



WMSC Inspection Report 20250906

ISSUED 9/9/2025

Inspection Details

Title: Overnight Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Inspection

Location: Union Station (B03) and Van Ness-UDC (A06)

Date of Inspection: September 6, 2025

Time of Inspection: 2:00 am to 7:00 am

Unannounced

Risk-Based (Audit)

Functional Area: Roadway Worker Protection

Hazard Rating: 1B

Overview

On Saturday, September 6, 2025, WMSC Inspectors carried out a roadway worker protection (RWP) inspection between Union Station (B03) and Van Ness-UDC (A06). The goal of this inspection was to evaluate Metrorail's adherence to roadway worker protection requirements (primarily stated in Metrorail Operating Rulebook section 17) firsthand as well as to observe how Metrorail's Department of Safety conducts its own inspections of roadway worker protection.

This is a risk-based inspection based on an urgent hazard identified during the WMSC's Track, Structures, and Roadway Worker Protection Audit.¹ On July 10 and 11 of 2025, the WMSC visited the Carmen Turner Training Facility (CTF) where RWP training and qualification records are held (there are no electronic or redundant versions of these records). Currently, Metrorail has three levels of RWP qualification: level IV-qualified individuals are referred to as roadway workers in charge and directly ensure the safety of all work taking place in their respective work zone. While at CTF, the WMSC identified level IV RWP training records that did not support the level IV certification given to those individuals. The WMSC issued an urgent hazard notification to Metrorail on July 14 based on this information. As of July 15, there were 1,246 RWP level IV personnel. Since reporting this, Metrorail identified 192 level IV personnel received certifications that do not conform to written requirements.

On September 4, 2025, the WMSC issued a [finding](#) that Metrorail is not following its written process to ensure and document that its roadway workers in charge have demonstrated the knowledge and

¹ Also discussed at the WMSC's [August 5, 2025 Public Meeting](#) (viewable at youtube.com/live/pOl4Gyr_JZo?t=805s).



skills required to do their job safely. On September 8, 2025, Metrorail provided the first draft of the corrective action plan corresponding with the September 4, 2025, finding. To address this finding, Metrorail will be re-training and re-qualifying all 192 personnel; however, in the interim, as a way of monitoring level IV roadway workers in charge, and to verify that the safety condition created by inadequately qualified RWICs is not creating additional hazards, that new hazardous conditions aren't being detected with roadway worker protection practices, and to ensure that roadway worker protection rules are being adhered to generally, the WMSC is conducting a series of RWP risk-based inspections.

After concluding the inspection, the WMSC inspectors conducted a debrief with the Senior Safety Specialist, in accordance with Program Standard Section 6.F.1.

Defects and Corrective Actions

WMSC Inspections identify safety issues that may be classified as defects, findings, or recommendations. Findings and recommendations are defined by Program Standard Section 5.E.2 and 5.E.3 respectively. Ordinarily, issues identified in a WMSC inspection report are classified as defects. Defects are specific safety issues of non-conformance/non-compliance that are identified and that require remedial action.

This inspection did not identify any findings or recommendations and therefore does not require a WMSC Corrective Action Plan in accordance with Program Standard Section 5.E.4.

Defect Observations and Determinations

Defect 1

A Track and Structures crew engaged in insulator cleaning between Van Ness-UDC (A06) and Tenleytown-AU (A07) on track 2 failed to position a Warning Strobe and Alarm Device (WSAD) within their designated working limits while carrying out their responsibilities under a red tag.² Metrorail Operating Rulebook section 19.4.8 states:

“A Warning Strobe and Alarm Device (WSAD) must be installed on the section(s) of de-energized third rail within audible and visual range of personnel within those specific sections of third rail when work requiring a power outage is being performed.”

The Track and Structures roadway worker in charge (RWIC) was removed from service by the Department of Safety inspector due to the violation.

Hazard Rating: 1B

² Red Tag: “Third rail power outage where the circuit breaker is physically removed from the power circuit and a red tag is issued to implement lockout/tag-out procedures.” (Metrorail Operating Rulebook Glossary of Terms.)



Defect 2

An Automatic Train Control Maintenance crew engaged in an interlocking inspection at Union Station (B03) were relying on an expired RWP Quick Access Guide (see photo 1). This guide provides safety information such as a listing of hot spot locations and no clearance locations throughout the Metrorail system. Using accurate information such as hot spots and no clearance zones are critical to conducting a job safety briefing prior to the commencement of roadway work, safely, by all roadway workers, and for ensuring their safety throughout the work. The Department of Safety inspector removed the out of date quick access guide.

Hazard Rating: 3C

Photos:




Photo 1: Shows outdated Quick Access Guide. The current guide is dated December 15, 2024.

Defect 3 (Mitigated)

Also, at Union Station (B03), WMSC Inspectors observed that the Automatic Train Control roadway worker in charge (RWIC) was not carrying a Metro OneBadge which is required to be displayed “at all times” (Policy/Instruction 11.3/8, section 5.06).

The OneBadge is WMATA’s official identification card and for roadway worker protection, it includes a sticker affixed to the badge with an expiration date—this is the primary method of determining whether an individual is properly qualified to be on the roadway. To properly complete the roadway job safety briefing and the associated form, each person’s OneBadge must be checked by the roadway worker in charge and during that the roadway worker in charge will also check whether each person’s roadway worker protection qualification is current. As a result, The Department of Safety inspector permitted the roadway worker in charge to retrieve it from his work truck.

Hazard Rating: 3C



Defect 4

Between Van Ness-UDC (A06) and Tenleytown-AU (A07), WMSC Inspectors observed that the flagman of Prime Mover 26 engaged in insulator cleaning between Van Ness-UDC (A06) lacked a Metro OneBadge badge which is required to be displayed “at all times” (Policy/Instruction 11.3/8, section 5.06).

The OneBadge is WMATA’s official identification card and for roadway worker protection, it includes a sticker affixed to the badge with an expiration date—this is the primary method of determining whether an individual is properly qualified to be on the roadway. To properly complete the roadway job safety briefing and the associated form, each person’s OneBadge must be checked by the roadway worker in charge and during that the roadway worker in charge will also check whether each person’s roadway worker protection qualification is current. As a result, the employee completed the Roadway Job Safety briefing form without the roadway worker in charge confirming the flagman’s identification and whether the flagman should even be on the roadway. Consequently, the flagman and roadway worker in charge were taken out of service.

Hazard Rating: 3B

Defect 5

At Union Station (B03), WMSC Inspectors identified that the Automatic Train Control crew possessed an expired pair of class 0 rubber insulating gloves. Class 0 rubber insulating gloves are high voltage gloves used to protect workers from electrocution when working on or around high voltage electricity, especially around the track and third rail.

Metrorail’s intended long-term fix is underway via corrective action plan C-0042 created from finding 5 of the [2020 Audit of Roadway worker Protection and Training](#). Finding 5 states, “WMATA employees are not consistently following RWP Rule 5.12 for equipment calibration.” C-0042 remains open and is presently scheduled to close in July 2026. The WMSC has identified several expired insulated gloves this year:

On May 21, 2025, during a Communication Systems Audit observation, the WMSC found expired class 0 gloves. This was conveyed to Metrorail through that audit as an urgent hazard. On May 21, 2025, at the Carmen Turner Facility (CTF), prior to heading to the field, WMSC personnel checked the Class 0 electrical gloves of all personnel who would be involved in conducting the planned preventative maintenance. The gloves provided by two personnel set to go out in the field were expired. One of the sets of gloves was dated as tested on September 26, 2022. The other set of gloves was dated as expiring on March 10, 2025. When looking for replacement gloves, personnel identified a further six pairs of gloves that had expired. All expired gloves were removed and quarantined by a supervisor at the CTF radio shop. This was



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identified as a preliminary finding at this audit's exit conference with Metrorail on June 5, 2025.

As a result of the audit-identified expired gloves, the WMSC conducted two specific inspections on class 0 rubber gloves: one at the [New Carrollton \(D99\) Service and Inspection Shop](#) (June 4, 2025) and the other at [Shady Grove \(A99\) Service and Inspection Shop](#) (June 25, 2025).

As a result of the WMSC identifying the above-noted expired gloves: Metrorail has conducted interim mitigations including monitoring of glove compliance with roadway worker protection checks (see observation 1 below), briefing all Departmental Safety Committees, conducting monthly audits of tracking, and committing to developing a master electrical glove tracking above the departmental level procedures. And on June 24, 2025, Metrorail's Office of Safety issued a safety bulletin on this topic.

Hazard Rating: 3B

Photos:




Photo 2: Shows third rail glove with expiration date of August 2025.

Observation 1

Finding 1 from the WMSC's [2024 Roadway Worker Protection Program Audit](#) identified that "Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety." Metrorail is currently working to address this finding through corrective action plan C-0280.

WMSC Inspectors observed that at the present time, Metrorail's Department of Safety has one individual conducting roadway worker protection compliance checks. Depending on the proximity of work zones, one individual or group can generally only visit two work zones each night. On the night of September 6, 2025, the General Orders and Track Rights System (GOTRS) indicated 19 active work zones (some nights have fewer or greater number of work zones). The number of work zones on a given night and the fact there is only one SAFE



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inspector conducting independent work zone compliance checks does not appear sufficient to address C-0280.

Next Steps

Please respond **by Friday, September 12, 2025**, to acknowledge receipt and to convey responses to the WMSC regarding what, if any, actions will be or have been taken in response.