



## **W-0428 Collision at NoMa- Gallaudet U Station – August 20, 2025**

### **Document Purpose**

*This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on June 9, 2026.*

*WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.*

### **Safety event summary:**

On August 20, 2025 at approximately 11:17 a.m. a person entered the roadway and was struck by Train 131 after intentionally placing themselves in the path of the oncoming train as it entered the platform at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station. The individual jumped onto the roadway and attempted to jump out of the path of the train. This individual was not able to remove themselves from the path of the train, in time. The Train Operator of Train 131, operating in Automatic Train Operations (ATO), depressed the ATO Stop pushbutton. However, the train operator did not engage the Emergency Stop pushbutton, which is a requirement under the Metrorail Operating Rulebook. All concerned personnel were notified and dispatched to the scene, and the rail operations control center initiated third rail power de-energization. A rail operations supervisor was given permission to enter the roadway to hot stick the third rail at 11:27a.m. Approximately 5 minutes later, the rail operations supervisor confirmed that the third rail was de-energized.

At 11:24 a.m., the Metro Transit Police Department confirmed the trespasser was alive and located on the ballast between WMATA and Amtrak tracks. At 11:34 a.m. DCFEMS moved the trespasser from the roadway onto the train until they were transported to a hospital, with injuries to their head.

Initially, there was confusion regarding a nearby dead track that was unmarked and was equipped with a third rail. This confusion lead to uncertainty whether it belonged to WMATA or Amtrak. DCFEMS requested that power be deenergized on track 2, but Metro 1 denied the request pending MTPD authorization. It was later determined that DEFEMS was requesting third rail power to be de-energized on non-revenue tracks adjacent to NoMa-Gallaudet Station.

Rail operations between Judiciary Square and Rhode Island Avenue Stations were suspended for approximately 6 minutes due to a delay in notification from the Incident Commander to Police 1 that the trespasser had been removed. Third rail power was reenergized on track 2, allowing single-tracking operations between NoMa-Gallaudet U and Rhode Island Avenue



Stations. Third rail power was restored on track 1 after scene clearance, and Train 131 was transported non-revenue to Brentwood Rail Yard.

In adherence to Rail Transportation Standard Operating Procedures, the train operator was removed from service for involvement in an operational safety event. Train 131 was removed from service for Incident Investigations Team investigation procedures. The train operator attended refresher training focused on the emergency stop procedures. As a corrective action, the Metrorail Emergency Response Map has been updated to reflect that the 3rd track is abandoned and not energized.

The probable cause of the Collision at the NoMa-Gallaudet U Station event was an intentional unauthorized entry onto the roadway by the individual, resulting in the person being struck by train 131. Contributing factors include delayed confirmation of third rail power de-energization, and the Train Operator's incomplete execution of emergency braking procedures.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety  
Office of Safety Investigations

**FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E251404**

<b>Date of Event:</b>	August 20, 2025
<b>Type of Event:</b>	A-3: Collision
<b>Incident Time:</b>	11:17 Hours
<b>Location:</b>	NoMa-Gallaudet U Station, Track 1
<b>Time and How received by Safety:</b>	11:17 Hours Safety Information Official (SIO)
<b>Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:</b>	12:27 Hours
<b>Responding Safety Officers:</b>	None
<b>Rail Vehicle:</b>	Train ID 131 (L3122x23-3173x72-3011x10-3059x58T)
<b>Injuries:</b>	Trespasser with a head injury.
<b>Damage:</b>	None
<b>Emergency Responders:</b>	Emergency Response Team (ERT), Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), and District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Services (DCFEMS)
<b>Safety Universal Data System (SUDS I/A) Number</b>	20250820#129495MX

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E251404

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Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

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# NoMa-Gallaudet U – Collision

August 20, 2025

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AIMS</b>	Advanced Information Management System
<b>ARS</b>	Audio Recording System
<b>ATO</b>	Automatic Train Operations
<b>CAP</b>	Corrective Action Plan
<b>CCTV</b>	Closed-Circuit Television
<b>CMNT</b>	Office of Car Maintenance
<b>CMOR</b>	Office of the Chief Fleet Officer
<b>DCFEMS</b>	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
<b>FLO</b>	Fire Liaison Officer
<b>FT</b>	Foul Time
<b>IC</b>	Incident Commander
<b>IIT</b>	Incident Investigation Team
<b>I/A</b>	Incidents/Accidents
<b>MICC</b>	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
<b>MOR</b>	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
<b>MTPD</b>	Metro Transit Police Department
<b>NIMS</b>	National Incident Management System
<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
<b>RTC</b>	Rail Traffic Controller
<b>RTRA</b>	Office of Rail Transportation
<b>RVO</b>	Rail Vehicle Operator
<b>SAFE</b>	Department of Safety

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<b>SPOTS</b>	System Performance On-Time Summary
<b>SUDS</b>	Safety Universal Data System
<b>VMDS</b>	Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System
<b>WMATA</b>	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
<b>WMSC</b>	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

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**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

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**Executive Summary**

*\*Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. \**

On Wednesday, August 20, 2025, at 11:17 hours, the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) received a report from the Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) of Train ID 131 that a person had been struck by the train at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station on Track 1. Train ID 131, operating in Automatic Train Operations (ATO) Mode, entered the station when the trespasser, seen sitting on the platform by the RVO, jumped into the roadway and was struck. The RVO pressed the ATO Stop pushbutton but did not engage the Emergency Stop pushbutton (emergency mushroom), which is required under Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) 9.5.

The District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Service (DCFEMS), Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), the Emergency Response Team (ERT), and a Rail Operations Supervisor (ROS) were contacted to respond to the scene, and third rail power de-energization was initiated on Track 1 at 11:18 hours. At 11:24 hours, MTPD located the trespasser on the ballast between WMATA and Amtrak tracks, conscious with visible head trauma. The ROS that was already at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station was given permission to hot stick and confirmed third rail power was de-energized on Track 1 at 11:31 hours. DCFEMS removed the trespasser by hoisting them on the train via the train doors from the roadway at 11:34 hours and placed them aboard car 3173 while awaiting medical transport. At 11:38 hours, DCFEMS relinquished command, and the trespasser was transported to Medstar Hospital by Medic 21.

The Fire Liaison Officer (FLO) served as the communication bridge between MICC personnel and Fire Department responders, relaying information on power status, train movement, and scene updates. They had access to AIMS, power, and fire maps, which aided in coordination and situational awareness throughout the response. Initially, confusion arose over a nearby dead track that was unmarked but contained a third rail, leading to uncertainty over whether it belonged to WMATA or Amtrak. DCFEMS requested that power and train traffic be stopped on Track 2 for safety and to reduce noise during the rescue, but Metro 1 denied the request pending MTPD authorization. As a result, DCFEMS conducted the rescue through the train, selecting the least hazardous approach given the operational constraints.

The FLO described the MICC as crowded and noisy, with overlapping communications and multiple supervisors providing conflicting input, which complicated coordination efforts. Upon arrival, DCFEMS established incident command and at 11:29 hours, transitioned to a formal command post when Battalion 6 arrived. The FLO explained that during immediate rescue operations, tactical and strategic command takes precedence over unified command to ensure life safety. The delay in power removal and overall command confusion were attributed to unclear authority between WMATA, DCFEMS, and MTPD. Following the incident, the FLO submitted an update request for the mapping systems to clearly mark the dead track and recommended policy clarification regarding power removal authority and command hierarchy to prevent future delays and confusion.

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Rail operations between Judiciary Square and Rhode Island Avenue were suspended starting at 11:34 hours because the Command Post was unaware that the trespasser had already been removed from the roadway. The Incident Commander requested that third rail power be de-energized on Tracks 1 and 2. Once confirmed clear of personnel, third rail power on Track 2 was restored at 11:44 hours, and single-tracking operations began between NoMa-Gallaudet U and Rhode Island Avenue Stations with trains being turned at strategic locations while the Road Mechanic (RM) inspected Train ID 131. Third rail power on Track 1 was restored at 12:28 hours after scene clearance, and normal service resumed. Train ID 131 was then moved to Brentwood Rail Yard.

The investigation identified several procedural concerns, specifically delayed third rail de-energization confirmation and incomplete execution of emergency braking procedures by the RVO. Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) footage and ROS reports support that the trespasser's actions were intentional. ROS personnel on scene assisted with safety protocols, trespasser rescue, scene coordination, and train movement. Additional ROS personnel were dispatched to manage single-tracking operations and to assist in relocating the incident train.

In adherence to Rail Transportation Standard Operating Procedure 102-01-02, which outlines the protocol for removing an employee from service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio RTC dispatched an ROS to relieve the RVO from duty for post-incident testing.

In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Rail, Standard Operating Procedure 102.04, and Operations Administrative Policy 102.06, the MICC initiated the removal of Train ID 131 from service for Incident Investigations Team (IIT) investigation procedures.


There were injuries to the trespasser's head reported because of this event, but no damage to the train or track infrastructure was reported.

The probable cause of the Collision at the NoMa-Gallaudet U Station event on August 20, 2025, was an intentional unauthorized entry onto the roadway by the trespasser, resulting in the trespasser being struck by Train ID 131. CCTV evidence supports that the trespasser deliberately placed themselves in the train's path and attempted to evade the train but was unable to do so. Contributing factors included delayed confirmation of third rail power de-energization due to unclear authority between WMATA, DCFEMS, and MTPD, and the RVO's incomplete execution of emergency braking procedures, as the Emergency Stop pushbutton was not engaged in accordance with the Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) 9.5.

## Incident Site

NoMa-Gallaudet U Station is a common corridor above-ground station with a center platform and direct fixation tracks. There is an interlocking on the inbound end of the station and turnbacks at both ends of the station. This station is located inbound outside of Brentwood Rail Yard and adjacent to CSX tracks.

## Field Sketch/Schematics



*\*Image Not to Scale. The star indicates where the person was located.*

## Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

## Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through video and document review.
- Formal Interviews – Safety interviewed one individual as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Safety interviewed the following individual:
  - Fire Liaison Officer (FLO)

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- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
  - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
  - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
  - RVO Employee Training Procedures & Records
  - RVO Employee Certification Records
  - RVO 30-Day Work History
  - Rail Transportation – Investigation Data
  - Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
  - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
  - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
  - System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)
  - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

## **Investigation**

On Wednesday, August 20, 2025, at 11:17 hours, the MICC received a report of a Collision from the RVO of Train ID 131 L3122x23-3173x72-3011x10-3059x58 at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station on Track 1. Train ID 131 was operating in ATO Mode at the time of the incident.

The CCTV footage revealed that at 11:17 hours, Train ID 131 entered the platform at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station. It then showed the trespasser jumping from the platform onto the roadway, jumping again in the roadway, and then attempting to jump out of the path of the train onto the ballast, but was unable to move in time.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) playback indicated that at 11:18 hours, third rail power de-energization was initialized at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station on Track 1. At 11:24 hours, MTPD confirmed the trespasser was alive, in a seated position, and located on the ballast between WMATA and Amtrak tracks. At 11:34 hours, DCFEMS removed the trespasser from the roadway by hoisting them onto the train through the train doors and placed them aboard car 3173 of Train ID 131 to wait for a stretcher to transport them to the hospital.

Rail operations were suspended between Judiciary Square and Rhode Island Avenue Stations beginning at 11:34 hours because the Command Post was not aware that the trespasser had been removed from the roadway. The Incident Commander requested that third rail power be de-energized on Tracks 1 and 2. Once it was confirmed that no personnel were on the roadway on Track 2, third rail power was restored at 11:44 hours, and single-tracking operations began between Union Station and Rhode Island Avenue Stations. Third rail power was restored on track

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1 at 12:28 hours, and normal service resumed. Train ID 131 was transported to Brentwood Rail Yard.

The investigation revealed that emergency response was initiated immediately. MTPD, DCFEMS, and a Road Mechanic (RM) were dispatched to the scene. The Allied Security Officer and the ROS #1 were already at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station before this event. Third rail power on Track 1 was de-energized. The trespasser was located by MTPD between WMATA and Amtrak's tracks, conscious and moving, with visible head injuries. ROS #1 hot stick and confirmed third rail power was de-energized on Track 1. The trespasser was removed from the tracks and transported to the platform by DCFEMS. DCFEMS relinquished command, and the person was subsequently transported to Medstar Hospital by Medic 21.

According to the formal interview with the FLO, they served as the communication bridge between MICC personnel and Fire Department responders, relaying information on power status, train movement, and scene updates. They had access to AIMS, power, and fire maps, which aided in coordination and situational awareness throughout the response. Initially, confusion arose over a nearby dead track that was unmarked but contained a third rail, leading to uncertainty over whether it belonged to WMATA or Amtrak. DCFEMS requested that power and train traffic be stopped on Track 2 for safety and to reduce noise during the rescue, but Metro 1 denied the request pending MTPD authorization. The request was denied because the trespasser was on track 1, and the MICC wanted the Incident Commander to request de-energizing the third-rail power on track 2. It was later determined that DEFEMS was requesting third rail power be de-energized on non-revenue tracks adjacent to NoMa-Gallaudet Station. As a result, DCFEMS conducted the rescue through the train, selecting the least hazardous approach given the operational constraints.




Image 1 – Image of the inactive track located between NoMa Station and Amtrak.

The FLO described the MICC as crowded and noisy, with overlapping communications and multiple supervisors providing conflicting input, which complicated coordination efforts. Upon arrival, DCFEMS established incident command and at 11:29 hours, transitioned to a formal command post when Battalion 6 arrived. The FLO explained that during immediate rescue operations, tactical and strategic command takes precedence over unified command to ensure life safety. The delay in power removal and overall command confusion were attributed to unclear

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authority between WMATA, DCFEMS, and MTPD. Following the incident, the FLO submitted an update request for the mapping systems to clearly mark the dead track and recommended policy clarification regarding power removal authority and command hierarchy to prevent future delays and confusion.

The investigation also revealed some procedural concerns, primarily regarding the confirmation of third rail power de-energization and the RVO's partial execution of the ATO Stop procedure during an emergency. Although the RVO reported pressing the ATO Stop pushbutton, ROS #5 reported that the full stop process was not completed before impact because the RVO did not depress the Emergency Stop pushbutton (emergency mushroom) as per the Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) 9.5.

The Department of Rail Transportation Investigation identified that there was a report "at approximately 11:18, the RVO, while operating ID 131, witnessed a person on the roadway as they entered the platform NOMA Gallaudet station Track #1. The trespasser attempted to return to the platform, at which time the train made contact with the individual. MICC was notified of the incident, and all required notifications were made. A ground walkaround was conducted by the ROS. It was determined that there were signs of life for the person struck. The Operator was interviewed by MTPD on scene, then transported for post-incident testing." The RVO was offered EAP and accepted. They are still out on leave at this time.

According to the WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report of the RVO, they observed the trespasser sitting on the platform as the train entered NoMa-Gallaudet U Station on Track 1 and stated that they depressed the ATO Stop pushbutton upon noticing the person's actions. The trespasser jumped into the roadway and contact was made. They reported that they applied the handbrake after impact, cleared the train of customers with the help of ROS #1, who was already at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station, and remained aboard the lead car until released for post-incident testing.

According to the RTRA Supervisor's Reports of the ROSs involved, ROS #1 on scene confirmed that emergency protocols were followed, including de-energization verification, trespasser evacuation, and scene coordination with MTPD and DCFEMS. ROS #2 was dispatched to Rhode Island Avenue Station to assist with single-tracking operations. ROS #3 was instructed to respond to NoMa-Gallaudet U Station at the Command Post by the kiosk, but did not acknowledge those instructions and responded to Rhode Island Avenue Station according to an email that they received. ROS #4 and #5 reported to NoMa-Gallaudet Station at 12:12 hours to assist ROS #1 with moving Train ID 131 to the Brentwood Rail Yard. ROS #4 documented in their report that the person intentionally jumped onto the roadway and attempted to evade the train before being struck.

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## Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
11:17:48 hours	Train ID 131 entered the platform at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station in Automatic Mode. [SPOTS]
11:17:58 hours	<u>RVO of Train ID 131</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that a person was struck by a train. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the transmission and instructed the RVO to key down and perform a radio check with their handheld. [Radio OPS 1]
11:18:25 hours	<u>Police 1</u> : Dispatched multiple units to NoMa-Gallaudet U Station for a person struck by a train. <u>Allied Security</u> : Confirmed a person was struck by the train and informed Police 1 that the person was not under the train but was knocked onto the side, and the train was blocking him. It was also confirmed that the person placed themselves in front of the train. [MTPD-1X_3135]
11:18:33 hours	Third rail power was de-energized. *There seemed to be a contact rail at this location, and the entire track 1 did not appear to be de-energized. [AIMS]
11:19:03 hours	<u>ROS #1</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that they were on the platform at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the ROS to assist the RVO of Train ID 131 with off-loading the train and applying the handbrakes because third rail power was de-energized. [Radio OPS 1]
11:19:35 hours	<u>Rail 2</u> : Contacted DCFEMS to report that a person was struck by a train at Noma-Gallaudet Station. [Rail 2 Phone]
11:19:36 hours	<u>OM</u> : Notified the SIO that a person was struck by a train at NoMa Station. [Phone]
11:20:02 hours	<u>SIO</u> : Contacted the SDOC to inform them of the person struck at Noma Station.
11:22:28 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ROS #2 to report to the Rhode Island Ave Station to assist with single-tracking operations between Union Station and Rhode Island Avenue Stations by way of track 2. <u>ROS #2</u> : Acknowledged the message. [Radio OPS 1]
11:22:31 hours	<u>Metro 1</u> : Provided the MICC Director with a status update and confirmed power was down on track 1. [Radio]
11:23:14 hours	<u>Police 1</u> : Contacted Rail 1 to inquire if a ground walkaround was completed and if it was safe for single-track operations on track 2 between Union Station and Rhode Island Avenue Stations. <u>Rail 1</u> : Informed them that ROS #1 was performing the ground walkaround, and it was safe for single tracking between Union Station and Rhode Island Avenue Stations by way of Track 2. [Phone]
11:24:12 hours	<u>RVO of Train ID 131</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that MTPD and the National Guard were requesting to go to the roadway to locate the person on the opposite side of the train. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested ROS #1 to go to the roadway to check for signs of life if they felt comfortable.

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Time	Description
	<u>ROS #1</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that they were on the trailing end of Train ID 131 and wanted to verify that there were no customers on the cars that were off the platform, then they would report to MTPD. [Radio OPS 1]
11:24:57 hours	<u>Police Unit Adam 6</u> : Informed MTPD Dispatch that they located the trespasser between WMATA's tracks and Amtrak's tracks in the gravel with blood on their head, but the person was moving and appeared to be alert. [MTPD-1X 3135]
11:24:59 hours	<u>Police 1</u> : Contacted Rail 1 to inquire if third rail power was confirmed de-energized. <u>Rail 1</u> : Advised not yet. [Phone]
11:25:58 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ROS #1 to disregard checking the train and head to meet DCFEMS to go to the roadway to check for signs of life. <u>ROS #1</u> : Acknowledged the message. <u>RVO of Train ID 131</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that the handbrake was applied to the train, and the person struck was showing signs of life. [Radio OPS 1]
11:26:36 hours	<u>Police 1</u> : Informed MTPD Dispatch that third rail power was de-energized. [MTPD-1X 3135]
11:27:03 hours	<u>Rail 1</u> : Reported to SIO that the person was alive with a laceration to the head, and they were located between WMATA's tracks and CSX tracks, and there would be single tracking in that location. [Phone]
11:27:20 hours	<u>Rail 1</u> : Contacted Police 1 to inform them that there were signs of life. <u>Police 1</u> : Inquired if anyone had hot stick and confirmed third rail power was de-energized. <u>Rail 1</u> : Informed Police 1 that they still have not confirmed that third rail power was de-energized. [Phone]
11:27:38 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted ROS #1 Foul Time (FT) to hot stick and confirm that third rail power was de-energized. <u>ROS #1</u> : Acknowledged the message and informed the Radio RTC that the person was sitting up on the ballast and there were signs of life. [Radio OPS 1]
11:28:49 hours	<u>SIO</u> : Contacted Rail 1 to inquire if the incident command post was established. <u>Rail 1</u> : Informed the SIO that the incident command post had not been established yet. [Phone]
11:29:32 hours	<u>Rail 1</u> : Informed the SIO that Battalion 6 was the incident commander located outside of the station and had command. [Phone]
11:30:50 hours	Train ID 133 was the first train to crossover from track 1 to track 2 for single tracking operations. [AIMS]
11:30:57 hours	<u>Police 1</u> : Contacted Rail 1 to inform them that DCFEMS wanted power down on the other side, but was trying to confirm with the FLO. <u>Rail 1</u> : Informed them that the incident was on Track 1 and questioned why they wanted the power down on Track 2. <u>Police 1</u> : Stated that it was what the FLO was reporting.

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Time	Description
	<p>Asked if there were any other WMATA personnel on scene besides the Rail Supervisor.</p> <p><u>Rail 1</u>: Reported that it was only the ROS, Station Manager, and RVO, but OPS 2 was sending someone.</p> <p><u>Police 1</u>: Asked if the third rail power was down.</p> <p><u>Rail 1</u>: Confirmed third rail power was de-energized. [Phone]</p>
11:31:37 hours	<p><u>Cruiser 7</u>: Assumed command at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station and informed <u>Police 1</u> that the person was alert.</p> <p><u>Police 1</u>: Informed <u>Cruiser 7</u> that DCFEMS was requesting third rail power down on track 2.</p> <p><u>Cruiser 7</u>: Reported that the person was between the two tracks and recommended that third rail power be de-energized on both tracks.</p> <p><u>Police 1</u>: Informed <u>Cruiser 7</u> that they needed confirmation and to stand by because they needed to clear trains in that area. [MTPD-1X_3135]</p>
11:31:38 hours	<p><u>ROS #1</u>: Confirmed third rail power de-energized at CM B1 109+00.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged the message. [Radio OPS 1]</p>
11:32:06 hours	<p><u>Police 1</u>: Informed <u>Rail 1</u> that DEFEMS wanted power down on track 2.</p> <p><u>Rail 1</u>: Asked if they could have Train ID 135 clear the area before the power was de-energized.</p> <p><u>Police 1</u>: Confirmed Train ID 135 could go through the area but shut it down afterwards. [Phone]</p>
11:34:07 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u> made a blanket announcement that service would be suspended between Judiciary Square and Rhode Island Avenue Stations. [Radio OPS 1]</p>
11:34:40 hours	<p><u>Cruiser 114</u>: Reported to the command post that the person was removed from the tracks and on car 3173, awaiting the stretcher. [MTPD-1X_3135]</p>
11:35:00 hours	<p>Train ID 135 serviced Noma Station and departed. [AIMS]</p>
11:35:23 hours	<p><u>SIO</u>: Contacted the WMSC to report that a person was struck by a train at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station.</p> <p><u>WMSC</u>: Provided an event scene release time. [Phone]</p>
11:37:13 hours	<p><u>Cruiser 114</u>: Informed <u>Police 1</u> to stand by before removing power on track 2 because the person was removed from the station.</p>
11:38:32 hours	<p>Third rail power was de-energized on track 2. *There's a contact rail at this location, and track 2 did not appear to be completely de-energized. [AIMS]</p>
11:38:48 hours	<p><u>Cruiser 7</u>: Reported from the Incident Command that the person was removed from the track, and the Battalion requested the next train to hold so the person could be removed from the station.</p> <p><u>Police 1</u>: Informed <u>Cruiser 7</u> that they watched the trespasser be removed from the station via CCTV, and they should be able to begin single tracking. [MTPD-1X_3135]</p>
11:40:14 hours	<p><u>Cruiser 7</u>: Requested an ROS to report to the Command Post.</p> <p><u>Police 1</u>: Inquired if single tracking could begin.</p> <p><u>Cruiser 7</u>: Confirmed single could begin. [MTPD-1X_3135]</p>
11:40:51 hours	<p><u>Police 1</u>: Informed the SIO that the person was removed from the station, and single-tracking operations could resume. [Phone]</p>

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Time	Description
11:41:32 hours	<u>Police 1</u> : Advised Rail 1 that power was being re-energized on track 2, and they could resume single tracking on track 2. [Phone]
11:42:09 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked ROS #1 to go to track 2 to verify that there were no personnel or equipment on the roadway. <u>ROS #1</u> : Acknowledged the message. [Radio OPS 1]
11:42:32 hours	<u>Police 1</u> : Requested confirmation from Cruiser 7 that all personnel were clear of track 2 before third rail power was restored. <u>Cruiser 7</u> : Confirmed track 2 was clear. [MTPD-1X_3135]
11:44:11 hours	<u>ROS #1</u> : Confirmed with Radio RTC that NoMa-Gallaudet U track 2 was clear. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message and made the announcement for third rail power to be restored on track 2 at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station. [Radio OPS 1]
11:44:32 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Made blanket announcements that third rail power was being re-energized at Noma Station on track 2. [Radio]
11:47:57 hours	<u>Cruiser 7</u> : Command turned over to MTPD; also, POWR and ERT were at the scene, but they were still waiting for an ROS. [MTPD-1X_3135]
11:48:38 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ROS #1 to report to the command post to meet with Cruiser 7. [Radio OPS 1]
11:54:17 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked for ROS #1's location. <u>ROS #1</u> : Informed them that they were instructed to stand by with the RVO. [Radio OPS 1]
11:54:50 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ROS #3 to exit the train at NoMa and report to the command post at the kiosk. <u>ROS #3</u> : No Response. [Radio OPS 1]
11:55:22 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked ROS #3 if they copied their last message. <u>ROS #3</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that they exited the train at Rhode Island Avenue Station as per the email. [Radio OPS 1]
11:59:14 hours	<u>Police 1</u> : Informed SIO that command was turned over to Cruiser 7, but they didn't document the time. [Phone]
12:01:33 hours	<u>FLO</u> : Informed SIO that the person was transported to Medstar Hospital by Medic 21, and DCFEMS relinquished command at 11:38 hours. [Phone]
12:10:16 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Confirmed CMNT was en route to NoMa-Gallaudet U Station and requested a landline. <u>RM</u> : Confirmed the message. [Radio OPS 1]
12:17:45 hours	<u>ROS #4</u> : Asked the Radio RTC if an RM would be riding with Train ID 131. <u>RM</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that they were instructed to report to the kiosk. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and requested a landline from ROS #4. [Radio OPS 1]
12:21:56 hours	<u>ROS #4</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that the RM was on the scene. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked if the scene was released by the IC. <u>Command 91</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that the RM was there and verified Train ID 131 was a good train. [Radio OPS 1]
12:23:18 hours	<u>Command 91</u> : Requested that third rail power be restored on track 1. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message. [Radio OPS 1]

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Time	Description
12:24:30 hours	The Radio RTC made announcements to restore third rail power on track 1. <u>Command 91</u> : Acknowledged the message. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Informed them that power was still de-energized, but the POWR Department was working on re-energizing the power. [Radio OPS 1] <i>*Note, calls were being made by the Button RTC to notify all OPS of third rail power being de-energized at that time.</i>
12:27:12 hours	<u>RM</u> : Requested permission to walk around the train on track 1. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed RM to stand by and contact the command for a scene release. [Radio OPS 1]
12:27:26 hours	Third rail power was restored at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station on Track 1. [AIM]
12:28:20 hours	Third rail power was restored at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station on track 1. [Radio OPS 1]

*\*\*Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources.*

### Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 1 - Shows energized third rail sections at Noma Station, track 1.

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


Figure 2 – The third rail within the platform limits was showing de-energized.




Figure 3 - Shows when third rail power was de-energized on track 2.

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


Figure 4 - Shows when third rail power was re-energized on track 2.

## System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)

# ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Sun Aug 31 13:00:31 2025

Select Platform:  and/or Select ID:  Leave blank to remove criteria  
 Select Date:    Select Times (0-24HRS): From  To

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwel	Left door open	Left door close	dwel	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	Headway (door open to door open) door open to door open
<a href="#">125</a>	B35-1	6	13				11:02:19	11:02:46	27	11:01:48	11:03:12	-
<a href="#">127</a>	B35-1	6	13				11:11:20	11:11:36	16	11:10:51	11:11:57	9:01
<a href="#">129</a>	B35-1	8	13				11:14:07	11:14:24	17	11:13:36	11:14:50	2:47
<a href="#">731</a>	B35-1	8	13				11:22:07	12:42:14	4807	11:17:48	12:43:39	8:00

Figure 5 - Shows the head of Train ID entering the platform of NoMa-Gallaudet U Station at 11:17:48 hours.

## Operations

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## Rail Transportation

*Adopted from the Rail Transportation Managerial Investigation report with minor formatting and grammatical edits:*

Based on the Department of Rail Transportation Investigation data, it was reported that “at approximately 11:18, the RVO, while operating ID 131, witnessed a person on the roadway as they entered the platform NOMA Gallaudet station Track #1. The trespasser attempted to return to the platform, at which time the train made contact with the individual. MICC was notified of the incident, and all required notifications were made. A ground walkaround was conducted by the ROS. It was determined that there were signs of life for the person struck. The Operator was interviewed by MTPD on scene, then transported for post-incident testing.” The RVO was offered EAP and accepted. They are still out on leave at this time.

According to the employee’s statement, the RVO reported that “I was on ID 131 traveling to Glenmont when the train entered the station, a black male sat down on the platform. I then hit ATO Stop. The customer then jumped all the way to the roadway then the train made contact with the customer. I then called Central Control, and the supervisor arrived. I put a handbrake on, then we cleared the train.”

The RVO was removed from service and transported for post-incident testing. The Operator was offered EAP and accepted.

## Fleet

*Adopted from the CENV report with minor formatting and grammatical edits:*

Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data

The data for this incident was downloaded and analyzed by a CENV Engineer. Please find below the VMS data analysis for the incident: Person Struck by Train – NoMa-Gallaudet U 8/20/2025. Train ID 131, Lead car 3122, was operating in ATO during the incident.

<b>Time</b>	<b>Description of Events</b>
11:27:11 hours	ID 131 departed B03-1(Union Station) in ATO, 50 mph Regulated Speed, P5 command issued.
11:27:23 hours	The train has reached 34 mph, Speed Command dropped out, and B4 command issued.
11:27:30 hours	Train picked up F1-F9 Generating PSS, 40mph Regulated Speed, 23 mph Actual Speed, P5 command issued.
11:28:01 hours	Train picked up F2-F8, 35 mph Regulated Speed, 58 mph Station Stop Profile Speed, 34 mph Actual Speed.
11:28:18 hours	Train enters B35-1 (NoMa-Gallaudet U), 35 mph Regulated Speed, 38 mph Station Stop Profile Speed, 33 mph Actual Speed.
11:28:18 hours	At about 23 feet into the platform, the Road horn is activated 7 times.
11:28:20 hours	At about 121 feet into the platform, end-of-road horn activation.
11:28:21 hours	At about 160 feet into the platform, the data is consistent with the ATO stop being depressed (B4 rate and Full-Service Brake Requested), 33 mph Actual Speed.

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11:28:34 hours	The train is at zero speed. 126 feet prior to the 8-car marker. Deceleration rate calculated to be approximately 2.46 mph/s.
11:29:06 hours	Third Rail power is de-energized.
11:29:18 hours	PA announcement is made.
11:29:34 hours	PA announcement ends.
11:29:38 hours	The Train is Keyed Down.
11:57:42 hours	Brake Pipe Dumps due to no third Rail to run the compressors.



Based on the data analysis, there is no train performance anomaly observed that could contribute to the incident event reported.

### Interview Findings and Written Statements

As part of the investigation launched into the event, Safety interviewed one person. The interview identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

#### Rail Vehicle Operator of Train ID 131

- The RVO stated on their incident report that when they entered the station traveling towards Glenmont, the person sat down on the platform.
- The RVO stated they depressed the ATO Stop pushbutton, then the person jumped all the way to the roadway, where the train made contact with the person.
- The RVO notified the MICC, and a Rail Operations Supervisor arrived on the scene.
- The RVO stated that they applied the handbrake on the train, then cleared the train of trespassers with the supervisor.

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### Rail Operations Supervisor #1

- The ROS stated in their supervisor's report that they were at B35 Station when they heard the RVO of train 131 on track 1 at NoMa Gallaudet put an emergency call over the radio informing the RTC that someone had been struck by the train.
- The ROS stated that the MICC instructed the RVO to apply the handbrake, and they met the RVO on the platform to confirm that the handbrake was applied on the lead car.
- The ROS stated that they boarded the train and began offloading the customers from the rear cars, moving them to the front of the train.
- The ROS stated that they encountered MTPD who had located and made contact with the conscious but injured person who was sitting upright on the roadway ballast next to the train at 11:29 hours. They also turned the scene over to MTPD and instructed the RVO to remain aboard the lead car of the incident train.
- The ROS stated that they entered the roadway per the RTC to confirm third rail power was de-energized on track 1 at B-35 while DCFEMS entered the roadway and moved the injured trespasser to the platform into the awaiting ambulance.
- The ROS stated at 11:36 hours, all emergency personnel were clear of the roadway on track 1 at B-35.
- The ROS stated that at 11:45 hours, an MTPD Detective arrived on the scene and escorted the RVO to a nearby cruiser to conduct an interview.
- The ROS stated that once the RVO was released from the investigating officer, they were transported for post-incident testing by the Shady Grove Assistant Superintendent.
- The ROS stated that at 12:24 hours, third rail power was restored on track 1 at NoMa Gallaudet, and the incident train was moved into B99 Rail Yard.
- The ROS attended the hotwash at 12:50 hours

### Rail Operations Supervisor #3

- The ROS stated in their supervisor's report that they arrived on the scene with an additional ROS to move the train and a Stations Supervisor.
- The ROS stated that when they arrived, ERT, Track Maintenance, the Custodial Supervisor, an RM, and a Safety Officer were already on the scene.
- The ROS stated that the other ROS accessed the lead car and found that the mushroom was not depressed on L3123, and the handbrake was applied.
- The ROS stated that a ground walkaround was conducted and third rail power was restored.
- The ROS stated that normal service was resumed at 12:46 hours.
- The ROS stated that the first train to service track 1 after the incident arrived at 12:49 hours.

### Rail Operations Supervisor #4

- The ROS stated in their supervisor's report that they arrived at the command post at NoMa B35 with the Brentwood Assistant Superintendent at 12:12 hours.
- The ROS stated that the MICC gave a power re-energizing alert for track 2, and power was restored.

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- The ROS stated that the Shady Grove Assistant Superintendent arrived, and the RVO was released to them to be transported for post-incident testing.
- The ROS stated that the Road Mechanic was given permission to perform a ground walkaround, and Train ID 131 was transported to Brentwood Rail Yard.
- The ROS stated that at 12:41 hours, the train was moved from NoMa's platform, and normal service was requested as no clean-up was needed.
- The ROS stated a hotwash was conducted at 12:50 hours.
- The ROS stated in their root cause statement that the person intentionally jumped down onto track 1, jumped in the air, then attempted to jump out of the way prior to the train striking them.

### Fire Liaison Officer

- The FLO served as the communication bridge between MICC personnel and Fire Department responders, relaying information on power, train movement, and scene updates.
- They had access to AIMS, power, and fire maps, allowing them to assist with coordination and situational awareness during the incident.
- The incident occurred near a dead track within WMATA's property that contained an unmarked third rail, initially causing confusion over whether it belonged to WMATA or Amtrak.
- DCFEMS requested that power and train traffic be stopped on Track 2 for safety and noise reduction during the rescue, but Metro 1 denied the request pending MTPD authorization.
- Due to the power not being dropped, DCFEMS conducted the rescue through the train, selecting the least hazardous option under the conditions.
- The FLO described the MICC as crowded and noisy during the event, with overlapping communications and multiple supervisors interfering with coordination.
- DCFEMS established incident command upon arrival, later transitioning to a formal command post once Battalion 6 arrived.
- The FLO explained that in immediate rescue operations, tactical and strategic command take precedence over unified command to prioritize life safety.
- The delay in power removal and command confusion were attributed to unclear authority between WMATA, DCFEMS, and MTPD.
- After the incident, the FLO updated mapping systems to clearly mark the dead track and recommended policy clarification on power removal and command hierarchy to prevent future delays.

### **Weather**

On August 20, 2024, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 72°F, with clear skies, winds of 5 mph, and 93% humidity. Washington, DC. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Washington, DC.

### **Related Rules and Procedures**

Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)

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- 1.1 Guiding Safety Principles
- 1.2 Incident Reporting
- 9.5 Emergency Stops
- 17.28 Emergency Maintenance Procedures

#### Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

- #26 Person Hit by Train

#### Policy Instruction

- Incident Management Standard

### **Human Factors**

#### Rail Vehicle Operator

#### Evidence of Fatigue

SAFE evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. Video of the incident was reviewed for signs of the RVO's fatigue. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. The RVO reported feeling alert at the time of the incident. The RVO reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

#### Fatigue Risk

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The RVO reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The RVO worked the day shift in the days leading up to the incident. The RVO was awake for eight hours and 17 minutes at the time of the incident. The RVO reported eight hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was thirty-nine hours and four minutes, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the employee's usual workday sleep durations. The RVO reported no issues with sleep.

#### Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Rail Vehicle Operator complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

### **Findings**

- Train ID 131, operating in ATO Mode, struck a trespasser who intentionally placed themselves on the roadway in the path of the train at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station.
- The RVO pressed the ATO Stop pushbutton when they saw the unauthorized person on the roadway, but did not depress the Emergency Stop pushbutton (emergency mushroom) as required under MOR 9.5.

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- Contact was made between Train ID 131 and the trespasser; the person was struck but not run over and landed between WMATA and Amtrak tracks.
- Third rail power was de-energized on Track 1 at 11:18 hours; however, confirmation was delayed due to DCFEMS believing the abandoned rails outside of Track 1 were live tracks. Third rail power was confirmed de-energized on Track 1 at 11:31 hours.
- The trespasser was removed from the roadway and transported to Medstar Hospital by Medic 21.
- Confusion over command authority and communication congestion in the MICC caused delays in the removal of third rail power.
- The FLO acted as liaison between MICC and DCFEMS, reporting challenges from overlapping communications and unclear track ownership near the scene.
- Train ID 131 was transported to Brentwood Rail Yard.
- ROS #3 failed to follow the instructions given by the Radio RTC to exit the train at NoMa and report to the command post at the kiosk and instead followed conflicting email instructions and exited the train at Rhode Island Avenue, reporting to the wrong location.

### **Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence**

- Third rail power was de-energized at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station on Track 1 and temporarily on Track 2.
- Shuttle bus service was on standby.
- Single-tracking operations between NoMa-Gallaudet U and Rhode Island Avenue stations.
- The RVO of Train ID 131 was removed from service and transported for post-incident testing.
- Train ID 131 was removed from service and transported to Brentwood Rail Yard.
- The trespasser was transported to Medstar Hospital by Medic 21.

### **Probable Cause Statement**

The probable cause of the Collision at the NoMa-Gallaudet U Station event on August 20, 2025, was an intentional unauthorized entry onto the roadway by the trespasser, resulting in the trespasser being struck by Train ID 131. CCTV evidence supports that the trespasser deliberately placed themselves in the train's path and attempted to evade the train but was unable to do so. Contributing factors included delayed confirmation of third rail power de-energization due to unclear authority between WMATA, DCFEMS, and MTPD, and the RVO's incomplete execution of emergency braking procedures, as the Emergency Stop pushbutton was not engaged in accordance with the Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) 9.5.

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**Recommended Corrective Actions**

<b>Corrective Action Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Responsible Party</b>	<b>Estimated Completion Date</b>
129495_SAFECA PS_RTRA_001	The RVO will attend re-instruction training on MOR 9.5 Emergency Stop requirements.	RTRA SRC	Completed
129495_SAFECA PS_SAFE_001	The Metrorail Emergency Response Map has been updated to reflect that the 3rd track is abandoned and not energized.	SAFE OEP	Completed

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## Appendices

### **Appendix A – Interview Summary**

*The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.*

#### Department

##### *Fire Liaison Officer*

The Fire Liaison Officer has been a contractor with WMATA for 1 year and is employed by DCFEMS.

During the formal interview, the FLO explained their role as the bridge between WMATA personnel in the MICC and Fire Department responders on the scene. They clarified that their responsibilities include facilitating rapid communication about power status, train traffic, and situational updates, ensuring that information flows efficiently between field units and MICC personnel. The FLO noted they have access to AIMS, power maps, and fire maps, which allows them to support coordination and decision-making during emergencies.

Regarding the incident at NoMa-Gallaudet U Station, the FLO recalled hearing the RVO transmit that someone had been struck. They quickly located the area on the map and discovered that the incident occurred near a section of dead track within WMATA's fenced property. Although the section was not in use or connected to active live tracks, it contained an unmarked third rail, which initially caused confusion about whether it belonged to WMATA or Amtrak. This uncertainty complicated command coordination between agencies. MTPD entered the roadway after confirming power was down and located the victim outside the active track area. DCFEMS arrived shortly after, confirmed the individual was unconscious but showing signs of life, and initiated rescue operations.

The FLO explained that the DCFEMS could not initially verify which tracks were live or de-energized, and with trains still moving on Track 2, incident command requested that power and track be stopped on that track out of caution and to reduce noise during the rescue. Because no MTPD representative was yet at the command post, there was no unified command structure at that moment. The FLO personally relayed DCFEMS's request to Rail 1 and Metro 1 in the control center, but was told that only MTPD could authorize such an order. The FLO pushed back, emphasizing that DCFEMS had command of the scene and that immediate power removal was a life-safety necessity. Despite this, the power was not dropped, forcing DCFEMS to conduct the rescue by removing the patient through the train, which they deemed the least hazardous option given the conditions.

The FLO described the MICC as loud and crowded, with multiple personnel, supervisors, and command staff present, making communication difficult. They explained that during major incidents, additional supervisors often enter the room, which can hinder coordination due to overlapping conversations and command interference. The FLO emphasized that under normal circumstances, communication among MICC personnel is direct and verbal so that information is

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Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
Final Report – Collision  
E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

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shared quickly across desks. However, during this incident, the flow of communication was disrupted by competing voices and multiple simultaneous command channels.

They further detailed that DCFEMS established command immediately upon arrival, as standard procedure requires the first engine company on scene to assume command until a battalion chief arrives. Once Battalion 6 arrived, a formal command post was established outside the station entrance. The FLO explained the difference between tactical, strategic, and unified command under the National Incident Management System (NIMS), noting that unified command structures are designed for prolonged or complex events, not for immediate rescue operations where life safety is the priority. They stated that in urgent rescue scenarios, command decisions should not be delayed by additional layers of approval or procedural confusion.

When asked why Metro 1 refused to de-energize Track 2, the FLO reported being told that such an order could only come through MTPD, not directly from DCFEMS. They acknowledged that similar procedural issues had occurred before, where DCFEMS requests were delayed by repeated relays between MICC positions and transit personnel. The FLO expressed understanding of the operational constraints, such as maintaining power for stranded trains, but emphasized that life safety must take precedence over service continuity.

They confirmed that MTPD were already on the platform when DCFEMS arrived, but command post coordination lagged because transit officers were not immediately present at the unified command location. The FLO believed the lack of clear command alignment and the confusion surrounding the dead track contributed to the initial delay in power removal. They noted that Amtrak was also requested to halt all train traffic out of Union Station as a precaution, which was promptly confirmed by the Fire Operations Center.

Following the incident, the liaison submitted a correction through the mapping system to mark the dead track on fire maps, recognizing that its lack of clear identification could pose a hazard in future incidents. They concluded by stating that the event was not a failure of any one individual but a systemic issue stemming from unclear command authority and procedural gaps between WMATA and emergency response personnel. They emphasized the need for clearer policy definitions regarding command hierarchy and power removal during rescue incidents, underscoring that in emergencies, life safety must override operational concerns.

## Appendix B – RTRA Reports

**WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle)** Page \_\_\_ of \_\_\_

**Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents**

Date: 8/20/25 Incident Time: 11:18 AM Time Reported: 11:19 AM Reported by: Customer  Employee  ROCC  Other

**Location**

Station: Noma Mezzanine #: Track #/Destination: # 1 Glenmont Chain Marker/Signal Number:

**TYPE OF INCIDENT**

Property Damage  Smoke  Fire  Customer Complaint  
 Customer Injury  Customer Illness  Employee Injury  Employee Illness  
 Criminal Activity  Elevator Entrapment  Rail Vehicle Incident  Other (Explain in description of incident)

**WEATHER** **LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)** **LIGHTING (artificial lighting)**

Clear  Rain  Dawn/Dusk  Daylight  Lights On  Lights Off   
 Snow  Sleet/Ice  Dark  Tunnel/Underground  Lights Not Working

**STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC**

Elevator/Escalator#: AFC #: Room Number/Location:

Failure Number(s):

Parking Lot  Paid Area  Free Area  Garage  Station Entrance  Stairway # \_\_\_  Platform  Ancillary Room   
 Injury/Illness reported aboard Train  Other

Name of Responding Supervisor: Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder

**TRAIN INCIDENTS**

Train ID: 131 Destination: Glenmont Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 3122 Lead Car: 3122  
 Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: RTRA

**DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.**  
 Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

I [redacted] was on ID 131 traveling to Glenmont when the train entered the station a black male sat down on the platform I then hit ATO stop the customer then jumped all the way to the roadway then the train made contact with the customer I then called Central Control and supervisor arrived I put a hand brake on the we cleared the train

**Employee Completing Report**

Employee Name (print): [redacted] Employee #: [redacted] Date: 8/20/25  
 Division: Shady Grove Run #: 26 Block #: 2 Assigned Days: Sat/Sun

**To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager**

Supervisor Name (print): [redacted] Employee #: [redacted] Date: 8/20/25  
 Action Taken/Notes: [redacted]

SMS Number: 20250820#129495MX  
 50.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Figure 6 - RVO WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report.

Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
 Final Report – Collision  
 E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

**OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND WELLNESS'  
DRUG AND ALCOHOL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM  
POST-ACCIDENT/POST-INCIDENT DETERMINATION REFERRAL FORM**

Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulations and WMATA's drug and alcohol policy require employees involved in an accident/incident to submit to testing for prohibited drugs and alcohol as soon as possible following the occurrence. FTA regulations and WMATA's policy also require the testing of any other individual whose performance may have contributed to the accident/incident.

**EMPLOYEES MUST BE ESCORTED**  
*(Testing will not commence without supervisory escort.)*

**GENERAL INFORMATION (Please Print)**

Employee Name: [Redacted] Job Title: Rail Vehicle Operator  
 Supervisor: [Redacted] Phone #: [Redacted] Dept./Location: RIZAS Study Guide

**ACCIDENT / INCIDENT INFORMATION**

Accident / Incident Date: 8-20-2025 Accident / Incident Time: 11:15AM  
 Reported to Supervisor Date: 8-20-2025 Reported to Supervisor Time: 11:15AM

Please provide a brief description of what happened: A person jumped in front of the train, while the operator was operating.

**DECISION MAKER QUESTIONNAIRE**

Select One: DOT Safety Sensitive Non-Safety Sensitive (Non-DOT test ONLY)

- |   |                                      |                                     |
|---|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Did the occurrence involve the <u>operation of a revenue service vehicle</u> ?   | YES <input checked="" type="radio"/> | NO <input type="radio"/>            |
| 2. Was there a fatality?  | YES <input type="radio"/>            | NO <input checked="" type="radio"/> |
| 3. Has any individual suffered bodily injury and immediately received medical treatment away from the scene of the accident/incident?   | YES <input checked="" type="radio"/> | NO <input type="radio"/>            |
| 4. If the vehicle involved was a bus, van, or automobile was there disabling damage as a result of the occurrence and any vehicle removed from the scene by a tow truck or other vehicle? | YES <input checked="" type="radio"/> | NO <input type="radio"/>            |
| 5. If the vehicle was a railcar, was the vehicle removed from revenue service as a result of the occurrence?  | YES <input checked="" type="radio"/> | NO <input type="radio"/>            |

If you responded "NO" to question number one, please proceed with Non-DOT testing as appropriate.

[Redacted] (Print Clearly) [Redacted] [Redacted] 25  
 [Redacted] Phone Number

Please Continue to Next Page

Figure 7 - RVO's Post-incident Testing Form. Page 1 of 2

Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
 Final Report – Collision  
 E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

<b>TESTING INFORMATION</b>	
<p>FTA regulations and WMATA policy require alcohol testing as soon as possible following an accident/incident. If alcohol testing is not conducted within 2 hours after the accident/incident, you <b>MUST</b> document the reason for the delay on this form. If the alcohol test is not administered within 8 hours, and the drug test within 32 hours, you <b>MUST CEASE</b> all efforts to administer these tests and document the reason(s) why the tests were not administered within the FTA and WMATA policy prescribed time frames.</p>	
<p>Was the alcohol test completed within 2 hours of the accident/incident? If no, please explain: _____</p>	<p>YES <input checked="" type="radio"/> NO <input type="radio"/></p>
<p>Was the alcohol test completed within 8 hours of the accident/incident? If no, please explain: _____</p>	<p>YES <input checked="" type="radio"/> NO <input type="radio"/></p>
<p>Was the drug test completed within 32 hours of the accident/incident? If no, please explain: _____</p>	<p>YES <input checked="" type="radio"/> NO <input type="radio"/></p>
<p>Could any other employee's performance have contributed to this accident/incident? If yes, were they tested? If no, please explain: _____</p>	<p>YES <input type="radio"/> NO <input checked="" type="radio"/>          YES <input checked="" type="radio"/> NO <input checked="" type="radio"/></p>
<p><i>The operator was alone in the cab when the incident occurred. Person jumped in front of the train.</i></p>	
<p>If you determine, using the best information available at the time of this decision, that the employee's performance can be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident/incident <b>TESTING IS PROHIBITED</b>. If a fatality occurred as a result of the accident/incident you <b>MUST NOT</b> discount the employee as a contributing factor.</p>	
<p>Based on the information available at this time, can the employee's performance be <b>COMPLETELY</b> discounted as a contributing factor? Please explain: _____</p>	<p>YES <input type="radio"/> NO <input checked="" type="radio"/></p>
<p><i>The incident is pending investigation</i></p>	
<p>Additional Comments: _____ _____ _____ _____</p>	
<p>_____ _____ _____</p>	
<p>Official Dept. Signature: _____ <small>Revised Mar. 2020</small></p>	<p>Date: <i>8-26-2025</i></p>

Figure 8 - RVO's Post-incident Testing Form. Page 2 of 2

Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
 Final Report – Collision  
 E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

M RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT				
Date 20 Aug 2025	Incident Time 11:20AM	Incident Location Noma Gallaudet (B-35)	Track, Station, Mezzanine Number Track # 1	
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) Train ID 131 3058-3059 3010-3011 3172-3173 3123-3122 (Operating Car 3122)				
Incident Description Person Struck By a Train				
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
		N/A	Shady Grove	Yes
<b>Customer Information (Detailed information must be recorded on Station Manager Incident Report)</b>				
Name	Address		Injury?	
N/A	N/A		Yes	
Name	Address		Injury?	
Name	Address		Injury?	
<b>Fire Department/EMS/Other External Agency Responding (Use Supplemental sheet if necessary)</b>				
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks	
11:20AM			None	

Chronological Account of Incident

11 :20AM I was at B-35 station when I heard the RVO of train 131 on track # 1 at Noma Gallaudet, put an Emergency call over the radio informing the RTC that someone had been struck by the train. RTC instructed the RVO of train 131 to apply the handbrake on the operating car. I met the RVO on the platform to confirm that the handbrake was applied on the lead car. I entered the train and began offloading the customers from the rear cars, moving to the front of the train.

11 :29AM As I moved through the train I encountered Transit Officer [REDACTED] who had located and made contact with the conscious but injured customer who was sitting upright on the roadway ballast next to the train. At this time I turned the scene over to Transit Police. I instructed the RVO to remain aboard the lead car of the incident train.

11 :30AM I entered the roadway per the RTC to confirm that third rail power was de-energized on track 1 at B-35. DC Fire Department and DCPD Officers entered the roadway and the injured customer was moved to the platform and into an awaiting ambulance.

11 :36AM All Emergency personnel were clear of the roadway on track # 1 at B-35.

11 :45AM Transit Detective [REDACTED] arrived on scene and escorted the RVO to a nearby cruiser to conduct an interview.

(Note time for each entry; include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)

Your Arrival Time:

Supervisors Name (Print)	Payroll #	Date	Supervisors Signature	Date
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	20 Aug 2025		

RTRA-901-15-00  
Upon request please email to MICC\_Metro1@wmata.com

Figure 9 - ROS #1 Supervisor's Report.

Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
Final Report – Collision  
E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

M RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT				
Date 8/22/2025	Incident Time 11:31 am	Incident Location NoMa-Gallaudet	Track, Station, Mezzanine Number Track 1	
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) Lead car 3132				
Incident Description Track 1				
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
██████████	██████████		Shady Groce	Yes
Customer Information (Detailed Information must be recorded on Station Manager Incident Report)				
Name	Address			Injury?
Name	Address			Injury?
Name	Address			Injury?
Fire Department/EMS/Other External Agency Responding (Use Supplemental sheet if necessary)				
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks	

Chronological Account of Incident

11:54 am. MTPD ██████████ was on the scene and turn over to ██████████

At 12:11 am Unit 20 ██████████ & RISS Station Supervisor ██████████ arrived on the scene.

ERT ██████████ already on the scene.  
Track Maintenance already on the scene.  
Custodian Supervisor ██████████ on the scene.  
CMT ██████████ already in the scene.  
Safety Officer ██████████ already on the scene.

12:15 ██████████ accessed lead car and found mushroom wasn't pushed on L3123 and hand brake applied.

12:33 ground walk around began.

12:39 3rd rail power restored.

12:43 ██████████ will take incident train into the Brentwood yard.

12:46 Normal service has resumed.

12:49 1st train service the station.

(Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)

Your Arrival Time: 12:11

Supervisors Name (Print)	Payroll #	Date	Supervisors Signature	Date
██████████	██████████	8/20/2025		

RTRA-901-15-00  
Upon request please email to MICC\_Metro1@wmata.com

Figure 10 - ROS #3 Supervisor's Report.

Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
Final Report – Collision  
E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

M RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT				
Date 8/20/2025	Incident Time 11:20am	Incident Location Noma B35	Track, Station, Mezzanine Number Track 1	
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) ID #131 3122-3123x3173-3172x3011-3010x3059-3058				
Incident Description Person jumped in front of the train and was struck				
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
██████████	██████████	No	Shady Grove	Yes
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Customer Information (Detailed information must be recorded on Station Manager Incident Report)				
Name UNKNOWN	Address UNKNOWN		Injury? YES	
Name N/A	Address N/A		Injury? N/A	
Name N/A	Address N/A		Injury? N/A	
Fire Department/EMS/Other External Agency Responding (Use Supplemental sheet if necessary)				
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks	
UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	n/a	
UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	n/a	

Chronological Account of Incident

At 12:12pm, Assistant Superintendent ██████████ and I arrived at Noma B35 and headed to the command post.

At 12:23pm, MICC gave a power re-energizing alert for track 2.

At 12:24pm, power was restored at NOMA track 2.

At 12:27pm, Assistant Superintendent ██████████ arrived outside of Mezz 109 where the MTPD detective had RVO ██████████. The detective released RVO ██████████ to him and he transported her for post-incident testing.

At 12:32pm, MICC gave car equipment permission to do a ground-walk around.

At 12:35pm, MICC informed Assistant Superintendent ██████████ that the train was going into B99 yard.

At 12:41pm, Brakes off was established on ID #731.

At 12:42pm, train #731 is enroute to B99 yard.

At 12:45pm, normal service was requested by xxx as no clean-up was needed. MICC informed personnel that we will be going normal.

At 12:49pm, train ID# 109 was the first train to service track 1, Noma.

At 12:50pm, Assistant Superintendent ██████████ conducted a hot wash at Noma Track #1.

At 12:52pm, Assistant Superintendent ██████████ and I left the platform.

(Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)

Your Arrival Time: 12:12pm

Supervisors Name (Print)	Payroll #	Date	Supervisors Signature	Date
██████████	██████████	8.20.25	██████████	8.20.25

RTRA-901-15-

Figure 11 - ROS #4 Supervisor's Report.

Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
Final Report – Collision  
E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025



# Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

## Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report



**Incident Status: PRELIMINARY**

**GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION**

<p>Incident Type: Person Struck by a Train</p> <p>Incident Date: Wednesday, August 20, 2025</p> <p>Incident Time: 11:18</p> <p>Location: NOMA Gallaudet Track #1</p>	<p>Delay (Minutes): 84 minutes for the train. 7 minutes for customers.</p> <p>Vehicles Involved: ID 131 3122*3173*3011*3059</p> <p>First Reported By: Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED]</p>
--	--

**BRIEF DESCRIPTION:**

At approximately 11:18, Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED] while operating ID 131 witnessed a person on the roadway as they entered the platform NOMA Galludet station Track #1. The trespasser attempted to return to the platform at which time the train made contact with the individual. MICC was notified of the incident and all required notifications were made. A ground walkaround was conducted by [REDACTED] it was determined that there were signs of life for the person struck. The Operator was interviewed by MTPD on scene then transported for post-incident testing.

**Key Employees Involved & Employee Statements:**

1. Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED] -- Stated "I [REDACTED] was on ID 131 traveling to Glenmont when the train entered the station a black male sat down on the platform I then hit ATO stop the customer then jumped all the way to the roadway then the train made contact with the customer I then called Central Control and supervisor arrived I put a hand brake on then we cleared the train."

**Post Incident Testing & Employee History:**

- Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED] was removed from service and transported for post incident testing
- Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED]
- Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED]
- Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED] last Train Certification was October 18, 2024, Passed MOR 93% TVIOM 84%

Figure 12 - Managerial Report Page 1 of 2.

Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
Final Report – Collision  
E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025



# Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority



## Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

### SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT TIMELINE:

- 11:19 Rail vehicle operator of train ID 131 reported making contact with a person on the roadway.
- 11:21 [REDACTED] RTRA Supervisor [REDACTED] reported on the scene. Operator [REDACTED] Secure the hand brake on car 3122.
- 11:23 Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED] offloaded Train 131 on track 1 at Noma. [REDACTED] was granted foul time on track 1 at Noma for the purpose of checking for signs of life from the struck customer.
- 11:24 Train 133 began single tracking from Union Station to Rhode Island Station on track 2. Unit 14 Hot-sticked and verified that third rail power was de-energized at chain marker B1 109+00.
- 11:26 [REDACTED] reported that the customer was conscious and sitting up. Train 133 serviced Noma-Gallaudet track two.
- 11:40 Service was suspended on tracks 1 and 2 at Noma pending investigation of the scene.
- 11:48 Third rail power was restored on track 2 at Noma. Single tracking was resumed from Union Station to Rhode Island track 2.
- 12:28 Third rail power was restored on track 1 at Noma. CMNT [REDACTED] was granted foul time to inspect train 131 for damages.
- 12:36 [REDACTED] relinquished foul time, and no damage was reported on train 131 track 1 Noma.
- 12:43 Train 131 was re-blocked to ID 731 and continued non-revenue to Brentwood Yard.

### SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS & PENDING ISSUES:

- The operator was offered EAP and accepted.

### CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

No corrective actions currently. This incident is under investigation.

Figure 13 - Managerial Report Page 2 of 2.

Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
Final Report – Collision  
E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

# Appendix C – Emergency Response Map





Figure 14 - Updated Emergency Response Map that shows the abandoned track update as of October 27, 2025.

Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
 Final Report – Collision  
 E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

## Appendix D – Why-Tree Analysis



Incident Date: 08/20/2025, Time: 11:17 hours  
 Final Report – Collision  
 E251404

Drafted By: SAFE 709 – 10/12/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 10/15/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025