



## W-0429 – Red Signal Overrun at Dulles Rail Yard – September 7, 2025

### Document Purpose

*This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting June 9, 2026.*

*WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.*

### Red Signal Overruns

The total number of red signal overruns in 2025 was 11, with 7 of them occurring in rail yards. In the first few months of 2026 there have been 9 red signal overruns, 3 of which occurred in rail yards. Metrorail has implemented several initiatives, particularly in the last three years focused on the reduction of red signal overruns. Some of the most recent actions include safety campaigns to raise awareness regarding distracted driving and operating trains without speed commands (2025), and a requirement for rail operations supervisors to conduct Rail Supervisory Daily Activity Report (RSDAR), which includes discussions with train operators related to red signal compliance (2023). Last year a Rail Operations Personnel Notice was distributed to rail operations supervisors to increase discussions with train operators on the importance of point and call. Point and Call is a job aide that encourages rail vehicle operators to point to their regulated speed, signal and rail alignment and verbally identify it, is currently a part of the initial train operator training. Materials are being finalized for incorporation into the train operator refresher training program. Train operators are required to undergo refresher training every 2 years. The updated curriculum will include skills drills, assessments, and scenario-based activities designed to reinforce rule compliance and safe operating practices.

The Rail Transportation Department within Metrorail increased quality control audits on zero speed commands procedures, which showed less than 90 percent compliance. This prompted Metrorail to begin its safety risk management analysis for this subject area. A dashboard was created to track these audits and monitor metrics.

### Safety event summary:

On September 7, 2025, at approximately 2:52 p.m., Train 649 overran red signal N98-B16 as it was departing Dulles Rail Yard. This yard lead is between Dulles Airport and Loudon Gateway stations, and allows trains to enter the mainline



on track 2 in the outbound direction to Loudon Gateway Station. The train had no passengers aboard and was operated in manual mode at the time of the event.

At approximately 2:42 p.m., the Interlocking Operator in Dulles Rail Yard granted an absolute block<sup>1</sup> to Train 649 from signal N99-114 on track 8 to no closer than 10 feet of red signal N98-B16. This is the last signal in Dulles Rail Yard Track 8 before entering the mainline. The interlocking operator instructed the train operator to contact the radio rail traffic controller on Operations Channel (OPS) 4 when they arrived at N98-B16 to receive permission to enter the mainline on track 2. Train 649's operator attempted to stop at the red signal but initially applied the brakes at a B3 rate instead of the most restrictive B4/B5 rate and overran N98-B16 by 4 feet. The train operator reported the red signal overrun to the control center. The Control Center Assistant Operations Manager was notified, and two rail operations supervisors, signaling department personnel, the emergency response team and Department of Safety personnel were dispatched to the scene. There was no damage to switch 3. The train was in stop and proceed mode<sup>2</sup>, which permits movement in the yard without speed commands, and was travelling within the permitted speed limit at approximately 10 mph on a decline when the train operator moved from a B3 braking rate to B4/B5. The train passed red signal N98-B16 at approximately 5 mph and stopped approximately 4 feet beyond the signal. Train 649 and the operator were removed from service in accordance with Metrorail policy. The Incident Investigation Team report concluded that the train's mechanical equipment and on-board equipment performed as required. And therefore did not contribute to this event. WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the train operator complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy.

The probable cause and contributing factors of this safety event include:

- Loss/lack of situational awareness
- Failure to maintain control of the train. The train operator did not apply the most restrictive braking mode, resulting in the train passing the red signal.

Investigation W-0429 led to specific recommended corrective actions, which have been fully implemented as this investigation report is being presented for WMSA adoption. These include:

- The train operator attended refresher training following this event.
- Metrorail redistributed a Rail Operations Personnel Notice, which emphasized the use of the Point and Call Method.

WMSA Corrective Action Plan (CAP) C0183 requires Metrorail to develop and implement territory familiarization training. The curriculum is currently being developed, and the CAP is scheduled to be completed in 2027.

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<sup>1</sup> Absolute Block: A section of track that shall not be occupied by more than one rail vehicle at any one time.

<sup>2</sup> Stop and Proceed: A mode that allows a train to be moved in manual mode with Automatic Train Protection when no speed or door commands are being received.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety  
Office of Safety Investigations

**FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E251549**

<b>Date of Event:</b>	September 7, 2025
<b>Type of Event:</b>	O-8: Red Signal Overrun
<b>Incident Time:</b>	14:52 Hours
<b>Location:</b>	Dulles Yard Lead, Signal N98-B16 at Chain Marker (CM) N2 1531+03
<b>Time and How received by Safety:</b>	14:57 Hours
<b>Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:</b>	16:27 Hours
<b>Responding Safety Officers:</b>	Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)
<b>Rail Vehicle:</b>	Train ID 649 (L7196-97x7285-84x7395-94T)
<b>Injuries:</b>	None
<b>Damage:</b>	None
<b>Emergency Responders:</b>	None
<b>Safety Universal Data System (SUDS I/A) Number</b>	20250907#130056

Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

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# Dulles Yard, Signal N98-B16 – Red Signal Overrun

September 7, 2025

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AIMS</b>	Advanced Information Management System
<b>AOM</b>	Assistant Operations Manager
<b>ARS</b>	Audio Recording System
<b>ATC</b>	Automatic Train Control
<b>CCTV</b>	Closed-Circuit Television
<b>CMNT</b>	Office of Car Maintenance
<b>CMOR</b>	Office of the Chief Fleet Officer
<b>COSI</b>	Communications and Signaling
<b>ERT</b>	Emergency Response Team
<b>FT</b>	Foul Time
<b>IO</b>	Interlocking Operator
<b>MICC</b>	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
<b>MOR</b>	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
<b>PPE</b>	Personal Protective Equipment
<b>ROS</b>	Rail Operations Supervisor
<b>ROQT</b>	Rail Operations Quality Training
<b>RTC</b>	Rail Traffic Controller
<b>RTRA</b>	Office of Rail Transportation
<b>RVO</b>	Rail Vehicle Operator
<b>SAFE</b>	Department of Safety
<b>SPOTS</b>	System Performance On-Time Summary
<b>SUD</b>	Safety Universal Data System
<b>WMATA</b>	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
<b>WMSC</b>	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

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**Executive Summary**

*\*Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. \**

On Sunday, September 7, 2025, at 14:52 hours, Train ID 649 (L7196-7197.7285-7284.7395-7394T), a six-car consist, experienced a Red Signal Overrun when the train passed signal N98-B16, which was displaying a red aspect.

Prior to the event, the Interlocking Operator (IO) granted an absolute block to the Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) from signal N99-114 on track 8 within Dulles Yard to signal N98-B16 displaying a red aspect. The IO instructed the RVO to contact the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) at signal N98-B16. The RVO reported that they looked down at the master controller, which was positioned in B3 braking mode, as the train approached signal N98-B16. The RVO moved the master controller to B5, and the train stopped after passing signal N98-B16, which was red.

At 15:03 hours, trains began single-tracking on track 1. Personnel from the Department of Safety (SAFE), Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA), Communications and Signaling (COSI), and the Department of Track and Structures (TRST) were dispatched to investigate the event.

No injuries or damage were reported as a result of the event. Train ID 649 was returned to Dulles Yard, and normal service resumed.

In adherence to Rail Transportation Standard Operating Procedure 102-01-02, which outlines the protocol for removing an employee from service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio Rail Traffic Controller dispatched a Rail Operations Supervisor to relieve the Rail Vehicle Operator from duty for post-incident testing.

In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Rail, Standard Operating Procedure 102.04, and Operations Administrative Policy 102.06, the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center initiated the removal of Train ID 649 from service for Incident Investigations Team investigation procedures.

The probable cause of the Red Signal Overrun event at Dulles Yard on September 7, 2025, was due to the lack of situational awareness and failure to maintain control of the train by the RVO. Specifically, the RVO did not apply the most restrictive braking mode, resulting in the train passing the red signal.

**Incident Site**

Dulles Yard Lead - Signal N98-B16 on track 2.  
The area is an outdoor section at Dulles Railyard with ballasted tracks.


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## Field Sketch/Schematics



*\*Image not to scale.*

## Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

## Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Red Signal Overrun event at the Dulles Yard Lead on September 7, 2025, Safety dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. Safety team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Physical site assessment.
- Formal Interview – Safety interviewed one individual as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Safety interviewed the following individual.
  - Rail Vehicle Operator – Train ID 649
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.

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- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
  - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
  - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
  - RVO Training Procedures & Records
  - RVO Certification Records
  - RVO 30-Day Work History
  - Rail Transportation – Investigation Data
  - Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data
  - Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center – Investigation Data
  - Communications and Signaling – Investigation Data
  - Maximo Data
  
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
  - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
  - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
  - System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)
  - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

## Investigation

On Sunday, September 7, 2025, at 14:52 hours, Train ID 649 experienced a Red Signal Overrun when the train passed signal N98-B16, which was displaying a red aspect. The train had just departed Dulles Yard, and there were no passengers aboard the train at the time of the event.

Prior to the event, at 14:42 hours, the Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that the RVO contacted the IO and advised that Train ID 649 was ready for revenue service. The IO granted an absolute block from signal N99-114 on track 8 within Dulles Yard to signal N98-B16, which was displaying a red aspect. The IO instructed the RVO to contact the MICC Radio RTC at signal N98-B16 to receive permission to enter track 2.

The Closed-Circuit Television revealed that at 14:52 hours, Train ID 649 passed signal N98-B16, which was displaying a red aspect, and stopped before entering track 2.



*Image 1 – Image from the forward-facing camera on railcar 7196 approaching signal N98-B16.*

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According to the Audio Recording System (ARS), at 14:53 hours, the RVO reported the red signal overrun to the Radio RTC. The Radio RTC requested a response from a Rail Operations Supervisor (ROS) at Wiehle-Reston Station. The Button RTC notified the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) of the event.

At 15:02 hours, the Operations Manager (OM) informed the Safety Information Official (SIO) of the red signal overrun. The OM contacted the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) and requested that Automatic Train Control Maintenance (ATC) and the Emergency Response Team (ERT) personnel respond.

At 15:03 hours, the Radio RTC announced that single tracking was in effect between Dulles Yard West and Loudon Gateway Station via Track 1, and that the RVOs were to switch to Mode 2 Level 1 (manual mode). At 15:06 hours, the SIO contacted WMSC to report the red signal overrun at Dulles Yard.

At 15:21 hours, the Radio RTC granted foul time to the ROS to exit the train on track 1 to board the incident train. At 15:24 hours, the ROS reported that they had boarded the incident train and relinquished foul time.

At 15:41 hours, the Radio RTC instructed a second ROS to report to Dulles Yard and board the incident train. ATC and ERT personnel arrived and requested a train drop off. At 16:13 hours, ATC and ERT received foul time to exit the drop-off train to cross over to the incident scene. At 16:31 hours, ATC and ERT advised the Radio RTC that there was no switch damage, and it was safe to move the train.

At 16:23 hours, a Safety Investigator reported their location at Loudon Gateway Station.

At 16:36 hours, the Radio RTC instructed ROS #2 to key up the train in the trailing car, then granted a permissive block to signal N99-54. The train was dispatched to Dulles Yard. At 16:38 hours, ROS #2 contacted the IO and requested permission to enter the yard and was granted an absolute block from signal N99-54 to track 13 to store the train.

At 16:39 hours, the Radio RTC announced that the single had commenced and that normal service had resumed. At 16:50 hours, the RVO of Train ID 606 confirmed that ATC and ERT personnel were safely aboard the train.

During the formal interview, the RVO reported that they looked down at the master controller, which was positioned in B3 braking mode, as the train approached signal N98-B16. The RVO moved the master controller to B5, and the train stopped after passing the signal.

### Chronological Event Timeline

*A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:*

Time	Description
14:42:09 hours	<u>Rail Vehicle Operator</u> : Contacted the IO and advised that Train ID 649 was revenue ready. <u>Interlocking Operator</u> : Advised a lunar at N99-114 and granted an absolute block to N98-B16, then advised to contact the MICC. <u>Rail Vehicle Operator</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio N4-YD 2]

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<b>Time</b>	<b>Description</b>
14:52:48 hours	The train passed signal N98-B16 red. [CCTV]
14:53:31 hours	Train ID 649: Contacted the MICC and advised the train was located at N98-B16. Radio RTC: Acknowledged and inquired if the RVO stopped at the signal or past the signal. Train ID 649: Responded that the train slid past the signal by two feet. [Radio Ops 4]
14:55:41 hours	Radio RTC: Contacted a Rail Operations Supervisor located at Wiehle Reston Station and dispatched them to the incident train. [Radio Ops 4]
14:56:43 hours	Button RTC: Advised the AOM Red Signal Overrun. [Phone ROIC Lead]
14:56:50 hours	Operations Manager: Requested ATC Personnel to be dispatched. [Phone MOC]
14:57:33 hours	The Communications Section was advised of single tracking via track 1. [Phone ROIC Lead]
14:57:45 hours	The Interlocking Operator was advised of the Red Signal Overrun. [Phone Rail 2]
15:01:49 hours	Operations Manager: Requested ERT Personnel to be dispatched with ATC. [Phone MOC]
15:03:15 hours	Radio RTC: Announced single tracking between Dulles Yard West and Loudoun Gateway Station via track 1. [Radio Ops 4]
15:06:00 hours	SIO: Contacted the WMSC to advise of the signal overrun. [Phone EMER MGMT].
15:21:49 hours	Radio RTC: Granted permission to the Rail Supervisor to exit the train. [Radio Ops 4]
15:23:23 hours	Rail Operations Supervisor: Advised that they were aboard Train ID 649. The train was stopped three feet past the signal, behind the switch, and there was no damage. [Radio Ops 4]
16:12:12 hours	ATC and ERT personnel exited Train ID 603 on track 1. [Radio Ops 4]
16:16:07 hours	ATC and ERT personnel arrived at CM N2 1530+00 under foul time. [Radio Ops 4]
16:23:47 hours	Safety Investigator: Reported located at Loudoun Gateway Station. [Phone EMER MGMT]
16:31:10 hours	ATC: Informed the Radio RTC that there was no switch damage, and it was safe to move the train. [Radio Ops 4]
16:36:15 hours	The train was dispatched to N99-54. [Radio Ops 4]
16:38:45 hours	Train ID 649 was stored on Track 13. [Radio N4-YD 2]
16:39:51 hours	Radio RTC: Announced that normal service had resumed. [Radio Ops 4]
16:50:25 hours	Radio RTC: RVO of Train 606 confirmed that ATC and ERT personnel were aboard the train [Radio Ops 4]

*Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.*

## Operations

### Rail Transportation

*Adopted from Office of Rail Operations Investigation Report:*

On October 10, 2026, Rail Transportation determined that the Rail Vehicle Operator violated the Metrorail Operating Procedures (MOR), 1.2.1, 1.6.8, 1.8.8, 3.1.2, 3.3, and 3.4.2. The Rail Vehicle Operator received disciplinary action in accordance with the Disciplinary Administrative Program and completed re-instruction training on September 19, 2025.

Rail Transportation redistributed the Rail Operations Personnel Notice, which emphasized the use of the Point and Call Method.

### Fleet

#### Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data

IIT completed an analysis of the data retrieved from Train ID 649 cars (L7196-7197X7285-7284X7395-7394T) that were reported for a red signal overrun at Dulles N98-B16.

Based on the event recorder (ER) data, Train ID 649 was stationed at Dulles Yard on Track N99-TK8. At 14:39:20.940, Car 7196 was activated, and the operator updated the train ID from 622 to 649. The train was then placed in stop-and-proceed mode, which permits movement within the yard without speed commands. Shortly after, the Master Controller was set to power mode P1–P4, enabling the train to begin moving toward the mainline at a speed not exceeding 15 mph.

While progressing through the yard, the train made several required safety stops before continuing on Yard Lead Track #2 toward the mainline. As it approached signal N98-B16 near the mainline entry at CM 02+82, the operator failed to stop at the red signal at N99B-16. As a result, the train passed the red signal and came to a complete stop approximately four feet beyond it.

Based on ER and VMDS data, there was no fault with the train that contributed to the cause of this incident. In addition, there was neither an emergency brake application nor slide condition on lead car during the time of the incident. The train performed as commanded.

Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Rate
14:39:20	Car 7196 is keyed up on Track#8 at N99 Dulles Yard.	0Mph	B4
14:39:36	Train ID changed from 622 to 649.	0Mph	B4
14:40:12	All doors closed and Locked T/L Status goes high. Doors are closed and Locked.	0Mph	B4
14:40:27	Road Horn is activated.	0Mph	B4
14:40:20	ATC Operating Mode is switch to Manual with ATP. Train Is operating Manual mode without speed commands.	0Mph	B4
14:40:35	ATP Speed limit goes to 1Mph. Stop and Proceed was initiated.	0Mph	B5
14:40:37	Master Controller is placed on a “P1-P4” power mode and train began to move.	0.06Mph	P1-P4
14:40:45	Master Controller is moved from “P1P4” to “B5” position	3.1Mph	B5

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
Time	Description of Events	Train Speed	Rate
14:40:48	Train come to a complete stop after traveling 30.3feet.	0Mph	B5
14:40:50	Road Horn is activated.	0Mph	B5
14:40:53	Master Controller is moved from "B5" to "P1-P4" position and train began to move.	0.244Mph	P1-P4
14:40:04	Train came to a complete stop after traveling additional 44.1 feet.	0Mph	B5
14:41:07	Road Horn is activated.	0Mph	B5
14:41:08	Master Controller is moved from "B5" to "P1-P4" position and train began to move.	0.06Mph	P1-P4
14:41:42	Train came to a complete stop after traveling additional 372.3 feet. At track#8 lunar N99-114.	0Mph	B5
14:42:38	Master Controller is moved from "B5" to "P5" position and train began to move out of track#8.	0Mph	P5
14:44:23	Train came to a complete stop after traveling additional 1,531 feet. By the roadway at Yard Lead Track#2.	0Mph	B5
14:44:23	Road Horn is activated.	0Mph	B5
14:44:26	Master Controller is moved from "B5" to "P1-P4" position and train began to move.	0.122Mph	P1-P4
14:45:43	Train came to a complete stop after traveling additional 1,004 feet. By the 2 <sup>nd</sup> roadway at Yard Lead Track#2.	0Mph	B4
14:45:44	Road Horn is activated.	0Mph	B4
14:45:47	Master Controller is moved from "B4" to "P1-P4" position and train continued towards mainline on Yard Lead Track#2.	0.244Mph	P1-P4
14:52:43	Road Horn is activated. 63.4feet from signal at N98B-16.	10.7Mph	B1-B3
14:52:44	Master Controller is placed on B5 braking mode. 38.2feet from N98B-16 signal.	10.7Mph	B5
14:52:48	Train Overrun Red Signal N98B-16. at speed 4.8Mph. Master Controller in "B5" braking position. In manual mode.	4.8Mph	B5
14:52:51	Train came to a complete stop after Overrun N98B-16 signal by 4feet.	0Mph	B5

## 7196 ER GRAPH

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The 7196 ROCS report shows Train ID 649 moving from N99-TK8 to Mainline during the incident.



Car	7196
From	09/07/2025 02:00 PM
To	09/07/2025 03:52 PM

Activity

Local Time	Train ID	Consist	From Trk	To Trk	Operator	Remarks
9/7/2025 2:59 PM	649	7196-7197.7285-7284.7395-7394	N99 08	ML	DOCKERY	Dispatched to N12
9/7/2025 2:43 PM	649	7196-7197.7285-7284.7395-7394	N99 08		DOCKERY	Assigned
9/7/2025 2:39 PM	649	7196-7197.7285-7284.7395-7394	N99 08		Unknown	Assigned

**Infrastructure**

Communications and Signaling

*Adopted from the Signal Engineering Investigation Report:*

“Train was traveling from N99 Yard to Mainline utilizing N98B interlocking. N99 Yard & Yard Leads do not have Train to Wayside Communication System (TWC). For the purposes of this summary, the Train ID 649 and the lead car of 7196 were reported as the incident train identifiers. At 14:01:28, N98B Signal 16 state changed to stop (Red) condition, and it was neither selected for routing nor commanded to be cleared (LUNAR) during the incident time.

At 14:49:09, N98B Signal 8, which is in automatic state, is clear (Lunar) for a Mainline Train traveling towards N11 making Normal Call on Switch 3. At 14:52:21, Track Circuit YL2-12T is occupied, indicating the incident train is occupied. Track Circuit YL2-12T is in approach to Signal N98B-16.

At 14:53:13, Incident Train occupied track circuit 3T, indicating it had overrun N98B-16 Signal, which was in the Stop (Red) state from 14:01:28.”

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## Interview and Written Statement Findings

*As part of the investigation launched into the event, Safety interviewed one person. The interview identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below are based on reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources in the report.*

- The RVO stated that they were exiting Dulles Yard on the first trip of their workday.
- The RVO stated that the master controller was in B3 braking mode, as the train was moving downhill. The RVO stated that after they noticed the master controller in B3, they moved to B5 braking mode, and the train stopped two (2) feet past the signal.

## Weather

On September 7, 2025, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 75°F, with clear skies, winds 11.2 mph, and 3% humidity. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Sterling, VA

## Related Rules and Procedures

Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)

3.3 Signals Requiring a Stop Rail vehicles shall not be operated past or closer than a point 10 feet in approach of an interlocking signal or lamp displaying a red aspect, a red flag, or a dark interlocking signal, except at a bump post or entering a pocket track, or unless authorized by the Rail Traffic Controller or the Interlocking Operator and the move is consistent with customer safety.

### 3.4 Improperly Lined Switches

3.4.1 Rail vehicles shall not be operated through improperly aligned track switches.

3.4.2 If a rail vehicle runs through an improperly aligned track switch, the Rail Vehicle Operator shall stop the vehicle immediately, and report the occurrence to the Rail Traffic Controller or the Interlocking Operator. All parties shall treat the situation as if the vehicle has derailed, and the vehicle shall not be moved. Subsequent movement of the affected rail vehicle shall not be undertaken until investigated and determined to be safe by authorized personnel.

3.4.3 Rail Vehicle Operators who inadvertently accept a route for other than the intended destination, they shall immediately stop and contact the Rail Traffic Controller for instructions. Any subsequent turn back move shall be accomplished in compliance with rule outlined in this rulebook, and only after receiving authorization from the Rail Traffic Controller.

## Human Factors

### Evidence of Fatigue

Conditions were evaluated at the time of the incident to distinguish whether evidence of fatigue was present. Video of the incident was reviewed for behaviors suggesting fatigue. No indications of fatigue were evident from the video. The Rail Vehicle Operator reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The Rail Vehicle Operator reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

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Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

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## Fatigue Risk

The incident data was evaluated for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were not present. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Rail Vehicle Operator was awake for 11 hours at the time of the incident. The Rail Vehicle Operator reported 7.5 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 11 hours, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. The Rail Vehicle Operator reported no issues with sleep.

## **Post-Incident Toxicology Testing**

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the RVO complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

## **Findings**

- The train was operating in manual mode.
- The RVO was instructed by the IO to contact the Radio RTC at signal N98-B16 red.
- The train was in a B3 braking prior to passing the red signal.
- The train stopped four feet past signal N98-B16.
- The train stopped before reaching the switch point.

## **Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence**

- ATC and ERT personnel were dispatched to inspect the track and switch points.
- A ROS was dispatched to move the train into Dulles Yard.
- The RVO was removed from service for post-incident testing.

## **Probable Cause Statement**

The probable cause of the Red Signal Overrun event at Dulles Yard on September 7, 2025, was due to the lack of situational awareness and failure to maintain control of the train by the RVO. Specifically, the RVO did not apply the most restrictive braking mode, resulting in the train passing the red signal.

## **Recommended Corrective Actions**

<b>Corrective Action Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Responsible Party</b>	<b>Estimated Completion Date</b>
130056_SAFECAPS RTRA_001	RVO to complete re-instruction training.	RTRA	Completed

## **Appendices**

### **Appendix A – Interview Summary**

*The narrative below summarizes the incident and presents the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.*

Department

*RTRA*

Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO)

The Rail Vehicle Operator is a WMATA employee with one year of service and one year of experience as a Rail Vehicle Operator. The Rail Vehicle Operator holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in September 2026.

During the formal interview, the RVO reported that they were exiting Dulles Yard on the first trip of their shift with an absolute block to signal N98-B16 and to contact central control. While approaching signal N98- B-16, they thought that the master controller was in a B4 braking mode, but it was in a B3 Braking mode.

The RVO stated that they looked down at the master controller when they realized the train was quickly approaching the red signal, and the master controller was in a B3 braking mode, moving on a decline. They moved the master controller to B5 braking mode, but it was too late, and the train had stopped approximately two (2) feet past the signal.

The RVO stated that they contacted the MICC) and reported that they overran the signal. The RVO stated that they misjudged their braking while approaching the red signal overrun.

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Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025 Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025
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# Appendix B - Maximo Work Orders



## Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Work Order #: 19800583  
Type: CM

# \*19800583\*

Status: INPRG  
09/07/2025 17:39

Work Description: N98 Red Signal #16 over run  
Job Plan Description:

Work Information		
<b>Asset:</b> ATCSN98B ATCS, N98B, TRAIN CONTROL ROOM, INTERLOCKING, VE	<b>Owning Office:</b> ATCS-TSSM	<b>Parent:</b>
<b>Asset Tag:</b> ATCSN98B	<b>Maintenance Office:</b> ATCS-TSSM-NRFO	<b>Create Date:</b> 09/07/2025 15:06
<b>Asset S/N:</b> TCRN98B	<b>Labor Group:</b> ATCSD5N99	<b>Actual Start:</b> 09/07/2025 17:39
<b>Location:</b> N98 N98, DULLES YARD LEADS AERIAL GUIDEWAY	<b>Crew:</b>	<b>Actual Comp:</b>
<b>Work Location:</b>	<b>Lead:</b>	<b>Item:</b> ATCSV0984
<b>Failure Class:</b>	<b>GL Account:</b> WMATA-02-33530-50499270-042-*****_OPR**	<b>Target Start:</b>
<b>Problem Code:</b>	<b>Supervisor:</b>	<b>Target Comp:</b>
<b>Requested By:</b> [REDACTED]	<b>Requestor Phone:</b>	<b>Scheduled Start:</b>
<b>Chain Mark Start:</b>	<b>Chain Mark End:</b>	
<b>Create-Mileage:</b> 0.0	<b>Complete-Mileage:</b> 0.0	

Task ID	Task Description
10	Inspect signal 16 and Switch 3

Component:	Work Accompl:	Reason:	Status:	Position:	Warranty?:
			INPRG		N

Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	09/07/2025	09/07/2025	15:30	17:30	N	02:00	00:00	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	09/07/2025	09/07/2025	15:30	17:30	N	02:00	00:00	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	09/07/2025	09/07/2025	15:30	17:30	N	02:00	00:00	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	09/07/2025	09/07/2025	15:30	17:30	N	02:00	00:00	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	09/07/2025	09/07/2025	15:30	17:30	N	02:00	00:00	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	09/07/2025	09/07/2025	15:30	17:30	N	02:00	00:00	[REDACTED]
<b>Total Actual Hour/Labor:</b>							12:00	00:00	[REDACTED]

Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship
8951059	N98 Red Signal #16 over run	SR	RESOLVED	ORIGINATOR

WT\_plust\_woprint.rpdesign

09/8/2025 09:55

Document 1 – ATCM, Maximo Work Order, 19800583

Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Maintenance and Material Management System  
Work Order Details

Work Order #: 19800584  
Type: CM

**\*19800584\***

Status: FINISHED  
09/07/2025 21:40

Work Description: N98 Red Signal over ran #16 ERT [REDACTED] dispatched  
Job Plan Description:

Work Information			
Asset: TN98	YARD LEADS EQUIPMENT PARENT 0+00-51+69	Owning Office: TRST	Parent:
Asset Tag:		Maintenance Office: TRST-TRAK	Create Date: 09/07/2025 15:07
Asset S/N:		Labor Group: TRST-TRAK-ERT	Actual Start: 09/07/2025 21:35
Location: N	ORIM N LINE TO DULLES	Crew:	Actual Comp:
Work Location:		Lead: [REDACTED]	Item:
Failure Class: TRST013	RAIL	GL Account: WMATA-02-33620-50499360-042-*****-OPR**	
Problem Code: 2897	RUNNING RAIL	Supervisor:	Target Start:
Requested By: [REDACTED]		Requestor Phone: [REDACTED]	Target Comp:
Chain Mark Start: 1582		Chain Mark End: 1582	Scheduled Start:
Create-Mileage: 0.0		Complete-Mileage: 0.0	

**Task IDs**

Task ID	Description
10	N98 Red Signal over ran #16 [REDACTED]

Component: 200 TRACK      Work Accompl: INSPECTED      Reason: NO TROUBLE FOUND      Status: FINISHED      Position: 273      Warranty?: N

**Actual Labor**

Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	09/07/2025	09/07/2025	16:15	17:00	N	[REDACTED]	00:00	[REDACTED]
<b>Total Actual Hour/Labor:</b>							00:45	00:00	[REDACTED]

**Related Incidents**

Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship
8951059	N98 Red Signal #16 over run	SR	RESOLVED	RELATED

**Failure Reporting**

Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark Date

Remarks:

Incident Date: 09/07/2025    Time: 14:52 hours  
Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

# Appendix C - Signal Engineering Investigation Report

## SIGNAL ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION REPORT

REQUEST NUMBER: E251591 - 20250907  
(Red signal overrun at N98-16 signal)

REQUESTER: [REDACTED]  
DATE: 2025 Sept 22  
BY: [REDACTED]  
COSI – SIGNAL ENGINEERING

Original  
09/22/2025

INFR-COSI-ATC-IR-25-0022-N98B-0.0-092225  
Page 1 of 4  
INFR-COSI-ATCE-IR-25-0022-N98B\_0.0\_092225

*Document 3 – Signaling Engineering Report – Page 1 of 5*

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Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025 Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025
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Incident Title: N98B-16 Red Signal Overrun  
Incident Date/Time: 2025 Sept 07 – (1415-1500)  
Incident Location: N98B Yard Junction West

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**

Train was travelling from N99 Yard to Mainline utilizing N98B interlocking. N99 Yard & Yard Leads does not have Train to wayside Communication System (TWC). For the purposes of this summary, the Train ID of 649 and lead car of 7196 were reported as the incident train identifiers.

At 14:01:28, N98B Signal 16 state changed to stop (Red) condition and was not selected for routing or commanded to be clear (LUNAR) during the incident time.

At 14:49:09, N98B Signal 8 which is in automatic State is clear (Lunar) for a Mainline Train travelling towards N11 making Normal Call on Switch 3.

At 14:52:21 Track Circuit YL2-12T Showing occupied indicating incident train occupied Track Circuit YL2-12T in approach to Signal N98B-16.

At 14:53:13 Incident Train occupied track circuit 3T indicating it has overrun N98B-16 Signal which was in Stop (Red) state from 14:01:28.

**Attachments: -**

- N98B-G-19 Double line Track Plan BOP Page



<b>COSI-SIGNAL ENGINEERING</b>	<b>Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority</b>		<b>Detailed Incident Analysis</b>					
			Report Num:	E251591 - 20250907				
			Requestor:	[REDACTED]				
			Date:	09/22/2025				
			From:	[REDACTED]				
		To:	[REDACTED]					
Reported Data:		Time:	00.20.00 to 03.50.00	Train ID	612			
Description:			Interlocking Control: :[Central/Remote]					
Requested Analysis: Investigate Incident								
INITIAL STATE AS OF: [14:00:00]								
Name	STATE	AUTO	NAME	STATE	AUTO	NAME	STATE	AUTO
N98B-8	STOP	Y			-			-
N98B-16	STOP	N			-			-
Switch 3 Position	Normal	-			-			-
<b>RECORDED EVENT DATA</b>								
TIME	LOCATION	STATUS/ CONTROL	AIMS DESCRIPTION			COMMENTS		
14:02:28	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/9-0 Signal State B----16 Stop			N98B Signal 16 state changed to stop (Red) condition		
14:49:09	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/6-5 Switch Call B----3 Call Normal			Train ID 602 on Track 2 has a lunar on Signal 8 travelling towards N11 (Loudoun gateway). Switch 3 call normal for that route.		
14:49:09	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/8-4 Signal State B-----8 Clear					
14:49:09	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/8-7 Approach B-----8 Locked					
14:49:47	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/3-4 Track Circuit BN21526 Occupied					
14:49:54	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/6-5 Switch Call B----3 None					
14:49:54	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/8-4 Signal State B-----8 Stop			Train ID 602 cleared Interlocking N98B		
14:49:54	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/4-3 Track Circuit AN21523 Vacant					
14:49:56	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/3-7 Track Circuit B--3AAT Occupied					
14:49:57	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/2-6 Track Circuit BN21534 Occupied					
14:49:57	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/8-7 Approach B-----8 Unlocked					
14:50:02	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/3-4 Track Circuit BN21526 Vacant					

Original  
09/22/2025

INFR-COSI-ATC-IR-25-0022-N98B-0.0-092225

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Document 5 - Signaling Engineering Report – Page 3 of 5


Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

TIME	LOCATION	STATUS/CONTROL	AIMS DESCRIPTION	COMMENTS
14:52:21	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/4-1 Track Circuit BYL212T Occupied	Incident train occupied YL2-12T, track circuit before signal N98B-16
14:53:13	N98	Status	GENISYS/B/4-5 Track Circuit B----3T Occupied	Incident Train occupied track circuit 3T indicating it has overrun N98B-16 which was in STOP state

Circuit Power Failure: Yes  No       Processor Failure: Yes  No       Power Transfer: Yes  No

DISTRIBUTION LIST
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COSI Executive Leadership</li> <li>• Signal Engineering Managers</li> <li>• SAFE Personnel</li> </ul>



Document 7 - Signaling Engineering Report – Page 5 of 5

Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
 Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
 E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

# Appendix D – RTRA Incident Accident Report

**WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle)** Page 1 of 1

**Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents**

Date: 9-7-25 Incident Time: 1457 Time Reported: 1457 Reported by: Customer  Employee   
 ROCC  Other

**Location**

Station: \_\_\_\_\_ Mezzanine #: \_\_\_\_\_ Track #/Destination: YL#2 Chain Marker/Signal Number: N98B 16

**TYPE OF INCIDENT**

Property Damage  Smoke  Fire  Customer Complaint  
 Customer Injury  Customer Illness  Employee Injury  Employee Illness  
 Criminal Activity  Elevator Entrapment  Vehicle Incident  Other (Explain in description of incident)

**WEATHER** **LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)** **LIGHTING (artificial lighting)**

Clear  Rain  Dawn/Dusk  Daylight  Lights On  Lights Off   
 Snow  Sleet/Ice  Dark  Tunnel/Underground  Lights Not Working

**STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC**

Elevator/Escalator #: \_\_\_\_\_ AFC #: \_\_\_\_\_ Room Number/Location: \_\_\_\_\_

Failure Number(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Parking Lot  Paid Area  Free Area  Garage  Station Entrance  Stairway # \_\_\_\_\_  Platform  Ancillary Room   
 Injury/Illness reported aboard Train  Other

Name of Responding Supervisor: \_\_\_\_\_ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder: \_\_\_\_\_

**TRAIN INCIDENTS**

Train ID: [REDACTED] Destination: N12 Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 7196-7225-7395 Lead Car: 7196  
 Name of Responding Supervisor: [REDACTED] Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: \_\_\_\_\_

**DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.**  
 Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

At 1442 [REDACTED] advised the tower that his train was revenue ready. After acknowledging car numbers I gave [REDACTED] his absolute block no closer than 10 feet of N98 Bravo 16 Red and to contact Ops 4. [REDACTED] responded verify his Run at N99 114 absolute block no closer than 10 feet Red of N98 Bravo 16. I acknowledged correct repeat back. I was notified of the red signal at 1458 by MICC Superintendent [REDACTED]

**Employee Completing Report**

Employee Name: (print) [REDACTED] Employee Signature: [REDACTED] Employee #: [REDACTED] Date: 9-7-25  
 Division: N99 Run #: N9X Block #: \_\_\_\_\_ Assigned Days: F/S

**To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager**

Supervisor Name: (print) [REDACTED] Supervisor Signature: [REDACTED] Employee #: [REDACTED] Date: 9/8/25  
 Action taken/needed: reviewed / filed  
 SMS Number: 20250907 # 130056 MX

59-753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Document 8 – RTRA Incident Accident Report – Page 1 of 1

Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
 Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
 E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

# Appendix E – RTRA Supervisor Report

RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT				
Date 09/07/2025	Incident Time 1457	Incident Location N98 B16	Track, Station, Mezzanine Number YARD LEAD	
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) ID 649 7196-7285-7395				
Incident Description RED SIGNAL OVERRUN				
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
			DULLES	YES
Customer Information (Detailed information must be recorded on Station Manager Incident Report)				
Name	Address			Injury?
Name	Address			Injury?
Name	Address			Injury?
Fire Department/EMS/Other External Agency Responding (Use Supplemental sheet if necessary)				
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge		Remarks
1600				

Chronological Account of Incident

AT 1457 RVO [REDACTED] NOTIFIED TGHE MICC THAT HE HAD OVERRAN N98 B16. ACCORDING TO THE RVO, HE THOUGHT HE WAS ON A B4 BRAKING MODE UNTIL HE REALIZED THE TRAIN WAS ON A B3. RVO [REDACTED] TRAIN SLID 2 FEET PAST THE SIGNAL. ALL PERSONEL WAS NOTIFIED. SAFETY OFFICER [REDACTED] INTERVIEWED RVO [REDACTED] AFTER HIS POST INCIDENT TESTING.

(Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)

Your Arrival Time:

Supervisors Name (Print)	Payroll #	Date	Supervisors Signature	Date
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	09/07/2025	[REDACTED]	09/07/2025


Document 9 – RTRA Supervisor Report, Page 1 of 1

Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

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# Appendix F - Why Tree



Incident Date: 09/07/2025 Time: 14:52 hours  
 Final Report Red Signal Overrun  
 E251549

Drafted By: SAFE 711- 10/29/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/05/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025