



W-0434 – Collision at West Falls Church Yard - September 18, 2025

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on August 4, 2026.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

Safety event summary:

A collision occurred on September 18, 2025, at approximately 11:19 p.m., when a train operator (Operator #1) operating a four car consist in West Falls Church Yard, attempted to get close to a two car consist that was holding at signal K99-68. The operator of the two car consist (Operator #2) was experiencing poor radio communication, so the West Falls Church Interlocking Operator instructed Operator #1 to move their train no closer than 2 feet to the two car consist to give Operator #2 their instructions. Operator #1 intended to stop their consist 2 feet from the other consist, open the bulkhead door, and step across to the stationary consist to verbally explain the next yard move to Operator #2. Operator #1 was operating with the Hostler controller¹ in the coast position at 5 miles per hour (mph), before coming to a complete stop 4 feet from the stationary consist, and then moved to a power mode again, traveling at approximately 1 mph. Operator #1 then set the Hostler controller to the highest braking mode (B4/B5) as it moved on a decline and collided with the stationary consist. Operator #1 reported the collision to the interlocking operator who then reported it to the control center and a supervisor.

The coupler pins of railcar 3054 on the 2-car stationary consist sustained damage. There were no injuries as a result of this event.

Train Operator #1, the interlocking operator, and the railcars were removed from service in accordance with Metrorail policy. WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the train operator and the interlocking operator complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy.

The probable cause and contributing factors of this safety event include:

¹ Hostler Controller: The means of operating a 7000-series consist from a B-car as opposed to the master controller in the A-car.



- Procedural noncompliance
- Operator #1 failed to conduct the safety stops required during close-proximity yard movement.
- Operator #1 did not initiate emergency braking when B4/B5 braking was ineffective.
- Poor radio operability

Investigation W-0434 led to specific recommended corrective actions, which have been fully implemented as this investigation report is being presented for WMSC adoption. These include:

- The train and interlocking operators attended refresher training after this event.
- The coupler pins of railcar 3054 were repaired.

WMSC Staff Observation:

Poor radio operability throughout the Metrorail system continues to be a critical deficiency and contributory factor in numerous safety events. The WMSC's 2025 [Special Study of WMATA Metrorail's Radio Band and Infrastructure Replacement Project](#) and our [2025 Audit of Metrorail's Communication Systems](#) are the most recent reports to cite these deficiencies and the need for systemic improvement. The WMATA Office of the Inspector General released [Evaluation of WMATA's Radio and Cellular Infrastructure Replacement Project](#) in July 2026, which was conducted in response to the WMSC's 2025 special study, that included two findings, including that the project is significantly behind schedule. At the time of this report, there were eight open WMATA corrective action plans to address WMSC findings and recommendations at various stages of implementation. The WMSC will continue to monitor WMATA's communication system and replacement project, as the operability of the system is essential for the safety of WMATA employees, passengers, and first responders.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety
Office of Safety Investigations

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E251634

Date of Event:	September 18, 2025
Type of Event:	A-3: Collision
Incident Time:	23:29 hours
Location:	West Falls Church Yard
Time and How received by Safety:	23:44 hours – Safety Information Official (SIO)
Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:	01:00 hours
Responding Safety Officers:	Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)
Rail Vehicle:	L7363/62x7657/56T and T3054/55L
Injuries:	None
Damage:	Railcar 3054: coupler pins
Emergency Responders:	None
Safety Universal Data System (SUDS I/A) Number	20250919#130443MX

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
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Page 1

West Falls Church Yard – Collision

September 18, 2025

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms-----	3
Executive Summary-----	5
Incident Site-----	5
Field Sketch/Schematics-----	6
Purpose and Scope -----	6
Investigative Methods-----	6
Investigation-----	7
Chronological Event Timeline-----	9
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)-----	11
Operations-----	13
Fleet-----	13
Infrastructure-----	15
Communications and Signaling -----	15
Technical Training and Developments.-----	15
Interview Findings and Written Statements-----	15
Weather -----	16
Related Rules and Procedures -----	16
Human Factors -----	16
Fatigue -----	16
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing-----	17
Findings -----	17
Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence -----	17
Probable Cause Statement-----	17
Recommended Corrective Actions -----	18
Appendix A – Interview Summaries -----	19
RTRA -----	19
Appendix B – RTRA Incident Reports -----	22
Appendix C – Scene Photographs-----	29
Appendix D – Maximo Report-----	32
Appendix E – Why-Tree Analysis-----	34

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 2

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CMNT	Office of Car Maintenance
CMOR	Office of the Chief Fleet Officer
ER	Event Recorder
FLO	Fire Liaison Officer
FT	Foul Time
IIT	Incident Investigation Team
IO	Interlocking Operator
I/A	Incidents/Accidents
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
MPH	Miles Per Hour
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
PMI	Preventive Maintenance Inspection
ROQT	Rail Operations Quality Training
RSSI	Received Signal Strength Indicator
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
RVO	Rail Vehicle Operator
SAFE	Department of Safety
S&I	Service and Inspection

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 3

SMNT	Office of System Maintenance
SUDS	Safety Universal Data System
TCD	Train Control Display
VMDS	Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Thursday, September 18, 2025, at 23:29 hours, Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) #1, performed a yard move with a four (4) car 7000 series consist (L7363/62x7657/56T) at the West Falls Church Yard Inner Loop towards Signal K99-68 and collided with a legacy series married pair (T3054/55L) while railcar 3054 was stopped at signal K99-68. The married pair was occupied by RVO #2, who was waiting to conduct a separate yard move. Due to intermittent poor radio communications, RVO #1 was instructed by the Interlocking Operator (IO) to move their train close to RVO #2 and relay the instructions to complete the required train move. RVO #1 operated lead car 7363 with the hostler controller in the coast position, and moved at 3 MPH, attempting to get within no closer than three (3) feet of stationary railcar 3054. When RVO #1 placed the hostler controller in the “B4” braking position, the train continued to move down a decline and collided with railcar 3054 that was stationary. There were no injuries reported as a result of this event.

In adherence to Rail Transportation Standard Operating Procedure 102-01-02, which outlines the protocol for removing an employee from service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio Rail Traffic Controller dispatched a Rail Supervisor to relieve RVO #1 and the IO from duty for post-accident testing.

In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Rail, Standard Operating Procedure 102.04, and Operations Administrative Policy 102.06, the West Falls Church Car Maintenance (CMNT) department initiated the removal of railcars 7363 and 3054 from service for the Incident Investigations Team (IIT) investigation procedures.

The probable cause of the Collision event at the West Falls Church Yard on September 18, 2025, was human error – procedural non-compliance. Specifically, the RVO #1 omission of required safety stops during a close-proximity yard movement.

In addition, RVO #1 did not initiate the emergency braking when they observed that the train was not coming to a stop in the “B4” braking mode. Contributing to the event was intermittent poor radio communication at West Falls Church Yard during the event.

Incident Site

West Falls Church Yard Inner Loop.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 5

Field Sketch/Schematics



Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Physical Site Assessment
- Formal Interviews – Safety interviewed two individuals as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Safety interviewed the following individuals:
 - Interlocking Operator (IO)
 - Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) #1
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 6

- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Employee Training Procedures & Records
 - Employee Certification Records
 - 30-Day Work History
 - Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data
 - Office of Car Maintenance - Rail Fleet Investigation Data
 - Communications and Signaling – Investigation Data
 - Maximo Data
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
 - Oracle Report

Investigation

On Thursday, September 18, 2025, at the Audio Recording System (ARS) playback indicated that at 22:42 hours, the IO of West Falls Church Rail Yard contacted RVO #1 and requested their assistance with completing needed yard moves, taking specific railcars to the West Falls Church Service & Inspection (S&I) Shop for required Preventative Maintenance Inspections (PMI). The IO asked RVO #1 if they would be able to couple a four-car train consist to a two-car train consist on track 20-West due to the curvature of the track. Because track 20-West has a curve, the train's couplers may not be horizontally aligned, which will make the process difficult. RVO #1 stated they would be able to complete the coupling but would need to straddle the signal of track 20-West. The IO instructed RVO #1 to move the six-car consist from storage track 6A to shop track 17-West, where they would uncouple from the two trailing cars and leave them at the shop for PMI. The remaining four railcars would be moved from track 17-West lead to track 20-West lead, where RVO #1 would couple to railcars 3054/55, and then move the now six-car consist back to the storage track area at a later time.

At 22:58 hours, the ARS playback indicated that RVO #1 contacted the IO by radio and stated they were operating lead car 7656, standing by at signal K99-144 showing a red aspect. The IO granted RVO #1 an absolute block from signal K99-144 to clear signal K99-68 and reverse operating ends of the train. The response from RVO #1 was inaudible due to poor radio communications.

At 23:05 hours, the ARS playback indicated RVO #1 contacted the IO by radio and stated they reversed operating ends of the train and were currently standing by at signal K99-68. The IO copied the transmission and granted them an absolute block from signal K99-68 to track 17-West. The IO instructed RVO #1 to uncouple from two railcars, and the remaining radio transmission was inaudible.

At 23:09 hours, the ARS playback indicated RVO #1 contacted the IO by radio and stated that radio communications were bad. RVO #1 stated they uncoupled from the pair of railcars being stored on track 17-West and was standing by at the signal displaying a red aspect. The IO granted

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
 Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
 E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 7

RVO #1 an absolute block with a lunar aspect at signal K99-114 to signal K99-124 displaying a red aspect where RVO #1 was instructed to hold.

At 23:12 hours, the ARS playback indicated that RVO #1 contacted the IO by phone and requested a radio check, stating they could barely hear any communications over the radio. While on their cell phone with the IO, RVO #1 called out on the hand-held radio to the IO. The IO confirmed the negative radio transmissions. Continuing their communication by cell phone, RVO #1 advised the IO that railcar 7353 was uncoupled from railcar 7453 and requested permission to move the train and separate the railcars. The IO granted RVO #1 permission to move and complete the uncoupling procedures. The IO advised RVO #1 that they instructed RVO #2 to assist them with the next coupling/uncoupling procedure and operate the trailing end of the train consist.

At 23:16 hours, the ARS playback indicated another inaudible radio transmission due to poor communications. The IO contacted RVO #2 and stated there were bad radio communications throughout West Falls Church Yard, and instructed RVO #2, using the phone, to move their train clear of signal K99-68 and close in on RVO #1 no closer than two feet while they used caution. The IO instructed them that once they cleared signal K99-68, to move the two-car train consist to track 18-West for PMI and assist RVO #1 by operating another two-car consist that they coupled to, double-ending the train.

At 23:17 hours, the ARS playback indicated that RVO #1 contacted the IO by phone and requested that the IO change their initial instructions to have RVO #2 clear signal K99-68, separate two railcars from their four-car consist, return to the storage track, and position the remaining two-car consist for coupling by RVO #1 on the straight track. RVO #1 requested that the IO relay the message to RVO #2 by phone due to the negative radio communications throughout West Falls Church Rail Yard. The IO stated they agreed with the new instructions and advised RVO #1 to explain the methods of completing the yard moves to RVO #2 once RVO #2 cleared signal K99-68 and shared their location.

At 23:18 hours, based on the CMNT IIT's department investigation, railcar 7363 keyed up on track 6, 154 feet from stationary railcar 3054, and the Hostler controller was placed into a P1-P4 power position. The Hostler controller was then moved to a coast position, and the train moved at a speed of 3 miles per hour (MPH). The train increased speed to 5 MPH, and the Hostler controller was then set to a B1-B3 braking position.

At 23:19 hours, based on the CMNT IIT department investigation, the Hostler controller was moved to a B5 braking position, and the train's speed decreased to 1.76 MPH. The train then came to a complete stop 4 feet from the stationary railcar 3054. The Hostler controller was then moved to P1-P4 power position, and the train moved at a speed of 0.24 MPH. The Hostler controller was then set to a B5 braking position with the train speed at 1.28 MPH and collided with railcar 3054.

At 23:27 hours, the ARS playback indicated the IO requested a status update from RVO #1 and RVO #2 and asked if they were ok. No response over the radio was received.

At 23:28 hours, the ARS playback indicated the IO informed RVO #2 that signal K99-68 now showed a lunar aspect and granted them an absolute block from signal K99-68 to track 18-West. No response was received over the radio.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 8

At 23:29 hours, the ARS playback indicated that RVO #1 contacted the IO by phone and stated that while operating lead car 7363, they moved toward RVO #2, holding at signal K99-68. When they applied the train brakes, the train collided with railcar 3054. RVO #1 stated they were unable to identify damage to either railcar. The IO acknowledged the message and instructed RVO #1 to stand by, and they would report the incident.

During a formal interview with the IO, they stated that the inner loop track where the collision occurred had a declining grade to the track (downward hill).

At 23:32 hours, the ARS playback indicated that the IO contacted the OPS 4 Button RTC by phone and reported the collision event.

At 23:34 hours, the ARS playback indicated that the IO contacted a Rail Operations Supervisor (ROS) by phone and reported the collision. The ROS acknowledged the message and stated they were en route to investigate and remove the operator from service.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
22:42:38 hours	<u>IO</u>: Contacted RVO #1 and asked if they would be able to couple a four-car consist to a two-car consist on yard track 20-West due to the curvature of the track. <u>RVO #1</u>: Confirmed the request of the IO and stated they would need to straddle the signal with the four-car consist. <u>IO</u>: Acknowledged and copied the message and advised them of which railcars would be secured on track 17 for a PMI, and the remaining railcars would be transported to track 20-west for coupling. <u>RVO #1</u>: Acknowledged and copied the message. [K99 Tower Phone]
22:58:34 hours	<u>RVO #1</u>: Contacted the IO, and stated they were operating lead car 7656 standing by at signal K99-144 showing a red aspect. <u>IO</u>: Acknowledged and copied the message. Informed RVO #1, they were given an absolute block from signal K99-144 to clear signal K99-68 and reverse operating ends of the train. <u>RVO #1</u>: Response was inaudible due to poor radio communications. [FC YD1 Radio]
23:02:36 hours	<u>RVO #1</u>: Inaudible message due to poor radio communications. <u>IO</u>: Inaudible message due to poor radio communications. [FC YD1 Radio]
23:05:39 hours	<u>RVO #1</u>: Informed the IO that they have reversed operating ends and were standing by at signal K99-68. <u>IO</u>: Copied the transmission and informed them that signal K99-68 was now showing a lunar (white) aspect and to move to 17-west track, where they would disconnect from two railcars, then an inaudible message due to poor radio communications. <u>RVO #1</u>: Acknowledged and copied the transmission. [FC YD1 Radio]
23:09:17 hours	<u>RVO #1</u>: Stated that radio communications are unclear. <u>IO</u>: Copied the transmission. <u>RVO #1</u>: Stated they have uncoupled from the pair of railcars being stored on 17-West track and were standing by at a signal showing a red aspect. <u>IO</u>: Informed RVO #1 that signal K99-114 showed a lunar aspect, and they

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 9

Time	Description
	are to take the remaining four-car consist to signal K99-124 and hold at the signal, which showed a red aspect. <u>RVO #1</u> : Acknowledged and copied the transmission. [FC YD1 Radio]
23:12:30 hours	<u>RVO #1</u> : Contacted the IO and requested a radio check, which came back negative. <u>IO</u> : Confirmed negative radio transmissions and stated they could not hear RVO #1 on the radio, but RVO #1 received audible radio transmissions from the IO. <u>RVO #1</u> : Requested permission to move the train after manually uncoupling railcar 7353 from 7453. <u>IO</u> : Granted RVO #1 to move their train and complete the uncoupling process. Advised RVO #1 that they have instructed RVO #2 to assist with the next coupling procedure and operate the trailing end, double-ending the railcars to move into storage. <u>RVO</u> : Acknowledged and copied the message. [K99 Tower Phone]
23:12:50 hours	<u>IO</u> : Called for a radio check from RVO #1 but did not receive a response. [FC YD1 Radio. [FC YD1 Radio]
23:16:09 hours	Inaudible message due to poor radio communications. [FC YD1 Radio]
23:16:42 hours	<u>IO</u> : Stated that radio communications were bad and instructed RVO #2 to move their train clear of signal K99-68, closing in on RVO #1 no closer than two feet, and to use caution. After clearing signal K99-68, the IO instructed them to move the two-car consist to yard track 18-West. Then assist RVO #1 in coupling their four-car consist to an additional two-car consist and returning it to storage. <u>RVO #2</u> : Acknowledged and copied the transmission. [K99 Tower Phone]
23:17:22 hours	<u>RVO #1</u> : Requested the IO to instruct RVO #2 to clear signal K99-68 after dropping two of their four railcars, and then return to the storage track to allow RVO #1 to couple their remaining two-car consist on the tangent (straight) track. <u>IO</u> : Instructed RVO #1 to tell RVO #2 of the change in plans when they arrived at their location, clear of signal K99-68. <u>RVO #1</u> : Acknowledged and copied the transmission. [K99 Tower Phone]
23:27:10 hours	<u>IO</u> : Asked if the two rail vehicle operators were ok, received no response. [FC YD1 Radio]
23:28:35 hours	<u>IO</u> : Instructed RVO #2 to verify a lunar aspect at signal K99-68 and proceed with an absolute block to yard track 18-West. Received no response. [FC YD1 Radio]
23:29:47 hours	<u>RVO #1</u> : Reported to the IO that their train slid into the legacy series railcars operated by RVO #2, and they could not verify if the railcars endured any damage. <u>IO</u> : Acknowledged the message and informed RVO #1 that they would contact the immediate supervisor to report the incident. [K99 Tower Phone]
23:32:43 hours	<u>IO</u> : Contacted the Button RTC and reported the collision event. <u>Button RTC</u> : Acknowledged and copied the transmission. [OPS 4 Phone]
23:34:25 hours	<u>IO</u> : Contacted the Rail Operations Supervisor to report the collision. <u>ROS</u> : Acknowledged and copied the transmission. [K99 Tower Phone]


Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 10

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)



Picture 1 – Picture shows RVO #1 operating lead car 7363 while closing in on stationary car 3054 using the hostler control.



Picture 2 – Yellow arrow shows the point of impact at which railcar 7363 collided with the stationary railcar 3054.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

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Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 11



Picture 3 – Depicts the location of impact following railcar 7363 colliding with railcar 3054.



Picture 4 – Depicts the points of impact at both railcar couplers.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 12



Picture 5 – Depicts a closer image of both railcar couplers.

Operations

Fleet

Office of Car Maintenance - Rail Fleet Investigation Data

The Incident Investigation Team has completed its analysis of data retrieved from railcar 7363, which was involved in a collision with railcar 3054 at West Falls Church Yard on Track 6.

Based on Event Recorder (ER) data analysis, at 23:18:26, railcar 7363 was positioned 154 feet from stationary railcar 3054 when the Hostler controller was placed at P1-P4 power position, and the train began moving toward car 3054. The train came to a complete stop 4 feet from car 3054. Shortly after, the Hostler controller was again placed in P1-P4 power position, and the train resumed movement. The Hostler controller was then moved to B5, and lead car 7363 collided with car 3054 at a speed of 1.28 MPH.

Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS) fault logs indicate no mechanical or system faults with the train that contributed to this incident. The train operated as commanded throughout the sequence of events.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 13

Sequence of events table:

TIME	SEQUENCE OF EVENTS	MC Position	Train Speed	Distance from Car 3054
23:18:26	Car 7363 keyed up on track 6 at West Falls Church Yard.	B5	0 Mph	154 ft.
23:18:27	Yard Buzzer activated	B5	0 Mph	154 ft.
23:18:33	The Master Controller placed at P1-P4 power position. Train began to move at speed of 0.36 Mph.	P1-P4	0.36 Mph	153 ft.
23:18:36	The Master Controller moved to Coast position. Train speed 3:22 Mph.	Coast	3.22 Mph	140 ft.
23:18:46	The Master Controller Placed at B1-B3 braking position. Train speed 5:05 Mph.	B1-B3	5.05 Mph	75 ft.
23:18:59	The Master Controller placed at B5 braking position. Train speed 1:76 Mph.	B5	1:76 Mph	6 ft.
23:19:02	The train came to a completed stop 4 feet from stationary car 3054.	B5	0 Mph	4 ft.
23:19:04	The Master Controller placed at P1-P4 power position. Train began to move at speed of 0.24 Mph.	P1-P4	0.24 Mph	3.75 ft.
23:19:06	The Master Controller placed at B5 braking position. Train speed 1.28 Mph.	B5	1.28 Mph	2 ft.
23:19:06	lead car 7363 collided with car 3054 at speed 1.28 Mph.	B5	1.28 Mph	0 ft.
23:47:44	Car 7363 keyed down.	B5	0 Mph	0 ft.

Figure 1 – Depicts the analysis data from the CMNT investigation.

Car 7363 ER Data:




Figure 2 – Depicts the ER data analysis.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 14

Infrastructure

Communications and Signaling

Communications and Signals Maintenance

Communications and Signals Maintenance technicians reported that a radio test within West Falls Church yard was loud and clear. The radio test at West Falls Church yard was performed with an average Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) level of 104 Decibel-Milliwatts (dBm) which represents an extremely weak or very low signal. Testing was performed at the Service and Inspection (S&I) Shop on railcar 7251, S&I Building 18E and 19E, System Maintenance (SMNT) trailers, Security Guard shack, Traction Power Station, Front Parking Lot, Fuel Pump Station, near the salt dome, and Rail Transportation Building E. The Supervisor Quality Control test was reported as passed.

Technical Training and Developments

Rail Operations Quality Training

The RVO #1 was given a review of coupling procedures. The RVO #1 was observed making yard moves within the yard. The RVO #1 coupled both legacy series and 7K railcars using the troubleshooting guide.

Interview Findings and Written Statements

As part of the investigation launched into the event, Safety interviewed two people. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

IO

- Communicated the instructions to the RVO #1 by landline phone, due to inoperable radio transmissions.
- Witnessed from the yard tower that RVO #1 keyed up the train, and then keyed it back down, at the time of the collision.
- The inner loop track where the collision occurred had a declining grade to the track (downward hill).

RVO #1

- Was instructed by the IO to use close-in procedures, no closer than two feet of the stationary train, to board RVO #2 trailing car and inform them of the change in instructions.
- Controlled the train's speed with the Hostler control switch set in the coast position, while moving towards the stationary train.
- The RVO #1 stated the train slid after moving the train controller to the braking position.
- The RVO #1 stated their vision of the stationary train was obstructed due to the curvature of the track.
- The RVO #1 stated they did not have enough time to initiate emergency braking upon identifying that the train would not stop in time.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 15

Weather

On Thursday, September 18, 2025, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 73°F, partly cloudy skies, winds of 5.6 mph, and 91% humidity. [Falls Church County, Virginia]. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: [Falls Church County, Virginia].

Related Rules and Procedures

Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) – 8.1 Rail Vehicle Operations

- 8.1.6 Rail vehicles shall not be operated so as to collide with another vehicle, bumping post, or obstruction.
- 8.1.7 Safety stops shall be made when approaching another rail vehicle, bumping post, or obstruction.
- 8.1.8 Safety stops must be made three (3) car lengths, then two (2) car lengths, then 50-feet, then 10-feet, and then proceed at a speed not to exceed three (3) mph until the final stop is made.

Human Factors

Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

IO

A Safety Investigator examined signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No video of the involved person was available to ascertain whether signs of fatigue were present. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

RVO #1

A Safety Investigator examined signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. The employee reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. Employee reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

IO

A Safety Investigator evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were present. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The employee reported some variation in the sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked a morning shift on Sundays only and an overnight shift during their regular schedule. The employee performed day and night work in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for seven and a half hours at the time of the incident. The employee reported 10 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 16 hours, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 16

was more than the employee's usual workday sleep durations. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

RVO #1

A Safety Investigator evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The employee reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked an overnight shift in the days leading up to the incident. The employee was awake for 14 ½ hours at the time of the incident. The employee reported 11 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 16 hours, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the employee's usual workday sleep durations. The employee reported no issues with sleep.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the IO complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that RVO #1 complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

Findings

- Intermittent radio disruptions throughout West Falls Church Yard.
- RVO #1 did not perform safety stops while closing in on the stationary railcar.
- RVO #1 did not engage Emergency Braking before the collision.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- RVO #1 and IO were removed from service for post-incident testing.
- Railcars 3054 and 7363 were removed from service for the Incident Investigation Team (IIT) to perform a data download.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Collision event at the West Falls Church Yard on September 18, 2025, was human error – procedural non-compliance. Specifically, the RVO #1 omission of required safety stops during a close-proximity yard movement.

In addition, RVO #1 did not initiate the emergency braking when they observed that the train was not coming to a stop in the “B4” braking mode. Contributing to the event was intermittent poor radio communication at West Falls Church Yard during the event.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 17

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
130443_SAFECA PS_RTRA_001	The RVO will attend a one-day re-instruction training with the Office of Rail Operations Quality Training (ROQT).	RTRA SRC	Completed
130443_SAFECA PS_RTRA_002	The IO will attend a one-day re-instruction training with the Office of Rail Operations Quality Training (ROQT).	RTRA SRC	Completed

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 18

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

RTRA

Interlocking Operator (IO)

The IO is a WMATA employee with 25 years of service and two years of experience as an Interlocking Operator. The IO holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in November 2025.

During the formal interview, the IO stated that they initially instructed RVO #1 to move a six-car consist train from WFC Yard storage track 6A. The six-car consist needed to be taken into the CMNT Service and Inspection (S&I) shop, where they would uncouple from two of the cars and leave on the shop track. The IO stated that the remaining four cars operated by RVO #1 were to be taken to yard track 20-West to pick up two additional railcars and return the now six-car train consist to storage track 6A. The IO stated they also instructed RVO #2 to move a two-car consist from storage track four to storage track 18 for a PMI. The IO stated that RVO#1 contacted them by phone and informed them they could hear their radio transmissions but could not make radio contact with the IO. The IO stated that initially, all involved persons used the radio on the yard OPS channel, but then communicated by phone due to distorted radio communications.

The IO stated that RVO #1 suggested a different method of completing the yard moves, instructing RVO #2 to move the train cars to yard track 20-west, and then both RVO #1 and RVO #2 would combine the needed railcars on track 18. The IO stated they agreed with the change in plans due to track 18 being a tangent (straight) track, which was deemed safer, and intermittent radio communications, which posed a communication hazard. The IO stated they identified RVO #2 from the yard tower, key the train up, and then key the train down again. The IO asked RVO #2 if they were ok. The IO stated that they received a phone call from RVO #1 at 23:29 hours, stating they attempted to close in their train car to RVO #2 to inform them of the instructions given, and the train slid, making contact with RVO #2's train. The IO stated they then contacted the MICC and their immediate supervisor to report the collision event.

The IO stated that the location of the incident was on the inner loop track of West Falls Church Rail Yard and has a grade decline. The IO stated they reported the intermittent radio communications to the COMMS department and were given a Maximo ticket number. The IO stated that when they experience intermittent radio communications, they revert to communicating with train operators by phone. The IO stated that in case of emergencies, when radio communications are down, the train operators are to key the train down, step outside of the cab, and contact the tower by phone.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 19

Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO #1)

RVO#1 is a WMATA employee with 19 years of service and 18 years of experience as a rail vehicle operator. RVO #1 holds a RWP Level 2 certification that expires in November 2025.

During the formal interview, RVO #1 stated that on the day of the incident, they were assigned to work in the West Falls Church Rail Yard. RVO #1 stated that prior to the collision occurring, they experienced intermittent radio communications with poor quality of radio transmissions. RVO #1 stated that when experiencing bad radio communications, they use their train car radio, a handheld radio, and the next option would be to utilize a phone in a place of safety. RVO #1 stated that at the time of the incident, they were not near a landline phone and used their personal cell phone to communicate.

RVO #1 stated that before the incident, they were given instructions by the IO through radio communications. At the time they received the instructions, the railcar was beyond WFC Yard 68 signal, and RVO #1 needed permission to move back and clear the signal. RVO #1 stated they attempted to contact the IO via the train console radio and handheld radio but were unable to get through to the IO due to the intermittent radio communications. RVO #1 stated that they contacted the IO by personal phone and were instructed to move the train clear of signal 68, and that an additional train consist would be brought in front of them. RVO #1 stated that after they cleared signal 68, they keyed down and, from a place of safety, contacted the IO to discuss the instructions given. RVO #1 stated that the instructions given earlier have now changed. RVO #1 stated that the IO instructed them that when RVO #2 reaches their location, to inform them of the new plan to complete the required yard moves.

RVO #1 stated that when RVO #2 moved to the 68 signal, they were about 2 railcar lengths apart from each other. RVO #1 stated they were unable to communicate with RVO #2 over the radio, and they intended to close in their railcar consist closer to RVO #2 to inform them of the change of instructions due to the intermittent radio communications. RVO #1 stated they changed the power controller to the coast setting that allows the train wheels to move freely without actual propulsion and began to move the train in the direction of RVO #2, and performed safety stops as they approached. RVO #1 stated that they planned to move within two feet of RVO #2, key down the train they were operating, and walk through their operator cab bulkhead door to board the train of RVO #2 and follow the IO's instructions. RVO #1 stated that as they approached the two-foot distance, they initiated a braking mode with the train controller, but the train continued to move forward, and the couplers of both trains collided. RVO #1 stated they performed a visual inspection of the trains and did not identify any damage to the railcars. Both operators exited their respective trains, RVO #1 informed RVO #2 of the collision, and then notified the IO. RVO #1 stated that at the time of the collision, RVO #2 and their respective train were completely stopped. RVO #1 stated they were travelling with the hostler controller set to coast, at a speed of about three miles per hour. RVO #1 stated that once they reached the two-foot distance from RVO #2, they initiated a B4 braking mode with the brake controller. RVO #1 stated that the train did not respond to the B4 braking mode as expected, with the train still moving, and then moved the brake controller to the B5 braking mode, which is the last mode before emergency braking is applied. RVO #1 stated that the declining grade of the track caused the train to slide further than expected when they applied the B5 braking, which ended in their train colliding with the train of RVO #2.

RVO #1 stated they were operating the 7 series railcar while standing, looking out of the bulkhead door of the lead car. RVO #1 stated that their vision may have been obstructed due to the curved track. RVO #1 stated the proper procedure for closing in on another train is to get no closer than

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 20

two feet to that train. RVO #1 stated they did not have enough time to initiate the emergency braking before colliding with RVO #2. RVO# 1 stated that they performed a standing and rolling brake test before the collision. RVO #1 stated that once they were unable to contact RVO #2, they should have remained at their position clear of signal 68 and allowed RVO #2 to continue with the original instructions given by the IO rather than approach their train.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 21

Appendix B – RTRA Incident Reports

WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 1 of 1			
Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents			
Date: 9-19-25	Incident Time: 11:29P	Time Reported: 11:29P	Reported by: Customer ☐ Employee ☒ ROCC ☐ Other ☐
Location			
Station: YARD	Mezzanine #	Track #/Destination	Chain Marker/Signal Number
TYPE OF INCIDENT			
☐ Property Damage	☐ Smoke	☐ Fire	☐ Customer Complaint
☐ Customer Injury	☐ Customer Illness	☐ Employee Injury	☐ Employee Illness
☐ Criminal Activity	☐ Elevator Entrapment	☒ Rail Vehicle Incident	☐ Other (Explain in description of incident)
WEATHER			
Clear ☐ Rain ☐	LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)		LIGHTING (artificial lighting)
Snow ☐ Sleet/Ice ☐	Dawn/Dusk ☐ Daylight ☐		Lights On ☐ Lights Off ☒
	Dark ☐ Tunnel/Underground ☐		Lights Not Working ☐
STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC			
Elevator/Escalator #:	AFC #:	Room Number/Location:	
Failure Number(s):			
Parking Lot ☐ Paid Area ☐ Free Area ☐ Garage ☐ Station Entrance ☐ Stairway # ☐ Platform ☐ Ancillary Room ☐			
Injury/Illness reported aboard Train ☐ Other ☐			
Name of Responding Supervisor:		Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder	
TRAIN INCIDENTS			
Train ID	Destination	Car Numbers (list all cars in consist):	Lead Car:
		7363 x 7657	3054/55
Name of Responding Supervisor:		Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder	
DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.			
Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.			
After i drop 2 cars off at 17 W Lead. Radio the tower 2 pull back to clear K99 68. Radio communication was down I gave landline and proceeded to clear K99 68 once behind K99 68 I couldn't get in contact with the tower again I gave landline and was instructed to stay back behind K99 68 until operator [redacted] came and I was to give [redacted] the changed new instructions. Also couldn't reach operator [redacted] through radio so I did safety stops to [redacted] train so I could verbally tell [redacted] the new instructions. As my train came to a stop 2 feet away it surge making contact with [redacted] train I then			
Employee Completing Report			
Employee Name (print)	Employee Signature (date)	Employee #	Date:
			Landline
Division: West Falls Church	Run # 508	Block # 0	Assigned Days: the tower.
To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager			
Supervisor Name (print)	Supervisor Signature	Employee #	Date:
			9/19/25
Action taken/needed			
SOS (P1601)			
SMS Number:			
20250919 #130443MX			
50.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors			

Figure 3 – Redacted copy of RVO #1's written statement.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 - 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 11/19/2026

Page 22

WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page ____ of ____

Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents

Date: 9/18/2025 Incident Time: 23:25 Time Reported: 23:29 Reported by: Customer ☐ Employee ☒
 ROCC ☐ Other ☐

Location

Station WEST FALLS Mezzanine # _____ Track #/Destination _____ Chain Marker/Signal Number _____
WARD

TYPE OF INCIDENT

☐ Property Damage ☐ Smoke ☐ Fire ☐ Customer Complaint
☐ Customer Injury ☐ Customer Illness ☐ Employee Injury ☐ Employee Illness
☐ Criminal Activity ☐ Elevator Entrapment ☐ Rail Vehicle Incident ☐ Other (Explain in description of incident) _____

WEATHER **LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)** **LIGHTING (artificial lighting)**

Clear ☐ Rain ☐ Dawn/Dusk ☐ Daylight ☐ Lights On ☒ Lights Off ☐
 Snow ☐ Sleet/Ice ☐ Dark ☒ Tunnel/Underground ☐ Lights Not Working ☐

STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC

Elevator/Escalator #: _____ AFC #: _____ Room Number/Location: _____

Failure Number(s): _____

Parking Lot ☐ Paid Area ☐ Free Area ☐ Garage ☐ Station Entrance ☐ Stairway # _____ Platform ☐ Ancillary Room ☐
 Injury/Illness reported aboard Train ☐ Other ☐

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder _____

TRAIN INCIDENTS

Train ID N/A Destination 18W Lead Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 3055-3054 Lead Car @ 68 signal
 Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder _____

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.

Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

Cleared 68 signal with 2 (two) car lengths from train ahead reversed ends to face 68 signal, calling in to the tower to get a hunk to go to 18 West lead. During so I would not get in contact with tower because of bad radio communication not yet keyed up. I felt a jolt and train dinged. I looked out cup window saw 7K made contact with train or appeared so. Headed back to training car to find that it was. Operator from 7K called the tower to make aware of situation. I applied hand break on lead car at 68 signal.

Employee Completing Report

Employee Name (print): _____ Employee Signature: [Signature] Employee #: _____ Date: 9/19/2025
 Division: WEST FALLS Run # 507 Block # _____ Assigned Days: 3/5

To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager

Supervisor Name (print): _____ Supervisor Signature: _____ Employee #: _____ Date: 9/19/2025
 Action taken/recommended: SUCC / Filed
 SMS Number: 20250919 # 130943mpx

50.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Figure 4 – Redacted copy of RVO #2's written statement.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
 Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
 E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 - 11/19/2025
 Approved By: SAFE 707 - 11/19/2026

WMATA/RTA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 1 of 3
Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents

Date: 9.19.25 Incident Time: 11:29P Time Reported: 11:29P Reported by: Customer ☐ Employee ☒
 ROCC ☐ Other ☐

Location

Station _____ Mezzanine # _____ Track #/Destination _____ Chain Marker/Signal Number _____

TYPE OF INCIDENT

☐ Property Damage ☐ Smoke ☐ Fire ☐ Customer Complaint
☐ Customer Injury ☐ Customer Illness ☐ Employee Injury ☐ Employee Illness
☐ Criminal Activity ☐ Elevator Entrapment ☒ Rail Vehicle Incident ☐ Other (Explain in description of incident)

WEATHER **LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)** **LIGHTING (artificial lighting)**

Clear ☒ Rain ☐ Dawn/Dusk ☐ Daylight ☐ Lights On ☐ Lights Off ☒
 Snow ☐ Sleet/Ice ☐ Dark ☐ Tunnel/Underground ☐ Lights Not Working ☐

STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC

Elevator/Escalator #: _____ AFC #: _____ Room Number/Location: _____

Failure Number(s): _____

Parking Lot ☐ Paid Area ☐ Free Area ☐ Garage ☐ Station Entrance ☐ Stairway # _____ Platform ☐ Ancillary Room ☐
 Injury/Illness reported aboard Train ☐ Other ☐

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder _____

TRAIN INCIDENTS

Train ID _____ Destination _____ Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 7363-7657 + 3054/55 Lead Car: _____

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder _____

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.
 Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

Operator [REDACTED] came away w/ 6 cars off of track 6A. [REDACTED] cleared K9968 signal and then dropped a dence onto 17WL and cleared 68 signal w/ 4 cars. About the same time Operator [REDACTED] came off of track 04 w/ a dence and briefly held at K99 124 signal red. [REDACTED] was going to clear K99 68 as well and take [REDACTED] dence down on 18WL. [REDACTED] was supposed to add [REDACTED] four cars to a dence on 20WL but [REDACTED] keyed down and asked me via landline

Employee Completing Report

Employee Name (print) _____ Employee Signature (sign) _____ Employee # _____ Date: 9.19.25
 Division: WFC Run # NBX Block # 40 Assigned Days: F/S

To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager

Supervisor Name (print) _____ Supervisor Signature _____ Employee # _____ Date: 9/19/2025

Action taken/needed SUDS / Filed

SMS Number: 20250919#130443MX

50.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Figure 5 – Redacted copy of IO's written statement.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
 Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
 E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 24

WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 2 of 3

Additional Information: Complete this page for any incident where the information is available and when additional space is needed for incident description.

Customer Involved ☐ Employee Involved ☐ Witness ☐

Last Name, First Name _____ Employee # _____

Date of Birth _____ Sex _____ Home Phone _____ Work Phone _____ Cell Phone _____

Home Address _____ Email Address _____

Nature of Injury/Illness _____

Assistance Offered: Accepted ☐ Declined ☐

If Transported:

Hospital: _____ Ambulance Number: _____ Arrival: _____ Departure: _____

Customer Involved ☐ Employee Involved ☐ Witness ☐

Last Name, First Name _____ Employee # _____

Date of Birth _____ Sex _____ Home Phone _____ Work Phone _____ Cell Phone _____

Home Address _____ Email Address _____

Nature of Injury/Illness _____

Assistance Offered: Accepted ☐ Declined ☐

If Transported:

Hospital: _____ Ambulance Number: _____ Arrival: _____ Departure: _____

Police/Fire/Other Agencies Involved

Jurisdiction/Arrival Time _____ Name _____ Badge/Unit Number _____

Jurisdiction/Arrival Time _____ Name _____ Badge/Unit Number _____

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT (continued or witness statement): Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when. Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

if [REDACTED] could stay behind 68 signal and [REDACTED] come away the device on 2/WL, clear 68 again and then they both go down separately on the storage track and make the add. At this point we had lost all radio communications so I agreed thinking that this would be the safest way. I thought they would only be moving long enough to complete the move. At 11:29pm it was reported to me that (by oper. [REDACTED] # [REDACTED] tried to

Employee Completing report

Employee Name:(print) _____ Employee Signature:(sign) _____ Employee #: _____ Date: _____

50.7538 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators, remains in book for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Figure 6 - Redacted copy of IO's written statement, page 2.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
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Approved By: SAFE 707 - 11/19/2026

WMATA/RTA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 3 of 3

Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents

Date: _____ Incident Time: _____ Time Reported: _____ Reported by: Customer ☐ Employee ☐
ROCC ☐ Other ☐

Location

Station: _____ Mezzanine #: _____ Track #/Destination: _____ Chain Marker/Signal Number: _____

TYPE OF INCIDENT

☐ Property Damage ☐ Smoke ☐ Fire ☐ Customer Complaint
☐ Customer Injury ☐ Customer Illness ☐ Employee Injury ☐ Employee Illness
☐ Criminal Activity ☐ Elevator Entrapment ☐ Rail Vehicle Incident ☐ Other (Explain in description of incident)

WEATHER **LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)** **LIGHTING (artificial lighting)**

Clear ☐ Rain ☐ Dawn/Dusk ☐ Daylight ☐ Lights On ☐ Lights Off ☐
Snow ☐ Sleet/Ice ☐ Dark ☐ Tunnel/Underground ☐ Lights Not Working ☐

STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC

Elevator/Escalator #: _____ AFC #: _____ Room Number/Location: _____

Failure Number(s): _____

Parking Lot ☐ Paid Area ☐ Free Area ☐ Garage ☐ Station Entrance ☐ Stairway # _____ Platform ☐ Ancillary Room ☐
Injury/Illness reported aboard Train ☐ Other ☐

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder: _____

TRAIN INCIDENTS

Train ID: _____ Destination: _____ Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): _____ Lead Car: _____

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: _____

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.

Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

inch [redacted] train up to Crutchfield's and was unable to stop it and it made contact. I contacted the MCCC, and the Supv. [redacted] and informed them of the incident.

Failure # 19825783

Employee Completing Report

Employee Name (print): _____ Employee Signature (sign): _____ Employee #: _____ Date: 9.19.25
Division: WFC Run # WBX Buck # Assigned Days 4/5

To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager

Supervisor Name (print): _____ Supervisor Signature: _____ Employee #: _____ Date: 9/19/2025

Action taken/needed: SKDS / Filed

SMS Number: 20250919#150443MX

50.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Figure 7 - Redacted copy of IO's written statement, page 3.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 26

 RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT				
Date 9/19/25	Incident Time 23:29	Incident Location West Falls Rail Yard	Track, Station, Mezzanine Number N/A	
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) 7362-7363-7657-7656. 3054-3055				
Incident Description Rail cars collided due to coupling in the rail yard				
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
		N/A	WFC	Yes
		N/A	WFC	Yes
Customer Information (Detailed Information must be recorded on Station Manager Incident Report)				
Name N/A	Address N/A			Injury?
Name	Address			Injury?
Name	Address			Injury?
Fire Department/EMS/Other External Agency Responding (Use Supplemental sheet if necessary)				
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks	
N/A		N/A		

Chronological Account of Incident

Per assistant superintendent [REDACTED] I, supervisor [REDACTED] transported two operators who were removed from service due to a rail yard incident
Interlocking Oper [REDACTED] & RVO [REDACTED]

I advised the operators of the proper paperwork to be filled out and conducted a post incident interview for both operators

After they finished the testing process they were instructed to see the safety officer onsite

Next I transported the operators back to wfc rail yard to finish out the last of the paperwork process

Figure 8 – Redacted copy of ROS #1 incident report.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 27

M RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT				
Date 9/19/25	Incident Time 11:29 PM	Incident Location West Falls Rail Yard	Track, Station, Mezzanine Number Yard Lead 2	
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #) 7362-7363-7657-7656 3054-3055				
Incident Description Rail Car Collision				
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
		N/A	WFC	YES
		N/A	WFC	YES
Customer Information (Detailed Information must be recorded on Station Manager Incident Report)				
Name N/A	Address			Injury?
Name	Address			Injury?
Name	Address			Injury?
Fire Department/EMS/Other External Agency Responding (Use Supplemental sheet if necessary)				
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks	
N/A				

Chronological Account of Incident

Upon arriving to work Interlocking Operator [REDACTED] informed me that a train collision just took place behind K99 68 signal.

11:35 PM - I called MICC, Car maintenance, and Assistant Superintendent [REDACTED] about the accident.

11:45 PM - I took Operator [REDACTED] Out of Service and did the Incident/Accident Questionnaire.

11:50 PM - I went out and took pictures.

12:30 AM - I talked with safety and set of Operator Interviews.

1:00 AM - I was instructed to take Interlocking Operator [REDACTED] Out of Service.

1:30 AM - I handed over all information and duties associated with the accident to Supervisor [REDACTED]

1:45 AM - I took over Tower operations.

Figure 9 – Redacted copy of ROS #2 incident report.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634


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Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 28

Appendix C – Scene Photographs



Picture 6 – Shows the collision of railcar 7363 into railcar 3054.




Picture 7 – Shows the point of impact when railcar 7363 collided with stationary car 3054.


Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 29



Picture 8 – Photo of railcar couplers that absorbed the impact of the collision.



Picture 9 – Close-up image of the area of impact.


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Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 - 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 11/19/2026

Page 30



Picture 10 – Incident scene photograph of surrounding area.



Picture 11 – Close-up photograph of points of impact.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 31

Appendix D – Maximo Report



Work Order #: 19827016
Type: LM

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

19827016

Page 1 of 2
MXAZP

Status: CLOSE
09/20/2025 21:47

Work Description: K99: Safety Request Radio Operational Test in Yard Area
Job Plan Description:

Work Information	
Asset: 60090 RADIO, CRCS, T53	Owning Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO
Asset Tag:	Maintenance Office: COMM-TSSM-RADO
Asset S/N: CRCST53	Labor Group: COMMR3RADO
Location: 7025 T53, CRCS RADIO ANTENNA SITE, RESTON INTERNATIONAL CENTER	Crew:
Work Location:	Lead: [REDACTED]
Failure Class: COMR003 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS	GL Account: WMATA-02-33540-50499280-042-*****-QPR**
Problem Code:	Supervisor:
Requested By: [REDACTED]	Requestor Phone: [REDACTED]
Create-Mileage: 0.0	Complete-Mileage: 0.0
Parent: Create Date: 09/19/2025 09:41 Actual Start: 09/20/2025 20:57 Actual Comp: 09/20/2025 20:57 Item: N60040084 Target Start: Target Comp: Scheduled Start:	
Task IDs	
Task ID	
10 RADIO TESTED IN K99 YARD AREA LOUD AND CLEAR. (see description) ...	
RADIO TESTS PERFORMED @K99 WITH AN AVERAGE RSSI LEVEL OF 104	
S & I SHOP 7251 SMNT TRAILERS	
6H BUMP POST BUILDING GAURD SHACK	
TRACSION POWER STATION FRONT PARKING	
SERVICE PUMP AREA	
K99 - 306	
S & I BUILDING 18E - 19E	
THE SALT-DOME	
BUILDING E SMALL BUMP POST	
Component:	Work Accomp: Reason: Status: CLOSE Position: Warranty?: N
20 SUPERVISOR QC INSPECTION.	
Audio Quality test conducted in K99 Yard at different locations test pass.	

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11/10/2025 10:26

Figure 10 – Depicts the Maximo Work Order associated with the radio test of West Falls Church Yard.

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 32



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Page 2 of 2
MXAZP

Work Order #: 19827016
Type: LM

19827016

Status: CLOSE
09/20/2025 21:47

Work Description: K99: Safety Request Radio Operational Test in Yard Area
Job Plan Description:

Task IDs										
Task ID										
Component:		Work Accomp: INSPECTION		Reason: INSPECTION		Status: CLOSE		Position:		Warranty?: N
Actual Labor										
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost	
10		09/20/2025	09/20/2025	16:00	19:00	Y	03:00	00:00		
20		09/20/2025	09/20/2025	16:00	19:00	Y	03:00	00:00		
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							06:00	00:00		
Failure Reporting										
Cause		Remedy		Supervisor				Remark Date		
Remarks: K99 YARD TESTED								09/20/2025		

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11/10/2025 10:26


Figure 11 - Depicts the Maximo Work Order associated with the radio test of West Falls Church Yard (continued).

Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 33

Appendix E – Why-Tree Analysis



Incident Date: 09/18/2025 Time: 23:29 hours
 Final Report – A-3: Collision Rev. 1
 E251634

Drafted By: SAFE 706 - 11/06/2025
 Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 11/19/2025
 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 11/19/2026

Page 34