750 First St. NE • Ste. 900 • Washington, D.C. 20002 Office: 202-384-1520 • Website: www.wmsc.gov

Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

At or Near Cleveland Park and Foggy Bottom-GWU and stations

April 30, 2025 and July 31, 2025

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on May 12, 2026

WMSC staff recommend adoption of these investigations.

The investigation reports below detail two 2025 events that required passengers to be evacuated from a train, a Metrorail station, or both, due to life safety reasons. There were no injuries reported as a result of either event. The WMSC issued its most recent triennial audit report on Metrorail's Emergency Management and Life Safety programs in 2025 and continues to oversee Metrorail's progress as it implements safety improvements to address WMSC findings and recommendations from that report.

The causes of and contributing factors to the events described below include:

- A faulty digitrol[1], which is a component that controls air pressure to the brakes on a truck (W-0424)
- Electrical failure, due to improper maintenance and water intrusion, resulting in an AC return overload (W-0425)
- Poor radio transmission quality (W-0425)
- Failure to follow written policies and procedures, including those related to single tracking operations (W-0425)

Investigations W-0424 and W-0425, being considered at the May 12, 2026, led to specific corrective actions (referred to as recommended corrective actions or RCA) which have been fully implemented as this investigation report is being presented for WMSC adoption. These include:

[1] A digitrol controls air pressure to 3000-series railcar truck brakes. If the digitrol fails, the brakes remain applied.

- Metrorail created a directive for the cable division of Power Maintenance personnel to ensure that when wayside cables are booted for extended periods of time, they are secured and elevated off the ground to prevent potential safety hazards and damage.
- Metrorail re-inspected and tied off feeder cables at Foggy Bottom and Silver Spring stations that have been re-configured for third rail power maintenance.

Metrorail is in the process of implementing related corrective action plans (CAPs) including:

- C-0222 addresses a finding from the 2022 communications system audit that Metrorail communications rooms have signs of recurring water, dirt and dust intrusion. Metrorail is also improperly storing equipment in these rooms. Components in these rooms therefore may not function as required for the safety of riders, workers and first responders.
- C-0293 addresses a finding from the January 2025 Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit that Metrorail does not have a reliable communication system for operations or emergencies (Expected completion date September 2027).
- C-0318 addresses the finding from the 2025 communications system audit that Communication personnel are not consistently completing preventive maintenance on its public address and radio communication systems in accordance with Metrorail's procedures.
- C-0320 addresses the finding from the 2025 communications system audit that Metrorail rooms that contain communication systems equipment are not maintained in accordance with Metrorail policy to ensure an optimal environment for those vital systems.

Additionally, in August 2025, the WMSC released a report on a Special Study of WMATA Metrorail's Radio Band and Infrastructure Replacement Project. The study found that safety-related radio deficiencies persist at WMATA Metrorail. The WMSC recommended WMATA leadership continue its new focus on and prioritize expeditious completion of the radio modernization project to improve radio communications at WMATA Metrorail. The WMSC recommended relevant oversight authorities such as WMATA's Office of Inspector General take note of issues pursuant to the radio system at WMATA and the radio project's progress to date and provide any additional oversight necessary. Because of the impact of a continuously inconsistent and under-functioning radio communications system, the WMSC will continue its oversight of radio communications at WMATA Metrorail.

Safety event summaries:

W-0424 – Cleveland Park Station – April 30, 2025 (E25569)

Red Line Train 140 and Cleveland Park Station were evacuated after a passenger reported a smoke odor emitting from the rear of the train. There were no injuries reported.

At 9:18 p.m., the Train Operator of Train 140, in approach to Cleveland Park Station on track 2, notified the Radio Rail Traffic Controller in the control center that a customer reported a brake and smoke odor emitting from the rear of the train. A road mechanic and a rail supervisor were dispatched to Cleveland Park to assist. The Button Rail Traffic Controller requested fans to be activated at the station. The rail supervisor, who was already at the station when dispatched, confirmed there was smoke emitting from the rear of the train and requested to evacuate passengers from

the train. While cutting trucks as instructed, the rail supervisor informed the Radio Rail Traffic Controller that the front truck was on fire, requested ventilation fans be activated and for the station to be evacuated. Despite the initial request for fan activation at 9:18 p.m., fans were not activated until 9:27 p.m.

At 9:21 p.m., the Control Center Assistant Operations Manager requested an emergency response from the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS), which arrived at approximately 9:30 p.m. Trains began to single-track, using track 1, bypassing Cleveland Park Station. Smoke dissipated at approximately 9:32 p.m. and DCFEMS arrived at 9:34 p.m. At 9:45 p.m., after cutting out the defective brakes and performing a brake test, the rail supervisor was instructed to move the out-of-service train under a permissive block[2] toward Van Ness-UDC Station.

Post-accident inspection determined the cause of the smoke and fire emitting from trailing car (Railcar 3248) was due to a faulty digitrol, which led to the brakes not releasing on one of the railcar's trucks, causing the brake pads to overheat. . The digitrol was replaced on railcar 3248.

W-0425 – Foggy Bottom-GWU Station – July 31, 2025 (E251237)

Foggy Bottom-GWU Station was evacuated due to an electrical failure that damaged rail infrastructure. There were no injuries reported. During the investigation into this report, several deficiencies were identified, including compromised electrical components, requesting emergency services at the incorrect location and delays in communication and in removing third rail power.

At approximately 6:12 a.m., the Train Operator of Train 913 reported a fire on track 1 at Farragut West Station to a rail traffic controller in the control center. The train operator then clarified that the location of the fire was beyond the interlocking outside Foggy Bottom-GWU Station in approach to Farragut West Station. The location between stations caused confusion amongst control center management, as the Control Center Operations Manager believed the location to be Foggy Bottom-GWU Station and the Assistant Operations Manager believed it to be the next station, Farragut West. The Control Center Assistant Operations Manager requested emergency assistance from the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Services (DCFEMS) to be sent to Farragut West Station, instead of to Foggy Bottom-GWU Station, where the emergency response was needed. The rail traffic controller instructed the train operator to stop the train, turn off the train's environmental system, and reverse the train's direction away from the fire back toward Foggy-Bottom-GWU Station. Three additional train operators were instructed to reverse ends on their trains as well, and Train 612's Train Operator was instructed to offload customers from their train onto the platform at McPherson Square Station. Metrorail personnel, including the Emergency Response Team, were dispatched to the scene. At 6:20 a.m., the Foggy Bottom-GWU Station Manager notified the Control Center Operations Manager that they were evacuating the station due to what they described as an explosion and fire in the tunnel outside the station's platform limits.

[2] Permissive Block: A section of clear track ahead of a train in the established direction of traffic up to a specific point into which no other vehicle or track obstruction is permitted.

At 6:23 a.m., a DCFEMS Battalion Chief, who was on scene, notified DCFEMS Dispatch that the location of the emergency was Foggy Bottom-GWU. The Battalion Chief confirmed fire on track 1. At 6:25 a.m., third rail power remained energized on track 1 as the Train Operator of Train 913 was still in the process of reversing ends to move the train to safety. At 6:27 a.m., the Battalion Chief indicated they were still waiting for third rail power to be removed and permission to enter the roadway. The delay in the removal of third rail power was caused by a temporary power reconfiguration at Foggy Bottom Station due to maintenance work, requiring control center personnel to remove third rail power by opening multiple breakers using specific steps from a playbook, instead of the normal practice of opening only 2 breakers, which required clearing trains out of a larger segment of track before de-energizing power..

At 6:39 a.m., a rail traffic controller granted a rail operations supervisor foul time to enter the roadway on track 1 at Farragut West Station to walk to chain marker C1 064+00 to use a hot stick to confirm third rail power was down. After confirming power was down, the rail operations supervisor exited the roadway and was instructed to accompany fire department personnel and to perform a riding track inspection aboard Train 410, track 2 to Foggy Bottom-GWU Station. Metrorail's Emergency Response Team (ERT) arrived at Foggy Bottom-GWU Station at approximately 6:49 a.m. and requested that third rail power be restored on track 1 to conduct an inspection. The rail traffic controller informed ERT that they needed to first check in with incident command at the station.

At 7:08 a.m., ERT was granted permission by the rail traffic controller to enter the roadway on track 1 and began to conduct their inspection while third rail power was still down. ERT communicated that they believed a third rail cable "blew up", requested that power personnel perform a track inspection on track 2 to determine if the same issue was present, and advised that track 2 was not safe for train movement.

Power department personnel requested Foul Time protection and permission to enter the roadway at 7:28 a.m., initially requesting to enter on track 1 before being corrected by the rail traffic controller, who stated the correct track, track 2. During this time, Power Department personnel experienced radio communication transmission issues when trying to communicate with control center personnel. The rail traffic controller requested that Power Department personnel contact the control center via telephone. At 7:40 a.m., Power Department personnel confirmed track 2 was cleared for train service. At 7:46 a.m., ERT confirmed that the incident was a maintenance issue, and DCFEMS cleared the scene at 7:48 a.m.

Power Department personnel conducted work on track 2; two test trains were sent through the location, and ERT conducted inspections. During this time, trains were single-tracking, using track 1. During single-tracking operations, train operators are required to operate in manual mode, and radio announcements were made to notify them. However, Train 944 was operated in Automatic Train Operation.

After track inspections were completed, ERT confirmed the track 2 was safe for train movement and normal service at approximately 10:42 a.m.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety
Office of Safety Investigations

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E25569

Date of Event:	April 30, 2025
Type of Event:	A-4: Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	09:23 Hours
Location:	Cleveland Park Station
Time and How received by Safety:	09:23 Hours Safety Information Official (SIO)
Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:	11:04 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	None
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 140 (L3219/18x3259/58x3229/28x3248/49T)
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS)
Safety Universal Data System (SUDS) Number	20250507#126294

April 30, 2025
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AOM	Assistant Operations Manager
ARS	Audio Recording System
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CENV	Office of Vehicle Program Services
CMNT	Office of Car Maintenance
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
IIT	Incident Investigation Team
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OM	Operations Manager
ROS	Rail Operations Supervisor
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RVO	Rail Vehicle Operator
SAFE	Department of Safety
SIO	Safety Information Official
SMS	Safety Measurement System
VMSD	Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Wednesday, April 30, 2025, at 09:18 hours, the Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) of Train ID 140, an eight car legacy train, notified the Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) at the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) that a customer reported a heavy brake and smoke odor on the trailing cars of the train as they approached Cleveland Park Station. The Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) footage from the station revealed a moderate haze emitting from the rear of Train ID 140 as it was properly berthed on track two.

The Radio RTC dispatched an Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) Road Mechanic and a Rail Operations Supervisor (ROS) to Cleveland Park Station. The ROS was located at Cleveland Park Station, responded, and informed the Radio RTC that smoke was emitting from the trailing end of Train ID 140. The ROS requested activation of ventilation fans and started evacuating the station due to the trucks of railcar 3248 being on fire.

The Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) notified the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) and Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) of the station evacuation. Customers evacuated Cleveland Park Station by utilizing the escalators and steps, with assistance from the ROS.

The probable cause for the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Cleveland Park Station on April 30, 2025, was a mechanical default on railcar 3248. Specifically, railcar 3248 experienced an open differential pressure switch and white light conditions, preventing the train from achieving brakes off. The front digitrol was faulty and caused the blue light and the stuck brake.

Incident Site

Cleveland Park Station is an indoor station with a center platform and direct fixation tracks. There is no interlocking or turnback at this location.

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Evacuation for Life Safety at Cleveland Park Station on April 30, 2025, Safety dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. Safety team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through video and document review.

- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
    - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
    - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
    - Maintenance Section Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Form
    - The Office of the Chief Mechanical Officer, Incident Investigation Team Report

- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
    - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
    - Cleveland Park Station Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
    - Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS)

Investigation

On Wednesday, April 30, 2025, at 09:18 hours, while approaching Cleveland Park Station, the RVO of Train ID 140 reported to the Radio RTC that a customer reported a heavy brake odor and smoke in the rear of the train. The Radio RTC dispatched a CMNT Road Mechanic and a ROS to Cleveland Park Station. The ROS acknowledged the request and was at Cleveland Park Station, standing by to assess the situation of Train ID 140.

Cleveland Park Station CCTV footage revealed that 40 seconds after the RVO reported the smokey conditions, Train ID 140 entered Cleveland Park Station track two with a light haze of black smoke emitting from the rear of the consist.

At 09:19 hours, the ROS reported smoke coming from the trailing cars and requested to offload Train ID 140. The Radio RTC acknowledged the ROS's findings and instructed them to cut the trucks on the affected car. While cutting the trucks, the ROS informed the Radio RTC that the front truck was on fire. The ROS requested that ventilation fans be activated at Cleveland Park Station and permission to evacuate the station.

At 09:21 hours, the AOM contacted DCFEMS to respond to Cleveland Park Station. At 09:30 hours, DCFEMS arrived on-site and train service was suspended at Cleveland Park Station. Single-tracking operations were implemented by way of Track 1 and Cleveland Park Station was not serviced. At 09:24 hours, the Button RTC notified the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) that there were reports of smoke coming from the train. At 09:27 hours, the ventilation fans were activated inside Cleveland Park Station. Customers who were inside the station were instructed to evacuate.

At 09:34 hours, DCFEMS personnel were on the track two platform to investigate the source of the smoke, but were unable to locate any signs of an active fire or residual smoke. The smoke dissipated, and DCFEMS verified that the station was clear. At 09:41 hours, the station was reopened.

Train ID 140 completed a post-incident inspection and it was identified that railcar 3248 had a rear truck stuck brake with a strong brake odor, with a top blue trouble light at the rear of the railcar. The front digitrol was stuck at 74 psi and would not change. The front Digitrol [1]was faulty and caused the white light and the stuck brake.

[1] Digitrol failure can contribute to Brake odor, hot discs, and excessive heat, and sometimes smoke.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
09:18:16 hours	RVO: Reported to the Radio RTC that they were informed by a customer of a heavy brake odor and smoke in the rear of the train. Radio RTC: Acknowledged the report of smoke and brake odor and asked the RVO if they had a MOL on the train. RVO: Responded "I think yes, but I am able to move" and requested CMNT. [Radio Ops 1]
09:18:45 hours	Radio RTC: Dispatched CMNT Road Mechanic to intercept Train ID 140 and instructed a ROS to inspect Train ID 140 at Cleveland Park Station track two. ROS: Acknowledged and informed the Radio RTC that they were located at Cleveland Park Station. [Radio Ops 1]
09:18:45 hours	Button RTC: Requested tunnel fan activation at Cleveland Park Station. [Phone]
09:18:56 hours	Train ID 140 arrived at Cleveland Park Station Track two. [CCTV]
09:19:15 hours	ROS: Reported smoke coming from the trailing cars and requested to offload Train ID 140 at Cleveland Park Station. Radio RTC: Instructed the ROS to cut trucks in the trailing car and verify green and instructed the CMNT Road Mechanic to board the next train at Van Ness Station and head towards Cleveland Park Station. ROS: Reported smoke coming from below the train and requested ventilation fans at Cleveland Park Station and requested to evacuate the station due to trucks being on fire. Radio RTC: Acknowledged trucks were on fire, and the station was being evacuated. [Radio Ops 1]
09:19:30 hours	AOM: Informed the Operations Manager (OM) of smoke and burning brakes on Train ID 140. [Phone]
09:20:20 hours	OM: Informed the Safety Information Official (SIO) of smoke and burning brakes on Train ID 140. [Phone]
09:21:21 hours	AOM: Dispatched DCFEMS. [Phone]
09:27:52 hours	Cleveland Park Station tunnel fans were activated. [Maintenance Section Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Form]
09:28:22 hours	ROS: Reported blue lights on railcar 3248. Radio RTC: Instructed the ROS to cut trucks and verify green on railcar 3248. [Radio Ops 1]
09:30:09 hours	ROS: Confirmed trucks were cut on railcar 3248. [Radio Ops 1]
09:30:38 hours	Radio RTC: Started single tracking by way of Track One, bypassing Cleveland Park Station with Train ID 144. [Radio Ops 1]
09:32:33 hours	ROS: Reported that smoke self-dissipated, and they were keyed up and ready to move on track two. Radio RTC: Informed the ROS to stand by for CMNT. [Radio Ops 1]
09:34:30 hours	DCFEMS arrived on scene. [CCTV]
09:41:15 hours	Radio RTC: Contacted Train ID 143 and stated permission was granted to service Cleveland Park Station. Instructed all train operators to operate in Mode 2 Level 1 manual mode operations between Van Ness Station and Dupont Circle Station. [Radio Ops 1]

09:42:21 hours	CMNT Road Mechanic: Reported trucks cut railcar 3248 and are ready for rolling free and rolling brake test. [Radio Ops 1]
09:44:27 hours	DCFEMS cleared Cleveland Park Station. [CCTV]
09:45:17 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed the ROS to perform a rolling free, rolling brake test, and move Train ID 740 with a permissive block to Van Ness Station. [Radio Ops 1]
09:49:13 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed train ID 146 that they can close and go to Dupont Circle Station, being the first train to go normal at Cleveland Park Station. [Radio Ops 1]
09:51:21 hours	Radio RTC: Instructs all train operators to service all stations between Shady Grove Station to Glenmont Station. [Radio Ops 1]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

The Office of Chief Mechanical Officer / Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS)
Adopted from Office of Chief Mechanical Officer IIT report with minor formatting and grammatical edits:

The Office of the Chief Mechanical Officer, Incident Investigation Team (IIT) completed an analysis of the data collected from Train ID 140, specifically railcar 3248. Based on the data, railcar 3248 experienced an open differential pressure switch and a white light condition, preventing the train from achieving brakes off. The cause of the white light could not be determined due to the front and rear trucks not communicating with the Vehicle Monitoring System (VMS).



Figure 1 – Railcar 3248 VMS Analysis showing low differential pressure switch and white light condition.

Weather

On April 30, 2025, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 76°F, with clear skies, winds of 10 mph, and 62% humidity. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident. (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Washington, DC

Related Rules and Procedures

SOP 678 Procedure for Managing Fire and Smoke on the Metrorail System, Metrorail Operating Rulebook rules:

> • 1.19.1 Indications of fire observed on vehicles or WMATA property must be reported immediately to the Rail Vehicle Operator, the nearest supervisor, or the Rail Section of the MICC.
>
> • 17.28.1 Emergency Maintenance Procedures are invoked to address conditions occurring during revenue hours that can result in harm to individuals, fire/smoke events, damage to equipment or property causing a significant service disruption, or significantly impair a safety-critical system, or any combination of these circumstances. These events are of a short duration (typically, 30 minutes or less) and are of a nature that emergency repairs can be accomplished without the use of a Roadway Maintenance Machine.

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Findings

- Railcar 3248 had a faulty front digitrol.
- Railcar 3248 experienced an open differential pressure switch and a white light condition, preventing the train from achieving a Brakes Off.
- The ROS requested that the station be evacuated based on the smoke conditions.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Ventilation fans were activated to dissipate the smoke.
- Trains temporarily bypassed the station.
- The ROS cut out the defective brakes on railcar 3248.
- In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer, Incident Investigation Team (IIT) Operations Administrative Policy (OAP) 102.06, the MICC promptly initiated the removal of Train ID 140 from revenue service for post-incident investigative measures. This action adhered to the Rail Vehicle Event Investigation Policy, ensuring a comprehensive examination of the incident.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause for the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Cleveland Park Station on April 30, 2025, was a mechanical default on railcar 3248. Specifically, railcar 3248 experienced an open differential pressure switch and white light conditions, preventing the train from achieving brakes off. The front digitrol was faulty and caused the white light and the stuck brake.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
126294_SAFECAPS_CMNT_001	CMNT replaced the faulty digitrol board on railcar 3248.	CMNT SRC	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Work Orders

Page 1 of 4
MXAZP

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Work Order #: 19475312
Type: CM

19475312

Status: CLOSE
05/07/2025 13:01

Work Description: REPORT OF SMOKE, STUCK BRAKE FRONT TRUCK, TRUCKS C/O, 19/28, A05, CMD, SMKB, 140
Job Plan Description:

Work Information

Asset:	R3248	3248, RAIL CAR, BREDA, 3000 AC, A CAR	**Owning Office:**	CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	**Parent:**
Asset Tag:	R3248		**Maintenance Office:**	CMNT-SDYG-INSP	**Create Date:** 04/30/2025 11:45
Asset S/N:	3248		**Labor Group:**	CMNT	**Actual Start:** 04/30/2025 11:46
Location:	1136	A99, SHADY GROVE YARD	**Crew:**		**Actual Comp:** 05/02/2025 12:42
Work Location:	1136	A99, SHADY GROVE YARD	**Lead:**		**Item:** L18050002
Failure Class:	CMNT006	PROPULSION	**GL Account:**	WMATA-02-33320-50499160-041-**********-*****-OPR**	
Problem Code:	2429	N/A CODE (PROPULSION SYSTEM)	**Supervisor:**	[redacted]	**Target Start:**
Requested By:			**Requestor Phone:**	301-377-1104	**Target Comp:**
Chain Mark Start:			**Chain Mark End:**		**Scheduled Start:**
Create-Mileage:	2760643.0		**Complete-Mileage:**	2760811.0	

Task IDs

Task ID							
10	SEE DETAILS						
	IN THE YARD CHECKING THE WHOLE CONSIST FOR FLATS AND BRAKE ODOR, FOUND THAT THE FRONT TRUCK OFTHE CAR 3248 STUCK BRAKE WITH STRONG BRAKE ODOR, ALSO FOUND THE BLUE LIGHT INDICATOR AT THE REAR OF THE CAR SHOWN THE FRONT TRUCK BRAKE FAULT AND THE WHITE LIGHT. DOWNLOAD THE VMS, FRONT TRUCK BRAKE AND SNAP SHOT FOR REVIEW.					
	000-300-E00 SUBSYSTEM; FRICTION BRAKE; 2K/3K/						
Component:	6K/7K	**Work Accomp:** DOWNLOADED	**Reason:** FAILED	**Status:** CLOSE	**Position:**	**Warranty?:** N	
20	See Details						
	Downloaded Friction Brake data per IIT, data placed in flash drive and turned in to office. Inspected FNK1 White light relay and no issues observed. Self test was not performed on H1A to prevent any data from being erased currently, waiting on assessment of data before performing self test. Inspected Brake rates and found front truck stays at 74psi on ALL Brake Rates. Rear Truck Brake rates all within spec. Inspected Front Truck Digitrol cannon plug, plug was seated correctly and tight. All pins and plugs checked good and no signs of moisture intrusion observed. Inspected all components and no leaks observed. Front Digitrol stuck at 74psi and will not change. After cycling power now works and getting good brakes off. Front Digitrol faulty and cause of white light/stuck brake. Digitrol not in stock. Connector was resecured onto digitrol but with no safety wire. Will Need further work once replacement digitrol arrives. Recommend performing brake rate check and self test after replacement.						
	000-300-E08-007 C-1 DIGITROL CONTROL						
Component:	PORTION; 2K/3K	**Work Accomp:** INSPECTED	**Reason:** INOPERATIVE	**Status:** CLOSE	**Position:** 557	**Warranty?:** N	

Attachment 1: Maximo work order for railcar 3248 page 1 of 4.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Work Order #: 19475312
Type: CM

19475312

Status: CLOSE
05/07/2025 13:01

Work Description: REPORT OF SMOKE, STUCK BRAKE FRONT TRUCK, TRUCKS C/O, 19/28, A05, CMD, SMKB, 140
Job Plan Description:

Task IDs

Task ID						
30	SEE DETAILS -Continue from task # 10. -Per engendering recommendation inspected propulsion. -Confirmed excessive brake oder from front track. -Checked prop event log it has multiple LPSU LC1 closing fault. -Checked the variable LO- WSP1/WSP2 and L--WSP1/WSP2 all at high state at this time . -Inspected propulsion package LC1 contact has not flashed working good at this time . -Visually inspected all propulsion panel no defect . -Inspected HSCB contact is good. -Inspected under car no broken wire any flashed. -Megged front traction motor good . -Run high voltage and low voltage test pass successfully. -Checked friction log has just one brake stack. -cheked nebfaill=ok -Run brake rate and brake test using lap top good. -Checked digitrol plug and wiggle the wire no defect at this time, but front digitrol had wire issue checked(w/o=19419275) -According to task 20 need more inspection on front digitrol . -Due to multiple faults on LC1 and no dynamic fault advise to replaced CFM1 and LC1 . TIME OUT MORE WORK.					
Component:	000-300-D00 SUBSYSTEM; PROPULSION; 2K/3K/6K/ 7K	**Work Accomp:** TROUBLE SHOT	**Reason:** INTERMITTENT	**Status:** CLOSE	**Position:**	**Warranty?:** N
40	CONTINUE PER CENV REPLACE FRONT CFM REMOVE POWER WASH AND REPLACED CFM BLOWER NEED TESTING, OTHER COMPONETS NEED INSTALLING FIRST NFW ASSET OFF 419386 ASSET ON 424856					
Component:	000-300-D04-002 CONVERTER FUNCTION MODULE; CFM; 2K/3K/6K	**Work Accomp:** REPLACED REBUILT	**Reason:** WORK PERFORMED ON ANOTHER WORK ORDER	**Status:** CLOSE	**Position:** 557	**Warranty?:** N
50	Continued Removed and replaced Line Contactor No Asset # Secured all components and hardware. Performed HV Test and passed. Work Completed					
Component:	000-300-D02-002-001 LINE CONTACTOR; CONTACTOR MODULE; 2K/3K/6K	**Work Accomp:** REPLACED REBUILT	**Reason:** INTERMITTENT	**Status:** CLOSE	**Position:** 649	**Warranty?:** N

Attachment 2: Maximo work order for railcar 3248 page 2 of 4.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Work Order #: 19475312
Type: CM

19475312

Status: CLOSE
05/07/2025 13:01

Work Description: REPORT OF SMOKE, STUCK BRAKE FRONT TRUCK, TRUCKS C/O, 19/28, A05, CMD, SMKB, 140
Job Plan Description:

Task IDs

Task ID	
60	See details

Removed and replaced front Digitrol. Asset off #724398. Asset on #729175

Component: 000-300-E08-007 C-1 DIGITROL CONTROL PORTION; 2K/3K **Work Accomp:** REPLACED REBUILT **Reason:** INTERMITTENT **Status:** CLOSE **Position:** UNDSIDE **Warranty?:** N

Task ID	
70	YARD TRACK TEST.

THE TRAIN TAKE TO YARD TRACK TEST. THERE IS NO MORE PROBLEM: NO WHITE LIGHT, DYNAMIC BRAKE AND FRICTION BRAKE ARE GOOD. THE TRAIN IS GOOD.

Component: 000-300-E00 SUBSYSTEM; FRICTION BRAKE; 2K/3K/6K/7K **Work Accomp:** TRACK TESTED **Reason:** FAILED **Status:** CLOSE **Position:** **Warranty?:** N

Planned Materials

Task ID	Item	Description	Storeroom	Issue Unit	Quantity	Unit Cost	Line Cost
	M18310001	MODULE,CFM:FANW/O,2K, 3K, 6K,PROPULSION	253	EA	1	$0.00	$0.00
	M18323084	VALVE: C-1, DIGITROL CONTROL PORTION	552	EA	1	$0.00	$0.00
	M18310101	CONTACTOR: CERTIFICATION: DC BIDIRECTIONAL PROPULSION CONTACTOR, WMATA 2K/3K/6K PROPULSION LINE CONTACTOR, CT1114, 400 AMP / 1500V, ENCLOSURE: GENERAL PURPOSE, FITS: 2K/3K/6K PROPULSION SUBYSTEM, FLEET NUMBER: 2K/3K, SPECIFICATION/STANDARD: 1500V , 4	253	EA	1	$0.01	$0.01
					Total Planned Materials:		$0.01

Actual Labor

Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[redacted]	04/30/2025	04/30/2025	11:00	13:30	Y	02:30	00:00	$124.07
10		04/30/2025	04/30/2025	11:00	13:30	Y	02:30	00:00	$124.67
20		04/30/2025	04/30/2025	19:00	21:00	Y	02:00	00:00	$87.06
30		05/01/2025	05/01/2025	06:30	14:00	Y	07:30	00:00	$377.64
40		05/01/2025	05/01/2025	14:30	18:00	Y	03:30	00:00	$148.65
40		05/01/2025	05/01/2025	15:00	18:30	Y	03:30	00:00	$173.69
50		05/01/2025	05/01/2025	19:00	22:00	Y	03:00	00:00	$130.60
60		05/01/2025	05/01/2025	18:00	22:00	Y	04:00	00:00	$169.88
70		05/02/2025	05/02/2025	12:00	13:00	Y	01:00	00:00	$49.87
						Total Actual Hour/Labor:	29:30	00:00	$1,386.13

Attachment 3: Maximo work order for railcar 3248 page 3 of 4.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Work Order #: 19475312
Type: CM

19475312

Status: CLOSE
05/07/2025 13:01

Work Description: REPORT OF SMOKE, STUCK BRAKE FRONT TRUCK, TRUCKS C/O, 19/28, A05, CMD, SMKB, 140
Job Plan Description:

Actual Materials

Task ID	Item	Assetnum	Description	Storeroom	Trans Date	Issue Unit	Quantity	Unit Cost	Line Cost
	M18310001	424856	MODULE,CFM:FANW/O,2K, 3K, 6K,PROPULSION	253	05/01/2025	EA	1	$0.00	$0.00
	M18323084	729175	VALVE: C-1, DIGITROL CONTROL PORTION	552	05/01/2025	EA	1	$0.00	$0.00
	M18310101		CONTACTOR: CERTIFICATION: DC BIDIRECTIONAL PROPULSION CONTACTOR, WMATA 2K/3K/6K PROPULSION LINE CONTACTOR, CT1114, 400 AMP / 1500V, ENCLOSURE: GENERAL PURPOSE, FITS: 2K/3K/6K PROPULSION SUBYSTEM, FLEET NUMBER: 2K/3K, SPECIFICATION/STANDARD: 1500V , 4	253	05/01/2025	EA	1	$0.01	$0.01

Total Actual Materials: $0.01

Related Incidents

Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship
8893135	REPORT OF SMOKE, STUCK BRAKE FRONT TRUCK, TRUCKS C/O, 19/28, A05, CMD, SMKB, 140	SR	CLOSED	ORIGINATOR

Failure Reporting

Cause		Remedy		Supervisor	Remark Date
2349	MATERIAL FAILURE	0004	REPLACED	[redacted]	05/07/2025
Remarks:	COMPLETE CENV RECOMMENDATIONS, REPLACED FRONT CFM#1,LINE CONTACTOR, & FRONT DIGITROL, YTT PASSED				

Attachment 4: Maximo work order for railcar 3248 page 4 of 4.

Appendix B – Tunnel Fan Operation Form

Maintenance Section Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Form

MOC-FRM-0001-R01.(

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Approved: 5/21/2024

Call Time:	Reported By:		Incident Description: *(Arcing Insulator / Trash Fire / etc.)*
0927	RAIL 1 - LEKECHEA BAKER TRAIN BRAKES ON FIRE		TRAIN BRAKES ON FIRE
Nearest Station: *(Metro Center A01)*	Chain marker: *(xxx-xx)*	Track #:	Train ID:
A05, CLEVELAND PARK	N/A	2	740
Proposed Evacuation Route: *(towards which station)*		Playbook/Page Reference:	Incident Zone(s):
A05, CLEVELAND PARK		A58/ 228	STATION
Fan Controller Name:	Date:	MAINT 1 Name:	Date:
[redacted]	4/30/2025	[redacted]	4/30/25

Remote Legacy Fan Configuration

Station	Fan Name	Configuration (E/S/OFF)	Station	Fan Name	Configuration (E/S/OFF)
DUPONT CIRCLE	UPE IB/OB	OFF			
	FA4	OFF			
	FA5	OFF			
WOODLEY PARK	UPE IB/OB	OFF			
	FA6				
CLEVELAN D PARK	UPE IB/OB	E			
	FA7	OFF			
VAN NESS UDC	UPE IB/OB	OFF			
	FA8	OFF			
	FA9	OFF			
TENLEYTO WN-AU	UPE IB/OB	OFF			

MAINT 1 shall scan and save this form in the "M" Shared Network Drive.

Figure 5 - Maintenance Section Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Form.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety
Office of Safety Investigations

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E251237

Date of Event:	July 31, 2025
Type of Event:	A-4: Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
Incident Time:	06:13 Hours
Location:	Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1
Time and How received by Safety:	06:15 Hours; Safety Information Officer (SIO)
Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:	08:13 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	Safety Investigator, Emergency Responder
Rail Vehicle:	None
Injuries:	None
Damage:	Damage to the tunnel wall lining, third rail coverboard, and third rail jumper cables.
Emergency Responders:	District of Columbia Fire Department and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS); Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)
Safety Universal Data System (SUDS I/A) Number	20250731#128912MX

Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1 – Evacuation for Life Safety Reason

July 31, 2025

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
DECO	Department of Engineering Design and Construction
ERT	Emergency Response Team
FLO	Fire Liaison Officer
FT	Foul Time
GOTRS	General Order and Track Rights System
IIT	Incident Investigation Team
I/A	Incidents/Accidents
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOC	Maintenance Operations Controller
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OSC	On-scene Commander
OEP	Office of Emergency Preparedness
POWR	Department of Power
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RIO	Remote Input/Output
ROS	Rail Operations Supervisor

RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
RVO	Rail Vehicle Operator
RWIC	Roadway Worker in Charge
SAFE	Department of Safety
SOGR	State of Good Repair
SPOTS	System Performance On-Time Summary
SUDS	Safety Universal Data System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission
WSAD	Warning and Strobe Alarm Device

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Thursday, July 31, 2025, at 06:13 hours, the Metro Integrated Command and Communication Center (MICC) received a report from Train ID 913 that there was a fire in the tunnel between Foggy Bottom and Farragut West Stations on Track 1. The fire was reported as being located beyond the interlocking, with visible smoke and flames. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) began emergency response and recovery operations. At 06:20 hours, customer evacuation procedures began at Foggy Bottom Station.

The Emergency Response Team (ERT) confirmed that a third-rail mega cable had exploded, resulting in fire damage to the rail components and the adjacent tunnel wall. Communication issues arose due to poor radio transmissions between Farragut West and Foggy Bottom Stations, requiring coordination through landline communication.

A Rail Operations Supervisor (ROS) and ERT coordinated with the Incident Command and the District of Columbia Fire Department and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS), who remained on site until the scene was deemed stable. After confirming that Track 2 was unaffected, it was cleared for revenue service at 07:40 hours, and single tracking was initiated between Arlington Cemetery, Clarendon, and McPherson Square Stations via Track 2.

The Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) responsibilities were transferred from ERT to Power Crew #2 to conduct inspections and maintenance on Track 1. Third-rail power remained de-energized while hot-sticking procedures, red tagging, and cable inspections were completed. Once the repairs were finalized, third-rail power was restored, and test trains were used to verify operational safety. Train IDs 701 and 713 passed through the affected area at restricted and normal speeds, as observed by ERT. After confirming safe conditions and performing a final walkthrough, ERT and Power Crews cleared the roadway.

At 10:42 hours, normal rail service resumed on Tracks 1 and 2 at Foggy Bottom Station. All personnel and equipment were confirmed clear at 10:44 hours, with final confirmation provided by Power Crew #2 at 10:47 hours, officially concluding the emergency response and restoration process.

There were no injuries reported as a result of this event; however, damage was reported to the tunnel wall lining, third-rail coverboard, and the third-rail jumper cables.

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event at Foggy Bottom Station on July 31, 2025, was a maintenance-related electrical failure, specifically, an AC return overload to the pigtail, causing an explosion of a third-rail mega cable, which resulted in fire and infrastructure damage.

Contributing factors include delays in communication and third rail de-energization due to power reconfiguration. Additionally, the C04 Tie Breaker Station was offline with wayside cables disconnected. The pigtails coming from the third rail were black booted and lying on the concrete, which may have been wet. One of the black booted pigtails may have been compromised. This could have allowed the voltage to jump from the third rail, via a black booted pigtail, to ground.

Incident Site

Foggy Bottom Station is an indoor station with a center platform and direct fixation tracks. There is an interlocking on the inbound end of the station. The fire occurred on Track 1 outside of the interlocking.

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event at the Foggy Bottom Station on July 31, 2025, Safety dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. Safety team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Physical site assessment, video, and document review.
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.

- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
    - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
    - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
    - Maximo Data

- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
    - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
    - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
    - System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)
    - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
    - General Order and Track Rights System (GOTRS)
    - Oracle Report

Investigation

On Thursday, July 31, 2025, at 06:13 hours, the Radio RTC at the MICC received a report from the Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) of Train ID 913 that there was a large fire within the interlocking after departing Foggy Bottom Station on Track 1. Train ID 913 was instructed to reverse ends and go back to Foggy Bottom Station. Train IDs 409, 619, and 915 were instructed to key down and reverse ends. Train ID 612 was instructed to offload at McPherson Square Station to return to service in the direction of Downtown Largo Station.

According to the review of the Audio Recording System (ARS) at 06:20 hours, DCFEMS reported that there was an arcing insulator outside of Farragut West Station Track 1. Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) revealed that the fire was near the third rail near the interlocking on the inbound end of Foggy Bottom Station on Track 1. In response to the emergency, a West Falls Church Division ROS responded to Foggy Bottom Station per the instructions of the Radio RTC.

At 06:14 hours, an Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) contacted the Maintenance Operations Controller (MOC) to request that the ERT be dispatched to Foggy Bottom Station for a fire in the approach to Farragut West Station, Track 1. MOC advised that they needed to call the Facilities desk to have the fans activated. The tunnel fans had already been activated at 06:14 hours. At 06:15 hours, the Button RTC contacted the MOC to inform them of the fire between Farragut West and Foggy Bottom Stations on Track 1 and to be transferred to the fan desk. That call was never transferred. At this time, the Safety Information Officer (SIO) was also notified.

At 06:15 hours, an AOM contacted DCFEMS to report a fire on the roadway inside the tunnel at Farragut West Station, Track 1. This was the incorrect location of the fire. At 06:24 hours, the RVO of Train ID 913 notified the MICC that the fire was spreading in the interlocking, and the Fire Department was on the scene at Foggy Bottom Station.

Train Service was suspended between Arlington Cemetery, Clarendon, and McPherson Square Stations until track inspections were conducted on Track 2.

At 06:36 hours, ERT arrived at Foggy Bottom Station and identified smoke and fire within the interlocking. There was a power reconfiguration in the area, which delayed the de-energization of third rail power because trains had to be turned from the affected area before third rail power could be de-energized.

Foggy Bottom Tie-breaker Station had been bypassed. It had been in this configuration since April 11, 2025, for Tagging Relay Upgrades. There was no on-site work at the time of the fire or during the week leading up to the fire. Work was conducted on July 7, 2025, and July 23, 2025, with no intrusive work being performed.

All trains between Arlington Cemetery, Clarendon, and McPherson Square Stations had to clear the area because there were no other interlockings in that area to cross trains over. At 06:37 hours, third rail power was de-energized in the affected area, and Incident Command was established on the platform at Foggy Bottom Station. Battalion 6 was the Incident Commander. At 06:41 hours, the ROS hot sticked and confirmed that third rail power was de-energized at Chain Marker (CM) C1 064+00.

ERT was granted permission to conduct a walking track inspection under Foul Time (FT) protection. ERT and first responders were able to locate and visually identify that a third rail mega cable exploded, causing a fire and damaging the third rail, its components, and the adjacent tunnel wall lining at CM C1 064+10. There were feeder cables that ran from the station platform to the mega cables in the tunnel. ERT performed remedial action by cutting the damaged third rail feeder cable from the third rail, performed right-of-way cleaning in the area, and removed all damaged components and debris.

At 06:50 hours, bus bridges were established between Clarendon and Farragut West Stations to support rail closure. At 07:25 hours, the Button RTC notified the AOM that there was bad radio communication between Farragut West and Foggy Bottom Stations on Tracks 1 and 2.

At 07:41 hours, Power Crew #2 informed the Radio RTC that Track 2 was safe for revenue service, and the investigation showed Track 2 was clear for train movement. At 07:43 hours, ERT informed the Radio RTC that it was safe to start single-tracking operations on Track 2. At 07:45 hours, the Radio RTC instructed ERT to notify the Incident Command Post that it was safe for single tracking operations. At 07:46 hours, ERT informed the Radio RTC that it was a maintenance and power issue, and DCFEMS could leave the scene. The single tracking area extended from McPherson Square to Arlington Cemetery and Clarendon Stations via Track 2. At 08:24 hours, ERT transferred the RWIC duties to Power Crew #2.

The Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) indicated that at 09:54 hours, Train ID 944 arrived at Foggy Bottom Station operating in Manual Mode and switched to Automatic Train Operations (ATO). Train ID 944 departed Foggy Bottom Station in ATO and operated in ATO through the single tracking area despite blanket announcements being made by the Radio RTC. At 10:01 hours, AIMS indicated that third rail power was restored on Track 1. At 10:11 hours, Train ID 701 was used as the test train for the Track 1 inspection.

The Radio RTC made announcements informing personnel of single-tracking operations and instructed RVOs to proceed through the single-tracking area in Mode 2, Level 1 (Manual Mode) operations.

At 10:42 hours, successful inspections confirmed safe conditions, and normal rail service was resumed on Tracks 1 and 2 at Foggy Bottom Station, restoring full revenue service for passengers.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
06:12:10 hours	Train ID 913 entered Foggy Bottom Station, Track 1. [SPOTS]
06:12:58 hours	Train ID 913: Reported a fire at Farragut West Station, Track 1 to the MICC. Radio RTC: Immediately began holding trains and instructed Train ID 913 to stop their train and requested their location. Train ID 913: Informed the Radio RTC that the fire was beyond the interlocking, on the left-hand side, and that Train ID 913 was in approach to Farragut West Station, just left the platform at Foggy Bottom. Radio RTC: Asked Train ID 913 if they were past the fire yet and instructed the RVO to shut off the EV (Environmental System) on the train. Train ID 913: Informed the RTC that they had not passed the fire yet. Radio RTC: Confirmed that Train ID 913 had not passed the fire yet and instructed the RVO to key down and reverse ends. Train ID 913: Confirmed the instructions given by the Radio RTC and informed them that the fire was getting bigger. [Radio OPS 2]
06:14:19 hours	ROS: Contacted the Radio RTC and informed them that they were at Rosslyn and would board the next train to Farragut West. Radio RTC: Confirmed. [Radio OPS 2]
06:16:31 hours	Station Manager: Contacted the Radio RTC to request the fire department because of the fire in the tunnel and requested the train to be moved. Radio RTC: Informed the SM that the RVO was reversing ends and asked the RVO if they were keyed up on their Vienna end of the train. [Radio OPS 2]
06:17:09 hours	OM: Informed the AOM that they needed personnel at Foggy Bottom Station. AOM: Told the OM that they thought the fire was at Farragut West Station. [Phone VAHQ MICC METRO 1]
06:18:03 hours	Train ID 913: Confirmed the train was properly berthed at the platform and offloaded. Asked if the Radio RTC wanted them to verify that they were clear of customers. Radio RTC: Confirmed. [Radio OPS 2]
06:19:10 hours	ERT: Gave the AOM an ETA of 20 minutes. [Phone VAHQ MICC RAIL 2]
06:20:00 hours	Train ID 913: Verified that Train ID 913 was clear of customers. Radio RTC: Confirmed. [Radio OPS 2]
06:20:04 hours	Customer evacuation procedures began at Foggy Bottom Station. [CCTV]
06:20:09 hours	Station Manager: Informed the OM that they were evacuating the station. They told them that there was no smoke in the station, but there was fire in the tunnel and an explosion. [Phone VAHQ MICC METRO 1]
06:21:16 hours	Train ID 913: Informed the Radio RTC that they were standing by. Radio RTC: Informed the RVO that the train would stay on the platform and asked the ROS if they were mobile to Foggy Bottom Station. ROS: Confirmed and gave an ETA of 10 minutes, depending on parking. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
06:21:25 hours	Station Manager: Asked the Communications Agent (COMM) if they wanted them to close the doors at Foggy Bottom Station. COMM: Confirmed with the SM to close to doors and advise the customers that shuttle buses were en route. [Phone VAHQ MICC COMMS 2]

Time	Description
06:23:05 hours	DCFEMS Dispatch: Reported that the MICC informed them that the fire was at Farragut West on Track 1. DCFEMS Battalion: Informed dispatch that the fire was at Foggy Bottom Station on the Farragut West end of the platform, and the station was confirmed clear of customers by the Station Manager. DCFEMS Dispatch: Acknowledged the correction. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
06:23:16 hours	Train ID 913: There is a fire on track #1, just passed the interlocking, and it's spreading fast; there is a lot of smoke and fire. [Radio OPS 2]
06:24:15 hours	Train ID 913: Advised the Radio RTC that the fire department was on scene. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
06:24:49 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Confirmed a visual of an arcing insulator on Track 1 towards Farragut West and an active fire burning. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
06:25:32 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Confirmed that third rail power was still energized because the MICC was trying to get the train out of the area before removing power, and the tunnel fans had been activated. DCFEMS Engine: Reported smoke coming from the vent shaft at 20th St. and Pennsylvania Ave. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
06:27:40 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Reported the station was clear of smoke; however, there was still fire and smoke in the tunnel, and they were standing by and waiting for permission from the MICC to go to the roadway. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
06:27:44 hours	ROS: Notified the MICC that they were coming down the stairs at Farragut West Station. [Radio OPS 2]
06:28:22 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed Train ID 913 to key up on the Vienna end of the train. Train ID 913: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
06:28:40 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Informed dispatch that third rail power was going to take longer to take down because there was a reconfiguration, meaning the MICC would have to bring down more than just the local power. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
06:29:46 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Reported to dispatch that ERT had a 10-minute ETA to the scene. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
06:32:45 hours	Radio RTC: Gave Train ID 913 an absolute block back to Rosslyn Station by way of track 1. [Radio OPS 2]
06:33:47 hours	PWR Desk: Dispatched PWR work crews to C04 Foggy Bottom Station. [Radio M-Powr_6903]
06:35:34 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed Train ID 410 to verify that their train was clear of customers and to do a track inspection on track 2 between McPherson Square and Rosslyn Stations. [Radio OPS 2]
06:36:06 hours	Radio RTC: Asked the ROS if they had a working hot stick. ROS: Confirmed. Radio RTC: Instructed ROS to standby for Foul Time (FT) to hot stick location. [Radio OPS 2]
06:36:19 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Reported to dispatch that after speaking with PWR #1, there was no arching insulator and that there was a lot of electrical equipment in that area. They thought something shorted and were not confident that once they de-energized the third rail power, the fire would go out. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]

Time	Description
06:38:35 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Confirmed third rail power was de-energized with their dispatch, and train movement had stopped on Track 1. ERT ETA was 2 minutes. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
06:39:42 hours	ROS: Contacted the Radio RTC and informed them that they were standing by at track 1 Farragut West to hot stick and confirm at CM C1 064+00. Radio RTC: Instructed the ROS to stand by for foul time. [Radio OPS 2]
06:39:53 hours	ROS: Verified that they were at CM C1 064+00. Radio RTC: Granted the ROS FT for track one only and permission to enter the roadway. They advised them that the third rail was de-energized and instructed them to provide the Radio RTC with a Chain Marker. ROS: Acknowledged that the Chain Marker was C1 064+00 and that they had permission to enter the roadway to hot stick and confirm. [Radio OPS 2]
06:39:53 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Reported ERT was on the scene. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
06:41:17 hours	OM: Informed the SIO that Foggy Bottom Station will be shut down for an active fire due to Evacuation for Life Safety. [Phone Emergency MGMT]
06:41:27 hours	ROS: Relinquished FT and verified third rail power was de-energized at CM C1 064+00. Radio RTC: Confirmed third rail power was de-energized at CM C1 064+00, and the relinquish time was 06:41 hours. [Radio OPS 2]
06:43:11 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed the ROS to board the next train with the Fire Department on track 2 ID 410 at Farragut West Station to go back to Foggy Bottom Station. [Radio OPS 2]
06:46:47 hours	OM: Reports to Metro 1 that ERT is not answering their phone. [VAHQ MICC RAIL 1]
06:47:33 hours	2 Power Crew Members arrived at C04 Foggy Bottom Traction Power room. [Radio M-Powr_6903]
06:48:37 hours	ROS: Boarded Train ID 410 with the Fire Department track 2 at Farragut West Station. Radio RTC: Confirmed and instructed the ROS to remain in the operator's cab and perform a track inspection at restricted speed between McPherson Square and Rosslyn Stations on track 2. Train ID 410: Acknowledged the instructions. [Radio OPS 2]
06:49:13 hours	ERT: Arrived at Foggy Bottom station, track 1, and requested FT to do a track inspection. They requested that third rail power be restored so that they could find the exact location of the smoke or fire. Radio RTC: Asked the ERT if they had checked in with the Incident Commander (IC). ERT: Informed Radio RTC that they were unaware of an IC being at Foggy Bottom Station. [Radio OPS 2]
06:50:28 hours	Radio RTC: Informed ERT that the Incident Command Post was on the top side of Foggy Bottom Station. They instructed ERT to go check in, then return to the platform. [Radio OPS 2]
06:55:06 hours	ROS: Confirmed good track inspection from Farragut West to Foggy Bottom on track 2 with the Radio RTC. They also informed them that track 1 was visually obstructed and they could not smell smoke. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. ROS: Informed Radio RTC that they would be standing by at the 8-car marker at Foggy Bottom Station on track 1.

Time	Description
	Radio RTC: Instructed Train ID 410 to continue to Rosslyn and go into service towards Franconia-Springfield Station on track 2. [Radio OPS 2]
06:57:42 hours	ERT: Informed Radio RTC they were back on the platform ready to enter the roadway. Radio RTC: Instructed the ERT to standby because the DCFEMS had not released the scene back to them due to them still being on the roadway. [Radio OPS 2]
07:06:13 hours	ERT: Attempted to contact the Radio RTC. Radio RTC: Asked ERT if they contacted the IC to go to the roadway. ERT: Informed the Radio RTC that they have permission to enter the roadway from the IC however they needed third rail power restored. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and instructed ERT to stand by for third rail power restoration. [Radio OPS 2]
07:08:39 hours	Radio RTC: Granted ERT FT and permission to enter the roadway but also instructed them to stand by for third rail power restoration. ERT: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
07:09:43 hours	ERT: Requested to inspect before third rail power is restored. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
07:18:33 hours	Radio RTC: Acknowledged that ERT stated it appeared that a third rail cable blew up. ERT: Confirmed and requested that the Power Department be able to go to track 2 to perform an inspection at CM C2 064+00 to make sure that track 2 was not having the same issue. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. ERT: Informed the Radio RTC that it was not safe for train movement at Foggy Bottom Station, track 2 until they were able to perform a track inspection. Radio RTC: Instructed ERT to stand by while they set up FT. [Radio OPS 2]
07:20:55 hours	Radio RTC: Identified the Power Crew at Foggy Bottom Station with ERT and requested ERT to have PWR contact the MICC to receive their FT. [Radio OPS 2]
07:22:29 hours	PWR #1: Requested permission from the MICC to go into the C04 tie breaker room to check breakers and informed them it wasn't on the roadway, and they would be able to access the room from the catwalk. Radio RTC: Permission was granted. [Radio OPS 2]
07:25:03 hours	AOM: Reported to COMM poor communication between Foggy Bottom and Farragut West Stations. [Phone VAHQ MICC RAIL 1]
07:26:06 hours	Radio RTC: Asked ERT if they still needed DCFEMS on the scene. ERT: Confirmed they were on the scene. Radio RTC: Asked if it was a maintenance-related issue and if the DCFEMS needed to remain on the scene. ERT: Informed the Radio RTC that they were waiting for PWR #1 to perform their inspection and investigation before they restored third rail power and did not believe they would be bringing third rail power back up anytime soon, so they still required the assistance of DCFEMS. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]

Time	Description
07:27:24 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Reported to dispatch that a power cable on the third rail came loose, causing the fire, according to ERT. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
07:28:06 hours	PWR #1: Requested FT for two PWR crew members to walk C1, track 2 to 006+00 for cable inspection. Radio RTC: Requested the correct line and track for FT. PWR #1: Confirmed track 2. Radio RTC: Requested CM for track 2. PWR #1: Stated 0064+00. Radio RTC: Responded that PWR was requesting FT at CM C2 064+00. PWR #1: Confirmed. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and asked if they needed power de-energized on track 2. PWR #1: Responded “Negative, NO” Radio RTC: Granted FT on track 2 and instructed PWR #1 not to go past C04-08 signal due to trains still moving at McPherson Square Station. PWR #1: Acknowledged to not pass 0064+00 due to train movement. [Radio OPS 2] NOTE: Radios are distorted in this area, and communication was poor.
07:32:17 hours	Radio RTC: Told PWR #1 that they needed them to “put it over the radio” that they were not to pass the C04-08 signal. PWR #1: Informed Radio RTC that they were still unable to understand their transmission and would give them a landline. PWR #1 also relinquished their FT. Radio RTC: Asked PWR #1 if it was safe for train movement on track 2. PWR #1: (Response inaudible.) Radio RTC: Requested a landline due to poor radio communication. [Radio OPS 2]
07:33:18 hours	DCFEMS Battalion: Confirmed with dispatch that ERT determined that it was not an arching insulator; it was the end of the third rail power cable that was connected to the third rail that blew up. It was more than one, and they were waiting for PWR to perform an inspection. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
07:40:31 hours	PWR #1: Completed cable inspection on track 2 and cleared it for revenue service. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and requested a landline. (Inaudible Radio) Radio RTC: Asked PWR #1 if they needed power restored on track 1 to perform their inspection. PWR #1: Responded “Negative, do not bring the power up on track 1”. Radio RTC: Asked if it was safe for single tracking on track 2. PWR #1: Confirmed. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
07:43:35 hours	PWR #2: Requested permission from Radio RTC to go direct with PWR #1 for permission to enter their work location. Radio RTC: Permission granted. PWR #1: Permission granted. [Radio OPS 2]

Time	Description
07:45:18 hours	Radio RTC: Request for ERT to check in with IC to inform them that it was safe for train movement on track 2 at Foggy Bottom. ERT: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
07:46:32 hours	ERT: Reported to the Radio RTC that the incident on track 1 was a power maintenance issue and DCFEMS could leave if they wanted to. They confirmed that track 2 at Foggy Bottom was safe for train movement. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
07:48:34 hours	DCFEMS were released from the scene at Foggy Bottom Station. [OpenMHZ DCFEMS]
07:53:16 hours	Radio RTC: Began to make several blanket announcements about the single tracking, advising RVOs to operate in Mode 2, Level 1 through the single tracking area. [Radio OPS 2]
08:24:47 hours	ERT: Transferred RWIC duties to PWR work crew. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. The relinquished time was 08:25 hours, and asked ERT if they were clearing the roadway. ERT: Stated they still had personnel on track 1 and needed to make a few changes before clearing. [Radio OPS 2]
08:28:49 hours	PWR #2: Contacted Radio RTC to take over RWIC responsibilities at C04 track 1 at CM C1 064+00. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and gave the ERT a possession time of 08:29 hours. [Radio OPS 2]
08:39:59 hours	PWR #2: Requested an Emergency Red Tag C1 089+77 to 090+38. Radio RTC: Granted PWR #2 an Emergency Red Tag from C1 081+58 to C1 64+00 and instructed them to contact the PWR desk. The request time was 08:41 hours. [Radio OPS 2]
08:43:32 hours	PWR Desk: Began switching to rack out breakers in the C03 breaker 31 and C04 breaker 33 TP rooms. [Radio M-Powr_6903]
08:43:32 hours	Radio RTC: Contacted the ROS to let them know that they were the IC. ROS: Responded “I know”. [Radio OPS 2]
08:48:30 hours	PWR Desk: Instructed PWR #2 to contact the Radio RTC to hot stick Foggy Bottom track 1. PWR #2: Acknowledged. [Radio M-Powr_6903]
08:50:38 hours	PWR #2: Contacted the Radio RTC to request permission to hot stick C1 and set up ETO on track 1 at Foggy Bottom. Radio RTC: Asked if they had shunts. PWR: Confirmed. Radio RTC: Permission granted, started under FT until protection is established. PWR: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
08:59:29 hours	PWR #2: Confirmed hot stick C1 065+00, 062+00, 059+00, red tag 2025212537, and 1 shunt placed on the high side of the platform. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and confirmed third rail power was de-energized. PWR #2: Acknowledged Radio RTC: Granted PWR #2 permission to continue to set up their work location and go to work at 09:00 hours. PWR #2: Acknowledged [Radio OPS 2]
09:34:38 hours	PWR #2: Completed work, all personnel clear, relinquished red tag, and requested that third rail power be restored at Foggy Bottom track 1. Tracks revenue ready.

Time	Description
	Radio RTC: Acknowledged and asked if PWR #2 needed a test train. PWR #2: Confirmed they needed a test train to come through on track 1. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and cleared PWR #2 at 09:35 hours. [Radio OPS 2]
09:35:29 hours	Radio RTC: Made a blanket announcement that third rail power will be restored between Foggy Bottom and Farragut West Stations, track 1. [Radio OPS 2]
09:36:03 hours	ERT: Requested permission to perform an inspection under FT once the power was restored and the test train came through. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. ERT: Requested to watch the train go by from the roadway for observation. [Radio OPS 2]
09:44:51 hours	Radio RTC: Asked ERT if they needed to go to the roadway to clean up debris under the third rail. ERT: Requested to go to the roadway under FT to clean up before power is restored, then they would stand by in a place of safety until a test train went by. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and granted permission. ERT: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
09:46:39 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed PWR #2 to contact their office to relinquish the red tag. [Radio OPS 2]
09:51:45 hours	ERT: Canceled their clean-up request and requested that third rail power be restored. They were standing by and standing clear at C1 064+00. Radio RTC: Acknowledged the request, instructed ERT to stand by, and made announcements to personnel that power would be restored at Foggy Bottom Station. [Radio OPS 2]
10:00:26 hours	Radio RTC: Asked ERT and PWR #2 if they were standing by in a place of safety for a test train coming from Rosslyn on track 1. PWR #2: Informed the Radio RTC to stand by because they had personnel walking back to the platform. Radio RTC: Told PWR #2 to let them know when personnel were standing by in a place of safety. [Radio OPS 2]
10:02:54 hours	Radio RTC: Informed PWR #2 the test train was in approach on track 1 and asked if they were doing a riding inspection or watching the train go by on the catwalk. PWR #2: Confirmed they were going to watch the train go by and informed the Radio RTC that they were ready for the test train and personnel were in a place of safety. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and relinquished FT at 10:03 hours. PWR #2: Informed the Radio RTC that they were now under AMF protection in a place of safety and an AF was on the platform at Foggy Bottom Station, track 1 at the 8-car marker. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radion OPS 2]
10:04:21 hours	Train ID 701: Contacted Radio RTC at Arlington Cemetery to request a block because they were approaching a red signal and to inform them that they were the test train. Radio RTC: Informed Train ID 701 coming from Arlington Cemetery that they would be the test train and to make sure they talk to the AF at Foggy Bottom on track 1.

Time	Description
	Train ID 701: acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
10:06:35 hours	Radio RTC: Contacted ERT to ask if the test train should come through at a restricted speed or normal speed. ERT: Responded to have the train come through at a restricted speed. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and instructed Train ID 701 to enter at restricted speed. Train ID 701: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
10:13:27 hours	Radio RTC: Asked ERT if they were ready for the test train to proceed. ERT: Responded they were standing by in a place of safety, and the test train had permission to continue at restricted speed. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
10:15:37 hours	ERT: Asked the Radio RTC if Train ID 701 could reverse ends and come back through Foggy Bottom. Radio RTC: Acknowledged the request and asked ERT if they saw something. ERT: Responded, they did see something. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and instructed Train ID 701 to reverse ends once they arrived on the platform at Farragut West. [Radio OPS 2]
10:19:51 hours	Radio RTC: Informs ERT that another train will be coming on track 1. ERT: Acknowledged. Radio RTC: Instructed Train ID 701 to disregard reversing at Farragut West and to key up towards Downtown Largo. Train ID 701: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
10:22:11 hours	ERT: Requested the next test train to come through at normal speed. Radio RTC: Informed ERT that the speed would only be 35 MPH because of couplers that were turned. ERT: Acknowledged. Radio RTC: Instructed ERT to stand by, and they would let them know when the test train was in approach.
10:29:49 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed Train ID 713 to continue to Foggy Bottom track 1 and be sure that they stop and speak with the AF. Train ID 713: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
10:34:49 hours	Radio RTC: Informed ERT that the test train was in approach to Foggy Bottom track 1 and asked if it was safe for the test train to proceed after speaking with the AF. ERT: Informed the Radio RTC that after Train ID 713 talked to the AF, they had permission. Radio RTC: Asked Train ID 713 if they copied direct. Train ID 713: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
10:41:24 hours	ERT: Performed a good track inspection and requested permission to walk back to the platform under AMF protection. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and asked if the area was safe for train movement. ERT: Confirmed. Radio RTC: Acknowledged normal service resumed at 10:42 hours. [Radio OPS 2]

Time	Description
10:43:35 hours	Radio RTC: Instructed ERT to advise when clear of C04-02 signal. ERT: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]
10:44:26 hours	ERT: All personnel and equipment clear of the roadway. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and gave a clearing time of 10:44 hours. [Radio OPS 2]
10:47:38 hours	PWR #2: Gave the MICC a final confirmation of all personnel being clear of C04 Foggy Bottom Station. Radio RTC: Acknowledged. [Radio OPS 2]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)



Figure 1 - Initial fire at Foggy Bottom Station Track 1.

Figure 2 - ERT is inspecting the cables.

Figure 3 - DCFEMS is standing by on the platform.

Digital Images and Photographs

Figure 4 - Black booted pothead cover and electrical wire damage.



Figure 5 - Electrical wire damage.

Figure 6 - Residual fire damage to the tunnel wall and roadway.



Figure 7 - This image shows when the third rail power was de-energized.

Figure 8 - This image shows that Train ID 916 was the first train to single-track in the area.



Figure 9 - This image shows Train ID 944 operating in manual mode in approach to Foggy Bottom Station.



Figure 10 - This image shows that Train ID 944 switched to ATO when they arrived at Foggy Bottom Station and operated through the single tracking area in ATO.



Figure 11 - This image shows when the third rail power was restored on track 1.

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Tue Aug 5 14:02:30 2025

Select Platform: C04-1 **and/or Select ID:** Leave blank to remove criteria

Select Date: Jul 31 2025 **Select Times (0-24HRS): From** 06:00 **To** 11:00

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwell	Left door open	Left door close	dwell	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	Headway (door open to door open) door open to door open
407	C04-1	6	72				06:04:09	06:04:19	10	06:03:39	06:04:40	-
909	C04-1	6	20				06:06:27	06:06:58	31	06:06:02	06:07:19	2:18
607	C04-1	6	52				06:09:55	06:10:12	17	06:09:24	06:10:32	3:28
913	C04-1	6	20				06:12:39	06:12:54	15	06:12:10	06:33:40	2:44
	C04-1	0	0							09:04:17	09:30:22	-
	C04-1	0	0							09:30:22	09:32:27	-
701	C04-1	6	74				10:12:14	10:12:41	27	10:11:22	10:14:35	239:35
713	C04-1	6	74				10:38:37	10:39:45	68	10:37:21	10:41:09	26:23
449	C04-1	6	72				10:55:39	10:55:57	18	10:55:11	10:56:16	17:02
917	C04-1	8	20				11:00:22	11:00:46	24	10:59:51	11:01:11	4:43

Total number of trains that opened doors: 8

Operations

Rail Transportation

The Rail Operations Supervisor who responded to Foggy Bottom Station stated in their RTRS Supervisors Report that at “approximately 6:25 am, Train ID 913 reported fire and smoke on track 1, Foggy Bottom beyond the interlocking. I immediately contacted MICC that I was at Rosslyn Station, ready to board the next train in the direction of the incident. MICC via landline instructed me to drive to Farragut West Station. Once I arrived, I didn’t notice anything unusual. At 6:41 am, I verified power was de-energized at C1 64+00. MICC instructed me and Train ID 410 to perform a station inspection at 6:43 am. The track inspection was normal on Track 2 from Farragut West to Foggy Bottom Track 2. I reported to the Incident Command Point at 7:07 am to the Battalion Chief. ERT and Power performed a track inspection and determined the root of the fire because of loose wires at 8:05 am. Power transferred authority to another Power personnel with a red tag outage. At 8:30 am I became the OSC while various work crews performed their duties. Power was restored at 10:43 am. Normal service was established at 11:00 am.”

Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center

Bus Operations Section

At 06:29 hours, there was a report of smoke/fire at Foggy Bottom. Orange, Blue, and Silver line service was suspended between McPherson Square and Clarendon Stations. Shuttle service was requested between McPherson Square and Clarendon and between McPherson Square and Arlington. Cemetery Station. Shuttle service was established, and the first bus arrived at 06:45 hours. B2956 departed Clarendon with approximately 50 passengers aboard.

At 08:12 hours, Orange, Blue, and Silver line trains began servicing impacted stations. Shuttle buses were placed on standby as alternate methods of travel to accommodate customers. At 10:42 hours, the shuttle service was canceled. There were a total of 43 buses used.

Rail Operations Section

On July 31, 2025, at 06:13 hours, the RVO of Train 913 reported a fire located near the interlocking at Foggy Bottom on Track 1. In response to the emergency, the Rail Supervisor arrived at the scene, and the MICC Rail team shut down service between Clarendon and McPherson Square to redirect any trains affected by the incident. Upon assessment of the situation, the Fire Department was promptly dispatched, and the SIO was informed of the evolving situation. By 06:17 hours, firefighters confirmed the presence of a visible fire in the tunnel at Foggy Bottom Station. The flames spread rapidly, necessitating the immediate de-energization of third rail power between Foggy Bottom and Farragut West at 06:37 hours. An Incident Command Post was established at Foggy Bottom to coordinate the emergency response effectively, with Battalion 6 assuming duties as the Incident Commander.

Between 06:48 hours and 07:28 hours, Emergency Response Teams (ERT) and power personnel arrived on-site to conduct thorough inspections. They verified damage to the third rail jumper cables at chain marker C1-064+00. In light of the situation, shuttle bus service was implemented to transport passengers from Clarendon to Farragut West, providing an alternative means of transit during the emergency. By 07:46, the root cause of the issue was identified as a maintenance power-related problem. With this knowledge, it was deemed safe to begin single tracking to allow train movement through the affected area. The first train, ID 916, successfully passed through the impacted section at 07:53. Control of the worksite transitioned to the Power Department at 08:25 hours, ensuring that the area was managed efficiently and safely. By 09:34 hours, all emergency personnel and equipment had cleared the scene, allowing for further stabilization and safety checks. Third rail power was restored at 10:01 hours, returning the system to normal operations.

Test trains 701 and 713 traversed the incident area between 10:11 hours and 10:41 hours, allowing for critical evaluations of the track and overhanging equipment. Following successful inspections and confirmation of safe conditions, normal rail service on Tracks 1 and 2 at Foggy Bottom resumed at 10:42 hours, providing a full return to service for passengers.

Infrastructure

Power

Power Maintenance

On 7/31/2025 at 6:12 AM, C04 OPS 2 reported an active fire on track 1 at CM 66+50. Train 913 was instructed to reverse ends and key up on the Vienna end. MOCC COMM and all concerned personnel were notified. 6:14 AM Tunnel Fans were activated. 6:17 AM ERT enroute ETA 20 minutes. 6:20 AM Two SIGNL Supervisors were notified for single tracking support, ETA 20 minutes. 6:36 AM ERT on site. 6:37 AM Third rail power was de-energized from Farragut West to Foggy Bottom Track 1. 6:40 AM An ROS was granted Foul Time to hot stick and confirm third rail power de-energized. Power was confirmed at chain marker C1-064+00. 6:48 AM TRPM Crew (two personnel) dispatched and on scene at C04TP. 6:48 AM ERT on the scene at Foggy Bottom. 6:50 AM Shuttle buses implemented from Clarendon to Farragut West. 6:55 AM Train 710 performed a good track inspection from Farragut West to Foggy Bottom. The ROS reported no signs of smoke or fire. 7:00 AM Additional SGNL personnel arrived at Clarendon for single tracking support. 7:05 AM Additional SGNL personnel arrived at McPherson Square for single tracking support. 7:10 AM An additional TRPM Crew dispatched at C03TP. 7:20 AM ERT reported the third rail cable blew up at chain marker C1-064+00. POWR Crew (two personnel) requested foul time to inspect the third rail cable at CM C2-064+00.7:47 AM Maintenance-related incident. Safe for train movement on track two. 7:53 AM Single tracking operations implemented. Train 916 was the first train from McPherson Square to Clarendon. Train 422 McPherson Square to Arlington Cemetery. 8:03 AM Additional SGNL personnel arrived at Foggy Bottom for support. 8:40 AM POWR requested emergency red tag 202512537-A. 8:51 AM POWR was granted Foul Time to enter the roadway under ETO protection. 8:54 AM Train 903 incurred the longest delay, holding for 36 minutes at Clarendon Track 1. 8:56 AM Additional SGNL personnel arrived at Arlington Cemetery for single tracking support. 9:00 AM POWR crew confirmed power de-energized at chain markers C1-065+00, C1-061+00, and C1-059+00, in possession of red tag. Orange and Blue lines were operating on a 25-minute headway. 10:45 AM Clear track inspection. Safe for train movement. All personnel and equipment were clear of the roadway. 10:46 AM Train 902 continued in revenue service from McPherson Square to Vienna. Train 449 continued in revenue from Arlington Cemetery to Downtown Largo. Normal service resumed. 10:47 AM Train 917 continued in revenue service from Clarendon to New Carrollton.

C04 Tie Breaker Station was offline with wayside cables disconnected. The pigtails coming from the third rail were black booted and lying on the concrete, which may have been wet. One of the black booted pigtail may have been compromised. This could have allowed the voltage to jump from the third rail, via a black booted pigtail, to ground.

Power Modernization and Rehabilitation

C04TBS 750VDC Switchgear has been decommissioned and isolated from the system. DC Feeders breakers 43, 41, 42, 44, and 45 have been de-energized and removed from service. To bridge the third rail gaps and to allow continuous power between C04TPSS and D03TPSS, twelve (12) 1000kcmils jumpers are installed as follows:

- Track #2: (4) 1000kcmils jumpers from CM C63+92 to CM C64+92
- Track #1: (4) 1000kcmils jumpers from CM C63+99 to CM C63+99
- Track #1: (4) 1000kcmils jumpers from CM C67+00 to CM C68+00

Emergency Trip Stations (ETS) have been reconfigured to support this temporary rail reconfiguration while C04TBS 750VDC switchgear is being upgraded. Third rail reconfigured as per the Power Reconfiguration drawings, effective April 11, 2025. See Appendix A.

Weather

On July 31, 2025, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 81°F, with mostly cloudy skies, winds of 6 mph, and 88% humidity. [Washington, DC]. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: [Washington, DC].

Related Rules and Procedures

Metrorail Operating Rulebook

8.17.13 All class 1 rail vehicles must operate in Manual within the limits of single tracking at a maximum speed determined by the Rail Traffic Controller.

Standard Operating Procedures

Procedure Number: 678, Procedure for Managing Fire and Smoke on the Metrorail System, April 22, 2024

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied for this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Findings

- DCFEMS was initially dispatched to Farragut West Station.
- There was confusion at the MICC regarding the location of the fire.
- There was a miscommunication and misunderstanding regarding the DCFEMS personnel boarding Train ID 410 for a track inspection between Farragut West and Foggy Bottom Stations via Track 2.
- There was a power reconfiguration at Foggy Bottom Station due to work being performed, which required the assistance of the Power Department to remove third rail power.
- There was poor radio communication between Farragut West and Foggy Bottom Stations.
- Train ID 944 traveled through the single tracking area in ATO despite blanket announcements made by the Radio RTC to operate in Mode 2 Level 1 (Manual Mode) through the single tracking area.
- According to ERT, the cause of the fire at Foggy Bottom Station was a third rail cable becoming detached and blowing up.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Third rail power was de-energized on track one to determine where the fire and smoke were originating from.
- DCFEMS, ERT, POWR, and SGNL were dispatched to assist.
- DCFEMS inspected the station for the source of the fire and smoke.
- The station fans were activated.
- The station was temporarily closed until DCFEMS confirmed that the smoke had dissipated.
- Service was suspended from Clarendon Station/Arlington Cemetery Station to Foggy Bottom Station.
- Defective third rail cables were discovered and repaired.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons event at Foggy Bottom Station on July 31, 2025, was a maintenance-related electrical failure, specifically, an AC return overload to the pigtail, causing an explosion of a third rail mega cable, which resulted in fire and infrastructure damage. Contributing factors include delays in communication and third rail de-energization due to power reconfiguration. Additionally, the C04 Tie Breaker Station was offline with wayside cables disconnected. The pigtails coming from the third rail were black booted and lying on the concrete, which may have been wet. One of the black booted pigtails may have been compromised. This could have allowed the voltage to jump from the third rail, via a black booted pigtail, to ground.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
128912_SAFECAPS_POWR_001	Create a directive for the cable division of Power Maintenance personnel to ensure that when wayside cables are booted for extended periods of time, they are secured and elevated off the ground to prevent potential safety hazards and damage.	POWR SRC	Completed
128912_SAFECAPS_POWR_002	Re-inspect and tie off feeder cables at Foggy Bottom and Silver Spring Stations that have been re-configured for third rail power maintenance.	POWR SRC	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Foggy Bottom-GWU Project Upgrades Power Systems Reconfiguration



Figure 12 - Foggy Bottom-GWU Project C04TBS - Foggy Bottom-GWU Tagging Relay and SCADA Systems Upgrades Power Systems Reconfiguration Page 1 of 4



Figure 13 - Foggy Bottom-GWU Project C04TBS - Foggy Bottom-GWU Tagging Relay and SCADA Systems Upgrades Power Systems Reconfiguration Page 2 of 4



FOGGY BOTTOM - GWU PROJECT
C04TBS - FOGGY BOTTOM - GWU TAGGING RELAY & SCADA SYSTEMS
UPGRADES SUPERVISORY OR RED TAG OUTAGES

NOTES:

1. FOR POWER OUTAGE FROM CM. C89+21 TO CM. C39+91 TRACK #2 DE-ENERGIZE C04TPSS (BREAKER 34) AND C03TPSS (BREAKER 32)

2. FOR POWER OUTAGE FROM CM. C89+21 TO CM. C39+91 TRACK #1 DE-ENERGIZE C03TPSS (BREAKER 31, 35) AND C04TPSS (BREAKER 33)

3. FROM CM.C89+91 TO CM.C39+91: TRACK #2
ETS BOXES (C30, C28, C26, C24, C22, C20, C18, C16) WILL DE-ENERGIZE C04TPSS (BREAKER 34) AND C03TPSS (BREAKER 32) FROM CM.C89+21 TO CM. C39+91 ON TRACK #2

4. FROM CM.C89+21 TO CM.C39+91: TRACK #1
ETS BOXES (C29, C27, C25, C23, C21, C19, C17, C15) WILL DE-ENERGIZE C03TPSS (BREAKER 31,35) AND C04TPSS (BREAKER 33)

5. FROM FOGGY BOTTOM PASSENGER STATION CENTER PLATFORM:
   - ETS BOXES (C26 AND C24) WILL DE-ENERGIZE C03TPSS (BREAKER 32) AND C04TPSS (BREAKER 34) FROM CM. C89+21 TO CM. C39+91.
   - ETS BOXES (C23 AND C25) WILL DE-ENERGIZE C04TPSS (BREAKER 31,35) AND C04TPSS (BREAKER 33) FROM CM. C89+21 TO CM. C39+91.

CONTRACT NO. FRPQ211191

REFERENCE DRAWINGS — NUMBER | DESCRIPTION

REVISIONS — DATE | BY | DESCRIPTION
- PROVIDE ETS AND BREAKER TEMPORARY CONFIGURATION FOR C04TBS
- TRACK SWITCHGEAR NEW LAYOUT AND SCADA SYSTEMS UPGRADE

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

CAPITAL TRANSIT CONSULTANTS
SECTION DESIGNER
ALECIA LICATA
PROJECT ENGINEER

FOGGY BOTTOM - GWU PROJECT
C04TBS - FOGGY BOTTOM GWU TAGGING RELAY AND SCADA SYSTEM UPGRADE
POWER SUPERVISORY RED TAG OUTAGES

SCALE: NOT TO SCALE | DRAWING NO.: CRS-E-3 | 3 OF 4

Figure 14 - Foggy Bottom-GWU Project C04TBS - Foggy Bottom-GWU Tagging Relay and SCADA Systems Upgrades Power Systems Reconfiguration Page 3 of 4



FOGGY BOTTOM - GWU PROJECT
C04TBS - FOGGY BOTTOM - GWU TAGGING RELAY & SCADA SYSTEMS UPGRADES POWER SYSTEMS RECONFIGURATION

1. DURING THE REPLACEMENT OF C04TBS 750VDC SWITCHGEAR, THE TBS IS OFFLINE AND CABLES ARE INSTALLED TO BRIDGE THE THIRD RAILS GAPS

   1.1 THE CONTRACTOR WILL JUMPER THE THIRD RAIL INDIVIDUALLY AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:
   - TRACK#2: (4) 1000 KCMIL JUMPERS FROM CM. C63+92 TO CM. C64+92
   - TRACK#1: (4) 1000 KCMIL JUMPERS FROM CM. C67+00 TO CM. C68+00
   - TRACK#1: (4) 1000 KCMIL JUMPERS FROM CM. C63+99 TO CM. C64+99

   1.2 THESE JUMPERS WILL ALLOW CONTINUOUS POWER BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:
   - TRACK#2: FROM CM. C89+21 TO CM. C39+91
   - TRACK#1: FROM CM. C89+21 TO CM. C39+91

2. ETS IS RECONFIGURED TO SUPPORT THIS TEMPORARY THIRD RAIL RECONFIGURATION WHILE C04TBS 750VDC SWITCHGEAR IS BEING REPLACED AND UPGRADED.

   2.1 FROM CM.C89+21 TO CM.C39+91: TRACK #2
   ETS BOXES (C30, C28, C26, C24, C22, C20, C18, C16) WILL DE-ENERGIZE C04TPSS (BREAKER 34) AND C03TPSS (BREAKER 32) FROM CM.C89+21 TO CM. C39+91 ON TRACK #2

   2.2 FROM CM.C89+21 TO CM.C39+91: TRACK #1
   ETS BOXES (C29, C27, C25, C23, C21, C19, C17, C15) WILL DE-ENERGIZE C03TPSS (BREAKER 31,35) AND C04TPSS (BREAKER 33)

   2.3 FROM FOGGY BOTTOM PASSENGER STATION CENTER PLATFORM:
   - ETS BOXES (C26 AND C24) WILL DE-ENERGIZE C03TPSS (BREAKER 32) AND C04TPSS (BREAKER 34) FROM CM. C89+21 TO CM. C39+91.
   - ETS BOXES (C23 AND C25) WILL DE-ENERGIZE C03TPSS (BREAKER 31,35) AND C04TPSS (BREAKER 33) FROM CM. C89+21 TO CM. C39+91.

CONTRACT NO. FBRPG211191

DESIGNED A.K. FALL 4/2025 DATE
DRAWN A.K. FALL 4/2025 DATE
CHECKED A.K. FALL 4/2025 DATE
APPROVED K.G. - W.D. 4/2025 DATE

REFERENCE DRAWINGS
NUMBER | DESCRIPTION

REVISIONS
DATE | BY | DESCRIPTION
4/2025 | AKF | PROVIDE ETS AND BREAKER TEMPORARY CONFIGURATION FOR C04TBS 750VDC SWITCHGEAR REPLACEMENT AND SCADA SYSTEMS UPGRADE

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY
CAPITAL TRANSIT CONSULTANTS
SECTION DESIGNER
SUBMITTED ALECIA LICATA
PROJECT MANAGER

FOGGY BOTTOM - GWU PROJECT
C04TBS - FOGGY BOTTOM GWU TAGGING RELAY AND SCADA SYSTEM UPGRADE
POWER SYSTEMS RECONFIGURATION

SCALE NOT TO SCALE | DRAWING NO. | 4 OF 4

Figure 15 - Foggy Bottom-GWU Project C04TBS - Foggy Bottom-GWU Tagging Relay and SCADA Systems Upgrades Power Systems Reconfiguration Page 4 of 4

Appendix B – Scene Photographs



Figure 16 - A close-up of a crack in the metal structure.

Figure 17 - A close-up of the ash on the ground.

Figure 18 - A close-up of a white feather.

Figure 19 - A pipe on the ground.

Appendix C – Why-Tree Analysis



Figure 20 - Why Tree Analysis.