

Cap ID	CAP Status	Finding/Recommendation	Hazard Rating - Current & Historical	Anticipated Closure Date	Source
NTSB R-8-004-A	Open	Promptly implement appropriate technology that will automatically alert wayside workers of approaching trains and will automatically alert train operators when approaching areas with workers on or near the tracks.		03/01/23	<a href="#">Safety Directive 16-2 (12/15/2015)</a>
WMSC-20-C0042	Open	Finding 5: WMATA employees are not consistently following RWP Rule 5.12 for equipment calibration.	2C	07/21/26	<a href="#">RWP Audit (6/18/2020)</a>
WMSC-21-C0083	Open	Ten Metrorail structures have steel rocker bearings, which created a seismic risk in the event of an earthquake other seismic events.	4D	07/05/26	<a href="#">Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)</a>
WMSC-21-C0099	Open	A lack of an Intrusion Detection Warning (IDW) system where WMATA's own criteria require it.	2D	06/05/28	<a href="#">WMSC Directive (3/31/2021)</a>
WMSC-21-C0100	Open	Metrorail is not maintaining a fully functioning radio communications system in all rail yards and shops.	3C	12/28/26	<a href="#">WMSC Directive (4/30/2021)</a>
WMSC-21-C0120	Open	Finding 2: Metrorail ignores the minimum daily release period (rest period) requirements in its Fatigue Risk Management Policy.	3B	03/10/26	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>
WMSC-21-C0129	Open	Finding 11: WMATA does not have a documented procedure for and training to carry out fitness for duty checks prior to or during shifts on a regular basis for all covered employees as specified in the APTA fitness for Duty Standard.	3B	12/22/25	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>
WMSC-21-C0131	Open	Recommendation 2: Metrorail is not providing medical oversight of contractors and does not include any requirement in contracts that contractors meet WMATA medical, fatigue or hours of service standards.	4B	02/16/26	<a href="#">Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)</a>
WMSC-21-C0139	Open	The 7000 Series rehabilitation and subsystems overhaul program is being developed without full SAFE coordination, involvement or approval.	3C	03/17/26	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>
WMSC-21-C0143	Open	Metrorail does not consistently follow a standard process to address wheels out-of-round, to prevent cars with wheels out-of-round from operating, and to identify and address the root causes of wheels out-of-round.	3B	09/26/26	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>
WMSC-21-C0146	Open	Metrorail railcars do not include inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders in all operating compartments.	3D	10/17/26	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)</a>
WMSC-21-C0154	Open	Traction Power Maintenance employees do not get all required information and training to maintain equipment that they are directed to work on, and there is no process in place to ensure that personnel are trained on specific equipment prior to working on that equipment.	4D	05/11/27	<a href="#">High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)</a>
WMSC-22-C0173	Open	Finding 12: The exit stairwell from Rosslyn Station is not protected from obstructions, which creates a risk that the hatch will not be able to be opened in an emergency, trapping customers inside.	2D	10/05/26	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)</a>
WMSC-22-C0182	Open	Finding 2: Metrorail does not effectively identify, track, communicate and address operational hazards as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	3C	11/15/25	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>
WMSC-22-C0183	Open	Finding 3: Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard.	3C	12/15/26	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>
WMSC-22-C0193	Open	Finding 13: With frequent modifications due to temporary and permanent orders, and outdated versions of Metrorail's rulebook being distributed to personnel when hard copies are available, the latest Metrorail rules are not easily accessible to train operators. This creates document control issues and makes a rule requiring personnel to carry the latest version of the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) unrealistic.	4C	03/28/26	<a href="#">Rail Operations (4/7/22)</a>
WMSC-22-C0199	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail has not developed and implemented a comprehensive water intrusion and remediation program covering stations, elevators and escalators, which contributes to damage and deterioration of structures and other assets, to electrical hazards and to other safety risks.	4C	04/25/28	<a href="#">Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)</a>
WMSC-22-C0213	Open	Metrorail has an ineffective and insufficient inspection, maintenance and cleaning program for Automatic Train Control equipment, particularly including a lack of required tools, procedural compliance, and supervisory oversight for care of vital equipment housed in train control rooms, and is not maintaining the structural integrity of these ancillary rooms.	3E	12/19/26	<a href="#">ATC Room inspection, maintenance and cleaning program (8/4/2022)</a>
WMSC-22-C0216	Open	Finding 3: Metrorail is closing preventative maintenance work orders without correcting known deficiencies, which does not comply with its Systems Maintenance (SMNT) Maintenance Control Policy.	3B	03/02/26	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>
WMSC-22-C0217	Open	Finding 4: Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Metrorail closes communications related "corrective maintenance" (repair) tickets without effectively identifying, documenting and addressing issues.	3B	03/08/27	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>
WMSC-22-C0219	Open	Finding 6: Metrorail has insufficient training for communications personnel, including on-the-job training (OJT) that SMNT itself describes as deficient, and a lack of requirements to ensure that personnel only work on equipment they are trained on and capable of maintaining as required by the PTASP.	2A	05/23/28	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>
WMSC-22-C0222	Open	Finding 9: Metrorail communications rooms have signs of recurring water, dirt and dust intrusion. Metrorail is also improperly storing equipment in these rooms. Components in these rooms therefore may not function as required for the safety of riders, workers and first responders.	2C	06/23/26	<a href="#">Communications Systems (9/29/2022)</a>
WMSC-22-C0226	Open	Finding 2: Metrorail is not maintaining track infrastructure in rail yards in accordance with TRST-1000 requirements and related standards. This has introduced operational hazards.		12/30/25	<a href="#">Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)</a>
WMSC-23-C0240	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail does not ensure the use of adequate fall protection when working on or around RMM.	3D	10/20/25	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)</a>
WMSC-23-C0241	Open	Finding 2: Metrorail is not effectively tracking and mitigating hazards related to RMM maintenance and operations in accordance with its PTASP.	3C	02/09/26	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)</a>
WMSC-23-C0242	Open	Finding 3: Metrorail has not documented its practices regarding adjustments to its contractor RMM inspection procedures.	4E	01/25/26	<a href="#">Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)</a>
WMSC-24-C0251	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.	2D	01/10/28	<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0252	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.	2D	02/08/27	<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0253	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.	2D	07/20/26	<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0254	Open	Finding 2: Metrorail does not review, analyze, and act upon available safety data about the health and functionality of the Automatic Train Control system and subsystems as required by Metrorail's Agency Safety Plan. Therefore, Metrorail's ATC Engineering cannot reliably or proactively determine whether or not the ATC system and subsystems are or will be functioning as designed to provide for the safety of riders and workers.	2D	04/12/27	<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0255	In development	Finding 3: Metrorail is putting its personnel at risk due to health hazards such as damaged and repositioned materials marked as containing asbestos that are not being identified and managed as required by its Agency Safety Plan.			<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0256	Open	Finding 4: Metrorail is not systematically identifying, tracking, and mitigating hazards related to automatic train control and signaling as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	2D	09/15/26	<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0257	Open	Finding 5: Metrorail is not maintaining its books of plans in accordance with its requirements.	2D	10/24/26	<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0258	Open	Recommendation 1: Metrorail has not determined the required staffing for ATC and Signals.	3B	11/10/26	<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0259	Open	Recommendation 2: Metrorail does not ensure that lessons learned from prior projects are consistently shared with all relevant personnel responsible for ATC and Signals.	2D	11/17/25	<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0260	Open	Recommendation 3: Metrorail does not have a procedure for the removal of hang tags in Train Control Rooms that indicate temporary modifications. This has led to many rooms having such "temporary" hang tags in place for decades.	2D	02/15/27	<a href="#">ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0261	Open	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	2D	03/15/27	<a href="#">Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0262	Open	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	3D	03/14/28	<a href="#">Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0263	Open	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	3D	02/02/26	<a href="#">Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0264	Open	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	3D	12/30/25	<a href="#">Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0265	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail is not consistently identifying, addressing, and preventing water intrusion in power rooms.	2D	08/23/27	<a href="#">Power Systems (2/27/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0266	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail is not performing its train operator certification activities reliably and consistently in accordance with its safety requirements specified in its Agency Safety Plan and the associated Performance Standardization on Program Manual. Therefore, Metrorail is not ensuring that its trains are only operated by personnel who have demonstrated the skills required to do so safely.	3C	05/11/26	<a href="#">Train Operator Certification Order (2/28/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0269	Open	Finding 2: Metrorail is not conducting retraining of personnel who do not pass certification exams as required by its Performance Standardization Program Manual, and is not consistently retesting these personnel as specified in its safety procedures.	3C	02/02/26	<a href="#">Train Operator Certification Order (2/28/2024)</a>
WMSC-24-C0270	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail is not carrying out railcar maintenance and inspection tasks as specified by its procedures.	2D	08/10/26	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0271	Open	Finding 2: Metrorail is training railcar personnel on outdated procedures.	3D	04/13/27	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0272	In development	Finding 3: Metrorail is not meeting life-safety and occupational safety and health requirements in railcar maintenance facilities.			<a href="#">Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0273	Open	Finding 4: Metrorail is not identifying and mitigating hazards related to railcars and railcar personnel.	2D	03/16/26	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0277	Open	Recommendation 1: Metrorail is not tracking the shelf life of railcar parts that decay over time and therefore have a limited shelf life	3D	01/12/26	<a href="#">Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0280	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety.	1E	10/26/26	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0281	Open	Finding 2: Metrorail is not providing its personnel with up-to-date and accessible information about the locations where additional Roadway Worker Protection is required to prevent serious injury or death.	1E	07/18/26	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0282	Open	Finding 3: Metrorail is not systematically identifying, tracking, and mitigating hazards related to Roadway Worker Protection as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	2D	03/17/26	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0283	Open	Finding 4: Metrorail is training and qualifying personnel on outdated Roadway Worker Protection-related procedures and rules.	1D	02/03/26	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0284	Open	Finding 5: Metrorail has no process to ensure that areas requiring additional Roadway Worker Protection are accurately identified on an ongoing basis.	1E	05/02/27	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0285	Open	Finding 6: Metrorail directs its personnel to use forms of protection without training on the proper use of the protection. Specifically, Metrorail has no training or qualification related to local control. This contributes to an inconsistent application of Roadway Worker Protection rules.	1D	10/11/27	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0286	Open	Finding 7: Metrorail is not following its existing safety rules and does not have adequate training and supervisory oversight to ensure safe operation under mobile command.	1E	02/03/26	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0287	Open	Finding 8: Metrorail has no controls to ensure that rules being applied in areas it designates as an 'Authorized Construction Site' provide the same or greater level of protection for roadway workers as those workers have in other parts of the WMATA Rail System.	1E	12/15/26	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>

WMSC-24-C0288	Open	Finding 9: Metrorail is providing RWP qualifications without following the listed requirements for those qualifications.	1D	05/09/28	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0289	Open	Finding 10: Metrorail is not following its procedures regarding Roadway Worker Protection Training.	1D	01/12/27	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0290	Open	Finding 11: Metrorail is not providing critical roadway worker-related safety information and training. Instructors do not follow the standardized curriculum and omit materials.	1D	06/16/26	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0291	Open	Finding 12: Metrorail is providing incorrect information about cardinal rules and incomplete testing for non-English speaking contractors in Roadway Worker Protection Training.	1E	03/16/27	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-24-C0292	Open	Finding 13: Metrorail requires on-the-job Roadway Worker Protection training without outlining the requirements or process for this training.	1E	10/24/28	<a href="#">Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)</a>
WMSC-25-C0293	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail does not have a reliable communication system for operations or emergencies.	1D	09/21/27	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (12/29/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0294	Open	Finding 2: Metrorail Emergency Trip Stations (ETS) located throughout the system are not treated as fire life safety assets.	NA	04/06/27	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (12/29/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0295A	Open	Finding 3: Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.		04/14/26	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (12/29/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0295B	Open	Finding 3: Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.		03/16/27	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (12/29/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0295C	Open	Finding 3: Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.		08/03/27	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (12/29/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0296	Open	Finding 4: Metrorail is using emergency radio operations channel 6 although the channel is not ready for use.	4A	12/22/26	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (12/29/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0297	Open	Finding 5: Metrorail is not contacting jurisdictional emergency services immediately upon identification of fire and smoke on the Metrorail system.	NA	07/21/26	<a href="#">Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (12/29/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0298	Open	Finding 1: Metrorail does not have a sufficient number of rail traffic controllers and turnover is increasing.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0299	In development	Finding 2: Rail traffic controller written assessments, final assessments, and certification tests present conflicting data regarding an individual's aptitude.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0300	In development	Finding 3: Metrorail does not provide refresher training to rail vehicle operators on incidents and emergencies.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0301	In development	Finding 4: Metrorail's Train the Trainer (T3) program for Rail Training is not defined by Metrorail's procedures.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0302	Open	Finding 5: Metrorail revised ATC local control procedures without first informing all affected staff including rail traffic controllers.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0303	Open	Finding 6: Rail traffic controller consoles have been manipulated without their knowledge.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0304	In development	Finding 7: Metrorail uses Microsoft Teams chats during safety events but has not demonstrated a review of these records when determining the facts of these events.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0305	Open	Finding 8: Metrorail documents have not been updated on the required cadence.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0306	Open	Finding 9: Metrorail personnel are not following Metrorail radio transmission rules such as for train identification and location information.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0307	In development	Recommendation 1: Metrorail 'Service Disruption' calls during safety events are led by personnel who are actively managing the event rather than the designated role (Metro 1).			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0308	In development	Recommendation 2: Rail traffic controllers Advanced Information Management (AIM) system alarms are not standardized across rail traffic controller desks and personnel are not trained on how to arrange their alarm screens.			<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0309	Open	Recommendation 3: Metrorail does not evaluate the effectiveness of Line Platform Instructors (LPI).	4D	12/19/28	<a href="#">Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0310	Open	Metrorail is not following its own written process to ensure and document that its roadway workers in charge have demonstrated the knowledge and skills required to do their job safely.	1B	06/13/28	<a href="#">Finding requiring Metrorail to propose a Corrective Action Plan related to Level IV Roadway Worker Protection Qualification (09/04/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0311	In development	Finding 1: Metrorail elevators and escalators mechanics are not reviewing job hazard analyses as required by Metrorail procedures.			<a href="#">Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0312	In development	Finding 2: Metrorail does not proactively monitor calibration expiration for elevators and escalators equipment.			<a href="#">Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0313	In development	Finding 3: Metrorail personnel are entering elevator pits which have active electrical circuits with standing water present.			<a href="#">Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0314	In development	Finding 4: Metrorail elevator and escalator personnel are not trained on fall protection requirements listed within its job hazard analyses.			<a href="#">Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0315	In development	Finding 5: Metrorail is not maintaining or displaying elevator or escalator certificates on-site as required by local jurisdictions.			<a href="#">Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0316	In development	Recommendation 1: Metrorail elevator and escalator job descriptions are incomplete and a subset do not reflect current job responsibilities.			<a href="#">Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)</a>
WMSC-25-C0317	In development	Recommendation 2: Metrorail's Office of Elevators and Escalators Services uses multiple systems to capture data which could impair data management and result in discrepancies.			<a href="#">Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)</a>