



W-0410 – Improper Roadway Worker Protection at L'Enfant Plaza Station – December 12, 2024

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting December 9, 2025

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

Safety event summary:

On Thursday, December 12, 2024, a Rail Supervisor, who was operating an out-of-service train with no passengers aboard, failed to stop for a required safety briefing from an Advanced Mobile Flagger who was correctly positioned on the platform at the 8-car marker at L'Enfant Plaza Station, track 1, lower level.

At 9:39 a.m., an Emergency Response Team (ERT) Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) requested permission from a Radio Rail Traffic Controller in the Control Center to conduct a walking track inspection from Federal Center SW to L'Enfant Plaza Station under Advanced Mobile Flagger (AMF) protection. An AMF was confirmed to be in position at L'Enfant Plaza, track 1 at the 8-car marker as required, and the Rail Traffic Controller granted the ERT personnel permission to enter the roadway. At 9:41 a.m., the Rail Traffic Controller notified train operators via radio Ops 2, that personnel were on the roadway between Federal Center SW Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station, track 1.

An investigative review of data showed that at approximately 9:50 a.m., a Rail Supervisor, who had been instructed to transport out-of-service Train 724 to Downtown Largo Station, passed the ERT crew, who were in a place of safety, after failing to stop for a safety briefing from the AMF. The AMF was correctly positioned on the platform at the 8-car marker at L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1. The ERT Roadway Worker in Charge immediately reported the event to the Button Rail Traffic Controller. When asked by the Rail Traffic Controller, the Rail Supervisor operating Train 724 confirmed they had not spoken to the AMF at L'Enfant Plaza Station. ERT Personnel cleared the roadway and notified the Rail Traffic Controller that they were on the platform at L'Enfant Plaza Station.

Another Rail Supervisor was instructed to take over operation of Train 724 when it reached Stadium-Armory Station. The Rail Supervisor involved in the safety event was removed from service for post-event toxicology testing.

The probable cause and contributing factors of this safety event include:



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- Failure to adhere to Metrorail procedures, including those related to rail vehicle operation and performing work under Advanced Mobile Flagging
- Loss/lack of situational awareness

The recommended corrective actions (RCA) listed below were created and implemented following several months delays, (as is explained below), to adhere to the originally committed timeline by the Metrorail Office of Rail Transportation. When corrective actions result from safety events, they follow WMATA's internal corrective actions process and are called Recommended Corrective Actions (RCA).

The details are as follows: On January 20, 2025, the involved Rail Supervisor was allowed to return to their regular duties despite not completing the required refresher training. After several months, Metrorail's Office of Safety Investigations requested documentation confirming completion of refresher training, and discovered the training had not been completed. On September 8, 2025, eight months after the safety event, the Rail Supervisor completed reinstruction training.

- Rail Transportation and Safety Investigations established bi-weekly meetings to discuss the progress of Rail Transportation corrective actions.
- Metrorail began sharing a database with internal departments, which consists of all training or re-training requests stemming from accidents or incidents, and documentation when the training has been completed, finalized, and signed.

Metrorail is in the process of implementing related WMSC required corrective action plans (CAPs), including:

- C-0280 addresses the finding that Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety. Metrorail must ensure appropriate safety promotion and awareness for personnel to understand the safety implications of unauthorized deviations from documented roadway worker protection requirements. This corrective action plan is 54% complete and is expected to be fully implemented in the next ten months, in August 2026.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety
Office of Safety Investigations

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E24988

Date of Event:	December 12, 2024
Type of Event:	0-23: Improper RWP
Incident Time:	09:50 hours
Location:	L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 1
Time and How received by Safety:	10:16 hours, Safety Information Official (SIO)
(WMSC) Notification Time:	15:58 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	None
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 724 (L7434-35x7471-70X7352-53x7295-94T)
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	None
(SUDS I/A) Number	20241212#122099MX

Incident Date: 12/12/2024 Time: 09:50 hours
Final Report – Improper RWP Rev. 1
E24988

Drafted By: SAFE 703 – 03/15/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 707 – 03/15/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 03/15/2025

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L'Enfant Plaza Station – Improper RWP

December 12, 2024
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
AMF	Advance Mobile Flagger
AOM	Assistant Operations Manager
ARS	Audio Recording System
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
ERT	Emergency Response Team
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OM	Operations Manager
PPE	Personal Protection Equipment
SIO	Safety Information Official
SMS	Safety Measurement System
SPOTS	System Performance On-Time Summary
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
RWIC	Roadway Worker in Charge
RWP	Roadway Worker Protection
TRST	Office of Track and Structures
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Thursday, December 12, 2024, at 08:15 hours, at 09:50 hours, an Office of Track and Structures (TRST) Emergency Response Team (ERT) Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) informed the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) Button Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) of an Improper Roadway Protection (RWP) event that occurred at L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1.

Before the event, ERT personnel were conducting walking inspections on the Delta line due to an earlier incident in which a collector shoe assembly dislodged from Train ID 615 at Eastern Market Station, track 1. At 09:39 hours, the ERT RWIC contacted the Radio RTC to request permission to conduct a walking inspection between Federal Center SW Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1.

The ERT RWIC informed the Radio RTC that an Advanced Flagger was in place at L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1 at the 8-car marker. The Radio RTC confirmed that the Advanced Flagger was positioned at their respective location via radio and then granted the ERT RWIC permission to enter the roadway.

During this time, Train ID 724 (L7434-7435x7471-7470x7352-7453x7295-7494T), an eight-car consist, was being transported from West Falls Church Yard to Downtown Largo Station for service. An Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisor was operating Train ID 724 when the train entered L'Enfant Plaza Station platform limits at 22 MPH under the required traveling speed for non-revenue trains; however, the Rail Supervisor did not stop at the 8-car marker to receive a briefing from the Advanced Flagger. The ERT RWIC reported the event to the MICC. The Radio RTC confirmed with the Rail Supervisor that they did not stop for a briefing at L'Enfant Plaza Station.

The Radio RTC instructed a second Rail Supervisor who was standing by at Stadium-Armory Station to take over operation of the train. An RTRA Assistant Superintendent was dispatched to transport the Rail Supervisor for post-incident testing.

In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Rail, Standard Operating Procedure 102.04, and Operations Administrative Policy 102.06, the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center initiated the removal of Train ID 724 from service for Incident Investigations Team investigation procedures.

The probable cause of the Improper Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) event on December 12, 2024, at L'Enfant Plaza Station was the Supervisor's lack of situational awareness when they failed to observe the AMF positioned at the 8-car marker with the required Personal Protection Equipment (PPE).

Incident Site


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L'Enfant Plaza Station is an indoor station with dual levels that serves the Blue, Orange, and Silver lines on the lower level. The Green and Yellow lines serve the upper level. On the lower level, there is a center platform. This event occurred on the lower level on track number one.

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment through video and document review.
- Formal Interviews – Safety interviewed one (1) individual as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Safety interviewed the following individual:
 - Rail Supervisor 2 – Train ID 724
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Supervisor 30-day Work History
 - Supervisors Incident Report
 - RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report
 - Supervisors Report
 - Post Incident/Accident Form

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- RTRA Operations Personnel Directive AMF Procedures
- Post Accident / Interview Questionnaire
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
 - Closed-circuit television (CCTV)
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)
 - Office of the Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR IIT)

Investigation

On Thursday, December 12, 2024, at 09:08 hours, Train ID 724 L7434-7435x7471-7470x7352-7453x7295-7494T) was dispatched from West Falls Church Yard to West Falls Church Station as the Gap Train. At 09:13 hours, Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) Train ID 724 was instructed to transport the train to Down Largo Station. The RVO advised that they would require a relief operator to transport the train because the RVO was off duty.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that at 09:16 hours, Rail Supervisor #1, who was located at Ballston Station, was instructed to take over operating Train ID 724. At 09:29 hours, Rail Supervisor #2 contacted the MICC and advised that they were available at Federal Triangle Station to transport the train.

At 09:39 hours, an ERT RWIC contacted the Radio RTC and requested permission to conduct a walking track inspection between Federal Center SW Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1 under Advanced Mobile Flagging (AMF) protection. The ERT RWIC informed the Radio RTC that an Advance Flagger was in place at L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1 at the 8-car marker, ready to perform their duties, which was confirmed via radio.

At 09:41 hours, the Radio RTC announced to all trains on OPS 2 via radio that personnel were walking between Federal Center SW Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station, track 1. Train ID 724 arrived at Federal Triangle Station, Rail Supervisor #2 relieved Rail Supervisor #1 and took over operating the train. The Radio RTC granted the ERT RWIC permission to enter the roadway to perform the track inspection from Federal Center SW Station to L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) footage showed that at 09:50 hours, Train ID 724 entered the L'Enfant Plaza Station platform limits and did not stop for a briefing from the Advanced Flagger.



Image 1 – Image of the Advanced Flagger at the 8-car Marker as Train ID 724 approached at 09:50 hours.

The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer / Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS) analysis determined that the train lost speed commands and stopped 196 feet beyond the 8-car marker.

At 09:50 hours, the ERT RWIC contacted the Button RTC and reported that a non-revenue train leaving L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1 did not to stop at the 8-car marker for a briefing by the Advanced Flagger.



Image 2 – Image of Train ID 724 passing the 8-car Marker and personnel arriving at the platform at 09:50 hours.

At 09:51 hours, the Button RTC notified the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) of the event. At 09:52 hours, the AOM notified the Operations Manager (OM) of the event.

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At 09:53 hours, the AOM instructed the Radio RTC to inquire if Rail Supervisor #2, who was operating Train ID 724 at the time, had spoken with the Advanced Flagger at L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1. Rail Supervisor #2 acknowledged that they had not.

At 09:54 hours, the ERT RWIC advised the Radio RTC that all personnel were clear of the roadway. No track defects were found between Federal Center and L'Enfant Plaza Stations on track 1.

At 09:55 hours, the Radio RTC instructed Rail Supervisor #3, located at Stadium-Armory Station, to take over operating Train ID 724. At 10:01 hours, Train ID 724 arrived at Stadium-Armory Station, where Rail Supervisor #3 took over the operation of Train ID 724.

The AOM notified Division Management of the Improper RWP event at 10:12 hours. The OM reported the event to the Safety Information Official (SIO) at 10:16 hours. Rail Supervisor #2 was removed from service and transported for post-incident testing.

On January 15, 2025, RTRA determined that Rail Supervisor #2 failed to maintain attention to their operational duties and exercise good judgment and implemented disciplinary action. Additionally, Rail Supervisor #2 was informed that they would be scheduled for refresher training with Technical Training and Development to improve their situational awareness while performing their duties, and the date would be determined.

On January 20, 2025, Rail Supervisor #2 returned to their regular duties as a rail Supervisor without completing refresher training.

Over several months, the Office of Safety Investigations contacted the Rail Transportation management team to fulfill the documentation request confirming that Rail Supervisor #2 had completed the refresher training.

On September 3, 2025, over eight months after the event, Rail Supervisor #2 completed reinstruction training.

On September 8, 2025, the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) issued a requirement for Rail Transportation to implement a new corrective action, focused on ensuring transparency and timely completion of corrective actions.

On September 11, 2025, Rail Transportation was informed of the WMSC's request. On September 12, 2025, Rail Transportation and Safety Investigations collaborated with the following results:

- Rail Transportation requested to add Technical Training and Development management to the discussion and collaborative process.
- **Collaborative Efforts**
 - Rail Transportation and Safety Investigations
 - Bi-Weekly meetings to discuss the progress of Rail Transportation corrective actions.
 - Rail Transportation to develop a shared document of Re-Instruction/Re-Training progress.

On September 30, 2025, Rail Transportation, Technical Training and Development, and Safety Investigations collaborated with the following results:

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- Rail Transportation acknowledged that the collaborative initiatives established on September 12, 2025, are deemed adequate.
- Technical Training and Development has committed to providing support for the collaborative efforts. It has been noted that the department did not contribute to the delays experienced, which subsequently necessitated the implementation of additional corrective measures.
- **Collaborative Efforts**
 - Rail Transportation, Technical Training and Development, and Safety Investigations
 - Scheduled bi-weekly meetings between Rail Transportation and Safety Investigations to review the prior week's safety-related events and corrective action development. *[This action was completed on October 9, 2025]*
 - Rail Transportation will develop a document to share with Safety Investigations of Re-Instruction/Re-Training progress. *[This action was completed on October 9, 2025]*
 - Technical Training and Development will share with Rail Transportation and Safety Investigations a database, which will consist of all training or re-training requests stemming from accidents or incidents, and documentation when the training has been completed, finalized, and signed. *[This action was completed on October 1, 2025]*

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
09:08:28 hours	Train ID 724 was dispatched from West Falls Church Yard to West Falls Church Station as the Gap Train. [Radio OPS 4]
09:13:02 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted the RVO a permissive block to the turnback with a lunar at signal K99-06, with the new destination being Downtown Largo Station. <u>RVO on Train ID 724</u> : Acknowledged transmission. [Radio OPS 4]
09:16:03 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Rail Supervisor #1 to relieve the RVO on Train ID 724 at Ballston Station. <u>Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Acknowledged transmission. [Radio OPS 4]
09:29:23 hours	Rail Supervisor #2 contacted the MICC and advised that they were available at Federal Triangle Station to transport the train. [Phone BL/OR]
09:39:05 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised Rail Supervisor #1 that a relief operator was standing by at Federal Triangle Station. <u>Rail Supervisor #1</u> : Acknowledged transmission. [Radio OPS 2]
09:39:24 hours	<u>ERT RWIC</u> : Requested permission to perform a walking inspection from Federal Center SW to L'Enfant Plaza Station, track 1, AMF was in place at L'Enfant Plaza 8-car marker on track 1. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged transmission and advised ERT to go direct with the AMF. <u>ERT RWC</u> : Inquired the AMF via radio, did they copy? <u>AMF</u> : Responded, good copy, standing by at L'Enfant Plaza track 1, 8-car marker. <u>ERT RWIC</u> : Inquired if the Radio RTC copied direct. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and instructed personnel to stand by and stand clear. [Radio OPS2]

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Time	Description
09:41:00 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Announced to all trains on OPS 2 via radio that personnel were walking between Federal Center SW Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station, track 1. All RWP procedures in effect. [Radio OPS 2]
09:41:15 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised ERT to notify when the orange line train at Federal Center SW Station on track 1 departed. <u>ERT RWIC</u> : Acknowledged transmission. [Radio OPS 2]
09:41:32 hours	Rail Supervisor #2 relieved Rail Supervisor #1 on Train 724 at Federal Triangle Station, track 1, and took over operating the train. [CCTV]
09:41:55 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted ERT permission to enter the roadway to perform a walking inspection from Federal Center SW Station to L'Enfant Plaza Station track 1. Advised to look out for trains moving in both directions. <u>ERT RWIC</u> : Acknowledged transmission and repeated all instructions. [Radio OPS 2]
09:43:59 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Contacted Rail Supervisor #3. <u>Rail Supervisor #3</u> : Advised standing by at Stadium-Armory Station, track 1, waiting for Train ID 724. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised Train ID 724 was currently at Smithsonian Station. [Radio OPS 2]
09:50:35 hours	Train ID 724 departed L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1. [SPOTS]
09:50:57 hours	<u>ERT RWIC</u> : Reported to the Button RTC that the last train displaying No Passengers did not stop to be briefed by the AMF. <u>Button RTC</u> : Asked what train? <u>ERT RWIC</u> : Advised that one of the car numbers was 7471. <u>Button RTC</u> : Informed ERT that a supervisor was operating the train. <u>ERT RWIC</u> : Reported that the train kept going and never stopped. <u>Button RTC</u> : Inquired what time the incident occurred. <u>ERT RWIC</u> : Responded, 09:50.
	<u>Button RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Phone OPS 2]
09:51:45 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> advised the AOM. [Phone OPS 2]
09:52:09 hours	AOM advised the OM of the incident. [Phone Rail 2]
09:52:11 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Inquired if Rail Supervisor #2 had spoken to the AMF at L'Enfant Plaza Station, track 1. <u>Supervisor #2</u> : No response. [Radio OPS 2]
09:52:55 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Announced to all trains on OPS 2 via radio to stop at L'Enfant Plaza track 1, 8-car maker, and talk to the AMF. [Radio OPS 2]
09:53:11 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Inquired if Rail Supervisor #2 had spoken to the AMF at L'Enfant Plaza Station, track 1. <u>Rail Supervisor #2</u> : Advised they did not. [Radio OPS 2]

Time	Description
09:53:15 hours	<p><u>ERT RWIC</u>: Advised that two personnel were walking on the catwalk, and additional personnel were walking behind the handrail. As they were approaching the platform, the train never stopped.</p> <p><u>AOM</u>: Inquired if personnel were protected by the handrail.</p> <p><u>ERT RWIC</u>: Responded, yes.</p> <p><u>AOM</u>: Stated, so they just flew past personnel.</p> <p><u>ERT RWIC</u>: Responded, yes.</p> <p><u>AOM</u>: Acknowledged and asked what their current location was.</p> <p><u>ERT RWIC</u>: Advised that they were on the platform at L'Enfant Plaza Station and would advise via radio that personnel were clear of the roadway.</p> <p><u>AOM</u>: Advised that management would be notified. [Phone OPS 2]</p>
09:54:49 hours	<p><u>ERT RWIC</u>: Advised all personnel were clear of the roadway. No track defects were found between Federal Center and L'Enfant Plaza Station on track 1.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged transmission, clearing time 09:55 hours.</p> <p><u>ERT RWIC</u>: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]</p>
09:55:36 hours	<p><u>AOM</u>: Instructed Rail Supervisor #3 that upon relieving Rail Supervisor #2 off Train ID 724, have them contact the MICC.</p> <p><u>Rail Supervisor #3</u>: Acknowledged. [Phone Rail 2]</p>
09:57:36 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Advised Rail Supervisor #2 that the relief operator was located at Stadium Armory Station.</p> <p><u>Rail Supervisor #2</u>: No response. [Radio, OPS 2]</p>
10:01:03 hours	Rail Supervisor #3 took over operating Train ID 724 at Stadium-Armory Station track 1. [CCTV]
10:01:56 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Instructed Rail Supervisor #2 to give the AOM a landline.</p> <p><u>Rail Supervisor #2</u>: Inaudible transmission. [Radio OPS 2]</p>
10:12:50 hours	AOM informed the Division Superintendent of the incident. [Phone, Rail 2]
10:16:04 hours	OM advised the SIO of the incident. [Phone Rail 1]
10:30:00 hours	SIO granted an Event Scene Release. [SIO Log]
10:55:19 hours	Rail Supervisor #2 was removed from service. [Phone Rail 2]

****Note:** Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 1 – Shows Train ID 724 entering L'Enfant Plaza Station platform limits on track 1.

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The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer / Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS)
Adopted from Office of Chief Mechanical Officer IIT report with minor formatting and grammatical edits:

“IIT completed an analysis of data retrieved from Train ID 724 (L7434-35x7471x70-7352-53x7295x94T) that was reported for Improper RWP at L’Enfant Plaza on 12/12/2024 at 09:50 am.

Based on ER data and NVR video, Train ID 724 passed the 8-car marker at L’Enfant Plaza Station, track 1 at 18.28 mph with an AMF in position. The train consist comes to a complete stop 196 feet beyond the 8-car marker. The train road horn was activated 4 times, and the yard horn was activated 1 time, as the train was traveling within platform limits. There was no emergency brake application initiated and no wheel slip/slide condition during the time of the incident.


Based on the ER and VMDS data, there was no fault with the train that contributed to the cause of this incident. The train performed as commanded.”

Time	Description of Events	MC Position	Train Speed	Regulated Speed	ATP Speed Limit	Distance to 8-Car Marker
09:50:00	Train ID 724, with Lead Car 7434 entered L’Enfant Plaza station at speed 22.42 Mph, ATP Speed Limit was 28 Mph and Regulated Speed was 28 Mph, Master Controller in the Coast power Mode.	Coast	22.42 MPH	28 MPH	28 MPH	600 ft.
09:50:02	Road horn activated.	Coast	22.48 MPH	39 MPH	40 MPH	548 ft.
09:50:07	Master Controller placed at P1-P4.	P1-P4	18.70 MPH	35 MPH	35 MPH	379 ft.
09:50:08	Road horn activated.	P1-P4	17.73 MPH	35 MPH	35 MPH	363 ft.
09:50:10	Master Controller placed at Coast.	Coast	17.12 MPH	35 MPH	35 MPH	321 ft.
09:50:12	Road horn activated.	Coast	18.09 MPH	34 MPH	35 MPH	250 ft.
09:50:16	Road horn activated.	Coast	18.09 MPH	34 MPH	35 MPH	159 ft.
09:50:20	Yard Horn activated.	Coast	18.28 MPH	34 MPH	35 MPH	47 ft.
09:50:22	Train passes 8-Car marker at a speed of 18.28 Mph. NVR video shows AMF in-position.	Coast	18.28 MPH	34 MPH	35 MPH	0 ft.
09:50:24	ATP Speed limits dropped to 0 Mph.	Coast	18.34 MPH	34 MPH	0 MPH	-56 ft.
09:50:24	Regulated speed dropped to 0 Mph.	B1-B3	18.34 MPH	0 MPH	0 MPH	-83 ft.
09:50:25	Master Controller placed at B4.	B4	18.09 MPH	0 MPH	0 MPH	-88 ft.
09:50:34	Train came to a complete stop 196 ft. beyond the 8-car marker.	B4	0 MPH	0 MPH	0 MPH	-196 ft.
10:55:26.690	Master Controller placed in P5 Power position and train begins to move toward Federal Center Station	P5	0.24 MPH	34 MPH	45 MPH	

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Reviewed By: SAFE 707 – 03/15/2025
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Office of Rail Transportation

Excerpts adopted from RTRA Memorandum, dated January 15, 2025:

"On Thursday, December 12, 2024, at approximately 9:50am, track personnel reported non-revenue train 724 failed to stop at the eight {8} car marker and passed the AMF personnel in position on the platform at L'Enfant Plaza track 1. As a result of this report, you were removed from service and transported for post incident testing.

Supervisor you stated in your supervisor report, "At approximately 9:50am I rode pass a large group of employees on the platform. Five to six were at the bench two at the gate at the eight-car marker. Three more coming up the steps behind the end gate. I was never flagged to stop nor did I see a lantern. The three behind the end gate were coming up the steps protected by continuous hand rail. When I got to Capitol South MICC informed that I didn't stop for the AMF. I gave the train to unit and went to L'Enfant Pl. and waited for transport.

Your failure to maintain attention to your operational duties and exercise good judgment while in the performance of your duties is an injustice not only to our employees, but also to the integrity of Supervision. Your actions in this case are unacceptable and warrants immediate corrective actions. You will be scheduled for refresher training with ROQT to improve your situational awareness while in the performance of your duties (date to be determined)."

The Supervisor involved received disciplinary action as a result of this event.

Hire Date: April 5, 2002

Rail Operations Supervisor Start Date: October 16, 2016

Last Certification Date: August 14, 2024

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Interview Findings and Written Statements

As part of the investigation launched into the event, Safety interviewed one (1) person. The interview identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

Written Statement - Rail Supervisor #2

At approximately 9:50am I rode pass a large group of employees on the platform. Five to six were at the bench two at the gate at the eight-car marker. Three more coming up the steps behind the end gate. I was never flagged to stop nor did I see a lantern. The three behind the end gate were coming up the steps protected by continuous hand rail. When I got to Capitol South MICC informed that I didn't stop for the AMF. I gave the train to unit and went to L'Enfant Pl. and waited for transport.

Weather

On December 12, 2024, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 38°F, with clear skies, winds of 8.9 mph, and 49% humidity. L'Enfant Plaza Station is a two-level indoor station. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Washington, DC.

Related Rules and Procedures

17.22.5 Performing Work Under Advanced Mobile Flagging

- 17.22.5.1 All rail vehicles stopping at the passenger station's 8-car marker or end gate must be read the following script by each Advanced Flagger:

"There may be multiple work groups ahead. Contact ROCC and receive permission to proceed in Mode 2 - Level 1 at a speed not to exceed 35 mph until you reach the next passenger station."

- 17.22.5.2 If the Advanced Flagger hears multiple horn blasts from the rail vehicle the Advanced Flagger must make every effort to stop the rail vehicle by continuously displaying the stop hand signal using the orange flag.

- 17.22.5.3 If ANY rail vehicle moving in the direction of the Mobile Work Crew fails to stop at the Advanced Flagger's location, the Advanced Flagger shall:

- a. Immediately transmit via radio, "Emergency, emergency, emergency." Followed by identifying information and the nature of the emergency.
- b. Attempt to contact the RWIC via radio to ensure all personnel are clear of the roadway or in a place of safety, altering them to the approaching rail vehicle.
- c. Warn the Mobile Work Crew utilizing their air horn and whistle in short, rapid blasts.
- d. Report the incident to the Rail Traffic Controller as soon as possible.

Human Factors

Fatigue

We evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. Video of the incident was reviewed for signs of the Rail Supervisor's fatigue. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. The Rail Operations Supervisor reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

We evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The supervisor reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The supervisor worked one shift in the days leading up to the incident. The supervisor was awake for 7.33 hours at the time of the incident. The supervisor reported 6 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 8 hours which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that Rail Supervisor #2 complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Findings

- The Advance Mobile Flagger (AMF) was set up at the 8-car marker at L'Enfant Plaza Station Platform on track 1.
- Train ID 724 was a non-revenue train being transported from West Falls Church Yard Station to Downtown Largo Station.
- Rail Supervisor #1 was relieved at Federal Triangle Station by Rail Supervisor #2.
- Rail Supervisor #2 was operating Train ID 724 when they did not stop at the 8-car marker at L'Enfant Plaza Station, track 1, to be briefed by the AMF.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- The Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) notified the Button RTC of the incident.
- Rail Supervisor #3 took over the operation of Train ID 724.
- Rail Supervisor #2 was removed from service.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Improper Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) event on December 12, 2024, at L'Enfant Plaza Station was the Supervisor's lack of situational awareness when they failed to observe the AMF positioned at the 8-car marker with the required Personal Protection Equipment (PPE).

Recommended Corrective Actions

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Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
122099_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_001	The RTRA Supervisor will complete refresher training with an emphasis on station servicing and AMF procedures.	RTRA SRC	Completed
122099_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_002	Rail Transportation and Safety Investigations to establish Bi-Weekly meetings to discuss the progress of Rail Transportation corrective actions.	RTRA/SAFE	Completed
122099_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_003	Rail Transportation will develop a document to share with Safety Investigations of Re-Instruction/Re-Training progress.	RTRA	Completed
122099_SAFE CAPS_ROQT_003	Technical Training and Development will share with Rail Transportation and Safety Investigations a database, which will consist of all training or re-training requests stemming from accidents or incidents, and documentation when the training has been completed, finalized, and signed	ROQT	Completed

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Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

Rail Transportation Supervisor

The Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor, a WMATA employee with more than 22 years of service and 8 years of experience as an RTRA Supervisor, holds a current RWP Level 2 certification that expires on July 31, 2025. When asked questions relating to fatigue, they stated they were fully alert, and their sleep pattern did not change within the week leading to the incident, typically allowing between 6 hours of sleep on workdays.

During the interview, the RTRA Supervisor reported that their shift began at 03:55 hours on the day of the incident, and prior to the incident, they met the incident train for another RTRA Supervisor at the Federal Triangle Station and on their approach to Smithsonian Station they noticed a train ahead of them, and then suddenly they lost readouts. When they regained readouts, they started moving the train through the station at 25 MPH. When they noticed a large number of customers on the platform and WMATA personnel near the end gate, they began to sound the horn. The RTRA Supervisor stated that as they were approaching the end gate, it appeared that the WMATA personnel were clearing the area of protection, but no one flagged or attempted to stop the train.

When asked if there was a lantern at or near the 8-car marker on their approach, the RTRA Supervisor stated they did not see one, possibly because it was blocked by personnel.

When asked if they had heard track personnel requesting permission to perform walking inspections, the RTRA Supervisor stated they had heard one transmission regarding Eastern Market and a train requesting a block.

Also, during the interview, the RTRA Supervisor stated that radio communications were poor and had been for some time.

Appendix B – Photographs



Figure 2 – Depicts Supervisor 1 being relieved at Federal Triangle Station by Supervisor 2 at 09:41 hours.



Figure 2 – Depicts visual and verbal exchange of Train ID 724.

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Figure 3 – Depicts Supervisor 3 relieving Supervisor 2 at Stadium Armory Station at 10:01 hours.

Appendix C – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report



	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report	
		Incident Status: PRELIMINARY
GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION		
Incident Type:	RWP Violation	Delay (Minutes): N/A
Incident Date:	Thursday, December 12, 2024	Vehicles Involved: L-7434-7471-7352-7295
Incident Time:	9:50am	First Reported By: AMF Track Personnel
Location:	L'Enfant Plaza Track 1	
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:		
On Thursday, December 12, 2024 at approximately 9:50am, track personnel reported non-revenue train 724 failed to stop at the eight (8) car marker and passed the AMF personnel in position on the platform at L'Enfant Plaza track 1.		
Key Employees Involved & Employee Statements:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• [REDACTED]• Operator/Manager Rail Operations Supervisor [REDACTED] "Stated, at approximately 9:50am I rode pass a large group of employees on the platform. Five to six were at the bench two at the gate at the eight car marker. Three more coming up the steps behind the end gate. I was never flagged to stop nor did I see the lantern. The three behind the end gate were coming up the steps protected by continuous hand rail. When I got to Capitol South MCCC informed that I didn't stop for the AMF. I gave the train to [REDACTED] and went to L'Enfant Pl. and waited for transport. [REDACTED]"• [REDACTED] "Stated, At approximately 11:16am, I was instructed by Rail (1) at the MCCC to exit at Federal Center to transport Supervisor [REDACTED] for Post Incident Testing (RWP Violation). The incident occurred on track 1 between Capital South and Eastern Market.• Once I arrived at Federal Center, I could not locate him. [REDACTED] informed me that he was standing by at L'Enfant Plaza. I arrived at L'Enfant Plaza at 11:30am and located him at mezzanine [REDACTED]. At that time we proceeded to L'Enfant Plaza CHAW. No statement was given to me by Supervisor [REDACTED]. Transport information was entered into the RSDAR.• After Post Incident Testing was complete, Supervisor [REDACTED] cushioned to [REDACTED] was updated."		

Figure 3 – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report page 1.

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

Post Incident Testing & Employee History:

- ROS [REDACTED] was transported for post incident testing by [REDACTED]
- ROS [REDACTED] has been on the rail as a supervisor since October 16, 2016.
- ROS [REDACTED] has been employed by the Authority since April 5, 2002
- ROS [REDACTED] worked a total of 40 hours within the last seven (7) days. There were eleven (11) reported instances of overtime hours and no 8-hour rule violations.
- Last Certification Date: August 14, 2024
- There were no reported discrepancies with the employee's performance and/or fitness for duty.
- Recent Incidents – N/A

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT TIMELINE:

- 9: 50AM The MIIC notified the supervisor that he didn't stop at L'Enfant Plaza to get instructions from the AMF.
- 9:55AM The supervisor was relieved by unit [REDACTED]
- 11:16 AM Supervisor removed from service for post incident testing. Transported by Supervisor [REDACTED]

Figure 4 – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report page 2.

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident
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SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS & PENDING ISSUES:

- CCTV shows that the supervisor came into the station and didn't stop to acknowledge the AMF personnel at the eight (8) car marker.
- The AMF was standing in place with the lantern flashing and the flag in hand.
- Pending post incident test results.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

- The personnel involved will be issued the appropriate corrective action with ROQT pending the outcome of the investigation.

Root cause:

1. Failure to follow Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) procedures
2. Lack of judgment
3. Distraction

INCIDENT PHOTOS: ATTACH ANY SIGNIFICANT PHOTOS BASED ON THE INITIAL INCIDENT INVESTIGATION.



Figure 5 – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report page 3.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident
Investigation Report



Report
Prepared by: [REDACTED]

12/12/2024

Report
Reviewed by: _____

Figure 6 – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report page 4.

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Appendix D – Supervisors Incident Report

M RTRA Supervisor's Report		WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY		DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS—RAIL SERVICE Office of Rail Transportation	
Date	12/12/2024	Incident Time	9:50a	Incident Location (Station/Mezzanine #)	Lebanon Plaza
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #, Room #)		Transport 224		Track/Mezzanine #	
Incident Description		RWP violation			
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		N/C	y	
Name	Address			Injury?	
Name	Address			Injury?	
Name	Address			Injury?	
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person in Charge	Remarks		
Chronological Account of Incident					
Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion					
Your Arrival Time					
<p>At approximately 9:00am, I rode pass a large group of employees on the platform. Five to six were at the bench two at the gate at the right car matter. Three more coming up the steps behind the end gate. I was never flagged to stop nor did I see the lantern. The three behind the end gate were coming up the steps protected by continuous hand rail. When I got to capital south MICC informed that I didn't</p>					
Supervisor Submitting Report (include payroll #)	Date	Report Reviewed by	Date		
[REDACTED]	12/12/2024	[REDACTED]	12/12/2024		
50.437 09/16 REPORT MUST BE FAXED TO ROCC 202 962-2808 at end of tour					

Figure 7 – RTRA Supervisors Incident Report page 1.

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Reviewed By: SAFE 707 – 03/15/2025
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RTRA Supervisor's Report

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Details[continued from front]

stop for the AMF. I gave the train to
Unit 42 and went to the fast Pl. and waited
for transport. Unit 41

Key Findings (Detail below)

Supervisor Submitting Report (Initials)

Report Reviewed By (Initials)

REPORT MUST BE FAXED TO RICC 202 962-2808 at end of tour


Figure 8 – RTRA Supervisor Incident Report page 2.

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Appendix E – Why-Tree Analysis



Root Cause Analysis

E24988 – Improper RWP – L'Enfant Plaza Station

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