or alphanumeric station code when requesting GOTRS track rights the Radio RTC stated that it varies. They stated normally RWICs would only provide the CMs that they have track rights for without providing the station name or alphanumeric station code. This occurs frequently when the requested track rights are outside of the station platform limits.

When asked how do RTCs verify shunts have been placed the Radio RTC stated that it appears as downed track circuits on their AIMS screen. If the shunts have been placed correctly on both tracks it would appear as if four (4) track circuits were down. Two on the high end and two on the low end. If it was for one (1) track only then there should be two (2) track circuits down.

Appendix B – GOTRS Track Rights Request

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM Track Rights Request

Request Summary			
Request Number:	202423501000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/25/2024 01:00 to: 08/25/2024 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	1
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	TRST/STRUC	In Piggyback:	No
Tag #:	Closed (2024238712-S)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	STMN (South) Leak repair F06 Platform, / Drain maintenance.		

Location, Work Type and Description			
Location:	Mainline		
Non-Wayside Location Type:			
Request Type:	Expedited		
Charge Job Number:			
Contract Number:			
Maximo Work Order:			
Request Group:	N/A		
Location Description:			
Request Description:	Leak Repair (platform)		
Work Type:	Leak Repair		
Meeting Location:			
PB Meeting Location:			
Tools and Equipment:	hand tools PPE and all safety equipment		
Equipment on Tracks:	RMN 7 JR unit		
Track 1		Track 2	
Actual Work Area:	F182+34 F248+84	Actual Work Area:	F182+34 F248+84
Protected Work Area:	F177+34 F253+84	Protected Work Area:	F177+34 F253+84
Hot Stick Info. Third Rail Gaps:			
From	To	Track ID	
F145+49	F191+57	1	
F192+23	F248+84	1	
F144+83	F189+30	2	
F189+32	F191+91	2	
F192+23	F248+84	2	
Date & Time			

As of 09/03/2024 18:48
1 of 5

Figure 9 - GOTRS Track Rights Request, page 1 of 5.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM
Track Rights Request

Request Summary			
Request Number:	202423501000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/25/2024 01:00 to: 08/25/2024 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	1
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	TRST/STRUC	In Piggyback:	No
Tag #:	Closed (2024238712-S)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	STMN (South) Leak repair F06 Platform. / Drain maintenance.		
Start: 08/25/2024 01:00		End: 08/25/2024 04:30	
Contacts			
Entered by		Requestor	
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]@wmata.com		[REDACTED] [REDACTED]@wmata.com	
Work:	[REDACTED]	Work:	[REDACTED]
Cell:	[REDACTED] Home:	Cell:	[REDACTED] Home:
WMATA Manager		Emergency Contact	
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]@wmata.com		[REDACTED] [REDACTED]@wmata.com	
Work:	[REDACTED]	Work:	[REDACTED]
Cell:	[REDACTED] Home:	Cell:	[REDACTED] Home:
Support			
SUPPORT GROUP	Crew Size		
TRST/STRUC	4		
ESCORT GROUP	Crew Size		
POWER/LV	2		
Request Change History			
Date	Event		
08/22/2024 12:00	Request was cloned from Request 202423500900.		
08/22/2024 17:07	Request was edited. Field(s) changed: Request Title, Equipment on Track.		
08/22/2024 17:38	Request status was changed to Approved		
08/23/2024 16:37	Request was edited. Field(s) changed: Maximo Work Order.		
08/25/2024 02:33	Work Prep was completed.		
08/25/2024 03:54	Request status was changed to Opened		

As of 08/03/2024 10:48
2 of 5

Figure 10 - GOTRS Track Rights Request, page 2 of 5.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM
Track Rights Request

Request Summary			
Request Number:	202423501000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/25/2024 01:00 to: 08/25/2024 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	1
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	TRST/STRUC	In Piggyback:	No
Tag #:	Closed (2024238712-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	STMN (South) Leak repair F06 Platform. / Drain maintenance.		

Request Change History	
Date	Event
08/25/2024 07:04	Assistant Operations Manager Comment was updated.
08/25/2024 08:24	Request status was changed to Closed

Request Group	
Request Number	Description

Piggyback	
No active piggybacks found	

Close-Out Summary	
Final Status:	Closed
RWIC has contacted RTC to establish working limits:	08/24/2024 23:54
Authorize Power Outage Order:	08/25/2024 02:12
De-Energization Completed/RWIC notified:	08/25/2024 02:16
Hot Sticking:	step not done
Permission is given to setup worksite:	step not done
RTC authorization to start work is given to RWIC:	step not done
PDC confirmed working limits are clear:	08/25/2024 03:44
RTC confirmed working limits are clear:	08/25/2024 04:24
Energization by PDC completed:	08/25/2024 04:28
Work Stopped by Requestor:	08/25/2024 04:24
Reasons:	Not enough manpower
Rail Traffic Controller Comment:	
Assistant Operations Manager Comment:	RWIC placed shunts at Southern Ave. The correct work location was between Anacostia and Congress Heights.
RWIC Comment:	

As of 09/03/2024 10:49
3 of 5

Figure 11 - GOTRS Track Rights Request, page 3 of 5.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM
Track Rights Request

Request Summary			
Request Number:	202423501000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/25/2024 01:03 to: 08/25/2024 04:30	Clear In Tens:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	1
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	TRST/STRUC	In Piggyback:	No
Tag #:	Closed (2024238712-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	STMN (South) Leak repair F06 Platform. / Drain maintenance.		

As of 09/03/2024 10:49
4 of 5

Figure 12 - GOTRS Track Rights Request, page 4 of 5.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM
Track Rights Request

Request Summary			
Request Number:	202423501000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/25/2024 01:00 to: 08/25/2024 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	1
Requestor:		Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	TRST/STRUC	In Piggyback:	No
Tag #:	Closed (2024238712-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	STMN (South) Leak repair F06 Platform, / Drain maintenance.		

Close-Out Summary

Requestor Comment:

Delays

Delay #	From	To	Reason	Re-Hot Stick Done
1	08/25/2024 02:21	08/25/2024 04:24	RWIC went to the roadway at the wrong location	

As of 09/03/2024 10:49
5 of 5

Figure 13 - GOTRS Track Rights Request, page 5 of 5.

Appendix C – Roadway Job Safety Briefing (RJSB)

This form must be completed legibly and accurately and be retained and made available for inspection for a period of 90 days.

Part 1: General Job Briefing

1 Date: 8/24/24 Time: 12:00 RWIC: [REDACTED]

2 RWIC Call #: [REDACTED] RWIC Cell Phone #: [REDACTED]

3 Safety Contact: See Something Say Something

4 RWP Rule: #6 There shall be no clearing of any track at any time

5 Work Location: Southon Ave

6 Job Task(s): Drain Cleaning

7 Worksite, Electrical, Chemical, or Environmental Hazards: Topping Hazards Poor Lighting

8 PPE Inspected: ☒ Electronic Device Policy Reviewed: ☒ Radio Certification Date Inspected: ☒

9 RWP Stickers Inspected: ☒ Tools and Equipment Inspected: ☒ Radio Checks Performed: ☒

10 What Specialized PPE Will Be Used? Face Shield

11 Emergency Response Plan: Platform To STROM

Part 2: RWP Briefing: This section must be filled out before any Roadway Workers enter the Roadway.

12 Track Time On/Off: 12:12 / 12:16

13 Rail Line: GRN Track Number(s): 1+2 Track Access Guide (TAG) Speed: N/A

14 Working Limits Chain Markers: 162+34 278+34 TRK 1+2

15 OPS Radio Channel: OPS 3 OPS Phone Number: 202-962-1502

16 Place of Safety: CAT WALK Time Needed to Reach Place of Safety: 10 sec

17 Are There Red Hot Spots Within Your Working Limits? Yes ☒ No ☐

18 Red Hot Spot Chain Markers: Platform In the lock Red Hot Spot Hazard(s): NO Clearances

19 Form of RWP: ☐ ETO Authority ☐ Local Signal Control ☐ AMF ☐ FT ☐

20 RWP Notes: N/A

21 Advanced Mobile Flagger Call # (s) or Last Name (s): /

22 Advanced Mobile Flagger Placement: /

23 Watchman/Lookout Placement: /

24 Required Site Distance: / Watchman/Lookout Rotation Schedule: /

25 Will There be a Speed Restriction on the Adjacent Track? Yes ☐ No ☒

26 How Will the Speed Restriction be Implemented? /

27 Will Class 2 Vehicles be Part of the Working Limits? Yes ☐ No ☒

28 # of Class 2 Vehicles: N/A Type of Class 2 Vehicles: N/A

FOUR STATE 1501-001-00 52.002 06

Figure 14 - RJSB, page 1 of 2.

Power Outage: Red Tag ☐ Supervisory ☒ Not Sticking Chain Markers:

Red/Supervisory Tag #: 2024238712 5 151 TRK 1
193 TRK 1
151 TRK 2

Red/Supervisory Tag Holder: [REDACTED]

12 Insulated Mat(s) Color: Blue ☐ Red ☐ Green ☐ Orange ☐ Yellow ☐

WSAD Certification Due: [REDACTED] WSAD Serial #/Asset ID: [REDACTED] WSAD Certification Due: [REDACTED] WSAD Serial #/Asset ID: [REDACTED]

13 Will a Piggyback Crew(s) be Working Within Your Working Limits? Yes ☐ No ☒

Crew Leader/EIC Call # (s): [REDACTED] Piggyback Work Area Chain Markers: [REDACTED]

Piggyback Work Assignment(s): [REDACTED]

Part 3: Good Faith Challenge: The following must be read aloud by the RWIC to the Roadway Workers.
"WMATA guarantees each Roadway Worker the right to challenge, in good faith, the effectiveness of the Roadway Worker Protection being provided. The Roadway Worker making the challenge, and those that are sympathetic to the challenge, shall remain clear of the roadway until the challenge has been resolved."

RWP Issues: NONE Worker Name(s): [REDACTED]

Was the GFC Issue Resolved? Yes ☐ No ☐

Part 4: Roadway Worker Acknowledgement

"I understand and agree with all aspects of the Roadway Job Safety Briefing I just received. I am adequately protected from any train movement or roadway hazards. I understand I have a responsibility to conduct myself in a safe manner at all times."

ROADWAY WORKERS HAVE THE RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO INITIATE A GOOD FAITH CHALLENGE WHEN NECESSARY

Roadway Worker Signature	Employee ID #	Roadway Worker Signature	Employee ID #	Crew Leader/EIC Signature	Crew Leader Employee
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Part 5: RWIC Signature(s)

Additional RWIC Comments: Safety Incident

RWIC Signature: [REDACTED] RWIC Employee ID #: [REDACTED] Date: 8/24/24

Relieving RWIC Name: [REDACTED] Relieving RWIC Employee ID #: [REDACTED]

Relieving RWIC Signature: [REDACTED] Date/Time: / / : :

Relieving RWIC Call #: [REDACTED] Relieving RWIC Cell Phone #: [REDACTED]

Figure 15 - RJSB, page 2 of 2.

Appendix D – RWIC's Written Statement

Witness or Employee Statement Form TO BE COMPLETED AND
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 24 HOURS

Complete all Fields (Write N/A if field does not apply)

Involved Personnel (Use this Block for WMATA Employees and Contractors)

Name (Last Name, First Name, MI)	Witness? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	D.O.B.	Employee ID	Union
[Redacted]		[Redacted]	[Redacted]	NO
Phone Number	Job Title	Department/Division (Company)	Time asleep, before the incident?	
[Redacted]	Structure Supervisor	TRST	Fell Asleep: 8:00 AM Woke up: 6:00 PM	
Last Day Worked (Prior to)	Hours Worked (in last 24 hours)	Date/Time Shift Began	Was this the sleep schedule for the last seven days, including days off?	
8-23-24	8	8-24-24 10:00 PM	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	
On Overtime? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	Personal Protective Equipment used (list)		How alert were you immediately prior to the incident? Fully Alert <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Moderately Alert <input type="checkbox"/> Drowsy <input type="checkbox"/> Fighting Sleep <input type="checkbox"/>	
	VEST HAND HAT BOOTS GLOVES SAFETY GLASSES FLASH LIGHT			

Secondary Employment (Write None if employee does not have secondary employment)

Name of Secondary Employer	<input type="checkbox"/> Full Time <input type="checkbox"/> Part Time	Work Hours
NONE		
Secondary Employer Full Address		
Date of Hire	Supervisor	Phone Number

Injury Information (Complete for all involved people. If there is no injury, write None in Date of Injury)

Date of Injury	Time of Injury	Date/Time Injury Reported	Body Part(s) Injured:
NONE			
Location (Address) where injury occurred (check one: <input type="checkbox"/> MD <input type="checkbox"/> VA <input type="checkbox"/> DC)			

Witness Information (Name, Phone Number, Email, address)

Did Another Person Cause this Injury? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No		Name of Responsible Party
Responsible Party Insurance Carrier/Agent		Phone Number
Are you able to Continue Work? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		Name/Address of facility where you will seek treatment
Doctor's Phone Number		Date you will see your doctor

Employee, please read before signing:

- (1) This form is only to be used for Employees who are injured on the job.
- (2) All persons having a workers' compensation claim that was caused by the act of another is required to have the written approval of the Authority before agreeing to or signing any settlement for the injuries or lost wages that were paid as part of the whole by the Authority or its insurer to the employee as workers' compensation benefits.
- (3) Any Employee who willfully makes any materially false or misleading statements or representations for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under workers' compensation or leave provisions of the Authority may be subject to prosecution, disciplinary action up to and including dismissal and may adversely affect the employee's rights to workers' compensation benefits.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ THE ABOVE GUIDELINES AND UNDERSTAND THEM FULLY AND THE INFORMATION I HAVE PROVIDED IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

Employee Signature: [Redacted] Date: 8-27-24

Original: RISK Copy: (1) SMS Incidents/Accidents (SAFE) (2) Employee File (3) Employee

Figure 16 - The RWIC's Written Statement, page 1 of 2.



Witness or Employee Statement Form

TO BE COMPLETED AND

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 24 HOURS

Involved Person or Witness (Use this Block for Non-WMATA Involved Person or Witness)			
Name	Phone Number	E-Mail	
Address			
Incident Information			
Date	Incident Time	Date/Time Reported	Location
8-24-24	2:00 AM	8-25-24	SOUTHOWN AVE
Incident ID# (from OCC) - Completed by Supervisor		SMS Incidents/Accidents Report# Completed by Supervisor	
What happened prior to the incident/accident?			
GAVE SAFETY BRIEFING WAS GIVEN ETO BY CENTRAL			
Describe the incident/accident			
I WAS GIVEN JOB LOCATION AS FOL NO STATION NAME I LOOK AT MY MAP AND AT A GLANCE FOL LOOKED LIKE FOL MY MISTAKE WENT SOUTHOWN AVE INSTEAD OF ANACOSTIA WAS GRANTED ETO AS A TRAIN WENT BY ON TRACK #2 I ASKED CENTRAL IF I HAD BOTH TRACKS HE REPLIED YES AND ASKED MY LOCATION I RESPONDED FOL SOUTHOWN AVE HE DID NOT CORRECT ME SO I WENT IN THIN ROADWAY AND SETUP SHUTS ON I END HE THEN CALLED ME ON PHONE AND ASKED AGAIN MY LOCATION I RESPONDED FOL SOUTHOWN AVE HE THEN TOLD ME TO CLEAR THE ROADWAY AT ONCE I WAS AT WRONG LOCATION			
What happened after the incident/accident?			
I WAS TOLD TO CONTACT MY OFFICE AND WAS TAKEN TO MEDICAL FOR DRUG TEST			

Please indicate the area of the injury by placing an X on the corresponding body parts below. To specify which side of the body is involved, please use "L" for left and "R" for right.



FRONT



BACK

Turn Over to Complete Employee and Injury Information



Figure 17 – The RWIC's Written Statement, page 2 of 2.

EXCLUSIVE TRACK OCCUPANCY

Exclusive Track Occupancy may be issued only by the Rail Traffic Controller to employees who hold a current Level 4 RWP qualification.

Exclusive Track Occupancy may be used as a method of establishing working limits on controlled track where the track within working limits shall be placed under the control of one RWIC by either:

- Authority issued to the RWIC by the Rail Traffic Controller who controls train movements on the track, or
- The RWIC causing fixed signals at each entrance to the working limits to display an aspect indication "Stop." (Local Signal Control)

Exclusive Track Occupancy Set-Up

Exclusive Track Occupancy working limits supplemental protection must be placed prior to beginning scheduled work. This supplemental protection includes the placement of shunts accompanied by two (2) red lanterns or e-flares placed a minimum of 500' beyond the outside of the work area to define the working limits, as well as "End Work Area" mats placed at both ends of the work area.




Figure 18 – Depicts Exclusive Track Occupancy (ETO) Standard Work Zone Procedures.

F-Line Track 1 – Gallery Place to Branch Avenue						
F-Line Track 1	Station	Station	Chain Marker	Chain Marker	Max Speed (MPH)	Notes
Gallery Place Station	F-01	F-01	E003+00	F003+00	50	
Clear View	F-01	F-02	003+00	016+00	50	
Archives Station	F-02	F-02	018+00	022+00	50	
Clear View	F-02	F-03	022+00	042+00	50	
Clear View: Interlocking	F-02	F-03	042+00	045+00	50	
L'Enfant Plaza Station	F-03	F-03	045+00	051+00	50	
Turnout Switch #5	F-03	F-04	051+00	056+00	50	Note 11
Curve	F-03	F-04	056+00	068+00	50	
Restricted View: Curve	F-03	F-04	068+00	087+00	55	
Waterfront Station	F-04	F-04	087+00	093+00	55	
Clear View	F-04	F-05	093+00	116+00	55	
Clear View: Interlocking	F-04	F-05	116+00	120+00	55	
Navy Yard-Ballpark Station	F-05	F-05	120+00	126+00	50	
Restricted View: Curve	F-05	F-06	126+00	143+00	65	
Clear View	F-05	F-06	143+00	166+00	65	
Restricted View: Curve	F-05	F-06	166+00	171+00	65	
Clear View	F-05	F-06	171+00	182+00	65	
Anacostia Station	F-06	F-06	182+00	188+00	55	
Restricted View: Interlocking	F-06	F-07	188+00	192+00	65	
Restricted View: Curve	F-06	F-07	192+00	204+00	65	
Clear View	F-06	F-07	204+00	208+00	65	
Restricted View: Curve	F-06	F-07	208+00	214+00	65	
Clear View	F-06	F-07	214+00	220+00	65	
Restricted View: Curve	F-06	F-07	220+00	232+00	65	
Clear View	F-06	F-07	232+00	251+00	65	

Figure 19 - The green box depicts the CM included in the GOTRS track rights on Track, page 1 of 2, showing Anacostia Station.


F-Line Track 1 – Gallery Place to Branch Avenue						
F-Line Track 1	Station	Station	Chain Marker	Chain Marker	Max Speed (MPH)	Notes
Congress Heights Station	F-07	F-07	251+00	257+00	45	
Clear View: Curve	F-07	F-08	257+00	270+00	45	
Restricted View: Curve	F-07	F-08	270+00	280+00	45	
Restricted View: Curve	F-07	F-08	280+00	301+00	55	
Clear View: Interlocking	F-07	F-08	302+00	306+00	55	
Southern Avenue Station	F-08	F-08	306+00	312+00	65	
Clear View	F-08	F-09	312+00	320+00	65	
Restricted View: Curve	F-08	F-09	320+00	325+00	65	
Portal	F-08	F-09	325+00	325+00	65	
Restricted View: Curve	F-08	F-09	325+00	327+00	65	
Clear View	F-08	F-09	327+00	335+00	65	
Restricted View: Curve	F-08	F-09	335+00	344+00	65	
Portal	F-08	F-09	344+00	340+00	65	
Clear View	F-08	F-09	340+00	350+00	65	
Clear View: Curve	F-08	F-09	350+00	372+00	65	
Naylor Road Station	F-09	F-09	372+00	378+00	50	
Clear View: Interlocking	F-09	F-10	378+00	383+00	50	
Clear View	F-09	F-10	383+00	393+00	65	
Blind Spot: Curve	F-09	F-10	393+00	403+00	65	
Clear View	F-09	F-10	403+00	413+00	65	
Restricted View: Blind Spot	F-09	F-10	413+00	435+00	65	
Clear View: Curve	F-09	F-10	435+00	448+50	65	
Suitland Station	F-10	F-10	448+00	454+00	65	
Clear View	F-10	F-11	454+00	457+00	65	
Portal	F-10	F-11	457+00	457+00	65	

Figure 20 - The green box depicts the CM included in the GOTRS track rights on Track, page 2 of 2, showing Congress Heights Station.


F-Line Track 2 – Branch Avenue to Gallery Place						
F Line Track 2	Station	Station	Chain Marker	Chain Marker	Max Speed (MPH)	Notes
Restricted View: Curve	F-08	F-07	302+00	284+00	45	
Restricted View: Curve	F-08	F-07	284+00	257+00	45	
Congress Heights Station	F-07	F-07	257+00	251+00	65	
Clear View	F-07	F-06	251+00	235+00	65	
Restricted View: Curve	F-07	F-06	235+00	224+00	65	
Clear View	F-07	F-06	224+00	218+00	65	
Restricted View: Curve	F-07	F-06	218+00	213+00	65	
Clear View	F-07	F-06	213+00	208+00	55	
Restricted View: Curve	F-07	F-06	208+00	192+00	55	
Clear View: Interlocking	F-07	F-06	192+00	188+00	55	
Anacostia Station	F-06	F-06	188+00	182+00	55	
Clear View	F-06	F-05	182+00	172+00	55	
Curve	F-06	F-05	172+00	167+00	55	
Clear View	F-06	F-05	167+00	146+00	55	
Restricted View: Curve	F-06	F-05	146+00	126+00	55	
Navy Yard-Ballpark Station	F-05	F-05	126+00	120+00	55	
Clear View: Interlocking	F-05	F-04	120+00	116+00	55	
Clear View	F-05	F-04	116+00	093+00	55	
Waterfront Station	F-04	F-04	093+00	087+00	40	
Restricted View: Curve	F-04	F-03	087+00	070+00	40	
Clear View: Curve	F-04	F-03	070+00	055+00	45	
Clear View: Turnout Switch #7	F-04	F-03	055+00	051+00	45	
L'Enfant Plaza Station	F-03	F-03	051+00	045+00	45	
Clear View: Interlocking	F-03	F-02	045+00	042+00	50	

Figure 21 - The yellow box depicts the CM included in the GOTRS track rights on Track 2, showing Congress Heights Station to Anacostia Station.

Appendix F – Why-Tree Analysis



Root Cause Analysis

7 
E24676 - Improper RWP - Southern Avenue