

**W-0412 – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement at Grosvenor-Strathmore Station – February 23, 2025****Document Purpose**

*This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting January 20, 2026.*

*WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.*

**Safety event summary:**

On Sunday, February 23, 2025, a Train Operator moved Train 155 with no speed commands and without permission. At the time of the event, all Red Line trains were operating between Shady Grove and Medical Center stations due to scheduled track work. All train operators were instructed to switch from Automatic Train Operations (ATO) to manual operations at Grosvenor-Strathmore Station before leaving the Grosvenor-Strathmore Station, in approach to Medical Center Station. Medical Center Station was operating as a temporary terminal, and train operators were instructed to switch from Radio Ops 1 to New Yard 1 Radio Ops when in approach to communicate with the terminal supervisor.

According to an investigative review of closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage, at 4:50 p.m., The Train Operator of Train 155 stopped at the end gate, serviced Grosvenor-Strathmore Station, and departed the station. A review of downloaded data revealed that the train operator had transitioned from ATO to manual mode and then entered Stop and Proceed mode.

At 4:52 p.m., while monitoring their Advanced Information Management System (AIMS), the Button Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) noticed that Train 155 had departed Grosvenor-Strathmore Station, track 1, without speed commands and permission. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller tried to contact the Train Operator twice but was unsuccessful. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller then notified the Terminal Supervisor and asked them to try to contact the Train Operator.

During an investigative interview, the Train Operator stated that they switched the console radio from Ops 1 because there was no reason to talk to Ops 1 since Medical Center Station was the last station due to track work.



The turnback sign<sup>1</sup> at the station was set to red. When a turn back sign is red a train in approach to it loses speed commands while on the platform, requiring train operators to contact a rail traffic controller in the the control center for permission to move their train, in this case, toward Medical Center Station. . At 4:53 p.m., the Button Rail Traffic Controller informed the Terminal Supervisor at Medical Center Station that the Train Operator of Train 155 was moving their train without speed commands and permission.

The Radio Rail Traffic Controller dispatched a Rail Supervisor to relieve the Rail Vehicle Operator from duty for post-event testing. Train 155 was removed from service for post-event inspection.

The probable cause and contributing factors leading to this safety event include:

- Failure to follow established written policies and procedures, including Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) Section 9.8.1 Rail Vehicle Operators shall not move trains with zero speed commands except after notifying the Rail Traffic Controller or Terminal Supervisor and being given permission to move with zero speed commands and either a permissive block going with traffic or an absolute block going against traffic.

Investigation W-0412 led to specific recommended corrective actions (RCA), including:

- The Train Operator attended refresher training to review MOR 9.8 Speed Commands, 9.8.1, and 9.8.3. The Train Operator was also required to review the RTRA personnel's Notice Red Signal/Zero Speed commands compliance.
- Metrorail developed and distributed a Staying Focused: Preventing Red Signal Overruns and Zero Speed Commands campaign.

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<sup>1</sup> Turnback Signal: A simulated controlled wayside signal located at a turnback point, when approached in its “non-cleared” state used to initiate automatic turnback operation through an interlocking, by interrupting the speed commands which would otherwise be transmitted for the block. The simulated signal track location is marked by a turnback sign.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety  
Office of Safety Investigations

**FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E25305**

<b>Date of Event:</b>	February 23, 2025
<b>Type of Event:</b>	O-7; Improper Rail Vehicle Movement
<b>Incident Time:</b>	16:50 Hours
<b>Location:</b>	Grosvenor Strathmore Station
<b>Time and How received by Safety:</b>	17:07 Hours, Safety Information Official (SIO)
<b>Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:</b>	18:09 Hours
<b>Responding Safety Officers:</b>	None
<b>Rail Vehicle:</b>	Train ID#155 (L3043-42x3013-12x3060-61T)
<b>Injuries:</b>	None
<b>Damage:</b>	None
<b>Emergency Responders:</b>	None
<b>Safety Management System Incidents/Accidents (SMS I/A) Incident Number:</b>	20250228#124189

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Incident Date: 02/23/2025 Time: 16:50 hours  
Final Report – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement Rev. 1  
E25305

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 03/14/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 707 – 05/01/2025  
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# Grosvenor Station – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement

February 23, 2025

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AIMS</b>	Advanced Information Management System
<b>AOM</b>	Assistant Operations Manager
<b>ARS</b>	Audio Recording System
<b>ATO</b>	Automatic Train Operation
<b>CCTV</b>	Closed-Circuit Television
<b>CMOR</b>	Chief Mechanical Officer Rail
<b>IIT</b>	Incident Investigation Team
<b>MICC</b>	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
<b>MOR</b>	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
<b>OM</b>	Operations Manager
<b>ROS</b>	Rail Operations Supervisor
<b>RTC</b>	Rail Traffic Controller
<b>RTRA</b>	Office of Rail Transportation
<b>RVO</b>	Rail Vehicle Operator
<b>RWP</b>	Roadway Worker Protection
<b>SIO</b>	Safety Information Official
<b>SMS</b>	Safety Measurement System
<b>VMDS</b>	Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System
<b>WMATA</b>	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
<b>WMSC</b>	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Executive Summary**

*\*Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. \**

On Sunday, February 23, 2025, Red Line trains were operating between Shady Grove Station and Medical Center Station due to scheduled track maintenance. At the time of the event, all trains were operating in Automatic Train Operation (ATO) and switching modes of operation at Grosvenor Station with permission before exiting the station.

At 16:52 hours, a Button Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) noticed via the Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) that Train ID 155 had moved from Grosvenor Station Track 1 without permission and notified the Terminal Supervisor at Grosvenor Station.

The Radio RTC attempted to contact the Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) but was unsuccessful.

At 16:53 hours, the Button RTC contacted the Terminal Supervisor at Medical Center Station and informed them of the event.

In adherence to Standard Operating Procedure 102-01-02, which outlines the protocol for Removing an Employee from Service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio RTC dispatched a Rail Supervisor to relieve the Rail Vehicle Operator from duty for post-incident testing.


In accordance with the Office of the Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) Incident Investigation Team (IIT) Operations Administrative Policy (OAP) 102.06, the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) promptly initiated the removal of Train ID 155 from revenue service for post-incident investigative measures. This action adhered to the Rail Vehicle Event Investigation Policy, ensuring a comprehensive examination of the incident.

The probable cause of the Improper Rail Vehicle Movement event on February 23, 2025, at Grosvenor Station was that the RVO did not follow the established procedures. The RVO did not contact the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) to report that they did not have speed commands before activating stop and proceed.

## Incident Site

Grosvenor Station is an outdoor station with a center platform and direct fixation tracks with an interlocking on the outbound end of the station.

## Field Sketch/Schematics



\*This picture is not to scale. The yellow star indicates the approximate location where Train 155 moved without speed commands.

## Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

## Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Improper Rail Vehicle Movement event at the Grosvenor Station on February 23, 2025, Safety dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. Safety team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through video and document review
- Formal Interviews – Safety interviewed one individual as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Safety interviewed the following individual:
  - Rail Vehicle Operator

- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
  - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
  - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
  - Rail Vehicle Operator 30-day Work History
  - Rail Vehicle Operator Incident Report
  - Rail Vehicle Operator Training Record
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
  - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
  - Closed-circuit television (CCTV)
  - Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS)
  - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

## Investigation

On Sunday, February 23, 2025, Red Line trains were operating between Shady Grove Station and Medical Center Station due to scheduled track maintenance. Medical Center Station was operating as a temporary terminal which RVO's were instructed to switch to New Yard 1 Radio ops when in approach to communicate with the terminal supervisor.

According to Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), at 16:50 hours, Train ID 155, a six-car 3000 series train (L3043-42x3013-12x3060-61T), stopped at end gate with all cars on the platform and serviced Grosvenor Station. Thirty-four seconds later, the RVO closed the train doors and departed the station southbound.



Figure 1 - Train ID 155 is exiting Grosvenor Station

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The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) and Incident Investigation Team (IIT) data download from Train ID 155 operating car 3043 revealed that at 16:52 hours, the mode selector switch transitioned from ATO to manual forward and Stop and Proceed was initiated while the train doors were open.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that at 16:52 hours, the Radio RTC attempted to contact the RVO of Train ID 155 two times, but there was no response.

During the formal interview, the RVO stated that while servicing Grosvenor Station, they switched the console radio to New Yard 1 <sup>1</sup>Ops from Ops 1 because there was no reason to talk to Ops 1 since Medical Center Station was the last station due to the weekend track work.

At 16:53 hours, the Button RTC informed the Terminal Supervisor at Medical Center Station that Train ID 155 was moving without permission due to the turnback on Track 1 being red. The Button RTC knew the red turnback would cause all trains to lose their speed commands while on the platform to assure that the RVOs talk to the MIIC prior to departing Grosvenor Station on Track 1 for proper spacing of trains in and out of Medical Center Station.

The Terminal Supervisor at Medical Center Station informed the Button RTC that a Rail Transportation Supervisor (ROS) was located on site and that they would contact the RVO upon arrival.

The Terminal supervisor contacted the Assistant Superintendent at Shady Grove Division and informed them of this incident, who instructed the Terminal Supervisor to remove the RVO from service.

AIMS playback confirmed that at 16:51 hours, Train ID 155 began moving towards Medical Center Station on Track 1 while the turnback was still displaying a red aspect. The VMDS analysis revealed that the speed commands dropped to zero as the train stopped at Grosvenor Station.

At 16:52 hours, the mode selector switch was moved to forward, and then the stop and proceed mode was initiated. The master controller was placed in P5, and the train began to move.

The Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications, performed a radio operational test at Grosvenor Station Track 1, and no radio communication issues were found during this testing.

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<sup>1</sup> New Yard 1 shows as the Radio Channel on the handheld and console radios.

## Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
16:50:29 hours	Train ID 155 arrives at Grosvenor Station and stops at the end gate and services station. [CCTV]
16:51:03 hours	Train ID 155 begins to depart Grosvenor Station. [CCTV]
16:51:34 hours	Train ID 155 departed Grosvenor Station. [CCTV]
16:52:00 hours	RVO switched from ATO to Manual mode. [CMOR IIT]
16:52:23 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Tried to contact Train ID 155 twice [Radio Ops 1]
16:53:01 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Contacted Terminal Supervisor at Medical Center and instructed them to give them a landline call. [Radio Ops 1]
16:53:39 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Informed the Terminal Supervisor that Train ID 155 was moving without speed commands. [Phone Ops 1]
16:53:47 hours	<u>ROS</u> : Informed the Terminal Supervisor at Medical Center Station that they are in approach. [Radio New YD1 <sup>2</sup> ]
17:04:07 hours	<u>Shady Grove Assistant Superintendent</u> : Inquired if someone had moved without speed commands with the AOM [Phone MICC Rail 2]
17:05:42 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Contacted the Button RTC to confirm that Train ID 155 moved without speed commands. <u>Button RTC</u> : Verified that Train ID 155 moved without speed commands due to the turnback at Grosvenor turnback was set as a red signal so that all RVOs contacted Ops. 1 prior to departing to assure proper spacing in and out of Medical Center Station. [Phone Ops 1]
17:07:13 hours	<u>OM</u> : Informed Safety Information Officer of Train ID 155 moving without speed commands. [Phone MICC Rail 1]
17:07:51 hours	<u>AOM</u> : Informed OM that Train ID 155 was moving without speed commands and that RVO was being removed from service. [Phone MICC Rail 2]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

<sup>2</sup> The ARS display for New Yard 1.

## Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 2 - Showing Train ID 155 in manual operation mode the yellow circle shows the red turnback.

### The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer / Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS) Adopted from Office of the Chief Mechanical Officer IIT report with minor formatting and grammatical edits:

The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer (CMOR) and Incident Investigation Team (IIT) analyzed the downloaded data.

No mechanical defects that could have contributed to the incident were identified during the data analysis. The train operated as designed and responded to the commands entered through the Master Controller. In short, the speed commands were removed, the stop and proceed were initiated after the station was serviced, and the train proceeded to move inbound.

Time	Description of Events	Master Controller Position	Speed (mph)	Speed Limit (mph)
16:51:43	Speed commands dropped as the train stopped at the 8-car marker.	A/S	5	0
16:51:48	Doors opened and station was serviced.	A/S	0	0
16:52:00	Mode Selector Switch was moved to Manual Forward (train transition from ATO to Man).	B4	0	0
16:52:04	Stop and Proceed was initiated.	B4	0	1
16:52:17	Doors Closed.	B5	0	1
16:52:19	Master Controller was placed in P5 and Train 155 started moving without speed commands	P5	1	1
16:53:29	Train 155 moved a total of 1123 feet without speed commands at speeds no greater than 14 mph. Speed commands resumed at this point and train continued in service.	B3	12	55

Figure 3 - Timeline of Events.




Figure 4 - Data Download from Train ID 155, lead car 3043.

## Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications

The Office of System Maintenance and Office of Radio Communications performed a radio operational test at Grosvenor Station Track 1, and no radio communication issues were found during this testing.

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## Office of Rail Transportation

*Adopted from the Office of Rail Transportation report:*

On Sunday, February 23, 2025, at approximately 16:50 hours, MICC RTC contacted the Medical Center Terminal Supervisor to notify them of Train ID 155 RVO moving the train without speed commands, leaving Grosvenor Track 1 ROS contacted Shady Grove Assistant Superintendent to notify of the violation and get approval to remove the RVO from service.

### Interview Findings and Written Statements

*As part of the investigation launched into the event, Safety interviewed one person. The interview identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.*

#### RVO

- The RVO stated that they switched their radio channels at Grosvenor Station from Ops 1 to New Yard 1 Ops.

#### **Weather**

On February 23, 2025, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 52°F, with fair skies, winds of 6 mph, and 22% humidity. The weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Rockville, Maryland.

### Related Rules and Procedures

#### Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)

**9.8.1** Rail Vehicle Operators shall not move trains with zero speed commands except after notifying the Rail Traffic Controller or Terminal Supervisor and being given permission to move with zero speed commands and either a permissive block going with traffic or an absolute block going against traffic.

### Human Factors

#### Evidence of Fatigue

A Safety Investigator examined signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present during the incident. No video of the person involved was available to ascertain whether signs of fatigue were present. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The rail vehicle operator reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue at the time leading up to the incident.

#### Fatigue Risk

A Safety Investigator evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Rail Vehicle Operator reported some variation in sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The Rail Vehicle Operator worked the day shift on the days leading up to the incident. The Rail Vehicle Operator was awake for three hours at the time of the incident. The Rail Vehicle Operator reported eleven hours and thirty minutes of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. This was more than the Rail Vehicle Operator's usual workday sleep durations. The off-duty

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period was sixty-three hours and thirty-three minutes, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. The Rail Vehicle Operator reported no issues with sleep.

### Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Rail Vehicle Operator complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

### Findings

- Train ID 155's speed commands dropped out when the train berthed at Grosvenor Station.
- The RVO of Train ID 155 changed modes of operation while at Grosvenor platform, Track 1, without permission from the MICC.
- The RVO couldn't hear the MICC trying to contact them because the radio channel was changed while on the platform at Grosvenor.

### Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- The RVO was removed from service for post-incident testing.
- Train ID 155 was removed from service for post-incident inspection.

### Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Improper Rail Vehicle Movement event on February 23, 2025, at Grosvenor Station was that the RVO was rushing and not following the established procedures. The RVO did not contact the MICC to report that they did not have speed commands before activating stop and proceed.

### Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
124189_SAFE CAPS_RTRA _001	RVO will attend refresher training to review MOR 9.8 Speed Commands, 9.8.1, 9.8.2, and 9.8.3. RVO will also review the RTRA personnel's Notice Red Signal/Zero Speed commands compliance.	RTRA SRC	Completed
124189_SAFE CAPS_RTRA _002	RTRA will develop and distribute a Staying Focused: Preventing Red Signal Overruns and Zero Speed Commands campaign.	RTRA SRC	Completed

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## **Appendices**

### **Appendix A – Interview Summary**

*The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.*

#### **RVO**

The Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) is a WMATA employee with 4 years of service and 1 year of experience as an RVO. The RVO holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in December 2025.

During the formal interview, the RVO stated that they were on their first trip of the day. A rail supervisor informed them that they had moved the train without speed commands at Grosvenor Station, but to their knowledge, they had never lost speed commands.

The RVO stated that they properly berthed at the 8-car marker at Grosvenor Station, serviced the platform, switched to New Yard 1 Ops, and contacted the Supervisor at Medical Center Station. They properly berthed the train at Medical Center Station, cleared the signal at Medical Center Station, and were relieved from service at Medical Center Station after being informed of moving the train without speed commands.

The RVO stated that Grosvenor Station is a very hot spot of no communication, so it could be that the MICC was trying to contact them. However, because they had all the necessary train commands, there was no need to be contacted, and this is why they were confused about where the incident happened.

## Appendix B – Incident Reports

WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page _____ of _____			
Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents.			
Date: <u>2/23/25</u>	Incident Time: <u>6:50p</u>	Time Reported: <u>6:50p</u>	Reported by: Customer <input type="checkbox"/> Employee <input type="checkbox"/> ROCC <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Location</b>			
Station: <u>Medical center</u>	Mezzanine: <u>N/A</u>	Track #/Destination: <u>1 Medical center</u>	Train Marker/Signal Number:
<b>TYPE OF INCIDENT</b>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Property Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Smoke	<input type="checkbox"/> Fire	<input type="checkbox"/> Customer Complaint
<input type="checkbox"/> Customer Injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Customer Illness	<input type="checkbox"/> Employee Injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Employee Illness
<input type="checkbox"/> Criminal Activity	<input type="checkbox"/> Elevator Entrapment	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rail Vehicle Incident	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Explain in description of incident)
<b>WEATHER</b>		<b>LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)</b>	<b>LIGHTING (artificial lighting)</b>
Cloudy <input type="checkbox"/>	Rain <input type="checkbox"/>	Down/Dusk <input type="checkbox"/> Daylight <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Lights On <input type="checkbox"/> Lights Off <input type="checkbox"/>
Snow <input type="checkbox"/>	Sleet/Ice <input type="checkbox"/>	Dark <input type="checkbox"/> Tunnel/Underground <input type="checkbox"/>	Lights Not Working <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>STATION INCIDENTS:</b> Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EDC			
Elevator/Escalator: <u>N/A</u>	AFC #: _____	Room Number/Location: _____	
Failure Number(s): _____			
Parking Lot <input type="checkbox"/> Paid Area <input type="checkbox"/> Free Area <input type="checkbox"/> Garage <input type="checkbox"/> Station Entrance <input type="checkbox"/> Stairway # _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Platform <input type="checkbox"/> Ancillary Room <input type="checkbox"/>			
Injury/Illness reported aboard Train <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>			
Name/Department of PI/NTAEC or other WMATA responder: <u>RTRA</u>			
<b>TRAIN INCIDENTS</b>			
Train ID: <u>155</u>	Destination: <u>Medical</u>	Car Numbers(list all cars in consist): _____	Lead Car: _____
Name/Department of CMNT/DMST or other WMATA responder: <u>RTRA</u>			
<b>DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT:</b> Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.			
Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.			
<p>central said I moved the train w/o speed commands</p> <p>I had speed commands the whole time. NOT SURE when the incident occurred.</p>			
<b>Employee Completing Report</b> Employee Name: _____ Employee # _____ Date: <u>2/23/25</u> Division: <u>Shady Grove</u> _____			
<b>To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager</b> Supervisor Name (print): _____ Supervisor Signature: _____ Employee # _____ Date: _____ Action taken/needed: _____ SMS Number: _____			
<small>50-7530-04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators, retains a copy for use of elevator/escalator inspectors</small>			

Figure 5 - RVO's Incident Report.

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RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT				
Date 2/23/2025	Incident Time 504p	Incident Location (Station Mezzanine #) Medical Center	Track/Mezzanine # Track 1	
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) Train ID 155 Car# 3042x3013x3060				
Incident Description Moving without speed commands / Post Incident				
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
[REDACTED]		Yes	Shady Grove	Yes
Name N/A	Address	N/A	Injury?	N/A
Name N/A	Address	N/A	Injury?	N/A
Name N/A	Address	N/A	Injury?	N/A
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks	
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	

Chronological Account of Incident

459 Central contacted Medical Center terminal about the operator on 155 moving without speed commands in approach to Medical Center Track 1

504p Terminal Supervisor [REDACTED] informed Supervisor [REDACTED] to take operator [REDACTED] out of service with post incident

509p Supervisor [REDACTED] notified Operator [REDACTED] of incident and reason for being taken out of service. Departed Medical Center with Operator [REDACTED] to perform post incident

602p Arrived at Post incident location with Operator [REDACTED] (L'Enfante Plaza)

629p Operator [REDACTED] conducted interview with Safety via virtual meeting at L'Enfante Plaza

653p Operator [REDACTED] conducted and completed interview with Safety and departed back to Shady Grove

822p Arrived at Shady Grove with operator 840p All necessary personal contacted and documentation submitted

(Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)

Your Arrival Time: 504p

Supervisor Submitting Report	(Payroll #)	Date	Report Reviewed By	Date
[REDACTED]		2/23/2025		
Report must be faxed to ROCC 202-962-2808 at end of Tour				

Figure 6 - ROS Report.

Incident Date: 02/23/2025 Time: 16:50 hours  
Final Report – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement Rev. 1  
E25305

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 03/14/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 707 – 05/01/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 05/01/2025

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## Appendix C – Work Order



### Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 1  
MXAZP

Work Order #: 19349786  
Type: CM

Status: CLOSE  
03/11/2025 23:20

\*19349786\*

Work Description: A11/A10, Safety request Radio operational test Track#1  
Job Plan Description:


Work Information									
Asset: 60609	RADIO, CRCS, TUNNEL INFRASTRUCTURE, HEADEND, A09	Owning Office: SAMS-TSSM-SHOP	Parent:						
Asset Tag:		Maintenance Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO	Create Date: 03/11/2025 07:48						
Asset S/N: A09CRC SHE		Labor Group: COMMR3RADO	Actual Start: 03/11/2025 12:38						
Location: 6641	A09, BETHESDA, STATION, PLATFORM, ROOM 203, OPERATIONS ROOM	Crew:	Actual Comp: 03/11/2025 12:38						
Work Location:		Lead: [REDACTED]	Item: N60040001						
Failure Class: COMR004	CRC TUNNEL EQUIPMENT	GL Account: WMATA-02-33540-50499280-042-*****-OPR*							
Problem Code: 3663	UPLINK COMM PROBLEM	Supervisor: [REDACTED]	Target Start:						
Requested By: 5385		Requestor Phone: 202-893-3265	Target Comp:						
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:	Scheduled Start:						
Create-Mileage: 0.0		Complete-Mileage: 0.0							
Task IDs									
Task ID	Description								
10	performed Radio Checks A11-A10 track 1, and A10-A11 Track 2 --all radio checks loud and clear								
Component:	Work Accomp:	Reason:	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N				
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	03/11/2025	03/11/2025	10:30	13:00	Y	02:30	00:00	\$125.28
10	[REDACTED]	03/11/2025	03/11/2025	10:30	13:00	Y	02:30	00:00	\$130.12
						Total Actual Hour/Labor:	05:00	00:00	\$255.39
Failure Reporting									
Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark Date						
3192 TESTED / INSPECTED	3191 TESTED - NO TROUBLE FOUND	[REDACTED]	03/11/2025						
Remarks: All radio checks loud and clear									

Incident Date: 02/23/2025 Time: 16:50 hours  
Final Report – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement Rev. 1  
E25305

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 03/14/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 707 – 05/01/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 05/01/2025

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## Appendix D – Why-Tree Analysis



## Root Cause Analysis

E25305 – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement – Grosvenor

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Incident Date: 02/23/2025 Time: 16:50 hours  
 Final Report – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement Rev. 1  
 E25305

Drafted By: SAFE 705 – 03/14/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 707 – 05/01/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 05/01/2025

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