



## W-0430 – Red Signal Overrun at Brentwood Rail Yard – September 15, 2025

### Document Purpose

*This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting June 9, 2026.*

*WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.*

### Red Signal Overruns

There was a total of 11 red signal overruns in 2025, with two involving left-hand signals. In 2024, two of the 14 total red signal overruns involved left-hand signals. In the first five months of 2026, there have been 9 red signal overruns, none of them involved left-hand signals. Metrorail has implemented several initiatives, particularly in the last three years, focused on red signal overrun reduction. Some of the most recent actions include safety campaigns to raise awareness regarding distracted driving and operating trains without speed commands (2025), and a requirement for rail operations supervisors to conduct Rail Supervisory Daily Activity Report (RSDAR), which includes discussions with train operators related to red signal compliance (2023). Last year, a Rail Operations Personnel Notice was distributed to rail operations supervisors to increase discussions with train operators on the importance of point and call. Point and Call, is a job aide that encourages rail vehicle operators to point to their regulated speed, signal and rail alignment and verbally identify it. Training on Point and Call is currently a part of the initial train operator training. New materials are being finalized for incorporation into the train operator refresher training program. The updated curriculum will include skills drills, assessments, and scenario-based activities designed to reinforce rule compliance and safe operating practices.

The Rail Transportation Department within Metrorail increased quality control audits on zero speed commands procedures. These audits showed less than 90 percent compliance, by train operators. This prompted Metrorail to begin its safety risk management analysis for this subject area.

### Safety event summary:

On September 15, 2025, Train 801 overran red signal B99-06 in approach to Brentwood Rail Yard. Brentwood Rail Yard is located between NoMa-Gallaudet U and Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood stations, nestled between tracks 1 and 2. There were no passengers aboard Train 801, and it was operated in manual mode.



At approximately 4:00 a.m., the Control Center Assistant Operations Manager contacted Brentwood Interlocking Operator #1 to verify they had all the consists ready for passenger service. The Interlocking Operator stated that they needed two trains transported to Brentwood Rail Yard to fulfill the daily operational needs. The Control Center Assistant Operations Manager coordinated with the Greenbelt Interlocking Operator to transport a train from Greenbelt Rail Yard to Brentwood Rail Yard. At approximately 6 a.m., Brentwood Rail Yard Interlocking Operator #2 relieved Interlocking Operator #1. This interlocking Operator #2 was not informed that a transport train was en route.

Train 801 departed Greenbelt Rail Yard at approximately 5:02 a.m., en route to Brentwood Rail Yard. The Greenbelt Interlocking Operator did not notify the Brentwood Interlocking Operator that a train was en route. The train was unable to utilize the expected entrance to Brentwood Rail Yard due to a track circuit malfunction. The train was instead routed from track 2 to track 1 at Judiciary Square. Train 801 lost speed commands at 6:27 a.m. after departing NoMa-Gallaudet Station and was given permission to enter stop and proceed mode<sup>1</sup> along with a permissive block<sup>2</sup> no closer than 10 feet to B99-06 signal, which was red (stop) at the time of the incident. The control center is not permitted to set routes into a rail yard, so the operator was instructed to contact the interlocking operator at B99-06 signal. Train 801 passed the red signal at 6mph and came to a complete stop 603 feet past the signal. That signal is located on the left-hand side of the roadway, while most signals in the Metrorail system are on the right-hand side. The radio rail traffic controller was unable to establish radio communication with the train operator of Train 801 for several minutes due to the operator being on the Brentwood Yard Operations (OPS) radio channel instead of OPS1, the mainline channel. Once the operator changed back to OPS 1, they were given permission to perform a ground walkaround.

The Track and Structures Emergency Response Team, Signaling and Department of Safety personnel responded to the scene and confirmed there was no damage to the track infrastructure. At approximately 8:03 a.m., Train 801 was removed from service, and normal operations resumed. The operator of Train 801 was removed from service in accordance with Metrorail policy. The operator later stated in an investigative interview that initial operator training included the placement of B99-06 signal, but that they had forgotten and were looking for the signal on the right.

The probable cause and contributing factors of this safety event include:

- Loss/lack of situational awareness
  - There are 2 permanent signs on the outbound end of NoMa-Gallaudet U Station platform reminding operators that B99-06 signal is on the left-hand side.

Investigation W-0430 led to recommended corrective actions, which have been fully implemented as this investigation report is being presented for WMSC adoption, including:

- Metrorail provided refresher training to the train operator with a focus on the placement of B99-06 signal.

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<sup>1</sup> Stop and Proceed: A mode that allows a train to be moved in manual mode with Automatic Train Protection when no speed or door commands are being received.

<sup>2</sup> Permissive Block: A section of clear track ahead of a train in the established direction of traffic up to a specific point into which no other train, vehicle or track obstruction is permitted.



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Metrorail is in the process of implementing WMSC-required corrective action plans (CAPs) which mitigate several of the causes and contributing factors noted above, including:

- C-0183 addresses the finding that Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard (Scheduled completion date June 2027).



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety  
Office of Safety Investigations

**FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E251606**

<b>Date of Event:</b>	September 15, 2025
<b>Type of Event:</b>	O-8: Red Signal Overrun
<b>Incident Time:</b>	06:30 Hours
<b>Location:</b>	Brentwood Yard, B99-06 signal, Track 1
<b>Time and How received by Safety:</b>	06:32 Hours, Safety Information Official (SIO)
<b>Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:</b>	06:57 Hours
<b>Responding Safety Officers:</b>	Safety Investigator
<b>Rail Vehicle:</b>	Train ID 807 (L6087-86x6181-80x6052-53x6137-36T)
<b>Injuries:</b>	None
<b>Damage:</b>	None
<b>Emergency Responders:</b>	None
<b>Safety Universal Data System (SUDS) Number</b>	20250915#130296MX

**Brentwood Yard – Red Signal Overrun**

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

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## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

<b>AIMS</b>	Advanced Information Management System
<b>ARS</b>	Audio Recording System
<b>ATC</b>	Automatic Train Control
<b>CAP</b>	Corrective Action Plan
<b>CCTV</b>	Closed-Circuit Television
<b>CMNT</b>	Office of Car Maintenance
<b>CMOR</b>	Office of the Chief Fleet Officer
<b>FT</b>	Foul Time
<b>IIT</b>	Incident Investigation Team
<b>MICC</b>	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
<b>MOR</b>	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
<b>OEP</b>	Office of Emergency Preparedness
<b>PPE</b>	Personal Protective Equipment
<b>ROQT</b>	Rail Operations Quality Training
<b>RTC</b>	Rail Traffic Controller
<b>RTRA</b>	Office of Rail Transportation
<b>RVO</b>	Rail Vehicle Operator
<b>SAFE</b>	Department of Safety
<b>SOGR</b>	State of Good Repair
<b>SUDS</b>	Safety Universal Data System
<b>VMDS</b>	Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System
<b>WMATA</b>	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
<b>WMSC</b>	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations**

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**Executive Summary**

*\*Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. \**

On Monday, September 15, 2025, a Greenbelt Division Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) was transporting Train ID 801 (L6087-86x6181-80x6052-53x6137-36T) in non-revenue service from Greenbelt Yard to Brentwood Yard when a red signal overrun event occurred at signal B99-06.

At 06:08 hours, Train ID 801 entered the Red line on track 2 from the B & E Junction<sup>1</sup>, and the RVO was instructed to clear the interlocking at Judiciary Square Station and cross over from track 2 to 1 what would allow them to enter Brentwood rail yard via track 1. Upon arrival at NoMa Gallaudet Station, Train ID 801 lost speed commands, and the Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) issued a permissive block, authorizing movement no closer than 10 feet from signal B99-06 red.

The RVO exceeded the permissive block and overran signal B99-06, which was displaying a red aspect. The RVO changed their radio ops. to Brentwood Yard, which led to the initial failed attempts by Radio RTC to contact the RVO. A Rail Operations Supervisor (ROS) was instructed to respond to the incident, and single tracking<sup>2</sup> was initiated between Rhode Island Avenue Station and Union Station.

Communications and Signaling (COSI), Rail Fleet Maintenance, and Emergency Response Team (ERT) personnel were dispatched to inspect the train, track, interlocking, and switch machine. and confirmed that there were no derailment and no infrastructure damage.

At 8:05 hours, Train ID 801 was transported to the yard, and normal operations resumed.

In adherence to Rail Transportation Standard Operating Procedure 102-01-02, which outlines the protocol for removing an employee from service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) dispatched a Rail Supervisor to relieve the Rail Vehicle Operator from duty for post-incident testing.

In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Rail, Standard Operating Procedure 102.04, and Operations Administrative Policy 102.06, the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) initiated the removal of Train ID 807 from service for the Incident Investigations Team investigation procedures

There were no injuries or damages reported as a result of this event.

The probable cause of the Red Signal Overrun event at Brentwood Yard on September 15, 2025, was the lack of situational awareness. The RVO was focusing on one side of track only.

**Incident Site**

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<sup>1</sup> A point where trains can transfer from the B Line to the E Line

<sup>2</sup> A segment of a track used for both inbound and outbound traffic

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Brentwood Yard is located between NoMa – Gallaudet University Station and Rhode Island Station in Washington, DC. This yard is nestled between track 1 and track 2 on the Red Line. The incident occurred at the B99-06 signal, track 1.

### Field Sketch/Schematics




Image 1: Arrow indicates the location of the incident  
The above depiction is not to scale.

### Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

### Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Physical Site Assessment and document review.
- Formal Interviews – Safety interviewed two individuals as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Safety interviewed the following individuals:
  - Rail Vehicle Operator
  - Interlocking Operator
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
  - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)

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- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
  - Employee Training Procedures & Records
  - Employee Certification Records
  - 30-Day Work History
  - Rail Transportation – Investigation Data
  - Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data
  - Office of Car Maintenance - Rail Fleet Investigation Data
  - Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center – Investigation Data
  - Communications and Signaling – Investigation Data
  - Maximo Data
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
    - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
    - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
    - System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)
    - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
    - Oracle Report

## **Investigation**

On Monday, September 15, 2025, at 04:01 hours, the Assistant Operations Manager(AOM) contacted the BW Tower Interlocking Operator #1 contacted via the phone to make sure trains were revenue ready. This prompted the Interlocking Operator #1 to advise that they were short of two trains. The AOM advised to get back to them.

At 04:13:07 hours, the AOM informed BW Tower that Shady Grove Yard would send one train and Greenbelt Yard would provide another. BW Tower inquired about the arrival time of the Greenbelt train, but the MICC could not confirm and instructed them to confirm with the Greenbelt Shop.

According to the Audio Recording Service (ARS), at 5:02 hours, Greenbelt Tower instructed a RVO to move a train from track 3 to Brentwood Yard. After confirming the destination code “83,” the train was designated as Train ID 801. The Greenbelt Tower then advised Ops 3 Button RTC that Train 801 would be routed to the Red Line. The Interlocking Operator gave Train ID 801 a permissive block to exit Greenbelt Yard and proceed toward the mainline.

ARS revealed that as Train ID 801 entered the mainline, the RVO confirmed with the Radio RTC that they had an eight-car train in good order and was cleared to proceed toward Brentwood Yard. The Radio RTC later redirected Train ID 801 to Judiciary Square Station to reverse ends due to a downed track circuit on track 2-yard lead preventing trains to utilize that yard lead. Once on track 1 at Judiciary Square Station, Radio RTC granted them a permissive block toward Brentwood Yard.

At 06:27 hours, ARS revealed that , after departing NoMa-Gallaudet Station, the RVO reported to the Radio RTC that they lost speed commands. The Radio RTC granted the RVO a permissive block and instructed them to maintain no closer than 10 feet from signal B99-06 red and to contact BW Tower. The Incident Investigation Team Data downloads showed that train traveled 1,291 feet at 21 mph from the NoMa platform towards the signal B99-06. The train overran the

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red signal B99-06 by 603 feet before coming to a complete stop. The Train passed the switch 7A which was laying in Normal position, as well, before coming to a complete stop.

At 06:29 hours, the RVO contacted the BW Tower, but Interlocking Operator #2 was on the shift then, in the BW Tower and advised them that they transported an eight-car consist train, lead car 6087 to Brentwood Yard and were standing by the red signal B99-06. It was noticeable that the Interlocking Operator #1 never informed Interlocking Operator #2 that they requested two trains for revenue service before the shift change. The Interlocking Operator #2 informed Train ID 801 that they were not expecting a train and directed the RVO to stand by for further instructions. During this period, the advanced information management system (AIMS) recorded that Train ID 801 overran signal B99-06 and revealed that the signal was red since 06:26 hours.

At 06:35 hours, AOM after informing all the stakeholders at MICC operations and established a single tracking on track 2 between Rhode Island Avenue and NoMa Stations with Train ID 119 to be first in the single tracking area.

ROS and Signaling personnel were dispatched to inspect the interlocking and Train ID 801. No derailment occurred, and all switches and components were confirmed in good condition. SAFE Investigators arrived shortly thereafter, conducted site inspections, and verified no mechanical or systems faults on the train. Downloads of train data confirmed the vehicle operated as designed and responded to master controller inputs.

The SAFE interview with the RVO revealed that they were visually focused on the right-hand signal only while traveling to B99 yard.

At 08:02:24 hours, all the inspections were complete, and SAFE authorized the removal of Train ID 801 from service. Normal operations between Rhode Island Avenue and NoMa-Gallaudet stations were restored at 08:05:24 hours.

The Office of the Chief Fleet Officer's Incident Investigation Team (IIT) concluded that the red signal overrun was not the result of any equipment malfunction but stemmed from operational factors, including the loss of speed commands and communication lapses regarding routing and permissive block authority.

### Chronological Event Timeline

*A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:*

Time	Description
04:01:58 hours	<u>AOM</u> : Contacted the BW Tower to make sure they were revenue ready? <u>Interlocking Operator #1</u> : Advised them that they were short of two trains. [Phone BW Tower]
04:13:07 hours	<u>AOM</u> : Contacted BW Tower and notified them that Shady Grove Yard would send one train and Greenbelt Yard would provide another one. <u>BW Tower Interlocking Operator #1</u> : Asked what time the train from Greenbelt would arrive to Brentwood Yard? <u>MICC</u> : Responded they were not sure but advised BW Tower to confirm with them. [Phone BW Tower]
05:02:37 hours	<u>GB Tower</u> : Instructed the RVO to transport the train on track 3 to Brentwood Yard. [Phone GB Tower]

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Time	Description
05:40:54 hours	<u>RVO</u> : Advised GB Tower that they were located at E99-116 and requested the destination code to Brentwood Yard. <u>Interlocking Operator #1</u> : Instructed them to enter the destination code 83. [Radio GB-YD2]
05:41:29 hours	<u>GB Tower</u> : Advised the Ops 3 Button RTC that Train ID 801 was being transported to the Red line. [Phone ROCC YL/GR]
05:45:45 hours	<u>GB Tower</u> : Granted Train ID 801 a permissive block to exit the yard and instructed them to contact Greenbelt Station Terminal. [Radio GB-YD2]
05:50:27 hours	<u>Train ID 801</u> : Contacted the Greenbelt Terminal Supervisor. <u>Greenbelt Terminal Supervisor</u> : Granted a permissive block to track 1; advised to enter the mainline and contact the MICC. [Radio GB-YD1]
06:08:25 hours	<u>Train ID 801</u> : Reported 8-cars good for service, transporting to Brentwood Yard, approaching B06-34. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Advised a lunar at signal B06-34, crossing from track 3 to track 2. Permissive block to the turnback with speed commands going to Brentwood Yard. Instructed to clear signal B99-10. <u>Train ID 801</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio Ops 1]
06:12:42 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 801 to take the train to Judiciary Square Station. Advised that a revenue train was directly behind. <u>Train ID 801</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio Ops 1]
06:19:12 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised that Train ID 801 was clear. <u>Train ID 801</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio Ops 1]
06:22:55 hours	<u>Train ID 801</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that they reversed ends. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed to verify a lunar at B02-06, crossing over from track 2 to track 1. Granted a permissive block to the turnback with speed commands to continue. [Radio Ops 1]
06:27:52 hours	<u>Train ID 801</u> : Advised no speed commands leaving NoMa Station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted a permissive block no closer than 10 feet of signal B99-06 and contact BW Tower. <u>Train ID 801</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio Ops 1]
06:29:28 hours	<u>Train ID 801</u> : Contacted the BW Tower. <u>BW Tower</u> : Acknowledged. <u>Train ID 801</u> : Advised they were transporting 8 cars, lead car 6087, and standing by B99-16. <u>BW Tower Interlocking Operator #2</u> : Responded, they were not expecting Train ID 801; standby. Informed Train ID 801 they were going to Glenmont Yard. [Radio BW-YD1]
06:29:35 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the RVO. <u>Train ID 801</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]
06:29:56 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the RVO. <u>Train ID 801</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]
06:30:13 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the RVO. <u>Train ID 801</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]
06:30:15 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Contacted AOM and reported that Train ID 801 overran red signal B99-06, but they were not responding. <u>AOM</u> : Acknowledged.[Phone, Ops 1]
06:30:22 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the RVO. <u>Train ID 801</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]

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Time	Description
06:30:46 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Contacted BW Tower Interlocking Operator #2, inquired whether they had set the route for the Train ID 801 at B99-06 signal because that train was coming to Brentwood Yard. <u>BW Tower Interlocking Operator #2</u> : Responded, that train was fine. It was going to Glenmont Yard. It's just standing by the B99-06 signal. <u>Button RTC</u> : That train overran the red signal. <u>BW Tower Interlocking Operator #2</u> : Advised that they did not know about the red signal overrun. [Phone BW Tower]
06:31:02 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the RVO. <u>Train ID 801</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]
06:31:35 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the RVO. <u>Train ID 801</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]
06:32:05 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact a Rail Operations Supervisor #1. [Radio Ops 1]
06:32:16 hours	<u>Rail Operations Supervisor #1</u> : Advised located at NoMa Station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised that a red signal overrun occurred at signal B99-06. [Radio Ops 1]
06:32:38 hours	<u>AOM</u> : Advised COMMS Agent & Public Communications Coordinator(COMMS) that due to the Train ID 801 red signal overrun, the signal tracking would be established between NoMa and Rhodes Island Stations and Train ID 119 would be the first train in the single tracking area. <u>COMMS</u> : Acknowledged the message.[Phone, Ops 1]
06:31:46 hours	<u>AOM</u> : Contacted SIO to report two issues, which of one was to inform them that there was a possible red signal overrun at Brentwood Yard even though the RVO was not responding to calls. However, they received AIMS alarms that indicated that signal B99-06 was red since 06:26 hours and they initiated single tracking in the area. <u>SIO</u> : Acknowledged.[ Phone, Emergency Mgmt.]
06:32:48 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact the RVO. <u>Train ID 801</u> : No response. [Radio Ops 1]
06:32:56 hours	<u>GB Tower</u> : Informed the Button RTC that the RVO reported that BW Tower would not let them into the yard. [Phone GB Tower]
06:33:59 hours	<u>BW Tower</u> : Contacted the Button RTC and asked whether they should let Train ID 801 enter the yard. <u>Button RTC</u> : Responded, negative, and explained that they were treating the event as a derailment; therefore, the train would be holding for a while. [Phone BW Tower]
06:34:50 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Contacted BW Tower, asked them to have the RVO of Train ID 801 switch over to OPS 1 because they would have to conduct a ground walkaround of the train. <u>BW Tower</u> : Acknowledged.
06:35:10 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Announced the establishment of a single tracking from Rhode Island Avenue Station to NoMa-Gallaudet Station on track 2. All trains would be operating in Mode 2 Level 1 in the single-tracking area. [Radio Ops 1]
06:35:55 hours	<u>Train ID 801</u> : Advised they were at B99-16 Signal. [Radio Ops 1]
06:36:01 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Inquired whether they overran B99-06 Signal <u>Train ID 801</u> : Responded negatively that they did not overrun B99-06 Signal. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Inquired about whether they had a lunar on B99-06 Signal. [Radio Ops 1]

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Time	Description
06:36:13 hours	<u>Train ID 801</u> : Advised that Brentwood Tower had not given a lunar, but they were standing by at B99-06 Signal. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised Train ID 801 that they passed B99-06 Signal red. [Radio Ops 1]
06:37:47 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact a Rail Operations Supervisor #2. <u>Rail Operations Supervisor #2</u> : Acknowledged the message. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised them that the single tracking was in place between Rhode Island Ave Station and NoMA-Gallaudet Station due to a possible derailment on track 1 at Brentwood Yard.
06:38:16 hours	<u>Train ID 801</u> : Contacted the Radio RTC and advised them that they did not derail. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Re-advised them that they passed B99-06 Signal, red. <u>Train ID 801</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that the B99-06 Signal is on the left-hand side. [Radio Ops 1]
06:39:55 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Train ID 801. <u>Train ID 801</u> : Acknowledged the message. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed them to stand by and not to move the train. [Radio Ops. 1]
06:44:34 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Car Maintenance Mechanic (M-CMNT) at Fort Totten Station. <u>M-CMNT</u> : No Response. [Radio Ops 1]
06:44:44 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Car Maintenance Mechanic (M-CMNT) at Fort Totten Station. <u>M-CMNT</u> : No Response. [Radio Ops 1]
06:44:48 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Car Maintenance Mechanic (M-CMNT) at Fort Totten Station. <u>M-CMNT</u> : Acknowledged the message. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Reported the B99-06 red signal overrun, and instructed them to make their way to the train. [Radio Ops 1]
06:45:43 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Made a blanket announcement about the single tracking from NoMA-Gallaudet Station and Rhode Island Avenue Station. All trains would be in Mode 2, Level 1, in the single-tracking area. [Radio Ops 1]
06:52:17 hours	<u>SIO</u> : Contacted Washington Metrorail Safety Commission(WMSC) and notified them about the B99-06 red signal overrun. They brought to their attention also that a safety investigator was en route to the scene with 34 minutes estimated time arrival(ETA) and the Safety Director On-Call(SDOC) was notified. <u>WMSC</u> : Advised SIO to call them back once safety investigator arrived on-scene.[Phone, Emergency Mgmt.]
06:57:33Hours	<u>TRST-ERT</u> : Contacted the Radio RTC and requested permission to enter the roadway from chain marker B1 118+00 to B99-06 Signal for the post-incident interlocking inspection. [Radio Ops 1]
06:58:24 hours	<u>Signaling Technician</u> : Attempted to contact Radio RTC. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged their attempt, but decided to contact TRST-ERT first. <u>TRST-ERT</u> : Acknowledged the message. [Radio Ops 1]
06:58:41 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted Foul Time to TRST-ERT on track 1 to walk from B1-118+00 to the B99-06 Signal. <u>TRST-ERT</u> : Acknowledged the Foul Time permission. [Radio Ops 1]

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Time	Description
07:00:55 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Attempted to contact TRST-ERT.  <u>TRST-ERT</u>: Acknowledged the message.  <u>Radio RTC</u>: Inquired about their acknowledgement of the Foul Time granted at 06:58 hours.  <u>TRST-ERT</u>: Acknowledged the Foul Time. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:01:54 hours	<p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Requested Foul Time from chain markers B1 131+00 to B1 114+00.  <u>Radio RTC</u>: Repeated the message back.  <u>Signaling Technician</u>: Affirmed their request. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:03:01 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Attempted to contact Signaling Technician.  <u>Signaling Technician</u>: No Response. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:05:04 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Attempted to contact Signaling Technician.  <u>Signaling Technician</u>: No Response. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:05:30 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Attempted to contact Signaling Technician.  <u>Signaling Technician</u>: Acknowledged the message. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:07:41 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Contacted Signaling Technician and granted them Foul Time on track 1 only and advised them when they relinquished their Foul Time.  <u>Signaling Technician</u>: Acknowledged the message and advised the Radio RTC that they would be with the TRST-ERT team.  <u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged the message. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:08:50 hours	<p><u>TRST-ERT</u>: Attempted to contact the Radio RTC.  <u>Radio RTC</u>: No Response. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:11:19 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Contacted TRST-ERT and inquired about their message.  <u>TRST-ERT</u>: Relinquished their Foul Time at B99-06 Signal. All TRST-ERT personnel and equipment cleared the roadway.  <u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and stamped the Foul Time relinquished at 07:11 hours and inquired about an update on B99-06 Signal and switch.  <u>TRST-ERT</u>: All components, such as the switch point and frog, are good in the interlocking.  <u>Radio RTC</u>: Copied the message that all looks good. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:19:16 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Contacted Car Maintenance and inquired about their location.  <u>CMNT</u>: Advised that they were in Brentwood Yard. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:27:19 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Granted Foul Time to SAFE Investigator and instructed them to notify them when they relinquished their Foul Time. The third rail was still hot and energized.  <u>SAFE Investigator</u>: Acknowledged the message. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:30:42 Hours	<p><u>CMNT</u>: Contacted the Radio RTC and requested permission to enter the roadway on track 1 at Brentwood Yard.  <u>Radio RTC</u>: No Response. [Radio Ops. 1]</p>
07:30:46 hours	<p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Attempted to contact the Radio RTC.  <u>Radio RTC</u>: Put them on hold, acknowledged Car Maintenance (CMNT), and requested them to transmit their message. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:30:57 hours	<p><u>CMNT</u>: Requested permission to access the roadway on track 1 at Brentwood Yard to perform Train ID 801 inspections.  <u>Radio RTC</u>: Granted them permission on track 1 only and required them to advise when they were ready to relinquish their Foul Time. The third rail was still hot and energized.  <u>CMNT</u>: Acknowledged the message. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:31:24 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Attempted to contact Signaling Technician.</p>

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Time	Description
	<p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Requested the Radio RTC to electrically throw switch 7 in a reverse position and then back to normal position.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Inquired about all personnel standing clear for switch movement.</p> <p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Confirmed that all personnel and equipment were standing clear from switch 7 movement.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged the message. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:32:15 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Contacted Signaling Technician to confirm once again that all personnel and equipment were standing clear for switch movement.</p> <p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Confirmed that all personnel and equipment were clear from switch movement. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:32:32 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Advised Signaling Technician that switch 7 would be moving in Reverse. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:35:19 hours	<p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Attempted to contact the Radio RTC.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged their attempt and waited for their message.</p> <p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Advised the Radio RTC that they were standing clear for switch movement.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged their message and advised them that switch 7 would be moving in reverse position and then back to normal. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:38:23 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Contacted Signaling Technician and notified them that switch 7 was in the normal position.</p> <p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Concluded that switch 7 was in reverse and normal positions, then the switch was in good condition, with no damage to the switch.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged that switch 7 was in good condition and inquired about whether it was safe for train movement.</p> <p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Affirmed that it was safe for train movement. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:46:47 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Asked if they had a ROS standing by for the involved incident, Train ID 801? [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:46:56 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Attempted to contact ROS #1.</p> <p><u>ROS#1</u>: No Response. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:47:06 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Attempted to contact ROS #2.</p> <p><u>ROS#2</u>: Advised that they were located at Silver Spring Station. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:48:14 hours	<p><u>CMNT</u>: Contacted Radio RTC to relinquish their Foul Time on track 1 at Brentwood Yard.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged their Foul Time relinquished at 7:48 hours and boarded a train. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:50:57 hours	<p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Contacted Radio RTC and advised that all personnel and equipment had cleared the roadway, and they were relinquishing their Foul Time.</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and stamped their relinquishing time as 07:51 hours.</p> <p><u>Signaling Technician</u>: Acknowledged the clear time as 07:51 hours. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:53:30 hours	<p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Attempted to contact Signaling Supervisor at Brentwood Yard, track 1</p> <p><u>Signaling Supervisor</u>: No Response. [Radio Ops 1]</p>
07:55:19 hours	<p><u>SAFE Investigator</u>: Attempted to contact Radio RTC with greetings</p> <p><u>Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged the greetings. [Radio Ops 1]</p>

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Time	Description
07:55:26 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Inquired whether it was safe to move the train and whether all personnel and equipment had cleared the roadway. <u>SAFE Investigator</u> : Contacted Radio RTC and advised them they were still holding Foul Time; however, they had completed their investigations. [Radio Ops 1]
07:57:50 hours	<u>SAFE Investigator</u> : Relinquished their Foul Time and inquired about whether they had a ROS responding to Train ID 801. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message and instructed ROS # 1 to contact the SAFE Investigator. [Radio Ops 1]
07:58:11 hours	<u>ROS#1</u> : Acknowledged the message. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Stamped the Foul Time relinquished by SAFE Investigator as 07:58 hours and asked whether they were safe to board a train or going back to the yard. <u>SAFE Investigator</u> : Acknowledged their clear time and stated they were contacting the ROS # 1.  <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message and instructed them to advise when it would be safe to move the Train ID801 to the yard. [Radio Ops 1]
08:00:02 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Contacted ROS #1 and asked them to confirm if they can remove Train ID 801 from the roadway to the yard. <u>ROS#1</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops 1]
08:02:24 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Contacted the SAFE Investigator and asked if they could remove Train ID 801 from the roadway. <u>SAFE Investigator</u> : Instructed them that the preliminary investigation was completed, and the train was clear to be removed. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged that the train was clear to be removed. [Radio Ops 1]
08:03:09 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Contacted ROS#1 and asked them if they were ready to take the train out of service while they were standing at B99-16 signal. <u>ROS#1</u> : Confirmed. [Radio Ops 1]
08:03:16 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Contacted BW Tower and instructed them to set lunar at B99-06 signal. <u>BW Tower</u> : Acknowledged.
08:03:26 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the ROS#1 to contact the BW Tower Interlocking Operator. <u>ROS#1</u> : Acknowledged to switch over to Brentwood Tower. [Phone BW Tower]
08:04:52 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact ROS#1 and asked whether they were reaching out to Brentwood Tower.
08:05:24 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Made blanket announcement about normal operations between NoMA-Gallaudet Station and Rhode Island Avenue Station. No more single tracking.
08:07:13 hours	<u>BW Tower</u> : Contacted Button RTC and inquired about the status of Train ID 801. They were wondering whether that would be in service or out of service. <u>Button RTC</u> : Responded, out of service. [Phone BW Tower]

*Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.*



Image 1: Depicts B99-16 signal.

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


Image 2: Depicts signal B99-06 on the left.



Image 3: Depicts Signals Maintenance inspections of the switch machine 7A.

### Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

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


Figure 5 - Depicts Train 807 in the approach to B99-06 Signal in the Red aspect




Figure 6 – Shows Train ID 807 after it overran the red signal.

## Operations

Office of Rail Transportation – Managerial Incident Investigation Reports  
 Adopted from the RTRA Managerial Investigation Report:

### Brief Description:

“At 06:30 hours, approximately, Advance Information Management (AIM) displayed an alarm for a red signal overrun at Brentwood Yard (mainline) at B99-06. Train #801 was a non-revenue train. Red Line single tracking between NoMa-Gallaudet and Rhode Island Avenue. Signaling and Emergency Response (ERT) personnel were dispatched. RVO was removed from service, and post-incident testing was performed.”

### Key Employees Involved & Employee Statements:

Rail Vehicle Operator stated, "I was transporting a train to Brentwood Yard and was told by MICC to clear Judiciary Square and reverse ends. I was given a block to B99-06 and told to contact the

tower. I was looking at the red signal on my right side and made a mistake Brentwood signal is on the left.


### Post Incident Testing & Employee History:

The Rail Vehicle Operator was removed from service and transported for post-incident testing. RVO has been employed with WMATA since February 14, 2001. Their last certification date was on June 11, 2024. RVO has a prior violation on February 23, 2024, when they failed to follow AMF procedures/speeding Level 2 safety.

### Fleet

Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data  
*Adopted from the IIT Investigation Report:*

IIT completed the downloads and analysis of the data. Based on the data, there was no fault or mechanical defect that could have contributed to the cause of this incident. The train operated as designed and responded to the commands entered by the Master Controller.




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
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Below is the Double Line Track Map showing Signal B99-06.



**VMS Signal of Events**

VMS Time	Event Description	Master Controller	Train Speed	Train Marker
06:27:15	Train moving	P5	0 MPH	
06: 27:18	TWC 49, NoMa	P5	1 MPH	10757 Ft
06:28:45	Approaching Switch B99-6	B1	6 Mph	
06:28:48	MC moved	Coast	3MPH	
06:28:49	MC moved	B1	3 MPH	
06:28:52	MC moved	B4	1 MPH	
06:28:57	Executive Traffic Passing B99-6			11445 Ft
06:28:52	Train stopped	B4	0 MPH	



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## **INCIDENT SUMMARY:**

- Train left NoMa-Gallaudet Un Station in P5 (Train Marker 10757 Ft).
- The train traveled 1,291 Ft before stopping.
- The train stopped after overrunning the B99-6 Signal by 603 Ft.

## **Infrastructure**

Communications and Signal Engineering

[See Appendix D: Signaling Engineering Investigation Report](#)

## **Technical Training and Development**

Technical Training

[See Appendix G – Completed Re-Instruction Form](#)

## **Interview Findings and Written Statements**

*As part of the investigation launched into the event, Safety interviewed two people. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.*

### **Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO):**

- The RVO followed the Supervisor and Radio RTC instructions to move the train from Greenbelt Yard to Brentwood Yard, including a route adjustment at Judiciary Square and a permissive block instruction toward B99 -06.
- The RVO stated that while applying stop-and-proceed procedures near B99-06, the RVO became visually focused on the wrong signal.
- The RVO acknowledged that B99 Yard's left-hand signal placement (an exception to the usual right-hand placement) contributed to their misinterpretation.
- The RVO inadvertently passed the B99-06 red signal

### **Interlocking Operator (IO) #1:**

- The IO confirmed that the B99-06 Red Signal Overrun occurred after their shift, and they were not aware of the incident at the time.
- The IO contacted the MICC for an extra train due to a shortage of put-ins.
- MICC arranged trains from Shady Grove and Greenbelt Yards and instructed the IO to coordinate with Greenbelt Shop.
- The IO learned from Greenbelt Yard informed them that cars were not yet assembled into a train set; no further communication was received after that point.
- The IO was never informed that a train departed Greenbelt Yard during their shift.
- The additional train was ultimately unnecessary because the Brentwood Shop released a train, resolving the shortfall.
- The IO did not record the potential Greenbelt train in the logbook since its readiness was uncertain.
- The IO did not follow up with Greenbelt Shop or cancel the MICC request.
- The IO clarified that MICC manages train movements from NoMa-Gallaudet Station up to the B99-06 Signal, after which the IO assumes control.

## **Weather**

On September 15, 2025, at the time of the incident, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recorded the temperature as 74°F, with clear skies, winds of 7 mph, and 69% humidity. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Washington-National.

## Related Rules and Procedures

### Metrorail Operating Rulebook

#### 3.1 Passing a Stop Signal

- 3.1.1** Rail Traffic Controllers or Office of Rail Transportation Supervisors shall advise Rail Vehicle Operators when they are approaching red signals that are positioned just beyond the station platforms.
- 3.1.2** Rail Traffic Controller or Interlocking Operator shall give permission to pass a red signal after the switch have been clamped for the required move. Once this has been verified, the Rail Vehicle Operator will be given permission to pass the red signal at a speed no greater than five (5) mph
- 3.1.3** Rail vehicles shall be allowed to move on red signals with permission from the Rail Traffic Controller and in accordance with respective Operating Modes without clamping switches provided the following conditions are met:
- The signal is not associated with pocket track or turnout switch,
  - Verbal confirmation that the signal is lunar, and the switches are normal on the opposing track, and
  - Rail 1, 2, or 3 has approved the move.

## Human Factors

### Fatigue

#### *Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue*

SAFE examined signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No video of the involved person was available to ascertain whether signs of fatigue were present. RVO reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. RVO reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

#### *Fatigue Risk*

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. RVO reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The RVO worked a 2 AM-2 PM shift in the days leading up to the incident. The RVO was awake for five hours and thirty minutes at the time of the incident. The RVO reported six hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period preceding the incident was more than 36 hours long, which increases the opportunity for sufficient sleep. This was more than the RVO's usual workday sleep durations. The RVO reported no issues with sleep. The RVO worked from 2 AM to 2 PM in the days leading up to the incident.

## Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the RVO complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

## Findings

- Brentwood Yard contacted the MICC and requested two revenue trains.
- Greenbelt Yard transported a train to Brentwood Yard without contacting BW Tower.
- BW Tower did not call the MICC or Greenbelt Yard to cancel their train request.
- A Yard lead down track circuit prevented Train ID 801 from entering Brentwood Yard via track 2.
- Train ID 807 had to be routed to Judiciary Square Station to cross over from track 2 to track 1 in order to enter Brentwood Yard.
- The RVO loss speed commands and entered stop and proceed mode.
- The RVO did not remember the placement of signal B99-06 at Brentwood Yard.
- Brentwood Interlocking Operator #1 did not inform the new shift Interlocking Operator of the train requests.
- No derailment nor damage to the infrastructure was noticed as a result of this incident.

## Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- The train was removed from service
- The RVO was removed from service

## Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Red Signal Overrun event at Brentwood Yard on September 15, 2025, was the lack of situational awareness. The RVO was focusing on one side of track only.

## Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
130296_SAFECA PS_RTRA_001	The Rail Vehicle Operator will complete re-instruction on the Brentwood Yard Signal B99-06 placement.	RTRA	Completed

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## Appendices

### **Appendix A – Interview Summaries**

*The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individuals. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.*

#### Office of Rail Transportation

##### Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO)

The RVO is a Metro employee with 24 years of service and 22 years of experience as an RVO. The RVO holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in August 2026.

During the formal interview, the Revenue Vehicle Operator (RVO) provided a detailed account of events on the day of the incident.

The RVO stated that they were instructed by their supervisor at Greenbelt Yard to transport an eight-car revenue service train to Brentwood Yard. Because the trip required movement across two separate lines—E-Green Line and B-Red Line—the RVO contacted Radio RTC while approaching the BE-34 signal. Radio RTC subsequently granted permission to proceed via the B&E connector onto Track 2 of the Red Line.

Upon arrival at B99 Yard on Track 2, the RVO expected to enter the facility through the B99-46 signal. However, Radio RTC redirected them, instructing the train to continue to Judiciary Square Station and perform a reverse movement into the yard from the interlocking at Judiciary Square Station. The RVO complied and proceeded northbound until NoMa–Gallaudet Station, Track 1, where they experienced a loss of speed commands. The RVO reported this issue to Radio RTC. In response, Radio RTC instructed them to continue in permissive block until reaching the B99-06 signal, which was displaying a red aspect.

Following standard operating protocol, the RVO applied the stop-and-proceed rules and advanced the train past the B99-06 signal. However, the RVO later admitted that during this sequence, they became visually focused on the incorrect signal. The RVO explained that while they had previous operating experience on the Red Line, they recalled that B99 Yard presents an operational exception: its traffic signals are positioned on the left-hand side, rather than the conventional right-hand placement. This contributed to their misinterpretation of the active signal.

As a result, the RVO accidentally passed the B99-06 red signal. The mistake was not immediately noticed by the operator but was later confirmed by Radio RTC, which verified the red signal violation.

##### Interlocking Operator (IO)

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The Interlocking Operator is a Metro employee with 25 years of service and 05 years of experience as an IO. The RVO holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in November 2025.



During the formal interview, the Interlocking Operator (IO) stated that the B99-06 Red Signal overrun occurred after their shift, and they were unaware of the incident. On the day in question, the IO contacted the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) to request an additional train, as they were short of put-ins. MICC responded that one train would be dispatched from Shady Grove Yard and another from Greenbelt Yard. MICC further instructed the IO to coordinate directly with the Greenbelt Shop regarding the additional train.

The IO followed instructions and contacted the Greenbelt Shop. However, the shop informed them that the cars had not yet been assembled into a train set. This was the last conversation between the IO and the Greenbelt Shop. The IO stated that they were never notified of a train departing Greenbelt Yard before being relieved of duty. Ultimately, the additional train was no longer required because Brentwood Shop released a train that resolved the shortage.

The IO did not record the oncoming Greenbelt train in the logbook, noting that Greenbelt Shop was uncertain about its readiness and had indicated they would provide an update once the train was prepared. Because of this assurance, the IO did not make follow-up calls and did not cancel the original request with MICC.

Regarding traffic operations at Brentwood Yard, the IO explained that MICC controls the train movements from NoMa Station up to the B99-06 Signal, at which point control transitions to the Interlocking Operator.

# Appendix B – Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

	<b>Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority</b>	
<b>Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report</b>		<b>Incident Status: PRELIMINARY</b>
<b>GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION</b>		
Incident Type:	Red Signal Overrun (Mainline)	Delay (Minutes): N/A
Incident Date:	Monday, September 15, 2025	Vehicles Involved: ID #801 Lx6086-6180--6053-6136
Incident Time:	0630	First Reported By: MICC AIMS
Location:	B99-06	
<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION:</b>		
At 0630, approximately, Advance Information Management (AIM) displayed an alarm for a red signal overrun at Brentwood Yard (mainline) at B99-06. Train #801 was a non-revenue train. Red Line single tracking between NoMa-Gallaudet and Rhode Island Avenue. Signaling and Emergency Response (ERT) personnel were dispatched. RVO [REDACTED] was removed from service, and post-incident testing was performed.		
<b>Key Employees Involved &amp; Employee Statements:</b>		
Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED] stated "I was transporting a train to Brentwood Yard and was told by MICC to clear Judiciary Square and reverse ends. I was given a block to B99-06 and told to contact the tower. I was looking at the red signal on my right side and made a mistake Brentwood signal is on the left.		
<b>Post Incident Testing &amp; Employee History:</b>		
Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED] was removed from service and transported for post-incident testing. Rail Vehicle Operator Justin Ross has been employed with WMATA since February 14, 2001. [REDACTED] last certification date was on June 11, 2024. RVO [REDACTED] has a prior violation on February 23, 2024, when [REDACTED] failed to follow AMF procedures/speeding Level 2 safety.		
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report		Page 1 of 3

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

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# Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority



## Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

**INCIDENT PHOTOS:** ATTACH ANY SIGNIFICANT PHOTOS BASED ON THE INITIAL INCIDENT INVESTIGATION.

Report Prepared by: E [REDACTED]

9/15/2025

Report Reviewed by:

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025


Appendix C – RVO Written Statement

<b>WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle)</b> Page ___ of ___			
<b>Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents</b>			
Date: 9/15/25	Incident Time: 6:28 Am	Time Reported:	Reported by: Customer <input type="checkbox"/> Employee <input type="checkbox"/> ROCC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Location</b>			
Station Brentwood Yard	Mezzanine #	Track #/Destination	Chain Marker/Signal Number
<b>TYPE OF INCIDENT</b>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Property Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Smoke	<input type="checkbox"/> Fire	<input type="checkbox"/> Customer Complaint
<input type="checkbox"/> Customer injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Customer Illness	<input type="checkbox"/> Employee Injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Employee Illness
<input type="checkbox"/> Criminal Activity	<input type="checkbox"/> Elevator Entrapment	<input type="checkbox"/> Rail Vehicle Incident	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Explain in description of incident)
<b>WEATHER</b>		<b>LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)</b>	<b>LIGHTING (artificial lighting)</b>
Clear <input type="checkbox"/> Rain <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Dawn/Dusk <input type="checkbox"/> Daylight <input type="checkbox"/>	Lights On <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lights Off <input type="checkbox"/>	
Snow <input type="checkbox"/> Sleet/Ice <input type="checkbox"/>	Dark <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tunnel/Underground <input type="checkbox"/>	Lights Not Working <input type="checkbox"/>	
<b>STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC</b>			
Elevator/Escalator#:	AFC #:	Room Number/Location:	
Failure Number(s):			
Parking Lot <input type="checkbox"/> Paid Area <input type="checkbox"/> Free Area <input type="checkbox"/> Garage <input type="checkbox"/> Station Entrance <input type="checkbox"/> Stairway # ___ <input type="checkbox"/> Platform <input type="checkbox"/> Ancillary Room <input type="checkbox"/>			
Injury/Illness reported aboard Train <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>			
Name of Responding Supervisor:		Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder	
<b>TRAIN INCIDENTS</b>			
Train ID 801	Destination Brentwood	Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 6087 6181 6052 6137	Lead Car: 6087
Name of Responding Supervisor:		Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder	
<b>DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.</b>			
Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.			
<p>I was transporting a train to Brentwood yard and was told by MICC to clear Judiciary Square and reverse ends. I was given a block to B9906 and told to contact the tower. I was looking at the next red signal on my right side and made a mistake Brentwood signal 15 on the left.</p>			
<b>Employee Completing Report</b>			
Employee Name: (print) [Redacted]	Employee Signature: (sign) [Redacted]	Employee #: [Redacted]	Date: 9/15/25
Division: Green belt	Run #: 04	Block #:	Assigned Days: Fri/Sat
<b>To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager</b>			
Supervisor Name: (print) [Redacted]	Supervisor Signature: [Redacted]	Employee #: [Redacted]	Date: 9-15-2025
Action taken/needed: under investigation			
SMS Number: 2025 0915 130296 MX			
50.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors			

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

Appendix D – Signaling Engineering Investigation Report

	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
	<b>INVESTIGATION REPORT</b> <span style="float: right;">FORM: INFR-COSI-ATCE-TEMP-01-IR-25-0023-B99</span>

**SIGNAL ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION REPORT**

REQUEST NUMBER: IR-25-0023-B99

REQUESTER: [REDACTED]

DATE: 09/15/2025

BY: [REDACTED]

COSI – SIGNAL ENGINEERING

Revised  
Approved: 05/09/2024

INFR-COSI-ATC-TEMP-01-00 Signal Engineering Incident Analysis Template 1.0

Page 1 of 6

INFR-COSI-ATCE-TEMP-01-IR-25-0023-B99

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

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Incident Title: Red Signal Overrun Event at Brentwood Yard Signal 6

Incident Date/Time: 09-15-2025/ 06:28:51

Incident Location: B99

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**

The Brentwood Yard does not have Train to Wayside Communication (TWC) systems and does not keep track of assigned Train IDs or car identification numbers. For this summary, I will refer to the TWC reports from B03 and B35 (see Table 1) to determine the Train ID number based on the order in which each train serves the station.

Furthermore, I use AIMDATA for B35 and B99 to identify Train ID 807 and the train ID related to the B99 signal 6 that overruns a red signal.

As of 04:40:52 on Monday, September 15, 2025, traffic from B35 to B99 was normal, with Signal 6 at B99 in auto mode. Outbound trains were serving the B35/New York Avenue station without issues, and Signal 6 was functioning properly. Signal 6 was clear for the previous trains (IDs 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 113, and 117).

At 06:26:49, Signal 6 changed to stop for the next service when Train ID 117 occupied platform 7AT.

At 06:26:55, the approach for Signal 6 was unlocked, with Train IDs B1-102 and B1-108 still vacant. Train ID 807 entered the B35 platform, with Signal 6 remaining red.

At 06:27:17, Train ID 807 began traveling outbound on Track 1 to B99 at 06:27:17, but Signal 6 stayed at stop.

At 06:28:51, Train ID 807 went past Signal 6 while it was set to stop, with switch 7 in the normal position.

Revised  
Approved: 05/09/2024

INFR-COSI-ATC-TEMP-01-00 Signal Engineering Incident Analysis Template 1.0

Page 2 of 6

INFR-COSI-ATCE-TEMP-01-IR-25-0023-B99





05:48:17	B99	Status	Track circuit 7AT Occupied	
05:48:17	B99	Status	Signal 6 Stop	
05:50:07	B99	Status	Signal 6 Clear	
05:51:51	B35	Status	Train Number Input 1 105	Train ID 105 is outbound on Track 1, serving B35 stations. After serving the B35 station, the train, with signal 6 clear, safely proceeds past this signal.
05:52:08	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-108 Occupied	
05:52:11	B35	Status	Train Berthed Berthed	
05:52:50	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-110 Occupied	
05:53:03	B99	Status	Track circuit 7AT Occupied	
05:53:04	B99	Status	Signal 6 Stop	
05:58:37	B99	Status	Signal 6 Clear	
05:58:45	B35	Status	Train Number Input 1 107	Train ID 107 is outbound on Track 1, serving B35 stations. After serving the B35 station, the train, with signal 6 clear, safely proceeds past this signal.
05:58:53	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-108 Occupied	
05:58:54	B35	Status	Train Berthed Berthed	
05:59:38	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-110 Occupied	
05:59:51	B99	Status	Track circuit 7AT Occupied	
05:59:51	B99	Status	Signal 6 Stop	
06:05:03	B99	Status	Signal 6 Clear	
06:05:03	B35	Status	Train Number Input 1 109	Train ID 109 is outbound on Track 1, serving B35 stations. After serving the B35 station, the train, with signal 6 clear, safely proceeds past this signal.
06:05:19	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-108 Occupied	
06:05:23	B35	Status	Train Berthed Berthed	
06:06:27	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-110 Occupied	
06:06:42	B99	Status	Track circuit 7AT Occupied	
06:06:42	B99	Status	Signal 6 Stop	
06:10:24	B99	Status	Signal 6 Clear	
06:10:24	B35	Status	Train Number Input 1 113	Train ID 113 is outbound on Track 1, serving B35 stations. After serving the B35 station, the train, with signal 6 clear, safely proceeds past this signal.
06:10:40	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-108 Occupied	
06:10:44	B35	Status	Train Berthed Berthed	
06:11:36	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-110 Occupied	
06:11:53	B99	Status	Track circuit 7AT Occupied	
06:11:54	B99	Status	Signal 6 Stop	
06:17:34	B99	Status	Signal 6 Clear	
06:17:35	B35	Status	Train Number Input 1 115	Train ID 115 is outbound on Track 1, serving B35 stations. After serving the B35 station, the train, with signal 6 clear, safely proceeds past this signal.
06:17:52	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-108 Occupied	
06:17:57	B35	Status	Train Berthed Berthed	
06:18:36	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-110 Occupied	
06:18:49	B99	Status	Track circuit 7AT Occupied	
06:18:49	B99	Status	Signal 6 Stop	
06:25:13	B99	Status	Signal 6 Clear	
06:25:13	B99	Status	Switch Call 7 Call Normal	
06:25:15	B35	Status	Train Number Input 1 117	Train ID 117 is outbound on Track 1, serving B35 stations. After serving the B35 station, the train, with signal 6 clear, safely proceeds past this signal.
06:25:35	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-108 Occupied	
06:25:41	B35	Status	Train Berthed Berthed	
06:26:24	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-110 Occupied	
06:26:49	B99	Status	Track circuit 7AT Occupied	

Revised  
Approved: 05/09/2024

INFR-COSI-ATC-TEMP-01-00 Signal Engineering Incident Analysis Template 1.0

Page 4 of 6

INFR-COSI-ATCE-TEMP-01-IR-25-0023-B99

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025



06:26:49	B99	Status	Signal 6 Stop	
06:26:40	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-102 Vacant	Approach 6 Unlocked with signal 6 stop
06:26:50	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-108 Vacant	
06:26:55	B99	Status	Approach 6 Unlocked	
06:27:01	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-110 Vacant	Train ID 807 is traveling outbound on Track 1 to the B035 station with signal 6 Stop. The track circuit heads B1-110 and B1-7AT at B99 are Vacant.
06:27:09	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-102 Occupied	
06:27:09	B99	Status	Track circuit 7A Vacant	
06:27:11	B99	Status	Track Circuit B1-122 Occupied	
06:27:11	B35	Status	Train Number Input 1 807	
06:27:11	B35	Status	Track 1 PSS Received	
06:27:11	B35	Status	Train Destination Code Input 1 83	Destination (83): Non Rev, Brentwood Yard (46 - 44)
06:27:16	B35	Status	Train Motion Not Motion	Train ID 807 stops at B35 station. No train berthed.
06:27:16	B35	Status	Door Close Both Open	
06:27:17	B35	Status	Train Number Input 1 807	
06:27:17	B35	Status	Train Destination Code Input 1 83	
06:27:17	B35	Status	Track 1 Train Motion Motion	Train ID 807 is traveling outbound on Track 1 to B99 territory; however, signal 6 remains at Stop.
06:27:17	B35	Status	Track 1 Door Close Both Sides	
06:27:22	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-94 Vacant	
06:27:27	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-108 Occupied	
06:27:36	B35	Status	Track Circuit B1-110 Occupied	
06:28:51	B99	Status	Track circuit 7AT Occupied	Train ID 807 ran the signal 6 Stop with switch 7 in the Normal position
06:29:02	B99	Status	Track Circuit B1-116 Occupied	
06:29:36	B99	Status	Track Circuit B1-122 Occupied	
06:29:43	B99	Status	Track circuit 7A Vacant	
06:35:38	B99	Control	Signal 6 Set Auto Route Cancel Auto Ro	MICC cancel signal 6 AUTO
06:35:40	B99	Status	Signal Automatic Routing 6 Manual	
06:35:48	B99	Control	Signal 6 Set Auto Route Off	
07:32:02	B99	Status	Switch Position 7 Normal	MICC was throwing Switch7 in normal and reverse modes while the Train ID 807 was still between B1-116 and B1-122.
07:32:02	B99	Control	Switch 7 Set Reverse	
07:35:46	B99	Status	Switch Position 7 Reverse	
07:35:46	B99	Control	Switch 7 Set Normal	
07:35:53	B99	Status	Switch Position 7 Normal	
08:06:37	B99	Status	Track Circuit B1-116 Vacant	Train ID 807 has cleared the B1-116 and B1-122 areas, and MICC resume service.
08:06:41	B99	Status	Track Circuit B1-122 Vacant	
08:07:11	B99	Control	Signal 6 Set Auto Route Set Auto Route	
08:07:13	B99	Status	Signal Automatic Routing 6 Automatic	

Revised  
Approved: 05/09/2024

INFR-COSI-ATC-TEMP-01-00 Signal Engineering Incident Analysis Template 1.0

Page 5 of 6

INFR-COSI-ATCE-TEMP-01-IR-25-0023-B99

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

INVESTIGATION REPORT

FORM: INFR-COSI-ATCE-TEMP-01-IR-25-0023-B99


Circuit Power Failure: Yes  No     Processor Failure: Yes  No     Power Transfer: Yes  No

DISTRIBUTION LIST

- COSI Executive Leadership: [REDACTED]
- Signal Engineering Sr Director: [REDACTED]
- Signal Engineering Managers: [REDACTED]
- SAFE Personnel: [REDACTED]

Revised  
Approved: 05/09/2024

INFR-COSI-ATC-TEMP-01-00 Signal Engineering Incident Analysis Template 1.0

Page 6 of 6

INFR-COSI-ATCE-TEMP-01-IR-25-0023-B99

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

### B35-1 TWC and Occupancy Data

Date/Time	D1-00 Pre Occ	D1-102 Pltf Occ	D1-100 Post Occ	ID	Dest	Len	FSS	Train Auto	ATP	Doors	Ready	Berth	Motion	Door Man
Mon Sep 15 06:26:50 2025	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mon Sep 15 06:27:00 2025	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mon Sep 15 06:27:09 2025	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mon Sep 15 06:27:11 2025	0	0	1	807	83	8	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	0
Mon Sep 15 06:27:16 2025	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mon Sep 15 06:27:17 2025	0	0	1	807	83	8	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	0
Mon Sep 15 06:27:27 2025	0	0	0	807	83	8	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	0
Mon Sep 15 06:27:30 2025	1	0	0	807	83	8	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	0
Mon Sep 15 06:27:31 2025	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mon Sep 15 06:28:45 2025	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mon Sep 15 06:29:00 2025	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 1: B35 TWC for Train ID 807


B03 TWC:

Time	06:03:07	06:08:11	06:15:31	06:22:48	06:25:04	06:29:54	06:38:05
Train ID	109	113	115	117	807	119	121
Destination	13	13	13	13	83	13	13

B35 TWC:


Time	06:05:03	06:10:24	06:17:35	06:25:15	06:27:11	08:08:14	08:19:04
Train ID	109	113	115	117	807	103	121
Destination	13	13	13	13	83	13	13

Table 1: TWC-1 report for B03 and B35



Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
 Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
 E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025



REVISION		ISSUE DRAWING		REVISION		WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY		BENTWOOD SHIP EXPANSION TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEM		P80147	
NO.	DATE	BY	DESCRIPTION	NO.	DATE	BY	DESCRIPTION	SCALE	DRAWING NUMBER	SHEET 1 OF 4	
1	11/21/21	AS	AS SUBMITTED								
2	11/29/21	AG	CORRECTED AS SHOWN								
3	11/29/21	SA	UPDATES FOR TRACKS								
4	4/11/25	MT	AS IN REDLINE PART 17								

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
 Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
 E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
 Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

Appendix E – Scene Photographs




Image 5: Depicts signal B99-06 on the left-hand side

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

Sep 15, 2025 at 7:36:25 AM  
300 Morse St NE  
Washington DC 20002  
United States




Image 6: Depicts switch 7A point with no damage

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

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# Appendix F – Maximo Work Order



**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority**  
Maintenance and Material Management System  
**Work Order Details**

\*19818252\*

Page 1 of 2  
MXAZP

Status: CLOSE  
09/17/2025 11:57

Work Order #: 19818252  
Type: CM

Work Description: Red Signal Overrun at B99-06 signal.  
Job Plan Description:

---

Work Information			
Asset: R6087	6087, RAIL CAR, ALSTOM, 6000 AC, B CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:
Asset Tag: R6087		Maintenance Office: CMNT-GRBT-INSP	Create Date: 09/15/2025 09:34
Asset S/N: 6087		Labor Group: CMNT	Actual Start: 09/15/2025 09:43
Location: 1437	E99, GREENBELT YARD	Crew:	Actual Comp: 09/15/2025 17:04
Work Location: 1151	B99, BRENTWOOD YARD	Lead:	Item: A18060001
Failure Class: CMNT018	AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL (ATC)	GL Account: WMATA-02-33392-50499160-041-*****-OPR**	
Problem Code: 2437	N/A CODE (ATC SYSTEM)	Supervisor: [REDACTED]	Target Start:
Requested By:		Requestor Phone: [REDACTED]	Target Comp:
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:	Scheduled Start:
Create-Mileage: 1288158.0		Complete-Mileage: 1288158.0	

---

Task IDs	
Task ID	Description
10	SIP G004
PERFORMED TASKS DETAILED IN SIP G004. CHECKED BRAKE RATES, GOOD. MASTER CONTROLLER OPERATIONAL CHECK, GOOD. CHECKED THE WHEELS ON THE LEAD VEHICLE, NO FLATS FOUND. GOOD DAILY INSPECTION.	
Component: 000-300 RAIL CAR; 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accom: CHECKED Reason: INCIDENT//ACCIDENT Status: CLOSE Position: Warranty?: N
20	IIT DATA ANALYSIS
IIT completed the downloads and analysis of the data. Based on the data there was no fault nor mechanical defect that could have contributed to the cause of this incident. The train operated as designed and responded to the commands entered by the Master Controller.	
Component: 000-300 SUBSYSTEM; AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL (ATC); 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accom: DOWNLOADED Reason: INCIDENT//ACCIDENT Status: CLOSE Position: Warranty?: N

---

Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	09/15/2025	09/15/2025	12:00	13:00	Y	01:00	00:00	\$50.37
20	[REDACTED]	09/15/2025	09/15/2025	10:00	12:00	Y	02:00	00:00	\$152.61
<b>Total Actual Hour/Labor:</b>							03:00	00:00	\$202.97

---

Related Incidents				
Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship
8955014	Red signal overrun at B99-06 signal.	SR	CLOSED	ORIGINATOR

WT\_plust\_woprnt.rptdesign 04/4/2026 17:18

Image 7: Car Maintenance Labor Report, Maximo # 19818252 Page 1 of 2

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Maintenance and Material Management System  
Work Order Details

Work Order #: 19818252  
Type: CM

**\*19818252\***

Status: CLOSE  
09/17/2025 11:57

Work Description: Red Signal Overrun at B99-06 signal.

Job Plan Description:


Failure Reporting			
Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark Date
2477 NO DEFECT; OPERATOR ERROR	3192 TESTED / INSPECTED	[REDACTED]	09/15/2025
Remarks: CW SIP G004 RED SIGNAL OVERRUN PROCEDURE. IIT DETERMINED NO FAULT W/TRAIN. GOOD BRAKE RATE. GOOD DI			

Image 8:Car Maintenance Labor Report, Maximo # 19818252 Page 2 of 2


Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

Appendix G – Re-Instruction Training



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  
Form No. SARE-05-0177  
Rail Training Request Form  
Rev 0, 05/02/2023



### Rail Training Request Form

Use this Form for Reinstruction and Return to Duty Please Print/Type all information

Employee Name:		Employee Number:	Division:	Assigned Days:	Last Day Worked:
[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	E99	<Select>	09/15/2025
RTD Date:	Incident Date:		Incident Type:		
N/A	09/15/2025		Red Signal Overrun		
MOR Rule/Violation:		Post Incident (Y/N):	Date Cleared Medical:		
1.2, 1/ 1.6, 8/ 1.8, 8/3.1, 2/3, 3/3, 4.2/		No	N/A		
Last MICC/Train Certification Date:			RWP Expiration Date:		
06/11/2024			08/31/2026		
Requestor's (Name): Catrina Beverly					
<b>Brief Synopsis of Incident or Reason Out</b>					
RVO [REDACTED] Red Signal Overrun at B99-06 going into Brentwood Yard.					

Area Below for Rail Training Personnel Use Only

Date Reported: September 23, 2025	Number of Days Trained: 1	Location of Training: CTF
<b>Instruction Provided:</b> RVO Ross reviewed and discussed 3.1, 3.3. Signals requiring a stop, Passing a stop signal, 100% repeat back to ensure the instruction are clear and concise. RVO [REDACTED] read the red line signage safety enhancements. RTRA operations personnel notice, which has an illustration of the sign a NoMa Gallaudet track #1 which states Brentwood Yard signal B99-06 on the left.		
Trainee: Justin Ross	Signature: [REDACTED]	Date: 9/23/2025
Instructor: [REDACTED]	Signature: [REDACTED]	Date: 9/23/2025
Rail Training Manager: [REDACTED]	Signature: [REDACTED]	Date: 9/24/25
Trainee's Manager: [REDACTED]	Signature: [REDACTED]	Date: [REDACTED]

This form must be emailed to [ROQT\\_Management@wmata.com](mailto:ROQT_Management@wmata.com), immediately upon employees' notification to report to Rail Training.

\*Insert N/A to all non-applicable fields

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Image 9: Depicts Rail Vehicle Operator Re-instruction

Incident Date: September 15, 2025 Time: 06:30 hours  
Final Report – Red Signal Overrun  
E251606

Drafted By: SAFE 704 11/05/2025  
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 – 11/9/2025  
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/14/2025

# Appendix H – Why Tree Analysis

