



W-0426 – Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Anacostia Station – August 28, 2025

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting May12, 2026.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

Safety event summary:

On Thursday, August 28, 2025, a maintenance vehicle, Prime Mover 46 (PM-46), entered a work zone where a crew was working under Exclusive Track Occupancy (ETO), resulting in a near-miss collision with personnel on the roadway. A Facilities Maintenance (FMNT) Roadway Worker in Charge contacted Radio Rail Traffic Controller #1 to establish working limits for a Supervisory Power Outage under ETO and was instructed by Radio Rail Traffic Controller #1 to contact the Power Desk Controller to request the outage at Anacostia Station. The Power Desk Controller instructed the roadway worker in charge to stand by until the roadway was clear. Approximately 50 minutes later, while the roadway worker in charge and their work crew were still waiting to be given the Supervisory Power Outage, a Rehabilitation and Construction (PICO) employee, serving as a roadway worker in charge for a separate crew located between Branch Ave and Southern Ave stations, notified Radio Rail Traffic Controller #1 that PM-46 was enroute to their work location on track 1 and PM-46's Equipment Operator requested to travel to the work location at Branch Ave Station. Radio Rail Traffic Controller #1 acknowledged both transmissions. Approximately 17 minutes later, Radio Rail Traffic Controller #1 was relieved by Radio Rail Traffic Controller #2 for a personal break.

Radio Rail Traffic Controller #2 provided ETO protection on tracks 1 and 2 at Anacostia Station to the FMNT crew and then minutes later provided PM-46 with an absolute block ¹ to Southern Ave Station on track 1. These two directives meant that both PM-46 and the maintenance crew were both permitted to occupy the same section of track at the same time, creating a risk for collision. An investigative review of Advanced Information Monitoring System data showed that protections had not been fully implemented to protect the workers, as required by Metrorail policy.

PM-46 entered the work zone where the crew was on the roadway without warning, causing the roadway workers to flee to a place of safety to avoid being struck. During an interview following the event, the roadway worker in charge, stated they were located on the platform at the time of the event and tried to use their radio to contact the control center,

¹ Absolute Block: A section of track that shall not be occupied by more than one rail vehicle at any one time.



but had to use their cellphone instead because they encountered radio communication issues. Radio Rail Traffic Controller #2 admitted during an interview that they mistakenly allowed PM-46 to enter the area where the crew was under Exclusive Track Occupancy. Following this event, the roadway worker stated they shut down the work area due to the crew feeling unsafe.

Post-event toxicology testing was not conducted for the equipment operator or Radio Rail Traffic Controller #1. Radio Rail Traffic #2 and the Button Rail Traffic Controller underwent post-event toxicology testing, which determined their compliance with Metrorail's drug and alcohol policy.

During the investigation into this event, several deficiencies were identified, including a rail traffic controller authorizing rail vehicle movement in a work zone where personnel had been granted permission to enter the roadway under ETO protection, communication failures between rail traffic controllers regarding implementation of proper protections to ensure the safety of personnel on the roadway, and failure to immediately report the near-miss event.

The probable cause and contributing factors of this safety event include:

- Loss/lack of situational awareness
- Failure to adhere to Metrorail procedures, including those related to roadway worker protection, reporting hazards and unsafe conditions

Investigation W-0426 led to specific corrective actions, which have been fully implemented as this investigation report is being presented for WMSC adoption. These include:

- Metrorail conducted a Safety Stand Down to reinforce mandatory adherence to requirements before issuing ETO protection during reinstruction training.
- Metrorail distributed a Lessons Learned document of the incident
- Radio Rail Traffic Controller #2 and the equipment operator were both re-instructed

WMSC Staff observations

in August 2025, the WMSC released a report on a [Special Study of WMATA Metrorail's Radio Band and Infrastructure Replacement Project](#). The study found that safety-related radio deficiencies persist at WMATA Metrorail. The WMSC recommended WMATA leadership continue its new focus on and prioritize expeditious completion of the radio modernization project to improve radio communications at WMATA Metrorail. The WMSC recommended relevant oversight authorities such as WMATA's Office of Inspector General take note of issues pursuant to the radio system at WMATA and the radio project's progress to date and provide any additional oversight necessary. Because of the impact of a continuously inconsistent and under-functioning radio communications system, the WMSC will continue its oversight of radio communications at WMATA Metrorail.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety
Office of Safety Investigations

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E251460

Date of Event:	August 28.2025
Type of Event:	O-23: Improper Roadway Worker Protection (RWP)
Incident Time:	01:22 Hours
Location:	Anacostia Station, Track 1
Time and How received by Safety:	01:48 Hours – Safety Information Official (SIO)
Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:	02:54 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	None
Rail Vehicle:	Prime Mover (PM) 46
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	None
Safety Universal Data System (SUDS I/A) Number	20250828#129739MX

Anacostia Station – Improper RWP

August 28, 2025

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CMOR	Office of the Chief Fleet Officer
DECO	Department of Engineering Design and Construction
ER	Event Recorder
ETO	Exclusive Track Occupancy
FMNT	Facilities Maintenance
GOTRS	General Orders and Track Rights System
IIT	Incident Investigation Team
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
PICO	Rehabilitation & Construction
PM	Prime Mover
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
SAFE	Department of Safety
SUDS	Safety Universal Data System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Thursday, August 28, 2025, at 01:22 hours, a Facilities Maintenance (FMNT) Plumber AA Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) reported an Improper Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) near miss incident at Anacostia Station on Track 1 to the Metro Integrated Command and Communication (MICC) Center.

Prior to the event, Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) #2 granted permission to the FMNT RWIC to establish a work zone under Exclusive Track Occupancy (ETO) protection between Chain Markers (CM) F1/F2-177+34 and F1/F2-254+70. Although ETO was authorized at 01:08 hours by Radio RTC #2, safety measures such as placing human forms, applying prohibited exits, and canceling signal aspects in the Advanced Information Management (AIM) System were not fully implemented. At 01:15 hours, Radio RTC #2 granted an absolute block to Prime Mover (PM) 46 to Southern Avenue Station on Track 1. At 01:22 hours, PM-46 traversed the work zone at Anacostia Station, where they encountered personnel on the roadway.

Radio RTC #2 admitted to granting both ETO protection to the FMNT RWIC and PM-46's movement without confirming with the Button RTC that protections were established. The Button RTC later acknowledged being unaware that the FMNT RWIC had been cleared to begin setup of their work location and cited ongoing communication issues in that area. The failure to follow Standard Operating Procedures led to conflicting personnel being issued the same track area.

Radio RTC #2 and the Button RTC were removed from service and transported for post-incident testing.

In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Rail, Standard Operating Procedure 102.04, and Operations Administrative Policy 102.06, the MICC did not initiate the removal of Roadway Maintenance Machine PM-46 from service for Incident Investigations Team (IIT) investigation procedures.


There were no injuries or damages reported as a result of this event.

The probable cause of the Improper RWP at Anacostia Station event on August 28, 2025, was a lack of awareness by the Radio RTC #2 when they did not confirm that all Roadway Maintenance Machines were secured at their work locations before granting ETO protection to the FMNT RWIC and before the required safety protections were confirmed and fully established by the Button RTC.

Incident Site

Anacostia Station is a below-ground station with a center platform and direct fixation tracks. There is an interlocking on the outbound end of the station and turnbacks at both ends of the station.

Field Sketch/Schematics



**Image Not to Scale*

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through video and document review.
- Formal Interviews – Safety interviewed four individuals as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Safety interviewed the following individual:
 - Rail Traffic Controller – Button RTC
 - Rail Traffic Controller – Radio RTC #1
 - Rail Traffic Controller – Radio RTC #2
 - Equipment Operator – PM-46

- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
 - FMNT Plumber AA – RWIC
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Equipment Operator Pre-Trip Inspection
 - Equipment Operator Employee Disciplinary History
 - Equipment Operator 30-Day Work History
 - Track and Structure – Investigation Data
 - Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center – Investigation Data
 - Maximo Data
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - General Order and Track Rights System (GOTRS)

Investigation

On Thursday, August 28, 2025, at 01:22 hours, an FMNT RWIC contacted the MICC to report an Improper RWP near miss at Anacostia Station Track 1.

Prior to the event on August 27, 2025, at 23:51 hours, the FMNT RWIC contacted Radio RTC #1 via OPS 3 to establish work limits for a Supervisory Power Outage under ETO protection. The specified limits were from CM F1/F2-177+34 to F1/F2-254+70. The FMNT RWIC advised that PM-60 was exiting Glenmont Yard and would be entering the work zone to set up on Track 2 at Anacostia Station. Radio RTC #1 acknowledged the communication and instructed the FMNT RWIC to contact the Power Desk. At 23:54 hours, the FMNT RWIC contacted the Power Desk Controller (PDC), who acknowledged the Supervisory Power Outage request and instructed the FMNT RWIC to stand by and remain clear until the area was confirmed safe. The FMNT RWIC acknowledged.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) playback indicated that at 00:42 hours, on August 28, 2025, Rehabilitation & Construction (PICO) Track & Structure (TRST) informed Radio RTC #1 that PM-46 was en route to Branch Avenue Station and would be working on Track 1. The Equipment Operator of PM-46 confirmed their location at C06-08 signal and requested clearance to proceed to Branch Avenue Station. PM-46 crossed over from Track 2 to Track 1 at C06-08 signal. At 01:01 hours, Radio RTC #2 assumed control of the radio on OPS 3 from Radio RTC #1. At 01:04 hours, Radio RTC #2 instructed PM-46 to verify a lunar signal at C07-02 Pentagon Station Track 1 and gave them an absolute block to L'Enfant Plaza on Track 1.

At 01:08 hours, the Radio RTC #2 granted the FMNT RWIC permission to establish a work location on Tracks 1 and 2 at Anacostia Station under ETO protection, reminding the FMNT RWIC that the third rail remained energized. The FMNT RWIC acknowledged the message with 100% repeat back. At 01:08 hours, the Power Department Assistant Superintendent (PDAS) informed

the PDC of the Supervisory Red Tag 2025240708-S, covering the area between F05 Tie Breaker and F08 Traction Power, and the PDC confirmed the message.

At 01:15 hours, Radio RTC #2 instructed PM-46 to verify a lunar aspect at F03-32 signal and gave them an absolute block to Anacostia Station Track 1. PM-46 acknowledged the instructions and reconfirmed the message at 01:15 hours, which was again acknowledged by Radio RTC #2. PICO TRST confirmed placement of a shunt at Southern Avenue Station and advised that the third rail power had been successfully de-energized via hot stick at 01:16 hours. PICO TRST then requested permission to begin work on Track 2 and confirmed that PM-46 would only be operating on Track 1. Radio RTC #2 granted this permission with a clearing time of 04:00 hours. PICO TRST acknowledged and subsequently coordinated with PM-46 directly to arrange the pickup of personnel at Southern Avenue Station. At 01:19 hours, Radio RTC #2 granted PM-46 an absolute block to Southern Avenue Station Track 1. PM-46 acknowledged the message with a full repeat back.

At 01:17 hours, the PICO TRST RWIC requested a radio check from PM-46 and informed them that they would be picking up personnel at Southern Avenue Station, track 1, who would remove the barrier so the unit could enter the work location. At 01:25 hours, the FMNT RWIC reported that their work crew was on Tracks 1 and 2 and that a unit had passed through their work zone while personnel were present on the roadway. The FMNT RWIC emphasized that they had been granted permission to enter the roadway and had not been notified of the incoming unit. CCTV footage from PM-46's front camera showed PM-46 approaching the FMNT RWICs work location with 2 red lanterns between the running rails. Screenshots also showed PM-46 passing the first crew member on the roadway and the second in a place of safety protected by a continuous handrail. Once clearing the Anacostia platform at approximately 800 feet, outbound personnel were observed standing in a place of safety on the catwalk area between tracks 1 and 2. Radio RTC #1 stated that attempts were made via radio to contact the FMNT RWIC and reassured the FMNT RWIC that no further movements were scheduled. At 01:25 hours, the FMNT RWIC contacted the MICC via landline to request a radio check, and the Button RTC instructed them to stand by while protection was still being established. At 01:27 hours, the FMNT RWIC confirmed possession of Supervisory Red Tag 2025240708-S. PM-46 reported arrival at Southern Avenue Station at 01:28 hours, which was acknowledged.

The FMNT RWIC contacted the Button RTC again via landline at 01:36 hours to report that a unit had entered their work location at Anacostia Station during work zone setup. The FMNT RWIC asked the Button RTC if the unit would return, to which they responded that it would not. The Button RTC also admitted they were unaware of why the RWIC had been granted permission to begin setup before PM46's passage. At 01:40 hours, the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) contacted the FMNT RWIC via landline to confirm whether a near miss had occurred. The FMNT RWIC confirmed the near miss, stating that personnel had been in the roadway but moved to a place of safety before PM-46 went through their location. No injuries were reported. At 01:48 hours, the Fire Protection Supervisor notified the Safety Information Official (SIO), who then notified the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC).

At 02:00 hours, both the Button RTC and Radio RTC #2 were removed from service and transported for post-incident testing.

The investigation revealed that Radio RTC #1 initially initiated the worksite permissions by entering the request into the General Orders and Track Rights System (GOTRS), documenting the requested work location, applicable tracks, limits of the work zone, and the personnel associated with the request, but was off the console during the incident. Upon returning, Radio

RTC #1 was unaware of the incident until the FMNT RWIC contacted them. The Button RTC confirmed that proper safety protocols were not established for the FMNT RWIC and cited communication issues, including prior notifications about radio bleed-over and poor reception.

This incident represents a failure to adhere to established Standard Operating Procedures outlined in MICC-ROC-PRO-14 for ETO protection. Critical steps such as verifying clear tracks, placing human forms in the AIM System, establishing prohibited exits, and ensuring all signals and switches were blocked were not executed. Both the Radio RTC #2 and Button RTC failed to follow the required checklist before granting ETO protection or allowing movement through the designated work zone.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
	August 27, 2025
23:51:10 hours	<u>RWIC</u> : Contacted the Radio RTC to establish working limits for a Supervisory Power Outage under ETO protection, Chain Markers F1/F2 177+34 to F1/F2 254+70. The RWIC advised the Radio RTC that PM-60 was coming out of Glenmont Yard and would be entering the work location and setting up on Track 2 at Anacostia Station. <u>Radio RTC #1</u> : Acknowledged the transmission with 100% repeat back and instructed the RWIC to contact the Power Desk Controller (PDC). [OPS 3 Radio]
23:54:18 hours	<u>RWIC</u> : Contacted the PDC to request their Supervisory Power Outage. <u>PDC</u> : Acknowledged the Supervisory Power Outage request at 23:54 hours. The RWIC was instructed to stand by and stand clear until the work area was clear. <u>RWIC</u> : Acknowledged the message. [VAHQ POC Non-Roadway Phone]
	August 28, 2025
00:42:37 hours	<u>PICO TRST</u> : Advised that PM-46 was coming to their work area and was needed on track 1. <u>Radio RTC #1</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio Ops 3]
00:43:21 hours	<u>Equipment Operator</u> : Advised of the location at C06-08 signal and requested to transport to the work location at Branch Avenue. <u>Radio RTC #1</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio Ops 3]
01:01:00 hours	Radio RTC #1 was relieved by Radio RTC #2. [Radio Ops 3]
01:04:52 hours	<u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Instructed PM-46 to verify a lunar aspect at C07-02 with an absolute block to L'Enfant Plaza Station, Track 1. <u>Equipment Operator</u> : Acknowledged the message. [OPS 3 Radio]
01:08:06 hours	<u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Granted RWIC permission to establish work location on Tracks 1 & 2 at Anacostia under ETO protection. The RWIC was instructed to place their shunts for Central to verify their placement. The RWIC was reminded that the third rail was hot and energized. Once the RWIC received their Supervisory Outage tag, they would have permission to hot-stick and verify third rail power de-energization.

Time	Description
	<u>RWIC</u> : Acknowledged the message with 100% repeat back. [OPS 3 Radio]
01:08:22 hours	<u>PDAS</u> : Informed the PDC of Supervisory Tag 2025240708-S from F05 Tie Breaker to F08 Traction Power, Tracks 1 and 2. <u>PDC</u> : Acknowledged the message at 01:09 hours. [VAHQ POC Non-Roadway Phone]
01:15:05 hours	<u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Instructed PM-46 to verify a lunar aspect at signal F03-32, with an absolute block to Anacostia Station, Track 1. <u>Equipment Operator</u> : Acknowledged the message with 100% repeat back. <u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Acknowledged the message. [OPS 3 Radio]
01:15:14 hours	<u>Equipment Operator</u> : Contacted the Radio RTC to verify their absolute block to Anacostia Station, Track 1. <u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Acknowledged the absolute block. [OPS 3 Radio]
01:16:33 hours	<u>PICO TRST</u> : Asked the Radio RTC to verify that one (1) shunt was placed at Southern Avenue Station. <u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Acknowledged the placement of one (1) shunt at Southern Avenue Station. <u>PICO TRST</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that third rail de-energization was confirmed by hot-stick. The TRST Unit requested permission to start work on Track 2. <u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Acknowledged the message and asked if PM-46 would be working on Track 2. <u>PICO TRST</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that they were waiting for PM-46 on Track 1. <u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Acknowledged the message and granted TRST to install their safety equipment and begin working on Track 2 only. <u>PICO TRST</u> : Acknowledged the message and received a clearing time of 04:00 hours. [OPS 3 Radio]
01:17:39 hours	<u>PICO TRST</u> : Requested permission to speak directly with PM-46. <u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Granted TRST permission to speak directly to PM-46. <u>PICO TRST</u> : Requested a radio check from PM-46 and informed PM-46 that they would be picking up personnel at Southern Avenue Station, Track 1, who would remove the barrier so the unit could enter the work location. <u>Equipment Operator</u> : Acknowledged the message. [OPS 3 Radio]
01:19:54 hours	<u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Granted PM-46 an absolute block to Southern Avenue Station, Track 1. <u>Equipment Operator</u> : Acknowledged the message with 100% repeat back. [OPS 3 Radio]
01:24:13 hours	<u>Radio RTC #1</u> : Radioed for RWIC. [OPS 3 Radio]
01:25:19 hours	<u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Contacted RWIC to ask which track they were on. <u>RWIC</u> : Stated they were on Tracks 1 and 2. A unit passed through their work location with personnel in the roadway, and the RWIC had no advanced notification. The RWIC stated they were given permission to enter the roadway prior to the unit entering the work zone. <u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Acknowledged the message and stated they were attempting to contact the RWIC via the radio. <u>RWIC</u> : Stated it was unusual for a unit to pass through a work zone with personnel in the roadway. <u>Radio RTC #2</u> : Stated once more that they were attempting to contact the

Time	Description
	<p>RWIC via the radio to inform them of the unit approaching. <u>RWIC</u>: Asked the Radio RTC #2 if they were good now. <u>Radio RTC #2</u>: Acknowledged the message and stated no other units were entering the area. [ROCC OPS 3 Phone]</p>
01:25:59 hours	<p><u>RWIC</u>: Contacted the Radio RTC for a radio check. <u>Button RTC</u>: Instructed the RWIC to stand by and stand clear while their protection was established. [OPS 3 Radio]</p>
01:27:56 hours	<p><u>RWIC</u>: Contacted the Radio RTC to inform them that they were in possession of the Supervisory Outage Tag 2025240708-S. [OPS 3 Radio]</p>
01:28:51 hours	<p><u>Equipment Operator</u>: Informed the Radio RTC that they were at Southern Avenue Station. <u>Radio RTC #2</u>: Acknowledged the message. [OPS 3 Radio]</p>
01:36:19 hours	<p><u>RWIC</u>: Informed the Button RTC that a unit passed through their work location at Anacostia Station while personnel were setting up the work zone. The RWIC asked if the unit was returning. <u>Button RTC</u>: Informed the RWIC that the unit was reporting to their work location and would not be returning through their work zone. The Button RTC stated they were not aware why the RWIC was given permission to set up their work zone before the unit passed their location. [ROCC Yellow/Green Phone]</p>
01:40:47 hours	<p><u>AOM</u>: Contacted the RWIC to confirm if a near miss occurred. <u>RWIC</u>: Acknowledged a PM passed their location after they were granted permission to set up their work location. The RWIC stated there were personnel on the roadway who moved to a place of safety before any contact was made. No injuries reported or medical attention requested. <u>AOM</u>: Acknowledged the message. [ROCC Rail 3 Phone]</p>
01:48:20 hours	<p><u>Fire Protection Supervisor</u>: Contacted the Safety Information Official (SIO) to report a Near Miss incident at Anacostia Station, Track 1. The Fire Protection Supervisor stated that a Prime Mover passed through the area after permission was granted to set up their work area. [ROCC Emergency Mgmt Phone]</p>
01:53:02 hours	<p><u>SIO</u>: Informed the WMSC of the near miss and was informed that this event was classified as an O-23: RWP Violation. [ROCC Emergency MGMT]</p>
02:00:00 hours	<p>The Radio RTC and Button RTC were removed from service for an RWP Violation and transported for post-incident testing.</p>

****Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources.**

Closed-Circuit Television




Figure 1 - Screenshot from PM46's front camera as PM46 approaches and enters the work limits.




Figure 2 - Screenshot from PM46's front camera of PM46 passing the first roadway worker.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 3 - This image depicts PM46 traversing through the work location via track 1.

Operations

Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center

Based on the MICC Investigation data, the RWIC was granted ETO protection, but protections were not fully implemented in the AIM System, including the absence of human form, prohibited exits, and signal cancellations. An absolute block was issued to PM-46 for movement through the same location where the RWIC had been authorized to set up. The AIM System showed no active safety parameters. Radio RTC #2 admitted granting ETO protection before confirming with the Button RTC that protections were in place and acknowledged allowing PM-46 to move through the area before recognizing their error.

Infrastructure

Track and Structures

Based on the TRST Incident Investigation data, on the morning of August 28, 2025, MICC gave PM-46 an absolute block on Track 1 from F03 to F06 while another work crew was setting their work area (F06 to F07). There was an interview conducted as part of an investigation by the department into this incident. The Equipment Operator was instructed to answer questions to the best of their knowledge and reminded that it is a violation of the Metrorail Operating Rulebook for an employee to make/submit a false statement or report.

In the interview with TRST management, the Equipment Operator reported that while traveling through L'Enfant, they thought they heard on the radio the MICC tell the RWIC that the unit would be traveling through their area. According to the audio recordings, the MICC did not directly inform the RWIC that PM-46 would be traveling through their work area at Anacostia. When asked if they heard over the radio that the MICC permitted the RWIC to set up their work area, they stated that they thought they heard them tell the RWIC that 46 would be coming through, but they guessed they were wrong after listening to the recordings. The Equipment Operator also reported that they thought the MICC controller was a female, but they were male, according to the audio recording.

The Equipment Operator reported that they were not sure when they first saw personnel on the roadway, but they believed there were personnel on the platform at Anacostia. They also saw a couple of people when they left the platform. They reported that once they observed personnel, they attempted to adjust their speed, but they were going downhill, so it took a minute to slow down. When asked if they were flagged by personnel, they did not recall. It was reported by the RWIC that PM-46 did not use their horn to warn personnel that the unit was traveling through the work area, but the Equipment Operator stated that they blew their horn when they left the platform and when they observed personnel. They stated that they thought they heard the MICC tell the RWIC that they were coming through.

The Equipment Operator also stated that they thought that area was a part of the shutdown area, and that is why, when they saw the shunts and lights, they thought they could keep going. They thought the shutdown was extended to Anacostia at one point.

Interview Findings and Written Statements

As part of the investigation launched into the event, Safety interviewed four people. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

Equipment Operator

- The Equipment Operator was unaware that an incident had occurred until they arrived at work the next day.
- The Equipment Operator was transporting a single unit to Branch Avenue Yard.
- The Equipment Operator heard the Radio RTC communicating with the RWIC and saw the lights in the roadway, but they were not impeding traffic.
- The Equipment Operator was given an absolute block through the work location.
- The Equipment Operator stated that they observed personnel on the catwalk and in the vent shaft.
- The Equipment Operator reported that they were not having communication issues.
- The Equipment Operator stated that they did not communicate directly with the RWIC.
- The Equipment Operator stated that they went through the work location between 10 and 15 MPH.
- The Equipment Operator was not removed from service.

Radio RTC #1

- The Radio RTC #1 stated that they were working on OPS 3 on 8/28/2025.
- The Radio RTC #1 stated that around 01:00 hours, they stepped away from the console to take a personal and were relieved by the Radio RTC #2.
- The Radio RTC #1 stated that they returned to the console at approximately 01:30 hours.
- The Radio RTC #1 stated that they were completely unaware of any incident taking place during that time period.

Radio RTC #2

- The Radio RTC #2 stated that they were working as the radio controller on OPS 3.
- The Radio RTC #2 stated that they granted Exclusive Track Occupancy (ETO) Protection before confirming that the Button RTC was ready.
- The Radio RTC #2 stated that this action put the Button RTC in a position where protections were not in place for the work area.
- The Radio RTC #2 stated that they issued an Absolute Block to PM46 through the established work area.
- The Radio RTC #2 stated that by the time they recognized their error, the unit had already entered the area.

Button RTC

- The Button RTC stated that at 01:36 hours, they were notified by Facilities Plant Maintenance (PLNT) that a class 2 rail vehicle (PM-46) was entering their work location while ETO was being set up.
- The Button RTC stated that they were unaware that ETO was granted.
- The Button RTC stated that MOC COMM was notified at 22:22 hours on 8/27/2025 about bad radio communication as well as bleed over.
- The Button RTC stated that they were having issues with radio communications and was also answering the phone.
- The Button RTC stated that they did not hear Radio RTC #2 grant ETO protection.
- The Button RTC stated that they had a routing and protection set up for PM46 to move through that location to head to Southern Ave. Station, Track 1, to their work location.
- The Button RTC stated that they did not have protection set up for PLNT, which should have been a prohibited exit and human forms at the F07-F08 Track 1 and Track 2 work location, because PM46 was moving in that area.

RWIC

- The RWIC stated that they were the senior crew performing a fire line hydro and flow test for the fire system in the draft sandpipe tunnel.
- The RWIC stated that they had two piggyback junior crews underneath them.
- The RWIC stated that they were given permission at 01:08 hours to place shunts and lights and were informed that third rail power was still hot and energized.
- The RWIC stated that they thought they heard a unit coming through, but couldn't tell if it was on track 1 or track 2 because the unit on Track 2 was loud.
- The RWIC stated that they saw their crew members exit the roadway who tried to alert the crew members who were further down, but by then the unit had already passed through the area.
- The RWIC stated that they were on the platform at the time of the incident and tried to use the radio, but it beeped, and they couldn't get through, so they used their cell phone.
- The RWIC stated that there are dead spots near Anacostia.
- The RWIC stated that shunts and lights had already been placed before the unit came through.
- The RWIC stated that they contacted the MICC to see if any more units were coming through, and they were informed that everything was clear, and they could proceed with setting up their work location.
- The RWIC stated that the Radio RTC informed them that they copied four good shunts on tracks 1 and 2.
- The RWIC stated that they had one crew member on the roadway when the unit came past faster than 15 MPH and never stopped.
- The RWIC stated that the crew members felt unsafe, and they shut down the work area.

Weather

On August 28, 2025, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 64°F, with fair skies, winds of 3 mph, and 63% humidity. [Washington, DC]. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: [Washington, DC].

Related Rules and Procedures

Metrorail Operating Rulebook

- 1.1.7 Employees shall immediately report hazardous and unsafe conditions to their supervisor, including all near misses.
- 1.2.1 Employees involved in, witnessing, or informed of an accident or incident, to include near misses, on the Metrorail system shall inform their supervisor, Metro Transit Police Department, Rail Operations Control Center and/or other appropriate authority as soon as possible, and shall file a written report.

Standard Operating Procedures

Roadway Worker Protection: Exclusive Track Occupancy MICC-ROC-PRO-14

- 6.1.8 The Radio and Button RTCs will perform the following steps:
 - 6.1.8.1 Ensure that no rail vehicles that are not part of the work crew have been authorized to occupy the track segment where ETO has been requested, stop

indications have been displayed on all signals leading to and within the ETO track segment, and blocking devices (including technological solutions) have been applied to switches and signals leading into and within the ETO working limits.

- 6.1.8.1.1 The Button RTC must ensure that the area to be protected is clear of all movements that are not part of the work crew and verbally confirm this with the Radio RTC.
- 6.1.8.1.2 The Button RTC will cancel all signals leading to and within the area to be protected and shall establish prohibit exits and blue block traffic in the ETO area.
- 6.1.8.1.3 If applicable, the Button RTC shall remove automatic signaling in the ETO area.
- 6.1.8.1.4 The Button RTC will place a human form in AIM over the ETO area.
- 6.1.8.2 The Button RTC will verbally advise the Radio RTC when all protections have been established by stating that ETO has been established for the RWIC, specifying the applicable RWIC.
- 6.1.8.3 The Radio RTC will utilize the AIM system display to verify the cancelled signal(s), application of human form, and establishment of prohibit exits and blue block traffic, and record the canceled signal(s) on the FT/ETO/IT Roadway Access Form, MICC-ROC-FRM-19.
- 6.1.9 The Radio RTC must then contact the RWIC requesting ETO (via radio) and grant them ETO by stating the following:
 - 6.1.9.1 Department, if applicable, and radio call number
 - 6.1.9.2 Identify ETO limits including line, track number, between/at chain markers (i.e., C2 140+00 to C2 150+00)
 - 6.1.9.3 Time Effective
 - 6.1.9.4 Status of third rail power
 - 6.1.9.5 “TRST 1234, ETO is in effect between CM C2 140+00 and CM C2 150+00 at 2204 hours. Third rail power is still energized and dangerous to life.”
- 6.1.10 The RWIC shall acknowledge & confirm the accuracy of the working limits through repeat back to the Radio RTC.
 - 6.1.10.1 The Radio RTC shall acknowledge receipt of this message before it may be considered in effect.
 - 6.1.10.2 If the Radio RTC does not provide the RWIC with the proper requested working limits, then ETO shall not be considered in effect, and the RWIC shall address all discrepancies with the Radio RTC before continuing. Any subsequent communication regarding the working limits shall be confirmed with positive communication.
- 6.1.11 The Radio RTC will click the “Permission is Given to Set Up Worksite” step in GOTRS.
 - 6.1.11.1 At this time, the RWIC may set up working limits. It does not permit a work crew to begin their scheduled work.
 - 6.1.11.2 If ETO is accompanied by a Third Rail Power Outage, then hot sticking also may be completed at this point in accordance with SOP 2.
- 6.1.12 The RWIC or a RWIC designated personnel will complete setting up the work zone in the designated area then confirm (via radio) verification of the following with the Radio RTC:

- 6.1.12.1 Radio call number
 - 6.1.12.2 Track ID
 - 6.1.12.3 Hot stick completed
 - 6.1.12.4 Shunts were placed
- 6.1.13 The Radio RTC will visually confirm the placement of the shunts and that the correct number of shunts have been placed for the number of tracks included in the work location for the track configuration on the AIM display.
 - 6.1.14 If the placement or number of shunts is incorrect, the Radio RTC must inform the RWIC of the issue and the process shall go back to the start of 6.1.7.
 - 6.1.15 The Radio RTC will tell the RWIC the number of shunts the Rail Section has confirmed in the work location.
 - 6.1.16 The Radio RTC will tell the RWIC that they are clear to begin work.
 - 6.1.17 The RWIC must repeat back that they are clear to begin work.
 - 6.1.18 The Radio RTC will click the “Start Work” step in GOTRS.

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

Equipment Operator

SAFE examined signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No video of the involved person was available to ascertain whether signs of fatigue were present. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. Employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Radio RTC #1

SAFE examined signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No video of the involved person was available to ascertain whether signs of fatigue were present. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. Employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Radio RTC #2

SAFE examined signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No video of the involved person was available to ascertain whether signs of fatigue were present. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. Employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Button RTC

SAFE examined signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No video of the involved person was available to ascertain whether signs of fatigue were

present. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. Employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

Equipment Operator

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. Employee reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked the overnight shift in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 4.37 hours at the time of the incident. The employee reported 13.5 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 15.75 hours, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the employee's usual workday sleep durations. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

Radio RTC #1

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. Employee reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked the overnight shift in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 5.2 hours at the time of the incident. The employee reported 9.17 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 87.68 hours, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the employee's usual workday sleep durations. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

Radio RTC #2

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. Employee reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked the overnight shift in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 4.62 hours at the time of the incident. The employee reported 12.75 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 15.7 hours, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the employee's usual workday sleep durations. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

Button RTC

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. Employee reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked the overnight shift in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 5.37 hours at the time of the incident. The employee reported 5.5 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 15.72 hours, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the employee's usual workday sleep durations. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Equipment Operator
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Radio RTC #1
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Radio RTC #2
WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Radio RTC complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

Button RTC
WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Button RTC complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

Findings

- The Radio RTC #2 did not request permission from the RWIC before allowing PM-46 to enter the work location.
- ETO was granted to the RWIC despite the AIM System displaying a lunar signal on track 1 at Anacostia Station.
- An incomplete work location was established at Anacostia Station, specifically, no human form, red signals, or prohibited exits were in place at the time the FMNT RWIC was permitted to set up their worksite.
- Radio RTC #1 initially initiated the worksite permissions by entering the request into GOTRS, documenting the requested work location, applicable tracks, limits of the work zone, and the personnel associated with the request.
- Radio RTC #1 was relieved by Radio RTC #2 for a personal relief and assumed duties as the Radio RTC before the RWP violation.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

MICC

- The Button and Radio RTCs were removed from service.
- MICC management and the SIO were notified.
- Statements from the RTCs concerning the events were requested.
- Distribution of a Lessons Learned Document of the incident.
- Initiate a Safety Standdown through September 5, 2025
- Review of SOP areas of impact
- Safe Support Elements

TRST

- Reissuance of Safety Alert SA 25-05-D Version #1 Issue Date: 5/21/2025 during safety briefings, roll calls, or other staff meetings.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Improper RWP at Anacostia Station event on August 28, 2025, was a lack of awareness by the Radio RTC #2 when they did not confirm that all Roadway Maintenance Machines were secured at their work locations before granting ETO protection to the FMNT RWIC

and before the required safety protections were confirmed and fully established by the Button RTC.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
129739_SAFE CAPS_MICC_ 001	Safety Stand Down - Reinforce mandatory adherence to MICC-ROC-PRO-14-SOP requirements before issuing ETO protection during reinstruction training for the Button RTC and Radio RTC #2.	MICC SRC	Completed
129739_SAFE CAPS_MICC_ 002	Distribution of a Lessons Learned Document of the incident.	MICC SRC	Completed
129739_SAFE CAPS_MICC_ 003	RTC to attend re-instruction training.	MICC SRC	Completed
129739_SAFE CAPS_TRST_ 001	Equipment Operator to attend re-instruction training.	TRST SRC	Completed

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

Department

Equipment Operator

The Equipment Operator is a Metro employee with 11 years of service and 11 years of experience as an Equipment Operator. The Equipment Operator holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in October 2025.

During the formal interview, the Equipment Operator stated that they were transporting a single unit from New Carrollton Yard to Branch Avenue Yard. They stated that Central did not say a work unit was ahead, but they heard them tell the RWIC that they could set up their work location and gave their unit permission to go through the work area. They saw shunts and a mat. RTC gave them permission to go to Southern Avenue. They stated that they heard the RWIC say the unit had permission to pass through when the work area was set up. They saw personnel on the side peeking out of a hole. They also observed personnel on the catwalk and were blowing their horn when someone stuck their head out.

The Equipment Operator stated that no one attempted to stop the unit. They stated that they asked Central to go direct with the next RWIC to continue through their work location and were granted permission. They stated that they were traveling at 10-15 mph, and no one flagged the unit through location, but they observed about 5 people in the vent shaft. They stated that they communicated via OPS 3 with the RWIC when they gave them permission, but they were unsure of the time. They stated that the Radio RTC was talking to RWIC at the same time.

The Equipment Operator stated that if shunts are on top of the running rails, they can't go through, but they only saw the lights on the inside of the running rails. They would have stopped if shunts were on top of running rails. They stated that whoever the RWIC was said that they could go through the work area once it was set up, and it was set up.

The Equipment Operator stated that Central needs to allow units to speak directly with RWIC to enter work zones. They reported that they had no communication issues. They stated that there was no confusion between the two RWICs, and they didn't go direct with TRST until they arrived at Southern Ave because they needed them to open the barrier. They stated that the RTC didn't stop them to tell them to talk to the RWIC. Once the RWIC gives permission you are supposed to travel at a restricted speed. They stated that you don't always get hand signals because there isn't always personnel in the area.

The Equipment Operator stated that they were not aware that there was an incident until they arrived at work the next day and that they were not removed from service.

Radio RTC #1

The Radio RTC #1 is a Metro employee with 16 years of service and 1 and a half months of experience as an RTC. The Equipment Operator holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in December 2025.

During the formal interview, the Radio RTC #1 stated that they received more than adequate training. They were certified on July 15, 2025, and the training lasted 10 months. Six weeks in the workbook with 10 modules, then simulations on the AIMS screens, then OJT for one month on each shift. Radio RTC #1 stated that the certification consisted of 120 questions, a written exam, and a practical portion where they had to go through simulations of a station overrun, a red signal overrun, a sick customer, and troubleshooting as the Button or Radio RTC.

Radio RTC #1 stated that they were the Radio RTC on Ops 3 and can be busy during the overnight shift, with the possibility of more work locations. There were no issues before the incident.

Radio RTC #1 stated that they took the initial request from the Facilities RWIC, but they did not permit them to set up the work site. Typically, how it works is they will make a request, request the GOTRS rights, repeat the request back, and then have the RWIC stand by, stand clear, and contact the Power Desk because there is revenue train movement.

Radio RTC #1 stated that eight controllers were needed to staff the MICC, with two controllers per console, and there were over eight controllers at the time. Radio RTC #1 stated that Radio RTC #2 came over to assist and complete paperwork. Radio RTC #1 stated that they took a personal break, and then Radio RTC #2 took over the radio operation. Radio RTC #1 stated that they were away for 30 minutes, and upon their return, the incident had already occurred.

Radio RTC #1 stated that there are different ways to place the blue block. Some RTCs may place the blue block, but trains are still moving. However, the Button RTC should put in the prohibits and cancel the signals before giving permission to go to the roadway. Radio RTC #1 stated that ETO should be granted when all RMMs are secured at their work locations and no train movement.

Radio RTC #1 stated that they were aware that PM-46 was on the line moving to the shutdown area before they had taken their personal break, and they did not communicate or provide any blocks to PM-46 Equipment Operator.

Radio RTC #1 stated that when they returned to the console, they did not resume the Radio RTC role. The RTCs were actively giving permission to the roadway. Radio RTC #1 stated that they overheard the AOM report that a Prime Mover had entered a work location after a work crew was given ETO to set up the work site.

Radio RTC #1 stated that they were not removed from service.

FMNT RWIC

The RWIC is a Plumber AA and is a Metro employee with 3 years of service and 3 years of experience as a Plumber AA. The RWIC holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in February of 2026.

During the formal interview, the RWIC stated that they were the senior crew performing a fire line hydro and flow test for the fire system in the draft sandpipe tunnel. They had two piggyback junior crews underneath them; one crew was scheduled to repair concrete, and another crew was to perform scaffolding work on the platform. There were 8-9 workers at the time. One crew was to work on the platform, and another was to work just beyond the platform.

The RWIC stated that they had a safety briefing at the shop with their crew, then with the juniors, briefing them on the job site.

The RWIC stated that they were given permission at 01:08 hours to place shunts and lights, informed that the third rail was still hot and energized, and to contact when they received the Supervisor Tag. They proceeded to set up the track with the lights, shunts, and the work mat. The RWIC stated that they had a split crew, so they simultaneously started to set up on tracks one and two together. The RWIC stated that they physically set up track 2. The RWIC stated that they had PM-60 stationed at F06 on track 2 platform, awaiting approval to go to work.

The RWIC stated that they had the lights, shunts, and the mat down. They thought they heard a unit coming through, but couldn't tell if it was on track one or two because PM-60 was on track two, which made it loud. They vaguely heard a unit that sounded like it was coming from the rear, which was coming from behind them on the low end. They didn't see anything at the moment because they were on track one. Once they approached the platform and crossed over to track two, where the crew members were setting up, they heard a horn sound twice from the PM.

The RWIC stated that they saw their crew member exit the roadway, and the PM, at a high rate of speed, proceeded to go through track one towards the high end. They attempted to hit the radio, but there was still chatter on the radio, so they were unable to get through. They tried to call the crew members who were further down to alert them, but by then, the PM had already passed through their area of the roadway.

The RWIC stated that they were on the platform, tried to use the radio, but it beeped, and they couldn't get through. So, they grabbed their cell phone to make an emergency call to report that the PM was coming through. They were unable to get in touch with them. Afterwards, they received several phone calls from various crew members.

The RWIC stated that there was no damage; they didn't hear that a PM or any units were moving through the area or approaching the work area. There tend to be dead spots or dead zones at Anacostia Station.

The RWIC stated that they also received a phone call from OPS 3 apologizing and that the unit wasn't supposed to come through. They explained that it shouldn't have happened and that they didn't know why the unit came through. They assured that everything would be clear.

The RWIC stated that shut lights and mats were already down on tracks one and two, where the PM was traveling through. The RWIC stated that someone had told them they had a flashlight and was trying to get the PM to stop and acknowledge that there were workers on the roadway.

The RWIC stated that they contacted the MICC and was told that no other unit should be coming through. They asked if the PM needed to come back and if they were clear to proceed with setting up the track. The RWIC stated that the MICC informed them that everything was clear and that they should proceed with setting up the track.

The RWIC stated that they received a call from the Power Desk granting them the Supervisory tag. Then they noticed that they were never given permission to hot stick, they skipped a step and said they had copied four good shunts on tracks one and two (high and low end) and that they had the permission to place the rest of the safety equipment and go to work with a clearing time of 4:00 am.

The RWIC stated that there was one crew member on track one in the roadway setting up the track, and that's when the prime mover came, sounded the horn twice, and they got out of the way; the prime mover proceeded through, it never stopped, and was moving faster than 15 mph. The RWIC stated that the crew members felt unsafe, and they shut down the work area.

Button RTC

The Button RTC is a Metro employee with 12 years of service and 1 year of experience as an RTC. The Button RTC holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in November 2025.

During the formal interview, the Button RTC stated that on the day in question, the unit was being transported to the shutdown area. The work location that it was going to was the Southern Ave platform, track 1. The RWIC had a work location between Congress Heights and Anacostia tracks 1 and 2. That RWIC also had a unit that they wanted on the track 2 side at Anacostia. They stated that they set the lead for both units. The first unit went down to the work location for the RWIC between Congress and Anacostia. The lead was set for track 2 side, and then they also had a lead set for the unit that needed to go to Southern Ave., track 1 side.

The Button RTC stated that the unit for the RWIC had let them know that they were holding secure in the work location. They stated that they already had the blue blocks set up for the RWIC for their work location between Congress and Anacostia. They stated that they did not have the additional prohibited exits and did not have the human form put up because ETO should not be granted because it was not safe for ETO due to the unit that needed to go to Southern Ave. The unit needed to come down track 1, and that was the RWIC's work location on Tracks 1 and 2.

The Button RTC stated that the unit that was going to Southern Ave was coming from a different OPS and arrived on OPS 3 by way of Arlington Cemetery. Once again, all of the leads were set in place for that unit. They stated that once the unit was coming through the work location, they noticed that there were shunts placed and there were some red indications on the AIM Screen. They stated that when they saw those indications, they received a phone call around 01:36 hours from the RWIC, and they asked if there was another unit coming through the location, and the Button RTC was unaware that the RWIC had been given ETO.

The Button RTC stated that that's when they had a conversation with their partner and told them that management needed to be notified of what happened. The Button RTC also stated that there was bad radio communication on OPS 3. They stated that they notified MOC and COMM about the bad radio communication and bleed over on OPS 3 around 22:00 hours. They stated that they did not hear their partner grant the RWIC ETO, but they did have the correct protection set up for the unit that needed to go through the location.

The Button RTC stated that they couldn't remember where the first unit was coming from, but they were notified that PM-46 was coming. They stated that all communications were done over the radio until they received the call from the RWIC about the unit coming through the established work location. They also stated that they were working with multiple radio controllers. At the time

of the incident, they were working with Radio RTC #2 because Radio RTC #1 needed to take a personal. They stated the Radio RTC #1 took a personal before PM-46 made contact with OPS 3. Radio RTC #1 returned after the incident, but they do not know what time.

The Button RTC stated that on a typical night, the RTCs communicate visually and verbally by looking at the AIM screen and making sure the necessary protections are in place. As the Button RTC, they would ensure the work location was ready to go, then they would look at the AIM screen and verify that it is ready, then ETO is granted. In this instance, they would have been the ones setting up the protection, but it wasn't set up because a unit was moving through. They were unaware that Radio RTC #1 granted ETO for that work location.

The Button RTC stated that other personnel were contacting them via radio, trying to get access to the roadway at once, and they were also answering the phones. They stated that things were moving a little bit fast, and their partner did not notify them that they had granted ETO. In past practices, when working as a Radio RTC, they verified with their partners before granting ETO so they could check it off their list and know who was on the roadway.

The Button RTC stated that the RWIC was protected on Track 2 but not Track 1, so maybe their partner assumed that the RWIC would only be working on Track 2. They stated the AIM screen reflected that protection was set up on Track 2.

The Button RTC stated that they received proper training with an adequate amount of time, but they think it should be longer than what it is now. It used to be one year, now it is six months. They believe some of the controllers do not have rail experience, and that would help because you understand the foundation of what is happening on the roadway, as far as signals, the switches, and the rail itself, with visual understanding.

The Button RTC stated that the blue block is normally set up ahead of time, so you have a visual of how many work locations you have for the night. That also helps them pre-plan their work so that they know how to set up the proper prohibited exits. They stated that when they grant ETO protection, they have to check it off in GOTRS before the RWIC can set up their work location so that they can verify third rail power is de-energized and the proper shunts are in place. They stated that they set up 7-8 work locations that night, and it wasn't as many units as normal.

Radio RTC #2

The Radio RTC #2 is a Metro employee with 3 years of service and six months of experience as an RTC. The RTC holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in November 2025.

During the formal interview, the RTC stated that they were the Radio Controller, and when they arrived on duty, they were as directed, meaning if someone stepped out or needed help, they would fill in. They stated that the original Radio Controller needed to step out for a bathroom break, so they filled in so that the Button RTC was not by themselves. They stated that before Radio RTC #1 stepped off, they were already sitting there, so they heard some of the stuff that was going on.

The Radio RTC #2 stated that once they took over, they were just continuing the normal operation of putting the work crews out to the roadway, as well as moving units. They stated that they were granting ETO, and they and their partner were communicating about who had to go where. They stated that they were unsure who the RWIC was, but they granted them ETO, then gave PM-46

an absolute block through that work location that they had just granted ETO about 15 minutes before moving the unit through the work location.

The Radio RTC #2 stated that there was another unit at L'Enfant Plaza or Waterfront, and that is when they gave them the block to Southern Ave. They stated that typically they and their partner have to verify that they were on the same page, and if ETO had to be granted, they had to have blue block and human form, so when that isn't there, the Radio Controller sees a clear track. They stated that they did not confirm with their partner. They saw a clear track and gave PM-46 a block.

The Radio RTC #2 stated that sometimes they talk to each other, or the Button Controller can set something, and the Radio Controller can see it. They needed to double and triple check, and they should have gone off what the Button Controller was doing. They stated they tried to contact the RWIC and the unit, but it was too late by the time they realized what was happening because there was radio traffic. They called the RWIC to ensure everyone was ok. They stated that they immediately notified their management.

The Radio RTC #2 stated that there was no further communication with the RWIC via radio, but the AOM contacted the RWIC via landline.

The Radio RTC #2 stated that their training was well, they helped them with every situation they would encounter. They had been working the owl shift since April. They stated that their partner was also a new controller. They stated that when they granted ETO, there was a blue block, but they could not remember if there was a human form. They were unsure if red signals were set in the work location. They stated that they could recognize the shunt as the unit passed, which got their attention. They stated that they did not hear the RWIC give the unit permission to pass.

The Radio RTC #2 stated that they were sitting near Radio RTC #1 for approximately 10 minutes before they took over, but it is typically common practice to get a turnover before taking over. They stated that they were unsure if there was a delay in putting units out, but there was no pressure to get the units to their work locations. They stated that there are times when units are allowed to move through work locations. They stated the RWIC never confirmed that they completed the hot-sticking process.

The Radio RTC #2 stated that they understood the severity of this event.

Appendix B – General Orders & Track Rights System (GOTRS)

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM
Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	202507203000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/28/2025 00:30 to: 08/28/2025 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PLNT/BMSS	In Piggyback:	Yes, Senior
Tag #:	Closed (2025240708-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	F06 ANACOSTIA FF-6 FIRE LINE TESTING		

Location, Work Type and Description

Location:	Mainline
Non-Wayside Location Type:	
Request Type:	Regular
Charge Job Number:	
Contract Number:	
Maximo Work Order:	
Request Group:	No
Location Description:	
Request Description:	FIRE LINE HYDRO AND FLOW TEST
Work Type:	Fire Line Testing
Meeting Location:	
PB Meeting Location:	
Tools and Equipment:	HAND TOOLS AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT
Equipment on Track:	

	Track 1		Track 2	
Actual Work Area:	F182+34	F250+70	Actual Work Area:	F182+34 F250+70
Protected Work Area:	F177+34	F255+70	Protected Work Area:	F177+34 F255+70

Hot Stick Info. Third Rail Gaps:

From	To	Track ID
F145+49	F191+67	1
F192+23	F248+84	1
F249+12	F249+92	1
F250+20	F301+86	1
F144+83	F189+00	2
F189+32	F248+84	2
F249+12	F249+92	2

As of 08/28/2025 12:12
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Figure 4 - GOTRS request for the RWIC page 1 of 6.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM

Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	202507203000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/28/2025 00:30 to: 08/28/2025 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PLNT/BMSS	In Piggyback:	Yes, Senior
Tag #:	Closed (2025240708-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	F06 ANACOSTIA FF-6 FIRE LINE TESTING		

Request Change History

Date	Event
08/11/2025 13:17	Request was edited. Field(s) changed: Location, End Date/Time. Location: Track 1 Actual: F188+34 F250+70 Protected: F183+34 F255+70, Track 2 Actual: F188+34 F250+70 Protected: F183+34 F255+70 to Track 1 Actual: F182+34 F250+70 Protected: F177+34 F255+70, Track 2 Actual: F182+34 F250+70 Protected: F177+34 F255+70. End Date/Time: 8/28/2025 8:00:00 AM to 8/28/2025 8:30:00 AM.
08/11/2025 14:21	Request status was changed to Approved
08/28/2025 02:29	Work Prep was completed.
08/28/2025 03:52	Request status was changed to Opened
08/28/2025 06:12	Request status was changed to Closed

Request Group

Request Number	Description
----------------	-------------

Piggyback

Request Number	Order	Inherits Rights	Request Status	Piggyback Status	Track	Protected Area Start	Protected Area End
202507203000 F06 ANACOSTIA FF-6 FIRE LINE TESTING	SR	N/A	Closed	Forced	1	F177+34	F255+70
202507203000 F06 ANACOSTIA FF-6 FIRE LINE TESTING	SR	N/A	Closed	Forced	2	F177+34	F255+70
202515303243 MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station	JR-0	Yes	Closed	Forced	2	F177+34	F193+34
202515303243 MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station	JR-0	Yes	Closed	Forced	1	F177+34	F193+34
202521805600 STMN(South) F06 Crown Concrete Delamination Repair Trk 2	JR-1	Yes	Closed	Forced	2	F178+00	F200+00

Piggyback History

Date	User	Event
------	------	-------

As of 08/28/2025 12:12
3 of 6

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM

Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	202507203000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/28/2025 00:30 to: 08/28/2025 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PLNT/BMSS	In Piggyback:	Yes, Senior
Tag #:	Closed (2025240708-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	F06 ANACOSTIA FF-6 FIRE LINE TESTING		

08/11/2025 13:17 Piggyback with Junior Requests 202515303243, 202521805600 was formed.
Cause: Piggyback was forced.

Comments

By	On	Comment
[REDACTED]	3/13/2025 2:03:31 AM	THIS IS A FIRE LIFE SAFETY ASSET

Close-Out Summary

Final Status:	Closed
RWIC has contacted RTC to establish working limits:	08/27/2025 23:52
Authorize Power Outage Order:	08/28/2025 01:04
De-Energization Completed/RWIC notified:	08/28/2025 01:17
:	08/28/2025 01:08
Hot Sticking:	08/28/2025 01:37

From	To	Track ID	Waive(?)	Radio ID	Chain Marker	Entered By	Date
F145+49	F191+67	1		AutoUnit	F145+49	[REDACTED]	08/28/2025 01:37
F144+83	F189+00	2		AutoUnit	F144+83	[REDACTED]	08/28/2025 01:37
F192+23	F248+84	1		AutoUnit	F192+23	[REDACTED]	08/28/2025 01:37
F189+32	F248+84	2		AutoUnit	F189+32	[REDACTED]	08/28/2025 01:37
F250+20	F301+86	1		AutoUnit	F250+20	[REDACTED]	08/28/2025 01:37
F250+20	F301+86	2		AutoUnit	F250+20	[REDACTED]	08/28/2025 01:37
F249+12	F249+92	1		AutoUnit	F249+12	[REDACTED]	08/28/2025 01:37
F249+12	F249+92	2		AutoUnit	F249+12	[REDACTED]	08/28/2025 01:37

RTC authorization to start work is given to RWIC:	08/28/2025 01:37
PDC confirmed working limits are clear:	08/28/2025 01:59
RTC confirmed working limits are clear:	08/28/2025 02:12
Energization by PDC completed:	08/28/2025 02:50

As of 08/28/2025 12:12
4 of 6

Figure 7 - GOTRS request for the RWIC page 4 of 6.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	202507203000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/28/2025 00:30 to: 08/28/2025 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	██████████	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PLNT/BMSS	In Piggyback:	Yes, Senior
Tag #:	Closed (2025240708-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	F06 ANACOSTIA FF-6 FIRE LINE TESTING		

As of 08/28/2025 12:12
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Figure 8 - GOTRS request for the RWIC page 5 of 6.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	202507203000	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/28/2025 00:30 to: 08/28/2025 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PLNT/BMSS	In Piggyback:	Yes, Senior
Tag #:	Closed (2025240708-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	F06 ANACOSTIA FF-6 FIRE LINE TESTING		

Close-Out Summary

Rail Traffic Controller Comment:

Assistant Operations Manager Comment:

RWIC Comment:

Requestor Comment:

[REDACTED]

Delays

Figure 9 - GOTRS request for the RWIC page 6 of 6.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	202515303243	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/28/2025 00:30 to: 08/28/2025 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PICO\ATOC	In Piggyback:	Yes, Junior
Tag #:	Closed (2025240708-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station		

Location, Work Type and Description

Location:	Mainline		
Non-Wayside Location Type:			
Request Type:	Regular		
Charge Job Number:	FQ19021-25-002		
Contract Number:	0170_07		
Maximo Work Order:			
Request Group:	No		
Location Description:	Mezzanine Level		
Request Description:	SUN night into MON morn - GPR Scan of wall over tracks		Mon Night into Fri Morn
	Install scaffolding		
Work Type:	Breakers (A/C-D/C)		
Meeting Location:	Main Entrance near Kiosk		
PB Meeting Location:			
Tools and Equipment:			
Equipment on Track:			

	Track 1		Track 2	
Actual Work Area:	F182+34	F188+34	Actual Work Area:	F182+34 F188+34
Protected Work Area:	F177+34	F193+34	Protected Work Area:	F177+34 F193+34

Hot Stick Info. Third Rail Gaps:

From	To	Track ID
F145+49	F191+67	1
F192+23	F248+84	1
F249+12	F249+92	1
F250+20	F301+86	1
F144+83	F189+00	2
F189+32	F248+84	2

As of 08/28/2025 12:10
1 of 4

Figure 10 - GOTRS request for the PICO TRST page 1 of 4.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM

Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	202515303243	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/28/2025 00:30 to: 08/28/2025 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PICO/ATOC	In Piggyback:	Yes, Junior
Tag #:	Closed (2025240708-5)	Power Outage:	Supervisory MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	

Request Title: MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station

F249+12	F249+92	2
F250+20	F301+86	2

Date & Time

Start: 08/28/2025 00:30 **End:** 08/28/2025 04:30

Contacts

Entered by

[REDACTED]

Work: [REDACTED]

Cell: **Home:**

Requestor

[REDACTED]

Work: [REDACTED]

Cell: **Home:**

WMATA Manager

[REDACTED]

Work: [REDACTED]

Cell: [REDACTED] **Home:** [REDACTED]

Emergency Contact

[REDACTED]

Work: [REDACTED]

Cell: [REDACTED] **Home:** [REDACTED]

Support

SUPPORT GROUP	Crew Size
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TRST/TRACK	2
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ESCORT GROUP	Crew Size
---------------------	------------------

POWER/REGION	2
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Request Change History

Date	Event
08/04/2025 03:34	Request was replicated from Request 202515303239.
08/11/2025 14:21	Request status was changed to Approved
08/28/2025 02:14	Work Prep was completed.

As of 08/28/2025 12:10
2 of 4

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM

Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	202515303243	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/28/2025 00:30 to: 08/28/2025 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PICO(ATOC)	In Piggyback:	Yes, Junior
Tag #:	Closed (2025240708-S)	Power Outage:	Supervisory MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station		

Request Change History

Date	Event
08/28/2025 03:52	Request status was changed to Opened
08/28/2025 06:12	Request status was changed to Closed

Request Group

Request Number	Description
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Piggyback

Request Number	Order	Inherits Rights	Request Status	Piggyback Status	Track	Protected Area Start	Protected Area End
202507203000 F06 ANACOSTIA FF-6 FIRE LINE TESTING	SR	N/A	Closed	Forced	1	F177+34	F255+70
202507203000 F06 ANACOSTIA FF-6 FIRE LINE TESTING	SR	N/A	Closed	Forced	2	F177+34	F255+70
202515303243 MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station	JR-0	Yes	Closed	Forced	2	F177+34	F193+34
202515303243 MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station	JR-0	Yes	Closed	Forced	1	F177+34	F193+34
202521805600 STMN(South) F06 Crown Concrete Delamination Repair Trk 2	JR-1	Yes	Closed	Forced	2	F178+00	F200+00

Piggyback History

Date	User	Event
08/11/2025 13:17		Piggyback with Senior Request 202507203000 was formed. Cause: Piggyback was forced.

Comments

By	On	Comment
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As of 08/28/2025 12:10
3 of 4

Figure 12 - GOTRS request for the PICO TRST page 3 of 4.

GOTRS - GENERAL ORDERS & TRACK RIGHTS SYSTEM

Track Rights Request

Request Summary

Request Number:	202515303243	Track Access:	True
Dates Requested:	08/28/2025 00:30 to: 08/28/2025 04:30	Clear In Ten:	False
Request Status:	Closed	Equipment on Track:	0
Requestor:	[REDACTED]	Allow Piggybacks:	True
Requestor Organization:	PICO/ATOC	In Piggyback:	Yes, Junior
Tag #:	Closed (2025240708-S)	Power Outage:	Supervisory MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station
Lock Out / Tag Out:		Additional AC:	
Request Title:	MATOC SUPERVISORY F06 Anacostia Station		

Comments

[REDACTED] 6/2/2025 10:40:49 PM SUN night into MON morn - GPR Scan of wall over tracks
Mon Night into Fri Morn Install scaffolding

Close-Out Summary

Appendix C – Maximo Work Order



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 1
MXAZP

Work Order #: 19775048
Type: LM

Status: CLOSE
09/03/2025 06:51

19775048

Work Description: Safety Request Radio operational Test between F06 & F07 Tracks 1 &2, Extend test to OPS#3
Job Plan Description:

Work Information			
Asset: 60062	RADIO, CRCS, F06	Owning Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO	Parent:
Asset Tag:		Maintenance Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO	Create Date: 08/28/2025 20:40
Asset S/N: CRCSFD6		Labor Group: COMM3RADO	Actual Start: 08/29/2025 13:31
Location: 7671	F06, ANACOSTIA, STATION, PLATFORM, ROOM 111, LOUNGE	Crew:	Actual Comp: 08/29/2025 13:31
Work Location:		Lead: E014105	Item: N60040084
Failure Class: COMR004	CRCS TUNNEL EQUIPMENT	GL Account: WMATA-02-33540-50499280-042-*****-OPR**	Target Start:
Problem Code:		Supervisor:	Target Comp:
Requested By: 55385		Requestor Phone: [REDACTED]	Scheduled Start:
Create-Mileage: 0.0		Complete-Mileage: 0.0	

Task IDs

Task ID

10 Operational Test between F06 & F07 Tracks 1 &2
Operational Test performed between F06 & F07 Tracks 1 &2 with 3150, then Extended test to OPS#3.
Test were loud and clear.

Component:	Work Accomp:	Reason:	Status:	Position:	Warranty?:
20	Field Support		CLOSE		N

Component:	Work Accomp:	Reason:	Status:	Position:	Warranty?:
			CLOSE		N

Actual Labor

Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	08/29/2025	08/29/2025	08:00	10:00	Y	02:00	00:00	\$107.22
20	[REDACTED]	08/30/2025	08/30/2025	12:00	14:00	Y	02:00	00:00	\$102.73
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							04:00	00:00	\$209.95

Failure Reporting

Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark Date
			08/29/2025

Remarks: Test were loud and clear. Extended to OPS 3.
WT_plus_woprnt.rptdesign 09/8/2025 13:20

Figure 14 - Maximo Work Order # 19775048.



**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Incident Details**

Incident #: 8948643

Status: RESOLVED

Incident Summary: MICC Radio Controller gave an absolute block to a RMM through a RWIC's work location while under ETO protection, resulting in a near miss. Incident Start: 08/28/25 01:22:00

Incident Details

Detail:

Asset:		Rail Line:	GRN	Line Delay:	0
Location:		Jurisdiction:		Passenger Delay:	0
Train ID:	1:22:00 AM	Injuries??:	N	Train / Bus Delay:	0
Direction:		#9#??:	N	Partial:	0
Report Location:		Mode of Operation:		Offload:	0
Station Location:	FD6 ANACOSTIA STATION	# of Cars in Consist:		Late Dispatch:	0
Regional ID:		Originating OCC:	ROCC	No Dispatch:	0
Trouble Code:	RWPV RWP VIOLATION	Created By:	[REDACTED]	Trips Lost:	0
Responsibility Code:	OCC CENTRAL CONTROL	Created Date:	08/28/25 01:45:52	Reroutes:	0
Mileage:		Status Date:	08/28/25 02:26:05	Abandoned:	0

Operator Miscellaneous

Operator:	[REDACTED]	Block #:		Route:		Road Call??:	N
Division:		Run:		Destination:		Change Off??:	N

Figure 15 - Maximo incident details.

Appendix D – Scene Photographs (CCTV Images)




Figure 16 Screenshot from PM46's front camera as PM46 approaches and enters the work limits.




Figure 17 Screenshot from PM46's front camera of PM46 passing the first roadway worker.



Figure 18 Screenshot from PM46's front camera of PM46 passing the second roadway worker in a place of safety.



Figure 19 Screenshot from PM46's front camera of PM46 entering Anacostia Station.



Figure 20 Screenshot from PM46's front camera of PM46 passing roadway workers at approximately 800 feet outbound of the Anacostia Station platform.

Appendix E – Why-Tree Analysis




Figure 21 - Why Tree Analysis.