

ANNUAL REPORT ON WMSC
OPERATIONS AND THE SAFETY OF
THE WMATA RAIL SYSTEM IN 2025



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LETTER FROM THE WMSC CHAIR AND CEO


The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission's (WMSC) oversight helped the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) Metrorail system reach several important safety milestones in 2025, and the WMSC continues driving continuous safety improvement. As WMATA's Metrorail system celebrates 50 years of operations in 2026, the WMSC acknowledges the system's positive impact on the National Capital Region. The system has expanded and changed over the last half-century, and over the last few decades, several oversight bodies have helped maintain Metrorail as a safe mode of transportation throughout the region, including the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC). It is imperative that safety oversight agencies like the WMSC and rail transit agencies like WMATA work together for public rail transit to achieve safe operations for riders and safe maintenance for workers. This report includes a review of WMSC operations and highlights the WMSC's oversight activities, and the safety improvements Metrorail has implemented because of that work.

In 2025, the WMSC issued four audit reports and conducted work on three additional audits that are scheduled to be issued in 2026. The audits issued in 2025 include emergency management and life safety programs, control center and rail operations, elevators and escalators, and communications systems. The audits conducted in 2025 that will be published in 2026 address WMATA's track and structures programs, WMATA's internal safety reviews, and revenue vehicles and roadway maintenance machines.

As discussed later in this report, in December 2025, a U.S. Magistrate Judge granted the WMSC petition to enforce the subpoena that the WMSC issued on April 8, 2024, following Metrorail's refusal to provide documents requested as part of the WMSC's audit of Metrorail's fitness for duty and occupational health programs. The audit was initiated in February 2024; however, this matter remains ongoing because WMATA has filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's order. The WMSC remains ready to conduct this important audit work with the level of cooperation necessary from Metrorail to effectively assess and improve these important safety programs.



Christopher A. Hart, Chair



David L. Mayer, CEO

The audits issued in 2025 included findings that Metrorail is required to address through corrective action plans. For example, Metrorail does not have a reliable communication system (i.e. radio) for operations or emergencies, and Metrorail does not have a sufficient number of rail traffic controllers. Under WMSC oversight, Metrorail mitigated

previously identified deficiencies through the implementation and closure of 44 corrective action plans in 2025, including those related to system safety, procedure adherence, training, and hazard management.

In 2025, the WMSC continued overseeing Metrorail's safety certification of Automatic Train Operation (ATO). In 2024, we concurred that Metrorail completed the steps necessary to activate ATO on the Red Line, and in 2025, we concurred on each of the other lines, and Metrorail began operating trains in ATO systemwide in June 2025. On

the following pages, we detail the WMSC's operations and safety oversight work, outline

our ongoing strategies for ensuring that Metrorail continuously improves safety, provide the status of Metrorail safety in 2025, and discuss our plans for future work.

Sincerely,

Christopher A. Hart, Chair

David L. Mayer, CEO

COMMISSIONERS

CHRISTOPHER HART (District of Columbia), Chair, reappointed 2022



Commissioner Hart is chair of the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (re-elected March 2024). Chair Hart earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering and a Master of Science in Engineering from Princeton University and a Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School. Chairman Hart has extensive experience working in transportation and specifically with transportation safety issues in both the public and private sectors. He served as an attorney for the Air Transport Association of America, as an associate attorney for the law firms Peabody, Rivlin, Lambert, and Meyers and Dickstein, Shapiro and Morin, and as a managing partner for the law firm Hart & Chavers. He also served as Deputy Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Administration and as Assistant Administrator of System Safety and Deputy Director of the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service at the Federal Aviation Administration. Chairman Hart served two terms as a member of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) from 1990 to 1993 and 2009 to 2018. He served as chairman of the NTSB from 2014 to 2017.

ROBERT LAUBY (Commonwealth of Virginia), Vice Chair, appointed July 2023



Commissioner Lauby is Vice Chair of the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (re-elected March 2024). Commissioner Lauby is the former Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer for the Federal Railroad Administration and is currently an independent consultant with RCL Rail Safety Consulting, LLC. He is a licensed mechanical engineer with more than 40 years of railroad and rail transit experience involving safety, security, accident investigation, and engineering. Mr. Lauby's career included positions at the National Transportation Safety Board, Knorr Brake Corporation (a railroad and rail transit brake supplier), and Conrail. He has led safety regulation initiatives and safety oversight programs, has been involved in the development of passenger rail safety standards, and has conducted railroad and rail transit accident investigations worldwide.

CHRISTOPHER CONKLIN (State of Maryland), Secretary-Treasurer, appointed September 2023



Commissioner Conklin is Secretary-Treasurer of the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (elected November 2025). Conklin serves as the director of the Montgomery County Department of Transportation (MCDOT), and previously served as Deputy Director for Transportation Policy. He has guided the implementation of new transit services and worked to advance pedestrian safety and bicycle infrastructure projects. Prior to joining MCDOT, Conklin spent 23 years at the planning, engineering and environmental firm VHB, where he was managing director for the National Capital Region. Mr. Conklin holds a Bachelor of Civil Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology and two masters degrees in transportation and technology policy from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a licensed professional engineer in Maryland.

DEBRA FARRAR-DYKE (State of Maryland), reappointed August 2021

Commissioner Farrar-Dyke served as Secretary Treasurer of the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission from March 2018 to October 2025. Commissioner Farrar-Dyke is a senior manager with over 30 years of successful, progressive leadership and transportation, and procurement management. Commissioner Farrar-Dyke is also a Commissioner on the Maryland Transportation Commission. Previously, she was responsible for the Disadvantaged Business and Small Business Programs at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. She also led oversight of operating and capital budgets preparation and implementation at Metro.



ROBERT BOBB (District of Columbia), reappointed July 2024

Commissioner Bobb earned a Bachelor of Arts and Political Science from Grambling State University and a Master of Science degree in Business from Western Michigan University. He went on to earn a Certificate for Senior Executives in State and Local Governments from Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Commissioner Bobb is known as a turnaround specialist. He stepped in as emergency financial manager of Detroit Public Schools. He also served as city administrator for the District of Columbia, among his many accomplishments.



DON DRUMMER (State of Maryland),
appointed November 2025



Commissioner Don Drummer is a former Senior Executive with over 38 years of federal government experience in defense, logistics, transportation security, safety management, risk management, and organizational transformation. He concluded his government career while serving as Director of the Aviation Logistics Organization in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Prior to this appointment, he served in the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as Deputy Federal Security Director at John F. Kennedy International Airport, as Federal Security Director at Newark Liberty International Airport, and as Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Office of Security Capabilities in TSA Headquarters. Prior to joining TSA, Mr. Drummer retired as a U.S. Army Colonel. He's also a former member of the Washington Suburban Transit Commission (WSTC) with experience in advancing governance, operational effectiveness, regulatory compliance, transparency, and public trust. Mr. Drummer holds a Bachelor of Business Administration from the University of Texas at Austin, a Master of Business Administration from Kansas State University, a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College, and a Master of Professional Studies from the University of Maryland Baltimore County.

DEVIN C. ROUSE (Commonwealth of Virginia),
reappointed June 2025



Commissioner Rouse is the former Executive Officer of the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) Office of Railroad Systems, Technology and Innovation, and the former director of the Passenger Rail Division within the FRA's Office of Railroad Safety. He previously served on the board of directors of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, as well as FRA's Railroad Safety Board, and chaired the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee's Passenger Safety Working Group and Engineering Task Force. He has served as a subject matter expert in areas related to passenger rail safety, passenger rail equipment, Positive Train Control and emerging technologies, high-speed rail, and the development and construction of new railroads. Mr. Rouse is the owner of DCRail Advisory, providing services to passenger railroads, public transit agencies, and railroad industry executives. He holds a master's degree in Civil and Transportation Engineering, and a bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering from Virginia Tech. Mr. Rouse is a registered Professional Engineer in Virginia.

BRAD BELZAK (District of Columbia - Alternate),
appointed October 2025



Commissioner Belzak is a senior executive with 23 years of leadership experience across government, defense, consulting, finance, and technology. He currently serves as Senior Director at Strider Technologies and formerly held senior roles at the Export-Import Bank, the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Department of Defense. He began his career in transportation security post-9/11 and has advised on infrastructure, crisis response, and public safety worldwide. In the private sector, Brad led risk management and resilience efforts at Ernst & Young and Deloitte. A resident of Washington, DC, he chaired the city's Homeland Security Commission, and holds degrees from Northeastern University and Elon University.

KATHRYN O'LEARY HIGGINS
(State of Maryland - Alternate),
reappointed November 2024




Commissioner Kathryn (Kitty) O'Leary Higgins is a former member of the National Transportation Safety Board. In addition to her work as a member of the NTSB, she served as Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor and Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Labor, Vice Chair of the Presidential Commission on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, Acting Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts, and Vice President for Public Policy for the National Trust for Historic Preservation. Ms. Higgins previously served in various roles on White House staffs where she worked closely with the federal transportation agencies. She is the President of the Higgins Company, a government relations firm. Ms. Higgins holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Nebraska.

TIFFANY ROBINSON
(Commonwealth of Virginia - Alternate),
appointed November 2024



Commissioner Tiffany Robinson served as the Director for the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation through 2025. She also serves as a member of the Commonwealth Transportation Board, chair of the Virginia Passenger Rail Authority board, and as a board member for several transit organizations around the Commonwealth. She previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff in the Virginia Governor's Office. Ms. Robinson also served as the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Labor, as a Deputy Chief of Staff in the Maryland Governor's Office and as Assistant Secretary in Maryland's Department of Housing and Community Development. Ms. Robinson holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Maryland Baltimore County and a Juris Doctor from the University of Baltimore School of Law.





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) serves as the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Metrorail's state safety oversight agency (SSOA), playing a crucial safety role and serving as a catalyst for Metrorail safety improvements through our audits, safety event investigations, inspections, oversight of corrective action plans, and oversight of the safety certification program. The WMSC issues directives and orders, and when necessary, takes other enforcement action, as detailed later in this report. The WMSC's priority is the safety of riders and workers and all others who depend on the system's safe operation and maintenance.

As a result of the WMSC's independent rail safety oversight, WMATA has instituted, and will continue to implement, safety improvements that will increase the safety of all who interact with the Metrorail system. In 2025, the WMSC saw positive changes, but also identified new and recurring Metrorail safety issues that WMATA must address.

This annual report on WMSC operations and the safety of the WMATA rail system details the WMSC's programs, operations, and finances, and provides a safety readiness status update of the WMATA Rail System in calendar year 2025.



Some of the most notable safety oversight work in 2025 included overseeing Metrorail's safety certification process for activation of automatic train operations, investigating safety

In 2025, the WMSC saw positive changes, but also identified new and recurring Metrorail safety issues that WMATA must address.

events such as the derailment of a roadway maintenance machine at Mount Vernon Square Station that demonstrated a lack of situational awareness, training deficiencies, ineffective communication between personnel, radio communication issues, and Metrorail personnel's failure to adhere to established policies and procedures.

The WMSC also approved WMATA's new roadway worker protection program as required by Federal Transit Administration rule (**49 CFR part 671**). The rule established minimum safety standards to prevent safety events, injuries, and fatalities to transit workers who may access the roadway to perform their duties.

The WMSC also oversees WMATA's safety certification process, which is designed to identify and mitigate hazards to provide for the highest practicable level of safety for an element or asset before it is activated or, in some cases, reactivated for revenue service. For projects the WMSC has selected for in-depth review, WMSC concurrence is required before WMATA may activate the project or asset. WMSC concurrence signifies that Metrorail has met the requirements of WMATA's Safety and Security Certification Program Plan (SSCPP) and Metrorail's other written safety commitments. These commitments under the SSCPP are one element of Metrorail's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP). The PTASP requires a Safety Management System (SMS) approach. The SMS approach is a formal, top-down, organization-wide approach for identifying safety risks and ensuring the mitigation of those safety risks through such controls as safety promotion, safety policy, safety assurance, and safety risk management. A notable example of the safety certification oversight process was the WMSC overseeing Metrorail's completion of the safety certification process required to identify and mitigate hazards to activate

Automatic Train Operations (ATO) across the Metrorail system, and thereafter providing concurrence for Metrorail to activate Automatic Train Operation (ATO) on each line.


The WMSC completed four audits in 2025 and conducted work on three other audits to be published in 2026. For each audit finding, Metrorail is required to develop and implement a corrective action plan that addresses the finding and thereby improves the safety of the Metrorail system. The 2025 audits are linked below:

- **Audit of Communication Systems**
- **Audit of Elevators and Escalators**
- **Audit of Control Center and Rail Operations**
- **Audit of Emergency Management and Life Safety Programs**

Audit work was also conducted for the following programs in 2025, with final audit reports scheduled to be issued in 2026:

- Internal Reviews and Internal Safety Reviews
- Track and Structures with Roadway Worker Protection
- Revenue Vehicles and Roadway Maintenance Machines

In response to WMSC findings, the WMSC approved and then oversaw Metrorail's implementation of corrective actions to address specific safety issues, which led to the closure of 44 corrective action plans in 2025. This is in addition to other safety issues Metrorail addressed following identification through the WMSC's inspections, investigations, and other oversight, as well as those actions Metrorail took as a result of safety assurance measures required under its PTASP.



Fiscally, the WMSC operated within a budget of \$7,318,00, and delivered effective oversight for the region. The WMSC also developed the Fiscal Year 2026 budget of \$7.53 million in accordance with the jurisdictional funding agreement among the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. The WMSC's budget incorporates federal grants and local funds. This federal and local investment allows the WMSC to operate as an effective independent oversight agency. The WMSC's FY 2026 annual independent financial statement audit included an unmodified or "clean" audit opinion, which demonstrates the WMSC is using these funds responsibly in accordance with the WMSC's requirements.





INTRODUCTION





INTRODUCTION

The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) is the State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) Metrorail system. We are committed to the overall safety of the Metrorail system, as it impacts riders, employees, contractors, and first responders.

This annual status report on WMSC operations and the safety of the WMATA Rail System gives a high-level snapshot of the WMSC's safety oversight of Metrorail, as well as Metrorail's safety performance in 2025. This report satisfies WMSC Compact, Article V, which requires the WMSC to make and publish annually a report on its programs, operations, and finances, and provide a status report on the safety of the WMATA Rail System, which shall include, among other requirements established by the WMSC and federal law, status updates of outstanding corrective action plans, WMSC directives, and ongoing investigations.

The WMSC's safety oversight work includes conducting inspections, audits, and investigations, overseeing Metrorail corrective action plans (CAPs), overseeing Metrorail safety certification, and conducting other activities that help Metrorail as it works to continuously improve the safety of the rail system. The WMSC carries out this work by focusing on data gathered from Metrorail systems and frequent interaction with personnel at all levels of the Metrorail organization.

Metrorail is required to comply with all WMSC directives, to implement corrective action plans to address WMSC findings, to provide timely access to all information required by the WMSC and to otherwise follow all requirements set by the WMSC in the **WMSC Program Standard**.

The WMSC's authority includes, if necessary, directing WMATA to prioritize spending on safety-critical items, to suspend service, to direct WMATA to suspend or remove individuals from

safety-sensitive positions, to remove equipment from service, and to issue fines. The WMSC endeavors to work with Metrorail to avoid or resolve safety issues in a collaborative manner whenever possible. To that end, the WMSC is responsive to and remains in constant communication with personnel at all levels of Metrorail to foster open and effective lines of communication.

The WMSC conducts its work transparently through public meetings of the commissioners who guide the work of the WMSC staff and who take actions such as adopting the WMSC Program Standard, approving Metrorail's revisions to its Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP), and adopting final safety event investigation reports. Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, each appoint two commissioners and one alternate. Appointees are required to have backgrounds in transit safety, transportation, engineering, or public finance. Written products of the WMSC's work - safety audit reports, adopted investigation reports, corrective action plan details, inspection reports, official actions, our policy and program documents, as well as audit reports of WMSC operations conducted by external agencies, are all available online on the **WMSC website**.

Elected leaders, staff, and others including the governors of Maryland and Virginia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the D.C. Council, the Virginia and Maryland General Assemblies, local and regional bodies, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, federal executive branch agencies, and state, regional and local bodies have provided and continue to provide the fundamental support necessary for the WMSC to help ensure continuous safety improvement for the safety of riders, workers and all others who depend on the WMATA Rail System's



safe maintenance and operations. Funding from the governments of the District of Columbia, Virginia, and Maryland, and, along with federal grants from the FTA, enable the independent operations of the WMSC. This financial support permits the WMSC to continue to develop its staff and organization to ensure continuing effective safety oversight commensurate with the size, scale and complexity of the Metrorail system.

As required by the WMSC Compact, this report on WMSC operations and the safety of the WMATA Rail System in 2025 are provided to the Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration, the Governor of Maryland, the Governor of Virginia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Chairman of the D.C. Council, the President of the Maryland Senate, the Speaker of the Maryland House of Delegates, the President of the Virginia Senate, the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, WMATA's General Manager and the members of the WMATA Board.


Throughout Metrorail's history, safety oversight agencies have guided its work and the safety of the system.

The report is also published at wmsc.gov/annual-reports to provide an opportunity for the public to understand the independent safety oversight efforts of the WMSC, and the health of Metrorail as it continues its implementation of the federally-mandated safety management system (SMS) described in its PTASP. Additional information about the WMSC's work, including audit reports, inspection reports, official actions, investigation reports, and public meetings, is also available at wmsc.gov.








50 Years Of Service and Safety

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority began operating the Metrorail system on March 27, 1976, with five Red Line stations serving the center of Washington, DC. Since that opening day, the system has experienced continuous expansion, now operating 98 stations, with its territory stretching across the District of Columbia, southern Maryland, and northern Virginia. Throughout Metrorail's history, safety oversight agencies have guided its work and the safety of the system to help exact change when needed and to keep safety paramount through audits, investigations, safety certification, and corrective action plans.



WMATA METRORAIL-SAFETY OVERSIGHT HISTORICAL TIMELINE



SAFETY CERTIFICATION OVERSIGHT

The WMSC oversees Metrorail's safety certification process which is designed to identify and mitigate hazards to provide for the highest practicable level of safety during the design, construction and testing of new, modernized or rehabilitated assets, equipment, systems, and processes. Metrorail's safety certification program is a critical element of Metrorail's safety management system that must be completed prior to new assets and systems being put into service.

Consistently identifying hazards and mitigating the likelihood and severity of those hazards in a systematic way as documented in Metrorail's policies and procedures is what provides for the overall safety of the Metrorail system. The WMSC oversees Metrorail's safety certification through observations of testing and training activities, document and data review, and regular meetings with Metrorail safety certification committees and working groups.

The WMSC Program Standard dictates each of the WMSC's oversight programs, and for safety certification oversight, that includes the WMSC selecting projects for in-depth review. The WMSC uses these projects to sample and determine whether Metrorail is adhering to its safety certification program. Projects selected for in-depth review require Metrorail to receive WMSC concurrence before activating a program or equipment for passenger service. WMSC concurrence signifies that Metrorail has properly carried out its safety certification process. In 2025, the WMSC concurred on the Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) Consolidation Project. In-depth review projects that remain in progress include the Automated Wayside Inspection System (AWIS) and the 8000-series railcars. The WMSC also continues to conduct post-activation oversight of Automatic Train Operation (ATO), with a focus on station overruns.

WMSC oversight of this project focused on verifying that Metrorail followed its safety certification process.



Rail Traffic Controller Consolidation Project

This project was selected for in-depth review in 2025.

This project consolidates the command and control functions from a two-person configuration into one single controller on the Operations 4 (Ops 4) desk in the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC). Operations Desk 4 controls the Metrorail territory west of Courthouse Station on the Orange Line and the Silver Line. Prior to this project, each operations desk was staffed by a Button Rail Traffic Controller, whose responsibilities include monitoring train movement, setting routes, and ensuring proper protections for roadway workers, and a Radio Rail Traffic Controller who is responsible for all communication activities with train operators and supervisors on the mainline, including providing directives during normal operations, operational deviations and emergencies.

WMSC personnel attended multiple test observations, including both overnight and daytime sessions as well as control center staff training activities. WMSC oversight of this project focused on verifying that Metrorail followed its safety certification process, including controller training, human factors identification, and standard operating principles (SOP) development, safety certification documents, and procedural updates prior to activation.

After the WMSC completed verification activities, we concurred on December 5, 2025, that Metrorail met all its requirements necessary to implement this operational change, and Metrorail began using this single rail traffic controller model on Ops 4.

The WMSC will continue to monitor operational use of the single rail traffic controller to ensure that safety-critical control functions remain properly validated and that the change continues to perform as intended.

Automated Wayside Inspection System (AWIS)

The WMSC originally selected this project for in-depth Review in 2022 and the WMSC continued this oversight in 2025. AWIS is Metrorail’s version of a suite of technologies used in the rail industry to automatically monitor the condition of railcar wheels, axles and trucks as trains pass by. These systems aim to enhance safety and efficiency by detecting defects that may be difficult or impossible to identify during manual, stationary inspections of the railcars. Metrorail is installing four of these automated wayside inspection locations throughout the system to enable real-time railcar back-to-back measurements. Back-to-back measurements calculate the distance between the back (inside) faces of the running wheels of a rail vehicle. Maintaining specified measurements prevents rail vehicle derailments.

The AWIS project continues to progress. In the latter part of 2025, WMSC staff observed training on the data capture system for AWIS, called TrainBase. As it does with other Metrorail operations and inspection systems, the WMSC must retain access to this TrainBase data repository to independently view and verify AWIS performance, including how



exceptions data are captured, and addressed. The WMSC will continue its oversight work until Metrorail completes its safety certification of this project, at which point we will conduct final verification activities to determine whether the requirements for concurrence have been met.

8000-Series Railcars

The 8000-series railcar procurement and commissioning process remained under in-depth review in 2025. In 2020, Metrorail awarded the 8000-series railcar contract to Hitachi Rail US. As with each subsequent acquisition of railcars, it is an opportunity for Metrorail to design, engineer, and commission railcars that leverage the latest railcar design practices, incorporate lessons learned through accident investigations, customer and Metrorail employee insights, and a disciplined implementation of safety management industry practices. In 2022, the WMSC identified the 8000-series railcar procurement for in-depth review.



WMSC oversight emphasized verification of design-level hazard analyses, interface integration with existing systems, and evaluation of carborne safety design elements such as crashworthiness. Our in-depth review of this project focuses on ensuring that the 8000-series railcars incorporate safety improvements informed by prior safety event investigations and that WMATA’s safety certification process for the new fleet is being appropriately and thoroughly executed. At this stage, WMATA’s safety certification work is centered primarily on document and design specification verification. The WMSC’s role is to independently verify that WMATA’s certification activities demonstrate the design’s conformance with safety requirements and effective hazard mitigation. As of spring 2026, WMATA is finishing its Final Design Review phase of the 8000-series railcar project.





As work continues to progress, Metrorail has provided a few documents that pertain to the preliminary engineering work that has been completed. However, as of spring 2026, the WMSC needs additional documentation to enable our independent tracing and verifying identified hazards and how they have been fully addressed in the design. The WMSC will then continue the tracing and verifying process through railcar delivery.

Automatic Train Operations (Post-Activation Oversight)

The WMSC's work does not stop at concurrence. After a program or equipment is activated for passenger service, the WMSC monitors procedural adherence, unintended outcomes and their subsequent mitigation.



The Automatic Train Operation project, which is the subject of the WMSC's in-depth review, received line-by-line concurrence for use in revenue service. The WMSC continues to monitor ATO performance and safety issues through data-driven analysis and engagement with WMATA on operational safety. One unintended outcome of ATO activation has been a marked increase in station overruns. The WMSC expects WMATA will address this increase in overruns before submitting for the WMSC's concurrence the use of ATO systemwide.

A station overrun occurs when a passenger train is scheduled for a station stop but fails to stop within the station's platform limits (that is, the eight-car marker) and is unable to service the platform. There are safety risks associated with station overruns: Roadway workers or rail equipment being struck by the train. Failure to service the

platform may also result in passengers being unable to safely evacuate the train to the platform during an emergency, or law enforcement personnel being unable to board these trains to conduct their activities. The safety risks associated with station overruns prompted the WMSC to require systemwide actions and station-specific mitigations. When WMATA requested ATO activation on the Green and Yellow lines, the WMSC concurred after verifying WMATA's substantial efforts that were underway to mitigate station overruns. This included software updates on 7000-series railcars and conducting rules compliance checks. The mitigations implemented resulted in fewer overruns than those experienced on the Red Line during initial activation. ATO Activation on the Blue, Orange, and Silver lines, however, resulted in another increase in station overruns. Both WMATA and the WMSC continue monitoring stopping accuracy and investigating persistent challenges at specific stations while analyzing systemwide performance trends with a focus on identifying and preventing station overruns in ATO.

The WMSC continues to monitor ATO performance and safety issues through data-driven analysis.

To evaluate station overruns, WMATA downloads the vehicle data from each station overrun. These downloads are analyzed to determine what factor(s) led to the station overrun (e.g., railcar, wayside, or train operator performance). Based on that determination, WMATA is able to address the causes of station overruns incrementally, from personnel training to engineering modifications of the railcars or wayside equipment.

The WMSC continues to work with WMATA to ensure that root-cause analyses and corrective actions are developed, validated, and tracked to closure.

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS – ROADWAY WORKER PROTECTION PROGRAM

On December 1, 2025, the WMSC approved WMATA's new Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) program as required under Federal Transit Administration rule **49 CFR part 671**.

The FTA published this rule on October 31, 2024.

The rule established minimum safety standards to prevent safety events, injuries, and fatalities to transit workers who may access the roadway to perform their duties. Part 671 requires that the WMSC oversee and enforce the implementation of the RWP program requirement. The WMSC has conducted oversight activities related to RWP throughout our existence, with regular inspections, investigations, and audits, including audits published in **2020** and **2024**. The latest RWP audit occurred in 2025 (to be published in 2026), which satisfies a new FTA requirement that such audits be conducted annually.

The WMSC oversaw WMATA's work, leading to an RWP program that meets the federal requirements. This work allowed us to approve the compliant program, to meet the December 2, 2025, FTA deadline. This was accomplished through a disciplined, dedicated approach involving both organizations that occurred throughout most of 2025. The WMSC oversaw WMATA's assembly of the necessary program components and provided feedback that led to WMATA modifying certain parts of the draft program until it met the regulatory requirements, and we were able to provide our approval.

Part 671 requires both achieving an approved program and implementing it. At the time of this report, Metrorail has not yet begun operating under its newly approved RWP program;

however, WMATA submitted an implementation proposal that the WMSC approved. We will continue monitoring WMATA's implementation activities, which include training of all applicable WMATA transit workers on this newly approved RWP program.

The WMSC approved WMATA's new Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) program as required under Federal Transit Administration rule 49 CFR part 671.

The WMSC also updated the Program Standard as required by the new regulation. The changes reflect the WMSC's methods of overseeing the execution of the RWP program, including annually auditing the RWP program to assess its implementation and effectiveness. The triennial audit schedule was updated to reflect these annual RWP audits and was shared with WMATA. As mentioned, the first annual audit was conducted beginning in June 2025 and will be published in early 2026.


The WMSC is prepared to review and approve annual updates to the RWP program.

AUDITS, DIRECTIVES AND OTHER FINDINGS

The WMSC issued four audits in 2025 and began work in our third triennial audit cycle. The WMSC also conducted work on two other audits with those reports to be published in 2026.

The WMSC conducts an ongoing schedule of triennial audits. Therefore, there is always audit work in progress, such as preparation, data review, on-site activities, or report development. Each of the reports mentioned below is part of the WMSC's second cycle of audits. Therefore, in addition to the scopes described, each audit also focused on closed corrective action plans that were issued as part of the first cycle of audits. In accordance with the WMSC Compact, federal regulation, and the WMSC Program Standard, the WMSC audits each element of Metrorail's Agency Safety Plan through separate functional area audits that are conducted over the course of the three-year cycle.

The WMSC schedules these audits in advance and provides that schedule to WMATA each time it is updated. The audit schedule may be adjusted, for example, based on issues



identified through the WMSC's other oversight work. These audits are at various stages of completion at any one time, and some start in one year but the report is published in the subsequent year.

Audits are based on information gathered through extensive reviews of documents, data, recordings and interviews with Metrorail frontline, managerial, and leadership personnel. In addition to extensive interviews, document and data review, audit work includes on-site observations. The purpose of this audit work is to review Metrorail's policies and procedures and Metrorail's compliance with its policies, procedures or other requirements, and to identify deficiencies and hazards to further safety for riders and Metrorail personnel. The WMSC also highlights positive practices that are identified in each audit. Drafts of each audit report are provided to WMATA for a 30-day technical review, and the WMSC incorporates any subsequent information provided in that review, as appropriate, prior to issuing a final report to WMATA and publishing the final report at wmsc.gov.

The audits issued, initiated, and completed in 2025 demonstrate that while Metrorail has made positive improvement in the safe operation and maintenance of its system, there are areas that require more attention, including some recurring issues.

Audits

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS - DECEMBER 4, 2025


SCOPE: This audit assessed voice or data transmission systems and related equipment presently in use or available for use (including radio and public address (PA) systems).

Examples of positive practices identified include:

- Personal Protective Equipment: All personnel interviewed indicated sufficient provision of personal protective equipment.
- Equipment Verification: During on-site audit observations, all equipment was pre-checked before use and no equipment was out of calibration.

FINDINGS:

- **Finding 1:** Communication personnel are not completing preventive maintenance on its public address and radio communication systems in accordance with Metrorail's procedures.



- **Finding 2:** Metrorail does not have adequate supervisory oversight to ensure adherence to testing and replacement requirements for electrical safety gloves.
- **Finding 3:** Metrorail rooms that contain communication systems equipment are not maintained in accordance with Metrorail policy to ensure an optimal environment for those vital systems.
- **Finding 4:** Metrorail is not maintaining its self-assessed staffing levels required to maintain its current communications systems.

Recommendations:

- **Recommendation 1:** Metrorail should review how it deploys and safeguards vital communications equipment.
- **Recommendation 2:** Metrorail has the opportunity to improve worker safety by ensuring that personnel have the necessary equipment to safely complete maintenance tasks.

ELEVATOR AND ESCALATORS PROGRAMS - OCTOBER 15, 2025

SCOPE: This audit assessed Metrorail's elevator and escalator programs, including inspection, maintenance, operational practices and procedures and associated training.

Examples of positive practices identified include:

- Obtaining Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE). Each Office of Elevators and Escalators Services journeymen or mechanic confirmed that new or replacement PPE is quickly provided by supervisors upon request without issue.
- Hazard mitigations by Safety Risk Coordinators. The Elevator/Escalator Safety Risk Coordinator was able to show ongoing receipt and review of hazards and the tracking of mitigations related to those hazards.

FINDINGS:

- **Finding 1:** Metrorail elevators and escalators mechanics are not reviewing job hazard analyses as required by Metrorail procedures.
- **Finding 2:** Metrorail does not proactively monitor calibration expiration for elevators and escalators equipment.





- **Finding 3:** Metrorail personnel are entering elevator pits which have active electrical circuits with standing water.
- **Finding 4:** Metrorail elevator and escalator personnel are not trained on fall protection requirements listed within its job hazard analyses.
- **Finding 5:** Metrorail is not maintaining or displaying elevator or escalator certificates on-site as required by local jurisdictions.

Recommendations:

- **Recommendation 1:** Metrorail elevator and escalator job descriptions are incomplete and a subset do not reflect current job responsibilities.
- **Recommendation 2:** Metrorail’s Office of Elevators and Escalators Services uses multiple systems to capture data which could impair data management and result in discrepancies.


- Investigation interviews are no longer being coached. Over the course of this audit, personnel gave distinct, un-coached answers. This was evident based on the interviews and nature of the feedback provided to the WMSC throughout this audit.
- There are functioning microphones at all desks/locations in the control center and ambient audio is also being recorded from all desks/locations, as a result of CAPs C-0051 and C-0054.
- As a result of CAP C-0055, Metrorail is following the fatigue management policy that is applicable to rail traffic controllers.
- The Power Desk function, which was created as a part of CAP C-0037, is performing as intended and reducing the risk of electrocution for those on the roadway.

CONTROL CENTER AND RAIL OPERATIONS - AUGUST 27, 2025

SCOPE: The audit assessed Metrorail operations both on the mainline and in rail yards, as well as station managers and station operations, and the control center operations.

Examples of positive practices identified include:

- Metrorail transitioned into a new control center facility since the previous, 2020 WMSC audit of the control center. The control center developed a new, more integrated concept of its command line. It has also integrated Rail, Bus, Transit Police, Power Desk, Maintenance Operations Center, Bus Operations, Communications, Video Operations Center, and Emergency Operations Center within a new and updated control center facility with new equipment.



FINDINGS:

- **Finding 1:** Metrorail does not have a sufficient number of rail traffic controllers and turnover is increasing.
- **Finding 2:** Rail traffic controller written assessments, final assessments, and certification tests present conflicting data regarding an individual’s aptitude.
- **Finding 3:** Metrorail does not provide refresher training to rail vehicle operators on incidents and emergencies.
- **Finding 4:** Metrorail’s Train the Trainer (T3) program for Rail Training is not defined by Metrorail’s procedures.
- **Finding 5:** Metrorail revised ATC local control procedures without first informing all affected staff including rail traffic controllers.

- **Finding 6:** Rail traffic controller consoles have been manipulated without their knowledge.
- **Finding 7:** Metrorail uses Microsoft Teams chats during safety events but has not demonstrated a review of these records when determining the facts of these events.
- **Finding 8:** Metrorail documents have not been updated on the required cadence.
- **Finding 9:** Metrorail personnel are not following Metrorail radio transmission rules such as for train identification and location information.

Metrorail does not have a sufficient number of rail traffic controllers and turnover is increasing.

jurisdiction to ensure that all jurisdictions had the same (and correct) addresses for Metrorail facilities and buildings.

- Documentation provided for this audit included newly revised Metrorail Emergency Response Maps (also known as "Fire Maps") of each station. The maps represent an improvement in clarity and organization.

FINDINGS:

- **Finding 1:** Metrorail does not have a reliable communications system for operations or emergencies.
- **Finding 2:** Metrorail Emergency Trip Stations (ETS) located throughout the system are not treated as fire life safety assets.
- **Finding 3:** Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.
- **Finding 4:** Metrorail is using emergency radio operations channel 6 although the channel is not ready for use.
- **Finding 5:** Metrorail is not contacting jurisdictional emergency services immediately upon identification of fire and smoke on the Metrorail system.

Recommendations:

- **Recommendation 1:** Metrorail 'Service Disruption' calls during safety events are led by personnel who are actively managing the event rather than the designated role (Metro 1).
- **Recommendation 2:** Rail traffic controllers Advanced Information Management (AIM) system alarms are not standardized across rail traffic controller desks and personnel are not trained on how to arrange their alarm screens.
- **Recommendation 3:** Metrorail does not evaluate the effectiveness of Line Platform Instructors (LPI).


EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND LIFE SAFETY PROGRAMS - JANUARY 29, 2025

Work on this audit was conducted in 2024, and the final report was published in January 2025.

SCOPE: This audit assessed all components of the as-designed/ built rail or fixed-guideway system, system modifications, installed equipment, operational practices and procedures, maintenance, hazardous material events, regulations, and best practices related to emergency management and life safety. The audit also included fire alarms and emergency trip stations (ETS).



Example of positive practices identified included:

- Metrorail created a master location repository to ensure accurate addresses for all stations and their respective entrances. Metrorail also coordinated with each



Future Audit Work

The WMSC conducted preparations for and conducted audit activities for audits of Metrorail's Internal Reviews and Internal Safety Reviews Programs, as well as its Track and Structures Programs, which also contains a roadway worker protection component. Audit work of Metrorail's Revenue Vehicles and Roadway Maintenance Machines Programs began in late 2025, with work continuing into 2026. The WMSC's work on the **Fitness for Duty and Occupational Health**, first initiated in 2024, did not progress in 2025, due to WMATA's refusal to respond to most of the WMSC's initial document requests, and the subsequent and ongoing legal processes that have resulted.



More information on this matter can be found in the Subpoena and Petition for Enforcement section of this report.

The WMSC will continue to conduct its audit work on an ongoing basis as specified in the WMSC Program Standard with the goal of improving the safety of the Metrorail system.

OTHER FINDINGS AND ACTIONS

SPECIAL STUDY OF WMATA METRORAIL'S RADIO BAND AND INFRASTRUCTURE REPLACEMENT PROJECT

In 2025, the WMSC conducted and issued a report on a special study of safety impacts of WMATA's radio replacement project to examine WMATA's long-planned project to replace the present 450–490-megahertz system with the future 700-megahertz frequency radio system. Work on the radio replacement project began in 2017 before the WMSC's certification by the FTA. Similar to our audit work, the WMSC requested related documents and conducted interviews with WMATA personnel with responsibilities related to the project.



The WMSC and its predecessor safety oversight organizations have been aware of continued issues with inconsistent and unintelligible radio coverage at WMATA Metrorail for at least the last decade that have played a role in safety events and near misses. Multiple findings and other official actions regarding radio communications at Metrorail have been issued by the

WMSC and its predecessor safety oversight organizations, yet WMATA personnel and first responders continue to experience radio communications issues.

What the WMSC Found:

- Safety-related radio deficiencies persist at WMATA Metrorail. For example, 64 safety event investigations cited radio or communications issues Between April 2019 and July 2024.
- WMATA's work to upgrade its radio system began in 2015 and is not scheduled to reach completion until 2027.
- WMSC review found four key reasons for delays in this project to date, including that cellular infrastructure work took priority early in the project over the radio portion, delaying radio work. WMATA has reprioritized to focus on completing radio fiber work prior to other fiber initiatives, decreasing previously projected delays.


The full report, including the WMSC's recommendations, is available at wmsc.gov.

FINDING RELATED TO LEVEL IV ROADWAY WORKER PROTECTION QUALIFICATION

On September 4, 2025, the WMSC issued a finding, following the process defined by the WMSC Program Standard, regarding Metrorail's nonconformance with its written qualification requirements for the highest level of roadway worker protection training certification, known at Metrorail as Roadway Workers in Charge or RWIC. This qualification is the primary mitigation for the hazards of train movement and the electrified third rail that all Metrorail roadway workers face conducting work on the rail right of way.

During an inspection of Metrorail records in July, as part of the ongoing Track, Structures, and Roadway Worker Protection Audit, all WMSC staff found a number of records did not support that WMATA personnel were properly qualified to setup and be in charge of roadway worker safety. These





nonconformances represented a safety deficiency because Metrorail had no other basis for assuring that its roadway workers meet its own written qualification requirements to access the roadway.

To address this issue, Metrorail submitted and the WMSC approved for implementation, CAP C0-0310, which is scheduled for completion in 2028. Several action items have been completed and submitted in support of this corrective action plan, which requires Metrorail to, among other things, re-test and re-qualify all personnel who have been identified as not meeting the qualification requirements or whose qualification could not be verified.

The magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued an order, validating the WMSC's stance that our organization has the authority to conduct this audit.

Safety investigations, for example, also must be conducted in compliance with Metrorail's Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program, and drug and alcohol compliance programs are sources of data that Metrorail departments must monitor to reduce safety risks.

Since our 2024 annual report, the magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued an order, validating the WMSC's stance that our organization has the authority to conduct this audit. However, at the time of this report,

these proceedings are still ongoing, as WMATA has filed objections to the magistrate judge's decision to grant the WMSC's motion to enforce the subpoena. Below is a timeline of related events.

SUBPOENA AND PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT

As previously reported in our 2024 annual report, the WMSC was compelled to issue a subpoena (SDT-2024-0001) to WMATA Metrorail due to Metrorail's refusal to provide the WMSC with all documents and records required by the WMSC to initiate our second triennial audit of Metrorail's fitness for duty and occupational health programs. The **WMSC Compact** provides clear authority to conduct this audit and receive these records. Further, FTA regulation 49 CFR 674.27 requires the WMSC to audit WMATA's compliance with its **Public Agency Safety Plan**, WMATA's PTASP, Version 4.0, which was effective on December 31, 2023, at the time of the document request and the subpoena, includes the Department of Safety and Readiness. Metrorail's Department of Safety and Readiness functions include occupational health and wellness, and within that subgroup are programs aligned with Occupational Health, Employee Health and Wellness, and Health Quality and Compliance.

Specific to drug and alcohol testing, the Office of Occupational Health and Wellness administers the Substance Abuse Testing Program, which includes drug and alcohol testing.

Timeline

- February 9, 2024: WMSC sent initial document request for documents due March 11, 2024
- March 8, 2024: WMATA acknowledged receipt of, but refused to comply with all requests
- March 15, 2024: WMSC responded to WMATA's refusal to comply
- March 18, 2024: WMATA restated its position of non-compliance
- April 8, 2024: WMSC issued a subpoena to WMATA, requiring the production of all documents initially requested
- May 6, 2024: WMATA submitted written objections to the subpoena

- June 6, 2024: WMSC submitted written reply to WMATA objections
- October 31, 2024: WMSC filed a petition for subpoena enforcement in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia due to WMATA's continued non-compliance
- December 17, 2025: A U.S. Magistrate Judge granted the WMSC's motion to enforce the subpoena
- December 31, 2025: WMATA filed Objections to the U.S. Magistrate Judge's order and a request to stay its obligations under the order until the district court judge rules; WMSC did not object to stay request
- January 8, 2026: WMATA's request to stay was granted
- January 14, 2026: WMSC filed its Response to WMATA's Objections
- January 21, 2026: WMATA replied to our Response

The WMSC approved 20 CAPs for implementation (i.e. new CAPs) and 44 CAPs for closure in 2025.

The matter now rests with the U.S. District Court Judge.

WMATA's stance on the WMSC's authority to audit worker safety and related areas has led the WMSC to issue **notices of non-compliance**, which are detailed in the next section of this report.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS

Findings issued by the WMSC lead to safety improvements throughout the Metrorail System through corrective action plans (CAPs). After the WMSC issues findings, Metrorail must develop and implement CAPs to resolve the issues with the goal of reducing the risk of future safety events.

Metrorail submits proposed CAPs to the WMSC for review so the WMSC can ensure that the plans, when fully and properly implemented, will address the finding. In the event that any adjustments to the plans are needed, Metrorail submits proposed modifications to the WMSC for review and approval.

The WMSC approved 20 CAPs for implementation (i.e. new CAPs) and 44 CAPs for closure in 2025. Closed CAPs are safety success stories and from 2025 a few examples include those related to power hazards, bridge load ratings, and emergency management.

Other Examples of Corrective Action Plans Closed in 2025

- C-0212 was created to address the **2022 order** necessitated by identified safety deficiencies related to power restoration that put Metrorail personnel at risk of serious injury or death. Metrorail instituted both short-term and long-term mitigations to address immediate hazards while creating an improved system to address power energization, including retraining roadway workers in charge in conducting work safely in the vicinity of third rail power infrastructure, adequately staffing the power desk, gradually increasing the number of overnight work locations requiring power management as other criteria were met, safety certification of the

power desk activities at the new Metrorail control center, and the creation of a distinct process by which RWICs are provided a handheld device known as an Entrust Token, which generates unique Token Codes and Outage Release Codes which must be communicated in order to restore power to ensure power is only restored at the exact right location.



- C-0072 addressed a finding from our **2021 Elevated Structures audit** that WMATA did not have load ratings for its bridges and aerial structures. In March 2023 Metrorail completed load ratings for 65 percent of the systems bridges. The WMSC issued **a notice of non-compliance in October 2024** because Metrorail was late in finishing the remaining 84 load ratings. After the WMSC issued that notice, Metrorail completed the remaining load ratings.



- C-0162 addressed a finding from the **2022 audit of Metrorail's emergency management and fire life safety programs**, that Metrorail did not consistently follow the incident command system (ICS) structure and had procedures that did not comply with National Incident

Management System (NIMS)/ ICS requirements such as the use of plain language. Further, Metrorail's training requirements were insufficient to prepare personnel to respond to or manage emergencies within the NIMS/ICS framework. These deficiencies contributed to ineffective and improper emergency response and emergency management. Metrorail developed an entirely new set of procedures collectively referred to as the Incident Management Framework. This was the first Metrorail-wide emergency response training. It clearly outlines the incident command structure and incorporates both jurisdictional emergency responders as well as WMATA personnel and is scalable to various types of safety events. The new framework incorporates new terminology to align with the National Incident Management System terminology that jurisdictional emergency responders are already familiar with. The new framework also defines duties and provides playbooks for key personnel who respond to incidents. Metrorail trained 3,892 personnel through four different training levels, with a subset of personnel receiving classroom training over the course of several days.

- C-0155 was created to address a finding from the **2021 High Voltage and Traction Power Audit**, that Metrorail is not effectively identifying, tracking, and mitigating hazards related to high voltage and traction power. The WMSC required Metrorail to modify this original corrective action plan as a result of the WMSC's subsequent **power audit issued in 2024**. Metrorail developed a new Safety Risk Management procedure, which included the newly-created Safety Risk Coordinator role as well as creating Metrorail's internal system for tracking hazards and risks along with the organizing of safety committees at various levels of the organization. All applicable personnel were then trained in this new system.

Ongoing Corrective Action Plan Implementation and Oversight

◆ Submittal Verification and Closure Requests

After the WMSC approves a corrective action plan for implementation, Metrorail must carry out the plan. Submittals are provided to the WMSC throughout the CAP's life cycle. And when the plan is complete, Metrorail submits a detailed request to close the corrective action plan, including evidence of completion for WMSC review. The WMSC monitors implementation of the corrective action plan and closes the corrective action plan once WMATA has shown that it has been fully completed. Corrective action plan closures show that WMATA is following through with its plans and commitments to improve identified deficiencies within the Metrorail system.

When Metrorail submits requests for corrective action plan closure the WMSC reviews supporting documentation provided by WMATA and conducts verification activities to ensure that each aspect of the CAP has been carried out and addresses the finding it was created to remedy.

There are often instances when the WMSC rejects Metrorail's request for closure.

◆ CAP Modification

In some cases, as provided for in the WMSC Program Standard, Section 9.C.4, CAP Modifications, the WMSC or WMATA may identify existing corrective action plans that require modifications. In 2025, WMATA submitted 60 modification requests. An example of a corrective action plan WMATA requested to modify is CAP C-0129. This CAP was created to address a finding from the **2021 audit of Metrorail's Fitness for Duty Program**. Under this corrective action plan, Metrorail was required to establish, implement, and document a program that ensures covered employees are assessed for fitness for duty prior to or during their shift on a regular basis. Metrorail requested, and the WMSC granted, an extension to allow relevant labor negotiations to be resolved to ensure the program could be properly implemented. Metrorail created its Fitness for Duty Governance Board. This board is responsible for developing and implementing Metrorail's Fitness for Duty Program. The WMSC reviewed the Fitness for Duty Program



documents, which were based on American Public Transit Association (APTA) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) guidance and includes requirements such as physical exams every two years for safety sensitive personnel, return-to-duty physical exams, screening for sleep disorders, medication reporting, hours of service limits, and random and post-accident drug and alcohol testing. The WMSC approved this CAP for closure in December 2025.

Our work does not end at CAP closure. The WMSC continues its oversight to ensure that corrective action plan's implemented safety improvement remain in place and is as effective as intended, in accordance with WMATA's responsibility to maintain safety improvements long-term. Implementing and completing a corrective action plan is a demonstration of continuous safety improvement, as each corrective action plan helps to make Metrorail safer.

◆ Notices of Non-compliance

When Metrorail does not provide actionable items or misses a milestone, the WMSC must address that failure. WMSC Program Standard, Section 11.B, Notice, allows the WMSC to issue a notice of non-compliance in the event WMATA fails to comply with any provision of the Program Standard. While monitoring WMATA's progress on addressing identified hazards through our oversight work, the WMSC has determined that WMATA is not complying with the requirements of its corrective action plans in some instances. (See specific summaries below.) Of the four notices of non-compliances issued in 2024, two were resolved (**C-0072** and **C-0146**). WMATA remains out of compliance with the requirements for CAP **C-0255** and **C-0272**. In 2025, the WMSC issued two additional notices of non-compliance for CAP C-240, which is summarized below.

Notices of Non-Compliance for CAP C-0240

◆ Notice issued April 4, 2025

As part of the **2023 WMSC audit of Metrorail's Roadway Maintenance Machines**, the WMSC found that Metrorail is putting its personnel at risk by not ensuring the use of adequate fall protection when working on or around RMM (roadway maintenance machines). During on-site observations for the audit, a Metrorail employee climbed on



When Metrorail does not provide actionable items or misses a milestone, the WMSC must address that failure.

top of the concrete plant on a RMM without fall protection. Car Track & Equipment Maintenance (CTEM) shops had recently obtained portable fall protection systems that are intended for use when personnel work on top of vehicles, but this system was not used in this case. The observed actions during this audit demonstrated that Metrorail personnel were regularly operating without the required safety protections. The WMSC also observed missing fall protection barriers in the Alexandria Rail Yard storeroom in February 2023 (corrected by Metrorail). Investigation report **W-0176** Repair and Maintenance Supply Storage Facility on April 25, 2022, highlighted a serious injury as result of improper or a lack of fall protection at the Queenstown Road Repair and Maintenance Supply Storage Facility.

When the WMSC raised this safety concern, Metrorail responded that personnel receive fall protection training. However, these protections are not being carried out in practice.

As a result of this finding, the WMSC required that Metrorail complete development and implementation of a comprehensive fall protection program that includes Metrorail conducting safety promotion activities to ensure that personnel working on and around roadway maintenance machines understand the hazard of falls from height and the necessary mitigations to keep themselves and their colleagues safe.

Actionable Item 1 was provided to the WMSC on February 23, 2024. On April 18, 2024, Metrorail emailed the WMSC that it intended to pause submission of actionable items related to several open corrective action plans that relate to worker safety; C-0240 was included on that list. C-0240 Actionable Item 2 was due on July 10, 2024, and Actionable Item 3 was due on January 22, 2025. Neither of these items were received as required.

◆ Notice issued September 15, 2025

In addition to non-compliance with delivery of the aforementioned actionable items, WMATA Metrorail failed to submit Actionable Item 4, which was due on July 22, 2025, and Actionable Item 5, which was due on August 21, 2025, resulting in the issuance of a second notice of non-compliance for CAP C-0240. By not addressing this CAP, Metrorail is not mitigating a known hazard to workers' safety

For WMATA to return to compliance with C-0240, WMATA must submit all CAP actionable items that are now past-due. As of the date of this notice, late actionable items for C-0240 include Actionable Items 2, 3, 4, and 5.

A full list of CAPs WMATA is working to complete can be found on our website at wmata.wmasc.gov.




SAFETY EVENTS





SAFETY EVENTS

Some of the Most Common Safety Events of 2025



MetroRail reported 2,782 safety events to the WMSC in 2025, an increase from 1,071 total safety events reported in 2024. The WMSC Program Standard defines events that are formally reportable to the WMSC as either an accident, incident, or occurrence. Investigations are required to be conducted on events that may have broader safety implications, and the WMSC Program Standard requires that certain investigations be documented in a final report for WMSC adoption. These requirements are based on FTA regulations and WMSC operational experience.

Some of the most common safety events to occur in 2025 were related to station overruns in both manual and automatic train operation mode, speed restriction or track closure due to track

or infrastructure damage or failure, customer injury (minor) that required transport and signal system failure, including loss of shunt. Not all reported events require a final investigation report. In 2025, the WMSC adopted 56 final safety event investigation reports.

Other investigations included red signal overruns, improper roadway worker protection and improper train movement, some of which are highlighted below. Complete final safety event investigation reports are available at wmsc.gov/reports.

The safety events summarized below occurred in 2024 and the associated investigation reports were adopted by the WMSC in 2025.

Red Signal Overruns

MetroRail reported 11 red signal overruns in 2025, a decrease from 14 in 2024, and an increase from nine in 2023. As of February 1, 2026, there have been three such events reported in 2026. The causes of and contributing factors to the red signal overrun events described below included non-compliance with operational rules, procedures and instructions, inadequate training, loss of situational awareness and inadequate rail traffic controller staffing levels.



► **W-0371 - New Carrollton Rail Yard - January 21, 2024**

- A train operator passed a red signal while conducting yard moves at the New Carrollton Rail Yard. The train operator was assigned by an interlocking operator to move an 8-car train on track 11, which is only capable of accommodating 14 cars. However, 16 cars were routinely stored on the track, resulting in the lead car of the lead 8-car consist being in front of a signal. After performing a rolling brake test, the train operator crossed over switch 109.



During an investigative interview, the train operator indicated it was their first time moving a train to the mainline that had been secured in front of another train and that they were unaware of the placement of the governing red signal that they moved their train beyond. This highlights the importance of territory familiarization training for equipment operators, as identified in the WMSC's **2022 audit of Metrorail's rail operations**. The associated corrective action plan, C-0183, which required several modifications, is scheduled for completion in June 2027, with deliverables due throughout the implementation process.

Due to this event, the New Carrollton Division developed Tower signage to remind Interlocking Operators that track 11 should only hold a maximum of 14 cars. Additionally, the insulator joint for signal D99-110 was repositioned from beyond the signal to before the signal so that the maximum allowed 14 cars would fit 10 feet behind signal D99-110.

► **W-0374 - near Brentwood Rail Yard - July 16, 2024**

- While remotely monitoring radio traffic as part of regular oversight work, WMSC personnel notified Metrorail's Director of Safety Investigations of a possible red signal overrun at signal B99-16, located between NoMa-Gallaudet and Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood stations. Personnel in the Control Center were not notified of the safety event until approximately 20 minutes later, after it was confirmed. An investigative review of the Audio Recording System showed that a rail traffic controller granted permission to a train operator to allow WMATA personnel to exit their train at the Brentwood Rail Yard northbound stop. During this time, there were ongoing intermittent Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) outages throughout the system, affecting remote train monitoring. While RTUs are down, rail traffic controllers are unable to see visual indications for trains and signals in the impacted area. The rail traffic controller was working alone, carrying out the Radio and Button Rail Traffic Controller duties for the first 5-10 minutes of this safety event.

The Train Operator reported that their train had no speed commands, and due to miscommunication regarding the location of the train, the Rail Traffic Controller initially granted a permissive block to the 8-car marker at Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station. The operator was given a permissive block to signal B99-16 red. The operator asked if they had been given another permissive block to the northbound platform stop and they were instructed by the rail traffic controller not to pass the red signal. During an investigative interview, the train operator confirmed signal B99-16 was red when they moved the train beyond it.

WMATA Operations IT indicated 10,351 incidents of the RTUs being in a failed state where communication of data was not possible between February and August 2024. Most of these events were intermittent and self-restored within seconds. WMATA determined the RTU's are outdated and, at the time of the investigation, had not identified a timeline for installation of new RTUs. WMATA has since tested and installed new software that has lessened RTU disruption.

Metrorail is implementing related corrective action plan C-0251, which addresses the finding that Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks such as inspection and



handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other element of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designated safety protections (scheduled completion date January 2028).

Improper Train Movement

► W-0406 - Improper Vehicle Movement - near D&G Junction - December 10, 2024 - A Blue Line Train

Operator misunderstood instructions from the Radio Rail Traffic Controller in the Control Center and operated their train past a red signal and against the normal flow of traffic, risking a head-on collision with an Orange Line Train on the same track. At the time of this safety event, there were no passengers aboard the train. At 5:15 a.m., the Radio Rail Traffic Controller provided the train a permissive block, a clear section of track in front of the train, and instructed the operator to reverse ends (toward Minnesota Avenue) and hold at signal D98-44, which was red, indicating to stop. At 5:17 a.m., the Train Operator entered the pocket track at the D&G Junction and stopped short of the signal, without clearing Switch 11. The Rail Traffic Controller informed the Operator that they had not cleared the interlocking. The Rail Traffic Controller instructed the Train Operator to reverse ends (go back to the car they had previously operated from on the downtown or inbound or Stadium-Armory end) and move



the train forward to clear the interlocking. At 5:22 a.m., the Rail Traffic Controller instructed the Train Operator to move to car 7168 (Stadium-Armory end), presumably to provide clarity on which operating end their instructions referred to, and to use the Coast to Car Wash Button until being instructed to stop the train. At 5:23 a.m., the Rail Traffic Controller identified that Train 612 was moving in the wrong direction, toward Minnesota Avenue, and instructed the Train Operator to stop the train.

The Train Operator had not walked back through the train to the opposite (Stadium-Armory) end to reverse ends as instructed, but instead began moving toward New Carrollton. The Rail Traffic Controller again notified the Train Operator that they had been instructed to operate from car 7168 (Stadium-Armory end). The Train Operator of Train 612 did not accurately repeat back the directions and moved their train through signal D98-44, which was red, toward Minnesota Avenue, when the instruction was to move the train in the direction of Stadium-Armory (inbound). The Train Operator moved the train from the pocket track to track 2, against the normal flow of traffic, traveling 210 feet before being instructed to stop by the Radio Rail Traffic Controller. At 5:30 a.m., the Rail Traffic Controller instructed the Train Operator to key down (turn off) the train, reverse ends to proceed back into the pocket track, and then key the train down. A Rail Supervisor was dispatched to and assumed operation of the train. In accordance with Metrorail procedure, the Train Operator and Rail Traffic Controller were removed from service for post-event toxicology testing, and the train was removed from service for inspection.

It was the Train Operator's first day operating independently since completing rail vehicle operator training and certification. Review of audio data demonstrates that the Train Operator appeared overwhelmed by the instructed tasks. During the WMSC's **2025 audit of Metrorail's Control Center and Rail Operations**, Metrorail personnel interviewed



expressed concerns over the training of rail vehicle operators and the effectiveness of line platform instructors who are responsible for training new train operator candidates. The WMSC issued a recommendation that Metrorail does not evaluate the effectiveness of Line Platform Instructors. To address this recommendation, Metrorail created and the WMSC approved for implementation CAP C-0309. The corrective action plan is scheduled for completion in December 2028, with deliverables due for submission throughout implementation.



Improper Roadway Worker Protection Events

There were 43 improper roadway worker protection safety events reported to the WMSC in 2025. This is an increase from the 34 improper RWP events that required final investigation reports in 2024.

► **W-0377 - Improper Roadway Worker Protection - Southern Avenue Station - August 25, 2024** - An Office of Track and Structures Supervisor acting as the Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC), entered the roadway and placed shunts at the incorrect location, resulting in the RWIC having no protection against possible train collision. The RWIC requested a supervisory power outage and incorrectly informed the Radio Rail Traffic Controller that they were located at "F06", which is the alphanumeric code for Anacostia Station. However, the RWIC and their crew were actually located at F08, Southern Avenue Station. The Rail Traffic Controller granted the RWIC permission to enter the roadway to place shunts under Exclusive Track Occupancy. The RWIC expressed confusion, informing the Rail Traffic Controller that a train had just traveled through the station while the crew were still on the platform. Again, the RWIC incorrectly stated "F06" when asked. At no time during this exchange or previous communication was an actual station name identified by the Rail Traffic Controller or the Roadway Worker in Charge. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller later identified on their Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) screen display that shunts had been placed at Southern Avenue, not at Anacostia Station, where permission had been granted and protection had been established.

► **W-0405 - Improper Roadway Worker Protection - Capitol Heights Station - April 23, 2024** - A Roadway Worker Protection rule violation took place

between Capitol Heights Station and Addison Road Station, when a work crew conducting a track inspection on track 2 without establishing an Advanced Mobile



Flagger (AMF) at the stations to warn train operators of roadway worker personnel on the tracks, encountered a train operating at regulated speed, instead of at 35 mph as the rule dictates. The RWIC briefed their work crew, including AMFs before the work began. However, the RWIC changed the track order after the briefing was completed, notifying only AMF #1 of the change.

Customer Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

There were 7 customer evacuation for life safety reasons event reports adopted in 2025. For example, on May 18, 2024, Foggy Bottom-GWU Station (**W-0362**) was evacuated for life safety reasons due to the report of fire on the track caused by accumulated debris near the energized third rail located close to an interlocking between Farragut West and Foggy Bottom - GWU stations. At the onset of the event, the Buttons Rail Traffic Controller in the Control Center was working alone, as their partner was on a personal break. The failures and deficiencies identified during the investigation into this event included the Rail Traffic Controller reporting the wrong incident location and not providing the chain markers as required when asked, the emergency fire alarm not being activated automatically or manually in the station, and there were power restoration issues, including non-compliance with procedures and ineffective communication. Other causes and contributing factors include:

- Inadequate maintenance and inspection to prevent the accumulation of debris near the energized third rail
- Inadequate fan configuration due to restrictive procedures outlined in the Fan Emergency Playbook that do not align with operational needs during real-world emergencies
- Miscommunication between internal Metrorail departments, as well as between partnering agencies and Metrorail personnel

WMATA is in the process of addressing several related deficiencies that the WMSC identified in our 2025 audit of Metrorail's Fire and Life Safety programs through the corrective action plan process. The report is summarized earlier in this report and can be found in its entirety on our website at wmata.com/wmsc.

The work crew was supposed to be under Advance Mobile Flagging protection; however, the Advance Mobile Flagger was not in the correct location, to provide this protection. This was as a result of the Roadway Worker in Charge not communicating this information to all personnel that were part of the roadway work crew.

There was a location discrepancy not identified by the RWIC or the Radio Rail Traffic Controller, who then granted the RWIC permission to begin their walking track inspection. A train operator reported having passed a work crew as they approached Capitol Heights Station, but that there was not an AMF at Addison Road Station. The RWIC and their crew were at Capitol Heights Station, while the AMF was at Benning Road Station.

These two events highlight the importance of rail system physical characteristics and territory familiarization, effective communication using plain language, and compliance with written operational rules and procedures, regarding verification of chain markers prior to entering the roadway. The WMSC also previously identified deficiencies during audit activities, which led to corrective action plans C-0280 regarding personnel not following RWP rules and C-0183 regarding territory familiarization training and assessment. Both corrective action plans are scheduled for completion in late 2026.

INSPECTIONS

The WMSC has regularly inspected various aspects of the Metrorail system since becoming certified as the SSOA for WMATA in 2019. On October 21, 2022, the Federal Transit Administration issued **Special Directive 22-50**, requiring the WMSC to develop and implement a risk-based inspection program as required by 49 U.S.C. § 5329(k). The WMSC integrated the FTA-approved risk-based aspects into our Program Standard on November 15, 2024, and began implementing the new program thereafter.



WMSC inspections include onsite activities such as training observations, walking the Metrorail right of way, riding trains or maintenance vehicles, observing activities in rail yards and maintenance facilities, data and document analysis, communications monitoring and review, video review, and frequent discussions with Metrorail personnel at every level.

At the conclusion of each inspection, an oral debrief occurs, and a written report is provided. This serves to share any concerns, defects, or non-compliance issues, which are conveyed to the relevant WMATA personnel responsible, as well as to WMATA's Department of Safety. WMSC Inspectors prepare inspection reports that are posted at wmata.gov/wmsc. The WMSC's website contains 80 reports pertaining to inspections that were conducted in 2025.

An example of inspections completed by WMSC personnel in 2025 include a series of roadway worker protection (RWP)-focused inspections conducted in October. All ten inspections were risk-based, resulting from an urgent hazard identified during the WMSC's Track, Structures, and Roadway Worker Protection Audit: On July 10 and 11 of 2025, WMSC personnel visited the Carmen Turner Facility (CTF), where RWP training and qualification records are held (there are no electronic or redundant versions of these records). At the time, Metrorail had three levels of RWP qualification: Level IV-qualified individuals are referred to as roadway workers in charge (RWIC) and directly ensure the safety of all work taking place in their respective work zones.

While at CTF, WMSC personnel identified Level IV RWP training records that did not support the Level IV certification given to those individuals. The WMSC issued an urgent hazard notification to Metrorail on July 14, 2025, based on


this information. As of July 15, 2025, there were 1,246 RWP Level IV personnel. After the WMSC's reporting of this hazard, Metrorail identified 192 Level IV personnel who received certifications that did not conform to written requirements.

On September 4, 2025, the WMSC issued a **finding** that Metrorail is not following its written process to ensure and document that its roadway workers in charge have demonstrated the knowledge and skills required to do their job safely. To address this finding, Metrorail developed and the WMSC approved corrective action plan C-0310. Under this corrective action plan, Metrorail has retrained and requalified all 192 personnel; however, as an interim mitigation while this corrective action plan was underway, the WMSC began conducting a series of targeted RWP risk-based inspections to monitor Level IV roadway workers in charge.

During the course of these inspections, the WMSC identified nearly 50 defects. Many were communicated immediately to Metrorail and mitigated in the field at the time the hazard or rule violation was noted by WMSC Inspectors. Two inspections resulted in the Metrorail Department of Safety issuing Improper Roadway Protection (O-23) safety event actions that resulted in the cessation of work being carried out in hazardous conditions identified by WMSC Inspectors. The rest of the defects were mitigated through the WMSC's regular inspection reporting process with Metrorail. The WMSC thanks Metrorail for their timely attention, and the resulting swift action taken to mitigate the key defects identified.

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AGENCY SAFETY PLAN (PTASP)

As required by the WMSC Program Standard and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulations, **WMATA's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP)** includes Metrorail's commitment to and process for implementation of its Safety Management System (SMS). This is a proactive, data-driven approach to safety management emphasizing continuous improvement through commitments from each member of the organization.



The 2025 revisions to WMATA's PTASP included updates to the hazard rating process, which now includes three levels of assessment, adding the future or residual risk rating.

The WMSC ensures Metrorail meets the requirements of its Agency Safety Plan through our audits, inspections, and other oversight. The WMSC enforces this when needed through the issuance of findings requiring Metrorail to correct safety issues and through other enforcement tools such as WMSC orders. Overseeing and checking Metrorail's implementation of these documented safety commitments is a basic element of our Program Standard, and a basic responsibility specified in the WMSC Compact.

The Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan is intended as a living document, subject to regular updates as part of continuous safety improvement. In accordance with the WMSC Program Standard and Federal Regulation, Metrorail must review its plan at least annually. Metrorail completed its sixth revision of its PTASP in 2025.

WMSC staff provided detailed feedback to Metrorail regarding its proposed 2025 revisions before Metrorail presented its revisions to its board of directors. The WMSC Board considered and approved the revision on October 21, 2025 (with the latest version taking effect December 31, 2025).

The 2025 revisions to WMATA's PTASP included updates to the hazard rating process, which now includes three levels of assessment, adding the future or residual risk rating. Two elements of Employee Safety Training were revised to reflect requirements for Hazard Communication Training and Safety Management System Training. WMATA added language that incorporates the requirements of the new FTA Rule on Roadway Worker Protection. WMATA also revised titles of departments, personnel, and reference documents, and added additional language explaining roles, purpose and expectations to the Safety Committee and Safety Risk Assessment sections.

The WMSC assessed this revision in accordance with WMSC processes utilizing an FTA-recommended checklist and the WMSC's experience and expertise. The WMSC is focused on ensuring that Metrorail is proactive, acts on, tracks and investigates hazards and risks as required by the SMS approach, and allows easy reporting of concerns from frontline workers, along with providing proper feedback and protections for those reports.

Metrorail's other documented policies and procedures are also implemented using this high-level document. Overseeing and verifying Metrorail's implementation of these documented safety commitments is a basic element of the WMSC Program Standard, and a basic responsibility specified in the WMSC

Compact. If the WMSC identifies that Metrorail is not following its safety requirements, we take the necessary action to require Metrorail to correct that safety issue.

PROGRAM STANDARD

The Program Standard establishes the requirements and expectations for WMATA and WMSC interactions. In accordance with our responsibilities under the WMSC Compact, the process set out in our Program Standard, and federal regulations, the WMSC is required to review and, if necessary, update the Program Standard annually. Through this annual process, the WMSC examines ways to continually improve how safety oversight work is conducted.

The Program Standard is updated at least once each year as part of our continuous improvement process. During this revision process, the WMSC submits a draft of our proposed revision to WMATA for its 30-day review. We carefully review Metrorail's comments and incorporated changes in response to those comments where appropriate based on our role as the principal safety oversight authority, our Compact, and relevant regulations.

In 2025, in regards to **Program Standard revision 8.0**, the WMSC also received correspondence from the Office of the City Administrator, on behalf of D.C. Mayor Bowser, D.C. Council Chairman Phil Mendelson and Councilmember Charles Allen, Maryland State Delegate Marc Korman, the Washington Suburban Transit Commission, the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and the Greater Washington Board of Trade. The WMSC had follow-on conversations with many of

these individuals and entities on the Program Standard process and the WMSC's oversight of the WMATA Metrorail System.

Program Standard revision 8.0 was adopted by the WMSC Board at the September 16, 2025, public meeting and took effect October 1, 2025.

The 2025 revisions can be broken into four categories: FTA required changes, those prompted by actions and activities that have occurred throughout the past year, those designed to enhance clarity, and finally, changes created to address other concerns.

1. FTA-required changes

- Sections 1, 4 - public transportation safety certification training program
- Section 2 - new roadway worker protection regulation under 49 CFR part 671
- Section 2 - disposition of Program Standard comments from new 49 CFR part 674
- Section 7 - safety event notification requirements derived from new 49 CFR part 674

2. Changes prompted by actions/activities during past year



- Signing Internal Safety Reviews
- Posting inspection reports
- Safety Certification: Purpose and Benefit
- When oversight begins

3. Changes focused on clarifications and enhancing existing language

- Safety Certification
- Project verification documentation
- Access to project documents
- Revision to Fines section

4. Changes to address comments/concerns

- Coordination with other agencies for audits
- Oral Petition to the Commissioners as part of the Petition for Reconsideration process



FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE

Funding from the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, along with federal grants from the FTA, enables the WMSC to operate independently. The WMSC is meeting all budgeting and financial reporting requirements. Fiscal year 2025 ended June 30, 2025, with the WMSC operating within its approved budget. The approved budget for fiscal year 2026, which began on July 1, 2025, is \$7.53 million, the majority of which covers staff costs such as salaries and benefits (see Appendix D for approved FY26 budget).

To be good financial stewards and to provide predictability for Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, the WMSC uses multi-year spending plans for FTA grant awards. Any amounts in a particular year not covered by FTA grant awards are divided equally among the three jurisdictions. In fiscal year 2025, the FTA awarded the WMSC a \$4,054 million grant through the federal fiscal year 2024 safety oversight apportionments. The WMSC is spreading these funds over a multi-year period, as it does for each federal award, so that the WMSC maintains all active FTA awards and maximizes the benefits of this federal funding for effective safety oversight and for the responsible use of available local and federal funds.

Expanding Oversight Capacity

The WMSC added key positions in 2025 including Safety Oversight Program Manager, Safety Certification Program Manager, and Multimedia Communications Specialist. As the WMSC regularly assesses its workload requirements in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, the WMSC determines the need for any additional positions or services based on the size, complexity, and oversight needs of the WMATA Metrorail system.

Continuing Clean Financial Audits

The WMSC received another unmodified (“clean”) financial statement audit opinion for fiscal year 2025. The report, and the similar reports covering previous fiscal years, are available at wmsc.gov.

The draft fiscal year 2027 budget and work plan was developed in fall 2025. A final fiscal year 2027 budget will be approved by the Commissioners no later than June 1, 2026, in accordance with the jurisdictional funding agreement.

WMSC STRATEGIC PLAN

During the past year, the WMSC made significant progress in developing its first comprehensive strategic plan, which established a framework to guide the agency’s long-term priorities and strengthen its independent safety oversight of Metrorail. The Commission conducted internal assessments and engaged the Commissioners, staff and external stakeholders to evaluate organizational operations, oversight programs, and future risks to inform the strategic goals and objectives. This work incorporated the further developments in the inspections program, performance measurements, and data analytics. These efforts are the foundation for a forward-looking, data-driven strategy aligned with the Commission’s mission. The WMSC’s inaugural Strategic Plan, spanning 2026-2030, will be adopted and published in 2026.

CONTINUING EDUCATION, TRAINING AND AWARENESS

WMSC staff are meeting all requirements to demonstrate that they are qualified to perform their functions based on appropriate training. In 2025, staff made significant progress towards training credentials required by FTA regulation, which includes individual progress on the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program (PTSCCTP). As of February 1, 2025, 14 WMSC staff members have completed the PTSCCTP program (six in 2025), and four staff members are making considerable progress towards completing the program as soon as 2026. WMSC contractors performing relevant work also participate in this training program. Nine WMSC personnel have also completed the training requirements for Transit Safety and Security Program (TSSP) certification. Completion of this training program indicates that the individual has a broad-based knowledge of the safety and security principles applicable to transit system safety, operations, and management.

WMSC staff also participated in workshops and forums, including the FTA’s Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Workshop.

As required by the WMSC Compact, the WMSC commissioners appointed by Maryland, the District of Columbia and Virginia have expertise in transportation safety, transportation, engineering and public finance.

WMSC staff are meeting all requirements to demonstrate that they are qualified to perform their functions based on appropriate training.

TRANSPARENCY, PUBLIC INPUT AND EXTERNAL SAFETY CONCERNS



The WMSC is committed to transparency and inclusive public participation in carrying out every aspect of its program. The WMSC solicits, receives, and responds to safety concerns submitted by members of the public. The WMSC also receives information about safety concerns through our website, social media and email. The WMSC reviews and appropriately addresses every safety concern that it receives, demonstrating the importance and the effectiveness of the WMSC interacting directly with riders, personnel, data, and documentation throughout all levels and all departments of Metrorail to ensure that safety

events, hazards and other issues are properly identified, and, most importantly, to ensure that Metrorail identifies mitigations that can help prevent similar issues in the future.

For example, on February 7, 2025, the WMSC received a safety concern regarding erosion around the footing of a pier that supports a section of the Red Line, just south of Grosvenor-Strathmore Station. The WMSC conducted an inspection (**WMSC Inspection Report 20250210**) and identified four defects, including the erosion described in the safety concern, along with exposed earth, and noted that pier identification was either obstructed by graffiti, or non-existent. The WMSC notified Metrorail of the safety concern and the issues identified were mitigated.

In conjunction with the WMSC's other robust information-sharing methods, our regularly held public meetings allow substantial public education and awareness of the WMSC's safety oversight work. As part of video streaming of these meetings, the WMSC provides closed captioning to further increase accessibility.

The WMSC encourages Metrorail employees and contractors to report any safety concerns to WMATA's safety hotline, and encourages employees, contractors and members of the public to continue to report safety concerns to us at the WMSC via phone, via social media (@MetrorailSafety), via [wmsc.gov](https://www.wmsc.gov) or via email at safetyconcern@wmsc.gov.





CONCLUSION

During 2025, as a direct result of the WMSC's rail safety oversight program, Metrorail has made strides in improving its safety readiness in many areas. For instance, as we described earlier in this report, the WMSC provided direct oversight of Metrorail's incremental initiation of automatic train operations on all rail lines, ending a 15-year moratorium on ATO following the 2009 Ft. Totten accident. Also, under the WMSC's direct rail safety oversight, Metrorail assembled and presented to the WMSC for its approval, its first-ever federally compliant Metrorail Rail Transit Roadway Worker Protection Program. The WMSC approved Metrorail's Roadway Worker Protection Program in December 2025.

As we have done since being certified as the designated safety oversight agency for Metrorail in 2019, we continued to use a fact-based, evidence-driven rail safety oversight program to guide Metrorail towards a safer rail system. Through our audits, inspections, oversight of safety certification, investigations and our oversight of corrective action plans, the WMSC has required Metrorail to adhere to its safety commitments,

leveraging the appropriate Metrorail experts to design systems, procedures, training, and to conduct supervision, inspection, maintenance, repair and modernization for the safety of employees, passengers and first responders on the Metrorail system. The WMSC upheld our obligations while being accountable to the responsibility that we have been entrusted with and we did so judiciously and efficiently, with integrity, using the financial resources provided by state and federal stakeholders, to conduct WMSC's operations.

Safety is not a destination with an endpoint; it is instead a never-ending journey on a road towards continuous improvement. Looking forward to 2026, the WMSC is continuing its oversight work with a continued focus on safety. That includes oversight of WMATA's rollout of its new RWP program and automated systems, as well as conducting safety certification work on the new 8000-series railcars so that the WMSC is able to provide timely concurrence when Metrorail is ready to put the fleet into passenger service. The WMSC remains committed to effective rail oversight and the goal we share with Metrorail of maintaining and improving Metrorail safety.



APPENDICES



OPEN CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS (CAPS)

AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 2026

CAP ID	Finding/Recommendation	Expected Completion	Source
NTSB R-8-004-A	Promptly implement appropriate technology that will automatically alert wayside workers of approaching trains and will automatically alert train operators when approaching areas with workers on or near the tracks.	03/01/23	Safety Directive 16-2 (12/15/2015)
WMSC-20-C0042	Finding 5. WMATA employees are not consistently following RWP Rule 5.12 for equipment calibration.	07/21/26	RWP Audit (6/18/2020)
WMSC-21-C0083	Ten Metrorail structures have steel rocker bearings, which created a seismic risk in the event of an earthquake other seismic events.	07/05/26	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0099	A lack of an Intrusion Detection Warning (IDW) system where WMATA's own criteria require it.	06/05/28	WMSC Directive (3/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0100	Metrorail is not maintaining a fully functioning radio communications system in all rail yards and shops.	12/28/26	WMSC Directive (4/30/2021)
WMSC-21-C0120	Finding 2. Metrorail ignores the minimum daily release period (rest period) requirements in its Fatigue Risk Management Policy.	03/10/26	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0131	Recommendation 2. Metrorail is not providing medical oversight of contractors and does not include any requirement in contracts that contractors meet WMATA medical, fatigue or hours of service standards.	02/16/26	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0139	The 7000 Series Rehabilitation and subsystems overhaul program is being developed without full SAFE coordination, involvement or approval.	03/17/26	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0143	Metrorail does not consistently follow a standard process to address wheels out-of-round, to prevent cars with wheels out-of-round from operating, and to identify and address the root causes of wheels out-of-round.	09/26/26	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0146	Metrorail railcars do not include inward and outward-facing audio and image recorders in all operating compartments.	10/17/26	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0154	Traction Power Maintenance employees do not get all required information and training to maintain equipment that they are directed to work on, and there is no process in place to ensure that personnel are trained on specific equipment prior to working on that equipment.	05/11/27	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)
WMSC-22-C0173	Finding 12. The exit stairwell from Rosslyn Station is not protected from obstructions, which creates a risk that the hatch will not be able to be opened in an emergency, trapping customers inside.	10/05/26	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)
WMSC-22-C0182	Finding 2. Metrorail does not effectively identify, track, communicate and address operational hazards as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	11/15/25	Rail Operations (4/7/22)
WMSC-22-C0183	Finding 3. Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard.	06/15/27	Rail Operations (4/7/22)
WMSC-22-C0193	Finding 13. With frequent modifications due to temporary and permanent orders, and outdated versions of Metrorail's rulebook being distributed to personnel when hard copies are available, the latest Metrorail rules are not easily accessible to train operators. This creates document control issues and makes a rule requiring personnel to carry the latest version of the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) unrealistic.	03/28/26	Rail Operations (4/7/22)
WMSC-22-C0199	Finding 1. Metrorail has not developed and implemented a comprehensive water intrusion and remediation program covering stations, elevators and escalators, which contributes to damage and deterioration of structures and other assets, to electrical hazards and to other safety risks.	04/25/28	Station Maint., Elevator/ Escalator Audit (5/25/22)
WMSC-22-C0213	Metrorail has an ineffective and insufficient inspection, maintenance and cleaning program for Automatic Train Control equipment, particularly including a lack of required tools, procedural compliance, and supervisory oversight for care of vital equipment housed in train control rooms, and is not maintaining the structural integrity of these ancillary rooms.	12/19/26	ATC Room inspection, maintenance and cleaning program (8/4/2022)
WMSC-22-C0216	Finding 3. Metrorail is closing preventative maintenance work orders without correcting known deficiencies, which does not comply with its Systems Maintenance (SMNT) Maintenance Control Policy.	03/02/26	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0217	Finding 4. Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Metrorail closes communications related "corrective maintenance" (repair) tickets without effectively identifying, documenting and addressing issues.	03/08/27	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)



OPEN CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS (CAPS)

AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 2026

CAP ID	Finding/Recommendation	Expected Completion	Source
WMSC-22-C0219	Finding 6. Metrorail has insufficient training for communications personnel, including on-the-job training (OJT) that SMNT itself describes as deficient, and a lack of requirements to ensure that personnel only work on equipment they are trained on and capable of maintaining as required by the PTASP.	05/23/28	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0222	Finding 9. Metrorail communications rooms have signs of recurring water, dirt and dust intrusion. Metrorail is also improperly storing equipment in these rooms. Components in these rooms therefore may not function as required for the safety of riders, workers and first responders.	06/23/26	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-23-C0240	Finding 1. Metrorail does not ensure the use of adequate fall protection when working on or around RMM.	10/20/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)
WMSC-23-C0241	Finding 2. Metrorail is not effectively tracking and mitigating hazards related to RMM maintenance and operations in accordance with its PTASP.	02/09/26	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)
WMSC-24-C0251	Finding 1: Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.	01/10/28	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0252	Finding 1: Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.	02/08/27	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0253	Finding 1: Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.	07/20/26	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0254	Finding 2: Metrorail does not review, analyze, and act upon available safety data about the health and functionality of the Automatic Train Control system and subsystems as required by Metrorail's Agency Safety Plan. Therefore, Metrorail's ATC Engineering cannot reliably or proactively determine whether or not the ATC system and subsystems are or will be functioning as designed to provide for the safety of riders and workers.	04/12/27	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0255	Finding 3: Metrorail is putting its personnel at risk due to health hazards such as damaged and repositioned materials marked as containing asbestos that are not being identified and managed as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	TBD	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0256	Finding 4: Metrorail is not systematically identifying, tracking, and mitigating hazards related to automatic train control and signaling as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	09/15/26	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0257	Finding 5: Metrorail is not maintaining its books of plans in accordance with its requirements.	10/24/26	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0258	Recommendation 1: Metrorail has not determined the required staffing for ATC and Signals.	11/10/26	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0259	Recommendation 2. Metrorail does not ensure that lessons learned from prior projects are consistently shared with all relevant personnel responsible for ATC and Signals.	11/17/25	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0260	Recommendation 3: Metrorail does not have a procedure for the removal of hang tags in Train Control Rooms that indicate temporary modifications. This has led to many rooms having such "temporary" hang tags in place for decades.	02/15/27	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0261	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	03/15/27	Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)
WMSC-24-C0262	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	03/14/28	Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)
WMSC-24-C0264	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	02/28/27	Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)
WMSC-24-C0265	Finding 1: Metrorail is not consistently identifying, addressing, and preventing water intrusion in power rooms.	08/23/27	Power Systems (2/7/2024)

OPEN CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS (CAPS)

AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 2026

CAP ID	Finding/Recommendation	Expected Completion	Source
WMSC-24-C0268	Finding 1: Metrorail is not performing its train operator certification activities reliably and consistently in accordance with its safety requirements specified in its Agency Safety Plan and the associated Performance Standardization on Program Manual. Therefore, Metrorail is not ensuring that its trains are only operated by personnel who have demonstrated the skills required to do so safely.	05/11/26	Train Operator Certification Order (2/28/2024)
WMSC-24-C0270	Finding 1: Metrorail is not carrying out railcar maintenance and inspection tasks as specified by its procedures.	08/10/26	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0271	Finding 2: Metrorail is training railcar personnel on outdated procedures.	04/13/27	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0272	Finding 3: Metrorail is not meeting life-safety and occupational safety and health requirements in railcar maintenance facilities.	TBD	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0273	Finding 4: Metrorail is not identifying and mitigating hazards related to railcars and railcar personnel.	03/16/26	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0280	Finding 1: Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety.	10/26/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0281	Finding 2: Metrorail is not providing its personnel with up-to-date and accessible information about the locations where additional Roadway Worker Protection is required to prevent serious injury or death.	07/18/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0282	Finding 3: Metrorail is not systematically identifying, tracking, and mitigating hazards related to Roadway Worker Protection as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	03/17/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0284	Finding 5: Metrorail has no process to ensure that areas requiring additional Roadway Worker Protection are accurately identified on an ongoing basis.	05/02/27	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0285	Finding 6: Metrorail directs its personnel to use forms of protection without training on the proper use of the protection. Specifically, Metrorail has no training or qualification related to local control. This contributes to an inconsistent application of Roadway Worker Protection rules.	10/11/27	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0287	Finding 8: Metrorail has no controls to ensure that rules being applied in areas it designates as an 'Authorized Construction Site' provide the same or greater level of protection for roadway workers as those workers have in other parts of the WMATA Rail System.	12/15/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0288	Finding 9: Metrorail is providing RWP qualifications without following the listed requirements for those qualifications.	05/09/28	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0289	Finding 10: Metrorail is not following its procedures regarding Roadway Worker Protection Training.	01/12/27	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0290	Finding 11: Metrorail is not providing critical roadway worker-related safety information and training. Instructors do not follow the standardized curriculum and omit materials.	06/16/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0291	Finding 12: Metrorail is providing incorrect information about cardinal rules and incomplete testing for non-English speaking contractors in Roadway Worker Protection Training.	03/16/27	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0292	Finding 13: Metrorail requires on-the-job Roadway Worker Protection training without outlining the requirements or process for this training.	10/24/28	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-25-C0293	Finding 1: Metrorail does not have a reliable communication system for operations or emergencies.	09/21/27	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0294	Finding 2: Metrorail Emergency Trip Stations (ETS) located throughout the system are not treated as fire life safety assets.	04/06/27	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0295A	Finding 3: Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.	04/14/26	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0295B	Finding 3: Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.	03/16/27	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0295C	Finding 3: Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.	08/03/27	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0296	Finding 4: Metrorail is using emergency radio operations channel 6 although the channel is not ready for use.	12/22/26	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0297	Finding 5: Metrorail is not contacting jurisdictional emergency services immediately upon identification of fire and smoke on the Metrorail system.	07/21/26	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)



OPEN CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS (CAPS)

AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 2026

CAP ID	Finding/Recommendation	Expected Completion	Source
WMSC-25-C0298	Finding 1: Metrorail does not have a sufficient number of rail traffic controllers and turnover is increasing.	03/14/28	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0299	Finding 2: Rail traffic controller written assessments, final assessments, and certification tests present conflicting data regarding an individual's aptitude.	03/18/29	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0300	Finding 3: Metrorail does not provide refresher training to rail vehicle operators on incidents and emergencies.	03/07/28	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0301	Finding 4: Metrorail's Train the Trainer (T3) program for Rail Training is not defined by Metrorail's procedures.	03/12/28	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0302	Finding 5: Metrorail revised ATC local control procedures without first informing all affected staff including rail traffic controllers.	05/26/26	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0303	Finding 6: Rail traffic controller consoles have been manipulated without their knowledge.	11/24/26	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0304	Finding 7: Metrorail uses Microsoft Teams chats during safety events but has not demonstrated a review of these records when determining the facts of these events.	TBD	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0305	Finding 8: Metrorail documents have not been updated on the required cadence.	02/16/27	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0306	Finding 9: Metrorail personnel are not following Metrorail radio transmission rules such as for train identification and location information.	09/15/26	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0309	Recommendation 3: Metrorail does not evaluate the effectiveness of Line Platform Instructors (LPI).	12/19/28	Control Center and Rail Operations Audit (8/27/25)
WMSC-25-C0310	Metrorail is not following its own written process to ensure and document that its roadway workers in charge have demonstrated the knowledge and skills required to do their job safely.	06/13/28	Finding requiring Metrorail to propose a Corrective Action Plan related to Level IV Roadway Worker Protection Qualification (09/04/25)
WMSC-25-C0311	Finding 1: Metrorail elevators and escalators mechanics are not reviewing job hazard analyses as required by Metrorail procedures.	TBD	Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)
WMSC-25-C0312	Finding 2: Metrorail does not proactively monitor calibration expiration for elevators and escalators equipment.	TBD	Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)
WMSC-25-C0313	Finding 3: Metrorail personnel are entering elevator pits which have active electrical circuits with standing water present.	TBD	Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)
WMSC-25-C0314	Finding 4: Metrorail elevator and escalator personnel are not trained on fall protection requirements listed within its job hazard analyses.	TBD	Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)
WMSC-25-C0315	Finding 5: Metrorail is not maintaining or displaying elevator or escalator certificates on-site as required by local jurisdictions.	TBD	Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)
WMSC-25-C0316	Recommendation 1: Metrorail elevator and escalator job descriptions are incomplete and a subset do not reflect current job responsibilities.	TBD	Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)
WMSC-25-C0317	Recommendation 2: Metrorail's Office of Elevators and Escalators Services uses multiple systems to capture data which could impair data management and result in discrepancies.	TBD	Elevators and Escalators Audit (10/15/25)
WMSC-25-C0318	Finding #1: Communication personnel are not consistently completing preventive maintenance on its public address and radio communication systems in accordance with Metrorail's procedures.	TBD	Communication Systems Audit (12/04/25)
WMSC-25-C0319	Finding #2: Metrorail does not have adequate supervisory oversight to ensure adherence to testing and replacement requirements for electrical safety gloves.	TBD	Communication Systems Audit (12/04/25)
WMSC-25-C0320	Finding #3: Metrorail rooms that contain communication systems equipment are not maintained in accordance with Metrorail policy to ensure an optimal environment for those vital systems.	TBD	Communication Systems Audit (12/04/25)
WMSC-25-C0321	Finding #4: Metrorail is not maintaining its self-assessed staffing levels required to maintain its current communication systems.	TBD	Communication Systems Audit (12/04/25)
WMSC-25-C0322	Recommendation 1: Metrorail should review how it deploys and safeguards vital communications equipment.	TBD	Communication Systems Audit (12/04/25)
WMSC-25-C0323	Recommendation 2: Metrorail should review the maintenance tasks related to its communication systems and ensure that all personnel have the necessary equipment to complete them.	TBD	Communication Systems Audit (12/04/25)

APPENDIX B

FINAL SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORTS

Each final safety event investigation report adopted by the WMSC is available at wmsc.gov/reports.

ADOPTED BY THE WMSC
IN 2025

Report Number	Date of Adoption	Report Title
W-0344	January 28, 2025	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Eastern Market Station
W-0355	January 28, 2025	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Anacostia Station
W-0356	January 28, 2025	Red Signal Overrun near Brentwood Rail Yard
W-0357	January 28, 2025	Red Signal Overrun at Shady Grove Rail Yard
W-0358	January 28, 2025	Derailment at West Falls Church Rail Yard Lead
W-0359	January 28, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Greenbelt Station
W-0360	March 4, 2025	Derailment near Naylor Road Station
W-0361	March 4, 2025	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at L'Enfant Plaza Station
W-0362	March 4, 2025	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Foggy Bottom - GWU Station
W-0363	March 4, 2025	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Eisenhower Avenue Headquarters
W-0364	March 4, 2025	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Benning Road Station
W-0365	April 8, 2025	Hazardous Materials Spill near Rosslyn Station
W-0366	April 8, 2025	Improper Vehicle Movement at Dupont Circle Station
W-0367	April 8, 2025	Improper Vehicle Movement at Pentagon Station
W-0368	May 13, 2025	Employee Injury at West Falls Church Rail Yard
W-0369	May 13, 2025	Train Operator Removed for Electronic Device Policy Violation at Franconia-Springfield Station
W-0370	May 13, 2025	Train Operator Removed for Suspicion of Fatigue at Friendship Heights Station
W-0371	May 13, 2025	Red Signal Overrun at New Carrollton Rail Yard
W-0372	May 13, 2025	Red Signal Overrun at Dulles Rail Yard
W-0373	May 13, 2025	Red Signal Overrun at King Street-Old Town Station
W-0374	May 13, 2025	Red Signal Overrun near Brentwood Rail Yard
W-0375	May 13, 2025	Red Signal Overrun at Downtown Largo Station
W-0376	May 13, 2025	Red Signal Overrun at West Falls Church Rail Yard
W-0377	June 10, 2025	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Southern Avenue Station
W-0378	June 10, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Glenmont Station
W-0379	June 10, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Silver Spring Station
W-0380	June 10, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Braddock Road Station
W-0381	June 10, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Innovation Station



APPENDIX B

FINAL SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORTS


Each final safety event investigation report adopted by the WMSC is available at wmsc.gov/reports.

ADOPTED BY THE WMSC
IN 2025

Report Number	Date of Adoption	Report Title
W-0382	June 10, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Silver Spring Station
W-0383	June 10, 2025	Collision at Landover Station
W-0384	August 5, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Vienna/Fairfax-GMU Station
W-0385	August 5, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Fort Totten Station
W-0386	August 5, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Downtown Largo Station
W-0387	August 5, 2025	Improper Door Operation at King Street-Old Town Station
W-0388	August 5, 2025	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Shady Grove Station
W-0389	August 5, 2025	Automatic Train Protection Safety Event at Addison Road Station
W-0390	August 5, 2025	Collision at Federal Triangle Station
W-0391	September 16, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Bethesda
W-0392	September 16, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Rockville Station
W-0393	September 16, 2025	Improper Door Operation Franconia-Springfield Station
W-0394	September 16, 2025	Improper Door Operation at Pentagon Station
W-0395	September 16, 2025	Serious Injury at McPherson Square Station
W-0396	September 16, 2025	Derailment near Ronald Reagan National Airport Station
W-0397	September 16, 2025	Collisions at Near Minnesota Ave Station
W-0398	September 16, 2025	Collision at Minnesota Ave Station
W-0399	October 21, 2025	Collision at Benning Road Station
W-0400	October 21, 2025	Collision at Gallery Place Station
W-0401	October 21, 2025	Collision at Anacostia Station
W-0402	October 21, 2025	Serious Injury at Capitol Heights Station
W-0403	October 21, 2025	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Forest Glen Station
W-0404	October 21, 2025	Derailment near Greenbelt Station
W-0405	October 21, 2025	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Capitol Heights Station
W-0406	October 21, 2025	Improper Vehicle Movement near D&G Junction
W-0407	December 9, 2025	Red Signal Overrun Dulles Rail Yard
W-0408	December 9, 2025	Red Signal Overrun Vienna/Fairfax-GMU Station
W-0409	December 9, 2025	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Foggy Bottom-GWU Station
W-0410	December 9, 2025	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at L'Enfant Plaza Station




APPENDIX C WMSC STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART



APPENDIX D

WMSC FY2026 BUDGET:

STAFF, OFFICE SPACE AND RELATED COSTS - SUBTOTAL: \$5,747,000



→ Staff compensation

(salaries, benefits) - \$5,258,000

Cost reflects salary and benefits for 28 full-time employees along with a benefits factor of 22.5 percent and annual performance and market adjustments to ensure retention of core staff. Staff numbers reflect personnel and organizational manpower necessary to ensure the WMSC can carry out its mission and maintain the level of effort required by the FTA's certification.

→ Commission meetings

(stipends, expenses) - \$35,000

Cost reflects statutorily obligated stipends and travel expenses, fees, meeting space, and meeting materials.

→ Office equipment and supplies - \$35,000

Purchase and depreciation of office equipment (e.g. laptops, monitors, and printers), office collaboration equipment, and office supplies.

→ Office space lease - \$210,000

Cost reflects annual lease of office space, access control, and operating expenses.

→ Business Insurance - \$209,000

Cost reflects annual premiums for cybersecurity, liability, property, and acts and omissions insurance policies.



CONTRACTORS - SUBTOTAL: \$1,563,000

Organizational management
\$255,000

IT support services
\$200,000

Legal services
\$600,000

SSOA staffing support
\$500,000

CONTRACTORS
SUBTOTAL:
\$1,563,000

→ IT support services - \$200,000

Cost reflects support for general IT services, including laptop configuration and maintenance, website maintenance, email domain management, computer security, and disaster recovery planning.

→ SSOA staffing support - \$500,000

Cost reflects contracted staffing support for non-permanent personnel necessary to provide specialized, uniquely focused technical expertise, staffing augmentation when resignations and retirements occur, and staffing augmentation for special large-scale audits and high-profile investigations.

→ Legal Services - \$600,000

Cost reflects annual outsourced legal services. Legal services are necessary to address voluminous issues related to business concerns and complex questions.

→ Organizational management - \$263,000

Cost reflects outside contract support for human resources, audit and accounting services, procurement, graphics, performance metrics design, managerial development, and employee benefits management services.

TRAVEL AND TRAINING - SUBTOTAL \$90,000

Training
(e.g., TSI, industry workshops,
conferences)
\$45,000

TRAVEL AND
TRAINING
SUBTOTAL:
\$90,000

Staff travel for field work
(inspections and meetings)
\$45,000


→ Training (e.g., TSI, industry workshops, conferences) - \$45,000

Cost reflects training for commissioners and staff to obtain required certifications, as well as training on oversight of drug and alcohol requirements, fatigue and human factors in transportation, accident investigations, investigation interview techniques, project management, and related topics. Training is offered through DOT, FTA, NTSB and other entities.

→ Staff travel for field work (inspections and meetings) - \$45,000

Cost reflects reimbursement for travel associated with field work, inspections, and meetings.

EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE - SUBTOTAL: \$130,000



→ IT software and maintenance - \$100,000

Cost reflects acquisition and maintenance, support, and licensing fees for software and data systems to support WMSC's mission and IT infrastructure. This includes legal databases, media monitoring, office productivity and other related software, and website domain renewal. Cost also includes office internet and telephone services.

→ Publications and memberships - \$15,000


Cost reflects maintaining staff professional licenses and memberships, purchases of various industry technical publications and subscriptions.

→ Personal protective equipment - \$10,000

Cost reflects purchase of weather-related personal protective equipment required for staff to work safely in the rail system.

→ Tools and instruments - \$5,000

Cost reflects acquisition and testing of speed monitoring equipment, track measuring tools, cameras, and other electronic devices and specialized work equipment that are needed to conduct field inspection activities.



TOTAL FY2026 BUDGET - \$7,530,000

FY2025 FUNDING SOURCES

The WMSC is funded by federal grants, carryover funds, and the equal support of the District of Columbia, state of Maryland and Commonwealth of Virginia. After federal grants and carryover funds, each jurisdiction supported the FY26 budget with \$1,211,531.



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