



WMSC Inspection Report 20260630

ISSUED 7/1/2026

Inspection Details

Title: Rail Vehicle Operators Entering Stop-and-Proceed Mode Inspection

Location: Medical Center (A10), Federal Triangle (D01), Vienna (K08), Potomac Yard (C11), Huntington (C15), Mount Vernon (E01), Wiehle-Reston East (N06)

Date of Inspection: 6/30/26

Time of Inspection: June 17, 2026, through June 30, 2026 (ten hours)

Unannounced

Risk-Based (Data Review, Investigation)

Functional Area: Operations

Hazard Rating: 2C

Overview

This is a risk-based inspection based on the ongoing investigation into the March 18, 2026, Red Signal Overrun¹ event (safety event code O-8) near Huntington Station (C15). One of the preliminarily determined contributing factors to the March 18 red signal overrun was the train operator entering Stop and Proceed Mode² without permission. This is to ensure rail vehicles operators only operate the vehicle with speed commands present or via rail traffic controller permission, to mitigate the risk of collision or another unsafe condition. Therefore, this inspection focused on circumstances where a rail vehicle operator would need to request permission to enter Stop and Proceed Mode in order to test whether the radio rail traffic controller, or terminal

¹ In accordance with WMSC Program Standard (Rev. 8) Metrorail must "...report all safety events outlined in the Safety Event Notification Matrix in the timeframe and manner specified for each safety event type." Safety event code O-8 Red Signal Overrun is triggered when a rail vehicle moves past a red stop signal, flag, or indicator, without authorization, creating a high-risk safety hazard. Source: WMSC Program Standard (Rev. 8).

² Stop and Proceed (S&P) is a mode that allows the consist to be moved without speed commands. The consist must operate at a maximum speed of 15 mph without speed commands.



supervisor, established a permissive block³ that is required for Stop and Proceed.⁴ This inspection focused on seven instances of rail vehicle operators entering Stop and Proceed Mode on June 17, 2026, and June 18, 2026.

Red signal overruns are when a rail vehicle passes a red aspect (stop) signal without other permission to pass that red signal. Red signal overruns have the potential to cause serious injury or death and can also significantly damage rail infrastructure. In 2025, a total of 12 red signal overruns occurred on the Metrorail system; since January 1, 2026, a total of 11 red signal overruns occurred in the first half of 2026 (6 months).⁵ Compared to 2025, red signal overruns are occurring at a statistically higher rate in 2026 than in 2025 (~83% increase).⁶ As a result of this data analysis, the WMSC began an effort to focus on operations inspections involving rail traffic control and the rail vehicle operator to identify issues that may be affecting the increase in red signal overruns. (See inspection report [20260403B](#).)

From June 17, 2026, through June 30, 2026, a WMSC Inspector spent approximately ten hours tracing the actions of Metrorail rail vehicle operators and radio traffic of rail traffic controllers using digital tools such as radio playback (radio operations (OPS) channels 1-4, Vienna terminal OPS and Huntington terminal OPS), AIMS,⁷ and the Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS)⁸ railcar downloads.

After concluding the inspection, the WMSC Inspector conducted a debrief with the senior director of rail transportation in accordance with Program Standard Section 6.F.1.

³ Permissive Block is “A section of clear track ahead of a train in the established direction of traffic, up to a defined limit, into which no other train, vehicle, or obstruction is permitted.” Source: Metrorail Operating Rulebook, Glossary of Terms, p. 17-12.

⁴ Source: Metro Operating Rulebook section 8.2.3

⁵ Source: WMATA Data Mart - Safety Universal Data System (SUDS) Rail Data. (Accessed June 30, 2026.)

⁶ According to Metrorail Safety Universal Data System (SUDS), in 2025, the system averaged 1 red signal overrun per month. As of June 30, 2026, 11 red signal overruns have occurred in the first 6 months of 2026. This shifts the 2026 average to approximately 1.8 per month, which represents a roughly 83% increase in frequency in 2026 versus 2025.

⁷ The Advanced Information Management System (AIMs) is the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system used by Metrorail's control center to manage all rail line traffic, traction power devices and station equipment by receiving information from the field, processing it, and displaying it on workstations and large projection screens on the floor of the control center. AIMS playback function enables the review of historical information.

⁸ “The basic functional requirements for the VMDS are: Collect, store, and display (to the Train Operator) safety-critical and operational-critical fault information obtained from monitored subsystems within the car and from additional VMDS systems in the train consist. Collect and store system faults and other data useful for maintenance and troubleshooting activities.” Source: Metrorail VMDS SFD-Rev. 33.



Defects and Corrective Actions

WMSC Inspections identify safety issues that may be classified as defects, findings, or recommendations. Findings and recommendations are defined by Program Standard Section 5.E.2 and 5.E.3, respectively. Ordinarily, issues identified in a WMSC inspection report are classified as defects. Defects are specific safety issues of non-conformance/non-compliance that are identified, and that require remedial action.

This inspection did not identify any findings or recommendations and therefore does not require a WMSC Corrective Action Plan in accordance with Program Standard Section 5.E.4.

Defect Observations and Determinations

For this inspection, the WMSC Inspector relied on Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS) railcar downloads, Advanced Information Management System (AIMs) playback, and radio recordings (radio OPS channels 1–4, Vienna terminal OPS, and Huntington terminal OPS) to check compliance with Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) procedures. The relevant MOR sections:

8.2 Speed Commands

8.2.1 Operators must not move trains with zero speed commands unless authorized and protected with either:

- A permissive block (with traffic), or
- An absolute block (against traffic)

8.2.2 Loss of Speed Commands on the Platform Operators must not adjust the train forward unless authorized. Doors must remain open until:

- A) Speed commands return
- B) A proper signal aspect is displayed (lunar or flashing lunar), and
- C) Rail Traffic Controller grants permission to depart (with an absolute block if required)

8.2.3 Loss of Speed Commands – Mainline

7000 Series Trains

Operators must contact the Rail Traffic Controller and obtain block authority before entering the code on the ADU to enter Stop-and-Proceed Mode.



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Legacy Trains

Operators must contact the Rail Traffic Controller anytime speed commands are lost and the train stops

A block must be provided before moving.

The table below references all seven events of trains losing speed commands and entering stop and proceed that were inspected.

Date	Time	Train ID	Lead Car Number	Location	Received Permissive Block
6/17/2026	9:08am	147	3278	Medical Center Track 1	Yes
6/17/2026	11:34am	930	7236	Federal Triangle Track 2	Yes
6/17/2026	12:08pm	930	7236	Vienna Track 2	Yes
6/18/2026	7:32am	336	7358	Potomac Yard Track 2	Yes
6/18/2026	7:42am	336	7358	Huntington Track 2	Yes
6/18/2026	8:11am	305	7688	Mount Vernon Track 3	No
6/18/2026	11:18am	618	7044	Wiehle-Reston Track 2	Yes



Defect 1

On June 18, 2026, Train ID 305 lost speed commands at approximately 8:11am after servicing Mount Vernon Sq Station (E01) track 1. The train entered Stop and Proceed Mode as it entered the pocket track⁹ (track 3) to reverse ends. The train operator did not contact the rail traffic controller for permission to enter stop and proceed or to receive a permissive block in accordance with MOR 8.2.3:

MOR 8.2.3

Loss of Speed Commands – Mainline

7000 Series Trains

Operators must contact the Rail Traffic Controller and obtain block authority before entering the code on the ADU to enter Stop-and-Proceed Mode.

Legacy Trains

Operators must contact the Rail Traffic Controller anytime speed commands are lost and the train stops.

A block must be provided before moving.

Hazard Rating: 2C

Observation 1

On June 17, 2026, Train ID 147 lost speed commands at approximately 9:08am after servicing Grosvenor (A11) track 1. The train operator contacted the radio rail traffic controller in accordance with MOR section 8.2.3 to receive a permissive block to Medical Center (A10) track 1.

Observation 2

On June 17, 2026, Train ID 930 lost speed commands at approximately 11:34am after servicing Smithsonian (D02) track 2. The train operator contacted the radio rail traffic controller in accordance with MOR section 8.2.3 to receive a permissive block to Federal Triangle (D01) track 2.

⁹ A pocket track is “A track connected between two main tracks, typically via three switches, used to store or turn trains (also called a crotch track).” Source: MOR Glossary of Terms 17-13



Observation 3

On June 17, 2026, Train ID 930 lost speed commands at approximately 12:08pm in approach to Vienna (K08) track 2. The train operator contacted the terminal supervisor in accordance with MOR section 8.2.3 to receive a permissive block to Vienna (K08) track 2.

Observation 4

On June 18, 2026, Train ID 336 lost speed commands at approximately 7:32am in approach to Potomac Yard (C11) track 2. The train operator contacted the radio rail traffic controller in accordance with MOR section 8.2.3 to receive a permissive block to Potomac Yard (C11) track 2.

Observation 5

On June 18, 2026, Train ID 336 lost speed commands at approximately 7:42am in approach to Huntington (C15) track 2. The train operator contacted the terminal supervisor in accordance with MOR section 8.2.3 to receive a permissive block to Huntington (C15) track 2.

Observation 6

On June 18, 2026, Train ID 618 lost speed commands at approximately 11:18am in approach to Wiehle Reston East (N06) track 2. The train operator contacted the radio rail traffic controller in accordance with MOR section 8.2.3 to receive a permissive block to Wiehle-Reston East (N06) track 2.

Next Steps

Please respond **by Monday, July 6, 2026**, to acknowledge receipt and to convey responses to the WMSC regarding what, if any, actions will be or have been taken in response.