



WMSC Inspection Report 20251029B

ISSUED 10/31/2025

Inspection Details

Title: Roadway Worker Protection Overnight Inspection

Location: Fort Totten (B06) to Takoma (B07)

Date of Inspection: 10/29/2025

Time of Inspection: 2:00am to 4:00am

Announced (via phone and email to Senior Director, Safety Assurance 10/21/25)

Risk-Based (Audits, Inspections, Corrective Action Plans)

Functional Area: Roadway Worker Protection

Hazard Rating: 1B

Overview

On October 29, 2025, WMSC Inspectors carried out a roadway worker protection (RWP) inspection at Fort Totten (B06) and Takoma (B07). The goal of this inspection was to evaluate Metrorail's adherence to roadway worker protection requirements (primarily stated in Metrorail Operating Rulebook section 17) firsthand as well as to observe how Metrorail's Department of Safety conducts its own inspections of roadway worker protection.

This is a risk-based inspection based on an urgent hazard identified during the WMSC's Track, Structures, and Roadway Worker Protection Audit. On July 10 and 11 of 2025, the WMSC visited the Carmen Turner Training Facility (CTF) where RWP training and qualification records are held (there are no electronic or redundant versions of these records). Currently, Metrorail has three levels of RWP qualification: level IV-qualified individuals are referred to as roadway workers in charge and directly ensure the safety of all work taking place in their respective work zone. While at CTF, the WMSC identified level IV RWP training records that did not support the level IV certification given to those individuals. The WMSC issued an urgent hazard notification to Metrorail on July 14 based on this information. As of July 15, there were 1,246 RWP level IV personnel. Since reporting this, Metrorail identified 192 level IV personnel received certifications that do not conform to written requirements.

On September 4, 2025, the WMSC issued a [finding](#) that Metrorail is not following its written process to ensure and document that its roadway workers in charge have demonstrated the knowledge and skills required to do their job safely. The WMSC approved corrective action plan C-0310 on



September 30, 2025. To address this finding, Metrorail will be re-training and re-qualifying all 192 personnel; however, in the interim, the WMSC is conducting a series of RWP risk-based inspections as a way of monitoring level IV roadway workers in charge. These inspections also serve to verify that the safety condition created by inadequately qualified RWICs is not creating additional hazards and to ensure that roadway worker protection rules are being adhered to generally. The WMSC has also identified RWP defects in other inspections conducted this year.¹

After concluding the inspection, the WMSC inspectors conducted a debrief with the safety specialist in accordance with Program Standard Section 6.F.1.

Defects and Corrective Actions

WMSC Inspections identify safety issues that may be classified as defects, findings, or recommendations. Findings and recommendations are defined by Program Standard Section 5.E.2 and 5.E.3 respectively. Ordinarily, issues identified in a WMSC inspection report are classified as defects. Defects are specific safety issues of non-conformance/non-compliance that are identified and that require remedial action.

This inspection did not identify any findings or recommendations and therefore does not require a WMSC Corrective Action Plan in accordance with Program Standard Section 5.E.4.

Defect Observations and Determinations

Power work crew 1369 roadway worker in charge provided a roadway job safety briefing that covered all required aspects in the appropriate detail. He explained well that their type of protection was Exclusive Track Occupancy (ETO) with Foul Time when necessary. He reviewed the electronic device policy and gave the crew an opportunity for any Good Faith Challenge, among all other requirements of a roadway job safety briefing.

WMSC Inspectors checked all personal protective equipment (PPE) and Metrorail OneBadges. All PPE were in proper accordance with Metrorail policy (with one exception, see Defect 1).

WMSC Inspectors checked all Class 0 high voltage electrical safety gloves and hot sticks and found all to be in compliance.

Foul time was requested and given from the Takoma (B07) platform, track 2, in the direction of Fort Totten (B06). Foul time was held for the entire time the crew was present on the roadway.

Crew members wearing high voltage gloves installed shunts on the high side of the track. Red e-flares were placed on top of all four rails. The control center verified all four shunts, with one requiring minor adjustment.

Work mats were placed at the proper 500-foot distance.

Similarly, crew members wearing high voltage gloves installed shunts on the low side of the track south of Fort Totten (B06) station platform. Red e-flares were placed on top of all four rails. The control center verified all four shunts. Work mats were placed at the proper 500-foot distance near the north end of the station platform.

¹ Approximately 25% of all inspections identified roadway worker protection defects.



Defect 1

While checking Metrorail OneBadges one inspector found one worker's badge did not have a roadway worker protection certification sticker.

The OneBadge is WMATA's official identification card and for roadway worker protection, it includes a sticker affixed to the badge with an expiration date—this is the primary method of determining whether an individual is properly qualified to be on the roadway. To properly complete the roadway job safety briefing and the associated form, each person's OneBadge must be checked by the roadway worker in charge and during that the roadway worker in charge will also check whether each person's roadway worker protection qualification is current.

The worker explained to inspectors that the current certification sticker had been on his OneBadge but it had "rubbed off." That individual was not permitted to go wayside and the incident is being followed up by the individual's Metrorail supervisor.

Hazard Rating: 1B

Defect 2

WMSC Inspectors noted that Automatic Train Control (ATC) technicians (a different work crew that was seemingly piggybacking but was not denoted as such) began testing switches, not included in the safety briefing, in the vicinity of the work zone, after the roadway job safety briefing was completed and was signed by the crew and roadway worker in charge.

Metrorail Operating Rulebook 17.5.2 A Roadway Job Safety Briefing must be conducted by the RWIC with roadway workers or any additional parties arriving after the initial job briefing and prior to their fouling any track.

Hazard Rating: 1B

Defect 3

At one point the roadway worker in charge should have paused the roadway job safety briefing due to excessive background noise, which made it difficult to hear the briefing. Once the excessive noise passed, only then should the roadway worker in charge proceeded with the rest of the briefing.

Hazard Rating: 1B



WASHINGTON METRORAIL SAFETY COMMISSION

Next Steps

Please respond by **Monday, November 3, 2025**, to acknowledge receipt and to convey responses to the WMSC regarding what, if any, actions will be or have been taken in response.