Office: 202-384-1520 . Website: www.wmsc.gov

WMSC Inspection Report 20251017B

ISSUED 10/20/2025

Inspection Details

Title: Roadway Worker Protection Overnight Inspection

Location: Suitland Ave (F10)

Date of Inspection: 10/16/2025

Time of Inspection: 11:30 PM to 5:00am

Announced (via phone and email to Senior Director, Safety Assurance 10/14/25)

Risk-Based (Audits, Inspections, Corrective Action Plans)

Functional Area: Roadway Worker Protection (RWP)

Hazard Rating: 1B

Overview

On October 17, 2025, two WMSC Inspectors carried out a roadway worker protection (RWP) inspection at Suitland Ave (F10). The goal of this inspection was to evaluate Metrorail's adherence to roadway worker protection requirements (primarily stated in Metrorail Operating Rulebook section 17) firsthand as well as to observe how Metrorail's Department of Safety conducts its own inspections of roadway worker protection.

This is a risk-based inspection based on an urgent hazard identified during the WMSC's Track, Structures, and Roadway Worker Protection Audit. On July 10 and 11 of 2025, the WMSC visited the Carmen Turner Training Facility (CTF) where RWP training and qualification records are held (there are no electronic or redundant versions of these records). Currently, Metrorail has three levels of RWP qualification: level IV-qualified individuals are referred to as roadway workers in charge and directly ensure the safety of all work taking place in their respective work zone. While at CTF, the WMSC identified level IV RWP training records that did not support the level IV certification given to those individuals. The WMSC issued an urgent hazard notification to Metrorail on July 14 based on this information. As of July 15, there were 1,246 RWP level IV personnel. Since reporting this, Metrorail identified 192 level IV personnel received certifications that do not conform to written requirements.

On September 4, 2025, the WMSC issued a <u>finding</u> that Metrorail is not following its written process to ensure and document that its roadway workers in charge have demonstrated the knowledge and skills required to do their job safely. The WMSC approved corrective action plan C-0310 on



September 30, 2025. To address this finding, Metrorail will be re-training and re-qualifying all 192 personnel; however, in the interim, the WMSC is conducting a series of RWP risk-based inspections as a way of monitoring level IV roadway workers in charge. These inspections also serve to verify that the safety condition created by inadequately qualified RWICs is not creating additional hazards and to ensure that roadway worker protection rules are being adhered to generally. The WMSC has also identified RWP defects in other inspections conducted this year.¹

After concluding the inspection, the WMSC inspectors conducted a debrief of the Metrorail Safety Department's Inspector in accordance with Program Standard Section 6.F.1.

Defects and Corrective Actions

WMSC Inspections identify safety issues that may be classified as defects, findings, or recommendations. Findings and recommendations are defined by Program Standard Section 5.E.2 and 5.E.3 respectively. Ordinarily, issues identified in a WMSC inspection report are classified as defects. Defects are specific safety issues of non-conformance/non-compliance that are identified and that require remedial action.

This inspection did not identify any findings or recommendations and therefore does not require a WMSC Corrective Action Plan in accordance with Program Standard Section 5.E.4.

Defect Observations and Determinations

WMSC Inspectors observed two work crews. One crew was carrying out rail grinding on a section of the track. The second was an information technology crew that had a piggyback crew in the same work zone.

During this observation, the information technology crew was found to be out of compliance with multiple safety issues. WMSC Inspectors were accompanied by a Metrorail safety inspector who immediately pulled the information technology crew from service and reported the RWP violations to the Safety Information Officer (SIO). The crew was found to have two individuals, who were not the designated roadway worker in charge (RWIC), establishing the work zone. Additionally, these individuals did not sign the job safety briefings (see defect 6). The RWIC was also missing personal protective equipment (PPE) to establish the proper work zone (see defect 4). During the inspection, several items were identified as missing from the Roadway Job Safety Briefing sheets for both work crews.

Metrorail Operating Rulebook 17.5.4: The following items must be considered when participating in a Roadway Job Safety Briefing:

- Everyone's attention and participation,
- Type of On-Track Protection,
- Identification of Adjacent Track(s) and Protection being provided on such track(s),
- Working Limits,
- Track Designations,

¹ Approximately 25% of all risk-based inspections identified roadway worker protection defects.



- Track Speeds,
- Predetermined Place of Safety (PPOS),
- Potential distractions,
- Unique workplace hazards,
- Hot Spot Areas (only applicable for Mobile Work Crews),
- Safety Equipment Certification Dates (radios, mats, shunts, gloves, etc.),
- Placement of Watchmen and rotation and relief policy,
- Inspection of watchmen's equipment,
- Review of Policy and Instruction 10.3 (Electronic Device Policy),
- Brief of new arrivals,
- Re-brief when work or situation changes,
- Complete understanding & documentation,
- Good Faith Challenge process.

Defect 1

The rail grinding crew's job safety briefing contained many blank fields rather than marked as not applicable "N/A" noting these items were discussed. Specifically, sections 9 and 10.

Hazard Rating: 1B

Photo:

	Rail Line:	Track Number(s):	<u>/:,</u> 	rack Access Guide (TAG) Speed:	
	Working Limits Chain Markers: 393+00 - 451+00				
		3	OPS Phone Nu	mber: 202 962 1502	
7	Place of Safety: Place	HFOIM F	ence line,	/ Time Needed to Reach Place of Safety: 3	
	Place of Safety: Place of Safety: Fence ine Time Needed to Reach Place of Safety: 30 safety: Time Needed to Reach Place of Safety: 30 safety: 3				
	Red Hot Spot Chain Man	kers: 448+00	Re	ed Hot Spot Hazard(s): No Cleatance	
	448+00 -	410400		Restricted view	
8	Form of RWP: IT ETO Authority Local Signal Control AMF FT				
	RWP Notes:				
		/			
	See	Domething	TAY	Southing	
	Advanced Mobile Flagge	r Call #(s) or Last Nam	e(s): N	Sondhing A	
9	Advanced Mobile Flagger Advanced Mobile Flagger		e(s): N	Sondhing A	
9		r Placement:	e(s): w/	Southing A	
9	Advanced Mobile Flagger	r Placement:		out Rotation Schedule:	
9	Advanced Mobile Flagger Watchman/Lookout Place	r Placement: ement:	Watchman/Look	out Rotation Schedule:	
9	Advanced Mobile Flagger Watchman/Lookout Place Required Site Distance:	r Placement: ement: striction on the Adjaco	Watchman/Look ent Track? Yes □	out Rotation Schedule:	
	Advanced Mobile Flagger Watchman/Lookout Place Required Site Distance: Will There be a Speed Re	r Placement: ement: striction on the Adjaco iction be Implemente	Watchman/Look ent Track? Yes □ d?	out Rotation Schedule:	

Photo 1: Blank fields on sections 9 and 10 of the roadway job safety briefing.



Defect 2

Additionally, the rail grinding crew's documentation was missing the outcome of the good faith challenge.

Hazard Rating: 1B

Photos

	ntees each Roadway Worker the right to challenge, in good faith, the effectiveness of the Roadway Worker Protection being dway Worker making the challenge, and those that are sympathetic to the challenge, shall remain clear of the roadway until the challenge has been resolved."					
RWP Issues:			Worker Name(s):			
			Was the GFC Issue Resolved? Yes □ No □			

Photo 2: Good faith challenge fields are blank.




Photo 3: a Metrorail example of how a RWIC should note the good faith challenge was offered, and none were reported.

Defect 3

The information technology job safety briefing was missing a proper safety contact. In lieu of a safety contact, the RWIC repeated their phone number in the field as the safety contact.



	This form must be completed legibly and accurately Part 1: General Job Briefing	adway Job Safety Briefing Form JOB CODE:				
1	Date: 0/16/25 Time: 00:01	RWIC:				
-	RWIC Call #	RWIC Cell Phone #:				
2	Safety Contact					
	RWPRULE: YOU DEE LESPONSING FOR YOUR OWN SAFETY					
	Work Location: A LET					
3	Job Task(s): FTS PENNT					
4	Worksite, Electrical, Chemical, or Environmental Hazards:					
		vice Policy Reviewed: Radio Certification Date Inspected:				
5		ipment Inspected: Radio Checks Performed:				
	What Specialized PPE Will Be Used?					
6	Emergency Response Plan:					
0	Satural Place of safety	GFFATER SuthEAST				

Photo 4: Invalid safety contact.

Defect 4

The information technology work crew's job safety briefing should have included chain markers for the applicable work zone.






Photo 5: no chain markers are noted in work location.

Defect 5

For the information technology briefing, WMSC noted several missing hazards from the briefing. Two examples, working during the nighttime hours and the third rail being present.






Photo 6: No worksite hazards were listed on the briefing.

Defect 6

The information technology work crew required the use of hot sticks as well as warning strobe and alarm devices (WSADs) in this work zone and should have been noted in the briefing.

Hazard: 1B






Photo 7: blank field reserved for specialized personal protective equipment (PPE).

Defect 7

Section 7 of the information technology work crew's job safety briefing is missing an OPS phone number. Time to reach a place of safety is missing a unit of time. Red hot spots were present but missing an indication on the form despite being identified in the next box. The individual hazards of each hot spot are not present in the appropriate box.






Photo 8: Missing, wrong, or blank items on section 7 of the job safety briefing.

Defect 8

Hot sticking information as well as the WSAD information was missing from the information technology work crew's job safety briefing form. When this issue was brought to the RWIC's attention, WMSC Inspectors learned this crew was approved for Exclusive Track Occupancy (ETO) protection as outlined on the form. However, the crew were under the impression that they were setting up a mobile work zone, which is a different form of protection with different roadway worker protection requirements because of the different nature of necessary safeguards. Subsequently, they did not have the proper protective equipment available to set up proper ETO protection (ex: No WSADs).



Defect 9

Section 13 on the information technology work crew's job safety briefing was missing information for the piggyback crew.

Hazard Rating: 1B

Photo

	This form must be completed legibly and accurately and be retained. Part 2: RWP Briefing, continued: Power Outage: Red Tag Supervisory	Hot Sticking Chain Markers:			
	Red/Supervisory Tag #: 2025 29 0726-5	THOUSTICKING CHAIN MARKETS:			
	Red/Supervisory Tag Holder:				
12	Insulated Mat(s) Color Blue Red Green Orange Valloy				
	WSAD Certification Due WSAD Serial #/Asset ID	WSAD Certification Due	WSAD Serial #/Asset ID		
	Will a Piggyback Crew(s) be Working Within Your Working Limits? Yes No				
3	Crew Leader/EIC Call #(s):				

Photo 9: missing piggyback crew information.

Defect 10

The information technology work crew's job safety briefing is missing the outcome of the good faith challenge being offered to the crew member.

Hazard Rating: 1B

Photos




Photo 10: Missing information regarding the good faith challenge.



WASHINGTON METRORAIL SAFETY COMMISSION

Part 3: Good Faith Challenge: The following must be read aloud by the RWIC to the Roadway Workers.

"WMATA guarantees each Roadway Worker the right to challenge, in good faith, the effectiveness of the Roadway Worker Protection being provided. The Roadway Worker making the challenge, and those that are sympathetic to the challenge, shall remain clear of the roadway until the challenge has been resolved."

RWP Issues:

Worker Name(s):

N/A

Was the GFC Issue Resolved? Yes \(\text{No} \)

Photo 11: a Metrorail example of how a RWIC should note a good faith challenge was offered but none were reported.

Defect 11

The RWIC of the information technology work crew informed WMSC Inspectors that he had two other workers setting up the work zone with one being at Branch Ave (F11) and the other being on site with the RWIC at Suitland (F10). It was at this point in the briefing that WMSC and Metrorail inspectors noted that the workers currently on the roadway setting up the work zone had not signed the briefing before fouling the track. They were immediately instructed to clear the area.

Hazard Rating: 1B

Photo




Photo 12: missing signatures from the job safety briefing.

Defect 12 (mitigated)

During the observation inspectors noticed that the station manager was using a make-shift device to depress the "RESET" button on the emergency swing gate's control while away from the kiosk which disabled the crash bar release and rendered the gate unable to release workers or patrons in the event of an emergency. Once this issue was raised to the Metrorail safety inspector on site the defect was immediately mitigated.

Hazard: 1B





Photo 13 and 14: make-shift device to depress the "RESET" button

Next Steps

Please respond **by Thursday, October 23, 2025,** to acknowledge receipt and to convey responses to the WMSC regarding what, if any, actions will be or have been taken in response.