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WMSC Inspection Report 20251017A

ISSUED 10/20/2025

Inspection Details

Title: Roadway Worker Protection Overnight Inspection

Location: Brentwood Yard (B99)

Date of Inspection: 10/17/2025

Time of Inspection: 11:30pm to 6:00am

Announced (via phone and email to Senior Director, Safety Assurance 10/14/25)

Risk-Based (Audits, Inspections, Corrective Action Plans)

Functional Area: Roadway Worker Protection

Hazard Rating: 1B

Overview

On Thursday, October 17, 2025, WMSC Inspectors met their escort at Brentwood Yard (B99) and carried out a roadway worker protection (RWP) inspection between Union Station (B03) and Noma-Gallaudet U (B35). The goal of this inspection was to evaluate Metrorail's adherence to roadway worker protection requirements (primarily stated in Metrorail Operating Rulebook section 17) firsthand as well as to observe how Metrorail's Department of Safety conducts its own inspections of roadway worker protection.

This is a risk-based inspection based on an urgent hazard identified during the WMSC's Track, Structures, and Roadway Worker Protection Audit. On July 10 and 11 of 2025, the WMSC visited the Carmen Turner Training Facility (CTF) where RWP training and qualification records are held (there are no electronic or redundant versions of these records). Currently, Metrorail has three levels of RWP qualification: level IV-qualified individuals are referred to as roadway workers in charge and directly ensure the safety of all work taking place in their respective work zone. While at CTF, the WMSC identified level IV RWP training records that did not support the level IV certification given to those individuals. The WMSC issued an urgent hazard notification to Metrorail on July 14 based on this information. As of July 15, there were 1,246 RWP level IV personnel. Since reporting this, Metrorail identified 192 level IV personnel received certifications that do not conform to written requirements.

On September 4, 2025, the WMSC issued a <u>finding</u> that Metrorail is not following its written process to ensure and document that its roadway workers in charge have demonstrated the knowledge and

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skills required to do their job safely. The WMSC approved corrective action plan C-0310 on September 30, 2025. To address this finding, Metrorail will be re-training and re-qualifying all 192 personnel; however, in the interim, the WMSC is conducting a series of RWP risk-based inspections as a way of monitoring level IV roadway workers in charge. These inspections also serve to verify that the safety condition created by inadequately qualified RWICs is not creating additional hazards and to ensure that roadway worker protection rules are being adhered to generally. The WMSC has also identified RWP defects in other inspections conducted this year.¹

After concluding the inspection, the WMSC inspectors conducted a debrief with the Safety Specialist in accordance with Program Standard Section 6.F.1. in accordance with Program Standard Section 6.F.1.

Defects and Corrective Actions

WMSC Inspections identify safety issues that may be classified as defects, findings, or recommendations. Findings and recommendations are defined by Program Standard Section 5.E.2 and 5.E.3 respectively. Ordinarily, issues identified in a WMSC inspection report are classified as defects. Defects are specific safety issues of non-conformance/non-compliance that are identified and that require remedial action.

This inspection did not identify any findings or recommendations and therefore does not require a WMSC Corrective Action Plan in accordance with Program Standard Section 5.E.4.

Defect Observations and Determinations

Defect 1 (mitigated)

Between Union Station (B04) and NoMa-Gallaudet U (B05), chain markers 131+00 to 175+00, WMSC Inspectors noted work crew members were not wearing safety glasses as required personal protective equipment according to Metrorail Operating Rulebook 17.11.3: "All personnel are required to wear, while on the roadway: Hard Hat/Helmet (Not applicable to Class 1 Rail Vehicle Operators), Safety Glasses, Safety Footwear, High Visibility Yellow Safety Apparel, and High Visibility Orange Safety Apparel (Contractors and Visitors)."

This was mitigated onsite.

Hazard Rating: 1B

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ Approximately 25% of risk based inspections identified roadway worker protection defects.



Photo:

METRORAIL OPERATING RULEBOOK

Table 13, PPE for On-Track Safety

PPE	Roadway Worker ¹	Advanced Mobile Flagger	Watchman/ Lookout	RWIC	ATC Workers	Contractors and Visitors
Hard Hat	R	R ²	R	R	R	R
Safety Glasses	R	R	R	R	R	R
Safety Footwear	R	R	R	R	R	R
Flashlight	R	R	R	R	R	R
High-Visibility Yellow Safety Apparel	R	R	R	R	R	NA
Mechanic Style Work Gloves	AR	AR	AR	AR	AR	AR
High Voltage Electrical Safety Gloves	AR	NA	NA	AR	AR	NA
High Visibility Orange Safety Apparel	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	R

¹⁻A roadway worker is an employee of a railroad, or a contractor to a railroad, whose duties include inspection, construction, maintenance or repair of railroad track, bridges, roadway, signal and communication systems, electric traction systems, roadway facilities, or roadway maintenance machinery on or near track or with the potential of fouling a track, and flagmen and watchmen/lookouts.

Photo 1: Metrorail Operating Rulebook 18.7.1 Table 13

Defect 2

Between Union Station (B04) and NoMa-Gallaudet U (B05), chain markers 131+00 to 175+00, WMSC Inspectors observed the roadway worker in charge (RWIC), under a supervisory power outage while establishing the work zone, prematurely place safety shunts before hot sticking the third rail and prior to being granted permission to move forward from the control center.

Metrorail Operating Rulebook 19.7 (Red Tag Third Rail Power Outage)

²⁻Contract employees performing the duties of an Advanced Mobile Flagger are not required to have a hard hat since they are prohibited from entering the Authority roadway.

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19.7.1 Any work that requires contact with the third rail, or any of its components, must not be performed unless a Red Tag Power Outage has been implemented for that specific section of third rail.

A Red Tag Power Outage entails...removal of energy from the third rail which requires that track feeder breakers which feed a specific section of third rail be removed from their operating cubicles and **specific verification and coordination procedures involving the Rail Operations Control Center and Maintenance Operations Control** and the red tag holder. (Emphasis added.)

Hazard: 1B

Next Steps

Please respond by Thursday October 23, 2025, to acknowledge receipt and to convey responses to the WMSC regarding what, if any, actions will be or have been taken in response.